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Strange-Face-in-the-Mirror Illusion

July 2010
Perception 39(7):1007-8

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PubMed

Authors:

University of Urbino

I describe a visual illusion which occurs when an observer sees his/her image reflected in a mirror in a dimly lit room. This illusion can be easily experienced and replicated as the details of the setting (in particular the room illumination) are not critical. These observations were made in a quiet room dimly lit by a 25 W incandescent light. The lamp was placed on the floor behind the observer so that it was not visible either directly or in the mirror. A relatively large mirror (0.5 mT0.5 m) was placed about 0.4 m in front of the observer. Luminance of the reflected face image within the mirror was about 0.2 cd m(-2) and this level allowed detailed perception of fine face traits but attenuated colour perception. The illusion occurred even at higher levels of illumination of observer's face (from 0.2 to 1.6 cd m(-2)). The task of the observer was to gaze at his/her reflected face within the mirror. Usually, after less than a minute, the observer began to perceive the strange-face illusion. Phenomenological descriptions were made by fifty naive individuals (age range 21 ^ 29 years; mean 23 years; SD 2.1 years). At the end of a 10 min session of mirror gazing, the participant was asked to write what he or she saw in the mirror. The descriptions differed greatly across individuals and included: (a) huge deformations of one's own face (reported by 66% of the fifty participants); (b) a parent's face with traits changed (18%), of whom 8% were still alive and 10% were deceased; (c) an unknown person (28%); (d) an archetypal face, such as that of an old woman, a child, or a portrait of an ancestor (28%); (e) an animal face such as that of a cat, pig, or lion (18%); (f) fantastical and monstrous beings (48%). Language: en

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I describe a visual illusion which occurs when an observer sees his/her image reflected

in a mirror in a dimly lit room. This illusion can be easily experienced and replicated as

the details of the setting (in particular the room illumination) are not critical. These

observations were made in a quiet room dimly lit by a 25

incandescent light. The

lamp was placed on the floor behind the observer so that it was not visible either

directly or in the mirror. A relatively large mirror (0.5 m60.5 m) was placed about

0.4 m in front of the observer. Luminance of the reflected face image within the

mirror was about 0.2 cd m

ÿ2

and this level allowed detailed perception of fine face

traits but attenuated colour perception. The illusion occurred even at higher levels of

illumination of observer's face (from 0.2 to 1.6 cd m

ÿ2

). The task of the observer was

to gaze at his/her reflected face within the mirror. Usually, after less than a minute,

the observer began to perceive the strange-face illusion.

Phenomenological descriptions were made by fifty naive individuals (age range

21^ 29 years; mean 23 years; SD 2.1 years). At the end of a 10 min session of mirror

gazing, the participant was asked to write what he or she saw in the mirror. The

descriptions differed greatly across individuals and included: (a) huge deformations of

one's own face (reported by 66% of the fifty participants); (b) a parent's face with traits

changed (18%), of whom 8% were still alive and 10% were deceased; (c) an unknown

person (28%); (d) an archetypal face, such as that of an old woman, a child, or a portrait

of an ancestor (28%); (e) an animal face such as that of a cat, pig, or lion (18%);

(f) fantastical and monstrous beings (48%).

The disappearance or attenuation of face traits could be linked to the Troxler

fading that occurs in the periphery while staring at a central fixation. However, this

explanation would predict that face traits should fade away and eventually disappear

(Wade 2000), whereas the apparitions in the mirror consist of new faces having new

traits. A possibly related `multiple-faces' phenomenon (Simas 2000) has been reported

for photos of faces placed in peripheral vision. In this case, the reported deforma-

tions of features include variations of the facial traits and expressions or appearance

of new ones like teeth, or a beard, as well as completely new faces, 3-D distortions,

rotations, upside-down faces, the subject's own face, sometimes younger or older.

Clearly, there are similarities in effects for peripherally viewed photos and centrally

viewed self-reflections in dim light. However, in central viewing, the perception of the

face is more accurate, making the distortion more salient, and, because the distortions

are of one's own face, the effects are amplified from merely intriguing to often unsettling.

The two types of distortion (peripheral versus low-illumination central viewing) can be

compared by viewing one's own face in ÅÙÆprofile in a mirror in peripheral vision.

From a perceptual viewpoint, the strange-face illusion may be explained by disruption

of the process of binding of traits (eyes, nose, mouth, etc) into the global Gestalt of face

(Thompson 1980). This long-term viewing of face stimuli of marginal strength may

generate a haphazard assembly of face traits that generate deformed faces or scrambled

LAST BUT NOT LEAST

Strange-face-in-the-mirror illusion

Perception, 2010, volume 3 9, pages 1007 ^ 1008

Giovanni B Caputo

Department of Psychology, University of Urbino, via Saffi 15, 61029 Urbino, Italy;

e-mail: giovanni.caputo@uniurb.it

Received 15 May 2009, in revised form 11 May 2010

doi:10.1068/p6466

faces. Frequent apparitions of strange faces of known or unknown people support the

idea that the illusion involves a high-level mechanism that is specific to global face

processing. On the other hand, the frequent apparition of fantastical and monstrous

beings, and of animal faces cannot, in our opinion, be explained by any actual theory

of face processing. Neither constructive approaches nor top ^ down accounts seem to

provide adequate explanations.

The participants reported that apparition of new faces in the mirror caused sensa-

tions of otherness when the new face appeared to be that of another, unknown person

or strange `other' looking at him/her from within or beyond the mirror. All fifty partic-

ipants experienced some form of this dissociative identity effect, at least for some

apparition of strange faces and often reported strong emotional responses in these

instances. For example, some observers felt that the `other' watched them with an

enigmatic expression

a situation that they found astonishing. Some participants saw

a malign expression on the `other' face and became anxious. Other participants felt

that the `other' was smiling or cheerful, and experienced positive emotions in response.

