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Credibility of Collective Brand as a Source of Equity:
An Empirical Application for Spanish Wine Market
Dopico, D.C.
1
, Blázquez, F.
2
, Tudoran, A.
3
1
University of A Coruña, Faculty of Economics, Spain
2
University of A Coruña, Faculty of Economics, Spain
3
University of A Coruña, Faculty of Economics, Spain
Paper prepared for presentation at the 113
th
EAAE Seminar “A resilient
European food industry and food chain in a challenging world”, Chania, Crete,
Greece, date as in: September 3 - 6, 2009
Copyright 2009 by [Dopico, D.C.
1
, Blázquez, F.
2
, Tudoran, A.
3
]. All rights reserved.
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by
any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.
2
Credibility of Collective Brand as a Source of Equity:
An Empirical Application for Spanish Wine Market
Dopico, D.C.
1
, Blázquez, F.
2
, Tudoran, A.
3
1
University of A Coruña, Faculty of Economics, Spain
2
University of A Coruña, Faculty of Economics, Spain
3
University of A Coruña, Faculty of Economics, Spain
Abstract. The appearance of consumers groups increasingly concerned about the quality of food products, together
with an increasingly competitive environment and domestic saturated markets, has led companies to achieving
differentiated quality. The wine sector is immersed in this situation. Valuation of this differentiation by consumers
will not happen by complying with certain standards or technical specifications, but rather it has to be perceived by
consumers. Unlike experts, consumers cannot easily know which properties are intrinsic to products, which are those
that give them their quality. There is, thus, a problem of uncertainty regarding the quality of products. This problem
becomes more complex when consumers are faced with many alternatives of a similar perceived quality, which makes
them have to decide on one without being completely sure. This problem is evident in the wine market. To solve this
issue, Signalling Theory has investigated the variables used by consumers to infer quality. Among these variables are
price, guarantees, origin, advertising, packaging design and brand. From the consumer point of view, the most
reliable signal is the brand. Due to the territory image was earning more and more equity; an opportunity to
differentiate wine emerged for these regions, which was the creation of appellations of origin. Thus, some producers
of a same region or territory can collaborate and establish a joint offer which permits to differentiate a typical
production. Therefore, the appellation of origin or, in our case, the collective brand, will have the basic objective of
signalling differentiation. The aim of this work is therefore to ascertain the value that the collective brand, as a
signal, provides for end consumers. In order to respond to this question, a field study consisting of a personal survey
was carried out in 2006 on a sample of 296 Spanish purchasers and/or consumers of quality wine. Results reveal that
the collective brand, as a signal, allows consumers to infer quality, but also it improves perception of the intrinsic
attributes of the product, which some authors have called the halo effect.
Keywords: Collective brand, Quality, Perceived risk, Equity, Consumer Behaviour
3
1. Introduction
The appearance of consumer groups increasingly concerned about the quality of food products (Grunert et
al., 1996)
1
, together with an increasingly global, open and competitive environment and mature and
occasionally saturated markets, has led companies to search for new solutions that respond to this
problem. The wine sector is immersed in this situation. Companies in a global and international context
and with a saturated national market have to face the challenge of achieving differentiated quality and
aiming to improve their competitive position (Vrontis and Paliwoda, 2008)
2
. Valuation of this
differentiation by consumers will not happen by making products of the best quality, i.e., that have
complied with certain standards or technical specifications, but rather it has to be perceived by
consumers. Unlike experts, consumers cannot easily know which properties are intrinsic to products,
which are those that give them their quality. There is thus a problem of uncertainty regarding the quality
of products (Akerlof, 1970)
3
, also known as asymmetry and imperfect information on product quality.
This problem becomes more complex when consumers are faced with many alternatives of a similar
perceived quality, which makes them have to decide on one without being completely sure. This problem
is evident in the wine market, where consumers do not have a clear understanding of the multitude of
alternatives that exist, which leads to a problem with managing the information and, therefore, the risk
associated with the purchase.
To sum up we are presented with two problems: one the one hand, how to infer quality and, on the other
hand, how to solve the problem of making the right choice from so many alternatives, the so-called
perceived risk (Mitchell and Greatorex, 1988
4
, 1988
5
). To face these problems, firms in wine sector have
the possibility to create appellations of origin, e.g. collective brands. A collective brand is the result of a
collective and cooperative effort of different individual producers. These producers gather their efforts in
order to create an exclusive and differentiated quality. According to origin –with which certain properties
regarding the type of grape, climate, soil are linked- wines are classified and categorised. A Supervisory
Council verifies the existence of their exclusive and specific characteristics (climate, preparation method,
type of grape,…) and guarantee the authenticity of those intrinsic properties. Signalling Theory (Erdem
and Swait, 1998
6
, 2004
7
; Ye and Van Raaij, 2004
8
) has investigated the variables used by consumers to
infer quality. Among these variables are price, guarantees, brand (manufacturer or distributor) origin,
advertising and packaging design. From the consumer point of view, the most reliable signal is the one
that commits the offeror to fulfil quality promises. That signal is the brand. The brand is the most reliable
signal, and therefore the most credible one from which product quality is inferred. The logic that endorses
the signalling properties of the brand name is the credibility or vulnerability of this brand in the face of
market approval, which therefore commits the firm to fulfilling those quality promises.
