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The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview

Authors:
  • Busara Center
The Lord’s Resistance Army in
Sudan: A History and Overview
By Mareike Schomerus
8
2 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 3
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Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey
© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2007
First published in September 2007
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4 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 5
The Human Security Baseline Assessment
The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a three-year research
project (2005–08) administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been devel-
oped in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN
Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of inter-
national and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and
dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform
(SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security.
The HSBA is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team of regional, security,
and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed vio-
lence throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.
HSBA Working Papers are timely and user-friendly reports on current research
activities in English and Arabic. Future papers will focus on a variety of issues,
including victimization and perceptions of security, armed groups, and local
security arrangements. The project also generates a series of Issue Briefs.
The HSBA project is supported by Canada, the UK Government Global Con-
flict Prevention Pool, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida),
and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
For more information contact:
Claire Mc Evoy
HSBA Project Coordinator
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1202 Geneva, Switzerland
E-mail: mcevoy@hei.unige.ch
Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan
HSBA Working Paper series editor: Emile LeBrun
Contents
Acronyms and abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................. 6
About the author ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 10
II. The Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement ............................................................................................. 12
III. The LRA in Eastern Equatoria ............................................................................................................................ 18
The LRA and civilians ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Areas of control ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
LRA command structures .......................................................................................................................................................... 22
IV. Allies and enemies ................................................................................................................................................................... 24
The Government of Sudan ....................................................................................................................................................... 24
The SPLM/A ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
The UPDF in Sudan ............................................................................................................................................................................. 28
Other armed groups ............................................................................................................................................................................ 32
V. The Juba Peace Talks .............................................................................................................................................................. 34
VI. Access to weapons ................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Types, stockpiles, and command of arms ........................................................................................................ 41
Arms transfers .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 43
VII. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 45
Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 48
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 51
6 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 7
Acronyms and abbreviations
CAR Central African Republic
CoH Cessation of Hostilities
CHMT Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDF Equatorian Defence Force
GPMG General Purpose Machine Gun
GoS Government of Sudan
GoSS Government of South Sudan
ICC International Criminal Court
LRA/M Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement
MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces
SSIM South Sudan Independence Movement
UN United Nations
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Force
About the author
Mareike Schomerus is a doctoral candidate at the Development Studies Insti-
tute (DESTIN) at the London School of Economics. Her research on northern
Uganda and southern Sudan has included reports for UNICEF, USAID, and
the Minority Rights Group International. During the ongoing peace talks
between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, she is
advising local peace building teams in Western and Eastern Equatoria under
the auspices of Pact Sudan.
Having trained as a journalist at Columbia University’s Graduate School of
Journalism, Schomerus spent 15 years working for major international broad-
casters in Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. She is a direc-
tor and producer of documentaries screened on the French–German channel
ARTE and the German channel ARD.
8 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 9
Abstract
The ongoing peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s
Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) in Juba, the capital of South Sudan,
have created renewed international interest in the conflict in northern Uganda.
While the negotiations have proved extremely difficult, they have opened up
new channels of communication with the LRA. The talks have also allowed
the affected population of Eastern and Western Equatoria, South Sudan, to
voice their grievances against the LRA and raise questions about the conduct
of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in Sudan. This study examines
the military history of the LRA in Sudan, the current prospects for ending the
conflict, and the main challenges facing the peace talks.
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10 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 11
obstacle to a peace process in Uganda. This is certainly the view taken by the
LRA, which argues that the ICC is biased and politically motivated in its
pursuit just of the LRA and not of both parties, when many, in fact, see the
war as a planned intervention by the Museveni government (Otunnu, 2006).
Currently, the question is whether the affected community’s quest for account-
ability is served better through local justice procedures—both traditional and
formal—or through an international justice system (Afako, 2006). Both options
come with significant challenges. Local traditional justice procedures have
not traditionally provided accountability for large-scale atrocities and their
suitability for this purpose remains contested (Allen, 2006). At the same time,
negotiating a peace deal under the threat of international arrest has proved
problematic for the LRA leadership and has divided the international com-
munity in its support for a peaceful solution.
It is extremely difficult to obtain factual information about the LRA. Much
of the existing voluminous research from northern Uganda is agenda-driven
or fails to account for the overlap between LRA and civilian grievances and
perspectives. Because research in northern Uganda and, to some extent, south-
ern Sudan requires the cooperation of the Uganda People’s Defence Force
(UPDF), information is often coloured by the UPDF’s own perspective.
This report is based on focused fieldwork in northern Uganda and southern
Sudan in 200507. The author conducted face-to-face interviews with a range
of Ugandan and Sudanese civilians and community leaders. The military
was not present on these occasions and the interviewees were assured of ano-
nymity. Members of the military from both countries, Sudanese politicians,
and LRA representatives, including the LRA high command—specifically
Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti—were also interviewed.
In describing the history of the LRA/M–UPDF conflict in Sudan and Uganda,
this report seeks a balance that has been sorely absent in previous media and
academic accounts. That the LRA/M can be seen as having arisen in pursuit
of legitimate grievances—which at times have been shared by many commu-
nities in northern and eastern Uganda—should in no way be interpreted as a
defence of the group’s methods and tactics. Part of the story of the conflict,
however, hinges on the use of propaganda and access to information; accord-
ingly, this report attempts to separate fact from fiction.
I. Introduction
The arrival of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Sudan in 199394 marked
the beginning of more than a decade of fighting involving Ugandans on Suda-
nese soil. This development had an impact on both the Sudanese civil war and
the war in Uganda, isolating large parts of Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria state
from outside help and causing thousands to flee. The LRA had ventured into
Sudan in the early 1990s to seek refuge from the fighting in Uganda. By 1993,
the Sudanese government of Omar al-Bashir had turned the LRA into a signi-
ficant actor in Khartoum’s efforts to crush the southern rebellion. Moving into
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005, the LRA became a genuine
threat to regional security.
The LRA is one of the most notorious rebel armies in the world. Under the
command of Joseph Kony and his second-in-command Vincent Otti, the group
has been an armed opponent of the Government of Uganda and President
Yoweri Museveni since 1987. Breathtaking brutality, political manoeuvring,
and propaganda have marked the conflict on all sides. The LRA has fought
this war with ruthless attacks and abductions, and the Government of Uganda
has responded with structural violence on a grand scale against the people of
northern Uganda.1 Northern and parts of eastern Uganda have been system-
atically marginalized. Warfare tactics on the government side consisted of
forcing the entire population in these areas into so-called protected villages,
which are in reality displacement camps with inhumane conditions. This move
has destroyed traditional structures and interrupted development (Finnstrom,
2003). Furthermore, there are numerous reports of violence by the Ugandan
army against civilians in the region (Otunnu, 2006).
The conflict is also setting precedents in the international justice system. In
2005 the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) issued its first
warrants, selecting Kony, Otti, and three other LRA commanders.2 This height-
ened international debate about the role of international criminal justice in
peace building efforts. Opponents of the ICC see its intervention as the major
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 13
the insurgent army’s political profile because of the atrocities committed by
its troops against civilians, and because of the widely-publicized forceful re-
cruitment of children into the army. Political manifestos (see Box 1), although
published at irregular intervals, were largely ignored because of the political
climate in Uganda, which had successfully portrayed the LRA/M as a group
of irrational maniacs, driven in its political agenda by an out-of-touch and
disconnected diaspora. According to the official Ugandan assessment of LRA
manifestos, many were written in the diaspora and were therefore inauthen-
tic—despite the fact that the war had global connections and significance,
and that the issues raised in the manifestos were clearly relevant to northern
Uganda (Finnstrom, 2003). The LRA says that its own information dispatches
were inevitably blocked by the UPDF. According to Kony, during Operation
Iron First in 2002 (see Box 2), one journalist who tried to see what was hap-
pening in southern Sudan was stopped by Museveni in Paratanga.5 Over the
years, government propaganda and media coverage has effectively depoliti-
cized the war. Its disregard for the existence of LRA political manifestos has
largely obscured the underlying political causes of the insurgency,6 which are
II. The Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement
The LRA has been something of an unknown entity for many years, attracting
wild speculation about its motives and the strength of its fighting forces. Chair-
man Kony himself has been described in misleading terms either as insane or
as a muddled messiah because of his spiritual teachings, spirit communication,
and his supposed strong adherence to idiosyncratic biblical values. Certainly,
Kony is a powerful spiritual and military figurehead who has managed to
command the LRA and imbue it with an extremely strong, and at times vio-
lent, sense of community. But explaining the LRA solely in terms of its leader
misses the underlying reasons for the war. Active LRA fighters have said that
they do not fight the war for the chairman. They see themselves as fighters
for their people, the Acholi, whom they believe to be marginalized, abused,
and excluded from Uganda’s development by an oppressive regime.3
Very little is known about the military history of the LRA–UPDF conflict.
Most battles went unreported except for cases where the army celebrated a
spectacular victory. Reports about fighting have been almost exclusively dis-
seminated by the Ugandan government and its information policy has always
been to play down the strength of the LRA. Estimates of LRA fighting forces
at the height of military action vary widely. Even since the beginning of the
Juba Peace Talks in July 2006, numbers given have ranged from a few hun-
dred to at least 10,000, depending on the source.4 Reliable estimates of LRA
forces at other points during the war simply do not exist. Survey-driven esti-
mates are flawed because at different times and in different contexts it has
been either advantageous or disadvantageous for civilians to admit their affili-
ation. In addition, LRA membership has often been fluid, with people joining,
leaving, and rejoining (Allen and Schomerus, 2006). Active combatants have
been less than vocal about their political agenda and have shrouded them-
selves in spiritual mystery.
The Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM)—the political arm of the LRA, main-
tained as an intricate network in the diaspora community—was unable to raise
LRA Chairman Joseph Kony (L) with LRA Deputy Commander
Okot Odhiambo, Ri-Kwangba, June 2006 © M. Schomerus
14 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 15
found to be widely supported by the affected population in northern Uganda,
even though the accompanying violence is never condoned (Finnstrom, 2003).
The people of northern Uganda share a sense of marginalization with those
in the east. After 20 years of war the statistics are appalling: in 2006, 60 per
cent of schools in the north were non-functioning, leaving 250,000 children
without any education; 95 per cent of people in the north were living in abso-
lute poverty compared with the national average of 37 per cent (CSOPNU,
2006). Other parts of Uganda have benefited from significant economic growth
during this period, but northern Uganda has only experienced growth in the
(often inefficient) humanitarian and development industries. Perhaps para-
doxically, the proliferation of aid is seen by many as one of the main drivers
of continued warfare. Political representation of northern and eastern Uganda
at the national level remains minimal.
The LRA/M manifestos, collected by Swedish researcher Sverker Finn-
strom over several years, present the issues that are at the heart of the conflict
in Acholiland: the lack of political representation from the region; repeated
human rights violations at the hands of the military; nationwide socio-
economic underdevelopment; and government corruption (see Box 1).
Although these manifestos have been available to the public in northern
Uganda and, once posted on the Internet, globally, their authenticity has
always been questioned by the Ugandan authorities—making them politi-
cally ineffectual (Finnstrom, 2003). Those who publicly contradicted the
official Ugandan line were often detained and, in some cases, died in custody.
Joseph Kony explained in 2006 that, ‘We have done our manifesto. . . Our
political agenda, our manifesto is open. Even if we did not explain to the
world, it is already there in Uganda.’ Asked why the LRA/M had failed to
publicize its political aims more widely, Kony replied, ‘People are fighting
with propaganda. But for me as a guerrilla, I have not yet reached. . . All thing
[all information comes] from Museveni’s side or from some other people,
because I do not have proper propaganda machineries.’7 The inability of the
LRA/M to pursue a convincing information strategy, coupled with strong
propaganda from the Ugandan government—benefiting from a good inter-
national reputation, and a plethora of aid agencies willing to accept the official
line—has certainly contributed to the spiral of violence.
