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Bad Is Stronger than Good

December 2001
Review of General Psychology 5(4)

DOI:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323

Authors:

Roy Baumeister

Harvard University

Catrin Finkenauer

Utrecht University

The greater power of bad events over good ones is found in everyday events, major life events (e.g., trauma), close relationship outcomes, social network patterns, interpersonal interactions, and learning processes. Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than good. The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones. Various explanations such as diagnosticity and salience help explain some findings, but the greater power of bad events is still found when such variables are controlled. Hardly any exceptions (indicating greater power of good) can be found. Taken together, these findings suggest that bad is stronger than good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena.

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Review of General Psychology

2001.

1089-2680/O1/S5.O0 DOI: 10.1037//1089-2680.5.4.323

Bad Is Stronger Than Good

Roy F. Baumeister and Ellen Bratslavsky

Case Western Reserve UniversityCatrin Finkenauer

Free University of Amsterdam

Kathleen D. Vohs

Case Western Reserve University

The greater power of bad events over good ones is found in everyday events, major life

events (e.g., trauma), close relationship outcomes, social network patterns, interper-

sonal interactions, and learning processes. Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback

have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly

than good. The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good

ones.

Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to

disconfirmation than good ones. Various explanations such as diagnosticity and sa-

lience help explain some findings, but the greater power of bad events is still found

when such variables are controlled. Hardly any exceptions (indicating greater power of

good) can be found. Taken together, these findings suggest that bad is stronger than

good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena.

Centuries of literary efforts and religious

thought have depicted human life in terms of a

struggle between good and bad forces. At the

metaphysical level, evil gods or devils are the

opponents of the divine forces of creation and

harmony. At the individual level, temptation

and destructive instincts battle against strivings

for virtue, altruism, and fulfillment. "Good" and

"bad" are among the first words and concepts

learned by children (and even by house pets),

and most people can readily characterize almost

any experience, emotion, or outcome as good or

bad.

What form does this eternal conflict take in

psychology? The purpose of this article is to

review evidence pertaining to the general hy-

Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, and Kathleen D.

Vohs,

Department of Psychology, Case Western Reserve

University; Catrin Finkenauer, Department of Psychology,

Free University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Ellen Bratslavsky in now at the Department of Psychol-

ogy, Ohio State University.

We thank the many people who have contributed helpful

comments and references. This work is dedicated to the

memory of Warren.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-

dressed to Roy F. Baumeister or Kathleen D. Vohs, Depart-

ment of Psychology, Case Western Reserve University,

10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7123. Elec-

tronic mail may be sent to either rfb2@po.cwru.edu or

kdv3@po.cwru.edu.

pothesis that bad is stronger than good (see also

Rozin & Royzman, in press). That is, events

that are negatively valenced (e.g., losing

money, being abandoned by friends, and receiv-

ing criticism) will have a greater impact on the

individual than positively valenced events of

the same type (e.g., winning money, gaining

friends, and receiving praise). This is not to say

that bad will always triumph over good, spelling

doom and misery for the human race. Rather,

good may prevail over bad by superior force of

numbers: Many good events can overcome the

psychological effects of a single bad one. When

equal measures of good and bad are present,

however, the psychological effects of bad ones

outweigh those of the good ones. This may in

fact be a general principle or law of psycholog-

ical phenomena, possibly reflecting the innate

predispositions of the psyche or at least reflect-

ing the almost inevitable adaptation of each

individual to the exigencies of daily life.

This pattern has already been recognized in

certain research domains. This is probably most

true in the field of impression formation, in

which the positive-negative asymmetry effect

has been repeatedly confirmed (e.g., Anderson,

1965;

Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Skowronski

& Carlston, 1989). In general, and apart from a

few carefully crafted exceptions, negative infor-

mation receives more processing and contrib-

323

324BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

utes more strongly to the final impression than

does positive information. Learning something

bad about a new acquaintance carries more

weight than learning something good, by and

large.

In other spheres, the effect seems present but

not recognized. For example, nearly every psy-

chology textbook teaches that propinquity

breeds attraction. This conclusion is based on

the landmark study by Festinger, Schachter, and

Back (1950) in which the formation of friend-

ships in a married students' dormitory was

tracked over time. Contrary to elaborate hypoth-

eses about similarity, role complementarity,

values, and other factors, the strongest predictor

of who became friends was physical propin-

quity: Participants who lived closest to each

other were most likely to become friends.

Yet a lesser known follow-up by Ebbesen,

Kjos,

and Konecni (1976) found that propin-

quity predicted the formation of disliking even

more strongly than liking. Living near one an-

other increased the likelihood that two people

would become enemies even more strongly than

it predicted the likelihood that they would be-

come friends. Propinquity thus does not cause

liking. More probably, it simply amplifies the

effect of other variables and events. Because

bad events are stronger than good ones, an

identical increase in propinquity produces more

enemies than friends.

The relative strength of bad may also be

relevant to the topics studied by research psy-

chologists. As president of the American Psy-

chological Association, Martin Seligman (1999)

called for a "positive psychology" movement to

offset the negative focus that he saw as domi-

nating most of psychology's history. The nega-

tive focus was first documented by Carlson's

(1966) survey of psychology textbooks, in

which he found twice as many chapters (121 vs.

52) devoted to unpleasant as to pleasant emo-

tions,

and a similar imbalance was found in

lines of coverage and use of specific words.

More recently, Czapinski (1985) coded more

than 17,000 research articles in psychology

journals and found that the coverage of negative

issues and phenomena exceeded positive, good

ones 69% to

31%,

a bias that was fairly strong

across all areas of psychology (although weak-

est in social psychology). Seligman is probably

quite right in proposing that psychologists have

focused most of their theoretical and empirical

efforts on understanding the bad rather than the

good.

Why has this been so? Undoubtedly, one

hypothesis might be that psychologists are pes-

simistic misanthropes or sadists who derive per-

verse satisfaction from studying human suffer-

ing and failure. An alternative explanation,

however, would be that psychology has con-

sisted of young researchers trying to obtain pub-

lishable findings in a relatively new science that

was characterized by weak measures and high

variance. They needed to study the strongest

possible effects in order for the truth to shine

through the gloom of error variance and to

than good, then early psychologists would in-

evitably gravitate toward studying the negative

and troubled side of human life, whereas the

more positive phenomena had to wait until the

recent emergence of stronger methods, more

sensitive measures, and better statistical

techniques.

The goal of this review is to draw together the

asymmetrical effects of bad and good across a

deliberately broad range of phenomena. Even in

topic areas in which this asymmetry has been

recognized (as in impression formation), re-

searchers have not generally linked it to patterns

in other topic areas and may therefore have

overlooked the full extent of its generality. The

present investigation is intended to provide

some perspective on just how broadly valid it is

that bad is stronger than good. We certainly do

not intend to claim that the greater power of bad

things overrides all other principles of psychol-

ogy. Other relevant phenomena may include

congruency effects (good goes with good; bad

goes with bad) and self-aggrandizing patterns

(bad can be avoided or transformed into good).

Nevertheless, the general principle that bad is

stronger than good may have important impli-

cations for human psychology and behavior.

Definition implies rendering one concept in

terms of others, and the most fundamental ones

therefore will resist satisfactory definition.

Good,

bad, and strength are among the most

universal and fundamental terms (e.g., Cassirer,

1955;

Osgood & Tzeng, 1990), and it could be

argued that they refer to concepts that are un-

derstood even by creatures with minimal lin-

guistic capacity (such as small children and

even animals). By good we understand desir-

able,

beneficial, or pleasant outcomes including

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 325

states or consequences. Bad is the opposite:

undesirable, harmful, or unpleasant. Strength

refers to the causal impact. To say that bad is

stronger than good is thus to say that bad things

will produce larger, more consistent, more mul-

tifaceted, or more lasting effects than good

things.

A Brief Discussion: Why Should Bad Be

Stronger Than Good?

Offering an explanation for the greater power

of bad than good is likely to be an inherently

difficult enterprise. The very generality of the

pattern entails that there are likely to be few

principles that are even more broad and general.

Meanwhile, researchers will have found lower

level explanations that help explain why bad

may be stronger than good with regard to spe-

cific,

narrowly defined phenomena.

From our perspective, it is evolutionarily

adaptive for bad to be stronger than good. We

believe that throughout our evolutionary his-

tory, organisms that were better attuned to bad

things would have been more likely to survive

threats and, consequently, would have increased

probability of passing along their genes. As an

example, consider the implications of foregoing

options or ignoring certain possible outcomes.

A person who ignores the possibility of a pos-

itive outcome may later experience significant

regret at having missed an opportunity for plea-

sure or advancement, but nothing directly terri-

ble is likely to result. In contrast, a person who

ignores danger (the possibility of a bad out-

come) even once may end up maimed or dead.

Survival requires urgent attention to possible

bad outcomes, but it is less urgent with regard to

good ones. Hence, it would be adaptive to be

psychologically designed to respond to bad

more strongly than good. After we review the

evidence for the phenomenon of bad being

stronger than good, we present a more complete

discussion of the theoretical reasons for the

strength of bad over good and also review other

theories that have been proposed in the context

of specific subareas (e.g., impression formation).

Evidence

The purpose of the following sections is to

review evidence pertaining to the central hy-

pothesis that bad is stronger than good. To

establish the breadth of the pattern, we try to

identify many seemingly different and diverse

spheres in which bad is stronger than good.

Given the breadth of the hypothesis, it is prob-

ably not possible to cover every study that has

ever found bad to be stronger than good in any

sphere. We have, however, tried to cover as

much as possible and to provide evidence for

the effect in as many different spheres as pos-

sible.

How did we accomplish this? Unlike

more focused narrative reviews or meta-analy-

ses,

we were unable to conduct a systematic

search using keywords such as good or bad.

Instead, we made an effort to cast as broad a net

as possible and then focus our search on several

research areas. As part of this process, we made

a request via e-mail to the members of the

Society for Personality and Social Psychology

list-serve. The roughly 100 responses received

from these members served as a starting point

for our search. After dividing our review into

several topic areas, we then set out to uncover

those studies that compared the relative strength

of good and bad effects, especially those that

also included a neutral control group.

The central goal of this review is to establish

convergence across multiple areas. The consis-

tency of conclusions across each area is more

important than the robustness or methodologi-

cal strength of evidence in each specific area.

We attempt to do justice to each area, but our

emphasis is on breadth (and on the quest for any

patterns in the opposite direction), so it seemed

desirable to cover as many different areas as

possible.

Reacting to Events

All lives contain both good and bad events. If

bad is stronger than good, then the bad events

will have longer lasting and more intense con-

sequences than good events. In particular, the

effects of good events should dissipate more

rapidly than the effects of bad events. This

should occur despite the mechanisms described

by Taylor (1991), by which many people strive

to minimize bad events and distance themselves

from them, although those minimizing pro-

cesses should limit the impact of bad events and

possibly produce some contrary findings.

A widely accepted account of the impact of

life events was put forward by Helson (1964)

326BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

and called adaptation level theory. In this view,

the impact of substantial changes in life circum-

stances is temporary. People (and animals) react

more to changes than to stable conditions, so

they are most sensitive to new conditions.

Change, therefore, produces strong reactions,

but the circumstances that result from the

change gradually cease to elicit a reaction and

eventually become taken for granted. Applying

this theory to human happiness, Brickman and

Campbell (1971) postulated a "hedonic tread-

mill" by which long-term happiness will remain

roughly constant regardless of what happens

because the impact of both good and bad events

will wear off over time.

In testing the hedonic treadmill, however, it

emerged that bad events wear off more slowly

than good events. Brickman, Coates, and

Janoff-Bulman (1978) interviewed three groups

of respondents: people who had won a lottery,

people who had been paralyzed in an accident,

and people who had not recently experienced

any such major life event. The lottery wins and

accidents had occurred about 1 year before the

interview. Confirming the hypothesis for posi-

tive events, the lottery winners did not report

greater happiness than the two other groups.

Brickman et al. proposed that this result was

due to habituation, as the adaptation level phe-

nomenon would predict: The euphoria over the

lottery win did not last, and the winners' hap-

piness levels quickly returned to what they had

been before the lottery win. Ironically, perhaps,

the only lasting effect of winning the lottery

appeared to be the bad ones, such as a reduction

in enjoyment of ordinary pleasures.

In contrast to the transitory euphoria of good

fortune, the accident victims were much slower

to adapt to their fate, Brickman et al. (1978)

found. They rated themselves as significantly

less happy than participants in the control con-

dition. The victims continued to compare their

current situation with how their lives had been

before the accident (unlike lottery winners, who

did not seem to spend much time thinking how

their lives had improved from the bygone days

of relative poverty). Brickman et al. called this

phenomenon the "nostalgia effect" (p. 921).

The seeming implication of these findings is

that adaptation-level effects are asymmetrical,

consistent with the view that bad is stronger

than good. Adaptation-level effects tend to pre-

vent any lasting changes in overall happiness

and instead return people to their baseline. After

a short peak in happiness, people become ac-

customed to the new situation and are no more

happy than they were before the improvement.

After a serious misfortune, however, people ad-

just less quickly, even though many victims

ultimately do recover (Taylor, 1983).

Comparison of unanticipated financial out-

comes can equate the objective magnitude of

events. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) had par-

ticipants perform thought experiments in which

they either gained or lost the same amount of

money. The distress participants reported over

losing some money was greater than the joy or

happiness that accompanied gaining the same

amount of money. Put another way, you are

more upset about losing $50 than you are happy

about gaining $50.

In a prospective study of stress in pregnant

women, Wells, Hobfoll, and Lavin (1999) ex-

amined gains and losses of resources early in

pregnancy and measured postpartum outcomes

including depression and anger. Gains in re-

sources had no significant effects, but losses

produced significant effects on postpartum an-

ger (even after controlling for anger at the time

of initial measurement, which included anger at

the loss of resources). Wells et al. also found

that effects of subsequent losses of resources

were significantly higher among women who

had experienced the previous losses; whereas if

they had not had the initial loss, the effect of the

later loss was muted. These findings point to a

snowballing effect of consecutive bad out-

comes. Good outcomes did not produce any

such effects.

Developmental and clinical observations

likewise suggest that single bad events are far

stronger than even the strongest good ones. Var-

ious studies reveal long-term harmful conse-

quences of child abuse or sexual abuse, includ-

ing depression, relationship problems, revictim-

ization, and sexual dysfunction, even if the

abuse occurred only once or twice (Cahill,

Llewelyn, & Pearson, 1991; Fleming, Mullen,

Sibthorpe, & Bammer, 1999; Silver, Boon, &

Stones, 1983; Styron & Janoff-Bulman, 1997;

Weiss, Longhurst, & Mazure, 1999). These ef-

fects seem more durable than any comparable

positive aspect of childhood, and it also seems

doubtful (although difficult to prove) that a sin-

gle positive event could offset the harm caused

by a single episode of violent or sexual abuse;

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD327

whereas the single negative event can probably

undo the benefits of many positive interactions.

Sexuality offers a sphere in which relevant

comparisons can perhaps be made, insofar as

good sexual experiences are often regarded as

among the best and most intense positive expe-

riences people have. Ample evidence suggests

that a single bad experience in the sexual do-

main can impair sexual functioning and enjoy-

ment and even have deleterious effects on

health and well-being for years afterward (see

Laumann, Gagon, Michael, & Michaels, 1994;

Laumann, Paik, & Rosen, 1999; Rynd, 1988;

note,

however, that these are correlational find-

ings and some interpretive questions remain).

There is no indication that any good sexual

experience, no matter how good, can produce

benefits in which magnitude is comparable to

the harm caused by such victimization.

Turning from major experiences to everyday

actions, we find the same pattern of greater

power for the unpleasant than the pleasant

events. A diary study by David, Green, Martin,

and Suls (1997) examined the effects of every-

day good and bad events, as well as personality

traits.

Undesirable (bad) events had more per-

vasive effects on subsequent mood than desir-

able (good) ones. Although each type of event

influenced the relevant mood (i.e., bad events

influenced bad mood, and good events predicted

good mood) to similar degrees, bad events had

an additional effect on the opposite-valence

mood that was lacking for good events. In other

words, bad events influenced both good and bad

moods, whereas good events influenced only

good moods. Similar findings emerged when

David et al. compared neuroticism (associated

with distress and negativity) and extraversion

(associated with positivity). Neuroticism influ-

enced both good and bad moods, whereas ex-

traversion affected only good moods.

Further evidence of the greater power of bad

events emerged from a 3-week longitudinal

study by Nezlek and Gable (1999). Their par-

ticipants furnished multiple measures of adjust-

ment each day, as well as recording daily

events. Bad events had stronger effects on ad-

justment than good events on an everyday basis.

The superior strength of bad events was consis-

tent across their full range of measures of ad-

justment, including self-esteem, anxiety, causal

uncertainty, perceived control over the environ-

ment, and depressogenic cognitions about the

future, the

self,

and life in general.

How long the impact of everyday events lasts

was studied by Sheldon, Ryan, and Reis (1996).

Bad events had longer lasting effects. In their

data, having a good day did not have any no-

ticeable effect on a person's well-being the fol-

lowing day, whereas having a bad day did carry

over and influence the next day. Specifically,

after a bad day, participants were likely to have

lower well-being on the next day. Although the

results are technically correlational, something

must cause them, whether it is the bad day itself

causing the subsequent bad day or some other

cause producing the consecutive pair of bad

days.

Either way, the bad has stronger power

than good because only the bad reliably pro-

duced consecutive bad days.

Even at the sensory level, bad events seem to

produce stronger reactions than good ones. Ex-

pressive reactions to unpleasant, pleasant, and

neutral odors were examined by Gilbert, Frid-

lund, and Sabini (1987). Participants smelled

various odors while alone, and their facial ex-

pressions were videotaped. Raters then watched

the tapes and tried to infer the odor from the

facial reaction. Unpleasant odors were most ac-

curately classified, partly because more facial

movement was perceived in the unpleasant odor

trials.

Pleasant odors elicited more facial move-

ment than neutral odors, but the neutral ones

were still rated more accurately than the posi-

tive ones. Thus, responses to unpleasant odors

were apparently stronger, at least to the extent

that they could be accurately recognized by

raters.

Perhaps the broadest manifestation of the

greater power of bad events than good to elicit

lasting reactions is contained in the psychology

of trauma. The very concept of trauma has

proven broadly useful, and psychologists have

found it helpful in many different domains.

Many kinds of traumas produce severe and last-

ing effects on behavior, but there is no corre-

sponding concept of a positive event that can

have similarly strong and lasting effects. In a

sense, trauma has no true opposite concept. A

single traumatic experience can have long-term

effects on the person's health, well-being, atti-

tudes,

self-esteem, anxiety, and behavior; many

such effects have been documented. In contrast,

there is little evidence that single positive expe-

riences can have equally influential conse-

328BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

quences. It is possible that such events have

simply eluded psychological study, but it seems

more likely that the lack of an opposite concept

for trauma indicates the greater power of bad

than good single events to affect people.

Although the findings from Brickman et al.

(1978) and others reviewed in this section pro-

vide vivid and well-known indications that bad

events produce stronger, more lasting reactions

than good ones, some of the studies suffer from

a possible asymmetry in the objective magni-

tude of the event. There is no way to ascertain

objectively that winning a lottery is comparable

in magnitude to becoming paralyzed by an ac-

cident. The diary studies have the advantage of

having used all the events of the day, so these

are methodologically more useful. Most con-

vincing are the studies that attempted to ensure

equal objective magnitudes (such as when peo-

ple gain vs. lose the same amount of money)

because these permit the firmest conclusions

that bad events produce stronger reactions.

Therefore, throughout the rest of

this

review, we

emphasize studies that either did manage to

equate the good and the bad events in terms of

their objective magnitude or that took some

broad, representative or exhaustive sample of

events.

In summary, most findings indicate that peo-

ple react more strongly to bad than good events.

The evidence covers everything from minor ev-

eryday events and brief experimental exposure

to aversive odors to major life events and trau-

mas.

Bad events produce more emotion, have

bigger effects on adjustment measures, and

have longer lasting effects.

Close Relationships

One of the central tasks and goals of human

life is to sustain a network of close relationships

characterized by mutual caring and pleasant,

supportive interactions (e.g., Baumeister &

Leary, 1995). Unfortunately, many relation-

ships fail to last, and others are sometimes less

than satisfactory. In this section, we review

evidence about good versus bad patterns that

contribute to the long-term relationship out-

comes. Obviously, one would expect that bad,

destructive characteristics of the relationship

will hasten its demise; whereas good, construc-

tive ones will preserve it. The relevant predic-

tion goes beyond that, however: The harmful

effects of the bad characteristics will exert more

influence over the relationship outcome than the

beneficial effects of the good characteristics.

People commonly believe that positivity of

communication (as opposed to negativity) is

associated with high relational satisfaction (e.g.,

friendships, marriages, partnerships, and fami-

lies).

