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I describe a visual illusion which occurs when an observer sees his/her image reflected in a mirror in a dimly lit room. This illusion can be easily experienced and replicated as the details of the setting (in particular the room illumination) are not critical. These observations were made in a quiet room dimly lit by a 25 W incandescent light. The lamp was placed on the floor behind the observer so that it was not visible either directly or in the mirror. A relatively large mirror (0.5 mT0.5 m) was placed about 0.4 m in front of the observer. Luminance of the reflected face image within the mirror was about 0.2 cd m(-2) and this level allowed detailed perception of fine face traits but attenuated colour perception. The illusion occurred even at higher levels of illumination of observer's face (from 0.2 to 1.6 cd m(-2)). The task of the observer was to gaze at his/her reflected face within the mirror. Usually, after less than a minute, the observer began to perceive the strange-face illusion. Phenomenological descriptions were made by fifty naive individuals (age range 21 ^ 29 years; mean 23 years; SD 2.1 years). At the end of a 10 min session of mirror gazing, the participant was asked to write what he or she saw in the mirror. The descriptions differed greatly across individuals and included: (a) huge deformations of one's own face (reported by 66% of the fifty participants); (b) a parent's face with traits changed (18%), of whom 8% were still alive and 10% were deceased; (c) an unknown person (28%); (d) an archetypal face, such as that of an old woman, a child, or a portrait of an ancestor (28%); (e) an animal face such as that of a cat, pig, or lion (18%); (f) fantastical and monstrous beings (48%). Language: en
I describe a visual illusion which occurs when an observer sees his/her image reflected
in a mirror in a dimly lit room. This illusion can be easily experienced and replicated as
the details of the setting (in particular the room illumination) are not critical. These
observations were made in a quiet room dimly lit by a 25
incandescent light. The
lamp was placed on the floor behind the observer so that it was not visible either
directly or in the mirror. A relatively large mirror (0.5 m60.5 m) was placed about
0.4 m in front of the observer. Luminance of the reflected face image within the
mirror was about 0.2 cd m
and this level allowed detailed perception of fine face
traits but attenuated colour perception. The illusion occurred even at higher levels of
illumination of observer's face (from 0.2 to 1.6 cd m
). The task of the observer was
to gaze at his/her reflected face within the mirror. Usually, after less than a minute,
the observer began to perceive the strange-face illusion.
Phenomenological descriptions were made by fifty naive individuals (age range
21^ 29 years; mean 23 years; SD 2.1 years). At the end of a 10 min session of mirror
gazing, the participant was asked to write what he or she saw in the mirror. The
descriptions differed greatly across individuals and included: (a) huge deformations of
one's own face (reported by 66% of the fifty participants); (b) a parent's face with traits
changed (18%), of whom 8% were still alive and 10% were deceased; (c) an unknown
person (28%); (d) an archetypal face, such as that of an old woman, a child, or a portrait
of an ancestor (28%); (e) an animal face such as that of a cat, pig, or lion (18%);
(f) fantastical and monstrous beings (48%).
The disappearance or attenuation of face traits could be linked to the Troxler
fading that occurs in the periphery while staring at a central fixation. However, this
explanation would predict that face traits should fade away and eventually disappear
(Wade 2000), whereas the apparitions in the mirror consist of new faces having new
traits. A possibly related `multiple-faces' phenomenon (Simas 2000) has been reported
for photos of faces placed in peripheral vision. In this case, the reported deforma-
tions of features include variations of the facial traits and expressions or appearance
of new ones like teeth, or a beard, as well as completely new faces, 3-D distortions,
rotations, upside-down faces, the subject's own face, sometimes younger or older.
Clearly, there are similarities in effects for peripherally viewed photos and centrally
viewed self-reflections in dim light. However, in central viewing, the perception of the
face is more accurate, making the distortion more salient, and, because the distortions
are of one's own face, the effects are amplified from merely intriguing to often unsettling.
The two types of distortion (peripheral versus low-illumination central viewing) can be
compared by viewing one's own face in ÅÙÆprofile in a mirror in peripheral vision.