There is no doubt that the LRA has used horrific methods, both in Uganda
and in Sudan, in pursuit of its aims. In July 2006, the leadership publicly
acknowledged and even apologized for its tactics, at least to representatives
of southern Sudanese communities.8 Kony himself has stated that, ‘I cannot
say that we are fighting clean war [or that] Museveni is fighting dirty war, that
one is difficult to say. Because a clean war is known by God only.’9
Misleading information, however, often based solely on government sources,
has led to an oversimplified, one-sided view of the conflict and of the LRA
itself. The media, too, has given a one-sided portrayal of the war. Government
information policy has driven public opinion. As a result, it is commonly
believed that the LRA is an army of child soldiers and the sole perpetrator of
war crimes, even though the UPDF has also been found guilty by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice of training and sending children off to fight.10 One inter-
national security expert, summing up the general government information
policy on the LRA, confirmed that, ‘Most people still think the LRA is a bunch
of children and old guys due to 20 years of propaganda.’11
Box 1 The LRA manifestos
The LRA/M has published political manifestos at regular intervals over the course of the
war. While this is well-known in northern Uganda, where frustration is often expressed
over the successful silencing of the LRA/M as a political movement, the war has been
continuously presented in the global media as having no political agenda. Much of the
LRA/M’s political energy has therefore been spent trying to counter the view that they are
solely a religiously-motivated terrorist group. For example, a 1999 manifesto signed by
Joseph Kony stated that while many members of the LRA are practising Christians, they
did not intend to become fundamentalist Christians (Finnstrom, 2003).
In addition to countering the official discourse on the LRA, which represented the
movement as driven by a desire for a rule of law based on the Ten Commandments, the
manifestos over the years have called for the restoration of multi-party politics and the
introduction of constitutional federalism. They have also called for support for human
rights, and the need to develop a nationwide socio-economic balance while promoting
peace and security and ending corruption. The manifestos routinely call for free and fair
elections, the separation of the judiciary and executive from the military, and a reform of
parliament to tackle those issues. Often, the political practices of Museveni are questioned
and analysed in detail, especially the concentration of military, legislative, and executive
power in his hands. Other manifestos have outlined LRA/M programmes on health, agri-
culture, education, infrastructure, and even defence (Finnstrom, 2003).
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 17
While the emphasis on child abductions accurately captures the brutality
of the war, it glosses over the fact that the LRA is a well-trained armed group
answering to a very strong, centralized command. Many members of the
LRA are well beyond childhood and remain with the LRA out of conviction,
a sense of adventure, or a belief in the cause (Allen and Schomerus, 2006).
Studies have revealed an array of reasons for people joining and staying with
the LRA: for many, life at home offers little while the group provides a sense
of power and loyalty; for others, the fear of reprisal makes them afraid to
leave. While thousands of children were abducted by the LRA, the fighting
forces usually comprise men and women in their late teens or early twenties.
A large number would have been with the LRA for many years, but only
started fighting when they reached their teens and were no longer considered
children in the Acholi community. Youth in Acholi society are generally de-
fined as people of 13 to 30 years of age—or those who are not yet married
(Annan and Blattmann, 2006). Thus the most active members of the LRA are
more likely to be considered as youth than as children by the local commu-
nity. Furthermore, patterns of abduction show that the LRA does not usually
abduct very young children and that many abductees are released after hav-
ing done duty as porters (Allen and Schomerus, 2006). Those who are forced
to stay with the rebels are often teenagers or young men and women who are
physically strong or well-educated: these are the ones capable of receiving
military training and coping with the harsh living conditions of the bush. For
these reasons, defining the LRA as an army of abducted children infantilizes
the movement, suggesting a lack of accountability and making it appear a
less than viable partner in peace negotiations. This has been a problem during
the Juba peace talks.
With the start of the Juba negotiations in 2006, the LRA/M finally estab-
lished a continuous information policy, denying responsibility for attacks in
Uganda and Sudan and blaming government troops posing as LRA fighters
for the horrific deeds committed against civilians. It is true that both the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the UPDF have attacked and
looted civilians, and other actors have used the LRA to cover up their own
attacks. But in many individual cases identifying the true perpetrators of
attacks is very difficult.12 One complication is the lack of law enforcement,
transport, and communication infrastructure to prosecute effectively aggres-
sors in Sudan. Explaining the general tendency to assign blame to only one
group, a local leader in Juba stated, ‘[the] LRA has become the name for every-
body who has done wrong. Bad people here, they say they are LRA.’ It will be
a lengthy process to investigate each incident and make an accurate account-
ing of responsibility, but the need for this was reiterated in the signed Agreement
on Accountability and Reconciliation, in which both parties acknowledged the
necessity of ‘truth-seeking and truth-telling processes’ (Government of Uganda
and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, 2007d).
Inter-tribal clashes, small militias, and roving bandits add to a confusing
environment. In Eastern Equatoria alone, civilians have been caught in con-
flicts between the forces of the LRA, the UPDF, the SPLA, the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF), the Equatorian Defence Force (EDF), and the South Sudan Inde-
pendence Movement (SSIM). Armed groups supported by the Government
of Sudan (GoS) are still generating instability in the region with the goal of
disrupting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
and destabilizing the South. As one LRA fighter described the situation in 2006,
‘The truth is, the war between the SPLA and Khartoum is far from over.’
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 19
III. The LRA in Eastern Equatoria
The earliest sightings of the LRA in Eastern Equatoria date from 1991 but it
was not until 1994 that the group located its base of operations there and
made its presence felt. Locals recall the first killings of civilians occurring the
same year, along with the first abductions. One chief remembers that in the
early days, people did not make the connection between the armed fighters
who appeared in their region and the LRA: people started to recognize the LRA
only when the fighters employed tactics familiar from Uganda and when they
began abducting people.13 The locals say that even after they had identified
the group they still did not know why they were fighting in Sudan.
The LRA’s arrival in Sudan was often explained by the Ugandan govern-
ment as a reaction to UPDF military pressure, but the move over the border
was in fact more politically driven. The LRA has stated that it was invited to
become one of Sudan’s pro-government armed groups. When the SPLA split
in 1991, the faction led by Riek Machar (known as SPLM/A-United) moved
into Eastern Equatoria. In 1992, SPLM/A-United signed a cooperative agree-
ment with the GoS. Machar subsequently broke from SPLM/A-United to form
the SSIM in 1994. The SSIM then aligned with the EDF and later with the LRA.
The EDF included members from various backgrounds, including Acholi,
Madi, Lokoya, Lolubo, Iyire, and Lotuko. Many members of the EDF had
taken refuge in northern Uganda and hence spoke Acholi. The EDF and SPLA-
United commander William Nyuon Bany, who was then working with Machar,
facilitated the first contact between the LRA and the GoS (Johnson, 2003).
A partnership between Khartoum and the LRA was established that would
benefit both: Khartoum ran a proxy war through the LRA against both the
SPLA and the UPDF, while the LRA obtained supplies and assistance in its
attempt to overthrow Museveni. Some claim the LRA actually signed an accord
to that effect with Khartoum in 1994, but Second-in-Command Vincent Otti
categorically denied that.14 However, both Kony and Otti were regular visitors
to Khartoum from the beginning of 1994 and the LRA quickly set up official
residence in Juba, then a government stronghold. The LRA soldiers also re-
ceived military training, which mirrored British tactics from the 1960s and
early 1970s, with an emphasis on anti-ambush drills and jungle fighting.15
The LRA and civilians
In the muddled military environment of Sudan in the 1990s, the lines between
armed groups and civilians were murky. The LRA, while much feared by the
civilian population, also played host to local factions that had fallen out with
Sudanese rebel groups. Since the early days of the second civil war in Sudan
(19832005), many Sudanese Acholi and other Equatorians were opposed to
the SPLA. They regarded the rebels as a Dinka movement with no regard for
Equatorian concerns (Branch and Mampilly, 2005). While a few Equatorians
joined the SPLA during the 1990s, others stayed with the EDF or the LRA. When
there was fighting against the SPLA or the UPDF, even locals who were not
ethnic Acholi, such as the Didinga, reportedly fought side by side with the
LRA. This often happened out of disappointment with the SPLA: locals felt
that it had failed to bring enough forces into the area to protect civilians and
that it mistreated Equatorians. The Acholi in Eastern Equatoria may bear a
grudge against the LRA because ‘people had it very rough from [them]’, but
they also have an undeniable connection with the group, whom they regard as
‘brothers’.16 According to one UPDF officer in Eastern Equatoria, ‘Locals have
a certain level of contact with the LRA, the people here are very anti-SPLA.’17
Eastern Equatorians report ongoing business relationships and intermarriage
arrangements between themselves and LRA members.18
The SPLA accused the locals of failing to report the LRA when they appeared
and thereby collaborating with them, but the locals argued that, ‘it is hard to
report [them] if somebody comes at gunpoint’.19 To a certain degree, allying with
the LRA has also been a protection mechanism. One security officer, comment-
ing on the inability of NGOs to help civilians in Magwi County for the best part
of the war, explained that the community was left to its own devices and thus
chose to avoid confrontation. Because the area was declared off-limits by aid
agencies for such a long time, the locals had to accommodate themselves with
the soldiers. ‘The community could not afford to be hostile to the LRA,’ he said.20
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 21
Eastern Equatoria has a long history of hosting groups opposed to the
Museveni government. In the 1980s, the forces of Museveni’s predecessor
and adversary, Tito Okello, and of Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement
both stayed in the area. Alice Lakwena’s movement is generally seen as the
spiritual and military precursor of the LRA.21 Involvement in Ugandan poli-
tics and the violence connected with it has thus been part of life for the people
of Magwi County throughout the war.
Once the LRA moved into Eastern Equatoria, ambushes and attacks on vil-
lages there became an everyday reality. The LRA was an efficient fighting
force. However, when asked for their assessment of the group’s behaviour,
people in Sudan viewed it very differently from those in Uganda. In Uganda,
the grievances of the community are specifically directed towards the LRA
and the UPDF, often down to the personal level of one particular commander.
In Sudan, the LRA was just one of many faces of war. In the highly militarized
environment created by the SPLA, the EDF, the SAF, the UPDF, and the LRA,
all armed groups and their methods merged into one single threat to every-
day stability—the soldier. As one man explained, ‘With soldiers, you cannot
trust them. They will always misbehave.’22 In Uganda, it was the brutality of
the attacks on civilians that angered the community most, whereas in Sudan
such attacks blended into the high level of ongoing, widespread violence.
Using atrocities or a show of ruthless force was effective in Uganda (Vinci,
2005). In Sudan, the LRA moved in a very different context with many other
ruthless players. One Sudanese politician said that she felt the LRA changed
its behaviour after moving to Sudan, partly because they were encouraged
by Khartoum to commit atrocities, but also because the already brutal envi-
ronment increased the spiral of violence. She said, ‘They [the LRA] kill people
and hang them up, so when local people come, they don’t touch anything. I
think the LRA learned these things from southern Sudan.’23
Areas of control
In the mid-1990s, Eastern Equatoria was at the frontline of the Sudanese civil
war. The SAF controlled the areas of Magwi, Parajok, Torit, and Owiny-Kibul
with the help of their aligned militias. The LRA became a constant threat
to the SPLA in Eastern Equatoria
because of the group’s unpredict-
able movements. Sometimes fighters
would not be seen for several
months, only to then invade a village
and remain in the vicinity for sev-
eral days.24 Road ambushes were
frequent, especially along the Parajok–
Palataka route. Even Eastern Equa-
torians who had fled the area did not
always manage to escape: two attacks
in the Sudanese Achol-Pii refugee
camp in Uganda, one in 1996 and
one in 2002, left hundreds of Suda-
nese Acholi dead.25 To this day this
remains a bitter memory for the peo-
ple of Magwi.