In general, research findings are consistent

with this assumption. People satisfied with their

relationships communicate with more positive

verbal behaviors (e.g., agreement, confirmation,

constructive problem solving, politeness, ex-

pressing forgiveness) and nonverbal behaviors

(e.g., smiling, head nodding, caring, or con-

cerned voice; for more detailed descriptions of

these behaviors, see Gottman, 1979; Riskin &

Faunce, 1970; Rusbult, Johnson, & Morrow,

1986;

Stafford & Canary, 1991; Ting-Toomey,

1983;

Wills, Weiss, & Patterson, 1974). On the

contrary, people dissatisfied with their relation-

ships communicate with more negative verbal

behaviors (e.g., insults, threats, or criticisms)

and nonverbal behaviors (e.g., frowning or

speaking in a cold hard voice).

More important, however, positive and neg-

ative communication have different impacts on

relational satisfaction, and the negative are

more decisive. To show this, John Gottman and

his colleagues (Gottman, 1979, 1994) video-

taped married couples in the laboratory and at

home as they talked about a wide variety of

topics such as how their day went, the nutri-

tional value of certain foods, marital problems

in general, and specific conflicts in their rela-

tionship. They then coded the couple's behav-

iors in categories (e.g., verbal, nonverbal, pos-

itive,

and negative). The findings indicated that

the presence or absence of negative behaviors

was more strongly related to the quality of cou-

ples'

relationships than the presence or absence

of positive behaviors. Positivity and negativity

were independent, in the sense that increasing

one did not necessarily decrease the other. The

important implication is that increasing positive

behaviors in a relationship will not affect the

relationship as much as decreasing negative be-

haviors. In another study in which videotaped

marital interactions were used, Gottman and

Krokoff (1989) found that negative interactions

predicted marital satisfaction more strongly

than positive interactions.

The effects of emotional interactions on

changes in relationship satisfaction were exam-

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD329

ined by Gottman and Levenson (1986; Leven-

son & Gottman, 1983, 1985). They made vid-

eotapes of couples interacting, then showed the

interaction tapes to the individuals and obtained

ongoing ratings of affect through the interac-

tion. Of particular interest were data on reci-

procity, defined in terms of one person express-

ing a similar emotion or change in emotion right

after the partner had indicated similar feelings.

Reciprocity of negative affect was especially

potent and in particular was more influential

than reciprocity of positive affect. The greater

influence of negative affect reciprocity was

found with regard to differentiating happy ver-

sus distressed marriages (Levenson & Gottman,

1983).

In a longitudinal follow-up 2 years later,

the couples who had initially shown higher rates

of negative affect reciprocity reported greater

declines in relationship satisfaction, whereas

reciprocity of positive affect had no significant

effect (Levenson & Gottman, 1985). In sum-

mary, relationships are most affected by pat-

terns in which one person responds negatively

to the other's negative act or feeling.

On the basis of these results, Gottman (1994)

has proposed a revealing diagnostic index for

evaluating relationships: He proposed that in

order for a relationship to succeed, positive and

good interactions must outnumber the negative

and bad ones by at least five to one. If the ratio

falls below that, the relationship is likely to fail

and breakup. This index converges well with

the thrust of our argument: Bad events are so

much stronger than good ones that the good

must outnumber the bad in order to prevail.

Gottman's index suggests that bad events are on

average five times as powerful as good ones, at

least with regard to close relationships.

Constructive and destructive problem-solv-

ing behavior patterns for relationships were

studied by Rusbult et al. (1986; see also Rusbult

& Zembrodt, 1983). They were able to classify

couples as to the degree to which they used

constructive and destructive approaches to

problems, and these were assessed indepen-

dently so that a given couple might use both,

either, or none. In a longitudinal design, Rusbult

et al. showed that the destructive patterns were

more predictive of relationship outcomes than

constructive ones were. In particular, destruc-

tive responses to the partner's destructive re-

sponses showed a greatly increased predictive

power. This finding confirms Levenson and

Gottman's (1985) conclusion that reciprocity of

bad responses is an especially potent predictor

of relationship outcomes (and is stronger than

reciprocity of good responses). The implication

is that the long-term success of a relationship

depends more on not doing bad things than on

doing good things.

A similar conclusion emerged from a recent

longitudinal study by Huston, Caughlin, Houts,

Smith, and George (2001). By following cou-

ples for more than a decade, they were able to

ascertain what features of early marital relation-

ships predicted divorce (and other unhappi-

ness) 10 to 12 years later. Huston et al. found

that levels of negativity and distress early in the

marriage were higher among the later divorcing

couples than among the happily married ones.

Positive relations during the early years of mar-

riage, including love and affectional communi-

cation, did not differ significantly between the

ones who ended up divorcing and those who

ended up happily married. Without random as-

signment to early marital conflict (a technical

and ethical impossibility), it is difficult to draw

a firm causal inference from these data. It also

remains possible that the early distress reflected

some underlying conflict or even personality

problem among the later divorcing spouses, but

even that conclusion would fit the view that bad

is stronger than good.

Even stronger results emerged from a 2-year

longitudinal study by Huston and Vangelisti

(1991).

They measured three types of socio-

emotionally expressive behavior among newly-

wed couples: affectionate communication, sex-

ual interest, and negativity. Sexual affection had

no relation to marital satisfaction, and giving or

receiving affection had only weak and inconsis-

tent relationships to satisfaction. In contrast,

negativity had strong and consistent links to

global marital satisfaction. Thus, people's sat-

isfaction with their marriage depended much

more heavily on the bad parts (negativity) than

on the good parts (affection and sex).

In support of this idea, sexual dysfunction

was found to have a greater effect on the marital

bond than good sexual functioning. McCarthy

(1999) reported that when sexuality functions

well within a marriage, it accounts for 15-20%

of the variance in the marital bond, but when

sex functioning is bad or nonexistent (which

most married couples would consider a bad

state),

it accounts for 50-75% of the variance.

330BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

The power of bad sexual experiences, then, far

outweighs the benefits of good sexual experi-

ences within a marriage.

One factor that may contribute to some of

these effects is that destructive behaviors are

understood better than constructive ones.

Acitelli, Douvan, and Veroff (1993) found that

during the early years of marriage, couples per-

ceived and understood each other's destructive

behaviors better than the constructive ones.

Acitelli et al. interpreted this as based on the

greater visibility and recall of bad, destructive

behaviors. As Kellermann (1984) has noted,

however, such explanations are not theoretically

complete because they fail to say why bad

events are more readily noticed and recalled.

Daily reports of spousal behaviors and mari-

tal satisfaction were made for 2 weeks by par-

ticipants in a study by Wills et al. (1974). Of the

amount of variance (in marital satisfaction) that

the predictor variables were able to explain in

regression analyses, the majority (65%) was

captured by the aversive, displeasurable behav-

iors.

This was significantly greater than the

amount explained by supportive, pleasurable

behaviors (25%). This was true despite the fact

that there were about three times as many pos-

itive behaviors as aversive ones. The greater

power of the bad behaviors had to overcome

their lesser number in order to produce a stron-

ger effect.

Reciprocation patterns were also examined

by Wills et al. (1974). Interspouse correlations

indicated that negative, displeasurable behav-

iors were reciprocated to a significant degree,

whereas the reciprocation of positive, pleasur-

able behaviors was weaker and not significant.

This is an important step toward explaining the

greater power of bad events to affect relation-

ship outcomes: The couples' subsequent inter-

actions are apparently more directly and consis-

tently affected by bad than good behaviors. As

with the daily events reviewed in the preceding

section, couple interactions continue to be af-

fected by bad more than good.

The relative contributions of stress (negative

factors), social support (positive), and resources

(positive) to the quality of family life were

assessed in an extensive telephone survey by

Pittman and Lloyd (1988). Both marital satis-

faction and parental satisfaction were more

strongly affected by the bad events (i.e., the

stresses) than by the positive (i.e., support and

resources). Thus, negativity and stress added

more than 20% to the amount of variance in

marital satisfaction that was explained, whereas

positive support and resources added only 5%.

All in all, the evidence is fairly clear and

unanimous in indicating that relationships are

more affected by bad events than good ones. As

seen in daily interactions, broad patterns, affect

of problem solving, and marital communica-

tion, bad events have stronger effects than good

events. Reciprocation of bad responses appears

to be especially powerful for leading to deteri-

oration and breakup of close relationships.

Other Relationships and Interactions

Although close relationships have received

the greatest amount of study, there is also some

relevant information regarding not-so-close re-

lationships and other forms of interpersonal in-

teraction. We report several such studies here,

although the research on formation of initial

impressions is covered in a separate section

later in the article.

Sociometric studies have examined how in-

dividuals perceive each other within established

groups or social networks. If bad is stronger

than good, then dislike and social rejection

should be more pronounced, which would be

reflected in higher agreement throughout the

social network. A meta-analysis of sociometric

studies of children recently confirmed this con-

clusion (Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993).

In particular, the two social extremes were rep-

resented by the highly popular children and the

rejected children, and these were about the same

proportions (9% and 12% of the groups, respec-

tively, on average). Consistency of reports

across the children, as well as for self-reports

and for ratings by teachers and parents, was

higher for the rejected than for the popular

children. In other words, all perspectives agree

more about who is rejected than about who is

popular.

Another approach to the same problem is to

examine the link between naming someone as

"best friend" or "worst enemy" and overall rat-

ings of ability. An ambitious study by French,

Waas,

and Tarver-Behring (1986) obtained ex-

tensive sociometric data from 250 third- and

fourth-grade children. All children listed their

three most and least desired friends, as well as

listing the three best and worst peers at sports

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD331

and at schoolwork. All children then rated ev-

eryone in their class in terms of friendship,

sports, and schoolwork. The proportion of vari-

ance shared by the two methods was consis-

tently higher for the bad than for the good; that

is,

low ratings led to more frequent nominations

as "undesirable friend," "bad at sports," and

"bad at schoolwork" more reliably than high

ratings led to more frequent nominations as

"desirable friend," "good at sports," and "good

at school."

Undoubtedly the initial acts in an interaction

create expectancies and set the tone for further

ones,

and if subsequent acts differ, the expect-

ancies are violated. The impact of these was

assessed by Afifi and Burgoon (2000), who had

participants observe a videotaped interaction.

Their research design included changes from

initially negative to positive and from initially

positive to negative interactions. These violated

expectancies produced strong reactions, but the

violations in the negative direction had stronger

effects on attraction. Their finding that changes

produced stronger reactions than consistent in-

terpersonal behavior replicated an earlier dem-

onstration by Aronson and Linder (1965), but

Afifi and Burgoon's work clearly showed that

the shift toward the negative has a more pow-

erful effect than the comparable shift toward the

positive. That is, the largest change in attraction

occurred when the stimulus person on the vid-

eotape started off by behaving in a friendly,

interested manner and then turned aloof and

unfriendly.

A further investigation by Reyes et al. (1999)

showed that both social attraction and sexual

desire were more strongly influenced by nega-

tive,

unpleasant social interactions than by pos-

itive,

pleasant ones. Participants who behaved

in the unpleasant style produced clear (negative)

reactions that were stronger than the reactions to

people who showed a positive, friendly interac-

tion style.

The notion that bad is stronger than good in

social interactions received a fairly explicit test

in a recent study. Exline and Baumeister (1999)

had people play prisoner's dilemma against a

simulated opponent who was randomly pro-

grammed to start off with either a cooperative

(good) or a defensive/exploitative (bad) move.

When participants were asked to rate their op-

ponent, the one who started off with the bad

move was rated as stronger than the one who

started off with the cooperative move. Partici-

pants also rated the bad opponent as stronger

than they themselves were, unlike the coopera-

tive opponent.

In fact, when Baumeister and Leary (1995)

reviewed the evidence in support of a need to

belong, they concluded that that need was for

nonnegative interactions, rather than positive

ones as they had originally theorized. The rea-

son was that neutral interactions seemed ade-

quate to satisfy the need to belong in many

cases.

This too confirms the greater power of

bad: The effects of positive, good interactions

were not consistently different from the effects

of neutral interactions, whereas bad ones were

clearly different from the neutral.

Emotion

The distinction between good and bad (pleas-

ant and unpleasant) emotions is well established

in psychology and familiar to nearly everyone.

Although laypersons typically regard these as

opposites, there is some evidence that the two

are somewhat independent (e.g., Watson & Tel-

legen, 1985), and indeed measures of affect

intensity (e.g., Larsen, Diener, & Emmons,

1986) rest on the assumption that positive and

negative emotions can be positively correlated

within person, even though a person does not

normally feel both at the same time. Diener,

Larsen, Levine, and Emmons (1985) concluded

that the seeming independence is produced by a

combination of positive correlations in affective

intensity and negative correlations in frequency.

In any case, it is possible to compare positive

and negative emotional states against neutral

ones.

The prediction is that negative affect and

emotional distress will have stronger effects

than positive affect and pleasant emotions, even

when the two emotional states or traits are

equally distant from the neutral position.

Language provides one index of relative

power, although naturally language is subject to

multiple determinants. To the extent that nega-

tive emotions are more powerful and important,

they should be more fully represented in the

language. Sure enough, there appear to be more

words for negative than positive emotions.

Averill (1980) constructed a Semantic Atlas of

Emotional Concepts by an exhaustive compila-

tion of 558 emotion words. When he had par-

ticipants rate them, he found that there were one

332BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

and one-half times as many negative terms as

positive ones (i.e., 62% negative vs. 38% posi-

tive),

which differed significantly from the null

hypothesis that there would be 50% of each.

Averill also had three judges sort Anderson's

(1965) list of 555 personality traits into emo-

tional and nonemotional traits. He then evalu-

ated them according to whether they fell above

or below the midpoint on Anderson's original

likeableness ratings. Among the nonemotional

traits,

there was a small preponderance of pos-

itive traits (57%), but among the emotional

traits,

the negative ones were in a clear majority

(74%).

Clearly, then, there are more words for

bad emotions than for good ones.

A similar conclusion emerged (although tan-

gentially) from a study by Van Goozen and

Frijda (1993). They instructed participants in

six different European countries and Canada to

write down as many emotion words as they

could think of within 5 min. The researchers

then tallied the 12 most frequently mentioned

words in each country. They reported that joy,

sadness, anger, and fear (three of which are

negative) were the ones that made all six coun-

tries'

lists of the top dozen. If surprise, excite-

ment, and crying are all treated as neutral (be-

cause they can be either positive or negative),

all the countries except The Netherlands had

more negative than positive words among the

top dozen. Thus, when people try to think of

emotion terms, they come up with a preponder-

ance of words referring to negative emotions.

This too suggests that bad emotions are more

important to label and discuss than good

emotions.

Other work has confirmed that there are many

more words to indicate negative emotional

states and differentiate among them than is the

case for positive emotional states (Clore & Or-

tony, 1988; Russell, Fernandez-Dols, Manstead,

& Wellenkamp, 1995). Thus, negative words

appear to be more varied than positive words, or

at least people seem to find it more important to

recognize and label the distinctions between

them.

Another sign of the relative power of bad

versus good emotions is evident in research on

affect regulation. People often try to change

their moods and have many techniques for do-

ing so. Naturally, there is an asymmetry to their

goals:

for purely hedonic reasons, people prefer

to avoid bad emotions and obtain good ones.

Those two goals can be separated, however, and

one can examine the relative frequency and

number of techniques for each. Doing so yields

a clear difference: There are many more tech-

niques people use for escaping bad moods than

for inducing good ones. Baumeister, Heather-

ton, and Tice (1994) noted that there are six

possible categories of affect regulation, consist-

ing of efforts to induce, prolong, or terminate

either a pleasant or an unpleasant state. Of

these, however, efforts to terminate the unpleas-

ant states are by far the most frequently re-

ported. The fact that people exert disproportion-

ate amounts of energy trying to escape from bad

moods (and in particular more than they exert to

induce good moods) is consistent with the hy-

pothesis of greater power of negative emotions.

The effect of induced good and bad moods on

cognitive processing (in connection with stereo-

types) was studied by Esses and Zanna (1995).

Across four studies, they consistently found that

bad moods had a bigger impact than good

moods, in terms of the discrepancies from the

neutral mood condition. In some of the studies,

this could be ascribed to a weaker difference

among the mood manipulations. In Experi-

ment 4, for example, the manipulation checks

on self-reported moods did not yield any

signif-

icant difference between the neutral and good

mood induction conditions. In Experiments 2

and 3, the neutral mood condition yielded

moods closer to the positive than the negative

mood condition. In Experiment 1, however, the

manipulation checks showed that the two mood

manipulations were about equally far apart: In

terms of the autobiographical narrative in the

mood induction, the pleasantness of the posi-

tive,

neutral, and negative conditions was 2.25,

-.03,

and

-2.21,

respectively, and the self-re-

ported moods were

1.79,0.69,

and -.49. Despite

the apparently equal departure in mood from the

neutral condition baseline, the bad mood induc-

tion produced bigger effects on ethnic outgroup

stereotypes: Only the negative mood induction

produced stereotypes that differed significantly

from the neutral mood baseline. Thus, when

good and bad moods were equidistant from the

neutral control, the bad moods were found to

have the stronger effects.

Recall for positive versus negative emotions

was studied by Thomas and Diener (1990), who

compared diary and experience sampling data

against the same people's general estimates of

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD333

their emotional experiences. They found that

people tended to underestimate the frequency of

positive affect, but not negative affect, which is

consistent with the view that the relative weak-

ness of positive emotional experiences makes

them more forgettable. (It may also be, how-

ever, that positive affect is so much more fre-

quent than negative affect and that the greater

frequency accounts for the relative underesti-

mation. Then again, Thomas and Diener did

find that people were fairly accurate in estimat-

ing the ratio of relative frequency of positive

versus negative affect.)

Likewise, recall for emotional events appears

to favor bad ones. Finkenauer and Rime" (1998)

asked people to recall a recent, important emo-

tional event that they had either shared with

others or kept secret. Although both positive

and negative emotional events were welcome,

and both were recalled, people reported far

more bad than good events, by about a four-to-

one margin across two studies. Thus, events

involving bad emotions remain more salient on

people's minds than events involving good

emotions.

People's estimations of how long or intensely

various events will affect them has been termed

affective forecasting (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,

Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Gilbert et al.

found that, in general, people overestimate the

extent to which events in their lives will affect

them. Moreover, the data reveal that this phe-

nomenon is stronger for negative events than for

positive ones. These data suggest that people

have a cognitive heuristic that informs them that

negative events are powerful influences on sub-

sequent affective states, more so than positive

events, and therefore will affect them longer.

Children's understanding of emotional con-

cepts was studied by Laible and Thompson

(1998) in relation to attachment style. Not sur-

prisingly, secure attachment was linked to better

emotional understanding in the sample (age 2.5

to 6 years), but this effect was mainly found

with negative emotions. Positive emotions were

understood about the same in the various cate-

gories. The opposite finding might have been

expected, given that secure attachment is pre-

sumably associated with more experiences of

positive rather than negative emotions, but the

results fit the pattern of bad emotions being

stronger (or at least more important) than good

ones.

Laible and Thompson speculated that the

effects were due to the greater need among

nonsecurely attached (such as avoidant) chil-

dren to avoid negative, unpleasant emotions,

with the result that they are slower to develop an

understanding of them. This interpretation was

admittedly speculative. Still, it does rest on the

assumption that bad emotions are more impor-

tant than good ones, so children who do not

have optimal attachment patterns find it more

important to downplay bad emotions than to

focus on good ones.

The emotional traits of positive and negative

affectivity were studied by Major, Zubek, Coo-

per, Cozzarelli, and Richards (1997) in terms of

their effects on adjustment following abortion.

A commendable feature of Major et al.'s design

is that they measured positive and negative out-

comes separately, allowing for subjective well-

being and personal distress to be assessed inde-

pendently. Well-being was predicted by both

positive and negative affectivity, and with

roughly equal power. Distress, however, was

only predicted by negative affectivity. Thus,

negative affect influenced both outcome mea-

sures,

whereas positive affect influenced only

one.

There is also evidence that bad moods elicit

more thorough and careful information process-

ing than good moods (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, &

Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 1990). These findings

are consistent with Taylor's (1991) view that

negative information stimulates a special set of

processes designed to cope with threat. Yet

even when a person is not threatened, bad

moods seem to lead to greater processing. For

example, Bless, Hamilton, and Mackie (1992)

induced good and bad moods and then pre-

sented to participants information about some-

one else. They found that participants in good

moods tended to cluster information and pro-

cess it superficially, whereas people in bad

moods processed it more carefully. Forgas

(1992) extended this work to study the effects of

good and bad moods on information about peo-

ple who either conform to prototypes (stereo-

types) or violate them (e.g., the engineer who is

vs.

the engineer who is not interested in foot-

ball).

The strongest mood effect involved the

bad mood and the atypical, nonconforming per-

son, which is precisely the combination that

also elicited the most processing.

An exception to the general pattern of thor-

ough, careful information processing during bad

334BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

moods was provided by Leith and Baumeister

(1996).

They focused mainly on high-arousal

bad moods, in contrast to most prior work that

has emphasized low-arousal moods such as sad-

ness.

Leith and Baumeister did, however, repli-

cate the greater processing among sad partici-

pants.

