Article

A note on interpreting consumption tax incidence in OLG models

January 1998

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RePEc

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This note discusses the generational incidence of consumption taxes in an OLG framework. The objective is to highlight the channels through which an increase in, e.g., a VAT redistributes income across generations. It turns out that with labor supply exogenous VAT incidence is very similar to the impact of a PAYG pension system or government debt.

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A note on interpreting consumption tax incidence in OLG models

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