The LRA established a presence in
the Imatong hills and gained control
over Magwi and parts of Eastern
Equatoria, even renaming an area
‘New Gulu’. It set up its main head-
quarters near Aru Junction, an area
that the UPDF called ‘Kony Village’.
The camp at Aru Junction was sizable, usually hosting 3,0004,000 fighters. It
was the training centre and base for several battalions. Kony would stay there
with his wives and Otti was also often based there. According to the SPLA,
and not disputed by the LRA, the SPLA overran this stronghold in 1997. Kony
and Otti reportedly fled to Juba, which then became the group’s administra-
tive headquarters. Sudanese forces provided visible protection for Kony’s
residence, and the LRA established a new camp near Juba in Rubangateka,
which became the base for Otti’s command force. The LRA also had camps in
the areas of Gambera and Illyria.
LRA Second-in-Command Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba,
September 2006 © M. Schomerus
22 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 23
LRA command structures
The internal hierarchy of the LRA puzzles its opponents. One SPLA officer
based in Eastern Equatoria remembers, ‘Nobody ever spoke to Kony. We did
not know who they were. We did not know their commanders or their struc-
tures.’26 It is known that there are four main brigades (named Gilva, Sinia,
Stockree, and Trinkle) answering to the high command (‘Control Altar’). Fur-
ther structures are less clear.
A command structure in which the headquarters directs LRA forces un-
doubtedly does exist, but field commanders have operated with a certain
degree of independence. With troops on the move and spread out in both
Sudan and Uganda, tracking each group of fighters is a challenge. In mid-
2007, the LRA high command also acknowledged for the first time that there
might be former LRA groups that no longer answer to it.27 When the LRA
engaged the SPLA in combat, LRA fighters typically attacked first, followed
by a second attack by SAF troops. Most battles fought between the SPLA and
the LRA involved the SAF. If the SAF were involved, they often employed
tanks and sometimes Antonov planes.
The locals in Magwi grew to recognize the more prominent LRA com-
manders (during the assembly of the LRA in Owiny-Kibul in late 2006, locals
easily identified the major commanders), but the UPDF continued to find it
difficult to understand the group. One said, ‘We heard of Stockree [one of the
LRA brigades], but to us, we don’t know who is who.’28 For UPDF officers,
who are mostly not northern Ugandans, distinguishing the various Acholi
militias who speak the same language was difficult. A UPDF officer explained
that it took the UPDF many years to understand the dynamics in Sudan and
to distinguish LRA members from EDF members. Not until 2002, when UPDF
intelligence gathering grew stronger in Sudan, did it clearly establish that the
EDF was more active around the Torit area, which is far from Aru Junction
where the UPDF was engaged in fighting the LRA.29
Box 2 Operation Iron Fist
In 2002 Khartoum and Kampala signed an agreement that authorized the UPDF to pursue
and attack Kony’s forces in Aru Junction. The UPDF’s foray into Sudan was dubbed Opera-
tion Iron Fist and it was one of the bloodiest periods of the war. The campaign was marked
by regular helicopter gunship attacks on the LRA and by retaliatory LRA ground attacks.
Many LRA and UPDF soldiers were killed and the civilian population in Eastern Equatoria
suffered tremendously.
Despite the UPDF’s efforts to rout the LRA from Eastern Equatoria, the group would
remain there for four more years. From mid-2005, when the LRA began to prepare for the
peace process that was to become the Juba talks, its fighters and high command moved
towards the border of the DRC in Western Equatoria. On their way west, some of the
fiercest fighting with the SPLA occurred in areas that had previously been untouched by
the LRA, such as the road between Yei and Juba (BBC News, 2005). However, the LRA
has denied that these attacks were carried out by their troops (Lord’s Resistance Army/
Movement, 2005).
24 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 25
IV. Allies and enemies
The Government of Sudan
In the years before the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), which ended the second Sudanese civil war, it was an obvious advan-
tage for Khartoum to ally itself with the LRA. This was a perfect set-up for
carrying out a proxy war (Prunier, 2004). Otti described the logistics of the
mutual agreement by saying, ‘We had a very good relationship with Khar-
toum and the chairman [Kony] went there. Even me, I went several times.’30
A Ugandan official explained that ‘Kony had an official residence in Juba town,
he had an office, he was a respected military officer like any of the Sudanese
military officers.’31 Khartoum’s divide and rule tactics worked to keep the
war in the South alive without relying too heavily on its own troops (Martin,
2002). At the same time, Khartoum’s support had a politicizing effect on the
LRA that went largely unnoticed by the general public: by obtaining official
sponsorship from another state, the group’s plans to overthrow the Ugandan
government were further legitimized.
Khartoum used the split in the SPLA and the subsequent founding of the
SSIM by Riek Machar to destabilize Eastern Equatoria. Machar failed to con-
vince the international community of his cause. After the massacre of Bor
Dinka in Jonglei in August 1991, when Machar’s troops killed an estimated
2,000 people and displaced hundreds more, he was left with no outside sup-
port. With nowhere to turn, he allied with Khartoum in his quest to gain
southern independence, and turned against his former SPLA comrades. In
return, the GoS agreed to allow a referendum on southern independence
before 2009.32
The LRA was an obvious partner for the SSIM. It claims that it was invited
to come to Sudan by the SSIM through representatives of the EDF. Although
both Machar and Kony spent a considerable amount of time in their resi-
dence in Juba, they did not meet directly during day-to-day interactions
between the two groups. They did, however, come face to face at least once in
1997.33 Their subsequent meeting was not until the preparations of the peace
talks in 2006, at which point Machar, then vice-president of the Government
of South Sudan (GoSS), acted as mediator between the LRA and the Govern-
ment of Uganda.
The LRA–Khartoum relationship peaked in 1996, around the time of the
abduction of the Aboke girls, one of the most infamous incidents of the Sudan–
Uganda cross-border war (de Temmermann, 2001).34 By this time, according
to a female former member of the LRA, ‘The Arabs were bringing food and
weapons by car and giving them to us at Aru Junction—sometimes ten car-
loads. They came every three or four months. The Arab soldiers always stay
and chat.’ Most deliveries were brought by land, though some former LRA
members say that ammunition was usually airdropped. After 1996, the rela-
tionship slowly waned. ‘The LRA had a bittersweet relationship with Arabs,’
remembered a local from Eastern Equatoria, recalling that the LRA at times
sent messages to the SPLA offering to take over Juba on their behalf.35
While civilian and military interviewees say that Khartoum supplied equip-
ment to the Ugandan rebels well into 2006, the LRA says that such supplies
ceased long before then.36 Others have reported that supplies stopped in
November 2005, when the LRA crossed into Garamba National Park in DRC.
Khartoum apparently tried to re-establish contact in March 2006, but the gen-
eral consensus is that the relationship was by then over—the LRA today is
adamant that they no longer have any connection with the GoS. It is clear that
Khartoum was still supplying weapons after the 1999 agreement (Human Rights
Watch, 2006), but the exact end date of the relationship is hard to establish. It
seems certain, though, that from the time the LRA made its first overtures to
the GoSS in early 2006, the LRA was completely disengaged from the GoS.
Nevertheless, reports persist that airdrops continued in the region formerly
controlled by the LRA long after the group had left. In June 2006, there were
apparently airdrops along the Torit road. In October, locals reported airdrops
and at least three low-flying Antonov planes, also near Torit. The area is an
SAF stronghold and locals think that the supplies were either for the SAF or
for the so-called EDF 2, a group of disgruntled former EDF fighters still sup-
ported by the GoS with the aim of sabotaging the CPA. Among southern
Sudanese it is ‘common knowledge’ that the GoS continues to undermine the
26 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 27
the newly established GoSS, now a semi-autonomous regional government
under the terms of the CPA, did not authorize the renewal of the protocol
when it expired in February 2006. The UPDF now has no legal right to stay in
Sudan. Machar stated in June 2006 that he felt uncomfortable under a ‘foreign
invasion’, but he has made only minimal efforts to force the UPDF out.41 The
reason may be that the GoSS must maintain a good relationship with the
Ugandan government, which initially did not look favourably on Sudanese
attempts to bring about peace talks.
The UPDF’s ongoing presence in Sudan and its military actions against the
LRA have been a major sticking point during the Juba talks. Representatives
of the Ugandan government in Kampala have hinted that there are ‘other
reasons’ besides the LRA presence for why the UPDF is staying in Sudan.42
For example, according to some Eastern Equatorians, the GoSS is using the
UPDF to protect the SPLA against GoS forces.43 Meanwhile, there is suspicion
that Khartoum is still behind the insecurity in southern Sudan, supporting
whoever is carrying out attacks there. According to a politician from Nimule,
‘We cannot rule out that some people, some militias on the ground, were not
absorbed into the military. The area is littered with weapons. But it is the hope
of people that this is not the LRA.’44 Implementing the Juba Declaration, which
formally merged militias such as the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) with
the SPLA, has been challenging (Young, 2006). Given the suspicions and evi-
dence that Khartoum still supports various militias as proxy forces—just as it
did at the height of the war—the only hope for bringing peace to the region
is a comprehensive restructuring of the security sector.
In addition to attacks by militias on GoSS military targets, road ambushes
have occurred with more economic objectives. Since the signing of the CPA,
trade between Uganda and Juba has exploded, undercutting many traders
with connections to Khartoum. Some road ambushes have been traced back to
merchants attempting to cut off supply routes to Uganda in order to monopo-
lize the markets in Juba with their Khartoum goods. A local politician explained,
‘People in the South believe that the North has not come out sincerely in this
peace. Especially northern traders. Having these roads [Juba–Nimule and
Juba–Torit] operational makes it flooded with goods from East Africa. Khar-
toum goods remain on shelves because the market is not there.’45
CPA by supporting armed groups. In his speech on the second anniversary of
the signing of the CPA, Salva Kiir Mayardit, GoSS president and first vice-
president of Sudan, made it clear that continued military support from Khar-
toum for the LRA and other militias was one reason for the probable failure
of the CPA (Kiir Mayardit, 2007). This claim has wide currency, although Kiir’s
statement also conveniently diverted attention from GoSS shortcomings.
There are various theories about why the relationship between the GoS
and the LRA deteriorated. One of the most recurring stories, spread in both
Uganda and Sudan, is that some LRA fighters were sent for training to Khar-
toum and never returned. It is strongly suspected that this group was integrated
into the forces that became the janjawid—the largely Arab proxy force used
by the GoS to terrorize Darfurians.37 The UPDF spread the story that in 1997
about 300 LRA fighters were taken to fight in Darfur. When Kony requested
their return, President Bashir declined. Other security sources estimated the
number of fighters taken to Darfur to be only 37 as of late 2005.38 When Otti
was asked about rumours indicating that LRA members were fighting in
Darfur, and whether this ended the relationship with Khartoum, he replied:
‘That is a big no. No.’39
An element of distrust had, in any case, been introduced into the relation-
ship in late 1999 when Sudan and Uganda signed the Nairobi Agreement.
Brokered by the US-based Carter Center, the agreement established that
neither party would support the other ’s rebels (Governments of Sudan and
Uganda, 1999). Pressure on Sudan had increased when they were officially
declared sponsors of terrorism by the US administration of Bill Clinton. The
Nairobi Agreement was an attempt to bring peace to the region, but it ex-
cluded the LRA—thereby guaranteeing that it would fail to achieve either
peace or stability. According to one LRA member, ‘The Carter Center did not
talk to the right people.’40 While support for the LRA officially stopped, the valid-
ity of the agreement was doubted from the moment it was signed (Hasunira
and Solomon, 1999).