They found that highly aroused, aversive

moods led participants to curtail information

processing and make snap decisions when

choosing what level of risk to choose (see also

Keinan, 1987). Although this result did not con-

form to the general pattern of greater processing

with bad moods, Leith and Baumeister still

found that bad was stronger than good. The

highly aroused, unhappy participants showed

distinctive patterns of high-risk and self-defeat-

ing behavior, whereas good-mood participants

did not differ from neutral-mood control

participants.

Thus,

there is an assortment of evidence that

negative affect is stronger and more important

than positive affect. People have more words

for bad emotions than good ones and use them

more frequently. Bad emotions generally pro-

duce more cognitive processing and have other

effects on behavior that are stronger than posi-

tive emotions. People try harder to avoid and

escape bad moods than to induce or prolong

good moods, and they remember bad moods

and emotions better.

Learning

Learning refers to behavioral or cognitive

change resulting from situational contingencies.

Reinforcement and punishment are the two

main kinds of situational feedback that produce

learning. Given the extensive research tradition

in the study of learning, one might expect that

the relative power of reward and punishment

would be well established, but in fact we found

it difficult to locate much in the way of direct

comparisons. One reason is that most learning

research has been performed with rats, in which

food pellets are used for rewards and electric

shock for punishments, and it is difficult to

calibrate these so as to establish how many food

pellets are equivalent to how many shocks.

Still, some researchers have examined the

relative power of reward and punishment. In

several older studies, researchers compared the

effectiveness of reward-and-punishment contin-

gencies on discriminative learning of tasks that

require an active response from participants (in

contrast with tasks that require the inhibition of

a response). The punishment of incorrect re-

sponses (by the presentation of an aversive

stimulus on mistakes) was consistently found to

be more effective than the reward of correct

responses: Punishment led to faster learning

than reward, across a variety of punishments

and rewards. Penney and Lupton (1961) and

Penney (1968) used a loud tone as punishment,

and Meyer and Offenbach (1962) and Spence

(1966) used verbal punishments ("Wrong").

Spence and Segner (1967) compared nonverbal

and verbal punishments (i.e., loud tone and

"Wrong") with nonverbal and verbal rewards

(i.e.,

candy and "Correct") and found that learn-

ing with both types of punishment contingen-

cies led to superior learning as compared with

learning with either type of reward contingen-

cies.

In other words, people learned more

quickly from bad events (punishment) than

from good ones (reward).

This work was extended in methodologically

rigorous ways by Costantini and Hoving (1973).

Children in the reward condition received an

empty container and were instructed to win as

many marbles as possible by doing a good job

on different performance tasks (e.g., match

identical figures). Children in the punishment

condition received a container full of marbles

and were instructed to lose as few marbles as

possible by doing a good job on different per-

formance tasks. This procedure is noteworthy

because it equates reward and punishment in an

important sense, insofar as the same number of

marbles was contingent on performance. The

only difference was that the child would gain

marbles for success in one condition but lose

marbles for errors in the other condition. (In

contrast, the procedure of comparing candy re-

wards vs. loud noise punishments is susceptible

to question about whether the rewards and pun-

ishments were of equal magnitude.) Because

Costantini and Hoving were interested in how

well children could learn to inhibit responses,

the measures consisted of (a) walking as slowly

as possible over a board lying on the floor and

(b) waiting as long as possible to tell the exper-

imenter after discovering matched animals. For

both tasks, punishment contingencies (losing

marbles) resulted in longer, more effective in-

hibition of responses than reward contingencies.

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 335

To explain these results, Costantini and Hov-

ing (1973) suggested that the motivation to

avoid losing something is greater than the mo-

tivation of gaining something. In our view, this

conclusion is another way of saying that bad is

stronger than good.

To examine whether the effectiveness of pun-

ishment on learning varies across developmen-

tal stages, Tindall and Ratliff (1974) conducted

a study among 540 first (6.4 years), fourth (9.4

years),

and eighth graders (13.5 years). Children

were assigned to three conditions. In the reward

condition, they received a token for correct re-

sponses (correctly identifying a particular fig-

ure).

In the punishment condition, children were

exposed to a loud noise for incorrect responses.

In the reward-punishment condition, they re-

ceived both a token for a correct response and a

loud noise for an incorrect response. Children in

the punishment condition performed signifi-

cantly better than children in the reward and the

reward-punishment conditions, with no

signif-

icant difference between the two latter condi-

tions.

A main effect for developmental stage

revealed that eighth graders performed better

than the first and fourth graders, but develop-

mental stage did not show any interaction with

experimental condition, suggesting that punish-

ment is relatively more effective than reward

across all grade levels.

Textbooks in learning and education some-

times assert that reward is better than punish-

ment for learning, but they do not provide a

clear basis for this assertion. The assertion itself

would provide an important contradiction to the

general pattern of bad being stronger than good.

Yet they may assert the superiority of reward

over punishment because of various side effects

of punishment, such as aggravation, anger, and

even disorientation, any of which could inter-

fere with optimal learning. Such interference

could even occur because bad events are stron-

ger than good ones and because bad events

produce side effects, whereas good ones do not.

In any case, the studies we have reviewed show

that punishment is stronger than reward. We

were not able to find studies showing the

opposite.

Another way of testing the relative power of

good versus bad in learning is to compare ap-

proach (good) and avoidance (bad) patterns. In

an overview of the early research on these is-

sues,

Miller (1944) noted that both approach

tendencies and avoidance tendencies grow

stronger as the object becomes nearer, but one

"fundamental principle" from many studies was

that "the strength of avoidance increases more

rapidly with nearness than does that of ap-

proach" (p. 433). Put another way, the avoid-

ance gradient is steeper than the comparable

approach gradient, which indicates the superior

power of bad. Miller cited experimental studies

by Brown (1940) that provided direct, precise

tests of these variables, such as the examination

of how hard rats would pull against a restraint in

order to approach or avoid some stimulus. In

some studies, Brown used both strong and weak

versions of both the reinforcers and punishers,

but even so the avoidance gradient for the

weaker punisher was steeper than the approach

gradient for the stronger reinforcer (see Miller,

1944,

p. 435).

A similar conclusion was reached, in which

human beings and different methods were used,

by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). They exam-

ined the relationship between subjective and

objective values of various possible outcomes,

which they termed the value function. In gen-

eral, Kahneman and Tversky concluded that the

value function is steeper for losses than for

gains.

A given increase in possible loss there-

fore has a bigger impact on a decision than an

objectively equal increase in possible gain.

One of the few ways to make reward and

punishment comparable is to use money: Re-

search participants receive money for some be-

haviors and lose money for others, and if the

amounts are identical, one can establish which

is stronger. This strategy was used by research-

ers in an approach-avoidance situation in con-

nection with wagering and gambling. Atthowe

(1960) had people choose among various pos-

sible wagers to see how their preferences var-

ied. Some people were completely rational, in

the sense of consistently making the choices

with the best expected value. Others departed

from rationality in either direction. The "con-

servative" individuals were defined by Atthowe

as those whose choices reflected "an overcon-

cern with the possibility of losing money"

(1960,

p. 4; thus, for them, bad was stronger

than good). In contrast, people showing the

"extravagance" pattern showed the opposite

motivation, in which they emphasized the pos-

sibility of gain and disregarded the possibility of

loss.

Among the people in Atthowe's study who

336BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

were consistently nonrational in their choices,

the vast majority (83%) fell into the conserva-

tive (i.e., loss-avoiding instead of gain-pursu-

ing) category. Moreover, across the entire sam-

ple,

the majority (71%) of all nonrational

choices were conservative.

Similar findings with a different task were

reported by J. L. Myers, Reilly, and Taub

(1961):

Choices were more affected by the

chance of losing than by the chance of gaining

money. Thus, although there does exist a mi-

nority of behavior that is driven more by seek-

ing gains than by avoiding losses, the clear and

consistent majority is primarily motivated by

the effort to avoid loss, which implies that for

most people, bad is stronger than good when it

comes to financial outcomes.

Food likes and dislikes are among the most

clear-cut and immediate reactions in humans.

Pavlovian associative learning offers an expla-

nation for the association between food and

liking. In animal studies, it has been demon-

strated that the flavor of a certain food (condi-

tional stimulus) becomes intrinsically disliked

after contingent presentation of this flavor with

an unconditioned stimulus that produces nausea

or vomit-producing reactions (Garcia & Koel-

ling, 1966). This effect is known as conditioned

taste aversion learning.

The relative power of good and bad associ-

ates in taste learning among human beings was

investigated by Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh,

and Crombez (1990). Artificial flavors that were

initially neutral in valence were paired with

either an aversive, distasteful substance (Tween20

polysorbate 20) or a pleasant-tasting substance

(sugar). After about 12 trials, the bad stimulus

had induced participants to dislike the artificial

flavors, and these effects were still discernible

in a follow-up measure

week later. The pleas-

ant stimulus failed to induce participants to like

the flavors any better, nor was there any

signif-

icant effect on the delayed measure. Thus, the

bad stimulus had a stronger effect than the good

one,

in terms of learning.

Thus,

there are several findings indicating

that learning and conditioning are more strongly

affected by bad things than good, even when the

objective magnitude of good and bad is pre-

cisely equated. People appear to be predisposed

to learn more rapidly and easily about the cor-

relates of negative than of positive events.

Neurological Processes

Some evidence suggests that responses in the

brain are stronger to bad than good things. Bar-

tholow, Fabiani, Gratton, and Bettencourt

(1999) examined event-related brain potentials

(ERPs) in response to participants reading about

people performing acts that were either consis-

tent or inconsistent with personality descrip-

tions.

Larger amplitude P300 responses were

observed following negative inconsistencies

(i.e.,

people with positive traits performing bad

behaviors) than positive inconsistencies (people

with bad traits performing good behaviors).

These amplitudes reflect degree of information

processing and thus are consistent with the ev-

idence of greater information processing.

Even more dramatic evidence comes from

studies linking brain responses to learning and

extinction of fear responses. Apparently fear-

inducing events leave indelible memory traces

in the brain (LeDoux, Romanski, & Xagoraris,

1989;

Quirk, Repa, & LeDoux, 1995). Even

after the behavioral response to a fear-inducing

conditioned stimulus has been extinguished, the

brain retains a changed pattern of neuronal fir-

ing in response to that stimulus and of neuronal

connections between cells (Quirk et al., 1995;

Sanghera, Rolls, & Roper-Hall, 1979).

In an investigation of the effect of reaction

times during a forced-choice paradigm found

that even patients with brain damage are af-

fected by different types of feedback (Gauggel,

Wietasch, Bayer, & Rolko, 2000). Brain-dam-

aged patients with varying etiologies displayed

faster reaction times after (false) negative feed-

back (an effect that remained even when statis-

tically controlling for depression), suggesting

that even among patients with profound brain

damage, bad still outweighs good.

The existence of a specific brain mechanism

to detect self-generated errors (Luu et al., 2000)

also suggests that the brain is wired to react

more strongly to bad than good. Errors and

mistakes are, obviously, unintended responses

and hence are more likely to lead to bad out-

comes than good outcomes. Research confirms

the existence of a neurological process that rec-

ognizes self-initiated errors. For instance, stud-

ies in which participants are asked to make

continued response adjustments have shown

that participants know they have made an error,

even in the absence of feedback (e.g., Rabbitt,

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 337

1966).

Moreover, there is a discernible change

in the electrophysiological state of the brain that

occurs soon after an error is made (within 80-

100 ms). This brain response is measured by

using ERP methods and is called error-related

negativity (ERN). The results of another ERP

study also support the existence of a neural

marker for error detection (Miltner, Braun, &

Coles,

1997). Using ERP methods, Miltner et

al.

found a pattern in the anterior cingulate—a

neurological substrate thought to be central to

self-regulatory abilities (see Posner, 1994)—

similar to the negative pattern reported by Luu,

Collins, & Tucker (2000). Moreover, Miltner et

al.

saw this neurological marker across three

different sensory modalities (visual, auditory,

and somatosensory), suggesting that our brains

have a generic system for recognizing self-ini-

tiated errors.

Recently it has been suggested that ERN may

"represent a means of tracking human self-mon-

itoring in real time" (p. 45, Luu et al., 2000). It

is noteworthy that errors, which themselves are

bad (because they are unintended responses)

and which are strongly linked to aversive con-

sequences, appear to have a neurological corre-

late;

whereas there does not seem to be an

analogous neurological reaction for correct

responses.

The effect of negative versus positive stimuli

on neurological indices of evaluative categori-

zation also supports our proposition that bad

outweighs good. Using ERP methodology, Ito,

Cacioppo, and Lang (1998) found that brain

activation consistent with operations at the eval-

uative categorization stage changed as a func-

tion of the pleasantness and unpleasantness of

visual images participants were viewing. Across

two experiments, larger amplitude brain re-

sponses were found when viewing negative ver-

sus positive stimuli. Moreover, this effect oc-

curred despite equating positive and negative

stimuli with respect to probability, evaluative

extremity, and arousal. That there were valance-

related differences at the evaluative categoriza-

tion stage (as opposed to the output stage, for

example) indicates that bad outweighs good at a

motivational level.

Although the evidence has only begun accru-

ing, it suggests that the brain responds more

strongly to bad than good things and that it

retains the memory of bad things, even when

the behavioral response has undergone extinc-

tion. The extinction of a fear response is there-

fore not a genuine case of unlearning, it merely

reflects a behavioral adaptation. The organism

retains the readiness to respond with fear again,

so subsequent relearning of the fear response

would be facilitated. Clearly, this would be an

adaptive pattern insofar as once a threat is rec-

ognized, the person or animal will remember

the threat more or less forever.

Child Development

Fairly little work is available to examine the

relative power of good versus bad events on

child development. An authoritative work by

the eminent developmentalist Scarr (1992) di-

rectly addressed the effects of good versus bad

environments on child development. She pro-

posed that normal development depends on

having an environment that falls within the nor-

mal range. Anything outside that range impairs

development. Scarr cited "violent, abusive, and

neglectful families" (1992, p. 5) as examples of

such environments that can harm child devel-

opment. The thrust of Scarr's argument was that

having exceptionally good parents or a positive

environment would not produce any better de-

velopment than having average parents and an

average environment; whereas having bad par-

ents or a bad environment can inflict lasting

harm. Thus, only the bad, and not the good, can

produce effects that go beyond the average or

normal.

Perhaps the most conclusive data come from

cognitive and intellectual development. It is

fairly well established that intelligence (IQ) is

consistently correlated with social class, as well

as being strongly influenced by genes and he-

redity (e.g., Jensen, 1998). The correlation with

social class can be interpreted as fitting several

different causal hypotheses, and indeed the con-

troversial work by Herrnstein and Murray

(1994) proposed that IQ is a decisive determi-

nant of social class, because low intelligence

leads to lower success in life. Other authors

have,

however, emphasized the opposite causal

direction, proposing that social class affects IQ,

either through the good effects of a well-off

family or the harmful effects of growing up in a

poor, disadvantaged environment.

Any effect of rich or poor families has to

overcome the strong genetic contribution to IQ.

Recently, some researchers have begun to ex-

338BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

amine how the relative contributions of nature

and nurture (operationalized in terms of genetic

heredity vs. shared family environment) may

change as a function of social class. This per-

mits a rather precise comparison of whether bad

is stronger than good: Does the family environ-

ment overcome the genetic contribution more

effectively in good or poor families? Put an-

other way, one assumes that children start off

with a genetic blueprint for a certain level of

intelligence, and the crucial questions are

whether good parents can increase their chil-

dren's IQ above that level, whether poor parents

can decrease their children's IQ below that

same level, or both.

The educational level of parents was selected

for investigation by Rowe, Jacobson, and Van

den Oord (1999). Consistent with the view that

bad is stronger than good, they found that the

influence of family educational level (relative to

heredity) was stronger at the low end. More

precisely, the genetic heritability of intelligence

(IQ) was strong and significant among highly

educated families but was weak and

nonsignif-

icant among poorly educated families. The ef-

fects of shared environment on children's IQ

showed the complementary pattern, with the

effect of the shared family environment ap-

proaching zero among the highly educated fam-

ilies but having an appreciable and significant

effect among the poorly educated families.

Thus,

a relatively poor family environment was

able to overcome the genetic contribution to

intelligence, but the good family environment

had no effect and simply allowed the genes to

determine the children's intelligence. Parents

can make their genetically bright children less

intelligent, but they cannot apparently make

their unintelligent ones (or any others) smarter.

Similar results were obtained in another

study using father's occupational level. Among

the occupationally successful fathers, children's

IQ depended mainly on genetic heredity,

whereas with less successful fathers the family

environment effect was strong and the genetic

contribution was minimal (Thompson, Tiu, &

Detterman, 1999). These findings converge

with those of Rowe et al. (1999) and indicate

that the effects of parenting and other environ-

mental experiences on children are mainly neg-

ative: Bad family environments override the

effect of genetic heredity on intelligence, but

good environments do not—fitting the view that

bad environments are stronger.

Thus,

we do not have extensive data compar-

ing good versus bad influences on child devel-

opment, but the available data are methodolog-

ically quite strong because of the research de-

sign that separates environmental from genetic

effects. The evidence is consistent with the view

that bad is stronger than good.

Social Support

Over the past couple decades, the importance

of social support has been established as central

to health and well-being. Social support is usu-

ally defined in terms of emotional bolstering

and practical assistance received from other

people, particularly friends, relatives, and other

relationship partners. Interactions with such in-

dividuals are not invariably positive, however,

and certainly conflict, undermining, and other

detrimental interactions are possible. If bad is

stronger than good, we would predict that these

aversive interactions with relationship partners

will have a stronger impact on health, well-

being, and other outcomes than will positive,

supportive interactions. Given the general thrust

of social support research toward showing pos-

itive,

beneficial effects, the social support liter-

ature may be regarded on an a priori basis as a

fairly hostile sphere in which to test the hypoth-

esis about the greater power of bad things.

Various findings have indicated that negative

or upsetting social support weighs more heavily

than positive or helpful social support (e.g.,

Manne, Taylor, Dougherty, & Kemeny, 1997).

One important approach has people furnish sep-

arate ratings of the good and bad behaviors of

the members of their social network (e.g., being

a source of conflict and distress vs. being help-

ful and optimistic). Fiore, Becker, and Coppel

(1983) used this method and found that the

degree to which a person rated his or her net-

work members as upsetting was more predictive

of depression than was the rated degree of

helpfulness.

Similarly, Rook (1984) found that helpful

aspects of the social networks of older widowed

women were generally unrelated to psycholog-

ical adjustment and well-being, but problem-

atic,

unhelpful aspects of the widows' networks

were associated with lower levels of adjustment

and well-being, even after controlling for sev-

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD339

eral demographic and health-related variables.

More precisely, the number of interpersonal

problems and the number of people who pro-

vided problematic or confiictual interactions

both predicted (lower) well-being, whereas the

number of sources of positive social support

failed to predict anything (except loneliness,

which seems a trivially obvious effect). Rook

concluded that aversive social interactions have

stronger effects on well-being than positive so-

cial interactions.

Using an older sample of both genders, Okun,

Melichar, and Hill (1990) found stronger (cor-

relational) effects for bad than good social ties

and for bad than good daily events. The bad

aspects of the social network predicted psycho-

logical distress more strongly than the good

aspects. The independent contributions of good

and bad aspects of one's social support network

on people caring for a spouse with Alzheimer's

disease were assessed by Pagel, Erdly, and

Becker (1987) in a 10-month longitudinal study.

They found that positive aspects (such as help-

fulness) were unrelated to depression and social

support satisfaction. Negative aspects such as up-

setting interactions, however, predicted greater

depression and lower satisfaction with the social

network. Even after controlling for initial de-

pression and initial problems, changes in nega-

tive aspects of social support over time pre-

dicted changes in depression.

Similar findings were reported by Finch,

Okun, Barrera, Zautra, and Reich (1989). Their

sample consisted of recently disabled or re-

cently bereaved older adults and a matched con-

trol group. Positive social ties predicted positive

well-being, whereas negative social ties pre-

dicted both well-being and distress.

The effects of social conflict and social sup-

port on coping with abortion were studied by

Major et al. (1997). They concluded that con-

flict in close relationships had a greater impact

than support on postabortion distress, although

support in close relationships had a greater im-

pact on postabortion well-being. These results

fit an affect-matching view (i.e., good things

have an impact on good feelings, whereas bad

things have an impact on bad feelings) rather

than the simpler blanket position that bad is

stronger than good, so their results could be

considered partly contrary to the main thrust

here.

Several features of their study prevent it

from serving as powerful contrary evidence,

though. For one, most of the disclosures were

selectively aimed only at people who the

women expected would be supportive: Women

did not disclose the abortion to someone who

was likely to be disapproving, so the range was

severely restricted. Furthermore, the effects

were obtained mainly after controlling for pos-

itive and negative affectivity, and these vari-

ables strongly colored the perception of social

support and conflict. As noted previously, in

terms of pure effects not already adjusted by

valence, negative affectivity had a stronger im-

pact overall than the positive, on both types of

outcomes combined.

Social support and social conflict (undermin-

ing) were examined by Vinokur and van Ryn

(1993) in a sample of people who had lost their

jobs within the past 4 months, with follow-up

questionnaires 2 months and 4 months later.

