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The Causes and Effects of International Migrations: Evidence from OECD Countries 1980-2005

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This paper contains three important contributions to the literature on international migrations. First, it compiles a new dataset on migration flows (and stocks) and on immigration laws for 14 OECD destination countries and 74 sending countries for each year over the period 1980-2005. Second, it extends the empirical model of migration choice across multiple destinations, developed by Grogger and Hanson (2008), by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. We use the model to derive a pseudo-gravity empirical specification of the economic and legal determinants of international migration. Our estimates clearly show that bilateral migration flows are increasing in the income per capita gap between origin and destination. We also find that bilateral flows decrease when destination countries adopt stricter immigration laws. Third, we estimate the impact of immigration flows on employment, investment and productivity in the receiving OECD countries using as instruments the push factors in the gravity equation. Specifically, we use the characteristics of the sending countries that affect migration and their changes over time, interacted with bilateral migration costs. We find that immigration increases employment, with no evidence of crowding-out of natives, and that investment responds rapidly and vigorously. The inflow of immigrants does not seem to reduce capital intensity nor total factor productivity in the short-run or in the long run. These results imply that immigration increases the total GDP of the receiving country in the short-run one-for-one, without affecting average wages and average income per person.
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The Causes and Eects of International Migrations:
Evidence from OECD Countries 1980-2005
Francesc Ortega (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Giovanni Peri (University of California, Davis and NBER)
March 2009
Abstract
This paper contains three important contributions to the literature on international migrations. First, it
compiles a new dataset on migration ows (and stocks) and on immigration laws for 14 OECD destination
countries and 74 sending countries for each year over the period 1980-2005. Second, it extends the empirical
model of migration choice across multiple destinations, developed by Grogger and Hanson (2008), by allowing
for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. We use the model to derive
a pseudo-gravity empirical specication of the economic and legal determinants of international migration.
Our estimates clearly show that bilateral migration ows are increasing in the income per capita gap between
origin and destination. We also nd that bilateral ows decrease when destination countries adopt stricter
immigration laws. Third, we estimate the impact of immigration ows on employment, investment and
productivity in the receiving OECD countries using as instruments the "push" factors in the gravity equation.
Specically, we use the characteristics of the sending countries that aect migration and their changes over
time, interacted with bilateral migration costs. We nd that immigration increases employment, with no
evidence of crowding-out of natives, and that investment responds rapidly and vigorously. The inow of
immigrants does not seem to reduce capital intensity nor total factor productivity in the short-run or in
the long run. These results imply that immigration increases the total GDP of the receiving country in the
short-run one-for-one, without aecting average wages and average income per person.
Key Words: International Migration, Push and Pull factors, Employment, Investment, Productivity.
JEL Codes: F22, E25, J61.
Francesc Ortega, francesc.ortega@upf.edu. Address: Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Department of Economics and Business,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 08005, Spain. Giovanni Peri, gperi@ucdavis.edu. Address: University of California, Davis,
One Shields Avenue, Davis CA 95616. We are thankful to Greg Wright and Tommaso Colussi for excellent research assistance. Peri
gratefully acknowledges generous funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. This paper was commissioned
as background research study for the United Nation Human Development Report, 2009.
1
1Introduction
The present paper advances the literature on the economic determinants and eects of international migrations.
We make three main contributions. First, we gather and organize annual data on bilateral immigration ows
from 74 countries of origin into 14 OECD countries from 1980 to 2005 and on immigration laws in those OECD
countries in order to analyze the economic and legal determinants of migration ows. We rst update the data
used in Mayda (forthcoming) from the OECD international migration statistics. These data were discontinued
in 1994. For the period 1995-2005 it has been substituted with a new database on immigration ows and sto cks
in OECD countries.1We merge these two datasets on ows covering the period 1980-2005 with data on the
stock of immigrants residing in the 14 OECD destination countries from the same 74 countries for the period
1990-2000. This also allows us to impute the "net" migration ows to the OECD countries—that is, immigration
net of re-migration out of the country. For the same 14 OECD countries we also collect, organize, and classify
information on immigration laws, distinguishing between laws regulating entry,stay,asylum, and a few specic
multilateral treaties with implications for international labor mobility. The richness of our data allows us to
control for a very large set of xed eects when analyzing the determinants of bilateral ows. Furthermore,
it allows us to identify the eects of economic variables and immigration laws using variation by destination
country over time only.
The second contribution is that we use an empirical “generalized gravity equation”, derived from a model
in which potential migrants maximize utility by choosing where to migrate. We use such a model to estimate
the eects of variation in geographic, economic and policy variables in the destination countries on immigration
ows. Our empirical model adapts and generalizes the one proposed in Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008). In
contrast to them, however, we do not focus (as they do, following Borjas, 1987) on the selection of immigrants
according to skills but rather on the total size (scale) of bilateral migration ows. On the other hand, we
allow for a more general empirical specication that is consistent with several dierent discrete choice models
(simple logit as well as nested logit) and requires only data on bilateral stocks (or ows) of migrants in order
to be implemented. Importantly, we allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-
migrants. Also, since we have data on bilateral ows over time we can control for unobserved, time-varying,
sending-country characteristics and focus mainly on income per person, employment, and immigration policies
in the destination countries as determinants of migrations.
Third, and most importantly, we can identify the aggregate eects of these immigrant ows on the economy
of the receiving country, specically on total employment, total hours worked, physical capital accumulation
and total factor productivity. While the recent literature on the impact of immigrants on labor markets (Borjas
and Katz 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008) acknowledges that the country is the appropriate unit with which
1Publicly available at http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MIG.
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to analyze such eects (due to the high degree of mobility of workers and capital within a country) there are
extremely few cross-country (or panel) studies of those eects. The reason is that in order to do this one needs to
overcome two problems. First, we need to gather consistent, yearly data on hours worked, employment, capital
stock for each of the 14 OECD countries of destination, over the period 1980-2005. Second, we need to isolate
the impact of immigration on those variables when we know that productivity, investment and employment
growth are also determinants of immigration ows (through their eects on income and wages). We address the
rst issue by employing data from dierent OECD datasets, while to solve the second issue we use our bilateral
migration equation estimated below. Restricting the explanatory variables of the bilateral migration ows to
factors specic to the country of origin and to bilateral costs only, we obtain a predicted ow of migrants to
OECD countries that can be used as an instrument, since it isolates the push-driven ows. Those ows vary
across country of destination due to the dierent bilateral costs (due to geography and networks) of migrating
from one country to another, which are independent of any destination country variable. For instance, a boom
in emigrants from Poland due to the opening of its border is more likely to generate large migration to Germany
than to Canada (for geographical and historical reasons), while a boom of emigrants from the Philippines is
more likely to generate large immigration to Japan (proximity) and the US (previous networks) than to France.
Using such push-driven ows we track their eects on the employment, capital and productivity of the receiving
countries.