Khartoum went one step further in 2002 and issued a military protocol to
allow UPDF operations on Sudanese soil (see Box 2). Operation Iron Fist re-
sulted in increased fighting on both sides of the border. Rather than ending
the war it brought a whole new set of problems to Sudan. As a consequence,
28 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 29
The SPLM/A
The SPLA in Eastern Equatoria has always fought multiple enemies. While
engaging in fierce battles with GoS forces, its various factions were also busy
fighting between themselves, with one side bringing in the LRA to fight with
the GoS. The SPLA faced fierce opposition from local Equatorians; on top of
this, it recognized that it could not deal properly with the LRA.46 Accounts of
military engagement between the LRA and the SPLA differ and are often con-
tradictory, depending on the source. The LRA generally says that the SPLA
was a weak force and did not want to fight them; the SPLA in turn argues that
the LRA never attacked military targets, only civilian ones, which meant that
engaging with them involved too many civilian casualties.47 Overall, military
contact seems to have been limited to a few clashes and major battles, some
as recently as 2005. The SPLA calls its battles against the LRA ‘mostly victori-
ous’, although both sides claim to have had the upper hand. The LRA says
that it managed to acquire many weapons as a result of these clashes. The
conflict between the two armed groups was also fought using the civilian
population as proxy fighters. The SPLA did not declare war on the LRA, but
they gave arms to villagers to defend themselves.48
In late 2005 the newly established GoSS, in which the SPLM holds the major-
ity, changed its approach to the LRA. After Otti announced on the radio in the
autumn of 2005 that the LRA wanted peace, the GoSS attempted to establish
contact. Peace delegates of the LRA had already made the link with Nairobi-
based Acholi elders who consulted with local Sudanese politicians and con-
sequently linked them to Machar. Machar, who had become vice-president of
the GoSS after the death of John Garang, offered to negotiate. In February 2006,
a viable contact was established. The first meeting between Otti and Machar
took place in April 2006 and eventually led to the first meeting with Kony the
following month. The Juba Peace Talks officially began on 14 July 2006.
The UPDF in Sudan
With the signing of the agreement to launch Operation Iron Fist, the UPDF
was officially allowed to establish a presence in southern Sudan. Connections
between the Governments of South Sudan and Uganda, however, go back
further. One international observer said, ‘It is an intricate relationship between
GoSS and Uganda. It is hard to dismiss the UPDF in all of this.’49 The UPDF
has supported the SPLA in both war and peace, providing supplies and stra-
tegic advice. UPDF activity on Sudanese soil is hence not uncommon. While
the UPDF only officially started fighting the LRA in Sudan in 2002, there is
credible evidence that it has been in Eastern Equatoria since 1997. UPDF sol-
diers have confirmed that they had been in the area much earlier than officially
sanctioned.50 Local civilians and politicians say that the presence of a foreign
army did much to exacerbate the Sudanese civil war and had a detrimental
effect on the already war-stricken population. One local from Eastern Equa-
toria says that while the community members never dared to fight the LRA,
they would keep weapons to be prepared for the UPDF. ‘When they [the
UPDF] meet you in the bush, they cannot identify if you are a rebel or a civilian.
They kill you,’ he said.51
A common saying among Eastern Equatorians, as quoted by an interna-
tional security expert, is: ‘Why is the UPDF in Sudan? To make sure the LRA
is not destroyed.’52 The LRA has made the UPDF powerful because military
funding in Uganda has been based on government arguments that stronger
defence is needed against the rebels. With the spread and continuation of the
war, the army has also become a significant economic player through its
plundering activities and corruption.53 The crimes committed by government
actors, however, is often overlooked (Galletti and Rone, 2005). ‘The resentment
of people is that these people [the UPDF] were never defending them,’ said a
local politician in Nimule. ‘They did not have very effective encounters with
the LRA although their mission was to fight them. . . they resorted to destruc-
tion of the area and cutting trees in our forest. People really resent them.’ He
also pointed out that the UPDF no longer has a mandate to patrol Magwi
County, which includes Nimule.54
Local leaders from Eastern Equatorian counties presented their grievances
about both the LRA and the UPDF to the LRA leadership in July 2006. While
the accusations of killings and abuses against the UPDF do not match those
of the LRA, the local leaders’ statement reads: ‘The UPDF did not fulfil their
mission to South Sudan. For example, instead of following and attacking the
LRA, they turned their guns on the civil population, shooting, looting, raping,
30 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 31
and burning their huts in pretext of chasing the LRA’ (The People of Acholi
Madi, Southern Bari, Lotuho, Lokoya, Lulubo, 2006). Uganda and its army
have been found guilty of similar behaviour in the DRC by the International
Court of Justice, including ‘killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treat-
ment’ of the civilian population while inciting ‘ethnic conflict’ and failing ‘to
take measures to put an end to such conflict’ (International Court of Justice,
2005). The court’s assessment of the UPDF is often cited by both locals in
Eastern Equatoria and the LRA/M, who draw attention to similar behaviour
in South Sudan.
From an economic perspective, keeping the war alive has become part of a
lucrative economy for the army. Locals regularly reported that the UPDF cuts
down teak trees to take them into Uganda: ‘The UPDF are business-minded
soldiers, they are logging timber in the Acholi area. Who gives them permis-
sion?’55 A UN panel of experts presented evidence of Uganda’s similar exploi-
tation of natural resources during their military exploits in the DRC in 1998. In
this case, members of the UPDF were found guilty of exercising a monopoly over
the area’s principal natural resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues, for
the purpose of enriching high-ranking members of the military and other leaders.
The UPDF established physical control over areas containing coltan (columbite-
tantalite, a metallic ore), diamonds, timber, and gold (United Nations, 2002).
Even during the withdrawal of the UPDF from the areas around Owiny-
Kibul under the terms of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH) (see
Chapter V), locals reported that the UPDF cut down around 200 trees just out-
side Palataka and carried them across the border before it could be reported
to the authorities. In response, a UPDF officer argued, ‘Our duties are to look
for rebels in southern Sudan, to maintain law and order along the road. How
can we look for timber?’56
The UN panel also found that, in the DRC, the UPDF was guilty of creating
‘the conditions that require the presence of troops’ and that ‘UPDF military
operations have contributed to the arming of large numbers’ (United Nations,
2002). To local communities, fighting the actual enemy did not seem to be the
main drive of either the LRA or the UPDF in Eastern Equatoria. As a local
leader says, ‘Since the UPDF came to Sudan, they never had a face-to-face
confrontation with the LRA. It is like the LRA has been given safe passage.
People wonder why the UPDF is here. If their presence in Sudan can still
aggravate tension with the LRA, why can they not move behind fire lines?
The UPDF should be asked politely to leave. Their presence is not very wise
to reach a tangible peace with the LRA.’57
The animosity towards the UPDF in Eastern Equatoria is striking. Locals
and international security observers alike accuse them of having orchestrated
attacks made to look like LRA actions, an explanation that has also been used
by the LRA to clear themselves of blame. Often, however, even the locals have
trouble telling one armed group from another. Others point out that the UPDF
started sponsoring EDF 2, a successor of the EDF, to maintain insecurity in
Eastern Equatoria and to clear the LRA from the area. Witnesses describe how
South Sudanese and former LRA fighters were recruited into the 105th bat-
talion of the UPDF to enter Sudan and fight the LRA with its own people. The
105th is also said to be one of the more successful UPDF battalions in engag-
ing the LRA militarily. Locals say that it was used to set up attacks made to
look like LRA activity and that its soldiers were still very active in the area in
the spring of 2007. While it remains almost impossible to substantiate such
claims, they underline the murky and lawless environment. While there is
little doubt that individual soldiers or units have abused their military power,
it is hard to establish the institutional motivation.
All such accusations, both by locals and by the LRA, are dismissed by the
UPDF. One UPDF official said, ‘The LRA are looking for all reasons to justify
what has happened.’ According to the UPDF, the LRA never engaged in fight-
ing the army but used cowardly tactics, engaging only the smallest groups of
UPDF on patrol and usually choosing to attack civilians in trading centres.58
Responding to accusations of choosing soft civilian targets, Joseph Kony coun-
tered that when the LRA fought the UPDF, the UPDF were supported and
hence accompanied by civilians: ‘So when we shoot, the close fire will kill
civilians also.’ He added that the UPDF always made a point of being close to
civilians when they attacked the LRA: ‘That is the tactic, which Museveni now
have [sic] started in Uganda. They mix soldier with civilians so that when we
fight them, we kill civilian.’59
As noted earlier, the continued UPDF presence became a major sticking point
in the Juba talks. While some locals claim that a complete UPDF withdrawal
32 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 33
would leave them with no protection from armed groups, the majority of the
people in Eastern Equatoria seem tired of its presence. An assembly in Eastern
Equatoria proved unworkable in late 2006 amid accusations that the UPDF as
well as the LRA continued to commit atrocities.
Other armed groups
The abundance of armed groups remains a problem in southern Sudan. The
CPA laid the framework for ending the presence of Other Armed Groups
(OAGs) through their integration into the SAF and the SPLA. This was followed
by the Juba Declaration, which merged the SSDF with the SPLA (Sudan People’s
Liberation Army and South Sudan Defence Forces, 2006). Despite these devel-
opments, the LRA is one of many armed groups that persist. Some of the
others are GoS proxy forces, others rogue SPLA units who, deprived of pay,
have turned to wreaking havoc. Still others work with traders and bandits
sabotaging transportation routes to control the price of market goods, or attack
locals for their subsistence.
Assigning responsibility for each individual attack to a clearly identifiable
group is often impossible. Alliances change quickly and so do methods of fight-
ing. For a long time, people identified the LRA by their dreadlocks and panga
(machete) attacks—in fact, the LRA is often referred to as tong-tong’ (chop-
chop). But other groups also use pangas, and the LRA sometimes attacked
with guns, complicating the identification of perpetrators.
Despite tensions, the LRA and the EDF have cooperated closely, often fight-
ing side by side and sharing members and allegiances. In a famous siege in
October 2002, Sudanese government forces recaptured Torit from the SPLA
with what for years was believed to be LRA assistance. Only recently has it
become clear that the assistance actually came from the EDF: the LRA was not
involved in this particular operation.60
One commonly cited OAG is the so-called ‘LRA Sudan’ (Izama, 2006). This
is most likely an Acholi militia recently supported by Khartoum and not under
Kony’s command. As one chief explains, ‘LRA Sudan, they are there. They
are those who speak the language of Kony. They start by the inception of the
peace talks. They are being given money to fight. These are Acholi fighting
for Khartoum.’61 Observers say that the group identified as LRA Sudan might
actually be, or at least work closely with, EDF 2.
Despite attempts to integrate OAGs, the culture of militias in southern
Sudan remains unbroken. ‘A lot of individuals in militias are unscrupulous,’
said one UN official. ‘They have had many years of a sense of being paid for
their service and that is hard to overcome.’62
34 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 35
V. The Juba Peace Talks
The first inklings of a promising and comprehensive attempt to end the war
in Uganda and to solve the problem of the LRA presence in Sudan began in
2006. Both sides had made overtures. In 200506, the LRA made contact with
international organizations to gather support for peace talks, expressing a
willingness to cooperate with the GoSS. The GoSS, after repeated unsuccess-
ful attempts to establish contact with the high command, offered the LRA
three options: withdraw from Sudan, declare war on the SPLA, or engage in
negotiations. This led to the first meeting between Kony and Machar near the
Congolese border on 3 May 2006, which was facilitated by the Dutch organi-
zation Pax Christi.