The appellation of origin or, in our case, the collective brand, will have the basic objective of
differentiating wine and offering quality guarantees for consumers who are more concerned with quality.
The aim of this work is therefore to ascertain the equity that the collective brand, as a signal, provides for
end consumers. To do this, and in accordance with Signalling Theory, we will prove whether this signal is
credible for consumers and whether this credibility may be used to infer product quality and reduce the
uncertainty associated with the purchasing process.
To respond to this objective, we have divided this work into four sections. First of all, we will explain in
detail the theoretical framework on which the principles of brand as a signal are based. Next, based on
these foundations, we will build the hypotheses. We will then explain the methodology and, finally, the
analysis of results from which we will extract the main conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework: Signalling Theory
As we explained at the start of this work, we are thus faced with a problem of imperfect market
information. Literature on the information economy (Stigler, 1961
9
; Ackerlof, 1970
3
) has contributed to
the solution of signals to this problem of asymmetric and imperfect information. To be able to infer those
properties and, as a result, perceive the quality that the product possesses, consumers make use of signals
or indicators. For the case of wine, the signals that have been researched the most are region of origin
(Orth et al., 2005)
10
; brand, price and label (Lockshin et al., 2005)
11
; and intrinsic characteristics –type of
grape, appearance, taste- (Charters and Pettigrew, 2007)
12
. Among them, brand stands out as the most
reliable signal for consumers, since it commits the firm to fulfilling quality promises.
Brand Equity as a Signal
From the point of view of the Information Economy, and considering markets that are imperfect and have
major asymmetry of information which prevents consumers from evaluating the product quality at the
time of purchase, we investigate the characteristics of the signal that allow the consumer to infer product
quality. A current of research in Information Economy examines elements of the marketing mix as quality
cues. In this way, marketing mix variables such as labelling, advertising and warranties not only provide
consumers with information on the product, but they also inform indirectly about those attributes of the
4
product on which they are imperfectly informed, such as, for example, attributes of experience. One of
the most outstanding of them is brand. Thus, Erdem and Swait (1998)
6
study brand equity by examining
its ability to reduce consumer uncertainty about the qualities of the product and they state that the main
determining factor in brand equity is its credibility as a signal of information for consumers. Erdem and
Swait (2004)
7
explain that the credibility placed in the brand increases utility, improving their perception
on product quality and reducing the risk and costs of searching for information associated with the
purchase. This is what we will explain in more detail.
Brand and Perceived Quality
As has already been indicated, there is considerable uncertainty about product quality or about the
attributes that give a product quality. Wine is a very good example (Charters and Pettigrew, 2007)
12
. The
signals into which there has been most research have been price, guarantees (Boulding and Kirmani,
1993
13
; Erevelles et al., 1999
14
); manufacturer or distributor's brand (Yoo et al, 2000)
19
; umbrella
branding (Wernerfeldt, 1988
16
; Erdem, 1998
17
); origin (Bertozzi, 1995
18
; Biljana et al., 1996
19
;
Papadopoulos and Heslop, 1993
20
); advertising (Kirmani, 1990)
21
and packaging design. The signal that
stands out from all of these is brand, since it is presented as the most reliable and credible signal for end
consumers. Brand will be the signal from which consumers infer a specific level of objective quality,
since consumers confer a confidence value on it (Cox, 1967)
22
which other signals do not have. It is as if
consumers were looking for another guarantee, which they will find in the brand and which, unlike other
signals, is highly credible, i.e., it has a high confidence value. It is obvious and justified that it is a
credible signal because it is exposed to market approval and because it is closely linked with the intrinsic
properties of the product. Since it is so closely linked to these properties -providing guarantees-, it also
transmits other benefits that are directly connected with these intrinsic properties, such as the positive
associations and images evoked by these attributes –imagine that German engineering evokes the idea of
very good engineers, safe or very hardwearing engines-. This higher value is what we explain as an
improvement in perceived quality.
Brand and Perceived Risk
Perceived risk was defined by Bauer (1967)
23
as a subjective belief in the probability of something bad
happening or unfavourable consequences arising after buying the product (for example, incorrect
assessment of its quality, other members of the household not liking it, or simply the product in question
not being the right one). Marketing literature subsequently began to develop the concept (Cox, 1967
22
;
Bettman, 1973
24
; Dowling, 1986
25
). Since the level of uncertainty about the quality or quality attributes is
considerable, good signalling of them is a determining factor in the selection process. It is obvious that
since they cannot process these attributes or properties, consumers are going to base their opinion on the
signal that allows them to recognise these attributes, i.e., on the informative signal that allows them to
recognise many of these quality attributes. On the other hand, as well as recognising these quality
attributes, consumers need to make sure that these attributes correspond to what would objectively be a
quality product. It will therefore be the credibility of the signal that is the basis on which this information
is collected and processed. Due to the fact that the brand summarises a lot of information about the
quality attributes that have been mentioned and since that information is credible for the end consumer as
it is guaranteed by the brand, it is logical and immediate to check how the brand reduces the search for all
of this information because it is presented as a highly credible signal.