Independent measures were given for social

support and social conflict or undermining, and

these had been designed to look at behaviors

that would, in principle, have precisely opposite

effects (i.e., restoring vs. diminishing

self-

worth).

Despite the implicit parallel, the mea-

sures of social conflict and social support were

not opposite ends of a single factor. They were

negatively correlated at about -.70, but were

found to be largely independent factors with

quite different effects on other variables.

Most relevant were the effects on mental

health, which was assessed by measures of anx-

iety and depression scales from a symptom in-

dex. Social conflict or undermining was

signif-

icantly related to mental health at all three

times,

with correlations growing from .20 at

Time

to .47 on the final survey 4 months later.

In contrast, positive social support had a weak

(r = -.20) relation to mental health at Time 1

and even weaker, nonsignificant relationships at

later times. Thus, positive social interactions in

the form of social support had only a weak

effect on mental health, and only at first,

whereas social conflict continued to have a

strong (and, if anything, an increasing) effect on

mental health throughout the period of study.

Vinokur and van Ryn (1993) concluded that bad

interactions are more influential than good ones:

"Interpersonal conflicts that are expressed in

undermining behaviors appear to have a stron-

ger concurrent impact on mental health than

supportive behaviors" (p. 358).

340BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, F1NKENAUER, AND VOHS

The separate effects of support and hindrance

from one's social network were studied by

Ruehlman and Wolchik (1988) in a large sam-

ple of undergraduates. They asked participants

to choose the three adults who were most im-

portant to them in their current life situation and

to report the degree to which these individuals

supported and hindered the four most important

personal projects and goals in the participant's

current life. The researchers found that support

and hindrance were largely independent, and

indeed the correlations between support and

hindrance by the same person ranged from .00

to .11. They found that project hindrance pre-

dicted both well-being (i.e., positive psycholog-

ical functioning) and distress (negative psycho-

logical functioning). Project support, on the

other hand, predicted only well-being. Although

their findings represent only cross-sectional cor-

relations, and causal interpretation is therefore

necessarily speculative, these findings do point

toward the same conclusion that bad events

have more pervasive effects than good events.

These results also fit the broader pattern in

which bad events affect both good and bad

outcomes, whereas good events only affect

good outcomes.

The role of social support versus social con-

flict or undermining was studied in relation to

several different sources of support by Abbey,

Abramis, and Caplan (1985). With regard to the

person closest to the respondent, bad was

clearly stronger than good: Social conflict was

related to three of the four measures of well-

being, whereas social support did not correlate

significantly with any of them. Likewise, when

participants reported on support and conflict

from "some one person," conflict predicted with

more (four) indices of well-being, whereas sup-

port predicted only one. For the vaguest cate-

gory, however, social support versus conflict

with people in general, both support and conflict

predicted well-being on almost all of the mea-

sures.

These results suggest that bad is stronger

than good when considering particular and im-

portant individuals, but across the broadly non-

specific social network, bad and good social

relations were about equally important.

Supportive and negative interactions with

spouses, friends, and relatives were also exam-

ined by Schuster, Kessler, and Aseltine (1990).

Both types of interactions had effects on emo-

tional functioning (measured in terms of a

checklist for depressive symptoms). Compari-

son of the trends however suggested that the

negative interactions had a stronger effect.

Taken together, thus these studies suggest

that helpful aspects of one's social network bear

little or no relation to depression, well-being,

and social support satisfaction, while upsetting

or unhelpful aspects do. Some findings fit an

affect-matching view, in which positive interac-

tions predict positive outcomes whereas nega-

tive interactions predict negative ones. Even in

those findings, however, there appears to be an

asymmetry: Bad interactions have stronger,

more pervasive, and longer lasting effects.

Information Processing

The extent of information processing is an

important indicator of power and importance.

High motivation and pragmatic concerns cause

people to process relevant information more

thoroughly (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Insofar

as people are cognitive misers, they cannot af-

ford to process all information to an equally full

extent, so they must prioritize their cognitive

resources and focus on what is important. If bad

is generally stronger than good, then informa-

tion pertaining to bad events should receive

more thorough processing than information

about good events. The greater information pro-

cessing may be reflected in paying more atten-

tion to them and in elaborating them more thor-

oughly or constructing more extensive cogni-

tive interpretations (such as attributions). The

more extensive processing will also tend to lead

to enhanced memory for bad material, although

this tendency may sometimes be offset if the

main goal and thrust of the processing involve

defensive responses that retroactively minimize

the bad events and thus conspire to erase them

from memory (cf. Taylor, 1991).

Early evidence that bad things get more

thought was provided by Klinger, Barta, and

Maxeiner (1980). On a self-report scale, people

claimed to devote more thought to their goals

that were blocked than to other categories (in-

cluding positive things). Threatened personal

relationships and projects that had encountered

unexpected difficulties topped the list of most

frequent topics of thought.

The quantity of cognition in response to var-

ious interpersonal events was studied by Abele

(1985).

People engaged in more thinking and

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 341

reasoning about bad than good events. A further

and noteworthy feature of Abele's research is

that she also explicitly manipulated whether the

event was expected or unexpected. This vari-

able yielded its own main effect (unexpected

events produced more cognitions), but it did not

interact with valence. Thus, bad events elicit

more processing than good events, even when

the expectedness of the event is held constant.

This suggests that the greater power of bad

cannot be reduced to expectancy effects, con-

trary to one of the theories we have proposed.

Quantity (duration) of cognitive processing

was measured by Fiske (1980), who showed

people photographs of various behaviors that

varied in positivity versus negativity. The os-

tensible purpose of the photographs was to form

impressions. Participants spent longer viewing

the photographs depicting negative than posi-

tive behaviors, suggesting that people paid more

attention to bad than good acts when forming

impressions.

More generally, it is generally assumed that

people seek to understand events that happen to

them, and attributional processing is part of this

search for meaning (e.g., Baumeister, 1991;

Frankl, 1963; Taylor, 1983). To find meaning,

people can try to find a cause that provides them

with an answer to the question as to why certain

events happened or they can try to find a dif-

ferent interpretation and reframe their experi-

ences.

Some evidence suggests that negative

events cause people to engage in greater search

for meaning and making sense than positive

events. Baumeister concluded from a broad re-

view that unpleasant events stimulate the need

for meaning to a greater degree than positive or

pleasant events. An empirical test of the differ-

ence was conducted by Gilovich (1983), who

examined spontaneous thinking about important

outcomes. Participants in his study first placed

bets on sporting events and either lost or won

money. About

week after the event took place,

they came back into the laboratory to settle their

bets with the experimenter. They also provided

tape-recorded accounts of their current thoughts

about the games. The amount of time spent

discussing the game was greater for the lost

games than for the winning games. This differ-

ence reflects a greater search for meaning for

bad than for good outcomes.

A similar conclusion emerged from a review

of 17 studies on causal attribution by Weiner

(1985).

Spontaneous attributional activity was

defined as people's efforts to explain what is

happening to them and to identify a cause for

what happened. In all studies in which positive

events were contrasted with negative ones,

spontaneous attributional activity was greater

for negative (e.g., failures) than for positive

events (e.g., successes).

Pratto and John (1991) set out to test whether

attentional resources are automatically directed

away from the current task when extraneous

stimuli, either good or bad, are presented. Using

a modified Stroop paradigm, the researchers

presented participants with personality trait ad-

jectives (e.g., sadistic, honest), and participants

were instructed to name the color ink in which

each word was printed. To the extent that atten-

tion was automatically seized by the meaning of

the trait, participants would be slower to name

the color. In the first study, people took longer

to name the ink color when the word referred to

a bad trait than when it was a good trait. Thus,

the meanings of bad traits had greater power for

attracting attention, as compared with good

traits.

Retrospective self-reports indicated that

participants claimed they ignored the words and

concentrated on the colors, which is consistent

with the view that any interference occurred at

an automatic and not a fully conscious level.

In a second study, Pratto and John (1991)

replicated the greater interference by bad than

good traits and also showed that people had

greater memory for the bad than for the good

traits:

Participants were twice as likely to re-

member the bad ones than the good ones. This

suggests that the automatic shifting of attention

to the bad traits stimulated some incidental

learning, resulting in the superior recall. In a

third study, Pratto and John replicated the ef-

fects despite explicitly varying the base rates of

good and bad traits, in order to rule out the

hypothesis that bad information is stronger sim-

ply because it is more unusual. The manipula-

tion of base rates (i.e., whether the stimulus set

contained more good or more bad traits in total)

was not significant, whereas the valence imbal-

ance remained significant across different base

rates.

The authors concluded that bad informa-

tion, at least in the form of undesirable trait

terms,

has more power than good information

for attracting attention in an automatic, nonin-

tentional fashion, and that this effect is not due

to greater informativeness of diagnosticity

342BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

(based on generally positive expectations and

base rates).

The greater attention to bad than good was

shown in a different way by Graziano, Brothen,

and Berscheid (1980). Participants received ei-

ther a positive or a negative evaluation from

another person. They viewed the other person's

evaluation on videotape. Across conditions, all

participants monitored the negative evaluation

video for significantly more time (56% of the

total time) than the positive evaluation video

(44%

of the total time). This difference was

more pronounced when participants expected to

interact with the other person as compared with

when participants did not expect any future

interaction.

Attention to emotionally expressive faces

was studied by Oehman, Lundqvist, and Es-

teves (2001). Schematically drawn faces were

presented in groups, and some of them had

either a happy smiling face or a threatening,

frowning face. Threatening faces were detected

more quickly and accurately than the smiling

faces under most conditions. A no-difference

result was obtained under one condition (in-

volving a background matrix of friendly faces

and a short processing time), but overall the

frowning faces were noticed better.

Another sign of the attentional priority of bad

over good was furnished by Marshall and Kidd

(1981),

who conducted a series of studies ask-

ing whether participants preferred to hear good

or bad news first, provided that both were forth-

coming. Across several studies, they found a

strong majority consistently (from 77% to 88%)

asked to hear the bad news first. The greater

processing of bad than good events was shown

by Holtzworth-Munroe and Jacobson (1985) in

the context of marital relationships. Participants

generated lists of positive and negative events,

frequent and infrequent, that were occurring in

their marriage. They were then presented with

various items from the list in random order and

asked to list their thoughts and feelings that

would occur if each event were happening right

now. The aversive partner behaviors, regardless

of whether frequent or infrequent, led to more

attributional activity than positive partner

behaviors.

The issue is somewhat more complicated in

reactions to other people's emotion displays.

Krull and Dill (1998) found that participants

made more spontaneous trait inferences from

other participant's happy rather than sad behav-

ior. They speculated, however, that sad behav-

ior can result from a variety of causes, so it is

complex and not sufficiently unambiguous (di-

agnostic) to permit a spontaneous inference. In

support of this conclusion, Krull and Dill re-

ported that participants were significantly

slower at making either inferences about the

causes of sad behavior as compared with happy

behavior. The slower reaction time is consistent

with the general theme of greater processing

with regard to negative than positive informa-

tion. In plain terms, people can make snap judg-

ments about someone who seems happy, but

they engage in longer and more complex (but

less conclusive) thinking about someone who

seems sad.

The longer time taken for the attributions

about negative behaviors may be related to the

greater specificity of negative traits. Claeys and

Timmers (1993) found that bad traits are more

specifically and narrowly defined than good

traits,

in the sense that the bad traits are seen as

more different from each other and encompass a

narrower range of behaviors. The greater spec-

ificity of bad traits may be a linguistic sign of

the greater power or importance of bad than

good, parallel to the preponderance of words for

bad than good emotions.

There is also some evidence that affective

consequences of negative information are stron-

ger than those of good information. Ikegami

(1993) primed people by having them write

first-person sentences containing friendly, hos-

tile,

or neutral words. The hostile priming had

stronger and longer lasting effects on subse-

quent emotional states than either the positive or

the neutral primes.

Some apparent exceptions may be found in

the special category of bad feedback about the

self,

which people are motivated to avoid.

Baumeister and Cairns (1992) found that repres-

sors devoted less processing time to unfavor-

able personality feedback, under some condi-

tions.

The tendency to avoid bad feedback prob-

ably does not indicate any lack of strength on

the part of the individual, however. More likely,

it reflects a tendency to want to shield the self

from the negative impact (such as potential loss

of self-esteem). Even in this work, moreover,

bad information did receive exceptionally long

processing when it could not easily be dis-

missed and avoided, so even the apparent ex-

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 343

ception to the general pattern was found under

only limited conditions.

The more extensive and elaborate processing

of bad than good material has been amply con-

firmed in practical contexts outside of the lab-

oratory, too. Among journalists and communi-

cation scientists, it is considered common

knowledge that bad events are more newswor-

thy and attract more reader attention. Periodic

calls for the news to focus more on positive,

uplifting stories get nowhere, not because jour-

nalists are sadists or misanthropes, but because

bad news sells more papers. Likewise, Fiedler's

(1966/1982) authoritative history of novels in-

cluded the pointed observation that no one has

ever been able to make a successful novel about

a happy marriage, whereas marital problems

have filled countless novels. Thus, the most

widely read classes of writers—journalists and

novelists—both devote the bulk of their writing

to elaborating bad rather than good events.

Thus,

bad information does receive more thor-

ough information processing than good infor-

mation. Bad information is more likely to seize

attention, and it receives more conscious pro-

cessing as well. The one exception to this gen-

eral rule involves unflattering information about

the self that some individuals such as repressors

may simply avoid.

Memory

Memory should be most subject to a positiv-

ity bias, in view of the minimization processes

that selectively erase bad memories (Taylor,

1991) and other repressive processes. Yet even

with memory, there is some evidence that bad is

stronger than good, although this effect is

bounded by self-enhancement processes and

mood-congruent recall processes.

Interviews with children and adults up to 50

years old (in separate studies) about childhood

memories found a preponderance of unpleasant

memories, even among people who rated their

childhoods as having been relatively pleasant

and happy (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1968).

Likewise, superior recall for unfavorable in-

formation was shown by Dreben, Fiske, and

Hastie (1979). Regardless of serial position,

sentences describing people's undesirable be-

haviors were recalled better than sentences de-

scribing desirable or neutral behaviors. The su-

perior memory for bad than for good things was

also found by Bless et al. (1992). Participants

remembered bad behaviors better than good

ones.

Skowronski and Carlston (1987) also

found that bad behaviors were recalled better

than good ones, for both extreme and moderate

levels.

On the other hand, biases that flatter the self

make recall of one's own bad behaviors less

likely. Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, and Shan-

non (1991) explicitly compared memory for

everyday life events for both the self and for

another person such as a friend whom the par-

ticipant saw almost every day. They found no

difference in recall for the friend's pleasant

versus unpleasant events, but for the self there

was a memory bias in favor of the pleasant

events (although this was limited to events with

intermediate typicality; typical and atypical

events were recalled better, regardless of pleas-

antness). These findings suggest that there are

certain memory biases that downplay bad expe-

riences of the self but not of other people,

consistent with Taylor's (1991) minimization

hypothesis.

Also supportive of a motivation to minimize

negative events are the findings from a study in

which the researchers examined whether recol-

lection of the emotional intensity of a personal

event changed as a function on time and initial

positivity or negativity of the event (Walker,

Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). Walker et al. as-

sessed participants' evaluations of personal ex-

periences—both positive and negative—as they

occurred and then reassessed their evaluations

of these experiences at intervals of 3 months, 1

year, and 4.5 years. Consistent with previous

findings (e.g., Holmes, 1970), they found that

the affective intensity of a memory fades as

time progressed and that this effect was espe-

cially true for memories of negative events.

That is, the drop in intensity was steeper for

memories of negative, compared with positive,

events. Notably, the content of the memories

remained intact over time. The researchers in-

terpreted this finding as indicating that people

effortfully target the emotional intensity of neg-

ative events, hoping to diminish their subse-

quent influence (see Taylor, 1991).

Cognitive psychologists have examined

whether bad items are processed and remem-

bered better than positive ones. Robinson-

Riegler and Winton (1996) confirmed that par-

ticipants showed better recognition memory for

344BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

negative than positive items. Furthermore, they

were better able to recall the source of bad than

good information, as shown by their ability to

identify which stimuli had come to them in a

second as opposed to a first phase; whereas the

positive stimuli seemed simply to get all mixed

together. These findings suggest that the bad

material received more thorough processing

when it was encoded and was, therefore, re-

tained in a more complex, elaborate memory

trace.

Ohira, Winton, and Oyama (1997) extended

Robinson-Riegler and Winton's work by in-

cluding measures of eyeblinks and latency, both

of which have been associated with increased

conscious processing. They too found that par-

ticipants remembered (recognized) negative

words more successfully than positive words.

The negative words were also associated with

slower responses and more eyeblinks, both of

which indicate greater conscious processing.

These findings fit the view that negative mate-

rial evokes more extensive conscious activity,

which in turn produces better memory for the

material.

In contrast, there is evidence for mood-con-

gruent recall for semantic material (for a re-

view, see Matt, Vasquez, & Campbell, 1992).

Nondepressed individuals show a bias toward

recalling positively valenced stimulus words;

depressed individuals recall equal numbers of

positively valenced and negatively valenced

stimulus words.

In summary, three psychological forces ap-

pear to collide in the human memory. The mem-

ory literature does supply limited evidence for

the greater power of bad over good, but this

does not appear to be the dominant force. This

evidence coexists with a tendency for individu-

als to recall positive information (a self-en-

hancement effect), particularly when in a posi-

tive mood (a mood-congruent recall effect).

This is true for self-relevant memories and se-

mantic recall.

Stereotypes

A generalization about a category or group of

people can in principle be either good or bad.

Although undoubtedly some stereotypes are fa-

vorable, the majority of them appear to be neg-

ative and pejorative. This suggests that the pro-

cess of forming and maintaining stereotypes is

biased toward negativity, which would be yet

another sign that bad is stronger than good.

One important source of stereotype formation

and persistence is illusory correlation based on

distinctive events. A meta-analytic review of 23

studies on this pattern was conducted by Mullen

and Johnson (1990). They found that distinctive

negative behaviors have stronger effects, in the

sense of being better able to generate illusory

correlations, than distinctive positive behaviors

or neutral behaviors. In particular, minority

groups (which are already salient by virtue of

minority status) are likely to be assigned unde-

sirable stereotypes based on illusory correlations.

One important sign of differential power

would be the relative ease with which stereo-

types are formed and disconfirmed, as a func-

tion of whether the stereotype is favorable or

unfavorable. Rothbart and Park (1986) found

strong correlations between the favorability of a

trait and the number of instances required for its

confirmation (r = .71) and discontinuation (r =

-.70).

Specifically, the more unfavorable the

trait, the fewer the number of instances required

for confirmation and the greater the number of

instances necessary for disconfirmation.

In other words, bad reputations are easy to

acquire but difficult to lose, whereas good rep-

utations are difficult to acquire but easy to lose.

These findings suggest that unfavorable charac-

teristics once acquired as part of a stereotype

may be difficult to lose in part because a large

number of observations are necessary for their

disconfirmation. The findings certainly confirm

that bad is stronger than good: It takes far more

to overcome the bad than the good trait, and

more to change the bad than the good

reputation.

Forming Impressions

Impression formation is one of the few topics

with which researchers have recognized and

discussed a general pattern of valence imbal-

ance (e.g., Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). The

usual term is

positive—negative

asymmetry, in-

dicating that bad information about a stimulus

person or new acquaintance carries more weight

and has a larger impact on impressions than

good information (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski,

1990).

An early demonstration of this asymmetry

was provided by Anderson (1965), who pre-

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 345

sumably hoped for different findings because he

was trying to advance an additive and averaging

model of impression formation. That is, he

sought to show that people form impressions of

someone by adding up and averaging all of the

information they have about that person, good

and bad alike.

To support his averaging model, Anderson

(1965) provided participants with various per-

sonality traits that allegedly characterized a

stimulus person. These traits had been given

precise weights based on favorability ratings, so

he carefully chose positive and negative traits

that were equally distant from the neutral point

on the favorability scale. The participants were

then asked to rate their overall impression of the

stimulus person. Anderson could then investi-

gate how these global impressions departed

from the midpoint of the scale as a function of

how the various traits departed from the favor-

ability midpoint. He found that the bad trait

adjectives were stronger than the good ones.

The mean ratings of stimulus persons defined by

all negative traits departed farther from the

global scale midpoint than did the mean ratings

of stimulus persons defined by all positive traits,

even though the traits were equally distant from

the midpoint. Furthermore, when stimulus per-

sons were described with both favorable and

unfavorable traits, the unfavorable ones lowered

the global impression rating more than a simple

additive or averaging model would predict, un-

like the favorable traits, which did not exert an

influence beyond averaging. Anderson con-

cluded that unfavorable trait adjectives were

more powerful than favorable ones in shaping

impressions.

Another early demonstration was provided

by Feldman (1966; see also discussion in

Wright, 1991), who was also interested in av-

eraging models. Participants in his study pro-

vided ratings of stimulus persons who had been

described with one positive, one negative, or

one of each type of adjective. The overall rat-

ings of people described by both positive and

negative labels were more negative than a sim-

ple averaging of impressions would have pre-

dicted: Thus, the bad information carried more

weight. Wyer and Hinkle (1971) likewise found

that bad information carried more weight in

impression formation than in good information.