From a perceptual viewpoint, the strange-face illusion may be explained by disruption
of the process of binding of traits (eyes, nose, mouth, etc) into the global Gestalt of face
(Thompson 1980). This long-term viewing of face stimuli of marginal strength may
generate a haphazard assembly of face traits that generate deformed faces or scrambled
Strange-face-in-the-mirror illusion
Perception, 2010, volume 3 9, pages 1007 ^ 1008
Giovanni B Caputo
Department of Psychology, University of Urbino, via Saffi 15, 61029 Urbino, Italy;
Received 15 May 2009, in revised form 11 May 2010
faces. Frequent apparitions of strange faces of known or unknown people support the
idea that the illusion involves a high-level mechanism that is specific to global face
processing. On the other hand, the frequent apparition of fantastical and monstrous
beings, and of animal faces cannot, in our opinion, be explained by any actual theory
of face processing. Neither constructive approaches nor top ^ down accounts seem to
provide adequate explanations.
The participants reported that apparition of new faces in the mirror caused sensa-
tions of otherness when the new face appeared to be that of another, unknown person
or strange `other' looking at him/her from within or beyond the mirror. All fifty partic-
ipants experienced some form of this dissociative identity effect, at least for some
apparition of strange faces and often reported strong emotional responses in these
instances. For example, some observers felt that the `other' watched them with an
enigmatic expression
a situation that they found astonishing. Some participants saw
a malign expression on the `other' face and became anxious. Other participants felt
that the `other' was smiling or cheerful, and experienced positive emotions in response.
The apparition of deceased parents or of archetypal portraits produced feelings of silent
query. Apparition of monstrous beings produced fear or disturbance. Dynamic deforma-
tions of new faces (like pulsations or shrinking, smiling or grinding) produced an overall
sense of inquietude for things out of control.
Static face pictures and the distortions seen when they are peripherally viewed (Simas
2000) involve the binding of face traits. In contrast, self-perception in a mirror engages
a far broader set of processes as the image duplicates one's own face perfectly in space
and time, triggering an integration of perceptual, motor, and proprioceptive processes.
It is a dynamic process involving self-motion and autonomous self-exploratory control
of facial pose and expression (Rochat 2002). The construction of our self-identity
includes, among other processes, the capacity to recognise oneself in the mirror, a
competence acquired in childhood between 2 ^ 3 years of age (Zazzo 1981). Another
aspect of the strange-face illusion is the potential breakdown of self-identity that may
take place when gazing at a strange new face that has replaced one's own in the mirror
for a relatively long time.
Acknowledgment. I would like to greatly thank Patrick Cavanagh for his help in revision, advice,
and enthusiastic support.
Rochat P, 2002 ``Ego function of early imitation'', in The Imitative Mind Eds A N Meltzoff,W Prinz
(Cambridge: Cambr idge University Pres s) pp 85 ^ 97
Simas M L, 2000 ``The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigative studies'' Perception 29
1393 ^ 1395
Thompson P, 1980 ``Margaret Thatcher: a new illusion'' Perception 9483 ^ 484
Wade N J, 2000 A Natural History of Vision (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
Zazzo R, 1981 ``Miroir, images, espaces'', in La Reconnaissance de son Image chez l'Enfant et l'Animal
Eds P Mounoud, A Vinter (Paris: Delachaux et Niestle
ß 2010 a Pion publication
1008 Last but not least
... Under a low-level face illumination, the mirror-gazing task (MGT) reliably produces strange-face illusions (SFIs). In the first study of SFIs (Caputo, 2010a), after 10-minutes of mirrorgazing, 50 healthy individuals from the general population perceived: (a) face deformations that still represented one's own face (66% of the 50 participants); (b) a parent's face with altered traits (18%); (c) an unknown person with an independent identity (28%); (d) an old man or woman, a child or an adolescent (28%); (e) an animal face (18%); and (f) non-human beings (48%). Similar results were obtained through interpersonal eye-gazing in dyads (Caputo, 2019). ...
... The participant's task in previous studies was to stare at their eyes reflected in the mirror (Caputo, 2010a(Caputo, , 2010b or to stare at the other's eyes during eye-gazing in dyads (Caputo, 2019;Lange et al., 2022). In general, participants had no difficulty in executing this task, while some participants were easier to fixate on only one eye at a time, or the nasal septum in between the eyes. ...
... Research Question: suggestions and biases introduced by task instructions. In previous studies of SFIs, the participant's task involved noting experiences of changes of their own face reflected in the mirror (Caputo, 2010a(Caputo, , 2010b or seen in the other participant's face during eyegazing (Caputo, 2019;Lange et al., 2022). Thus, it was possible that this instruction had primed the participant to detect face changes and biased the participant's response to face changes. ...