Brand Equity and Utility
This approach is based on the idea that consumers make use of brands to infer the characteristics of
products due to the existence of imperfect and asymmetric information in markets. Brand should be
understood as a signal that symbolises the company's current and past marketing strategies, thereby
communicating more information than that transmitted at individual level by other signals. For this
reason, and due to the existence of the problems of adverse selection, brand may constitute, for the
company, a more effective signal than warranties, price, advertising and, generally, any signal considered
in isolation. Thus, brand is a credible signal and, as well as improving perceived quality by helping
consumers to infer the level of objective quality, it also helps them to reduce the perceived risk associated
with the purchase, i.e., the risk of not knowing what the result of the product may be. It therefore allows
reduction of information costs and an increase in the utility of the product. As a corollary, we could
deduce that brand equity may be defined in terms of the utility it offers consumers as an information
signal. Based on these principles, we are going to develop a theoretical model that we intend to prove and
the hypotheses that we wish to compare. This is explained below.
5
3. Modelling and hypotheses
As indicated in the introduction, we are presented with two problems: on the one hand, how to infer
quality and, on the other hand, how to solve the problem of making the right choice from so many
alternatives, the so-called perceived risk. To solve this problem, we should make use of Signalling Theory
as explained. Based on this theory, hypothesis will be built. This is explained in detail below.
Credibility and Perceived Quality
In an experience good such as quality wine, the attributes that give the product quality are vintage (young,
rearing, reserve wine, etc...), type of grape (garnacha, albariña, treixadura, etc.), year (harvest year);
method of preparation and origin (Muñoz, 1998)
26
. As we have mentioned, to be able to infer those
properties and, as a result, perceive the quality that the product possesses, consumers make use of signals
or indicators. Erdem and Swait (1998)
6
concluded that the most relevant signal is brand. On the other
hand, Aaker (2003)
27
, on examining the sources of brand equity, concludes that what we have to research
are the attributes that allow us to identify and differentiate one offer from another and that, at the same
time, give it intrinsic value. These attributes will constitute sources of brand equity. Within food markets,
previous literature on brand equity has pointed out that origin makes an enormous contribution to the
creation of brand equity. This is why we are now looking into the importance of the appellation of origin.
The logic that endorses the signalling properties of the brand name is the credibility.
Credibility of the collective brand has been based on two basic elements. On the one hand, on its history
or tradition, i.e., a long period of existence and a permanent association of the origin territory with a
certain level of quality, mainly based on informal word of mouth transmitted from one generation to
another. This is how the appellation of origin allows consumers to associate or recognise a certain level of
quality and which, accepted by many, began to symbolise a culture. On the other hand, the Supervisory
Councils, which verify the existence of their exclusive and specific characteristics (soil, climate,
preparation method, etc.), guarantee the objectiveness and authenticity of those intrinsic properties. This
objectivisation is responsible for credibility, which is the basis for recognising quality. This is how in the
minds of consumers the appellation of origin, the so-called collective brand, became a highly credible
signal of quality (more than just a mere extrinsic attribute) and its symbolism created a significantly
favourable perception of the rest of the product's attributes. As a result, brand has a double effect, on the
one hand, it guarantees specific properties and gives the product an intrinsic quality and, on the other
hand, the origin of the product evokes history, tradition, know-how and prestige, which generates the so-
called symbolic utility. In this respect, marketing literature talks about the “halo” effect exercised by the
brand, which is expressed as a very positive relationship between the brand and the overall quality
perceived in the product.
H
1
: Credibility of the collective brand, as a signal, improves the perception of the
intrinsic attributes (or halo effect).
Credibility and Perceived Risk
The diversity of alternatives, due to the wide variety of wines produced, generates a lot of uncertainty and
confusion in consumers when it comes to selecting a wine with specific attributes (Mitchell and
Greatorex, 1988)
5
. This phenomenon arose - as we explained previously - due to the continuous
appearance of numerous wines, where consumers are faced with numerous alternatives that in many cases
are not identified or they do not know. It is therefore a question of an inherent or latent risk (Mitchell,
1998)
28
that the consumer perceives in relation to the class of quality wines. In this context, application of
the collective brand –the appellation of origin (A.O.)- reduces perceived risk. As it is categorised and
classified through the A.O., consumers can infer a wine with a differentiated quality, i.e., one that has
certain characteristics that they can recognise objectively (or at least perceive as guaranteed). The
appellation of origin serves to reduce risk in the identification of characteristics or probability of error,
since it provides an indication of its attributes such as flavour, type of grape or a specific region (Ruiz and
Azón, 2004)
29
.
Furthermore, the role of the collective brand as a reliable signal is reflected in the guarantee of non-
variability of quality. At times, uncertainty about the product may exist even after the experience of use or
consumption. However, the objectivity of the attributes guaranteed by the collective brand, together with
the subsequent learning derived from the experience of consumption, increases reliability regarding the
levels of the attributes and therefore reduces the risk associated with the purchase. Now that we have
established this relationship between credibility and perceived risk, we can make a second hypothesis in
our structural model:
H
2
: Credibility of the collective brand, as a signal, reduces perceived risk
6
Credibility and the Search for Information
Wine is a highly complex product and those who buy and consume it incur multiple costs when they
gather and process information to reduce uncertainty and perceived risk. To solve this, consumers will
look for a signal that allows them to reduce the effort involved in searching for information and to reduce
the costs of processing this information, while ensuring that the properties that this quality wine possesses
are real.