Similar findings were provided by Hodges

(1974).

Participants in his study rated pairs of

traits,

and Hodges then calculated whether the

combined impression deviated from the average

of the two traits. A pure averaging model suc-

cessfully predicted impressions when only both

traits were positive. In all others, the more neg-

ative trait carried greater weight. Thus, even

when both traits were negative, the total impres-

sion was more negative than a simple averaging

of the two traits would predict. Of course, when

the traits were one of each, the bad one carried

more weight. Thus, bad information consis-

tently had a stronger effect on the final

impression.

Hamilton and Huffman (1971) also found

that undesirable traits received more weight in

impression formation than did desirable ones.

The authors explained this on the basis of dis-

tinctive usefulness of information: Because

good behavior is common and expected, bad

things are more revealing and hence more im-

portant to know. Hamilton and Zanna (1972)

found that negative traits exerted a stronger

effect than positive traits on impressions, as

shown by greater departure from the mean rat-

ings of neutral targets. Moreover, negative traits

had a stronger effect than positive traits on

participants' confidence in their impressions.

That is, raters were more confident of the accu-

racy of their bad impression of someone with

bad traits than they were confident about their

good impression of someone with good traits.

Taken together, these findings show that bad

information has greater power both objectively

and subjectively. The objective power is shown

in the stronger effect on the impression, and the

subjective power is shown in the greater confi-

dence in the accuracy of the impression.

Evidence that negative information carries

more weight than positive information in terms

of influence on likeability was provided by

Fiske (1980). She showed photographs depict-

ing various behaviors that differed in valence

(i.e.,

positive or negative) and extremity. Neg-

ative behaviors had more impact on likeability

than positive information, especially when the

level of extremity was high. The greater power

of bad information than good information has

continued to be found in recent work (e.g.,

Vonk, 1993, 1996, 1999; Vonk & Knippenberg,

1994).

The greater power of bad than good informa-

tion can also be seen in speed of decision mak-

ing and the amount of information sought. Yzer-

346BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

byt and Ley ens (1991) had participants make

decisions about whether a given actor was

suited to play a theatre role that was described

as likeable or unlikable. Participants were told

how much total information was available about

each actor and were given this information a

little at a time, so they were free to make a

decision as soon as they felt confident enough to

do so. The greater impact of negative trait in-

formation was shown in speedier decisions (i.e.,

with less information): A little evidence that the

actor was unlikable was enough to discredit him

or her for the likeable role. In contrast, a small

amount of evidence that an actor was likeable

was not enough to disqualify him or her for the

unlikable role. (That is, with the unlikable role,

the difference was eliminated but not signifi-

cantly reversed.) When initial information was

favorable but unfavorable information followed

it (with the likeable role), participants shifted

strongly and quickly to rejecting the candidate,

which again shows a disproportionately strong

impact of bad traits. In general, then, people

made faster decisions with less information

when they were given negative rather than pos-

itive information.

The evidence and theories about the positive-

negative asymmetry were reviewed by Skow-

ronski and Carlston (1989). These authors also

put forward their own theory, based on category

diagnosticity (see also Czapinski, 1986). The

basic assumptions of their theory were, first,

that people categorize other individuals by us-

ing available informational cues. Second, peo-

ple see some behaviors as more helpful than

others in discriminating between various trait

categorizations. In other words, some behaviors

are more informative than others. For example,

the behavior of stealing is more informative

about someone's honesty than is the behavior of

running. This usefulness of behaviors for mak-

ing such judgments is what Skowronski and

Carlston meant by category diagnosticity.

Third, attributes perceived as more diagnostic

for category membership will be more influen-

tial in impression formation than others. Fourth,

and most relevant, extreme or negative behav-

iors are perceived as more diagnostic than mod-

erate or positive behaviors.

Why should this be so? Skowronski and Carl-

ston (1989) proposed that bad behaviors are

more diagnostic than good ones simply because

the category requirements of consistency are

more stringent for good than bad traits. To be

categorized as good, one has to be good all of

the time (consistently). To be categorized as

bad, a few bad acts are sufficient, and presum-

ably hardly anyone is consistently bad. Hence,

negative behaviors carry more weight than pos-

itive behaviors for ruling out some categories.

The diagnosticity view was tested in a later

paper by Skowronski and Carlston (1992). They

noted that to be morally good means to be

always good, whereas immorality does not re-

quire consistent immorality, so single immoral

behaviors are more diagnostic. For example,

one may be regarded as a liar despite telling the

truth on many occasions, but one will not be

regarded as an honest man if he tells many lies.

The opposite may apply to intelligence, how-

ever, because a stupid person can never be

brilliant, whereas a very intelligent person can

occasionally do a stupid thing. Skowronski and

Carlston did find that the negativity bias held

true for moral behaviors but was reversed for

intelligence-related behaviors: Extremely posi-

tive (intelligent) acts had a bigger effect than

extremely negative ones.

The greater power of bad in the sphere of

moral behavior was the focus of Riskey and

Birnbaum (1974) in an article with the revealing

subtitle, "Two Rights Don't Make Up for a

Wrong." They found that morally bad actions

create a powerful effect on overall judgment,

and this effect is only slightly mitigated by

adding morally good actions. Riskey and Birn-

baum's conclusion was "the overall goodness of

a person is determined mostly by his worst bad

deed, with good deeds having lesser influ-

ence.

.. . Given a person has done evil, an

infinite number of good deeds may not produce

a favorable overall impression" (p. 172). Skow-

ronski and Carlston (1992) found that the im-

pression impact of morally good behaviors was

easily overridden by new information depicting

immoral behaviors, but the reverse did not hold:

An initial impression based on morally bad be-

haviors was not easily changed by new infor-

mation about morally good behaviors.

Some researchers have pointed out that in

certain domains, positive information should

carry more weight. Skowronski and Carlston

(1987) contended that diagnosticity helps pre-

dict differential weighting of information as a

function of whether the judgment pertains to

morality or competence. With morality, bad

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 347

acts are more diagnostic because only immoral

people do bad things, whereas both moral and

immoral people do good things. With ability,

however, good performances should be more

diagnostic than bad ones because only compe-

tent people achieve superior performances,

whereas both competent and incompetent peo-

ple can perform badly. Their findings confirmed

a negativity bias with moral traits (e.g., dishon-

est behaviors influenced impressions more than

honest ones) but a positivity bias with traits

based on competence (e.g., intelligent behaviors

had a stronger effect than stupid ones). The

dependent variable in these studies was the par-

ticipant's estimate that the stimulus person

would act a certain way in the future, which

differs from simply giving a subjective judg-

ment of favorability or likeability. Thus, the

results indicate mainly that having performed

well (i.e., competently) leads to stronger predic-

tions about future performance than having per-

formed badly, whereas having acted immorally

leads to stronger predictions about future per-

formance than having acted morally.

Similar results were reported by Martijn,

Spears, van der Pligt, and Jakobs (1992), but

with an added twist that they surveyed the net

effect of various combinations on overall im-

pressions. The global impression was more af-

fected by bad behaviors than good ones, regard-

less of whether the information referred to abil-

ity or morality. That is, Martijn et al. examined

various combinations of traits (e.g., morally in-

corruptible plus clever, incorruptible plus stu-

pid, corrupt plus clever, and corrupt plus stupid)

and assessed overall impressions. All of the

combinations, except the double-positive condi-

tion, were more negative than a simple averag-

ing model would have predicted. Thus, any bad

information carried a disproportionately stron-

ger impact than any good information. Another

way of describing their results is that they rep-

licated the diagnosticity effect but also showed

that the greater power of bad than good infor-

mation goes beyond issues of diagnosticity.

Hiring and personnel decisions constitute an

especially important sphere of impression for-

mation, and it is one in which situational con-

tingencies probably underscore the greater im-

portance of bad information: It may be more

costly to hire a bad, undesirable employee than

to reject a good, desirable one. Bolster and

Springbett (1961) studied how interviewers'

opinions changed as a function of new good or

bad information about a candidate. Across a

variety of measures and procedures, they found

consistently that bad information exerted a

more powerful effect than good information.

For example, if the initial judgment favored

hiring (i.e., acceptance), only 3.8 unfavorable

bits of information were required to shift the

decision to rejection; whereas 8.8 favorable

pieces of information were necessary to shift an

initially negative decision toward acceptance.

Likewise, Webster (1964) concluded that per-

sonnel interviewers use unfavorable informa-

tion as a basis for rejecting candidates to a

greater extent than they use favorable informa-

tion as a basis for hiring them. Webster sug-

gested that it was more common (and hence

presumably required less information) to

change from a favorable to an unfavorable im-

pression of a candidate than to change from

unfavorable to favorable.

The influence of speaking with positive ver-

sus negative words on impressions was studied

by Berry, Pennebaker, Mueller, and Hiller

(1997).

They instructed one set of participants

to "tell us about yourself and what is going on

in your life," and they videotaped these

speeches. The tapes were then shown to other

participants, who rated each one on several di-

mensions. Berry et

al.

found that people used far

more positive than negative emotion words in

their self-disclosures (consistent with the view

that positive things outnumber bad things), but

the negative emotion words had significantly

more impact on impressions. Specifically, the

more people used negative emotion words, the

less warm/likable and the less competent they

were judged to be. Positive emotion words had

no significant impact on either type of rating

and, in fact, on ratings of dominance, positive

emotion words actually had a negative effect.

Berry et al. speculated that the reason for the

discrepancy is that it is acceptable and even

expected for people to discuss positive feelings

during a first encounter, but speaking about

negative feelings is not expected and generates

a stronger reaction.

Thus,

the greater power of bad than good

information in forming impressions has been

well documented and recognized by research-

ers.

Multiple theories have been put forward to

address this asymmetry, including expectations,

memory, and category diagnosticity. Although

348BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER,

AND

VOHS

these theories

can

each explain

substantial

amount

the findings,

the

greater power

bad

than good information appears

survive even

when these explanations

do not

apply.

Self

Self-concepts should seemingly

be one

sphere

which

bad is not

stronger than good.

is well recognized that most people hold rather

favorable opinions

themselves. Taylor

and

Brown (1988) documented

substantial amount

of evidence indicating that people think more

favorably

themselves than objective evidence

warrants

(see

also Greenwald, 1980). Baumeis-

ter, Tice,

and

Hutton (1989) showed that

self-

esteem scores

on all

different scales tend

to be

distributed from very high

medium, with

hardly

any

participants scoring

in the

truly

low

self-esteem range. Other reviews have

con-

firmed that implausibly high majorities

peo-

ple consider themselves

to be

above average

various dimensions

(see

Gilovich, 1991).

bad

performances carried greater weight

forming

self-concepts, then presumably most people

would regard themselves

below average

rather than above.

Yet perhaps

direct prediction that people

would have unfavorable self-concepts

unre-

alistic.

It is

generally agreed that people have

strong motivations

maintain favorable

con-

cepts

themselves (e.g., Banaji

Prentice,

1994;

Baumeister,

1998;

Sedikides, 1993).

Hence,

it is

likely that they exert themselves

prevent

bad

information

and bad

experiences

from producing

unfavorable self-concept.

Thus,

bad

information could actually have

greater power than good, without necessarily

resulting

in a bad

self-concept—provided that

people's responses

to bad

experiences

threat-

ening information

are

capable

discounting

any implications about

the self.

This

was a

central thrust

Taylor's (1991) paper, which

recognized

the

power

of bad

feedback

but pro-

posed that minimization processes selectively

discredit

and

erase

the

negative implications

for

self.

These arguments suggest

a way to

reformu-

late

the

question

whether bad

stronger than

good with respect

to the self. The

strong moti-

vation

have

good rather than

a bad

opinion

of self

can be

decomposed into

two

strivings:

one

which

is to

avoid

a bad

opinion

self

(self-protection),

and the

other

is to

gain

good

opinion

self (self-enhancement).

If bad is

stronger than good, then

the

self-protective

mo-

tivation should

stronger than

the

self-en-

hancement

one.

Self-concept theory

has

traditionally placed

more emphasis

self-enhancement than

self-protection, such

embodied

in the

concept

the

ideal self

positive view

self) that

seen

as the

main motivator. Ogilvie (1987)

sur-

veyed psychology students

and

faculty

as to

whether life satisfaction depended more

on be-

coming like their ideal selves

becoming

un-

like their undesired selves,

and

nearly

90% of

both students

and

faculty said

the

desire

meet

one's positive ideals

was

stronger.

Yet

Ogil-

vie's

own

data pointed strongly

in the

opposite

direction:

The

undesired self (operationally

de-

fined as

"How I

hope never

to be") was a

powerful motivator than

the

desired

self. Gen-

eral satisfaction

life

had

significant correla-

tions with both closeness

to the

ideal self

and

closeness

to the

undesired

self, but the

latter

was significantly higher

(for

ideal

self, r = .368;

for undesired

self, r =

-.719). Regression anal-

yses suggested that

the

motivation

approach

one's ideals might even

derivative

of the

motivation

avoid becoming one's undesired

self.

Ogilvie suggested that many people form

their ideals precisely

response

their unde-

sired selves.

For

example, Ogilvie described

participant who said

his

most undesired self was

dependent, needy,

and

selfish

and who

correspondingly erected ideals

for

himself to

unselfishly helpful

others.

"It is

likely that

his

ideal self

was

derived from

his

undesired self

and

not

vice versa,

and it is

suspected that this

the

normal course

events" (Ogilvie,

1987,

384).

The distinction between protection

and en-

hancement

was

also made

Baumeister

et al.

(1989) with regard

individual differences

self-esteem

and

self-presentational motivations.

They concluded that people with

low

self-es-

teem

are

primarily concerned with self-protec-

tion, consistent with

the

view

of the

greater

power

of bad

events.

contrast, however,

Baumeister

et al.

concluded that people with

high self-esteem

are

oriented toward self-en-

hancement, which seemingly suggests

the op-

posite motivational pattern

(of

greater concern

with good than bad).

Yet the

self-enhancement

orientation

people with high self-esteem does

BAD

STRONGER THAN GOOD349

not actually indicate

indifference

to bad out-

comes

failure.

anything, people with high

self-esteem show even more dramatic

and

strik-

ing responses

failure than people with

low

self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister

Tice,

1985;

Baumeister, Heatherton,

Tice, 1993; McFar-

lin

Blascovich, 1981). The difference appears

that people with high self-esteem

do not

worry much about failure

rejection because

they

do not

expect these

happen. Their highly

favorable expectations account

for the

surpris-

ing discrepancy between seeming disregard

possible future failure

and

strong

and

distraught

reactions when they actually receive failure

feedback (Blaine

Crocker, 1993).

The distribution

self-esteem scores

may be

relevant.

Baumeister

et al.

(1989) noted,

participants scoring above

the

median

in self-

esteem

actually have high self-esteem scores

absolute sense,

so it is

plausible that they

not

spend much time worrying about possi-

ble

bad

outcomes.

contrast, participants scor-

ing below

the

median (thus

low in

self-esteem)

typically have scores that

are

medium

in self-

esteem,

absolute terms, indicating that they

have roughly comparable familiarity with

suc-

cess

and

failure. Thus, when both success

and

failure

are

familiar,

bad is

stronger than good,

and only

the

people

who

rarely encounter fail-

ure (according

their belief

and

perception,

anyway) disdain self-protection.

A direct test

the relative power

of the two

motivations

was

undertaken

Tice (1991).

She used

the

motivated pattern

self-handi-

capping,

strategic behavior that consists

creating obstacles

one's

own

performance,

such

inadequate practice

alcohol impair-

ment (Jones

Berglas, 1978).

principle,

self-handicapping

can

both enhance success

(e.g., succeeding despite minimal practice

doubly impressive)

and

protect against failure

(e.g., failing after inadequate practice

is no dis-

grace).

Although Tice's findings confirmed

the

general hypothesis that

low

self-esteem people

would self-handicap

for

self-protection while

high self-esteem people would

do it for self-

enhancement,

the

self-protection pattern

was

stronger overall.

For

example,

the

self-protec-

tive benefits

self-handicapping were

en-

dorsed

participants

both high

and low

levels

self-esteem, whereas

the

self-enhanc-

ing benefits were endorsed only

participants

with high self-esteem.

Put

another

way,

every-

one recognizes

the

value

self-handicapping

for protecting against

bad

outcomes, whereas

the value

for

enhancing good outcomes

is con-

fined

people with high self-esteem

(who do

not worry much about failure anyway).

The

more widespread appeal

self-protection

consistent with

the

view that

bad is

stronger

than good.

Likewise, self-serving biases

can

operate

ei-

ther

protect against

bad

outcomes

or to en-

hance good ones,

but,

again, some evidence

points

greater power

and

pervasiveness

self-protection, suggesting that people

are

motivated

avoid

the bad

than

embrace

the

good. Distortion

information

in a

self-serving

bias

was

studied

Klein (1992),

and he

found

that biases were stronger

connection with

bad

than good things.

In an

initial pair

studies,

students were asked

estimate

how

often they

engaged

positive health-related behaviors

(e.g., eating fruit, brushing teeth,

and

eating

vitamins)

and

negative health-related behaviors

(e.g., sunbathing, driving

in bad

weather,

and

eating salty foods). They also estimated

how

often their peers performed

the

same behaviors.

There

was

ample evidence

self-serving bias:

On average, students estimated that they

per-

formed

the

good acts more often,

and the bad

acts less often, than their peers.

For

present

purposes,

the

relevant point

that Klein found

greater bias

connection with

the bad

than

the

good behaviors.

fact,

in the

second study,

the

bias (i.e.,

the

difference between self

and

peer

estimates) reached significance

for the bad be-

haviors

but not for the

good ones.

In a

third

study, Klein used

the

same behavior (eating

raisins)

and

presented

it as

either

healthful

an unhealthful behavior. When

was presented

as health enhancing, because

of the

high vita-

min content

raisins, students claimed

to eat

more raisins than their peers,

but

when

it was

presented

unhealthful, because

of a

high

sul-

fur content

raisins, students estimated that

they

ate

fewer raisins than their peers. (Control

participants,

for

whom eating raisins

was not

presented

either healthful

unhealthful,

showed

bias either

way.) For

present

pur-

poses,

the

most relevant finding

was

that

the

positive bias

was

weaker than

the

negative bias.

All these findings point

to the

conclusion that

avoiding

the bad is a

stronger motivation than

embracing

the

good.

350BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

More generally, people seem to show more

self-favoring biases for negative than for posi-

tive behaviors. Hoorens (1996) reviewed multi-

ple studies showing this pattern, which is to say

that people seek to avoid bad traits more than

they seek to claim good traits. Hoorens's (1995)

earlier work found a contrary pattern, in which

participants claimed to possess more good and

fewer bad traits than the average person, so the

effect is not unanimous, but the contrary find-

ings are often confounded. Thus, Hoorens's

(1995) results were confounded by differential

base rates: The rates of endorsement of bad

traits were relatively low for both self and the

average person, so there was relatively little

statistical room for the denial of bad traits to

emerge.

Personal optimism was also studied by Hoo-

rens (1995) by having participants rate the rel-

ative likelihood that various positive and nega-

tive events would happen to them, as opposed to

being likely to happen to the average person of

their same age, sex, and school. The motiva-

tional bias fit the view that bad is stronger than

good: Hoorens found that personal optimism

was more pronounced with regard to bad events

than good events. In other words, participants

underestimated their own chances of having

various bad experiences (relative to the average

person) more strongly than they overestimated

their chances of having various good experiences.

In performance settings, self-enhancement

and self-protection are often indistinguishable.

Doing one's best accomplishes both the goal of

avoiding failure and securing success. Only a

few studies have effectively sought to separate

these motivations, but they too confirm that bad

is stronger than good. Goodhart (1986) had peo-

ple engage in either positive or negative think-

ing prior to an achievement task. These as-

signed thinking strategies involved recalling

oneself being in a situation in which one might

have the assigned series of thoughts, such as

"Deep down I think I'm a pretty competent

person" (positive) or "No matter how hard I try,

I just can't seem to grasp certain things" (neg-

ative).

They were then given an anagrams task.

The negative thinking led to better performance

on the test. Obviously, this does not reflect any

direct self-suggestion or self-fulfilling prophecy

(because the results point in the opposite direc-

tion).

Goodhart concluded that the negative

thoughts evoked more powerful motivations

than the positive thoughts.

The distinction between self-enhancement

and self-protection has been recast by Higgins

(1987,

1996) as a distinction between preven-

tion and promotion. In Higgins's view, the self

has some goals that involve striving toward

positive ideals and others that involve prevent-

ing the self from misdeeds, which he discusses

in terms of "ought" goals. Direct comparison of

these two was recently undertaken by Shah,

Higgins, Friedman, and Kruglanski (1999).