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Anomalous strange-face illusions (SFIs) are produced when mirror gazing under a low level of face illumination. In contrast to past studies in which an observer's task was to pay attention to the reflected face and to perceive potential facial changes, the present research used a mirror gazing task (MGT) that instructed participants to fixate their gaze on a 4-mm hole in a glass mirror. The participants' eye-blink rates were thus measured without priming any facial changes. Twenty-one healthy young individuals participated in the MGT and a control panel-fixation task (staring at a hole in a gray non-reflective panel). The Revised Strange-Face Questionnaire (SFQ-R) indexed derealization (deformations of facial features; FD), depersonalization (bodily face detachment; BD), and dissociative identity (new or unknown identities; DI) scales. Mirror-fixation increased FD, BD, and DI scores compared to panel-fixation. In mirror-fixation, FD scores revealed fading specific to facial features, distinct from "classical" Troxler- and Brewster-fading. In mirror-fixation, eye-blink rates correlated negatively with FD scores. Panel-fixation produced low BD scores, and, in a few participants, face pareidolias as detected on FD scores. Females were more prone to early derealization and males to compartmentalization of a dissociative identity. SFQ-R may be a valuable instrument for measuring face-specific dissociation (FD, BD, DI) produced by MGT. Use of MGT and panel-fixation task for differential diagnoses between schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder is discussed.
... Given the opportunity, every one of us can experience transient reality distortions akin to those observed in psychosis. For instance, experimentally-induced sensory manipulation has been shown to generate both hallucinatory experiences and depersonalization phenomena in community samples (Caputo, 2010;Daniel & Mason, 2015;Tsakiris et al., 2010). Similarly, psychoactive drugs, such as amphetamines and LSD that create states of heightened sensory awareness, are known to produce transient psychotic symptoms (Ham et al., 2017). ...
... As it pertains to psychological processes involving the understanding of the self, research has shown that patients with schizophrenia, individuals at clinical high-risk for the illness (CHR), as well as non-clinical individuals who self-report schizotypal personality traits and psychotic-like experiences display an externalizing tendency towards: (a) misattributing self-generated imagined mental events as overtly enacted (Docherty, 2012;Franck et al., 2000;Gawęda et al., 2012;Henquet et al., 2005;Humpston et al., 2017;Peters et al., 2007); and (b) misattributing the source of self-generated actions to external agents (Bentall et al., 1991;Brébion et al., 2000;Johns et al., 2010;Johns et al., 2006;Vermissen et al 2007;Allen et al., 2006;Larøi et al., 2004). Furthermore, these patterns of externalizing misattributions are found to be particularly pronounced among patients reporting hallucinations (Bentall et al., 1991;Brébion et al., 2000) and non-clinical adults experiencing hallucination-like phenomena (Larøi et al., 2004) Importantly however, although different types of self-and reality-monitoring misattributions have also been identified in studies of adolescents who are at neurogenetic risk for psychosis (Debbané et al., 2008;2010), no study to date has examined the associations between these self-referential processes and schizotypal dimensions in typically developing adolescents (see Tables 1.4. and 1.5. ...
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Contemporary research suggests that clinical psychosis is distally linked with schizotypal trait expression and more proximally with the breakdown of psychological processes pertaining to mentalizing. Although previous findings are suggestive of a relationship between trait-vulnerability for psychosis and mentalizing difficulties, they involve adult participants either within or beyond the critical period of illness onset. To date, little is known about the process of mentalizing during the critical developmental period of adolescence or its associations with schizotypal trait dimensions. In a series of empirical studies, the current thesis used novel experimental tasks and self-report measures in samples of typically-developing young people to: (1) examine the nature of associations linking schizotypal trait dimensions in adolescence to disruptions in mentalizing processes involving both the understanding of the self and others; (2) further understand the processes that sustain self-awareness during adolescence by examining the effects that age, cognitive effort and emotional valence may exert on self- and reality-monitoring performance; and (3) prospectively assess the nature of the relation between mentalizing processes sustaining self- (self-monitoring) and other-awareness (ToM) from adolescence to young adulthood. Overall, the findings of the current thesis provide novel data suggesting that the expression of schizotypal traits that impede interpersonal communication with others in adolescence are associated with difficulties in self and other understanding. Regarding the development of psychological processes sustaining self-awareness, current data suggest that although both self- and reality-monitoring abilities may be established in pre-adolescent development, reality-monitoring capacities for emotionally-charged material may undergo further elaboration from adolescence to young adulthood. In addition, the data of the current thesis suggest that increased cognitive effort and emotional valence during memory encoding may respectively lead to self- and reality-monitoring confusions. Finally, the findings of the current thesis suggest that different types of self-monitoring misattributions in adolescence can prospectively predict specific patterns of ToM dysfunction at 5-year follow-up.