The peace talks did not get off to a promising start. International support
was weak. The parties showed little trust for Machar, whom they perceived
as using his mediation role to tighten his own grip on power in the GoSS. The
LRA had no credibility as a negotiating partner, and because the International
Criminal Court (ICC) had issued warrants, states signatories of the Rome
Statute63 could not officially support a negotiated solution without trials in
The Hague first. Most of the international attention on the talks was focused
on questioning the legitimacy, capacity, and knowledge of the LRA/M peace
delegation, which was composed mostly of diaspora members (International
Crisis Group, 2006). It was often overlooked that the delegation had been offi-
cially selected and appointed by Joseph Kony.
While the LRA/M delegation has struggled with capacity issues and in-
fighting, the international questioning of its legitimacy perpetuated the view
that the LRA is not a political force, making an already difficult negotiating
environment even worse. The LRA/M repeatedly stated that the peace process
was unsafe and biased against it. Progress in the first six months of the peace
talks was therefore very slow. The GoSS, as the facilitator, has struggled to
create a neutral space for debate, not only because of the immense complex-
ity of interests involved, but also because it is a young government operating
in a precarious security environment. The Government of Uganda, while
showing commitment to the talks, displayed little flexibility on any of the early
LRA demands. On the other side, the LRA’s poor organization and some un-
realistic demands did not help its struggle for respect.
Before the talks even began, however, they were undermined by the dete-
riorating relationship between the mediator and the LRA. Machar was faced
with immense international pressure because he had reached out to the LRA
and committed to provide them with food to achieve a peaceful environment
for the negotiations. After being filmed handing over a cash gift of USD 20,000
to Joseph Kony, he was subjected to massive international criticism. It was felt
that the money would enable the LRA to purchase new weapons—despite
the fact that the LRA was not in need of weapons and the amount of money
would have purchased very few.64 To gain both financial and political sup-
port, Machar had to prove that these peace talks were workable and that the
LRA/M could be trusted as a negotiating partner. In July 2006, Machar put
pressure on Otti to leave Garamba National Park and join his peace delega-
tion in Juba. Otti declined because of his fear of arrest under his ICC warrant.
Machar then abandoned the LRA/M peace delegation in the bush near the
Congolese border, a move that all but destroyed the confidence that the LRA
delegation had in him. The peace talks suffered from this lack of trust in their
chief mediator from July through to December 2006.
After the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement was finally signed on
26 August 2006, LRA fighters assembled for the first time at two designated
meeting points in southern Sudan, having been assured safe passage (Govern-
ment of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, 2006). The assembly,
however, lasted only a short time and the LRA dispersed when they came
under military threat from the UPDF—through its intimidating presence, fire
exchanges, and later a helicopter gunship attack. In a renewed agreement, the
UPDF committed to withdrawing from the areas of assembly, but the LRA and
the UPDF continued to clash well into 2007. Before an addendum was signed
in 2007 allowing it safe passage across the Nile, the LRA was seen moving in
areas far from the assembly zones, a violation of the CoH. At the same time,
the UPDF moved its troops and attacked the LRA with helicopter gunships
on at least one occasion. This incident has been officially confirmed by the
36 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 37
Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT), which is made up of mem-
bers of the UPDF, the SPLA, and the LRA, as well as the UN. However, in
official press statements UPDF spokespeople continued to deny the attacks.
Reports of LRA activity on Sudanese soil, specifically in Eastern Equatoria,
in 200607 are contradictory. In late 2006, some locals were adamant that the
LRA had stopped attacking and was no longer supplied by Khartoum. Others
remain just as convinced that the LRA was still attacking and ambushing, even
with the help of the SAF. The LRA repeatedly stated that it has not launched
any attacks since it entered peace talks. Several of the attacks that the LRA
was accused of in late 2006 and early 2007 have been investigated by SPLA
and UN monitors, who established that they were not committed by the LRA.
However, the stop-and-go nature of the Juba talks in early 2007 meant that
the situation in Eastern Equatoria deteriorated significantly because of aggres-
sion on all sides, including confirmed military action by the LRA, the UPDF,
and the SAF. In early 2007, locals from Eastern Equatoria also renewed their
complaints about abusive behaviour—in particular harassment and looting—
by SPLA forces stationed in the area. Tensions between ethnic groups are also
running high and often result in violence.65
The LRA, unsure about the direction of the peace talks after its refusal to
return to the negotiating table in January 2007 (see below), ended a period of
relative calm when it carried out attacks on civilians. That month, a United
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) peacekeeper was killed in an attack in
Eastern Equatoria. The ambush was blamed on the LRA, who denied respon-
sibility and claimed that GoS-aligned militias were responsible. Locals in
Eastern Equatoria have expressed disappointment and anger with the LRA
for turning on them once again, even after the local community had agreed to
host them during the assembly. The deterioration in the security situation also
stalled relief and development programmes that had been a side effect of the
Juba talks, leaving the citizens of Magwi County in a desperate situation after
a brief period of hope.
Because the situation was clearly unworkable, and an assembly of the LRA
in Owiny-Kibul had become impossible, a new addendum to the CoH Agree-
ment allowed all LRA fighters to cross the Nile to gather in Nabanga, Western
Equatoria, within six weeks of the addendum’s signing on 14 April 2007
(Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement 2007b).
The recommendation for a single assembly point was made by the CHMT in
late January. But information about LRA attacks in Western Equatoria and the
group’s crossing into the Central African Republic (CAR) remained confusing
and often contradictory. The unresolved issue of the location of the peace talks
in early 2007 led the LRA high command to withdraw from its designated
assembly area in Western Equatoria, while news reports stated that LRA
fighters were moving towards the border of CAR. This has not been inde-
pendently verified but became a persistent rumour. Either way, any further
spread of the conflict would be a worrying development.
For international security personnel, the information situation underscores
the need to reinvestigate any attacks that have been blamed on the LRA,
since other groups appear to be taking advantage of the lack of monitoring.
According to one international security expert, the LRA record is so bad that
it will be difficult not to assume that they are always the perpetrators: ‘The
credibility of the LRA is based on the likelihood of the LRA attacking.’66 While
some attacks, especially since January 2007, can clearly be traced back to the
LRA, others remain unsolved. They were either carried out by the LRA, who
are still active despite their assurances, or by forces posing as LRA members,
using the commonly known uniform and ambush methods.
The LRA/M refused to continue peace talks in Juba in January 2007, citing
security concerns, heavy-handed mediation, and unfair treatment as their main
concerns. In a detailed statement, the LRA/M also complained that their del-
egation’s ‘credibility, authenticity, and negotiation strength’ was permanently
contested by the mediator (Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, 2007). This
position led to a stalemate from January to April. At first, the LRA/M’s refusal
to return to the table in Juba was seen as proof of their lack of commitment to
the peace talks, but the LRA/M’s subsequent detailed explanation has modi-
fied these views. While some of the LRA/M’s concerns are still regarded as
exaggerated, international observers agreed that certain claims needed to be
taken seriously and that the dynamics of the mediation team have at times
worked against the LRA.67 All parties to the peace talks, however, have proven
their ongoing commitment by continuing to attend meetings, by maintaining
open communications, and by participating in extensive consultations with
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 39
stakeholders. While the talks were officially ‘hibernating’ in early 2007, the
newly appointed UN special envoy on the LRA conflict, former President of
Mozambique Joaquim Chissano, held several meetings with the LRA leader-
ship in Garamba National Park. Efforts to reignite the talks in Juba proved
successful when the two parties agreed to return there after a face-to-face meet-
ing between the Ugandan government delegation and the LRA high command
in Ri-Kwangba on 1314 April 2007 (Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resist-
ance Army/Movement, 2007a). The LRA agreed to return only if certain con-
ditions concerning their security and their position at the peace talks were
met. They also called for observers from various African countries. Peace talks
resumed on 26 April 2007 and led to the signing of the Agreement on Compre-
hensive Solutions (see below). Representatives of the governments of Tanzania,
South Africa, Kenya, and Mozambique were among the signatories and, in
addition, several AU monitors have since strengthened the CHMT. This was
the first time that the LRA had been a contactable group engaging in ongoing
dialogue with the Ugandan government, with international actors, and with
representatives of the communities in Sudan and Uganda.
Since the negotiations first began in 2006, northern Ugandans have enjoyed
de facto peace, which has enabled many to plan for their return home to their
villages from government displacement camps. The peace process has allowed
traditional leaders to voice their concerns and their grievances about the plight
of the Acholi and other communities in northern and eastern Uganda. In Sudan’s
Eastern and Western Equatoria, the peace process has also enabled some devel-
opment as aid agencies have moved in to support both the local community
and the peace process. However, due to insecurities in early 2007, progress
came to a halt, much to the disadvantage of the local people who have ex-
pressed bitter disappointment both with the LRA for its continued attacks and
with agencies for not keeping their promises. The security situation for locals
grew much worse in early 2007 (Gordon et al., 2007).
While a peaceful solution is being pursued, military options have also been
explored by outside parties, supported by those who favour executing the ICC
arrest warrants. The ICC strategy has aimed to separate the leadership of the
LRA from the rank and file in order to drive a wedge between them and enable
a military intervention to execute the warrants, possibly using international
special forces. A military solution would mean a comprehensive attack on the
LRA camp, and would cost the lives of many soldiers in order to arrest a few
leaders. But despite existing tensions within the LRA/M delegation and be-
tween delegation members and the high command, the LRA/M has resisted
external attempts to create division between the command, the rank and file,
and the peace delegation.
It has become clear, however, that a comprehensive peace deal can only be
signed if there is a solution to the problem of the ICC warrants—one that satis-
fies all parties to the peace talks as well as the ICC. In May 2007, following
in-depth consultations, a framework was drawn up to deal with accountabil-
ity issues and to address the outstanding warrants. A much fought-over
Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions was signed on 2 May 2007, using an
unaltered draft that had been presented to both parties in December 2006
(Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement 2 May, 2007c).
While the signing was hailed as major progress in a peace process that, in many
eyes, had so far produced few tangible successes, the document in fact leaves
many issues unaddressed. Specifically, it does not outline implementation
modalities, leaving many of the agreed articles vague. It should be seen as an
expression of goodwill on both sides, not as an actual protocol of the final
peace agreement. It has already become clear that many points in the agree-
ment will need to be revisited, and this will constitute the content of the peace
talks in the coming months. As has been seen with the difficult CoH, signed
agreements do not necessarily lead to a clarification of issues. The CoH was at
various times treated as an expression of goodwill and as a ceasefire declara-
tion that required monitoring. This led to a confusing situation which was
exacerbated by severe logistical capacity problems in the CHMT.
The Juba talks also remain marred by a poor organizational framework, an
often slow or ambiguous international response, and a general lack of trust in
its validity—as well as the continuing propaganda war fought by the LRA
and the Government of Uganda. Military threats have become part of the
peace process. The governments of Uganda and the DRC, and both the GoS
and the GoSS, have made unambiguous statements about their readiness to
fight the LRA if peace talks fail. The LRA has also often emphasized its read-
iness to take up arms again.68
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 41
Peace in Uganda will depend on the ability of the parties and the mediators
to draft agreements that give both sides tangible gains. It must also deal with
the questions of justice and accountability in a way that is conducive to com-
munity building without disregarding the existence of the international justice
system. To ensure widest participation, ongoing consultations on northern
Uganda should include as many local leaders, civilians, and stakeholders as
possible to ensure a wide acceptance of the eventual implementation modali-
ties. Peace in southern Sudan depends first and foremost on successful imple-
mentation of the CPA. Yet comprehensive disarmament of OAGs and civilians,
and a peace agreement between the two Ugandan parties, are urgently needed
to stabilize the entire region.
VI. Access to weapons
Types, stockpiles, and command of arms
Southern Sudan is awash with small arms. Several factors contribute to this.
Numerous insurgencies in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa have
ensured a steady stream of weapons, and other anti-government insurgent
groups in Uganda have supplied the LRA with arms. When Idi Amin and
Tito Okello were overthrown (1979 and 1986, respectively), many of those
involved in the fighting looted guns and ammunition and cached them in
northern Uganda. Some of these stocks were very old. Vast numbers of civil-
ians also own and use weapons. Assault rifles are the weapon of choice and
the most readily traded.69 The LRA has also fought with more sophisticated
equipment, although Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles remain ubiquitous.