We understand that the collective brand fulfils this purpose. To a certain extent, the brand brings
information for consumers which is also very reliable. The appellation of origin, that is, the collective
brand reduces both the costs of collecting information and the costs of processing it (processing and
abstraction). This happens because collective brand plays a differentiating role between the vast group of
alternatives and reduces the effort that consumers have to make to recognise the attributes that the product
possesses (type of grape, flavour, colour, etc). Furthermore, as it is a credible signal, it guarantees that
these attributes that give the product quality are certain. Thus, the credibility of the signal allows
maximum reduction of the costs of searching for and processing that information. While the costs of
information on the product generally increase –since they depend directly on the asymmetry and
informative imperfection of the market (Erdem and Swait, 1998)
6
-, these same costs will be reduced
based on the credibility of the collective brand. All of this leads us to present a third hypothesis:
H
3
: The better the credibility of the collective brand, the shorter the search for information
will be.
Perceived Quality, Risk, Information and Expected Utility
The expected utility of the product depends on the physical, functional and symbolic attributes perceived
in the product brand and on the weight associated with the different attributes or the marginal utilities
associated with these attributes (Lancaster, 1966)
30
. We have already seen that brand is an excellent
indicator of quality. In addition, as we explained in hypothesis number one, since the origin of the product
is linked to it, the brand not only guarantees a certain quality status (which has specific quality attributes)
but it also transmits and evokes symbolic elements generating better perception of those attributes (Del
Rio et al., 1999)
31
. Consumers confer a higher value on the product. Thus, a higher perceived quality of
the product, -based on the credibility of the brand-, increases expected utility. This leads us to present the
next hypothesis:
H
4
: The utility expected by consumers, associated with the collective brand,
increases with the rise in perceived quality.
At the same time, as the theoretical and empirical evidence suggests, the aversion to risk in product
markets also has an influence on expected utility (Anand, 1993)
32
. The explanation is based on the fact
that the perceived risk causes confusion about the perceived attributes and the consumer's low level of
self-confidence reduces the probability of objective assessment of the product attribute. Consequently, at
the time of purchase the costs of the search for information required to convert the visible attributes into
perceptible quality signals will remain constant or will even increase. Compared to this, today's
consumers - always aiming for as few efforts as possible - will find a lot of utility in brand as information
signal that is necessary for its assessment. Furthermore, perceived risk can also increase the cost of
information, encouraging the search for it. Therefore, it is expected that the effects of collective brand on
perceived risk and the search for information indirectly have a positive impact on its expected utility. This
would ratify the value of the collective brand as a credible quality signal for consumers. For this reason,
another two hypotheses established to this effect will be:
H
5
: The utility expected by consumers, associated with the collective brand,
increases with the reduction in the level of perceived risk
H
6
: The utility expected by consumers, associated with the collective brand,
increases with the saving in information costs
After establishing the cause and effect relationships existing between the Credibility of the Collective
brand, the Perceived Quality, the Perceived Risk and the Search for Information involved, we can express
the structural model proposed as a graph with respect to the effects of Credibility on the Utility Expected
by Consumers. In this model, the relations described are highlighted, as well as the resulting hypotheses
(See Figure 1).
7
Figure 1. Collective brand as an informative signal and its influence on expected utility
Source: Author's own based on Erdem and Swait (1998)
6
4. Sampling, questionnaire, measuring of variables and methodology
To be able to prove the hypotheses that we explained earlier, we carried out a field study consisting of a
personal survey which was carried out on a sample of 320 purchasers and/or consumers of quality wine
resident in Galicia. Each interviewee was asked about various aspects such as the type and class of wine
that they bought, the properties they think a quality wine should have, their knowledge of wine in general,
the search for information in the purchase/consumption, the criteria and reasons for purchasing a quality
wine, the usual place of purchase, frequency of purchase and consumption and the value of the collective
brand from the point of view of signalling. In last part of the questionnaire, consumers replied with their
level of agreement or disagreement with respect to proposals relating to credibility quality, risk or the
search for information and expected utility. This section is explained more clearly below.
4.1. Sampling technical data sheet
Data was collected in April 2005. Right from the start the aim was for the sample to consist of regular
purchasers and/or consumers of wine so that the information was as reliable as possible. To select the
sample, the method of random sampling was used. Finally, a total of 296 questionnaires -out of a total of
320- were selected. With the size of the sample obtained there was a sampling error of around 6.1%.