The paper has three main ndings. First, conrming previous literature (e.g. Mayda, forthcoming), our
regressions consistently show that dierences in the level of income per person between the destination and
origin country have a positive and signicant eect on bilateral migration ows. An increase in the gap by 1000
PPP$ (in 2000 prices) increases bilateral migration ows by about 10% of their initial value. Also, we nd that
stricter entry laws signicantly discourage immigration. Each reform which introduced tighter rules of entry
for immigrants decreased immigration ows by about 6% on average. Second, we nd that time-varying push
factors specic to countries of origin and interacted with bilateral xed costs of migration, predict a signicant
share (between 30 and 40%) of the variation in migration to the OECD receiving countries. Such variation of
immigration ows for a receiving country over time can legitimately be consider as "exogenous" to the economic
and demographic conditions of the receiving country. Third, consistent with an increase in the labor supply
in the neoclassical growth model with endogenous capital adjustment, we nd that the “exogenous” inow
of immigrants increases one for one employment, hours worked and capital stocks in the receiving country,
implying no crowding-out of natives and a speedy and full adjustment of capital. Hence, even in the short run
(one year), the capital-labor ratio at the national level fully recovers from an immigration shock. We note that
in most instances, immigration ows are only a fraction of a percentage point of the labor force of the receiving
country. Moreover, the largest part of these ows is easily predictable, implying that full capital adjustment is
3
a very reasonable nding even in the short run. Also, immigration does not seem to have any signicant eect
on total factor productivity. These eects, taken together, imply no signicant eect of immigration on average
wages and on the return to capital in the receiving countries. Instead, immigration shocks lead to an increase
in total employment and a proportional response of GDP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the existing literature on the determinants and
eects of international migrations and puts the contribution of this paper into perspective. Section 3 describes
and presents the data, especially those on migration ows and immigration laws. Section 4 justies the empirical
model used to analyze the determinants of bilateral migrations and estimates the eect of income dierences
(between sending and receiving country) and immigration laws (in destination countries) on bilateral ows.
Section 5 presents the estimates of the eect of immigration on employment, physical capital accumulation and
productivity of the receiving country. Using an instrumental variable approach which isolates only the push-
driven part of immigrant ows, exogenous to the economic conditions of destination countries, we can provide
a causal interpretation of the estimated eect. Section 6 discusses the main implications of our ndings and
provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature on international migration that, so far, have developed
separately. One analyzes the determinants of international migrations (mostly by international economists) and
the other analyzes the impact of immigration on the receiving countries (mostly by labor economists and limited
to labor market eects). On the rst front we improve on the existing literature regarding the determinants
of bilateral migrations by applying a simple model of optimal choice similar to Grogger and Hanson (2008) as
the basis of our estimating equation. A large part of the literature on migration ows had previously either
estimated a gravity or "pseudo-gravity" equation between many origins and one destination (e.g. Clark et
al 2008, Karemera et al 2000, Pedersen et al 2004) with no foundation in the individual choices of migrants.
Other papers have derived predictions on the selection of migrants from a Roy model and estimated some of its
implications (Borjas 1987, Dahl 2002). Recently, Grogger and Hanson (2008) have analyzed the scale, selection
and sorting across destinations of migrants with dierent education levels using a model based on optimal
discrete choice. Their contribution is part-way between the theory of optimal choice and an empirical, pseudo-
gravity equation. In particular, their specication for the "scale" of migration uses as the dependent variable
the dierence between the logs of the odds of migrating to a specic country and the odds of not migrating at
all.
Gravity regressions have become very popular in analyzing trade ows (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003,
Chaney 2008 and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, forthcoming) primarily because they can be derived from
4
an equilibrium model with optimizing rms. Building on Grogger and Hanson (2008), we employ an extension
of their model that allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants in order
to derive an empirical specication that is fully consistent with a generalized gravity model. Unlike them we
do not distinguish between education groups. The model delivers an equation in which the log of bilateral
migration (stocks or ows) is a function of sending and receiving country eects, expected income dierentials
and migration costs. Moreover, this pseudo-gravity equation can be seen as the result of a simple multinomial
logit model in which the migrant makes a comparison between migrating to any other country or staying at home,
assuming bilateral and destination-specic migration costs. The empirical specication can also be derived from
a more general nested logit model in which migrants rst decide whether to migrate and then decide among
the potential destinations. Importantly, the nested logit model allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity
between migrants and non-migrants or, equivalently, for idiosyncratic shocks that may be correlated across
destinations.
We test the predictions of the model with aggregate panel data on stocks and ows of migrants. Our
empirical specication allows us to focus on the determinants of migration in the destination countries (while fully
controlling for any factor depending on country of origin and year). Another contribution of this paper (with the
exception of Mayda, forthcoming) is the careful analysis of the eects of immigration laws on immigration ows.2
In this respect, we present new data on several hundred immigration reforms in the 14 OECD countries analyzed.
Following some mechanical rules and by reading carefully the content of these laws we classify them based on
whether they tighten the requirements to enter or stay in the country, separating laws that concern asylum
seekers from laws dealing with other types of immigrants. The eects of these laws on subsequent immigration
ows turn out to be quite signicant, especially in the case of entry laws, and precisely estimated. Our dataset
on immigration laws over the 1980-2005 period, documented in the "Immigration Reform Appendix", may
become an important point of reference toward building a systematic classication of immigration laws across
OECD countries. In particular, we hope our data stimulates the literature on the determinants of immigration
policy that so far has remained mainly theoretical (Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005) for lack of data measuring the
“tightness" of immigration policies.3
The second part of this paper analyzes the impact of migration on the employment, investment and produc-
tivity of the receiving country using a panel of 14 countries over time. Most of the existing papers tracking the
impact of immigration focus only on labor market implications and on one or only a few receiving countries (e.g.
Aydemir and Borjas 2007, Borjas 2003, Ottaviano and Peri 2008, Manacorda et al. 2006). Angrist and Kugler
(2005) use a panel of European countries and analyze the labor market eects of immigration. Related to this
2See also Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) for a historical analysis of the eects of institutions on migration ows for a reduced
number of countries.
3A notable exception is Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) that looks at the economic and demographic determinants of citizenship
laws.
5
paper, Peri (2008) and Ortega (2008) analyze the eects of immigration on employment, capital accumulation
and productivity, respectively, across US states and Spanish regions. The literature on the aggregate eects
of migration using cross-country panel analysis is extremely scant. In particular, there are no estimates, so
far, of the eect of immigration on total employment, capital accumulation or productivity based on country
level data. Two major reasons that such analysis has not been performed are that consistent data on migration
across countries and over time are hard to nd and, since immigration is endogenous to income levels and to
their changes, the lack of plausible instruments has limited the ability to draw any inference on the eect of
immigration on national income. This paper addresses both issues, providing estimates of the eects of immi-
gration on aggregate employment, the capital stock, productivity and, consequently, income per capita at the
country level. Hence, though the paper builds on a rigorous model which can explain migration ows, the main
contribution is to estimate the aggregate impact of these ows on the receiving economies.
3Data
This section describes the data that are novel to this paper, namely those on yearly migration ows into 14
OECD countries over the period 1980-2005 and those on immigration laws and reforms in the same countries
overthesameperiod.
3.1 Migration Flows
The data on yearly migration ows come from the International Migration Dataset (IMD) provided by the
OECD. Data for the period 1980-1995 relative to 14 OECD destination countries and for close to 80 countries
of origin were collected and organized by Mayda (forthcoming)4. We merged these data with the new data
relative to the period 1995-2005 for 25 OECD receiving countries and more than one hundred sending countries,
available at OECD (2007). In order to obtain a balanced and consistent panel we select 14 OECD destination
countries5and 74 countries of origin (listed in table A1 of the Appendix). The data on migration ows collected
in the IMD are based on national statistics, gathered and homogenized by the OECD statistical oce6.The
national data are based on population registers or residence permits. In both cases these are considered to be
accurate measures of the entry of legal foreign nationals. We consider the data relative to the total inow of
foreign persons, independently of the reason (immigration, temporary or asylum). While the OECD makes an
eort (especially since 1995) to maintain a consistent denition of immigrants across countries, there are some
4We refer to Mayda (forthcoming) for specic descriptions of the data relative to the 1980-1995 period. The source (OECD
International Migration Data) and the denitions, however, are the same as those provided by the OECD for the statistics relative
to the 1995-2005 period. Hence, we simply merged the two series.
5Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
and USA.
6More details on the immigration data and their construction is provided in App endix A.
6
dierences between destination country denitions. An important one is that some countries dene immigrants
on the basis of the place of birth, and others on the basis of nationality. While this inconsistency can make a pure
cross-country comparison inaccurate, our analysis focuses on changes within destination countries over time.
Therefore it should be exempt from large mis-measurement due to the classication problem. The total inow
of foreign persons each year for each country of destination, as measured by these OECD sources, constitutes
what we call total (gross) immigration. We also construct a measure of total net immigration for each receiving
country. In this measure we try to correct for the outow of foreign persons, due to re-migration or return
migration. 7Those ows, however, are harder to measure as people are not required to communicate to the
registry of population their intention to leave the country. Hence we infer the net immigration ows using the
gross immigration data and the data on immigrant stocks (by country of origin) from Docquier (2007) for 29
OECD countries in years around 1990 and around 2000. Therefore, for each of our 14 countries of destination
we know the yearly inow and the stock circa years 1990 and 2000. For each receiving country we impute a
yearly out-migration rate of the stock of immigrants that, using the stock in 1990 and the measured yearly
ows between 1990 and 2000, would produce the measured stock in 20008. We apply this constant, destination-
specic, re-migration rate to all years and obtain the stock of immigrants each year (between 1980 and 2005)
and the net immigration rates each year. Panel A1 in the Appendix reports the gross and net immigration rates
(i.e. immigration ows as a percentage of the population at the beginning of the year) for our 14 destination
countries over the 25 years considered. For most countries gross and net immigration rates are similar and
move together over time. We note that our net immigration rates are probably much less precise than our
measures of gross immigration. Recall that we assumed constant re-migration rates for all years, while gross
immigration ows and re-migration rates are likely to be correlated9. Second, any dierence between stocks
and ows could also be due to undocumented immigration, their somewhat dierent classication systems, or
other discrepancies, rather than to re-migration only. Third, for some countries the implied re-migration rate
is extremely high and not very plausible10. Hence, while we will use the net immigration ows to check some
regression results (see Table 3 and 5) the preferred specications which analyze the impact of immigration on
the receiving economy will be based on gross inows of immigrants.
A preliminary look at Panel 1 reveals two facts. First, immigration rates have displayed an increasing trend
in many countries but for some countries, such as the US and Germany, they peaked in the middle of the period
(corresponding to the regularization of the late 1980s for the US and to immigration from the East in the early
1990s in Germany). Therefore it is hard to establish a common trend of immigration ows over time. Second,
7This phenomenon can be signicant—depending on the country, we estimate that every year between 0.5 and 10% of the existing
stock of migrants will migrate out.
8This procedure is like nding the unknown "depreciation rate" when we have a measure of a stock variable in 1990 and 2000
and a measure of yearly ows between them.
9Coen-Pirani (2008) analyzes migration owsacrossUSstates. Hends that gross inow and outow rates are strongly,
positively correlated.
10Appendix A reports the calibrated re-migration rates for each country of destination.
7
there is a lot of idiosyncratic uctuation in immigration rates across countries. Hence, in principle, the variation
within country over time is large enough (and independent across countries) to allow us to identify the eects of
immigration on employment, capital accumulation and TFP. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the summary
statistics and the data sources for the other economic and demographic variables in the empirical analysis. Note
that the average GDP per person was more than double in the receiving countries relative to the countries of
origin in each year; furthermore, the employment rate was also consistently higher and income inequality (Gini
coecient) consistently lower in the countries of destination. Countries of destination also typically had a lower
share of young persons in their population, reecting the fact that most international migration is by young
workers from countries where they are abundant to countries where young workers are scarce.11
3.2 Immigration Laws
An important contribution of this paper is the updating of a database on immigration laws for the 14 OECD
countries in our sample and the codication of a method to identify an immigration reform as increasing (+1)
or decreasing (-1) the tightness of immigration laws. The starting point for the database is the laws collected
by Mayda and Patel (2004) and the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti (FRDB) Social Reforms database (2007).
Mayda and Patel (2004) documented the main characteristics of the migration policies of several OECD countries
(between 1980 and 2000) and the year of changes in their legislations. The FRDB Social Reforms Database
collects information about social reforms in the EU15 Countries (except Luxembourg) over the period 1987-2005.
We merged and updated these two datasets obtaining the complete set of immigration reforms in the period
1980-2005 relative to all the 14 OECD countries considered, for a total of more than 240 laws. The list of
immigration laws by country and year and a brief description of what each of them accomplished can be
found in the "Immigration Reform Appendix" to the paper12. We then constructed three separate indices of
"tightness" for every reform mentioned in the database. The rst index includes only those measures tightening
or loosening the "entry" of non-asylum immigrants. The second is a more comprehensive index that includes
measures tightening or relaxing provisions concerning the entry and/or the stay of non-asylum immigrants.
The third is an index that includes changes in immigration policy concerning the entry and/or the stay of
asylum seekers only. In general, we consider as "loosening" entry laws (implying a change in the tightness
variable of -1) those reforms that (i) lower requirements, fees or documents for entry and to obtain residence
or work permits or (ii) introduce the possibility or increase the number of temporary permits. We consider
as a loosening in stay laws those legal changes that (iii) reduce the number of years to obtain a permanent
residencepermitandthosethat(iv)fosterthesocialintegration of immigrants. On the other hand, a reform
11The other variables used in the bilateral regressions are Log Distance, Border, Common Language and Colony dummies and
are taken from Glick and Rose (2001).
12Available at the website: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/Papers/immigration_reform_appendix.pdf
8
is considered as tightening entry laws (+1 in the variable capturing tightness of entry) if (i) it introduces or
decreases quotas for entry, and (ii) increases requirements, fees or documents for entry and to obtain residence
or work permits. It is considered as tightening the stay-laws if (iii) it raises the number of years to obtain
a permanent residence permit/citizenship or (iv) it introduces residence constraints. We also apply the same
denitions for the tightening of entry and stay to asylum seekers in order to produce tightness variables for this
group. In spite of these rules there are several reforms that do not explicitly t any of the categories above. In
those cases we classied them as "loosening" or "tightening", or no change, by scrutinizing the content of each
regulation. 13
Panel A2 in the Appendix plots the variables for immigration policy tightening with respect to entry for
immigrants (solid lines) and asylum seekers (dashed lines) for each of the 14 countries of destination. The initial
value of each variable in each country is 0. Hence the variables only capture the variation in laws over time
within a country. In the regressions which include the bilateral migration owswealwaysincludeacountryof
destination eect which captures initial cross-country dierences in tightness of immigration laws. A preliminary
inspection of the variables reveals that countries such as Australia, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and Canada
signicantly loosened their entry laws beginning around 1990, (with less of a change for their asylum laws).
