Article

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?

January 2005

Source
RePEc

Authors:

Written in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the document contains discussion about possible future trajectories for cooperation over Nuclear weapons. Seeing neither the grounds for continued competition nor immediate cooperation, the authors prescribe a path of cautious engagement in cooperative measures to diminish any nuclear threat.

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Chapter

French Nuclear Policy: Adapting the Gaullist Legacy to the Post-Cold War World

January 1994

Edward A. Kolodziej

The Gaullist nuclear legacy has undergone repeated change since the creation of the force de frappe in the 1960s.1 The early emphasis in French doctrine on the strict limitation of the French deterrent to the defense of the Hexagon gradually shifted to a stress on the contribution of French nuclear forces to European deterrence, a position officially recognized by NATO at Ottawa in 1974 and ... [Show full abstract] reaffirmed thereafter.2 The role of French conventional forces, while committed in French doctrinal thinking to testing enemy intentions before nuclear weapons were unleashed, was progressively enlarged in the 1970s to permit their engagement in a forward battle with allied conventional forces. In the 1980s the Socialist government of President Françis Mitterrand created a Rapid Action Force (FAR) to facilitate timely French cooperation with allied forces, principally those of Germany, in meeting a possible aggression from the East. Prestrategic nuclear forces were then quietly downplayed in deference to German concerns about their possible use against targets in Germany.

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January 2008 · International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business

Frédéric Le Roy

The aim of this research is for us to better understand collective strategies. To do so, the competitive behaviour of businesses in the French fish-canning industry from the 1960s to the 1980s is studied in depth. This study allows us, on the one hand, to define the conditions under which this type of strategy can emerge and stabilise and, on the other, to show the endogenous nature of its ... [Show full abstract] dissolution.

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Toward a GA Solution to the Discovery Problem

February 1970

Stewart W. Wilson

Classifier systems are an intriguing idea that, so far, has been hard to make work. The difficulties fall into three areas that I call the Discovery Problem, the Cooperation Problem, and the Time Problem. Here I will address the Discovery Problem, but the others deserve some mention. The Cooperation Problem arises because in a classifier system, classifiers must often cooperate ---and yet are ... [Show full abstract] also in competition under the GA. Classifiers may cooperate diachronically, forming chains along which payoff flows. Each member of a chain is dependent on the others: the early on the late and vice versa. So if the success of one member leads it to reproduce to the detriment of another member, it in effect shoots itself in the foot. Classifiers also may cooperate synchronically, sharing in the proper representation of a situation at one time. The same dilemma holds: a classifier's ultimate fitness may well depend on its contemporaries also being there---yet GA competition acts against this. ...

Article

The Development of Cooperation in Genetic Algorithms for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

March 2000

Bryant A. Julstrom

In the Prisoner's Dilemma, two players decide, without communicating, whether to cooperate or defect. The players engage in repeated rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), a model of competition and cooperation in social interactions. A genetic algorithm is a search procedure inspired by the mechanisms of biological evolution. In it, a population of solutions ... [Show full abstract] to a problem evolves, producing better solutions. Researchers have investigated the development of cooperation using genetic algorithms whose populations consist of IPD-playing strategies. This paper presents such an inquiry, in three parts. In the first, the average level of cooperation among strategies increases with the length of their IPD contests. In the second and third, the population is divided into clans that apply different strategies in contests with members of the same and different clans. Cooperation in "foreign" contests rises with the length of the contests, but falls with the num...

Article

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FORMAL POWERS OF GOVERNORS AND STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

March 1995 · Politics & Policy

Using numerical indices, this study describes and analyzes the relationship between governors and attorneys general in regard to formal powers. An index of formal power for each office is presented and divided into high and low categories. In examining the relationship between the formal powers of the two offices, the fifty states fall into four patterns for the combinations of formal power. Each ... [Show full abstract] of the power combinations suggests either greater competition or cooperation between these two important constitutional officers. The relationship of the formal power of the two offices is one significant factor which has implications for the governor's leadership in the executive branch.

Article

Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective

April 1995 · European Economic Review

Margaret A. Meyer

In static principal-agent relationships, cooperation and competition among agents both yield higher welfare than independent compensation — both modes of job design improve the tradeoff between risk and explicit incentives. In dynamic settings, welfare is also affected by implicit incentives, in particular, the ratchet effect. I characterize the effects of job design decisions on implicit ... [Show full abstract] incentives, showing that they differ in nature from explicit incentive effects and may be the dominant ones. Even if a decision about job design improves the static risk/incentive tradeoff, it may worsen the ratchet effect by so much that welfare falls.