4.2. Questionnaire Structure
The questionnaire was divided into three blocks of questions. In the first two blocks, points were analysed
such as purchasing and consumption habits. The third block of the questionnaire, which is the one that
interests us, aimed to measure the value of the collective brand from the point of view of signalling, i.e.,
in terms of perceived quality, perceived risk and the search for information involved in the purchasing
process. The items assessed by interviewees and representing the latent non-observable variables were
based on a bibliographical review of the literature, mainly Erdem and Swait (1998)
6
and Mitchell and
Greatorex (1989)
33
. Interviewees assessed a total of 14 items, using the 5-point Lickert scale, relating to
the credibility of collective brands, perceived quality, perceived risk, the search for associated
information and the expected utility, indicating their level of agreement or disagreement. This is
explained in further detail in the next section.
Search for
Information
Perceived
Risk
Perceived
Quality
Expected
Utility
Credibility of
collective
brand
8
4.3. Measurement of variables
The variables were measured on a Lickert type scale. Interviewees expressed their level of agreement or
disagreement with certain proposals, which will constitute the independent variables of the structural
model. These are the so-called observable variables. For each group of independent variables, we identify
a latent variable, also known as a factor or construct, which represents the variables of a more abstract
nature which we mentioned in the previous paragraph: credibility, perceived quality, perceived risk and
search for information. Interviewees assessed different appellations of origin, the so-called collective
brands, among which were Rioja, Ribera de Duero, Rías Baixas, Ribeiro, Valedorras and Ribeira Sacra.
To ensure proper representativeness of the sample, interviewees were distributed randomly so that they
could assess the different appellations, in our case, collective brands. Finally, the result was 48
observations for each of the collective brand. Each interviewee answered a questionnaire according to the
collective brand that was randomly assigned. A detailed explanation of the variables can be seen in table
number 1.
Table 1. Measurement of variables
CONSTRUCTS
(Latent Variables)
ITEMS (Observable Variables)
CREDIBILITY
Credibility1 - The ………… A.O is a name you can trust.
Credibility2 - Purchasing this ………… is the right decision.
Credibility3 - A wine with the …………. A.O. lives up to its promise.
PERCEIVED
QUALITY
Quality1 - Wine with the ……… A.O. is very good quality
Quality2 - In terms of overall quality, I would classify this ……….. A.O. as being of...
quality
Quality3 - I expect the ……………. A.O. to be of extremely high quality.
PERCEIVED
RISK
Risk1 - The likelihood of a bottle of wine with the ……….. X A.O. meeting my
expectations is high.
Risk2 - Buying a wine with the…………..A.O. would suit what the members of my
household prefer.
Risk3 - Buying a wine with the…………..A.O. would suit what my friends prefer.
Risk4 - If I buy wine with the ………. A.O. there is a high probability of wasting the
money I have spent.
SEARCH FOR
INFORMATION
Information1 - I will have to search for more information (ask the shop assistant, my friends, etc.)
before deciding to purchase a…………. A.O.
Information2 - I spend a lot of time choosing a wine with the………. A.O.. .
Information3 - I know what I am getting with the………. A.O., which saves me time on
shopping.
EXPECTED
UTILITY Equity - If you were to buy 10 bottles of wine, how many of each of the following A.O.
would you purchase?
Source: Author's own
4.4. Analysis of Covariance Structure
To make an analysis of the data and taking into account that what we are trying to measure are the causal
relationships between variables of a latent or abstract nature -which in turn are measured by independent
variables or indicators-, the technique of analysis of covariance structures was chosen. The Analysis of
Covariance Structure consists of changing from a theory expressed verbally to a model expressed
mathematically (Satorra and Bentler, 1994)
34
.
9
5. Analysis of results
After formulating the hypotheses that we wish to demonstrate and explaining the measurement of
variables and the methodology, we can now make an analysis of the results and, therefore, an empirical
comparison of the hypotheses presented. From this point of view, the aim is to analyse the importance
that brand as a signal has for end consumers. To test this, causal relationships between the different
variables were measured. This is explained below.
5.1. Modelling
Measurement Model: Convergent and Discrminant validity
First of all, we must check the factor loadings of the different items in the different constructs. The theory
(Levy Mangin, 1999)
35
states that it is necessary to eliminate observable variables with factor loadings of
less than 0.40. Table 2 shows these loadings, and also identifies those that are not going to continue as
part of the analysis. In our case, it is the credibility3 variable. The reliability analysis aims to find out the
degree to which the measurement scale is free from random errors and therefore provides stable and
consistent results (Sánchez and Sarabia, 1999)
36
. Cronbach's α was then measured in the latent variables,
which offered values for credibility, quality, risk and search for information of 0.885, 0.949, 0.800 and
0.564, respectively. As can be seen, the constructs are valid since they comply with both Cronbach's α
and extracted variance criteria. We thus have valid and reliable constructs which are therefore free from
measurement errors. We can now assess the structural model.