Denmark and Japan tightened their entry laws. The US loosened its immigration policy regarding entry during
the eighties and nineties and tightened policy beginning around 2000. The remaining countries did not change
the tightness of their immigration policies regarding entry very much. As it is hard to detect any clear correlation
between the change in laws over time and the change in immigration ows, we move to more formal regression
analyses of the determinants of bilateral migration ows, basing the estimating equation on a simple theory of
the discrete choices of migrants.
4 Determinants of Immigration
This section presents a model of migration choice across multiple locations and derives an estimating equation
from the model. Our estimating equation is consistent both with a simple logit model (McFadden, 1974) as
well as with a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978). Our migration model extends Grogger and Hanson (2007,
2008) by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. Potentially, this
is an important omission. It is plausible that migrants systematically dier from non-migrants along important
dimensions that are hard to measure, such as ability, risk aversion, or the psychological costs of living far from
home. An additional attractive feature of our empirical specication is that it is reminiscent of a generalized
gravity equation in which the logarithm of bilateral migration ows is a function of origin and destination
13Three research assistants read the laws and provided us with a brief summary of each law. These summaries were read by the
two authors and discussed until converging on the sign of the policy change.
9
country xed eects and bilateral migration costs.
4.1 Migration model
Following Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008), we study the problem of a potential migrant that makes a utility-
maximizing migration decision among multiple destinations. Agent i, in country of origin oO, decides whether
to stay in oor to migrate to any of dD={1,...,D}potential destination countries.
The utility from a given destination ddepends on the potential migrant’s expected permanent value of labor
income in that country and on the costs associated with migrating to d. Specically, individual i’s utility (net
of costs) associated with migrating from country of origin oto country dis given by:
Uodi =δod vodi =f(Wd)g(Cod)vodi,(1)
where δod is a country-pair-specic term shared by all individuals migrating from the same origin to the
same destination, and viod is individual-specic. In particular, the term Wdis the permanent expected earnings
of individual iin country dand Cod is the cost of migration, which may include destination-specictermsand
bilateral costs that vary by country pair.
We assume separability between costs and benets of migration. We also assume that the average expected
labor income in the country of destination Wdcan be decomposed into the product of the probability of
employment in that country (pd) times the average wage when employed (Wd). We explicitly allow migration
costs to depend on specic destination country factors θd(such as immigration laws), and on specic bilateral
country factors Xod (such as geographical or cultural distance). We normalize the average expected utility from
not migrating (remaining in o)f1(poWo)to zero. Obviously, migration costs are zero for individuals that choose
to stay in the country of origin.
We also assume that fand gare increasing functions. If these functions are approximately linear, we can
interpret them as monetary costs that reduce expected income. If fand gare better approximated by logarithmic
functions then migration costs can be viewed as time costs, which can be subtracted from log real wages.
Grogger and Hanson (2008) argue that their estimation results are inconsistent with utility maximization under
logarithmic fand g, implying that the logarithmic model is mis-specied and produces omitted variable bias14.
To keep our estimates comparable to theirs we proceed by assuming that functions fand gare approximately
linear. Hence, we can write (1) as:
Uodi =f1(pdWd)g1θdg2βXod νodi,(2)
14Our empirical sp ecication is much richer, in terms of xed eects, than the one used by Grogger and Hanson (2008). Hence,
we do not expect such a large bias from the log utility model. This is conrmed by the fact that our linear and logarithmic estimates
(see Table 1) are not too dierent.
10
where f1and giare positive constants.
The idiosyncratic term νodi captures any other individual, unobservable characteristics that are important to
migration decisions. There is substantial evidence suggesting that migrants and non-migrants are systematically
dierent in important dimensions. For example, it is plausible to expect migrants to have higher ability, lower
risk aversion, or lower psychological costs from being in a foreign country than non-migrants from the same
country of origin. A convenient way to capture these dierences is by adapting the nested logit discrete-choice
model rst proposed in McFadden (1978) to our problem. Specically, we follow the rendition by Cardell (1991),
which frames the nested logit model in the language of the random coecients model.15 Let
νodi =(1σ)εiod,for d=o(3)
νodi =ζi+(1σ)εiod ,for dD, (4)
where εiod is iid following a (Weibul) extreme value distribution, and ζiis an individual-specictermthat
aects migrants only, and its distribution depends on σ[0,1). As shown by Cardell (1991), νodi has an
extreme value distribution as well. Two points are worth noting. First, we note that term ζiis individual-
specic but constant across all possible destinations. Thus, it can be interpreted as dierences in preferences for
migration. Second, this model nests the standard logit model used in Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008) when
we set σ=0.16
Utility maximization under our distributional assumptions delivers a neat way to identify the utility (net
of costs) associated with migration decisions from data on the proportion of individuals that migrate to each
destination, or choose to stay in the country of origin. Namely,
ln sod ln soo σln sdD =f1Wdg1θdg2βXod,(5)
where sod =nod/(noo +PD
d=1 nod)is the share of people born in owho migrate to d(nod)in the total popu-
lation born in o,soo is the share of those who stay in o(noo)among those born in o,andsdD =nod/PD
d=1 nod
is the proportion of people born in omigrating to destination dover the total number of people born in owho
migrate (PD
d=1 nod).17
Keeping in mind our normalization, assigning a utility of zero to staying in the home country, we note that
coecient f1measures the eect of an increase in the expected earnings gap between the origin-destination
15See also Berry (1994).
16In this case, the distribution of ζicollapses and νodi =εiod.
17If we did not normalize the utility from staying in the origin to zero we would have
ln sod ln soo σln sdD =f1(WdWo)g1θdg2βXod.(6)
11
pair on the left-hand side variable. We also point out that the standard logit model leads to a very similar
expression: simply substitute σ=0in equation (5). Intuitively, the term σcorrects for the fact that there is
some information in the total share of migrants that helps identify the average value of the dierence in utilities
(due to costs or expected benets) between migrants (to somewhere) and non-migrants. After this correction,
the dierence in log odds equals the dierence between the average utility net of cost associated to destination
dand the utility from staying in o, which we normalized to zero.
Substituting the denition of the shares and solving for ln nod the logarithm of migrants from oto d,equation
(5) can be rearranged into
ln nod =1
1σ¡f1Wdg1θdg2βXod¢+1
1σln noo σ
1σln
D
X
d=1
nod (7)
.
Noting that the last two terms on the right-hand side are constant across all destinations d,wecanwrite
ln nod =Do+φwWdγ1θdγ2βXod,(8)
where Dois a constant that collects all terms that do not vary by destination d, φw=f1
1σ1=g1
1σand
γ2=g2
1σ. Equation (8) is the basis of our estimating equation, which obviously encompasses both the logit
and the nested logit models. In the former case, xed eect Docaptures the size of the group of stayers (noo).
In the case of the nested logit, the xed eect also includes the size of the group of migrants (PD
d=1 nod),which
provides a correction for the average unobserved heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. At any
rate, term Doallows for identication of coecient φw, which measures the eect of an increase in the gap
between the expected earnings in the home country and in destination d.
Assume that we observe, with some measurement error, the share of people born in country oand residing
in destination country dfor a set of countries of origin O, destinations D,andfordierent years t.Thelogof
the migration ow from oto destination dis given by
ln nodt =Dot +Dd+φwWdt +φ1Ydt +φ2βXod +eodt.(9)
Term eodt in (9) is the zero-mean measurement error. Coecient φwequals f1/(1 σ).TermDot is a set
of country-of-origin by time eects and Ddare destination-country dummies. Note that we are allowing for
time-invariant, destination-specic migration costs (through dummies) as well as time-varying ones (Ydt),which
will proxy for changes in the tightness of immigration laws or in variables that may aect these laws (population,
income inequality and the share of young people in the destination country).
