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The Difficult Transition From Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons From Mexico

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Abstract

Electoral competition is necessary but not sufficient for the consolidation of democratic regimes; not all elections are free and fair; nor do they necessarily lead to actual civilian rule or respect for human rights. If there is more to democracy than elections, then there is more to democratization than the transition to elections. But in spite of the rich literature on the emergence of electoral competition, the dynamics of political transitions toward respect for other fundamental democratic rights is still not well understood. Political democracy is defined here in classic procedural terms: free and fair electoral contestation for governing offices based on universal suffrage, guaranteed freedoms of association and expression, accountability through the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. Although analyses of democratization typically acknowledge that these are all necessary criteria, most examine only electoral competition. This study, however, develops a framework for explaining progress toward another necessary condition for democratization respect for associational autonomy, which allows citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without fear of external intervention or punishment.
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Center for Global, International and
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UC Santa Cruz
Peer Reviewed
Title:
The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico
Author:
Fox, Jonathan A, UCSC
Publication Date:
01-01-1994
Series:
Reprint Series
Publication Info:
Reprint Series, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies, UC Santa Cruz
Permalink:
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4n4746hk
Keywords:
Globalization and Regulation, Social Movements
Abstract:
Electoral competition is necessary but not sufficient for the consolidation of democratic regimes;
not all elections are free and fair; nor do they necessarily lead to actual civilian rule or respect for
human rights. If there is more to democracy than elections, then there is more to democratization
than the transition to elections. But in spite of the rich literature on the emergence of electoral
competition, the dynamics of political transitions toward respect for other fundamental democratic
rights is still not well understood.
Political democracy is defined here in classic procedural terms: free and fair electoral contestation
for governing offices based on universal suffrage, guaranteed freedoms of association and
expression, accountability through the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. Although
analyses of democratization typically acknowledge that these are all necessary criteria, most
examine only electoral competition. This study, however, develops a framework for explaining
progress toward another necessary condition for democratization respect for associational
autonomy, which allows citizens to organize in defense of their own interests and identities without
fear of external intervention or punishment.
... Without rejecting these observations, I build my analysis on a third view of clientelism to suggest that previous critical juncture views of clientelism may overstate its stability and coherence. While some authors view clientelism and the continued dominance of traditional patron classes as a strong barrier to democratic consolidation (Hagopian, 1996;O'Donnell, 1996a;1996b), other work, especially Fox's studies of Mexican politics examines how clientelism changes in response to more contingent forms political action and alliances between state and social actors, altering both the supply and demand for clientelist goods and producing a waxing and waning of clientelist politics over time and across subnational levels (Fox, 1992a;1992b;1994;Fox and Hernandez, 1989;Gay, 2006). Similarly, Levitsky's and Auyero's respective studies of Argentine politics over the 1990s show how class-based politics can revert to clientelism (Auyero, 2001;Levitsky, 1996). ...
... Until 2021, elections operated on a closed-list system, in which party members select a slate of candidates in mandatory primary elections (Filártiga Callizo, 2023). The constitution also established the basis for decentralization, instituting direct elections for municipal councils and mayors and for the newly created post of departmental governor. ...
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Clientelism is a deeply ingrained informal political institution in Paraguay and a source of continuity relative to political reforms and social and demographic changes, particularly democratization and the advent of electoral party alternation. This article examines Paraguay’s post-dictatorial politics (1992-2023), engaging with critical juncture and institutional change theory to analyze continuity and evolution in clientelist political systems. It argues that formal democratization, rather than eliminating the informal practice of clientelism, produced a process of gradual institutional conversion from a monopolistic form of clientelism to a more competitive and ideologically pluralistic form of clientelist interest representation in Paraguay.
... Conversely, failure to support results in exclusion from these provisions, serving as punishment. Thus, authors typically characterize relations of clientelism as hierarchical, vertical, asymmetric, or exploitive, where voters are often in a disadvantaged position (or persuaded) to trade their political subordination for material rewards (Hicken 2011;Stokes 2005;Hilgers 2011;Fox 1994). 2 Contrary to this traditional view, recent scholarship underscores the relevance of clients' interests and active role in initiating these clientelistic bonds. ...