In addition, other armed groups have stocks in Sudan and soldiers switch
sides between the various militias or armies, taking their weapons with them.
The LRA has weapons and ammunition cached all over northern Uganda
and southern Sudan (Small Arms Survey, 2006). During the years in which
supplies from Khartoum were constant, the UPDF often fell behind in the
quality of their equipment. As one officer recalls, ‘They [the LRA] had all the
small arms that you can think of, but also other support weapons, given by
Arabs. In fact they had the anti-aircraft weapons, the twin barrel, which they
could easily carry, and they had the B10, which they used to hit at our armoured
vehicles and tanks. They were well equipped and in fact before the UPDF
acquired a grenade launcher, they were the first people to acquire them. I
remember one time they attacked a very good group of UPDF fighters using
grenade launchers and we were wondering what sort of gun they were using.
When one of our people picked up the cartridge and we examined it, that is
when we got to know that they were far more advanced than us.’ The UPDF
then asked other countries for help to equip themselves with similar weaponry.70
The LRA was never seriously involved in arms trafficking. In the early days,
access to weapons was easy because many LRA fighters were either former
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 43
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) fighters or had close connections
to former members of the military who had been fighting Museveni, such as
members of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). In fact, locals re-
count how, after the overthrow of Tito Okello in 1986, a wave of weapons was
brought to northern Uganda and southern Sudan. When Khartoum pledged
its support for the LRA ten years later, access to modern weapons greatly
improved. One local leader said, ‘If you wanted 500 tanks, as long as you prom-
ised that you would use them to kill their [Khartoum’s] enemies, which to
them meant any black-skinned person. . . and of course they were using blacks
to kill blacks. To them arms is not a very big problem.’71
Some of the larger or more modern LRA weapons were acquired in battles,
mostly with the UPDF or the SPLA, but also with UN forces. In January 2006,
the LRA and forces of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (MONUC) clashed in Garamba National Park after MONUC
was given accurate information about the whereabouts of the LRA’s high
command. Eight Guatemalan MONUC peacekeepers were killed. Although the
official version of events—from both the LRA and MONUC—is that the LRA
was responsible for the deaths, international military officials interviewed con-
firm they were killed by ‘friendly fire’ in a ‘botched operation’ in which the LRA
had the upper hand because of their knowledge of the territory. In addition,
the officials argued that stories circulating about the mutilation of the bodies
of the Guatemalan peacekeepers were untrue.72 The LRA has said that many of
its fighters were killed in the operation, but it was able to make off with some
modern weapons including an M60 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).
At various stages in the conflict, the LRA used assault rifles, machine guns,
landmines—usually of Russian origin—and rocket-propelled grenades. They
reportedly also used SA-7 man-portable air defence systems, although it is not
clear whether this was actually the case. The main emphasis, however, has
always been on small arms, enabling the highly mobile LRA to survive. In
addition to 7.62 x 39 mm Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, 7.62 x 51 mm FN
FAL and G3 rifles are in use, as well as 9 mm Browning pistols, and a small
number of 5.56 x 45 mm M16 variants.
GPMGs—again, usually Russian-made—seem to be the most common ma-
chine gun in circulation, although the LRA also has Bren guns. The RPK, an
AK-47 with a heavier barrel, bipod, different stock, and larger magazine, is
the most common variation, along with the 7.62 x 54R mm PK, which fires a
longer-rimmed cartridge. Shotguns are available, but are rare and mostly single-
barrel US varieties. The LRA also displayed multi-shot grenade launchers. The
more expensive varieties, such as the Dragunov SVD or the M60, are rarer
because ammunition is expensive and difficult to obtain. The supply of ammu-
nition in general, however, has always been good and when in fighting mode
the LRA carries standard amounts—at least 200 rounds per man with an addi-
tional belt of 100 rounds on the gunner, 400 rounds on the loader, and 100
rounds on the rifleman.73
LRA communications rely on satellite phones and radio equipment acquired
through looting or from supporters. Where possible, the LRA has also used
standard mobile phones in addition to an efficient runner system between the
various groups led by different commanders.
All the parties involved in the fighting agree on one thing: weapon sup-
plies and stockpiles are enough to keep the conflict alive for a long time, even
without any further outside support. The LRA entered the peace talks knowing
that in terms of equipment, they remain a viable military threat. Stockpiles are
kept in Eastern and Western Equatoria as well as in northern Uganda, although
exact numbers are impossible to establish. In fact, the exact number of guns
may well become an issue during negotiations over the terms of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The UPDF calls the LRA weapon
stockpiles ‘a sizeable amount’, in terms of both weaponry and ammunition.74
LRA fighters are well-trained to keep their arms in good condition, cleaned
and oiled regularly. Section commanders use range cards to give axis or arc
cover. Gun stakes are still used, hinting at slightly outdated military training.
Most LRA fighters wear at least part of a uniform and many are fully outfitted
with proper military gear. Most fighters wear Wellington boots, which are now
considered almost a trademark of the LRA.
Arms transfers
Guns and ammunition are common currency in southern Sudan: all armies
involved in the LRA conflict have been known to trade arms for information.
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 45
The LRA has traded arms on a small scale, supplying locals with guns or
ammunition in return for information on the whereabouts of the SPLA. When
a UPDF soldier dies, his weapons are typically sold to locals in this way.
Southern Sudan has for two decades been an area without rule of law, and
armed groups have switched alliances easily—moving weapons back and
forth between various rebel and government forces. Even the official military
acted without a control mechanism and the wartime economy made weap-
ons trading a viable source of income, including for government armies. The
presence of a foreign army in Sudan, the UPDF, added to the climate of inse-
curity for civilians and provided them with an extra incentive to obtain and
carry arms.
It is not only the military that has driven the arms flows in the region. Pas-
toralists along the Kenyan, Ugandan, and Sudanese borders have been well
supplied with weapons. They have been disarmed at various stages but some
of these weapons have trickled back into the fighting areas (Mkutu, 2003). The
tradition of cattle raiding, exacerbated by increasing populations and dimin-
ishing access to natural resources, has provided a clear incentive for civilians
or pastoralists to acquire small arms (Schomerus, forthcoming).75
In addition, there has been an established arms supply route between
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan for many years, supplying the SPLA and civil-
ians. In Eastern Equatoria, both the LRA and other Khartoum-supported
militias have most of their weapons supplied in the government-held Torit
area. Nimule, although held by the SPLA, remains a major black market trad-
ing centre for weapons coming from Uganda, many of which seem to have
been picked up by civilians. The supply routes taken are just east of Nimule,
but they have become increasingly difficult to use because of the UPDF pres-
ence. More recently, there has been an increase in arms trafficking from Kenya
and Somalia to Uganda—an indicator of the unstable situation in Somalia,
but also of the increased sense of instability in the entire region, which is inevi-
tably shared by the southern Sudanese living along those routes.
VII. Conclusion
The Ugandan conflict and the current peace process must be set in a broader
bilateral and international context. Past attempts at achieving peace have
failed because one party was not seen as credible, attacks continued to occur,
or deadlines were too unrealistic and were followed by immediate military
action. The Juba Peace Process, despite its shortcomings and obstacles, is an
opportunity to negotiate a peace agreement that can address issues compre-
hensively. At the same time, it highlights problems within Sudan that must
be addressed in order to ensure peace in that country and stability in the
Great Lakes region in general.
By the first anniversary of the Juba talks in July 2007, the peace process had
come a long way. Two of the most contested points of the five agenda items
had been agreed to.76 The talks have been faced with numerous obstacles,
however, and each party has had its own difficulties to overcome. The LRA/M
had to find its footing as a negotiating partner and prove that it was credible
in its endeavour to achieve peace, despite the continuation of atrocities. The
Government of Uganda had to take on a new role in negotiating with the
LRA/M, something that it had previously said it would not be prepared to
do. At the same time, military pressure from the UPDF continued, causing
doubts about the government’s commitment. The GoSS and the SPLM/A
found themselves in the highly demanding role of facilitator while barely man-
aging their own peace process. Fluctuating levels of international commitment,
an often half-hearted aid agency response, and debates over the principles of
engaging with armed groups have added to the problems.
The Juba talks remain a complicated process involving difficult negotia-
tions that concern many years of grievances and suffering by civilians, the
army, and rebels. The chasms run extremely deep and the process was never
going to be a swift one. Many international bodies still find it difficult to accept
the LRA/M as a viable negotiating partner. While it is important to recognize
these difficulties and to communicate with the LRA/M about issues of dis-
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 47
trust and disorganization, it is equally important to ensure firm commitment
and support for the talks by all parties and to realise the implementation of
agreements.
The first priority must be to control the security situation in Sudan to make
peace building and development possible. A comprehensive development
approach that provides services beneficial to the LRA/M in a safe assembly
area, as well as to host communities, is essential in a region that remains un-
stable because of the numerous sources of insecurity. It is vital that resources
mobilized for development programmes do not dry up because of deteriorat-
ing security or the slow progress of the talks.
Because of the international implications of the conflict and the history of
mistrust, it is unlikely that the LRA will fully demobilize so long as there is
any threat of the international arrest of its leadership. While the Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation allows some room for manoeuvre through
officially instituting traditional justice procedures, the issues of the warrants
still needs to be resolved. The complex international situation will require an
adaptable and non-linear approach to demobilization. It needs to allow imple-
mentation of a peace deal that has disarmament and demobilization as an
accompaniment to peace, but not as a prerequisite.
At the same time, internal Sudanese disarmament programmes must be
strengthened. An approach is necessary that combines work on peace build-
ing with the implementation of a disarmament strategy that people—both
civilians and armed groups—can trust. There are many examples of disarma-
ment in the region that have not led to stabilization because they were carried
out either forcefully or ineffectually, such as the disarmament of the Karamo-
jong. It is important to recognize the long-term timeframe that disarmament
will need on both sides of the border.
Reintegration programmes must start before demobilization and they must
be designed to allow for flexibility. On the Ugandan side, a facilitated return
to village life should be supported to create a sense of normality conducive to
reintegration. Previously, reintegration in Uganda has been a difficult task
because the approach was centred on psychosocial interventions that often
assumed that all returnees from the LRA were traumatized (Allen and
Schomerus, 2006). If the LRA and the government sign a peace deal that leads
to LRA demobilization, many of the demobilized soldiers will have a very
different experience from those who escaped from the LRA earlier. Even escap-
ees did not always see their time with the LRA only in negative terms (Annan
and Blattmann, 2006), while many members of the LRA have chosen to remain
in the group out of conviction. Programmes need to take into account the fact
that many will feel they have fought a legitimate fight and have brought the
war to a peaceful end.
Both urban centres and remote rural areas are in desperate need of a credible
police authority. In most areas, policing has been undertaken by the military,
often granting impunity to its members. Training of police officers is vital for
establishing the rule of law and creating an environment conducive to devel-
opment (Ehrhart and Schnabel, 2006). Spoilers of the Sudanese peace have to
be identified beyond doubt and pursued accordingly.
Both international justice and civilian interests must be taken into account
in the peace building process. While this is covered in the accountability agree-
ment, implementation procedures are still very vague, or as Vincent Otti put
it, ‘Everybody now has to put some meat to the agreement.’77 It is not clear
who will administer traditional justice or what form a revised and appropriate
traditional justice ceremony would take—or whether a traditional procedure
can only follow after a different and more formal accountability procedure.