The apparition of deceased parents or of archetypal portraits produced feelings of silent

query. Apparition of monstrous beings produced fear or disturbance. Dynamic deforma-

tions of new faces (like pulsations or shrinking, smiling or grinding) produced an overall

sense of inquietude for things out of control.

Static face pictures and the distortions seen when they are peripherally viewed (Simas

2000) involve the binding of face traits. In contrast, self-perception in a mirror engages

a far broader set of processes as the image duplicates one's own face perfectly in space

and time, triggering an integration of perceptual, motor, and proprioceptive processes.

It is a dynamic process involving self-motion and autonomous self-exploratory control

of facial pose and expression (Rochat 2002). The construction of our self-identity

includes, among other processes, the capacity to recognise oneself in the mirror, a

competence acquired in childhood between 2 ^ 3 years of age (Zazzo 1981). Another

aspect of the strange-face illusion is the potential breakdown of self-identity that may

take place when gazing at a strange new face that has replaced one's own in the mirror

for a relatively long time.

Acknowledgment. I would like to greatly thank Patrick Cavanagh for his help in revision, advice,

and enthusiastic support.

References

Rochat P, 2002 ``Ego function of early imitation'', in The Imitative Mind Eds A N Meltzoff,W Prinz

(Cambridge: Cambr idge University Pres s) pp 85 ^ 97

Simas M L, 2000 ``The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigative studies'' Perception 29

1393 ^ 1395

Thompson P, 1980 ``Margaret Thatcher: a new illusion'' Perception 9483 ^ 484

Wade N J, 2000 A Natural History of Vision (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)

Zazzo R, 1981 ``Miroir, images, espaces'', in La Reconnaissance de son Image chez l'Enfant et l'Animal

Eds P Mounoud, A Vinter (Paris: Delachaux et Niestle

¨)pp77^110

ß 2010 a Pion publication

1008 Last but not least

Strange-face-in-the-mirror illusions: specific effects on derealization, depersonalization, and dissociative identity

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References

Article

Oct 2022

Josh Weisberg

Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot, or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal's work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.

Last but not least

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2000

We have noted several characteristics of the phenomenon. It seems to be easier to observe: (i) with highly familiar faces; (ii) when centred at the blind spot; (iii) with achromatic stimuli; (iv) with faces varying in size from 7 cm to about 14 cm; and (v) with medium-contrast levels. It often occurs in bursts, generally very fast, may encompass an emotional response, may involve a number of unrecognised faces, and generally tends to take at least 20 ^ 60 s to start for subjects observing it for the first time. Further, it seems to be more specific to human faces as compared to monkey faces. It can be triggered by small eye movements. The multiple-faces phenomenon appears to be related to adaptation to a very familiar face; as adaptation occurs, other face-related stored information is displayed by visual memory (overlaying the priming face). Such mechanism initially seems to act locally, as for eyes, mouth, nose, moustache, etc [more related to our category (iii)], and later, globally, as for whole faces, hair, beard, etc [more related to our category (iv)]. We have not found in the literature studies on face adaptation, however. We base our main hypothesis on physiological studies that identified cells responsive to faces, profile, and elements of a face in monkeys' inferotemporal cortex (for a review, see Desimone 1991). We suppose that mechanisms for detecting and identifying faces exist, and that these are primarily tuned in very early infancy to faces more frequently viewed (ie generally the mother's or first care-giver's face) and that later, as other faces are detected and stored, this mechanism builds upon previously stored most (similar?) seen faces, or opens new categorical face matrices. It is interesting to observe that male faces can be seen in female's photos and vice-versa. We are still gathering addi- tional and more controlled data to learn more about the occurrence and characteristics of this phenomenon. Language: en

The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigate studies

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2000

Maria Lúcia De Bustamante Simas

The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigative studiesWe have observed a new and peculiar phenomenon involving face perception. When afamiliar face measuring about 12 ^ 14 cm is placed in such a way that its nose coincideswith the blind spot, we create the best conditions for observing a series of interpolationevents, including the multiple-faces phenomenon. (3) (PDF) The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigate studies. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/12111370_The_multiple-faces_phenomenon_some_investigate_studies [accessed Mar 07 2023].

Ego function of early imitation

Chapter

Apr 2002

Philippe Rochat

Imitation guides the behaviour of a range of species. Scientific advances in the study of imitation at multiple levels from neurons to behaviour have far-reaching implications for cognitive science, neuroscience, and evolutionary and developmental psychology. This volume, first published in 2002, provides a summary of the research on imitation in both Europe and America, including work on infants, adults, and nonhuman primates, with speculations about robotics. A special feature of the book is that it provides a concrete instance of the links between developmental psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. It showcases how an interdisciplinary approach to imitation can illuminate long-standing problems in the brain sciences, including consciousness, self, perception-action coding, theory of mind, and intersubjectivity. The book addresses what it means to be human and how we get that way.

Miroir, images, espaces

Article

Jan 1981

R. Zazzo

Margaret Thatcher: A New Illusion

Article

Feb 1980

Peter Thompson

Miroir, images, espaces'', in La Reconnaissance de son Image chez l'Enfant et l

Jan 1981

R Zazzo

Zazzo R, 1981``Miroir, images, espaces'', in La Reconnaissance de son Image chez l'Enfant et l'Animal Eds P Mounoud, A Vinter (Paris: Delachaux et Niestle¨) pp 77^110 ß 2010 a Pion publication