... While the audio file was playing, with a short break after each sentence to enable repetition, a white screen was presented. A black screen was deliberately omitted during the scenario presentation because reflections that would result from glass monitors could also induce dissociative symptoms (cf., Mirror-Gazing Task, Caputo (2010)). The mean duration of the experiment was 50 minutes. ...
Shame and dissociation play pivotal roles in the pathogenesis and treatment of (complex) post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the causal relationship between these two symptoms remains unclear. We tested the association between state shame and state dissociation in 249 participants (Mage = 27.55; SDage = 8.74; 60.24% female; 84.7% no mental illness). After completing questionnaires (trait shame and dissociation, trauma history), participants were randomly allocated to an imaginative shame or dissociation induction group, and changes in state shame and dissociation were measured. The data were analyzed using latent change score modeling. We found significant changes in both state shame and dissociation, with an isolated change of state shame in the shame induction group but changes in both shame and dissociation in the dissociation induction group. Thus, state shame and dissociation correlated only with the induction of dissociation. We found an effect of trait variables only on state dissociation and no effect of trauma history on state variables. The interaction between shame and dissociation remains complex and is only partially understood. Our study adds to research supporting the assumption that dissociation leads to shame. In addition, in experimental psychopathology approaches, imaginative procedures seem more suitable for studying shame than for studying dissociative symptoms.
... As mentioned before, van den Hout et al. (2009) have shown how compulsive-like staring brought about DEP/DER in a non-clinical sample. Subsequently, mirror-gazing has been used in several studies as an experimental method of inducing DEP/DER (Caputo, 2010;Brewin and Mersaditabari, 2013;Caputo et al., 2021). More generally, different forms of perseveration and repetition may lead to dissociation or breakdown of meaning by blocking the activation TABLE 1 Summary of theoretical models presented in this paper, each with a specific suggested mechanism worthy of further study, and a suggested direction of causality between dissociative experiences and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. ...
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A strong and specific link between obsessive-compulsive disorder or symptoms (OCD/S) and a tendency for dissociative experiences (e.g., depersonalization-derealization, absorption and imaginative involvement) cannot be explained by trauma and is poorly understood. The present theoretical formulation proposes five different models conceptualizing the relationship. According to Model 1, dissociative experiences result from OCD/S through inwards-focused attention and repetition. According to Model 2, dissociative absorption causally brings about both OCD/S and associated cognitive risk factors, such as thought-action fusion, partly through impoverished sense of agency. The remaining models highlight common underlying causal mechanisms: temporo-parietal abnormalities impairing embodiment and sensory integration (Model 3); sleep alterations causing sleepiness and dreamlike thought or mixed sleep-wake states (Model 4); and a hyperactive, intrusive imagery system with a tendency for pictorial thinking (Model 5). The latter model relates to Maladaptive Daydreaming, a suggested dissociative syndrome with strong ties to the obsessive-compulsive spectrum. These five models point to potential directions for future research, as these theoretical accounts may aid the two fields in interacting with each other, to the benefit of both. Finally, several dissociation-informed paths for further developing clinical intervention in OCD are identified.