Frameworks of accountability should be drawn up to avoid giving the impres-
sion that the LRA leaders ‘got off lightly’. The ICC warrants were once a pos-
sible trigger for the peace process, but they have become an obstacle to its
progress. In the current climate of negotiations, it seems more conducive to
peace not to use the warrants just to fulfil a principle. It is more important to
prove that the international justice system is responsive to realities and that
peace and improvements in civilians’ living conditions are the priority.
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Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 49
Endnotes
1 The term ‘structural violence’ was coined by Galtung (1969) and refers to any situation in
which human development is hindered by economic and political structures. Unequal access
to political representation, resources, education, or health care—all of which are found in
northern Uganda—is considered structural violence.
2 The warrants have not yet been served and have become a major sticking point in the peace
talks with the LRA. One of the commanders named in the warrants was killed in 2006.
3 Author interviews with various LRA combatants, 200506.
4 The UPDF has consistently portrayed the LRA as a group of a few hundred scattered fighters.
The LRA says their strength exceeds 10,000, including fighters and non-combatants.
5 Author interview with LRA Chairman Joseph Kony, Ri-Kwangba, 12 June 2006.
6 For a more detailed discussion on ‘re-politicizing’ war see Allen and Seaton (1999).
7 Author interview with Joseph Kony, Ri-Kwangba, 12 June 2006.
8 Author interviews with participants of an Acholi meeting in Nabanga, July 2006.
9 Author interview with Joseph Kony, Ri-Kwangba, 12 June 2006.
10 In 2005, the International Court of Justice presented its ruling on the case of the DRC vs
Uganda. In Paragraph 210, the judgement states that ‘the Court finds that there is convinc-
ing evidence of the training in UPDF training camps of child soldiers and of the UPDF’s
failure to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers in areas under its control’ (International
Court of Justice, 2005).
11 Author interview with an international security expert, Juba, October 2006.
12 This is a conclusion based on fieldwork in various locations in Sudan and on interviews with
civilians as well as members of the military.
13 Author interview with a local chief in Magwi County, November 2006. This interview was
held in English and has been transcribed verbatim.
14 Author interview with LRA Second-in-Command Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba, December 2006.
15 Various interviews with security officials in Juba, October 2006
16 Author interviews with community members in Magwi County, October–December 2006.
17 Author interview with a UPDF commander, Magwi County, October 2006.
18 Author interviews with community members in Magwi County, October–December 2006.
19 Author interview with locals in Magwi County, October 2006.
20 Author interview with an international security expert, Juba, September 2006.
21 Often this identification of Alice Lakwena as Kony’s predecessor is based on the spirituality
of both movements. There has also been much speculation about old and continued contacts
between Joseph Kony and Alice Lakwena even after she went to live in exile in Kenya. Vari-
ous family connections between them have been quoted. Lakwena, however, never played
a public role in the LRA war and denied any connections to Kony shortly before her death
in 2007. Her Holy Spirit Movement was formed in 1986, which is usually seen as the begin-
ning of the LRA insurgency because that year Lakwena briefly teamed up with the rebel
Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). The Holy Spirit Movement managed to score
some military victories over the National Resistance Army. After the Holy Spirit Movement
was defeated, the LRA emerged as one of its splinter groups and successors.
22 Author interview with a local leader, Magwi County, November 2006.
23 Author interview with a government official in Juba, November 2006.
24 Author interview with locals in Magwi county, October 2006.
25 These massacres are well-known and have been widely reported.
26 Author interview with a high-ranking UPDF commander in 2006.
27 Author interview with security personnel, 2007.
28 Author interview with a high-ranking UPDF commander in 2006.
29 Author interview with a high-ranking UPDF commander in 2006.
30 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba, December 2006.
31 Author interview with a Ugandan government official, 2006.
32 Machar eventually realized that the GoS had no intention of letting the referendum through,
and this precipitated his break with Khartoum and return to the SPLA in 2002.
33 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba, December 2006.
34 In October 1996, 139 students were abducted from St. Mary’s College Boarding School in
Aboke (Apac District) and taken across the border into Sudan. The headmistress of the
school, Sister Rachele Fassera, followed the LRA to Sudan to negotiate the release of 109 of
the girls.
35 Author interview with a local leader from Eastern Equatoria, Juba, November 2006.
36 Author interview with high-ranking LRA commanders and LRA combatants, Sudan, July–
December 2006.
37 Author interview with a high-ranking UPDF officer, 2006.
38 Author interview with security personnel, Sudan 2006.
39 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba, December 2006.
40 Author interview with a LRA commander, July 2006.
41 Author interview with GoSS Vice-President Riek Machar, Maridi, June 2006.
42 Author interviews with international aid workers and local leaders, Sudan, September–
December 2006.
43 Author interviews with local leaders, Eastern Equatoria, September–December 2006.
44 Author interview with a local government representative of Nimule, Juba, October 2006.
45 Author interview with a Nimule politician, October 2006.
46 Author interview with a former SPLA commander, Juba, October 2006.
47 Author interview with a SPLA commander in Eastern Equatoria, Magwi County, November
2006.
48 Author interview with a UPDF commander, Magwi County, October 2006.
49 Author interview with an international observer in Juba, November 2006.
50 Author interviews with UPDF soldiers in Sudan and locals in Eastern Equatoria, September–
November 2006.
51 Author interview with a local chief in Magwi County, November 2006.
52 Author interview with an international security expert, Juba, September 2006.
53 This point is argued in more detail by Andrew Mwenda in his paper on the impact of inter-
national aid on the conflict in northern Uganda (Mwenda, forthcoming).
54 Author interview with a local politician from Nimule, Juba, October 2006.
50 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 51
55 Author interview with a local administrator, Parajok, November 2006.
56 Author interview with UPDF member, 2006.
57 Author interview with a local leader, Magwi County, October 2006.
58 Author interview with UPDF member, 2006.
59 Author interview with Joseph Kony, Ri-Kwangba, 12 June 2006.
60 Author interview with a SPLA general, Juba, November 2006.
61 Author interview with a local leader, Magwi County, November 2006.
62 Author interview with a UN official, Juba, September 2006.
63 The Rome Statute is the treaty that established the ICC; there are currently 104 states signed
up to it.
64 The money later trickled back into the community, and the LRA was seen purchasing goods
at markets in Western Equatoria.
65 A forthcoming publication by the same author addresses ethnic tensions in more detail.
66 Author interview with an international security expert, Juba, October 2006.
67 Author interview with international observers, Juba, September–December 2006.
68 Vincent Otti has stated this repeatedly during radio appearances.
69 Author interviews with military and civilians, July–December 2006.
70 Author interview with a high-ranking UPDF commander, 2006.
71 Author interview with a local leader, Magwi County, October 2006.
72 Author interviews with international military officials.
73 Author interviews with active LRA soldiers, Ri-Kwangba, December 2006; and with SPLA
members, Juba, September–November 2006.
74 Author interviews with UPDF officials, 2006.
75 HSBA Issue Brief 8 will focus on responses to pastoralist violence in southern Sudan, northern
Uganda, and north-western Kenya.
76 The five agenda items are: Cessation of Hostilities, Comprehensive Solutions, Accountability
and Reconciliation, DDR, and Ceasefire.
77 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba, July 2007.
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HSBA publications
Sudan Issue Briefs
Number 1, September 2006
Persistent threats: widespread human insecurity in Lakes State, South Sudan, since
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (also available in Arabic)
Number 2, October 2006
Armed groups in Sudan: the South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba
Declaration (also available in Arabic)
Number 3 (2nd edition), November 2006–February 2007
Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: recent experiences and implications
(also available in Arabic)
Number 4, December 2006
No dialogue, no commitment: the perils of deadline diplomacy for Darfur
(also available in Arabic)
Number 5, January 2007
A widening war around Sudan: the proliferation of armed groups in the Central
African Republic (also available in Arabic and French)
Number 6, April 2007
The militarization of Sudan: a preliminary review of arms flows and holdings
Number 7, July 2007
Arms, oil, and Darfur: the evolution of relations between China and Sudan
Sudan Working Papers
Number 1, November 2006
The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration,
by John Young
Number 2, February 2007
Violence and Victimization in South Sudan: Lakes State in the Post-CPA period,
by Richard Garfield
Number 3, May 2007
The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization, by John Young
Number 4, May 2007
Border in Name Only: Arms Trafficking and Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border,
by Joshua Marks
Number 5, June 2007
The White Army: An Introduction and Overview, by John Young
Number 6, July 2007
Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,
by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana
Number 7, July 2007
Emerging North–South Tensions and the Prospects for a Return to War,
by John Young
56 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 57
Small Arms Survey Occasional Papers
1 Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement,
by Eric Berman, December 2000
2 Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Collection and
Destruction Programmes, by Sami Faltas, Glenn McDonald, and Camilla
Waszink, July 2001
3 Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia,
by Katherine Kramer (with Nonviolence International Southeast Asia),
July 2001
4 Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency,
by Maria Haug, Martin Langvandslien, Lora Lumpe, and Nic Marsh
(with NISAT), January 2002
5 Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse in Central America, by William
Godnick, with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink, November 2002
6 Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the
Republic of Georgia, by Spyros Demetriou, November 2002
7 Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons,
by Edward Laurance and Rachel Stohl, December 2002
8 Small Arms in the Pacific, by Philip Alpers and Conor Twyford, March 2003
9 Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls: Small Arms in Yemen, by Derek B.
Miller, May 2003
10 Beyond the Kalashnikov: Small Arms Production, Exports, and Stockpiles in the
Russian Federation, by Maxim Pyadushkin, with Maria Haug and Anna
Matveeva, August 2003
11 In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and
Misuse in Sri Lanka, by Chris Smith, October 2003
12 Small Arms in Kyrgyzstan: Post-revolutionary Proliferation, by S. Neil Mac-
Farlane and Stina Torjesen, March 2007, ISBN 2-8288-0076-8 (first printed as
Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central Asia?, by S. Neil MacFarlane
and Stina Torjesen, February 2004)
13 Small Arms and Light Weapons Production in Eastern, Central, and Southeast
Europe, by Yudit Kiss, October 2004, ISBN 2-8288-0057-1
14 Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, by Robert Muggah,
October 2005, updated, ISBN 2-8288-0066-0
15 Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural
South Pacific Islands Communities, edited by Emile LeBrun and Robert
Muggah, June 2005, ISBN 2-8288-0064-4
16 Behind a Veil of Secrecy: Military Small Arms and Light Weapons Production
in Western Europe, by Reinhilde Weidacher, November 2005,
ISBN 2-8288-0065-2
17 Tajikistan’s Road to Stability: Reduction in Small Arms Proliferation and
Remaining Challenges, by Stina Torjesen, Christina Wille, and S. Neil
MacFarlane, November 2005, ISBN 2-8288-0067-9
18 Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand, by
David Atwood, Anne-Kathrin Glatz, and Robert Muggah, January 2006,
ISBN 2-8288-0069-5
19 A Guide to the US Small Arms Market, Industry, and Exports, 1998–2004, by
Tamar Gabelnick, Maria Haug, and Lora Lumpe, September 2006, ISBN
2-8288-0071-7
58 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8
Schomerus The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan 59
Small Arms Survey Special Reports
1 Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms
and Light Weapons, by Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, commissioned
by the Reference Group on Small Arms of the UN Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, July 2001
2 Small Arms Availability, Trade, and Impacts in the Republic of Congo, by
Spyros Demetriou, Robert Muggah, and Ian Biddle, commissioned by
the International Organisation for Migration and the UN Development
Programme, April 2002
3 Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons
in Kosovo, by Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin, commissioned by the
United Nations Development Programme, June 2003
4 A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict Macedonia, by Suzette
R. Grillot, Wolf-Christian Paes, Hans Risser, and Shelly O. Stoneman,
commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, and
co-published by the Bonn International Center for Conversion, SEESAC
in Belgrade, and the Small Arms Survey, June 2004, ISBN 2-8288-0056-3
5 Gun-running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the
Southern Highlands, by Philip Alpers, June 2005, ISBN 2-8288-0062-8
6 La République Centrafricaine: Une étude de cas sur les armes légères et les conflits,
by Eric G. Berman, published with financial support from UNDP, July
2006, ISBN 2-8288-0073-3
7 Small Arms in Burundi: Disarming the Civilian Population in Peacetime, by
Stéphanie Pézard and Nicolas Florquin, co-published with Ligue Iteka
with support from UNDP–Burundi and Oxfam–NOVIB.