12
As emphasized above, the set of dummies Dot absorbs any eect specic to the country of origin by year.
Justied by our theoretical model, this term serves the purpose of controlling for, among other factors, specic
features common to all migrants, for the average migration opportunities/costs in each country of origin in each
year. Potential migrants in country oand year tcompare average expected utility across destinations and choose
the one that maximizes their expected utility. However, besides the average wage there are many other features
of the country of origin aecting the cost and opportunity of migrating over time (such as the sudden fall of
the Iron curtain in Europe, the loosening of emigration controls in China, and so on) and that specication
accounts for them.
Finally, let us note that the theoretically grounded empirical specication (9) can be interpreted as deter-
mining a relationship between stocks of migrants from each country oto each country din each year t,orthe
analogous ows. Given our interest in the economic eects of immigration ows in the second part of the paper,
we shall focus on explaining immigration ows, and estimate the model using stocks as a robustness check.
Having data both on ows and stocks is a strength of our analysis. Data availability constrained previous
studies to the analysis of data on stocks only (e.g. Grogger and Hanson, 2008).
4.2 Economic and Geographic determinants of bilateral migration stocks
The basic empirical specication that we estimate on the data and its variations are all consistent with (9). In
particular, Table 1 shows the coecients for several dierent variations of the following basic specication:
ln(Migrant Stock)odt =φwWdt1+Dd+Dot +φdln(Distance)od +φb(Land Border)od +
+φc(Colonial)od +φl(Language)od +eodt (10)
Specication (10) captures variables specic to the country-of-origin by year with the set of dummies Dot.
The xed migration costs specic to country of destination dare absorbed by the dummies Ddand we explicitly
control for distance, colonial ties, common land border and common language as variables aecting the pair-
specic bilateral migration costs Xod.ThetermWdt captures explicitly the eect of the linear dierence in
income between destination and origin country, measured as PPP gross domestic product per person in USD,
2000. The theory implies a positive and signicant coecient φw.At the same time, if we assume that costs of
migration increase with distance, a negative value for φdis expected, while if sharing a border, having colonial-era
connections and speaking a common language decrease the costs of migration, φb
cand φlshould be positive.
The measures of (Migrant Stock)odt used in Table 1 are obtained from the bilateral stocks of immigrants circa
year 1990 (from Docquier 2007 data) updated backward and forward using the bilateral, yearly migration ows
data (described in section 3.1). In doing so we allow for receiving-country-specic re-migration rates calibrated
13
so that the stock of immigrants for each country of destination match the stock measured around year 2000,
also from the Docquier (2008) data. Specication (1) in Table 1 reports the estimates of the coecients for
the basic regression (10). In all regressions, unless otherwise specied,welagtheexplanatoryvariablesone
period,allowingthemtoaect the stock of immigrants in the following year. Our method of estimation is least
squares, always including the destination countries and the country-of-origin by year xed eects. We add one
to each observation relative to stock and ows of immigrants so that when taking logs we do not discard the
0observations
18. Finally we weight observations by the population of the destination country to correct for
heteroskedasticity of the measurement errors and we cluster the standard errors by country of destination to
account for the "within-destination country" correlation of the errors.
The estimated coecients on the income dierences (rst row of Table 1) are always signicant (most of the
time at the 5% condence level) and positive. The magnitude of the coecient in the basic specication (1)
implies that the increase in the average income dierences between destination and origin countries experienced
over the period 1980-2000 (equal to +7,000 US $ in PPP, calculated from Table 1A ) would generate an
increase of 42% (=0.06*7, since the income per capita is measured in thousands) in the stock of migrants to the
destination countries. This is equal to two thirds of the observed increase in the stock of immigrants from those
74 countries in the 14 OECD countries, which grew by 60%. Hence, both statistically and economically the
absolute real income dierences between sending and receiving countries, and their changes over the considered
period, can explain a very large fraction of the growth in the stock of immigrants.
As for the eect of geographic variables on migration costs, the variable "colonial relations" and the natural
logarithm of distance have very signicant eects with the expected signs. Having had colonial connections
more than doubles the average stock of immigrants from origin to destination, and that stock decreases by 80%
any time the bilateral distance increases by 50%. On the other hand, sharing a land border and speaking a
common language do not signicant aect bilateral migration ows. This is hardly surprising as most of the
large migratory ows to the OECD (except for Mexico-US) take place between countries that do not share a
land border or a common language. These two results are also found by Mayda (forthcoming) who does not
nd any signicant eects for common border and common language dummies. Specication (2) checks whether
including the logarithm of the destination country wage ln(Wdt)instead of its level results in similar eects.19
The sign and signicance of the income dierence variable is as in specication (1), though the magnitude of
the coecient is smaller. In fact, a change by 1 (100%) in the log dierence would only produce an increase
of 29% in the stock of immigrants. Notice, also, that in terms of log-dierence (percentage dierence) the gap
between origin and destination countries has barely changed between 1980 and 2000. This may imply that the
logarithmic specication is not the optimal approach; still, we are reassured that the sign and signicance of
18Except for Specication (6) of Table 1 where we explicitly omit zeros.
19Recall that Wot or its log are absorbed into the country of origin by year xed eects.
14
theincomeeect does not depend on the specic functional form chosen.
Specication (3) decomposes the eect of the expected (logarithmic) income dierence (between destination
and origin) into the eect of dierences in (the logarithm of) GDP per worker and dierences in (the logarithm
of) the employment rate (probability of employment)20. Both variables turn out to be signicant, conrming
that the expected destination-country income, on which potential migrants base their decisions, depends on
potential wages and on the probability of being employed.
Specication (4) adds three destination-country variables that can plausibly aect the willingness of the
country to accept immigrants and hence its immigration policies (and immigration costs). The rst is total
population, the second is a measure of income distribution (Gini Coecient) and the third is the share of
young (aged 15 to 24) individuals in the population. A country whose population is growing may nd it
easier to absorb new immigrants with little consequence for its citizens. Similarly, in periods when the income
distribution is more equal, the opposition to immigration may be milder. There is weak evidence of a positive
eect of population on immigration ows and of a negative eect of inequality: the point estimates have the
expected sign but the coecients are not signicant at standard levels of condence. Also, the share of young
workersdoesnotseemtobesignicant at all, possibly because young workers may fear the competition from
immigrants (who are typically younger than the average native) or, alternatively, they may be more exible and
mobile in adjusting their occupation in response to immigrants, and hence suer less from the competition.
In specication (5) we consider whether including longer lags of the income variable changes its impact on
immigration. As it may take more than one year before income dierences put in motion a migration response,
including a longer lag may strengthen the eect. The coecient on log income, lagged two years, is only
marginally dierent from that of the one year lag. If one includes both lags (not reported) or two lags and
the contemporaneous value (also not reported) only the two-year lagged income dierence is signicant (with
acoecient of 0.06). This implies that it takes at least one year and possibly up to two years for income
dierentials to stimulate migrations.
Specication (6) drops all the 0 observations. Note that we are using stocks as the dependent variable and
there are not many zeros (only 10% of the observations), and therefore the estimates do not change much.