Background: The most significant features for clinical diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) are cognitive-perceptual and disorganized symptoms. Experimental study of visual perceptual processes is important to elucidate the psychological mechanisms of cognitive-perceptual impairment in SPD. Objective: To research the performance of visual perceptual tasks in SPD. Design: Series I and II presented the subjects with visual perceptual tasks with different types of instructions (vague, verbal, or visual perceptual cues). The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R) was also administered. The participants were 39 SPD patients, 36 obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD) patients (F.21.8, F.60.5 in ICD-10, respectively), and 102 healthy controls. Results: SPD patients had a significantly lower number of correct answers in conditions of vague instruction and verbal cues in Series I of a visual-perceptual task in comparison with healthy subjects (p < 0.01). With visual perceptual cues in Series II, patients with SPD had the same number of correct answers as controls, whereas OCPD patients had the same number of correct answers as controls with verbal cues in Series I. SPD patients had significantly lower scores in most verbal and nonverbal WAIS-R subtests in comparison with controls. SPD patients differed from OCPD patients in that they had lower scores in the "Information" (p < 0.05) and "Comprehension" (p < 0.05) subtests. Conclusion: With visual-perceptual cues, SPD patients were able to achieve normative results in the performance of visual-perceptual tasks, whereas patients with OCPD demonstrated lower productivity. In SPD patients, the basic impairments were associated with difficulties in inhibition of peculiar responses, stability of a subjective manner of performance and inability to revise it, low orientation to the model, and slipping into subjective associations with the stimuli.
Background: Strange face illusions describe a range of visual apparitions that occur when an observer gazes at their image reflected in a mirror or at another person's face in a dimly lit room. The illusory effects range from mild alterations in colour, or contrast, to the perception of distorted facial features, or new strange faces.The current review critically evaluates studies investigating strange face illusions, their methodological quality, and existing interpretations. Method: Searches conducted using Scopus, PubMed, ScienceDirect and the grey literature until June 2022 identified 21 studies (N = 1,132; healthy participants n = 1,042; clinical participants n = 90) meeting the inclusion criteria (i.e., providing new empirical evidence relating to strange face illusions). The total sample had a mean age of 28.3 years (SD = 10.31) and two thirds (67 %) of participants tested to date are female. Results are reported using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The review was preregistered at the Open Science Framework (OSF: Results: Pooling data across studies, illusory new strange faces are experienced by 58% (95%CI 48 to 68) of nonclinical participants. Study quality as assessed by the Appraisal Tool for Cross-Sectional Studies (AXIS) revealed that 3/21 (14.28%) studies were rated as high, 9/21 (42.86%) as moderate and 9/21 (42.86%) as low quality. Whilst the items relating specifically to reporting quality scored quite highly, those relating to study design and possible biases were lower and more variable. Overall, study quality accounted for 87% of the variance in reporting rates for strange faces, with higher quality being associated with lower illusion rates. The prevalence of illusions was also significantly greater in samples that were older, had higher proportions of female participants and for the interpersonal dyad (IGDT) compared to the mirror gaze paradigm (MGT). The moderating impact of study quality persisted in a multiple meta-regression involving participant age, paradigm type (IGDT vs MGT) and level of feature distortion. Our review point to the importance of reduced light levels, face stimuli and prolonged eye fixation for strange face illusions to emerge. Conclusion: Strange face illusions reliably occur in both mirror-gazing and interpersonal gazing dyad paradigms. Further research of higher quality is required to establish the prevalence and particularly, the mechanisms underpinning strange face illusions.
Qualitative consciousness is conscious experience marked by the presence of sensory qualities, like the experienced painfulness of having a piano dropped on your foot, or the consciousness of seeing the brilliant reds and oranges of a sunset. Over his career, philosopher David Rosenthal has defended an influential theoretical approach to explaining qualitative consciousness. This approach involves the development of two theories – the higher-order thought theory of mental state consciousness and the quality space theory of sensory quality. If the problem of explaining qualitative consciousness is divided into two more manageable pieces, the door opens to a satisfying explanation of what is seen by some to be an intractable explanatory puzzle. This interdisciplinary collection develops, criticizes, and expands upon themes inspired by Rosenthal's work. The result is an exciting collection of new essays by philosophers and scientists, which will be of interest to all those engaged in consciousness studies.