They found that the positive goals or ideals

were more substitutable than the negative or

ought goals, which is another way of attesting to

the greater importance of the bad. That is, if

people refuse to accept a substitute for a partic-

ular goal, it seems fair to assume that that goal

is more important than another goal for which

they will readily accept an alternative. In the

study by Shah et al., participants performed two

tasks,

which were both framed as ideals, both as

oughts, or one of each. When both were framed

as ideals, then success on one reduced effort on

the second, whereas failure on the first led to

increased effort on the second—consistent with

the view that people believed success on one

would substitute for nonsuccess on the other. In

contrast, when both were framed as oughts (or

when they were mixed), there was no evidence

of substitutability, in the sense that there was no

effect for feedback on the first task on effort on

the second.

A conceptual replication of this pattern was

done by Liberman, Chen, and Higgins (1999;

cited by Shah et al., 1999). In that study, par-

ticipants were interrupted and prevented from

completing a first task and later given the op-

portunity to do another task or to resume work

on the same task. When both tasks were framed

as ideals, they were willing to move to the new

task, consistent with a substitutability interpre-

tation. In contrast, when both tasks were oughts,

participants wanted only to resume the old task,

presumably because the new task was not seen

as a substitute. Thus, this line of work suggests

that preventing one bad outcome is not an ade-

quate substitute for preventing another bad out-

come, whereas reaching one good outcome is

often an acceptable substitute for another.

The relative motivational power of good and

bad traits can also be examined in indirect tac-

tics.

Indirect tactics of self-enhancement and

protection were studied by Cialdini and his col-

leagues. The best known of these is probably

that of basking in reflected glory (Cialdini et al.,

BAD

STRONGER THAN GOOD 351

1976),

which people link themselves

to suc-

cessful others

and

successful groups. These

studies, however, relied

on the

procedure

ascertaining

how

much students identified with

their university (such

as by

wearing school

col-

ors) following victories versus defeats

by the

football team,

so it is

plausible that

the

effects

were mainly

due to

efforts

distance oneself

from

the

unsuccessful team (rather than linking

oneself

to the

successful team).

A more rigorous follow-up study

was

there-

fore done

Cialdini

and

Richardson (1980),

who explicitly distinguished between "basking

and blasting"

(p. 406). In

that study, basking

referred

enhancing

the

positivity

one's

own university, whereas blasting referred

derogating

rival university,

and

both tenden-

cies were assessed

responses

personal crit-

icism

in the

form

failure feedback

on a cre-

ativity test. Thus, basking invokes

the

good,

whereas blasting invokes

the bad.

Across

two

studies, Cialdini

and

Richardson found

the

blasting effect

to be

consistently stronger,

and,

in fact,

the

basking effect

did not

reach

signif-

icance

either study (unlike

the

blasting

ef-

fect).

Thus,

the

tendency

depict one's rival

university

as bad

was stronger than the tendency

to describe one's

own

university

good.

The

implication

that

the

motivation

avoid

the

bad

more powerful than

the

motivation

embrace

the

good, which

precisely what

one

would expect

if bad is

stronger than good.

Thus,

multiple lines

evidence suggest that

bad

stronger than good with regard

to the

self-concept, even though

the

simple fact

positively inflated self-appraisals might give

the

opposite impression.

The

positivity

self-con-

cepts reflects

the

combined motivational effects

of self-protection (avoiding

the bad) and self-

enhancement (embracing

the

good).

many

cases,

such

as a

simple desire

to do

well, these

two motivations operate

tandem. When they

can effectively

separated, though,

the

weight

the

evidence suggests that people

are

strongly motivated

avoid

bad

views

self

than

claim good ones.

Feedback

The relative power

good versus

bad

feed-

back

is yet

another sphere

which

test

whether

bad is

generally stronger than good.

Some researchers have reviewed,

discussed

in preceding sections, work that already points

bad

feedback

more potent.

For

example,

some

the data

reacting

daily events

are

probably mediated

feedback received during

events,

and the

finding that

bad

days have more

lasting impact than good days

probably

sign

that

bad

feedback

stronger. Likewise,

the

more widespread

use of

self-handicapping

for

self-protection than self-enhancement (Tice,

1991) suggests that people

are

more concerned

about avoiding

bad

feedback than about maxi-

mizing good feedback, which points

to a

greater

motivational power

of bad

feedback.

Self-enhancement

and

self-protective strate-

gies were studied

Agostinelli, Sherman,

Preston,

and

Chassin (1992). Specifically, these

authors examined whether people would

re-

spond

feedback

perceiving failure

as rel-

atively common

and

perceiving success

as rel-

atively uncommon. Both distortions benefit

the

self,

regardless

whether

the

self succeeds

fails,

because the self s success gains

prestige

by being seen

relatively special; whereas

the

self s failure loses

its

stigma

many other

people fail,

too.

Participants

their study

re-

ceived success, failure,

or no

feedback about

their performance

on a

decision-making prob-

lem; they were then given measures

of how

other people would likely

do.

Biases

judg-

ment were stronger following failure than

suc-

cess

(as

compared with

the

no-feedback

con-

trol):

After failure, people rated failure

common

and

likely

but

success

rarer

in the

general population. Success,

contrast, yielded

no departures from

the

control group. Thus,

participants were more affected

by bad

than

good outcomes,

and

their responses suggested

stronger motivations

protect

the

self against

failure than

amplify

enhance

the

impact

success.

Students' reactions

feedback from teachers

were studied by Coleman, Jussim,

and

Abraham

(1987).

Bad

feedback

had a

stronger effect

the students' perceptions

their

own

perfor-

mance than good feedback.

Bad

feedback

was

also seen

more indicative

the teachers' true

evaluations, although

not

surprisingly students

regarded

the

good feedback

more accurate

than

the bad.

Reactions

social feedback

acceptance

and rejection were studied

Leary, Tambor,

Terdal,

and

Downs (1995). Participants were

told that they either

had

been selected

other

members

to be

included

in a

group

excluded

from

it or had

been randomly assigned

to be

352BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER,

AND

VOHS

included

excluded. Only

the

intentional

re-

jection

led to a

change

self-esteem

(and a

corresponding change

ratings

other partic-

ipants).

Acceptance

did not

have

effect.

another study, Leary

al. provided participants

with specific individual feedback indicating that

another person

who had

listened

their

self-

disclosures

did or did not (a)

like them,

(b)

accept them,

or (c)

desire

meet them.

The

rejection feedback resulted

self-esteem scores

that were significantly lower than

the

individu-

als'

own

pretest self-esteem,

but no

feedback

and

the

positive (acceptance) feedback failed

produce

any

significant change

self-esteem.

Thus,

bad

feedback

was

clearly stronger

be-

cause

alone

had a

significant effect.

The role

counterfactuals

responding

borderline feedback

was

explored

Medvec

and Savitsky (1997). They compared partici-

pants

who had

just barely made

into

desir-

able grade category (e.g., getting

the

lowest

possible

"A")

against those

who

had just barely

missed

(e.g., getting the highest possible "B").

Satisfaction

was

high among participants

who

had just made

the

category

and low

among

those

who

had just missed

it, and the

borderline

status enhanced these reactions. Thus, those

who barely missed getting

an A

were more

distraught

and

engaged

more counterfactuals

than those

who

missed getting

an A by a

wide

margin.

For

present purposes,

the

important

finding was that

the

effects

just missing

category were stronger than

the

effects

just

making

it.

Medvec

and

Savitsky interpreted this

discrepancy

relation

prospect theory

(Kah-

neman

Tversky, 1979), which holds that

losses have more impact than comparably sized

gains

economic decision making;

other

words,

bad is

stronger than good.

The picture becomes more complicated with

regard

memory, because

the

defensive

pro-

cesses

may

succeed

suppressing memory

for

unwelcome feedback. Indeed, Kuiper

and

Derry

(1982) found that participants were less likely

remember

bad

than good trait words after they

had merely been asked whether

the

words

de-

scribed them, which shows

memory bias

against unwelcome views

self even when

these were

not

feedback

but

merely questions.

(Depressed individuals

did not

have

the

same

bias,

however.) Hence, findings

selective

for-

getting

of bad

feedback should

not be

surpris-

ing. Mischel, Ebbesen,

and

Zeiss (1976) found

that participants remembered more positive

than negative feedback, overall, although

the

effects were strongest when they either

ex-

pected success

or had had a

recent success

experience.

noted with

self,

however,

the

memory

trace

or net

result

can be

biased

favor

positive feedback, even

bad feedback

stron-

ger, because

the bad

feedback

processed

in a

more biased

and

hostile fashion. Baumeister

and Cairns (1992) examined

how

individuals

processed

and

remembered

bad

feedback, with

special attention paid

repressors

(who are

most likely

show defensive

self-deceptive

responses

in the

relatively mild context

of a

laboratory study).

Bad

feedback elicited clear

defensive responses during encoding,

and

these

defenses ranged from avoiding exposure

elaborating

with refutational thoughts.

Re-

pressors recalled

the

good feedback better than

the

bad

feedback overall, although

slight

re-

versal

was

found among nonrepressors.

this

study, moreover, feedback

was

mixed

vary-

ing degrees,

even

the

good feedback condi-

tion contained some

bad

feedback,

and

vice

versa.

The

highest memory scores

in the

entire

experiment were obtained among repressors

for

the small amount

of bad

feedback embedded

the generally good feedback.

(The

next highest

was nonrepressors

that same condition.)

In-

consistency

and

salience

doubt contributed

to these high memory scores,

but

inconsistency

and salience should also have operated

to im-

prove memory

for

small bits

praise embed-

ded

the generally

bad

feedback; there was

not

much evidence

this.

The

explanation

is ap-

parently that when feedback

generally good,

people

let

their defenses down, whereupon

any

small bits

criticism emerge

extremely

powerful

and are

therefore remembered excep-

tionally well.

Put

another

way, bad is

clearly

stronger than good when

the

defenses

are

down.

Taken together, these studies suggest greater

impact

and

power

for bad

than good feedback.

The main limitation

that defensive responses

sometimes succeed

miminizing

the

long-term

impact

of bad

feedback. When these defenses

are

not

operating, however,

bad

feedback

stronger than good. Moreover,

the

greater

and

more pervasive efforts

minimize

bad

feed-

back than

maximize good feedback reflect

motivational asymmetry that also recognizes

bad feedback

more important than good.

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD353

Health

The importance of physical health makes it a

desirable sphere in which to consider the rela-

tive importance of good versus bad outcomes.

Although we have not found a great deal of

evidence, there are some findings that fit the

idea that bad is stronger than good.

A review of human psychoneuroimmunology

and the biological and environmental factors

suggested that bad events have greater impact

than good ones (Cohen & Herbert, 1996). Nu-

merous studies have reported the deleterious

effects of psychological and physical stress on

immune status. For instance, Glaser, Rice,

Sheridan, Fertel, and Stout (1987) and Kiecolt-

Glaser et al. (1984) have investigated the effects

of medical school examinations as a form of

psychological stress on the immune functioning

of medical school students. Relative to a low-

stress time (e.g., immediately after vacation),

students' immune systems are significantly

compromised by the presence of psychological

stress.

Psychological stress results in decreased

activity of the natural killer cells, which protect

the body against disease (Kiecolt-Glaser et al.,

1984).

Stress also increases the proliferation of

lymphocyte production (e.g., Glaser et al.,

1987) and heightens the production of herpes

viruses antibodies (e.g., Glaser et al., 1987). The

effects of negative events such as stress on the

body appear to be not only consistent but also

swift. In a study of immune cell levels and

functioning, Herbert, Cohen, Marsland, Bachen,

and Rabin (1994) found weakened immune pa-

rameters as soon as 5 min after the induction of

the stressor.

Given that stressful events happen to every-

one at some point, researchers have sought to

assess whether relaxation techniques would

yield benefits to physiology comparable to the

harm caused by stress. Thus far, the answer

appears to be no. There has only been one study

to assess immune functioning after a stress-

reduction intervention in the presence of a

stressful event (Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, Strain,

Stout, & Tarr, 1986). These researchers found

that training medical students in relaxation tech-

niques did not affect the immune changes that

occurred as the result of stressful first-year ex-

ams.

Cohen and Herbert (1996) concluded that

there is little evidence for the benefits of stress-

reduction techniques on immunological health.

In other words, bad events impair the body's

protective system, but good events do not

boost it.

A different method of reducing stress is to

increase social support. However, evidence

from controlled studies on the advantageous

effects of social support is also limited. One

study found that residents in a geriatric home

who were visited three times per week by col-

lege students showed no change in cellular im-

mune functioning (Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, Wil-

liger, Stout, & Messick, 1985). In another study,

Arnetz, Wasserman, Petrini, Brenner, and Levi

(1987) examined the effect of social support on

lymphocyte proliferation. Swedish women who

had been unemployed for more than 9 months

were given both emotional and informational

support (e.g., giving them information on get-

ting another job). However, this intervention

was not successful in boosting immune

functioning.

In contrast, a lack of social support and lone-

liness have been shown to have a variety of

damaging health consequences. Kiecolt-Glaser

et al. (1984) found that medical students who

reported high levels of loneliness had weaker

immune functioning than students who did not

report high levels of loneliness. Similarly, psy-

chiatric patients who reported high levels of

loneliness also had depressed immune systems.

In summary, various studies and reviews of

the immunology literature indicate that bad is

stronger than good. In particular, researchers

have found that stress and the absence of social

support are reliably associated with immuno-

suppression, whereas their opposites—relax-

ation and increases in social support—do not

seem to have beneficial effects.

Optimism and pessimism were examined by

Schulz, Bookwala, Knapp, Scheier, and Wil-

liamson (1996) in an effort to predict the mor-

tality of cancer patients. Across 8 months, 70 of

the 238 patients in a radiation therapy sample

died. Using Scheier and Carver's (1985) Life

Orientation Test, Schulz et al. assessed both

optimism and pessimism traits. Optimism failed

to predict survival, either alone or in interaction

with age. Pessimism, however, did yield a sig-

nificant prediction of mortality, although only

for the youngest (30-59) age range. (Thus, the

only significant predictor was pessimism inter-

acting with age.) Although the results are cor-

relational, the longitudinal prediction does en-

354BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

hance the plausibility that the trait caused the

survival outcome rather than vice versa. The

implication is that the negative thoughts and

feelings associated with pessimism had a stron-

ger effect on mortality outcomes than the posi-

tive thoughts and feelings that characterize

optimism.

A similar conclusion emerged from a longi-

tudinal study by Robinson-Whelen, Kim, Mac-

Callum, and Kiecolt-Glaser (1997). Pessimism,

not optimism, uniquely predicted psychological

and physical health outcomes, 1 year later.

More precisely, pessimism during Year 3 sig-

nificantly predicted anxiety, stress, and

self-

rated health (but not depression) in Year 4. In

contrast, optimism during Year 3 did not make

a significant contribution to predicting any of

the outcomes in Year 4. Although the data are

correlational, the longitudinal design makes it

likely that the causal relationship went from

pessimism to the health outcome rather than the

reverse.

A very different approach has been taken by

Pennebaker and his colleagues (Francis & Pen-

nebaker, 1992; Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Pen-

nebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-

Glaser, & Glaser, 1988) in a program of re-

search on how writing about traumatic personal

experiences can affect subsequent health. In

these studies, participants are typically asked to

write about "the most traumatic experience of

your entire life," whereas control group partic-

ipants write about plans for the day, going to

college, or minor traumas. People who write

about their most traumatic experiences typically

show significant improvements in physical

health, as compared with the control group, on

measures such as visits to the medical centers,

immune system function, and sick days. In an

attempt to see what aspects of stories might

predict (and possibly cause or mediate) these

subsequent improvements, Pennebaker (1993)

subjected the essays from several previous in-

vestigations to linguistic analysis and then

checked these against the data on health out-

comes. Participants whose essays had contained

more words referring to negative, unpleasant

emotions showed significantly greater improve-

ment than those who used fewer such words.

Use of words referring to positive emotions had,

if anything, the opposite effect (and in any case,

the effect for positive emotions was weaker).

Even those participants who showed the biggest

increases in the number of references to positive

emotion across the multiple sessions of the

study (which seemingly should be a sign of

improvement) failed to show a relative im-

provement in health. Pennebaker concluded that

the participants who consistently expressed the

most anxiety, sadness, and other negative feel-

ings were the ones who subsequently showed

the greatest gains in health.

Thus far we have considered health as a de-

pendent variable, but it can also be considered

as an independent variable (although, again,

most work remains correlational). The effects of

health on happiness and subjective well-being

have been studied by several researchers. They

believe health has a large impact on happiness

(e.g., Diener, 1984), but the actual links tend to

be quite weak across the population. One large

and thorough study concluded that health is

irrelevant to happiness, except for older adults

and chronically ill people (Campbell, Converse,

& Rodgers, 1976). The exceptions may help

explain the seemingly mistaken perception that

health is extremely important for happiness.

When health is bad, it does have a major impact

on happiness, but variations in good health have

small or negligible effects. Put another way, the

difference between being moderately sick and

very sick is relatively powerful, whereas the

corresponding difference between being moder-

ately well and very well has little impact, so

health mainly affects happiness when health is

bad. Thus, health too conforms to the pattern in

which bad is stronger than good.

General Discussion

The principle that bad is stronger than good

appears to be consistently supported across a

broad range of psychological phenomena. The

quantity and strength of the evidence were not

consistent and in fact varied widely from one

topic to another. The breadth and convergence

of evidence, however, across different areas

were striking, which forms the most important

evidence. In no area were we able to find a

consistent reversal, such that one could draw a

firm conclusion that good is stronger than bad.

This failure to find any substantial contrary pat-

terns occurred despite our own wishes and ef-

forts.

We had hoped to identify several contrary

patterns, which would have permitted us to de-

velop an elaborate, complex, and nuanced the-

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 355

ory about when bad is stronger versus when

good is stronger. The most we can say is that

occasionally other psychological patterns will

override the greater strength of bad things, and

the greater strength of bad varies with respect to

size,

amount of evidence, and methodological

strength of evidence. However, the greater

strength of bad was apparent nearly every-

where. Hence, we must conclude that bad is

stronger than good at a pervasive, general level.

Let us briefly summarize the evidence. In

everyday life, bad events have stronger and

more lasting consequences than comparable

good events. Close relationships are more

deeply and conclusively affected by destructive

actions than by constructive ones, by negative

communications than positive ones, and by con-

flict than harmony. Additionally, these effects

extend to marital satisfaction and even to the

relationship's survival (vs. breakup or divorce).

Even outside of close relationships, unfriendly

or conflictual interactions are seen as stronger

and have bigger effects than friendly, harmoni-

ous ones. Bad moods and negative emotions

have stronger effects than good ones on cogni-

tive processing, and the bulk of affect regulation

efforts is directed at escaping from bad moods

(e.g., as opposed to entering or prolonging good

moods). That suggests that people's desire to

get out of a bad mood is stronger than their

desire to get into a good one. The preponder-

ance of words for bad emotions, contrasted with

the greater frequency of good emotions, sug-

gests that bad emotions have more power. Some

patterns of learning suggest that bad things are

more quickly and effectively learned than cor-

responding good things. The lack of a positive

counterpart to the concept of trauma is itself a

sign that single bad events often have effects

that are much more lasting and important than

any results of single good events. Bad parenting

can be stronger than genetic influences; good

parenting is not. Research on social support has

repeatedly found that negative, conflictual be-

haviors in one's social network have stronger

effects than positive, supportive behaviors. Bad

things receive more attention and more thor-

ough cognitive processing than good things.

When people first learn about one another, bad

information has a significantly stronger impact

on the total impression than any comparable

good information. The self appears to be more

strongly motivated to avoid the bad than to

embrace the good. Bad stereotypes and reputa-

tions are easier to acquire, and harder to shed,

than good ones. Bad feedback has stronger ef-

fects than good feedback. Bad health has a

greater impact on happiness than good health,

and health itself is more affected by pessimism

(the presence or absence of a negative outlook)

than optimism (the presence or absence of a

positive outlook).

Convergence is also provided by Rozin and

Royzman (in press). Quite independently of this

project, these authors reviewed the literature on

interactions between good and bad, and they too

concluded that bad things generally prevail. Our

review has emphasized independent, parallel ef-

fects of good and bad factors, whereas theirs

emphasized good and bad factors competing

directly against each other in the same situation

(such as contagion). Both approaches have con-

firmed the greater power of bad factors.

Thus,

the greater impact of bad than good is

extremely pervasive. It is found in both cogni-

tion and motivation; in both inner, intrapsychic

processes and in interpersonal ones; in connec-

tion with decisions about the future and to a

limited extent with memories of the past; and in

animal learning, complex human information

processing, and emotional responses.

Searching for Exceptions

Given the scope and variety of the evidence,

the appropriate question to ask is not whether

bad is generally stronger than good but rather,

how general or universal is this pattern? When

we began this review, we anticipated finding

some exceptions that would demarcate the lim-

its of the phenomenon. Although a few isolated

studies have deviated from the general pattern,

we were unable to locate any significant spheres

in which good was consistently stronger than

bad. At most, the greater power of bad can

occasionally be overridden, such as when pos-

itive information is made to be more diagnostic

than negative information (Skowronski & Carls-

ton, 1989, 1992)—but even in this instance, the

greater power of bad than good can be found

lurking in the background (Martijn et al., 1992).