Table 2. Factor loadings of the different indicators
Constructor
Variance extracted
Credibility
0.654
Quality
0.601
Risk
0.753
Search for
information
0.409
Item loadings
Credibility 1 0.650
Credibility 2 -0.931
Credibility 3 0.241*
Quality 1 0.989
Quality 2 0.914
Quality 3 0.507
Risk 1 0.707
Risk 2 0.442
Risk 3
Risk 4 0.819
0.776
Information 1 0.900
Information 2 0.394
Information 3 0.558
* Item deleted
Source: Author’s own
What we want to prove is that each of these factors or latent variables has only one dimension. The
necessary condition for validity to exist, which was mentioned previously, is not only for the indicators
that define a scale to provide estimates of the principal factor but also for the meaning of this principal
factor to correspond to what we want to measure. We have to measure the convergent validity and the
discriminant validity (Lehmann et al., 1999)
37
. Convergent validity (Bagozzi, 1994
38
; Bagozzi and Yi,
1988
39
) is directly linked with the substantiality of the standardised factorial regression coefficients
between the set of indicators and the construct in which they are loaded or saturated. Substantiality
requires the values to be higher than 0.5 (Bentler, 1995)
40
-all indicators meet this criterion-. Discriminant
validity has also been proved since the correlation coefficient of the latent variables is very low and in no
case does it come close to 1. Adaptation of the proposed scales to their convergent and discriminant
perspective allows us to confirm the validity of the above-mentioned constructs. Once we have proved the
validity of the constructs, both the convergent and the discriminant, and therefore proved this
unidimensionality, we can then examine the structural model.
10
Structural Model
The standardised parameters calculated and contained in the structural equation model (SEM) are
presented in figure 2. The level of acceptability of the structural model analysed were acceptable, thus,
the statistics χ2 = 84.948, NFI = 0.861, GFI = 0.920 and AGFI = 0.910, CFI = 0.91 were good and the
RMSEA = 0.078 was acceptable –less than 0,08-. We can now move on to interpretation of the results,
followed by comparison of hypotheses.
Chi-Square = 84,948
Degrees of Freedom= 38
Probability level= 0.000
NFI = 0,861
GFI = 0,920
AGFI=0,910
CFI=0,91
RMSEA=0,078
* p<0.005(in brackets, the equity of the critical region)
Figure 2. Relationships between Credibility, Perceived Quality, Perceived Risk, Search for Information
and Expected Utility
5.2. Comparison of Hypotheses and Analysis of results
5.2.1. Credibility and Perceived Quality
As we explained in the theory, literature on signalling has confirmed the existence of a positive
relationship between brand and perceived quality (Thakor and Lavack, 2003)
41
. We want to prove
whether this is true for the wine sector. For a product such as wine, its quality is determined by intrinsic
properties such as vintage, type of grape, vintage year, flavour or aroma. An expert can recognise the
R
2
=0,116
Credibility
ξ
1
Perceived
Quality
η
1
Perceive
d Risk
η
2
Search for
Information
η
3
Y
14
EXPECTED UTILITY
ß
11
=0,374* (3,438) ß
12
= -0,867*
(-5,600)
ß
13
=-0,675*
(-5,789)
ß
14
=0,487*
(2,868)
R
2
=0,456
ß
24
=-0,414*
(-2,116)
R
2
=0,752
ß
34
=0,052
(0,468)
R
2
=0,440
11
quality of a wine by assessing these properties or by tasting the wine. However, consumers, who logically
do not have the ability to process this information, require another type of information to be able to infer
that quality. To overcome these limitations, consumers require an indicator or signal. This collective
brand is configured as the indicator or signal that informs consumers about the intrinsic properties, also
serving as their guarantee, which will make it easy for consumers, on the one hand, to identify the product
and, on the other hand, to recognise a certain level of quality.
Through the collective brand consumers perceive positive associations –e.g. the fact that the product has
its origin in Rías Baixas, an area with a great tradition and know-how in which a certain type of grape is
grown -in this case albariña- and which the theory has explained as symbolic utility. In addition to this
symbolic utility, the collective brand groups together all wines from a specific type of grape, vintage and
year, guaranteeing them and therefore ensuring a certain level of quality. We see the fulfilment of the
hypothesis implicit in the theory in which we explained the influence that the overall impression has on or
towards the different product attributes (Vázquez et al., 2002
42
; Verdú, 2003
43
). The overall impression
that consumers perceive through the name of a collective brand brings about an improvement in the
perception of the intrinsic product attributes, which would not occur in the absence of this name. This
higher value is what Aaker (2004
44
, 2004
45
) calls value added by the brand. In our case, we can prove the
hypothesis because the parameter is positive and significant.
In our model, the parameter ß
11
which describes the relationship between Credibility and Perceived
Quality takes on a value equal to 0.374 at a signification level of t = 3.438, reflecting that the higher the
credibility in the collective brand, the more its perceived quality increases.
5.2.2. Credibility and Perceived Risk
The wide diversity of brands and varieties of wines generates uncertainty and confusion in consumers
when it comes to choosing a wine with specific attributes. When they are categorised and classified
through the appellation of origin, consumers may infer, through this extrinsic cue, a wine with a
differentiated quality, i.e., one that has specific characteristics that they may recognise objectively. As can
be observed in the model, this is the variable that takes on a higher load and statistical signification (ß
12
=
-0.867; t = -5.600), which reveals its importance in the perception process and therefore in the final
purchase.