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As humanity is approaching its third year under COVID-19, the virus’s grim day-to-day toll is becoming increasingly clear. By the end of 2021, over 5 million people will have died from the disease and many are continuing to die on a daily basis. The world has not even yet begun to count the psychological fallout from the disease, as only glimpses of it have become visible so far: children left behind in their schooling, depression among teenagers unable to socialise; students prevented from having campus experiences; parents at the end of their tethers because of closed schools and kindergartens; family members unable to see each other for years on end. Among survivors, “fatigue” is the most common words to be heard. Other words, unknown a few months ago, have become pedestrian, as we are all becoming (linguistic) epidemiologists: Delta and Omicron mutations, booster vaccinations, 2G, 3G, 3G++. The advantages and disadvantages of heterologous and homologous vaccinations, of mRNA vaccines vs adenovirus vector vaccines versus inactivated virus vaccines are broadly discussed. Additionally, rules and regulations change on a daily basis, and travel plans are more a guessing game than anything else. Under the reign of social media, discussions taking place oftentimes become heated and accusatory, rather than reflected and scientific. As the former spill out onto the streets, people are injured and killed. The virus is political. IJCS’s current issue pays a small tribute to this situation; in a larger expose, entitled “Screen Ontologies or Teaching the Virus a Lesson: A Few Things that Work in Online Education and a Few that Don’t”, the situation of accelerated online education is discussed. The article states that despite the fact that there were few alternatives to such online teaching, its necessity at the time should not supress necessary criticism of distance education in general. In particular, the teaching situation via screens is discussed and older philosophical and social criticisms of television culture and reintroduced and updated in order to expose the limits of screen education in particular and screen cultures in general. Finally, new ways of distance education are sketched that would usher in a post-screen education model. The second article, “Is There a Correspondence Between “Orientalism” and The Orient? – Said, Dyson and Sen” by Amitabha Gupta, revisits Edward Said’s seminal Orientalism work and, from the vantage point of 40 years after, explains how especially the work of Sen is able to provide a more fruitful approach today by circumventing some of the by now problematic premises Said relied on Naeim Sepehri’s “Psychological Effects of the Architectural-Space: Decorated Mirror-tile Artwork-A Phenomenological Approach”, discusses the usage of mirror shards in the interior decoration of palaces and mosques in Iran. He historicises this architectural feature and, with the help of recent psychological theories, demonstrates how such architectural approaches have become deeply engrained in the aesthetic of Iranian historical national narratives. “Innovation in Cultural Heritage Preservation in Taiwan: Lessons for Indonesia?” by Riela Provi Drianda, Laila Zohrah and Adiwan Fahlan Aritenang contrasts and compares cultural heritage politics and their implementation in Taiwan and Indonesia respectively. While the two cultural communities follow divergent politics of heritage conservation, the authors illustrate that many of the challenges faced by cultural heritage preservation actions, such as rapid development, profit maximisation, lack of political will and funding, and a host of others, are common to preservation efforts around the globe. Preservationists can learn from each other’s experiences, and while local givens, such as weather conditions, might differ, all preservation efforts share a number of commonalities which can best be explored together. Finally, Xiaolong Zhang’s “Media Power: Cigarette Package Design in China” explores the conflicting messages cigarette package design is sending: On the one hand, as in many other countries, the cigarette pack is supposed to alert its users that smoking kills; on the other, it is supposed to attract users to exactly this habit. Zhang traces this conflict to the differing political and economic messages being sent by the authorities. For one, tax revenues from cigarettes are an import economic factor, as are jobs in the tobacco industry; for another, the long term costs of smokers’ health-care costs have recently begun to be higher than tobacco’s economic benefits. Up to here, the Chinese situation does not seem to be so much different from the rest of the world. But Zhang shows that in China there is a strong cultural element at play that is different from other countries, and that is the social component of smoking. Via focus groups, Zhang demonstrates that smoking is variably used to exhibit status, masculinity and relational sociability. It is these features that make anti-smoking campaigns even harder to run in China than elsewhere. Holger Briel Editor-in-Chief
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Mirror-tile artwork is one of the most recent and striking phenomena in Iranian Spiritual Art. Aside from being an aesthetic item for adorning architectural building space, mirrors also exemplify profound cultural ideas. It has been applied in interior design and the decoration of holy and royal buildings with symbolic expressions and enigmatic nature. Initially, it was created using the broken and unused pieces of mirrors as a recycling project. Muslim artisans did not approve of wasting material. They used basic techniques to construct spiritual and effective Iranian-Islamic architectural spaces and ornamentations filled with mystery and marvels. This study is inspired by Giovanni Caputo’s research on the different psychological effects of mirrors, by the mirror phenomenon as an Iranian-Islamic architectural element, and as a psychological effect brought about by architectural components. It attempts to elicit responses from people who have been touched and encountered the phenomenon by asking them to describe their presence and experiences in a mirror-tile decorated environment. The interviews usually focused on two main topics; the first topic is concerned with the participant’s experience quality during their presence in the architectural space; the second is concerned with the way a person interacts with the various elements of the environment. As a result, there are two direct views at the moment of encountering the mirror-tile decorated architectural spaces: the “Close-look” (looking closely at one’s image) and the “Afar-look” (looking from afar, taking in the whole space). Moreover, the light a place and the emotional effects of the architectural built-up space on perception were the most critical factors for participants’ responses to achieve the research’s goal and thus laying the groundwork for future research in these areas.