The closest to a general reversal was in an-

ticipation of future events, insofar as prevailing

optimism about the future reflects a greater

power of good future events (e.g., Weinstein,

1980).

Even this pattern, however, did not con-

356BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

stitute a reliable exception. When people are

making decisions about specific, impending

events, they seem more motivated to avoid bad

outcomes than to pursue good ones, at least in

many cases in which the magnitude of the two

outcomes has been carefully calibrated to be the

same (as the gambling studies showed).

A related pattern showing a preference for

good is the so-called "pollyanna hypothesis,"

which suggests that people are biased toward

more positive ideas and conclusions. Boucher

and Osgood (1969) observed that "there is a

universal human tendency to use evaluatively

positive (E+) words more frequently ... than

evaluatively negative words (E-)" (p. 1). Simi-

larly, Matlin and Stang (1978) observed that

negative words consist more often of a positive

root that becomes negative by a prefix (e.g.,

unpleasant) than the reverse. Likewise, when

people are instructed to attribute traits to a target

person, they tend to assign more positive than

negative ones, with approximate proportions of

62%

positive and 38% negative (e.g., Adams-

Webber, 1977; Benjafield, 1984; Benjafield &

Adams-Webber, 1976; Tuohy & Stradling,

1987).

Still, such findings are not really contrary

evidence, and, in fact, they may help perpetuate

the greater power of bad by keeping it in the

minority so that it remains more salient (e.g.,

Berlyne, 1971). One could also suggest that the

preference for positive words and positive traits

makes the greater power of bad ones especially

remarkable because it must overcome bias. Our

view is simply that the greater frequency of

good is the natural complement to the greater

power of bad: Good can only match or over-

come bad by strength of numbers.

The memory literature also yielded several

findings demonstrating a reversal of the bad is

stronger than good pattern. This reversal ap-

pears to be driven by two distinct processes: a

self-enhancement

effect whereby negative memo-

ries were suppressed or positive memories ac-

cessed, and a mood congruency whereby non-

depressed individuals (the majority) showed a

tendency for recalling information that was pos-

itively valenced and thus matched their current

mood. At least in memory, the bad is stronger

than good effect will at times take a back seat to

other psychological principles. Still, the occa-

sional finding of greater recall for positive ex-

periences probably reflects a selective and mo-

tivated process by which bad memories are sup-

pressed, so it does not really indicate that the

bad experiences had lesser power. The very

emergence of processes designed to suppress

unpleasant memories can be regarded as a tes-

timonial to the power of bad experiences.

There was also some evidence that positive

and negative events have differential effects on

memory. Some researchers have found that peo-

ple remember pleasant events better than un-

pleasant events (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Holmes,

1970).

However, we found as many or more

studies indicating that negative events leave a

longer and more lasting mark on memory (e.g.,

Banaji & Hardin, 1994; Skowronski & Carl-

ston, 1987; see the Memory section in this arti-

cle).

Although our search did yield some mixed

evidence on the effects of bad versus good on

memory, the overall consensus was that, at least

in the short term, bad has a greater impact on

memory (e.g., Bless et al., 1992; Dreben et al.,

1979);

with time, it seems that there exist cog-

nitive operations to reduce the longevity of this

effect (e.g., Walker et al., 1997).

There are individual differences in the degree

to which people are oriented toward good ver-

sus bad. Nondepressed people seem to seek out

positive information and avoid negative infor-

mation more than depressed ones, as noted in

several spheres. These include optimism regard-

ing the future (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and

biased recall for positive information (Matt et

al.,

1992). There are also repressors who sys-

tematically ignore negative information about

the self

(e.g.,

Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). Like-

wise,

there are well-established individual dif-

ferences in general tendencies toward approach

and avoidance motivation (Elliot & Covington,

2001) that may be linked to the relative re-

sponse to bad and good stimuli. These excep-

tions seem, however, to reflect preference for

good over bad rather than subjective impact,

and many of those individuals are actually

strongly affected by bad events when they do

confront them. The individuals for whom good

is actually stronger than bad constitute a small

and atypical minority.

Another factor to consider is the possibility

that overall bad outweighs good (i.e., there is a

main effect for bad vs. good) but that the type of

outcome may moderate the strength of the ef-

fect. That is, if the dependent measures are

broken down into negative (e.g., judging how

clumsy a target is) versus positive

(e.g.,

judging

BAD

STRONGER THAN GOOD 357

how graceful

target

is), the bad and

good will

affect

the

positive measures,

but

only

the bad

will affect

the

negative measures. Although

nu-

merous studies

this review (e.g., Major

et al.,

1997) showed this pattern,

it was not

consistent

enough

for us to

pronounce this

true boundary

condition. However,

the

idea

intriguing

and

suggests directions

for

future research.

For in-

stance,

attempts

to use a

manipulation that

produces

the

strongest effects, researchers

would

wise

to use

something

bad so as to

influence both positive

and

negative outcomes.

The general lack

reliable counterexamples

has made

difficult

specify boundary condi-

tions

on the

general rule that

bad is

stronger

than good. Indeed, when reviewing

the evi-

dence,

we had

hoped

find more exceptions,

reversals, moderator variables,

and

boundary

conditions.

The

presence

these factors would

have made

for a

more sophisticated

and nu-

anced theory

as to why bad

would

stronger

than good. Accordingly,

the

lack

these vari-

ables renders

somewhat difficult

formulate

a theory that

can

account

for

such broad

and

consistent findings.

The

safest conclusion, then,

is that

the bad is

stronger than good effect

is a

robust

and

broad-level psychological principle

that underlies

range

psychological phenom-

enon

and

operates

in the

company

of a

limited

number

similarly broad principles.

Revisiting Theory

We began this article

briefly suggesting

that

the

relative strength

of bad

over good

is an

adaptive response

of the

human organism

to its

physical

and

social environment.

view

how pervasive

the

relative strength

of bad is, it

seems unlikely that this pattern

maladaptive.

In particular,

found that

bad was

stronger

than good with regard

health, social support,

and learning—all

which

are

important

spheres

for

adaptations.

seems especially

un-

likely that maladaptive patterns would have

re-

mained powerful there.

also noted that

peo-

ple

for

whom good

stronger than

bad

(e.g.,

people insensitive

pain

or to

guilt) seem

prone

misfortunes

and

early deaths; this

too is

consistent with

the

view that

it is

adaptive

for

bad events

have greater power.

turn

now

the

question

of why bad

would

stronger

than good across such diverse areas

and

with

such reliability.

adaptive?

At the

broadest level,

argue that

bad is

stronger than good because

responding

to the

world

this

way is

adaptive.

Generally, individuals

who are

attuned

preventing

and

rectifying

bad

things should

flourish

and

thrive more than individuals

ori-

ented primarily toward maximizing good

things. This argument

admittedly speculative.

The broadest argument

we can

devise

based

on a

change

motivational states

in the

presence

negative events, stimuli,

and

infor-

mation. When considering

why bad

outweighs

good,

intriguing possibility

that

bad

things

indicate

need

for the

self

change something

about

itself;

that

is,

that

bad

things prompt

self-

regulation. Through self-regulation,

organ-

ism

can

adapt

and

change itself

to fit its

envi-

ronment,

strategy that

adaptive, given that

the organisms most likely

reproduce

are

those

that

can be

flexible

in the

face

ever-changing

circumstances. Rigid adherence

behavioral

patterns that were useful

in the

past

is not ef-

fective when

met

with

new

challenges

and

threats. Thus,

one of the

best methods

of in-

creasing survival

and

gene transmission

is to be

closely attuned

to the

current environmental

contingencies. Moreover, changing

the

environ-

ment

to fit the

self

neither effective

nor

prac-

tical

as a

route

maximize evolutionary fitness.

A related argument

that progress

may be

best facilitated

having

bad

events have

lasting impact while good events have

tempo-

rary

one.

This

too is

based

on the

idea that

bad

events signal

need

for

change, whereas good

ones

do not. If

satisfaction

and

pleasure were

permanent, there might

little incentive

continue seeking further benefits

advances.

The ephemeral nature

good feelings

may

therefore stimulate progress (which

adaptive).

If bad feelings wore

off,

however, people might

repeat their mistakes,

genuine progress

would best

served

having

the

effects

bad events linger

for a

relatively long time.

Organisms require

not

only

system

signal

the need

for

change,

but

also

one

that commu-

nicates quickly

and

intensely, with little energy

or effort required

and

without awareness,

be-

cause

the

necessary change

may

require swift

responding. Empirical findings have demon-

strated that

bad

things satisfy these criteria.

Re-

search confirms that negative stimuli have

greater influence

neural responses than

pos-

itive stimuli

(Ito,

Larsen, Smith,

Cacioppo,

358BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

1998);

that negative traits, relative to positive

traits,

have greater influence on the overall im-

pression of another person (Peeters & Czapin-

ski,

1990); and that negative trait adjectives

command more attention, at a nonconscious

level, than positive trait adjectives (Pratto &

John, 1991).

In summary, it may be that humans and ani-

mals show heightened awareness of and re-

sponded more quickly to negative information

because it signals a need for change. Hence, the

adaptiveness of self-regulation partly lies in the

organism's ability to detect when response

modifications are necessary and when they are

unnecessary. Moreover, the lessons learned

from bad events should ideally be retained per-

manently so that the same dangers or costs are

not encountered repeatedly. Meanwhile, good

events (such as those that provide a feeling of

satisfaction and contentment) should ideally

wear off so that the organism is motivated to

continue searching for more and better out-

comes. As a result, organisms that possess

mechanisms for adept perception and process-

ing of negative cues will achieve greater fitness

with the environment and, consequently, will

have a greater chance of surviving threats and

more successful reproductive attempts.

A related argument might be made on the

basis of social (and biological) systems. In order

for a system to function effectively, each com-

ponent of the system must do its part. If one

component breaks down, the entire system can

be disrupted. Hence, at the level of the individ-

ual on the system, bad is undeniably stronger

than good. Any individual part can prevent the

system from functioning; but no individual part

can by itself cause the system to succeed. This

is especially true of social groups (or at least

those marked by division of

labor):

Water must

be found, food must be obtained and distrib-

uted, predators must be kept away, and enemies

must be intimidated or defeated. No one of

those successes can ensure the group's survival,

but failure in any of those spheres can ensure its

demise. Biological systems have similar prop-

erties,

and if even one vital organ ceases to

function (heart, lungs, brain, stomach), the per-

son will die. This concept was proposed under

the name of the chain principle by Weinberg

(1975;

Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). A chain's

efficacy depends on its weakest link, and weak-

ening any one link weakens the entire chain;

whereas strengthening any one link (other than

the weakest) or adding stronger links will have

minimal effect on the chain's overall strength.

A final consideration is that bad has greater

power because good entails consistency across

time and events, which cannot be created by a

single good event but can be destroyed by a

single bad one (see Rozin & Royzman, in

press).

The importance of stability with regard

to good things may well have contributed to

evolving a broad orientation to respond more

strongly to bad than good. In a crucial sense, the

stability argument is linked to the asymmetry of

life and death: The individual remains alive

after several years only if he or she managed to

survive every single day, and no degree of op-

timal experience on any given day can offset the

effects of failing to survive on another. Individ-

uals who failed to emphasize the consistency

and stability of good outcomes might well have

taken more extreme risks in pursuit of power-

fully good outcomes and hence failed to survive

and reproduce. In this way, natural selection

would have shaped the human organism to give

high priority to consistency and stability, which

in turn would foster the basic orientation that

bad is stronger than good.

In summary, the propensity to experience bad

as stronger than good may confer a significant

adaptive advantage for individuals, such that

those who mobilized their attention and re-

sources toward the bad would be more likely to

survive and reproduce. To see how life would

be lived if bad were not stronger than good, we

can look to the rare individuals who are born

with a congenital insensitivity to pain. These

individuals do experience pleasurable physical

sensations to a relatively greater extent and in-

tensity than negative ones. Yet they tend to die

from physical mishaps stemming from their in-

ability to feel pain, with children reportedly

biting off their fingers or tongues and suffering

severe burns from contact with hot surfaces and

adults having to find substitute signals for pain.

For example, one sufferer was reported to not

feel a ruptured appendix and therefore failed to

seek treatment in time; another suffered severe

spinal deformations as a result of neglecting

proper posture (Sternbach, 1968). Thus, as hu-

mans,

we are well served by having bad stron-

ger than good, on both a personal level and an

evolutionary level.

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD359

Insights from prior theory. Researchers

concerned with impression formation have al-

ready debated some of these theoretical issues

because their area is the main one in which the

predominant strength of the bad side has been

recognized (also known as the positive-nega-

tive asymmetry). Kellermann (1984) examined

the greater power of negativity in initial inter-

actions. She managed to articulate six different

theories: the first three were based on the greater

frequency of good than bad information, which

makes bad information more salient and per-

haps more powerful in other ways. As Keller-

mann noted, however, salience does not really

provide a full and satisfactory explanation, par-

ticularly for laboratory experiments in which

positive information is made equally salient.

One might, however, revive this theory by pro-

posing, at the broadest level, that life as a whole

has more good than bad events, such that bad

events will inevitably stand out (even if on a

local basis, such as in a given laboratory exper-

iment, their frequency is made comparable to

good events). One might even suggest that the

lives of American and Western European citi-

zens (from whom the majority of data are col-

lected) are exceptional in the disproportionately

high frequency of good events, and that if re-

searchers were to study people who live in

harsh, desperate times, individual good events

would be relatively rare and might therefore

have greater power by virtue of this salience.

Another theory was that negative information

is actually more informative, insofar as it de-

parts more from what is normative: People are

supposed to behave well, and so bad acts defy

social and situational pressures and hence are

presumably more revealing about the inner dis-

positions of the actors (and therefore more

likely to promote correspondent inferences; see

Jones & Davis, 1965). Extremity of information

(Fiske, 1980) is also relevant because extremely

positive information can also be quite informa-

tive,

so the informativeness hypothesis is a vari-

ation on the correspondent-inference theory.

Kellermann's (1984) review leaned toward fa-

voring the view that bad information is more

informative (based on extremity and distance

from the average or norm). Skowronski and

Carlston (1989) likewise favored the view that

bad events carry more weight in forming im-

pressions because they are more diagnostic of

the traits and dispositions of

individuals.

Even if

this assessment is correct, however, it is con-

fined to the sphere of forming impressions of

newly met acquaintances, so something addi-

tional would be needed if there is indeed a more

general pattern in which bad is stronger than

good.

Working from a perception background,

Wright (1991) has proposed a "fundamental

negative bias" (p. 471) in which perception will

be guided more by negative than positive

events. She also proposed that this negativity

will carry over into the thoughts and feelings

following the initial perception. Furthermore,

she proposed that these effects are likely to be

strongest to the extent that the stimulus is salient

and the context is vague or sparse. A rich con-

text may mitigate the effect of the stimulus,

whereas salience should enhance it. We note,

however, that if bad is indeed stronger than

good, then it is plausible that a mitigating con-

text might nullify the effects of good, positive

information even more thoroughly than the ef-

fects of bad, negative information. In this sense,

the logic behind Wright's proposition is not

entirely persuasive. Then again, Wright might

simply have meant that the differential impact

of negative information may be clearest when

all effects are strongest, which means in the

absence of mitigating context.

Wright's (1991) account is thus again at best

a partial explanation. If perception has a funda-

mental negative bias, then most other psycho-

logical phenomena will show the same asym-

metry to the extent that they depend on percep-

tion. The perceptual asymmetry, however,

requires explaining

itself,

so again we are left

searching for a more comprehensive explanation.

The same problem is found in Maslow's

(1968) motivational theories. Although he did

not explicitly speak of

the

superior power of bad

over good, he did propose that the most basic

and primary motivations involve escaping from

aversive states, such as hunger, deprivation,

cold, and danger. The more positive motiva-

tions of seeking esteem, love, belongingness,

and self-actualization only begin to direct be-

havior when the negative or deficiency (his

term) motives have been satisfied. As with

Wright's (1991) perception-based theory,

Maslow's motivation-based theory can effec-

tively explain why affect, cognition, and behav-

ior give precedence to escaping the bad, insofar

as these responses depend on motivation. How-

360BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

ever, the reason for the motivational asymmetry

is simply postulated rather than explained. In

our view, these patterns point back toward evo-

lutionary selection. We have suggested that sur-

vival and reproduction (in K-selected species)

depend on giving priority to avoiding bad rather

than pursuing good. If this argument is broadly

correct, it would hardly be surprising that the

basic phenomena of perception and motivation

would already show signs of this bias.

A more sophisticated theoretical formulation

by Taylor (1991) is also relevant. Indeed, in her

article, she devoted some space to documenting

the greater power of negative than positive

events. Taylor proposed that aversive events

produce complex cognitive and affective reac-

tions that good, desirable events do not because

the bad events present problems that require

solving. One can thus ignore something good

more easily than something bad. In Taylor's

account, bad events set off two relevant sets of

responses: the first mobilizes resources to meet

the threat, and the second tries to minimize the

damage or trauma afterward. In contrast, pleas-

ant events can be quietly and passively enjoyed

without either the mobilization or the

minimization.

Taylor's (1991) theory addresses a different

problem than the one with which we are con-

cerned. The mobilization and minimization pat-

terns she delineated could be entirely correct

even if good were stronger than bad. The extra

cognitive and affective work involved in re-

sponding to bad events (as opposed to good

ones) would contribute something to the greater

psychological impact of bad events, insofar as

more effort may be required and more extensive

processing may leave clearer psychological

traces (e.g., improving memory). Then again, to

the extent that the minimization process is suc-

cessful, the long-term impact of bad events may

turn out to be less than the impact of good

events: People do not minimize good events, so

these may live on even as the psyche attempts

to purge its memory of prior woes and

misfortunes.

A motivational account of the differential

effects of bad versus good has been proposed by

Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g., Cacioppo &

Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernt-

son, 1997). They proposed a negativity bias in

their model of evaluative space, such that com-

parable degrees of activation have greater ef-

fects on the negative, as opposed to positive,

motivational system. Accordingly, there is a

steeper slope for the relationship between the

activation and motivational response for nega-

tive stimuli. Several investigations have con-

firmed this negativity bias (Bradley, Lang, &

Cuthbert, 1997; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994;

Ito et al., 1998).

In summary, it is apparent that prior work has

contributed an important set of mid-level theo-

ries about the relative power of good versus bad

events. Taken alone, these formulations and in-

sights do not provide a full accounting for why

bad should be stronger than good as a general

psychological principle. The most sophisticated

theories about the asymmetry in impression for-

mation appear to zero in on diagnosticity and

correspondence of inferences, which are spe-

cific to impression formation and could not eas-

ily apply, say, to taste aversion learning or

trauma. We found that bad was stronger than

good in a remarkably broad and diverse set of

phenomena. A specific or mid-level theory may

not be broad enough to account for it. Instead, it

appears to be a basic, pervasive fact of psychol-

ogy that bad is stronger than good.

Implications

The role of culture. Our review focused ex-

clusively on the individual's experience of bad

and good and concluded that experiencing bad

as stronger than good is adaptive to the individ-

ual.

In other words, nature may have shaped the

human psyche to treat bad as stronger than

good. Culture, however, would not necessarily

have to conform to this. In fact, if one considers

the myths and ideals that cultures present, there

does not seem to be any clear message that bad

is stronger.

For example, religion is widely regarded as a

supremely cultural phenomenon. In recent mil-

lennia, religious ideas have emphasized salva-

tion as much as retribution (e.g., Eliade, 1982,

1985).

Heaven and hell are equally extreme in

the Christian tradition, and there seems little

basis for assuming that hell is in any sense more

powerful or extreme than heaven. Indeed, in

most modern nations, belief in hell is signifi-

cantly less widespread than belief in heaven

(e.g., Aries, 1981), which might be construed as

indicating that the cultural ideas emphasize

good more strongly than bad.

BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 361

Love has likewise received idealization in

cultural mythology that has made of it a more

extreme good than is empirically justified.

Songs, films, novels, and wedding vows con-

tinue to promise that love is forever, even

though the statistics on divorce, marriage ther-

apy, and infidelity indicate that it is not. In fact,

Baumeister (1991) concluded that cultural ide-

als of fulfillment have a general pattern of

promising more permanence than is typically

found, whether these fulfillments involve love,

happiness, spiritual enlightenment, fame and

celebrity, wealth, creativity, or others.

Thus,

culture certainly presents individuals

with mythical images of extreme possibilities in

both directions. Probably the reason for this is

that these cultural myths are important means

by which a society can motivate its individuals

to behave in socially desirable ways, and miti-

gating the extremity of the myth would simply

weaken the motivations. In particular, culture

may find it optimal to encourage people to delay

gratification over periods that are far longer than

what prevailed in our evolutionary history. As

just one example, the multiyear process of at-

tending college or graduate school is probably

best sustained by a positive image of how won-

derful life will be afterward, whereas nature has

few contingencies that require one to adopt such

a long-range time perspective.

Happiness. We have concluded that bad is

stronger than good, yet a wealth of data suggest

that life is good and people are largely happy

(D.

