Article

Interbank Lending, Credit-Risk Premia, and Collateral

International Journal of Central Banking (Impact Factor: 0.59). 12/2009; 5(4):5-43.
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT

We study the functioning of secured and unsecured interbank markets in the presence of credit risk. The model generates empirical predictions that are in line with developments during the 2007–09 financial crisis. Interest rates decouple across secured and unsecured markets following an adverse shock to credit risk. The scarcity of underlying collateral may amplify the volatility of interest rates in secured markets. We use the model to discuss various policy responses to the crisis.

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    • "Following this branch of literature we propose an Early-Warning Indicators System (EWIS) based on observed borrowing interest rates charged among interbank participants. We hypothesize that those financial institutions that are willing to pay higher borrowing rates are either facing liquidity risk or being penalized by their counterparts because of their credit risk (as in King, 2008; Heider and Hoerova, 2009; Ashcraft et. al, 2011). "
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    ABSTRACT: A core goal of regulators and financial authorities is to understand how market prices convey information on the financial health of its participants. From this viewpoint we build an Early-Warning Indicators System (EWIS) that allows for identifying those financial institutions perceived as risky counterparts by the participants of the interbank market. We use micro-level data from bilateral overnight unsecured loans performed in the interbank market between January 2011 and December 2014. The EWIS identifies those participants that systematically pay high prices for liquidity in this market. We employ coverage tests to estimate EWIS’ robustness and consistency. We find that financial institutions with an elevated frequency of signals tend to exhibit a net borrower liquidity position in the interbank market, hence suggesting they are facing recurrent liquidity needs. Those institutions also exhibit higher probability of insolvency measured by the Z-score indicator. Thus, our results support the existence of market discipline based on peer-monitoring. Overall, the EWIS may assist financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources on those financial institutions perceived by the market as those closer to distress.
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    ABSTRACT: I address the role of information heterogeneity in the Euro interbank market for unsecured term lending. I use high-frequency quotes of bid and ask prices to estimate probabilities of informed trading for contract maturities from one month to one year. The dataset spans from November 2000 to March 2008, and includes the relevant events that characterize the developments of the Euro area money market. I obtain four main results. First, I show that the loose supply of liquidity of the ECB has not dampened the distortions arising from asymmetric information in the unsecured money market. I also find that the probability of trading with a better informed bank is higher on days when open market operations take place, and at the end of the maintenance period. This effect has strengthened during the turmoil. The results indicate that information is segmented, in the sense that heterogenous knowledge among banks is maturity-specific. Finally, the paper presents some evidence suggesting that the risk of trading with a counterparty that enjoys an enhanced information set is priced.
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