Small Arms Survey Book Series
Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS
Region, edited by Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, May 2005,
ISBN 2-8288-0063-6
Armés mais désoeuvrés: Groupes armés, armes légères et sécurité humaine dans la
région de la CEDEAO, edited by Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman, co-published
with GRIP, March 2006, ISBN 2-87291-023-9
Targeting Ammunition: A Primer, edited by Stéphanie Pézard and Holger
Anders, co-published with CICS, GRIP, SEESAC, and Viva Rio, June 2006,
ISBN 2-8288-0072-5
No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa, edited by Robert Muggah,
co-published with BICC, published by Zed Books, July 2006, ISBN 1-84277-789-0
... Another important factor in the small arms trade of the region is the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Schomerus (2007) does not only limit the list to LRA but also mentions other insurgencies in the Great Lakes region that contribute the small arms mar- 2 Routes of arms from South-Sudan's Eastern Equatoria region to Kenya are primarily by road from Kapoeta and, to a limited extent, via the Didinga of southern Sudan and possibly the Ugandan Jie, before getting to Turkana North (Wepundi, 2011, p. 17). ket to and among pastoralist communities. ...
... The LRA possessed looted weapons during the 1979 and 1986 coups in Uganda; the Government in Khartoum constantly supplied the coups in Uganda (Schomerus 2007). This was because of the Khartoum governments' use of LRA to fight SPLM. ...
... This was because of the Khartoum governments' use of LRA to fight SPLM. According to Schomerus (2007), there were even times where the LRA received more advanced weapons than the UPDF from the Government of Sudan and other Arab nations. Eastern and Western Equatoria are two of the places the LRA keep its arms-stockpile. ...
Book
This book depicts the Ethiopian state as a product of “negotiation” processes and a multitude of “intersections” between the state an “various identity groups” both in critical historical periods and in the present time – where formations and reformations of the nature of the state are still ongoing. It, therefore, narrates the intentional and, as far as this book has found, the rational actions of identity groups in lowland Ethiopia, clearly countering singular narratives of victimhood and subjugation. The book started out as an interrogation of the role of arms among the Nyangatom pastoralists in the lower Omo Valley of Ethiopia. Arms are common phenomenon in most lowland borderlands in Africa including the Ethiopian south-western borderland studied in this book. However, an investigation into the role of arms has unravelled several nuances that go beyond the function of arms as an instrument of violence. The study of the role of arms in intra-communal relations has brought to light subtle trends, beliefs, and insecurities that reinforce intractable conflicts. Communities in borderlands are presented with social and economic challenges that call for creative solutions. The borders present options despite underdeveloped infrastructure and often-harsh environmental conditions. This book only covers the period up to 2017 thus the political and policy changes in Ethiopia after the premiership of Dr Abiy Ahmed are not covered.
... Auch die in Norduganda operierende und zu diesem Zeitpunkt militärisch starke Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) von Joseph Kony wird in diese Strategie miteinbezogen (LeRiche und Arnold, 2013: 91). Die sudanesische Unterstützung für die LRA währt über mehrere Jahre und führt sogar dazu, dass die LRA im Jahr 1994 eine Basis in Eastern Equatoria etabliert (Schomerus, 2007). Zugleich versucht Khartum politisch, die Nasir-Fraktion für separate Friedensverhandlungen zu gewinnen. ...
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Nach einem jahrzehntelangen Bürgerkrieg erlangt die Republik Südsudan am 9. Juli 2011 ihre Unabhängigkeit. Doch trotz aller Bemühungen um einen friedlichen Staatsaufbau nimmt die erste Dekade der Eigenstaatlichkeit einen gewaltsamen Verlauf: Im Dezember 2013 schlittert der Südsudan in einen blutig geführten Bürgerkrieg, der sich nicht als einheitlicher Konflikt mit klar definierbaren Parteien, sondern zu einem Amalgam komplex verschachtelter Konfliktlandschaften entwickelt. In analytischen Vignetten, die verschiedene Regionen sowie die nationale und internationale Dimension des Bürgerkrieges untersuchen, gibt Jan Pospisil einen Einblick in die südsudanesische Konfliktrealität.
... Stage 2 involvement transferred discursive authority over the LRA problem from the Ugandan state to the ICC: before the government's ICC referral, the discourse about the LRA belonged primarily to the government and the UPDF. The Narratives, justice and the return to war 73 government had consistently denied that the LRA had any political objectives (Branch 2005;Finnström 2008;Schomerus 2007), a narrative that excluded the rebels from the public sphere. In government and army discourse, LRA rebels were portrayed as terrorists, bandits and 'hyenas', wild creatures that symbolise vitality, power, danger, death and sorcery (Finnström 2008, 114). ...
Chapter
Why do some of the world's least powerful countries invite international scrutiny of their adherence to norms on whose violation their governments rely to remain in power? Examining decisions by leaders in Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Georgia, Valerie Freeland concludes that these states invited outside attention with the intention to manipulate it. Their countries' global peripherality and their domestic rule by patronage introduces both challenges and strategies for addressing them. Rulers who attempt this manipulation of scrutiny succeed when their patronage networks make them illegible to outsiders, and when powerful actors become willing participants in the charade as they need a success case to lend them credibility. Freeland argues that, when substantive norm-violations are rebranded as examples of compliance, what it means to comply with human rights and good governance norms becomes increasingly incoherent and, as a result, less able to constrain future norm-violators.
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This article analyses how Budi County in Eastern Equatoria State (South Sudan) was governed during the 1990s and up to mid-2007. Because its capital Chukudum was the SPLM/A headquarters almost throughout that period, it provides us with an interesting case from which to explore how the SPLM/A governed during the war and how this impacts on the post-war peace. One observation is that the war, besides a period of devastation and human suffering, was also a time of economic opportunities and social differentiation. For that reason this article will also explore livestock trade as a new mode of wealth appropriation and the changing nature of cattle raiding, and how this interferes with the struggle for regulatory power and governable “spaces”. This means that we comprehend the economy as a political terrain. At the same time we leave room for sociological perspectives, to complement the more restricted “competition for resources and gains” approach to conflict and violence. The article is written in three sections. In the first section we briefly clarify why in 1999 there was an uprising in Budi County against SPLM/A rule and why it engendered massive local support. In the second section we examine one of the most destructive manifestations of violence that affect Budi county: cattle raiding. We look at it from a perspective that has been under-researched in the field: that of trans-border trade. In the last section we look at how, after the peace of 2005, newly appointed local government authorities are (re)claiming domains of state regulation that previously lay firmly in the hands of the military. Particular attention is given to the capacity of the local authorities to guarantee security and provide protection.
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Objective: Africa’s 0 - 15 degrees of latitude North is one of the most Conflict regions in the world. Interfaith and religious Conflicts between followers of Islam and Christianity or between Religious groups with states are one of the types of conflicts in the region. The important point in examining conflicts, is pay attention to their roots. One aspect of this issue is the geopolitical analysis of these conflicts. The goal of this research is to explain the roots of interfaith and religious Conflicts in Africa’s 0 - 15 degrees of latitude North from a geopolitical point of view. Method: On the basis of purpose, the current study is considered to be a ‘Basic Research’. In terms of nature and method, is ‘descriptive’ and in terms of attitude, it is in the category of "descriptive-analytic" research. Gathering of data is done by documentary method and benefiting from a library resources. Data analysis method is qualitative. Results: Analysis of the roots of interfaith and religious Conflicts in Africa’s 0 - 15 degrees of latitude North and of the end of the Cold War to 2014 shows that in this type of conflict, the mutual role of the elements of 'politics', 'power' and 'geography' and the consequences of it are obvious and the conflicts are of a geopolitical nature. Conclusion: Of the 29 countries of Africa’s 0 - 15 degrees of latitude North, 21 countries are involved in a variety of conflicts. In 7 countries, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Ivory Coast, 10 cases of "Interfaith and religious Conflicts" have happened and is happening. A deeper look at the causes of the conflict represents a role of geopolitics in their occurrence. The study has achieved 9 geopolitical factors for interfaith and religious Conflicts which are generalizable to other conflicts of this type in other parts of the world.
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While much has been written about the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), hardly any analyses focus on the rebel group's activities in (northeastern) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)-although the rebel group conducted some of the biggest massacres in its history in the country, and continues to be active there. This analysis focusses on a consistent claim which is made among many actors in the DRC: that the LRA was invited, and supported, by the Congolese authorities. This analysis reviews this claim, by zooming in on the available evidence, such as the circumstances in which the rebel group arrived in the country. It concludes that, while freelancing individuals indeed might have brokered such an agreement, institutional Congolese government support to the LRA was (most probably) not the case. Yet, it shows the murky circumstances which allowed such claims to emerge, involving war entrepreneurs, freelancing government officials, ineffective protection, and a government more interested in state security rather than human security.
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This paper is one of the outputs of the WOTRO funded project "Returning to Stability" and aims to contribute to the emerging debate on the political dimensions of return by focusing on the sudden ‘spontaneous’ return of 11,6001 Congolese refugees who were forced back from exile in South Sudan to their home areas in Faradje, in northeast DRC. This is the 4th issue of the Congo research briefs, a joint publication of the Conflict Research Group (CRG) at Ghent University, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and its Understanding Violent Conflict programme, the Study Group on Conflicts and Human Security (GEC-SH) at the University of Kivu Research Center (CERUKI), the University of Kinshasa (UNIKIN) and the Governance-in-Conflict Network (GiC).
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Current research on motivational sources of military interventions in civil wars frequently assumes that states intervene due to direct interests in the civil war country. However, this study argues that there exists a subset of interventions in which weaker powers intervene on behalf of interests which great powers hold vis-à-vis the civil war country. Using the logic of principal-agent theory in combination with arms trade data allows one to identify 14 civil wars which experienced the phenomenon of indirect military interventions. This type of intervention features a weaker power providing troops for combat missions, whereas its major arms supplier is only involved with indirect military support. The analysis is complemented with two brief case studies on the Moroccan intervention in Zaire (1977) and the Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic (2009). Both case studies corroborate expectations as deduced from the proxy intervention framework.
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The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has created a pervasive climate of fear in northern Uganda. This study addresses the purpose of this conduct. Diverging from the traditional ‘greed-grievance’ approach to the study of new wars, the LRA's behaviour is analyzed from a strategic perspective. Specifically, the article focuses on the LRA's use of mutilation, abduction, surprise, and unpredictable attacks. The conclusion is that the LRA is strategically using fear as a force multiplier, to further its organizational survival, and as a way to fight a political ‘dirty war’.
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Document collected by the University of Texas Libraries from the web-site of the Reseau Documentaire International Sur La Region Des Grands Lacs Africains (International Documentation Network on the Great African Lakes Region). The Reseau distributes "gray literature", non-published or limited distribution government or NGO documents regarding the Great Lakes area of central Africa including Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. UT Libraries
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Sudan and Uganda have for many years carried out an undeclared war. One little-known aspect of this conflict is the use of Zaire/Congo as an outside battlefield where proxy guerrilla organizations either fought each other or fought the armies of their sponsor’s enemy. From a small scale prior to 1996, the conflict grew to occupy a major place in terms of men engaged and battles fought after this proxy war morphed into the bigger ‘Congolese’ conflict which developed from the fall of President Mobutu and lasted until 2002.