Finally, we show in specications (7) and (8) the results omitting the UK, whose immigration ows before 1990
look suspiciously small (see Panel 1A), and the US, whose large undocumented immigration from Mexico is not
included in our data. Neither omission aects the results. We also run other checks changing the weighting of
the observations and the clustering of the residuals or using only the observations after 1990. All estimates of the
income and geography variables are quite stable and similar to those in the basic specication. A particularly
interesting robustness check (that will be systematically incorporated in Table 2) is the introduction of a full
20We decompose the eects of GDP per worker and employment rates in the logarithmic specication because the logarithm of
GDP per person is the sum of those two logarithmic components.
15
set of origin-destination pair dummies. Such a specication adds 1022 xed eects and removes the geographic
controls (absorbed in the dummies). The estimated eect of wage dierentials on migration ows is equal to
0.054 with a standard error of 0.02 . Hence, still signicant and very similar to the estimate obtained in the
basic specication of Table 1.
4.3 Eect of Immigration laws on bilateral migration ows
In evaluating the eects of immigration reforms, it is easier to look at the eect on subsequent immigration
ows. After all, the immigrant stocks are the long-run accumulation of yearly ows, so the determinants of the
rst should also determine the second. Hence we simply adopt the specication in (9) and use as the dependent
variable the logarithm of the ow of immigrants from country oto country din year t, adding immigration laws
as an explanatory variable. Column (1) of Table 2, Panel A reports the relevant estimates for the following
specication:
ln(Migrant Flow)odt =φwWdt1+φR(Tightness)dt1+Dot +
+φdln(Distance)od +φb(Land Border)od +φc(Colonial)od +φl(Language)od +eodt
(11)
Our data on (Migrant Flow)odt are from the OECD International Migration Database, from 74 countries
of origin into 14 OECD countries. The variable "Immigration policy tightness" is the measure of tightness
of immigration (and asylum) laws described in section 3.221 . The other columns of Table 2 Panel A perform
variations and robustness checks on this basic specication. In Panel B of Table 2 we estimate a similar
specication but now include a full set of (73x14) country-pair xed eects, Dod, rather than the four bilateral
variables (Distance, Land Border, Colonial, Language) in order to capture any specic time-invariant bilateral
costs of migration.
Moving from left to right in Table 2 we modify our basic specication (1) by including income on logarithm,
rather than in levels, (specication 2), then using a broader measure of tightness (specication 3), or longer lags
of the explanatory variables (specication 4). Specication (5) includes extra destination country controls, (6)
omits observations with 0 ows and (7) omits the UK data, whose immigration ows recorded before 1990 appear
suspiciously small. In all these specications we include four variables that capture aspects of the immigration
laws. The rst variable is our constructed measure of "Tightness of entry laws", the second is our measure of
"Tightness of asylum laws". Both are described in section 3.2 and their values for each country and year are
shown in Panel 2A. We also include dummies for the two most important multilateral treaties aecting several
21Notice that all the explanatory variables (that vary over time) are included with one lag.
16
of the considered countries22.
The "Maastricht" treaty was ratied by most EU countries in 1992. Among other things, it introduced free
labor mobility for workers of the member states and it led to the introduction of the Euro, which may have
reduced migration costs within the European Union. The corresponding dummy takes a value of one for those
countries and years in which the agreement is in place and 0 otherwise. The "Schengen" agreement, adopted in
dierent years by 22 European countries, regulates and coordinates immigration and border policies among the
signatory countries. While it eases intra-EU movement for citizens of the signatory countries, the agreement
also implies more restrictive border controls to enter the "Schengen" area. The corresponding dummy takes
a value of one for countries and years in which the agreement is in place. Three main results emerge from
Table 2. First, income dierences between origin and destination country (whether in logs or in levels) have a
positive and signicant eect on immigration ows to OECD countries in almost every specication. Second, the
"Tightness of entry" has a signicant negative eect on immigration ows in most specications. Each reform
that introduced less restrictive measures increased, on average, immigration ows by 5 to 9%. For instance,
this implies that a country like Canada, whose immigration policy loosened by 6 points between 1985 and 2005
(see Panel 2A), should exhibit an increase in immigration rates of 25 to 54%. The yearly immigration rates, in
Canada, went from 0.5% of population in the early eighties to 0.7-0.8% in the early 2000’s. That is, the entire
increase in immigration ows can be attributed to the change in the laws. Third, among the other laws the
most signicant eect is associated with the Maastricht treaty which increased, on average, the immigration of
signatories between 50 and 60%. Tightness of asylum laws had a negative (but rarely signicant) impact on
immigration and Schengen had no eect at all. Interestingly, column (3) in both Panel A and B reveals that
combining immigration entry- and stay- laws decreases the precision of the estimated coecient, suggesting that
mainly entry laws had an eect on the actual inow of immigrants. At the same time the eect of entry laws
is less signicant when we include population, income distribution and the share of young among the receiving
country variables (specication 5, both in Panel A and B). This may imply that some of those variables aect
immigration laws, and indirectly immigration, so that including them reduces the eect of the laws. Finally,
omitting the cells with 0 immigration ows (specication 6) reduces drastically the eect of wage dierentials,
while the eect of entry laws is still signicant. Since almost 70% of the cells are zeros, because we are looking
at bilateral ows (rather than stocks), it is remarkable that the immigration laws variable maintains its sign
and signicance. Omitting the UK (column 7) does not change the results much. The estimated eects on the
geographic variables (not reported in Table 2 and available only for Panel A) are qualitatively and quantitatively
close to the estimates reported in Table 1. In particular, sharing a land border (point estimate -1.6 and standard
error 1.3) and sharing a common language (point estimate 0.4, standard error 0.5) have no signicant impact
22We h ave ru n a few o the r sp ecications such as a Tobit regression with censoring at 0, to account for the clustering of observations
at 0, and obtained a coecient of 0.25 on Wdt1and of -0.14 on Tightness conrming the results in Table 2.
17
on migration ows, while having had colonial ties (point estimate 3.88 and standard error 0.46) and the log of
distance (point estimate -2.2 standard error 0.46) are both very signicant in their impact on migration ows23.
Let us emphasize that the estimates in Table 2 Panel B include 1022 country-pair xed eects and 1825
country-of-origin by year xed eects. Hence any variation is identiedbythechangeovertimeinaspecic
bilateral migratory ow, after controlling for any country-of-origin by year specic factor. We are not aware
of any previous analysis that could run such a demanding specication on bilateral migration panel data. All
in all, our analysis nds statistically and quantitatively signicant eects of income dierentials on bilateral
immigration stocks and ows. These eects are very robust to sample choice, specication and inclusion of
controls. We also nd strong evidence that the receiving country laws, particularly those relative to the entry
of immigrants, signicantly aected the size of yearly inows. The inclusion of income dierences in levels or
in logs does not produce very dierent eects.
5 Impact of Immigration on OECD countries
5.1 A Production Function Framework
In order to evaluate the impact of immigration on the receiving economy’s income, average wages, and return
to capital, we use an aggregate production function framework, akin to the one used in growth accounting (see
for instance Chapter 10 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). Suppose that total GDP in each destination country
and year, Ydt,is produced using a labor input represented by total hours worked, Ldt (that can be decomposed
into Employmentdt times Hours per workerdt ), services of physical capital represented by Kdt and total factor
productivity Adt. According to the popular Cobb-Douglas production function:
Ydt =AdtKα
dtL1α
dt (12)
where αis the capital income share and can be approximated for the destination countries in our sample by
0.3324. In such a framework if we intend to analyze how immigration ows aects income or wages (marginal
productivity of labor), we need to identify rst how immigrations aects the supply of each input and of total
factor productivity. Then we can combine the eects of immigration using the implications of the model.