... 2 As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) observed, patrons' requirements to monitor and enforce clients' compliance are relaxed when they are embedded in long-term relationships-where affection and trust (either performative or genuine) develop alongside the exchanges-and when patrons cannot do more than threaten to punish clients' noncompliance. However, patrons in these relationships remain in control, as can be seen, for example, in the works of Fox (1994), Auyero (2000), Hilgers (2011), Hicken (2011), and Finan and Schechter (2012. 3 See, e.g., Barozet (2004), Eaton and Prieto (2017), Arévalo León (2015), and Silva (2016). ...
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Clientelism is traditionally viewed as a mechanism through which patrons exert control over clients. Drawing on qualitative data from three municipalities in Santiago, Chile, and building on literature that emphasizes client agency, this article explores a variant of clientelism in which clients initiate and enforce clientelistic relationships. The findings suggest that these two forms of clientelism can differently impact a crucial aspect of democracy: horizontal accountability. Client-driven clientelism compels patrons to seek resources for distribution, rendering them susceptible to influence by those who can grant them access to these resources. When patrons are tasked with accountability roles and the resource providers are subject to their oversight (as in the relationship between municipal councilors and mayors), the providers can deter these accountability functions. In contrast, patrons with independent access to resources can better preserve their autonomy.
... 1 Important studies on SURs in other world regions include, among others, Lankina andGetachew (2006, 2012), McMann (2006), and Tudor and Ziegfeld (2016). 2 See, for instance, Behrend (2011), Benton (2012, Borges (2007), Cornelius (1999), Eisenstadt (1999), Fox (1994), Gervasoni (2010), Gibson (2005Gibson ( , 2013, Giraudy (2010Giraudy ( , 2013Giraudy ( , 2015, Hagopian (1996), Loxton (2021), Montero (2007), Snyder (1999), and Solt (2003), among others. 3 Many states and provinces in Latin America experienced higher levels of democracy at the onset of the national democratic transition before sliding back into lower levels of democracy. ...
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This article uses the literature on subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) and regime juxtaposition in Latin America to gain analytical leverage on the recent process of subnational democratic erosion in the United States. Based on a review of five key dimensions of federalism, we argue that the institutional landscape for the emergence and continuity of SURs is, comparatively speaking, more favorable in the US than in any of Latin America’s three federations (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). In addition to showing how federal structures are more detrimental for subnational democracy in the US, we assess how the two main theoretical approaches that have been developed to understand SURs in Latin America and elsewhere can be applied to the US.
... El segundo dilema, íntimamente relacionado con el anterior, es la diferenciación, por el que se plantean distintas tipologías para distinguir las relaciones clientelares en las sociedades tradicionales frente a las modernas e incluso postmodernas. En este sentido, la modernización implica que el cliente tiene mayor posibilidad de negociar y cambiar de patrón, se diluyen las relaciones cara a cara y permanentes para hacerlas más anónimas y esporádicas, gana importancia las organizaciones de masas, las identidades ideológicas o la indiferencia, y el voto ocupa el centro de la relación (Lemarchand, 1972;Cornelius, 1977;Weingrod, 1977;Fox, 1994;Caciagli, 1996;Gay, 1997Gay, , 1999Günes-Ayata, 1997;Corrochano, 2002). Sin embargo, frente a estas distinciones que diversifican la naturaleza del concepto, Erdmann y Engel (2007) advierten que "este tipo de dicotomía no es realmente útil, ni siquiera con fines analíticos, porque no existen mundos tan distintos […], el clientelismo no solo existe en los intersticios tradicionales y en la periferia tradicional, sino también en el propio centro moderno, que no es tan moderno, sino que está muy contaminado y entretejido con elementos tradicionales" (p. ...
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