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KMTs Return to Power: A Contemporary Assessment of Relations in the Taiwan Strait

June 2008

Frank Vollmer

Sino-US relations have undergone dramatic changes in the past 60 years, characterised by a mix of baggage ranging from containment during the Cold War era to engagement in the post- Cold War period. Their relationship also reflects strategic ambiguity, built upon mutual reliance and cooperation, yet also underpinned by strategic competition and deep suspicion over the status quo of the Taiwan ... [Show full abstract] Strait. Frictions among the parties emerge when a de jure status is unilaterally claimed. Concerning the fragile relationship between the actors and the very importance of the Republic of China(ROC) as a potential 'stumbling block' in regional and global security affairs, it is eminent to understand the emergence of, and the various positions towards the status quo, in order to evaluate possibilities of future developments.

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485 Mechanical Model of Competition and Cooperation Representing Falling of Agents

August 2009 · The Proceedings of the Dynamics & Design Conference

A mechanical model of competition and cooperation representing falling of agents is proposed to develop a purely mechanical implementation comparable to the Lotka-Volterra competition model. It is numerically shown that our model can produce nine stable equilibriums, as well as that there exists the initial condition belonging to each of the equilibriums. Then, we develop a reduced order version ... [Show full abstract] of our model in order to obtain simpler description of our problem. The result shows that the reduced model can also produce sensitivity of initial conditions similar to the full model.

Chapter

Trade Associations and Other Bodies

January 2009

This chapter briefly explains the formation and objectives of the associations that have performed important roles in the development of the insurance industry during the twentieth century. They can be classified as falling into four categories: 1. those formed to control competition (the collusive associations); 2. those formed to ensure market cooperation in regards to a particular issue, or to ... [Show full abstract] represent the interests of their members to government and regulatory bodies, in some cases in response to public pressure (the cooperative associations); 3. those formed as the result of government action, including the enactment of various Acts (the quasi-official associations); and 4. educational and training bodies.

Chapter

Background and Previous Work

April 2016

In this chapter, we first review some concepts and terminologies from game theory and multiagent systems areas that will be used throughout the book in Sect. 2.1. After that, we explore previous work in multiagent learning literature by dividing them into two major categories: cooperative multiagent systems and competitive multiagent systems, distinguished by the underlying intentional stance of ... [Show full abstract] the agents within the system. Within each category, we review previous work in three different parts distinguished by the different goal that the work targets at. In Sect. 2.2, we focus on reviewing previous work whose goal falls into one of the following major solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, fairness, or social optimality. In Sect. 2.3, we focus on investigating previous work targeting at either of the following major solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, maximizing individual benefits, and Pareto-optimality.

Article

Legends of the fall

October 2005

M. Buchanan

Empires rise and fall because of competition and conflict between groups, some of which dominate others. Those able to muster and sustain a higher level of internal cooperation tend to prevail, doing a better job of providing a collective defense. Thus, history is an evolutionary competition between more or less cooperative groups. It is suggested that particular geographical zones act as ... [Show full abstract] incubators for highly cooperative groups, because they impose conditions under which cooperation really matters.

Article

S. W. Wilson 1 Discovery

October 1995

Stewart W. Wilson

Classifier systems are an intriguing idea that, so far, has been hard to make work. The difficulties fall into three areas that I call the Discovery Problem, the Cooperation Problem, and the Time Problem. Here I will address the Discovery Problem, but the others deserve some mention. The Cooperation Problem arises because in a classifier system, classifiers must often cooperate ---and yet are ... [Show full abstract] also in competition under the GA. Classifiers may cooperate diachronically, forming chains along which payoff flows. Each member of a chain is dependent on the others: the early on the late and vice versa. So if the success of one member leads it to reproduce to the detriment of another member, it in effect shoots itself in the foot. Classifiers also may cooperate synchronically, sharing in the proper representation of a situation at one time. The same dilemma holds: a classifier's ultimate fitness may well depend on its contemporaries also being there---yet GA competition acts against this. Coope...

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?

Abstract

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French Nuclear Policy: Adapting the Gaullist Legacy to the Post-Cold War World

The rise and fall of collective strategies: A case study

Toward a GA Solution to the Discovery Problem

The Development of Cooperation in Genetic Algorithms for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

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KMTs Return to Power: A Contemporary Assessment of Relations in the Taiwan Strait

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