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Understanding Deontics from a Preference Perspective

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Understanding Deontics from a Preference Perspective

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SOCREAL 2010: 2nd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality. Sapporo, Japan, 2010-03-27/28. Keynote Lecture 2
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Recently, conditional logics have been developed for ap- plication to problems in default reasoning. We present a uniform framework for the development and investi- gation of conditional logics to represent and reason with "normality", and demonstrate these logics to be equiv- alent to extensions of the modal system S4. We also show that two conditional logics, recently proposed to reason with default knowledge, are equivalent to frag- ments of two logics developed in this framework.
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Normative systems in a multiagent system must be able to evolve over time, for example due to actions creating or removing norms in the system. The only formal framework to evaluate and classify normative system change methods is the so-called AGM frame- work of theory change, which has originally been developed as a framework to describe and classify both belief and normative sys- tem change. However, it has been used for belief change only, since the beliefs or norms are represented as propositional formulas. We therefore propose, as a normative framework for normative system change, to replace propositional formulas in the AGM framework of theory change by pairs of propositional formulas, representing the rule based character of norms, and to add several principles from the input/output logic framework. In this new framework, we show that some of the AGM properties cannot be expressed, and other properties are consistent only for some logics, but not for others.
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Building on a simple modal logic of context, the paper presents a dynamic logic characterizing operations of contraction and expansion on theories. We investigate the mathematical properties of the logic, and show how it can capture some aspects of the dynamics of normative systems once they are viewed as logical theories.
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Several conditional theories of default reasoning have recently been proposed for the representation of statements about normal states of affairs or prototypical properties. The natural semantics of these systems and their ability to reason about default rules make these approaches quite appealing. We present a family of modal logics in which we define a conditional connective for statements of normality and examine its properties. We also demonstrate that two of the most important conditional approaches are equivalent to fragments of our conditional logics of normality (and to standard modal logics). The approach we take is general enough to allow the expression of a number of different forms of defeasible reasoning, and can be used to illustrate the relationship between these types of reasoning (e.g., belief revision, subjunctive and autoepistemic reasoning) and our default logics. This relationship is explored in a companion paper.
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We investigate under what conditions contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures lacking temporal and action elements can be given a coherent reading. We argue, contrary to some recent proposals, that CTD is not an instance of defeasible reasoning, and that methods of nonmonotonic logics are inadequate since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violation of primary obligations. We propose a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and CTD obligations are obligations of different kinds: a CTD obligation pertains to, or pre-supposes, a certain context in which a primary obligation is already violated. This framework is presented initially as an extension of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), a normal modal logic of type KD, and is illustrated by application to a series of examples. The concluding section is concerned with some resemblances between CTD and defeasible reasoning. We show first that the SDL-based framework contains a flaw and must be adjusted. A discussion of p...
An analysis of some deontic logics Changing for the Better Preferemce dynamics and Agent Diversity Contrary-to-duty obligations
  • B References
  • F Hansson
  • G E Liu
  • Moore
  • Ethica
References B. Hansson. An analysis of some deontic logics. Nous, 3:373-398, 1969. F. Liu. Changing for the Better. Preferemce dynamics and Agent Diversity. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2008. G. E. Moore. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, 1903. H. Prakken and M. Sergot. Contrary-to-duty obligations. Studia Logica, 57:91-115, 1996. O.Roy. Thinking before Acting: Intentions, Logic and Rational Choice,ILLC, University of Amsterdam, 2008