Specically, the percentage changes in total real GDP, Ydt,realGDPperhour,ydt, and the average real wage,
wdt, are given, respectively, by:
Ydt
Ydt
=Adt
Adt
+αKdt
Kdt
+(1α)Ldt
Ldt
(13)
23The reported point estimates and standard errors are from the basic specication of column 1, Panel A, Table 2.
24See Jones (2008) page 24 and Gollin (2002) to justify this assumption.
18
ydt
ydt
=wdt
wdt
=Adt
Adt
+α(Kdt
Kdt
Ldt
Ldt
)(14)
If we can identify the percentage changes in Adt,Kdt ,andLdt in response to exogenous immigration ows
to the country we will be able to evaluate the impact of immigration on total income, labor productivity and
average wages.
Clearly, immigration ows directly aect labor input Ldt by adding potential workers. However, the increase
in employment may be less than one-for-one if immigrants displace native workers (out of the country or out of
the labor market). In addition, there may also be composition eects if immigrants’ employment rates or hours
worked are lower than those of natives.
Regarding the capital input, standard models with endogenous capital accumulation imply that immigration-
induced increases in the labor force will generate investment opportunities and greater capital accumulation,
up to the point that the marginal product of capital returns to its pre-shock value. However, the short-run
response of the capital stock to an international immigration ow can be less than complete and it has yet to
be quantied empirically.
Concerning TFP, on the one hand immigrants may promote specialization/complementarities (Ottaviano and
Peri 2008) which increase the set of productive skills (Peri and Sparber, forthcoming) and increase competition
in the labor markets, generating eciency gains that increase TFP. Or there can be positive scale eects on
productivity if immigrants bring new ideas or reinforce agglomeration economies (of the kind measured by
Ciccone and Hall, 1996). On the other hand, it is also possible that immigration induces adoption of less
“productive”, unskilled-intensive technologies (as in Lewis 2005) that lead to reductions in measured TFP.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether an immigration shock increases, decreases or does not aect
TFP.
We denote by Fdt
Pop
dt the immigration rate, namely the change in the foreign-born population Fdt (immigration
ows to country din year t) relative to the total population of country dat the beginning of year t(Pop
dt). We
then estimate the following set of regressions:
Xdt
Xdt
=Dt+γx
Fdt
Pop
dt
+est (15)
Where Xwill be alternatively total hours worked (Ldt),25, services of physical capital (Kdt ) and total factor
productivity (Adt). As a check we also analyze directly the eect of Fdt
Pop
dt on aggregate GDP, GDP per hour,
and capital per worker. The term Dtcaptures year xed eects that absorb common movements in productivity
and inputs across countries in each year. In order to assert that the estimated coecients cγxidentify the causal
25Also decomposed between employment Employmentdt and Hours per workerdt.
19
eect of immigration on domestic variables we will instrument total immigration ows to a country with the sum
of bilateral ows to that country predicted using our empirical model in (11), but excluding variables relative to
the destination country26. Essentially we predict those ows using only the components that vary by country
of origin and time, and the xed bilateral migration costs.
5.2 Measurement of Employment, Capital Intensity and Productivity
The data on income and factors of production are mostly from OECD datasets. Specically, GDP data is from
the OECD Productivity dataset, and employment and hours worked are from the OECD-STAN dataset. The
data cover the whole period 1980-2005 for the 14 countries in our sample.27
The capital services data are also from the OECD Productivity dataset, but we make use of the data on
aggregate investment in the Penn World Tables (version 6.2) to extend its coverage. Let us provide a bit more
detail on the capital data that we use. The conceptually preferred measure of capital for our purposes is the
services of the capital stock that contribute to current production. Capital services are computed as follows.
For each type of capital (six or seven, depending on the country), we accumulate past investments making two
adjustments. First, we take into account that older units of capital provide fewer services than newer ones
(eciency weighting). Secondly, we take into account the productive life of each type of capital (retirement
pattern). Finally, we aggregate across all types of capital using the relative productivity of each type to obtain
the stock of productive capital. The capital services data reported by the OECD is the rate of change of the
stock of productive capital and it is interpreted as the ow of capital services that went into production during
that period.
The original data on capital services is available annually from 1985 onward and only covers 12 out of the 14
countries in our main sample.28 In order to expand the data to cover the whole country-year panel we use data
on gross xed capital formation. Specically, we proceed in three steps. First, we use the long series on real
investment provided by the PWT to compute the stock of capital for the 14 countries in our sample between
1980 and 2005. More specically, we initialize the capital stock in 1970 following the procedure based on the
perpetual inventory method used in Young (1995). Next, we iteratively build the entire series of capital values
for the period 1980-2005. The main dierence between this capital stock and the stock of productive capital
derived from capital services data is that here we are imposing the same growth rate across all types of capital.
Second, we build a predictor for productive capital using the data on capital stocks that we just created. In
particular, we estimate a regression model where the dependent variable is the change in the log of productive
capital and the main explanatory variable is the change in the log of the capital stock. We estimate this
26Essentially we omit the term Wdt1Wot1and the term from the basic specication.
27The data on Hours for Luxembourg start in 1983. We use employment growth to ll in the missing values.
28Norway and Luxembourg are missing.
20
relationship for the sample period for which we have data on both variables, namely, 1985-2005. The slope
coecient is 1.31, estimated very precisely. A coecient larger than one makes sense. In good times, rms may
increase the rate of replacement of old capital goods for new ones. This automatically leads to the provision of
greater capital services, even keeping constant the total capital stock. This is because of the age-ow prole of
capital goods used in the calculation of capital services: a new truck is assumed to produce more services than
an old one. Finally, we use our predictor to extend the data on capital services to cover the whole sample. For
the twelve countries for which we have data on capital services (that is, the growth rate of productive capital),
we use our predictor to extend the data back to 1980. For the two countries for which we lack data on capital
services we use the prediction rule for the entire period, 1980-2005.
Equipped with a full panel for real GDP and labor and capital inputs, we compute total factor productivity
as a Solow residual, imposing a labor share of 0.66 and using total hours worked and capital services as the
inputs into production.29
Let us now have a descriptive look at our panel data for income, labor, capital services, and TFP. Table A3
reports annualized growth rates of these variables for three sub-periods: the 1980s, the 1990s, and 2000-2005.
Three features stand out. First, there is a noticeable slowdown in economic growth between 1980 and 2005 for
our sample of OECD countries. In the three sub-periods real GDP grew annually by 2.72%, 2.62%, and 1.98%,
respectively. The slowdown is also noticeable in terms of lower employment growth (from 0.68% to 0.34%),
lower capital growth (from 3.43% to 3.11%), and lower TFP growth (from 1.14% to 0.73%). Note also the large
cross-sectional dispersion.
Secondly, average employment growth was substantially higher than average growth in total hours worked
between 1980 and 2005. That is, hours per worker on average fell during the period. Finally, capital intensity
on average increased substantially over the period. The average annual growth in capital services (in real terms)
was roughly three times as large as the annual growth rate in employment.