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The subjective experience associated to memory processing is the core of the definition of episodic autobiographical memory (EAM). However, while it is widely known that amnesia affects the content of memories, few studies focused on the consequences of an impairment of EAM on the subjective self, also called the I-self. In the present study, we explored the I-self in two puzzling disorders that affect EAM: functional amnesia, which has an impact on autobiographical memory, and transient global amnesia (TGA), which only affects episodic memory. I-self was assessed through an original measure of self-integration in autobiographical narratives, namely the use of general or personal pronouns. Results showed that patients with functional amnesia tended to use general pronouns, whereas patients with TGA preferentially used the first person. The link between I-self and depersonalization-derealisation tendencies was also explored, showing dissociative tendencies in patients with functional amnesia but not in patients with TGA. We discuss these results from a combined neuropsychological and psychopathological perspective, with a view to proposing an explanatory model of the links between self-awareness and the episodic component of autobiographical memory.
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We have noted several characteristics of the phenomenon. It seems to be easier to observe: (i) with highly familiar faces; (ii) when centred at the blind spot; (iii) with achromatic stimuli; (iv) with faces varying in size from 7 cm to about 14 cm; and (v) with medium-contrast levels. It often occurs in bursts, generally very fast, may encompass an emotional response, may involve a number of unrecognised faces, and generally tends to take at least 20 ^ 60 s to start for subjects observing it for the first time. Further, it seems to be more specific to human faces as compared to monkey faces. It can be triggered by small eye movements. The multiple-faces phenomenon appears to be related to adaptation to a very familiar face; as adaptation occurs, other face-related stored information is displayed by visual memory (overlaying the priming face). Such mechanism initially seems to act locally, as for eyes, mouth, nose, moustache, etc [more related to our category (iii)], and later, globally, as for whole faces, hair, beard, etc [more related to our category (iv)]. We have not found in the literature studies on face adaptation, however. We base our main hypothesis on physiological studies that identified cells responsive to faces, profile, and elements of a face in monkeys' inferotemporal cortex (for a review, see Desimone 1991). We suppose that mechanisms for detecting and identifying faces exist, and that these are primarily tuned in very early infancy to faces more frequently viewed (ie generally the mother's or first care-giver's face) and that later, as other faces are detected and stored, this mechanism builds upon previously stored most (similar?) seen faces, or opens new categorical face matrices. It is interesting to observe that male faces can be seen in female's photos and vice-versa. We are still gathering addi- tional and more controlled data to learn more about the occurrence and characteristics of this phenomenon. Language: en
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The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigative studiesWe have observed a new and peculiar phenomenon involving face perception. When afamiliar face measuring about 12 ^ 14 cm is placed in such a way that its nose coincideswith the blind spot, we create the best conditions for observing a series of interpolationevents, including the multiple-faces phenomenon. (3) (PDF) The multiple-faces phenomenon: some investigate studies. Available from: [accessed Mar 07 2023].
Imitation guides the behaviour of a range of species. Scientific advances in the study of imitation at multiple levels from neurons to behaviour have far-reaching implications for cognitive science, neuroscience, and evolutionary and developmental psychology. This volume, first published in 2002, provides a summary of the research on imitation in both Europe and America, including work on infants, adults, and nonhuman primates, with speculations about robotics. A special feature of the book is that it provides a concrete instance of the links between developmental psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. It showcases how an interdisciplinary approach to imitation can illuminate long-standing problems in the brain sciences, including consciousness, self, perception-action coding, theory of mind, and intersubjectivity. The book addresses what it means to be human and how we get that way.
Miroir, images, espaces'', in La Reconnaissance de son Image chez l'Enfant et l
  • R Zazzo
Zazzo R, 1981``Miroir, images, espaces'', in La Reconnaissance de son Image chez l'Enfant et l'Animal Eds P Mounoud, A Vinter (Paris: Delachaux et Niestle¨) pp 77^110 ß 2010 a Pion publication