Previous literature (Dowling and Staeling, 1994
46
; Mitchell, 1998
28
) has pointed out that this risk appears
because there are many options or alternatives that are presented -which is something that is very
characteristic in the wine market- or because they do not have the ability to process this number of
alternatives or simply because they do not know the intrinsic attributes. To reduce this uncertainty or risk,
consumers will make use of collective brand as an credible indicator that provides them with guarantees
(Erevelles et al., 1999)
16
. Consumers will look for options that have the highest level of social
recognition, which the literature has explained as reputation (Selnes, 1993
47
; Chu and Chu, 1994
48
;
Landon and Smith, 1997
49
). The reputation of a good wine will be built on the credibility of the
informative signal (De Chernatony, 1999
50
; Mora and Montoro, 2004
51
); in our case this will be on the
collective brand. Therefore, the hypothesis number 2 can be proved.
5.2.3. Credibility and the Search for Information
Wine is a relatively complex product since it presents a considerable number of intrinsic attributes that
condition its quality. We have the type of grape (albariña, garnacha, treixadura, tempranillo, godello and
many others); a specific origin; the year (some harvests are better than others); the vintage and, of course,
its organoleptic properties (aroma or flavour). We also have to add to this the immense number of
possible alternatives, which makes the informative signal take on major importance. We have already
indicated that uncertainty about these attributes is considerable which is why correct signalling of them is
presented as a determining factor in the selection process. It is obvious that as they cannot process these
attributes or properties, consumers are going to base themselves on the signal that allows them to
recognise those attributes, i.e., on the credible informative signal. It will therefore be the credibility of the
signal that is the basis on which this information is collected and processed. It is logical and urgent to
check how the brand reduces the search for all of this information, since it is presented as a highly
credible signal (Erdem et al., 2006)
9
. The impact of the credibility of the collective brand on the
information costs registered a negative coefficient (ß
13
= -0.675) which was very statistically significant (t
= 5.789). This means that the two types of costs -for collection of information and its processing- are
reduced with the credibility that the collective brand presents. Therefore, our third hypothesis is proved.
5.2.4. Perceived Quality, Risk, Search for Information and Expected Utility
These variables -quality, risk and search for information- are mediator variables between the signal and
the utility that we suppose consumers attribute to the brand. Figure 2 shows that parameters ß
14
, ß
24
have
the expected sign and, furthermore, they are statistically significant. This means that the model supports
12
hypothesis H
5
, reflecting a considerable influence on the perceived risk on expected utility (ß
24
= -0.414; t
= -2.116). This data reveals what was already stated in the theory, which is that, for a market with a wide
range of prices and even qualities, consumers perceive a high risk. To eliminate the consequences of the
wrong choice, or to reduce the processing of information caused by this for consumers is the reason why
the reliable signal that reduces this risk is sought. This signal is the brand. With respect to quality, the
parameter (ß
25
= 0.487, t = 2.868) confirms and ratifies hypothesis number 4 (H
4
) which refers to the halo
effect or improvement in the perception of intrinsic attributes. Effectively, not only do we demonstrate
that there is a higher value generated by the brand, but we also see that this higher value comes from the
improvement in the perception of quality, i.e., in the improvement in perception of the attributes that give
the product quality and that are associated with the collective brand (for example, Albariño from Rías
Bajas or Godello from Valdeorras).
Thus, brand is a signal that consumers use to infer quality (Ruiz and Azón, 2004)
29
, and it even
guarantees these properties, -which will also help to reduce the perceived risk-. The improvement in the
perception of these attributes or intrinsic properties is caused by the link that exists between the brand and
the intrinsic attributes. As the collective brand signals origin, it evokes know-how, tradition or
symbolism, which adds value to the product. This symbolic utility, which is external to the product, is
what increases the expected utility for end consumers. It is the added value that the brand gives to the
product.
The exception to the model is constituted by the coefficient ß
34
which describes the relationship between
the Costs of the Search for Information and the Expected Utility (ß
34
= 0.052, t = 0.468) and, therefore, H
6
cannot be proved. Perhaps the perception of the saving the costs of searching for information associated
with a product such as wine does not have any direct influence on the utility or value of the product
because consumers do not perceived this advantage directly but indirectly through reduction of the risk.
This last result is consistent with the theory of Information Economy, which demonstrates that the agent
makes use of reliable and credible signals to be able to reduce the risks in a good choice. This means that
the increase in utility derived from a reduction in information costs takes place, mainly, derived from the
reduction in the risk associated with the purchase (Dowling, 1986
25
; Cunningham, 1967
52
). On perceiving
the risk, they will search for the informative signal that is reliable for consumers. The brand, on bringing
together information on attributes that are difficult to perceive, makes an important saving in all of this
processing of information. This is how we explain that the relationship is not strictly direct and that the
increase in utility derived from the saving of costs of searching for information mainly comes from
reduction of the risk.
Overall, the results of the grouped model uphold the structural relations demanded and the central role of
credibility in the proposed framework. These results have several important implications. Credibility of
the collective brand has a stronger effect on Perceived Risk (–0.867) and Cost of the Search for
Information involved (-0.675) than on Perceived Quality (0.374). This data once more ratifies the
implication that we had reached in the previous section and this is that quality is less important than risk.