G. Myers, 1992). How can good overcome

the greater power of bad to make life seemingly

so wonderful? There are several answers.

Good can overcome bad by force of numbers.

To maximize the power of good, these numbers

must be increased. This can be done by creating

more goods. For example, in a romantic rela-

tionship each partner can make an effort to be

nice to the other consistently. Such small acts of

kindness are important for combating the bads

that will typically occur. Indeed, if Gottman

(1994) is correct, the ratio should be at least five

goods for every bad. Likewise, individuals can

make an effort to recognize and appreciate the

goods that they have—celebrating each small

success, being thankful for health, and having

gratitude for supportive others.

Another contributor to the perception of life

as good involves selective perception and mem-

ory. As Taylor (1991) argued, the human

psyche has powerful mechanisms for retrospec-

tively minimizing bad experiences. Although

both good and bad feelings may fade with time,

the bad ones are actively suppressed; whereas

the good memories may be cultivated and sus-

tained (e.g., through reminiscence). By the

same token, people may treat bad experiences

as isolated events while integrating good ones

into an ongoing general perception of goodness.

In this way, individuals may sustain a broadly

favorable view of their lives. Something like

this must after all be operating in most mar-

riages, given that most people rate their mar-

riages favorably, but half of marriages end in

divorce. Probably they rate their marriage fa-

vorably (by regarding the problems as tempo-

rary or exceptions) until they begin to contem-

plate divorce seriously.

These considerations are quite consistent

with the view that the good life consists of a

consistent pattern of good outcomes, even if

these are individually relatively small and weak.

A few bad outcomes can be minimized by mak-

ing external attributions or regarding them as

unimportant, thereby preserving the subjective

impression of a stable pattern of good out-

comes. As long as the individual perceives that

pattern of consistent goodness, life may seem

strongly good overall even if nothing strongly

good ever happens.

Learning and child development. We have

also noted that certain areas are characterized by

a belief in the superior power of good. These

areas include learning and child development.

We presented research earlier to suggest that

such beliefs are mistaken. Specifically, punish-

ment produces faster learning than reward, and

bad parenting has a stronger effect than good

parenting. Still, it is possible that some genuine

exceptions can be found in these areas. On the

other hand, it may be that ethical and practical

concerns are mainly responsible for the advo-

cacy of reward instead of punishment. Any

seeming disadvantage of punishment (as com-

pared with reward) in promoting learning may

arise because punishment has side effects that

interfere with effective learning, so punishment

may be quite strong in general. Ethical and

political concerns may make people reluctant to

hit their children, and those individuals who do

hit may sometimes encounter resentments and

other long-term problems, but these concerns do

not prove that punishment is itself weak. In

362BAUMEISTER, BRATSLAVSKY, FINKENAUER, AND VOHS

other words, punishment may not be optimal for

education, even if it does produce optimal learn-

ing, because the side effects of punishment can

be damaging.

The question about punishment and learning

raises a broader issue. To examine whether re-

ward or punishment promotes better learning is

to look for only one kind of effect—in particu-

lar, a good one (insofar as learning is good). In

a number of the studies we have reviewed here,

researchers found that positive independent

variables affected positive dependent variables,

whereas negative independent variables af-

fected negative dependent variables—although

often the negative independent variables also

affected the positive dependent variables. Put

more simply, good affects good, whereas bad

affects both bad and good. If one were to look

only at good outcomes, however, one might

well often find that good and bad events have

roughly equal impact, and sometimes the good

events will show up as stronger. This would,

however, be a misleading conclusion caused by

the one-sided focus on good outcomes. Only

when the range of outcomes includes both good

and bad ones, such as illness versus health, or a

happy marriage versus a divorce, or liking ver-

sus disliking, can one claim to have provided a

full and balanced assessment of the relative

power of good and bad causes.

Concluding Remarks

In our review, we have found bad to be

stronger than good in a disappointingly relent-

less pattern. We hope that this article may stim-

ulate researchers to search for and identify ex-

ceptions; that is, spheres or circumstances in

which good events outweigh bad ones. Given

the large number of patterns in which bad out-

weighs good, however, any reversals are likely

to remain as mere exceptions. The lack of ex-

ceptions suggests how basic and powerful is the

greater power of bad. In our view, this differ-

ence may be one of the most basic and far-

reaching psychological principles.

Although it may seem pessimistic to con-

clude that bad is stronger than good, we do not

think that such pessimism is warranted. As we

have suggested, there are several reasons to

think that it may be highly adaptive for human

beings to respond more strongly to bad than

good. In the final analysis, then, the greater

power of bad may itself be a good thing. More-

over, good can still triumph in the end by force

of numbers. Even though a bad event may have

a stronger impact than a comparable good

event, many lives can be happy by virtue of

having far more good than bad events.

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Received March 15, 2001

Revision received April 16, 2001

Accepted April 16, 2001 •

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Mar 2025
Contemp Fam Ther

Relationship improvement and the treatment of mental health problems in a relational context focuses on what we can observe or is self-reported. This leads to a focus on interaction patterns between couples or partners’ perceptions in relationships. Advances in assessing neurological and physiological processes have expanded observable relationship processes, but most MFT models have not yet integrated this knowledge. We propose an intervention model based on the idea that relationship interactions are influenced by pre-conscious physiologic processes around the perceived threat of situations. When a situation is perceived as threatening, partners’ innate response is based on survival and self-protection, which inhibits the physiologically based social engagement system. This model describes interventions to: (1) improve navigation of pre-conscious, and conscious processes through increasing positive emotional regulation, (2) reduce the influence of negative past events on current relationships, and (3) work toward having more connecting interactions and fewer protecting interactions in relationships.

It Takes Two to Untangle: Illuminating How and Why Some Workplace Relationships Adapt While Others Deteriorate after a Workplace Microaggression

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Mar 2025
ACAD MANAGE REV

The Relationship Between StudentWell-Being and Teacher–Student and Student–Student Relationships: A Longitudinal Approach Among Secondary School Students in Switzerland

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Mar 2025

The rapid changes in today’s world pose a great challenge to student wellbeing, especially in secondary school, where age-related transitions occur. Many school systems have recognized the importance of fostering both academic achievement and student well-being. Classroom relationships with teachers and peers play a key role in students’ academic, social, and emotional development, yet little is known about their longitudinal and reciprocal effects on well-being. This study adopts a multidimensional approach to student well-being, examining its relations with teacher–student closeness and conflict, as well as student–student cohesion, using two waves of data one year apart in a structural equation model (SEM). The participants were Grade 7 (N = 757) and Grade 8 (N = 720) students in Switzerland. The findings reveal no significant associations between student well-being, teacher–student closeness, and peer cohesion. However, teacher–student conflict at measurement point 1 is positively associated with physical complaints and social problems at measurement point 2, while a positive academic self-concept negatively predicts teacher–student conflict over time. These results highlight the impact of teacher–student conflict on student well-being and suggest enhancing the academic self-concept could help mitigate such conflicts. Insights into these relations can help educators and researchers identify and develop useful strategies for promoting student well-being.

Does Negative Online Review Matter? An Investigation of Travel Consumers

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Mar 2025
Int J Consum Stud

Recent literature on negative online reviews (NOR) indicates its growing strategic importance in understanding consumer behavior and brand image. While past literature shows the adverse effect of NOR on low‐involvement products such as books and digital music, there is a dearth of research on its impact on high‐involvement decisions, such as visiting a travel destination. There is also less understanding of how consumers perceive and process NOR characteristics. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the impact of NOR characteristics (level of detail and source credibility) on review credibility, destination image, and intention to visit a travel destination. Two 2 * 2 between‐subject factorial experiments were conducted to examine the effects of the level of detail (general vs. detailed) and source credibility (high vs. low) using different sample and design settings. The results revealed that detailed NOR and high source credibility of NOR increased review credibility. The negative effect of detailed NOR on intention to visit was higher among older adults. The cognitive and affective destination image mediated between review credibility and intention to visit. The study has several implications for destination marketing organizations and contributes to the NOR literature.

Duration Disparity in Losing versus Winning Forex Trades: Evidence from Individual Traders' Behavior

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Mar 2025

Boyan Ivantchev

This paper delves into the realm of behavioral finance, drawing upon existing academic literature, research studies, and laboratory experiments to underscore the impact of psychological biases on decision-making processes. However, empirical investigations pertaining to trading behavior, particularly in the context of an escalating number of individual traders, remain scarce. To address this gap, the present study examines a substantial dataset comprising foreign exchange transactions executed by Bulgarian individual traders over a five-year period. Leveraging my prior experience as a capital and forex markets dealer, my objective was to deconstruct my own decision-making and establish a straightforward guideline for mitigating psychological influences on trading behavior. Consequently, this study employs the principles and tools of behavioral finance to scrutinize the extensive trading dataset, aiming to provide empirical support for the composite and intricate effects of loss aversion bias, status quo, endowment effect, and loss attention biases on forex traders' decision-making and their subsequent trading outcomes and returns. Specifically, the research centers on the analysis of time duration disparities between winning and losing trades, elucidating the interrelationship between these ratios and the trading performance of Bulgarian individual forex traders. To the best of the author's knowledge, the investigation into the time duration of winning and losing trades represents a novel addition to existing trading statistical ratios, serving as a means to substantiate and interpret the psychological influences on individual traders' trading outcomes. This pioneering research builds upon two prior behavioral finance studies conducted by the author and an fMRI study exploring distinct patterns of brain activation in response to real and hypothetical monetary outcomes.

Volume XVIII • Issue 55 pp. 77-88 SGH Warsaw School of Economics Collegium of Management and Finance Journal of Management and Financial Sciences JMFS Duration disparity in losing versus winning Forex trades: evidence from individual traders' behaviour

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Full-text available

Mar 2025

Boyan Ivantchev

This paper delves into the realm of behavioural finance, drawing upon the existing academic literature , research studies, and laboratory experiments to underscore the impact of psychological biases on decision-making processes. However, empirical investigations pertaining to trading behaviour, particularly in the context of an escalating number of individual traders, remain scarce. To address this gap, the present study examines a substantial dataset comprising foreign exchange transactions executed by Bulgarian individual traders over a five-year period. Consequently, this study employs the principles and tools of behavioural finance to scrutinize the extensive trading dataset, aiming to provide empirical support for the composite and intricate effects of the loss aversion bias, status quo, endowment effect, and loss attention biases on Forex traders' decision-making and their subsequent trading outcomes and returns. Specifically, the research centres on the analysis of time duration disparities between winning and losing trades, elucidating the interrelationship between these ratios and the trading performance of Bulgarian individual Forex traders. To the best of the author's knowledge, the investigation into the time duration of winning and losing trades represents a novel addition to existing trading statistical ratios, serving as a means to substantiate and interpret the psychological influences on individual traders' trading outcomes. This pioneering research builds upon two prior behavioural finance studies conducted by the author and an fMRI study exploring distinct patterns of brain activation in response to real and hypothetical monetary outcomes.

The asymmetry of war support: Evidence from private donations to Ukraine

Article

Feb 2025
CONFLICT MANAG PEACE

Rimvydas Ragauskas

The prevailing rationalist approach portrays war as a gradual process of information disclosure, where cost–benefit calculations can influence strategy, outcomes and internal support for conflict. This research advances our understanding of how battlefield dynamics influence public support for war by analyzing tangible indicators of support—private donations to Ukraine. Analysis reveals a striking asymmetric pattern: heightened Russian attacks reduce donations by up to 18%, while Ukrainian offensive operations show no meaningful effect on donor behavior. Disclosed asymmetry presents an intriguing theoretical puzzle that challenges conventional rationalist approaches.

Wpływ znaku afektywnego i rodzaju słów na zapamiętywanie nowego materiału werbalnego z uwzględnieniem emocjonalności jako dyspozycjiInfluence of affective valence and type of words on memorization of new linguistic material with consideration of emotionality as a disposition

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Dec 2024

Iwona Legutko-Marszałek

Celem niniejszej pracy było zbadanie, czy znak afektywny i rodzaj słów wpływa na efektywność zapamiętywania nowego materiału werbalnego w odtwarzaniu bezpośrednim i odroczonym w zależności od uczuciowości rozumianej jako skłonność badanych do przeżywania pozytywnego lub negatywnego afektu. Analiza wyników wykazała, że na efektywność świadomego zapamiętywania nowego materiału werbalnego mają trwały i największy wpływ znak afektywny pseudosłów oraz moment ich odtwarzania. Zarówno w procesie przypominania, jak i rozpoznawania moment odtwarzania istotnie wpływa na poziom zapamiętywania w zależności od znaku afektywnego, natomiast niezależnie od tego, czy słowa mają znaczenie konkretne, czy abstrakcyjne. Pseudosłowa nacechowane afektywnie są lepiej pamiętane niż neutralne, a z upływem czasu słowa pozytywne są lepiej pamiętane niż negatywne. Uczuciowość badanych rozumiana jako tendencja do przeżywania pozytywnego lub negatywnego afektu nie ma izolowanego wpływu na efektywność zapamiętywania, natomiast moderuje wpływ rodzaju pseudosłów na poziom zapamiętywania, ale efekt ten nie jest trwały. Wynika z tego, że pamięć nie zależy od indywidualnych skłonności emocjonalnych.

Brands as Social Justice Educators: How Social Media Brand Activism Influences Psychological Processing of Advertising Advocating Transgender Rights

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Mar 2025

Minjie Li

Hurricane exposure, character traits, and hurricane event centrality

Article

Mar 2025
SELF IDENTITY

Attachment and Emotional Understanding in Preschool Children

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Sep 1998

This study was designed to elucidate the association between attachment and emotional understanding in preschool children. Forty children between the ages of 2.5 and 6 years and their mothers participated in the study. Mothers completed the Attachment Q-set, and children took part at their preschools in both an affective perspective-taking task and a series of interviews concerning naturally occurring incidents of emotions. Overall, age and attachment security predicted a child's aggregate score on the emotional understanding tasks. However, when the score was separated by the valence of the emotion, attachment security and age predicted a child's score for only those emotions with a negative valence (e.g., sadness) and not for those emotions with a positive valence (e.g., happiness). Thus, a secure attachment relationship seems to be important in fostering a child's understanding of emotion, primarily negative emotions.

Mixed Messages: Implications of Social Conflict and Social Support Within Close Relationships for Adjustment to a Stressful Life Event

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Jun 1997

The authors examined the impact of women's perceptions of negative (conflict) and positive (support) exchanges with their mothers, partners, and friends before having an abortion on negative (distress) and positive (well-being) indexes of adjustment after the abortion. Preabortion conflict and support from the partner predicted postabortion adjustment in the same affective domain: Conflict uniquely predicted distress, whereas support uniquely predicted well-being. Within-source interactions were observed between support and conflict from mothers and friends. Women who perceived high support from their mothers or friends were more distressed if they also perceived them as sources of high conflict than if they perceived them as sources of low conflict. Among women who perceived their mothers or friends as nonsupportive, no relationship was observed between conflict and distress. Cross-source buffering was not observed.

Differential Roles of Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Event Desirability for Mood in Daily Life: An Integrative Model of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences

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Jul 1997

Top-down and bottom-up approaches were combined to assess the relative impact of extraversion, neuroticism, and daily events on daily mood. Ninety-six community-residing men completed diaries for 8 consecutive nights. Extraversion predicted positive mood, whereas neuroticism predicted positive and negative mood. Undesirable events predicted negative mood and, more modestly, positive mood. Desirable events predicted positive mood. Negative dispositional and situational factors play a larger role in daily positive affect than positive factors do in daily negative affect.

Socioemotional Behavior and Satisfaction in Marital Relationships: A Longitudinal Study

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Nov 1991

The interplay between 3 types of socioemotional behavior (affection, sexual interest, and negativity) and marital satisfaction was studied using data from newly married couples followed over 2 years. Affection and negativity (but not sexual interest) were consistently associated cross-sectionally with marital satisfaction. Longitudinal analyses revealed a gender-differentiated pattern suggesting a more complex relationship between satisfaction and marital behavior than previously shown. Negativity, regardless of whether it was expressed by the husband or the wife, was associated with declines in wives' (but not husbands') satisfaction. Wives of husbands who were relatively negative early in marriage became more negative themselves. Wives who were relatively less satisfied early in marriage (but not husbands) were married to spouses who became more negative with time.

Automatic Vigilance: The Attention-Grabbing Power of Negative Social Information

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Sep 1991

One of the functions of automatic stimulus evaluation is to direct attention toward events that may have undesirable consequences for the perceiver’s well-being. To test whether attentional resources are automatically directed away from an attended task to undesirable stimuli, Ss named the colors in which desirable and undesirable traits (e. g., honest, sadistic) appeared. Across 3 experiments, color-naming latencies were consistently longer for undesirable traits but did not differ within the desirable and undesirable categories. In Experiment 2, Ss also showed more incidental learning for undesirable traits, as predicted by the automatic vigilance (but not a perceptual defense) hypothesis. In Experiment 3, a diagnosticity (or base-rate) explanation of the vigilance effect was ruled out. The implications for deliberate processing in person perception and stereotyping are discussed.

Marital Interaction and Satisfaction: A Longitudinal View

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Feb 1989

Two longitudinal studies of marital interaction were conducted using observational coding of couples attempting to resolve a high-conflict issue. We found that a different pattern of results predicts concurrent marital satisfaction than predicts change in marital satisfaction over 3 years. Results suggest that some marital interaction patterns, such as disagreement and anger exchanges, which have usually been considered harmful to a marriage, may not be harmful in the long run. These patterns were found to relate to unhappiness and negative interaction at home concurrently, but they were predictive of improvement in marital satisfaction longitudinally. However, three interaction patterns: were identified as dysfunctional in terms of longitudinal deterioration: defensiveness (which includes: whining), stubborness, and withdrawal from interaction. Hypotheses about gender differences in roles for the maintenance of marital satisfaction are presented.

Disclosure of Traumas and Immune Function: Health Implications for Psychotherapy

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Apr 1988

Can psychotherapy reduce the incidence of health problems? A general model of psychosomatics assumes that inhibiting or holding back one’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is associated with long-term stress and disease. Actively confronting upsetting experiences—through writing or talking—is hypothesized to reduce the negative effects of inhibition. Fifty healthy undergraduates were assigned to write about either traumatic experiences or superficial topics for 4 consecutive days. Two measures of cellular immune-system function and health center visits suggested that confronting traumatic experiences was physically beneficial. The implications for psychotherapy as a preventive treatment for health problems are discussed.

Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats

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Mar 1987

Giora Keinan

This study tested the proposition that deficient decision making under stress is due, to a significant extent, to the individual's failure to fulfill adequately an elementary requirement of the decision-making process, that is, the systematic consideration of all relevant alternatives. One hundred one undergraduate students (59 women and 42 men), aged 20–40, served as subjects in this experiment. They were requested to solve decision problems, using an interactive computer paradigm, while being exposed to controllable stress, uncontrollable stress, or no stress at all. There was no time constraint for the performance of the task. The controllability of the stressor was found to have no effect on the participants' performance. However, those who were exposed to either controllable or uncontrollable stress showed a significantly stronger tendency to offer solutions before all available alternatives had been considered and to scan their alternatives in a nonsystematic fashion than did participants who were not exposed to stress. In addition, patterns of alternative scanning were found to be correlated with the correctness of solutions to decision problems.

Optimism, Coping, and Health: Assessment and Implications of Generalized Outcome Expectancies

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Jan 1985

This article describes a scale measuring dispositional optimism, defined in terms of generalized outcome expectancies. Two preliminary studies assessed the scale’s psychometric properties and its relationships with several other instruments. The scale was then used in a longitudinal study of symptom reporting among a group of undergraduates. Specifically, respondents were asked to complete three questionnaires 4 weeks before the end of a semester. Included in the questionnaire battery was the measure of optimism, a measure of private self-consciousness, and a 39-item physical symptom checklist. Subjects completed the same set of questionnaires again on the last day of class. Consistent with predictions, subjects who initially reported being highly optimistic were subsequently less likely to report being bothered by symptoms (even after correcting for initial symptom-report levels) than were subjects who initially reported being less optimistic. This effect tended to be stronger among persons high in private self-consciousness than among those lower in private self-consciousness. Discussion centers on other health related applications of the optimism scale, and the relationships between our theoretical orientation and several related theories.

Causal Attributions of Married Couples: When Do They Search for Causes? What Do They Conclude When They Do?

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Jun 1985

In this study, we examined when and whether married people engage in attributional activity or form causal attributions to explain their partners’ behavior. We used an indirect probe to better approximate naturally occurring cognitive activity. We also examined the content of spouses’ causal attributions, using both direct and indirect probes. Spouses were asked about frequent as well as infrequent relationship events, and about partner behaviors that had positive or negative impacts on the recipient. Husbands in unsatisfying relationships reported more attributional thoughts than did happily married husbands, whereas wives in the two groups did not differ. Behaviors having negative impacts elicited more attributional activity than did positive behaviors. Behavioral frequency and impact interacted in ways contrary to predictions. Finally, distressed couples were particularly likely to report distress-maintaining attributions and were particularly unlikely to report relationship-enhancing attributions, compared with their nondistressed counterparts.