It seems that consumers are not so much concerned with inferring a level of quality with some certainty
as with not making a mistake in a specific choice. We must thus look for strategies that allow reduction of
this level of risk that is presented to consumers. At this point, consumers are faced with the question of
which strategies for risk reduction will be applied in order to minimise the quantity of perceived risk to a
tolerable level (Dowling and Staelin, 1994)
47
. In their attempt to reduce uncertainty, when it comes to
buying a wine, they should look for opportunities to try the wine before buying it. Another valid
alternative is to provide verbal or written information on the wine -for example, guides- (Ruiz et al.,
2004)
53
which also facilitate that choice and, finally, the information provided by the shop assistant (Ruiz
et al., 2004)
54
, making training in wine a basic requirement. These actions will lead to a reduction in the
estimated probability that the product purchased will fail or that the consequences will be very severe and,
therefore, they will lead to purchase completion.
6. Conclusions
We looked for the properties that the signal(s) should have in order to be easily perceived (identified and
processed) by consumers. Thus, we followed the latest approach in this current of research, Signalling
Theory. This theory aims to respond to the properties that the signals must have for them to be easily
perceived by consumers. This is a very important contribution since, as we have just explained, quality is
provided by those intrinsic attributes which, however, cannot be perceived (identified and processed) by
consumers. The other question was knowing how to improve the equity that the brand confers on the
product. This means whether the brand improves the product quality or reduces the perceived risk. The
main contributions are explained below.
Brand Equity and Perceived Quality
13
A contribution to be highlighted in this research has been that of checking, within the theoretical
framework of signalling, not only whether brand as a signal allows consumers to infer quality, but also
whether it improves perception of the intrinsic attributes of the product, which some authors have called
the halo effect. Our contribution has not been to identify this fact, since it had already been explained in
the existing literature (Del Río et al., 2001)
55
, but to identify the reason why this phenomenon takes place.
Brand, in addition to being a very reliable indicator for assessing quality, allows it to be improved, by
improving functional utility -a guarantee of the physical properties- and symbolic utility -positive
associations in the mind of the consumer directly related with these physical properties-. These
implications will have a high value for being able to provide brands (and collective brands), relating to
the sector being researched, with a higher brand equity.
Another of the relevant theoretical contributions of this research is the one that explains that this
improvement in perceived quality is an overall impression formed by the consumer from a specific signal
(in our case, the collective brand). The overall impression that consumers perceive through the signal
leads to an improvement taking place in the perception of the intrinsic attributes of the product. This
higher value is what Aaker (2004
45
) calls value added by the brand. This is what is known as the halo
effect or improvement in the perception of those attributes. Brand is the signal that allows an
improvement in the utility that the product possesses, giving it a higher functional utility and a better
image. Therefore to build strong brands is a very good strategy to differentiate the product and defend
from competition (Vrontis and Paliwoda, 2008)
2.
Another relevant theoretical question concerning quality is the uncertainty that exists about the intrinsic
properties. This uncertainty that exists, even when the product has been consumed, is what led us to
examine the problem of perceived risk. In other words, the agents can be faced with the problems of
adverse selection (Ackerlof, 1970)
3
that are presented when they have to choose between different
alternatives in which quality is not easily perceived. This is the supposition of asymmetric information
that we explained in the previous section and that leads us to the appearance of risk in the market. This is
explained below.
Brand Equity and Perceived Risk
As we have just pointed out, there is a lot of variability in the intrinsic properties that are in the market.
This causes consumers to be faced with a problem of choosing the optimum from among many
alternatives or simply not making the right choice. We are faced with the problem of perceived risk. Can
brand act as a signal to reduce risk? In imperfect and asymmetric information markets, the information
communicated by a brand will not produce any equity unless it is credible. Thus, credibility is the key
element in the signalling perspective on formation and administration of brand equity. This signalling
perspective aims to create this credibility.
The signalling perspective suggests that companies should inform consumers of what they are promising
with their brands. Companies should avoid deliberate and involuntary differences between the offer of the
promised product and the actual one, since otherwise the credibility of their brands could fade.
Standardisation of quality is an obvious and important way to avoid such discrepancies. The signalling
perspective suggests that, in the long run, the consistency of the current offer will provide feedback for
the offers of the company's products and will thus reinforce brand equity. Specifically, maintaining brand
equity requires consistency in the management of marketing mix elements. Elsewhere, it is also important
that both individual brand offers and levels of brand attributes maintain consistency (coherence) over
time. This coherence over time aims to guarantee the clarity of the brand position with the information
supplied and to reinforce its credibility. This credibility will be the signal that allows reduction of both the
risk associated with the purchase and the costs of searching for information associated with the
appearance of this level of risk.
For the wineries, the authenticity will be critical to reinforce the status, command price premiums and
obtain and advantage against potential competitors (Beverland, 2005)
56
. This is an excellent way to create
corporate regulation and build authentic brand equity.
All of this leads us to the conclusion that the basis for building a brand that is strong and therefore
credible lies in i) making a consistent offer, i.e., homogenising its quality and delivering what is
promised; ii) committing resources for the long term and iii) offering very clear information –easily
perceived- and therefore, submitting to market approval. In this way, brand will improve perceived
quality and reduce risks and costs of information associated with the purchase. We can say that collective
brand adds equity or utility to the product.
14
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