5.3 The Eects of Immigration: OLS
Table 3 presents the estimates, using least squares methods, of the coecients γxfrom equation 15. The
dependent variables are, in order, inputs to production (rst to fourth row), total factor productivity (fth
row), total GDP (sixth row), capital per worker, and output per hour worked (rows seven and eight). Notice
that not all the estimated coecients are independent of each other due to the relationship between inputs
and output provided by the production function. Hence, for instance, in the basic specications in which
no other control variables are included and the selected observations are common between regressions, by
29The OECD Pro ductivity dataset features an analogous measure of TFP for some countries covering part of our period of
interest. Our own measure is very strongly correlated with theirs. We run a regression of growth rates of the two measures amd
nd that the estimated coecient is 0.92 and the standard error is 0.018.
21
virtue of (14) the estimated coecient on y/y in the last row of the table should be equal to the dierence
between the coecient on Y/Y and the coecient on L/L30. Since we regress the percentage change of the
dependent variable on the inow of immigrants as a percentage of the initial population, the interpretation of
the coecients (as elasticities) is straightforward. Dierent columns of Table 1 correspond to dierent samples
and specications. Specication (1) is the basic one and it estimates 15 on 25 yearly changes (1980-2005) for
14 OECD countries. The method of estimation is OLS with year xed eects (since the variables are already
in changes we do not include country-level eects31). The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered by country. Specication (2) omits the US, which is one of the most studied cases, to show
that the rest of the sample does not behave too dierently from the US. Column 3 includes only the continental
European countries, excluding the Anglo-Saxon group (US, UK, Canada and Australia) often considered as
more "immigration friendly". Specication (4) includes only the more recent years (1990-2005) , for which the
most accurate migration data from the OECD are available and specication (5) includes in each regression
the lagged level of the dependent variable to control for potential "convergence" behavior of each variable to a
balanced growth path or a steady state. Finally, specication (6) uses as explanatory variable the immigration
ows net of imputed re-migration of the stock of immigrants. While there is signicant potential for endogeneity
in these OLS specications, let us comment on some robust and clear correlations that emerge from Table 3.
First, the coecient on total labor inputs L/L and on total capital K/K are in most cases similar to each
other and close to one. Except for specication (6) we can never reject that the eect on total labor input is
equal to one and in specications 1 to 4 we cannot reject that the eect on total capital services is equal to
one. This implies that the correlations do not show any evidence of crowding-out of native jobs: one newly
arrived immigrant worker increases employment by exactly one. Also, the estimates imply that the increase in
labor inputs occurs because of an increase in employment (one-to-one) and no changes in average hours worked
per person. The estimates on the capital stock imply that investment adjusts to the larger potential worker
pool (at constant wages) and capital increases within one year, eectively leaving unchanged the capital-labor
intensity in production. Row seven shows that capital labor ratios are not signicantly aected by immigration
in all six specications. Finally, the estimates in row 5 imply that there is no signicant eect of immigration
on TFP, A/A.Theseeects, combined together, imply that the inows of immigrants are associated with
larger employment, larger total GDP, and unchanged wages, capital intensity and GDP per hour. These
correlations also hold when we consider European countries only (specication 3), when we restrict ourselves to
the more recent period 1990-2005 (in specication 4) or when we include lagged levels of the dependent variable
(specication 5). The results obtained using the net immigration ows, on the other hand (specication 6),
30The reader can easily check that these relations hold.
31We have also run the panel regression with country xed eects, obtaining similar qualitative estimates, with larger point
estimates and standard errors, however.
22
show much larger coecients and standard errors on labor inputs and capital inputs (with similar eects on
productivity). This suggests that the imputed re-migration ows are probably a rather noisy measure of actual
outows of immigrants and by subtracting these imprecisely estimated outows we are reducing the value of
ows and increasing the noise to signal ratio. Still, even this specication does not show any evidence of a
change in the capital-labor ratio or GDP per person associated with immigration. What seems implausible in
specication 6, however, is the very large (more than 1 to 1) response of labor inputs to immigrants, which
may indicate measurement error or endogeneity problems. For this reason we prefer the gross ows, which are
directly measured in the data, and which we use in the instrumental variable analysis below. Combining the
estimated γxwith the formula ?? would imply that immigration has no signicant correlation with average
wages (or returns to capital) and that immigration increases employment and GDP in the receiving economy
one for one, even in the short run.
5.4 Immigration Eects: Instruments and 2SLS approach
The most signicant limitation of the estimates presented in Table 3 is that immigration ows are endogenous.
In fact, we have shown in section 4 that immigration ows respond vigorously to changes in wage dierences
between origin and destination. Employment, capital and TFP are the determinants of those wages, hence we
cannot consider immigration as exogenous to them. The framework of section 4, however, provides an analysis
of the determinants of the international migration ows and lends us a solution to the problem of endogeneity.
In particular, consider the bilateral regression model used in Table 2, Panel B:
ln(Migrant Flow)odt =φwWdt1+φR(Tightness)dt1+Dot +Dod +eodt (16)
The terms Dot capture any economic, demographic and cost determinant of migration out of country owhich
varies over time t. That set of dummies captures all the so called "push-factors" of immigration that do not
depend on specic destination countries but only on conditions in the countries of origin. The terms Dod ,on
the other hand, capture the xed bilateral costs of migrating from oto d. Theymostlyreect geographic factors
and the existence of historical networks which provide information and ease the adjustment of immigrants to the
destination country. Therefore, only the terms φwWdt1and φR(Tightness)dt1are specic to the country of
destination and in particular to its economic conditions. The wage dierential is the primary included economic
determinant of immigration, while the tightness of immigration laws can be considered as a determinant of the
cost of immigration which is still related to current economic conditions, although to a lesser degree. Hence
we can use (16), removing φwWdt1and φR(Tightness)dt1,to predict the log of annual bilateral ows from
all countries of origin to their destinations. The remaining factors in the regression, Dot and Dod are, by
23
construction, independent of time-varying economic (and legal) factors in the country of destination . Using
these predicted values we calculate the imputed immigration rate for each of the 14 destination countries in
each year (adding the predicted immigration rates from each country of origin).32 These imputed immigration
rates are what we use as instruments for the actual immigration rates. To the extent that immigration laws
(lagged one period) may also be considered as exogenous to the current economic condition of a country, we can
also construct predicted immigration ows by including the estimated term b
φR(Tightness)dt1in predicting
the bilateral ows in regression 16. Table 4 shows the statistics for the rst stage regressions using the predicted
immigration ows from 16 without wage dierentials or immigration laws (rst row of Table 4), and those
relative to predicted ows omitting only wage dierentials (second row of Table 4). We test the signicance of
the instrument on the whole sample (specication 1) or omitting the US (specication 2), using only European
countries of destination (specication 3) or only on the more recent period (specication 4). In each case
the coecient on the instrument is positive and very signicant, and the partial R-square of the instrument
is between 0.32 and 0.42. Each regression includes time xed eects. The F-statistic of signicance of the
instrument is usually above 300. Thus, the instrument is quite powerful and captures only the variation in
immigration rates due to the interactions between country-of-origin specic factors and bilateral migration costs
(due to geography and historical bilateral networks). For instance, the large increase in Polish emigrants in
the period 1990-1995 due to the end of the communist regime produced a large Poland-specicterm(
b
Dot)for
those years in the migration equation. The fact that Poland has smaller bilateral costs of migration to Germany
and the UK than to (say) Japan (which is captured by the higher estimated b
Dod for Germany and the UK)
implies that the predicted migration rates from Poland to Germany and the UK, using our model, are larger
then the predicted migration rates to Japan, and particularly so during the years of large Polish migration.
Recall that while they are additive in equation 16, the terms Dot and Dod predict the logarithms of immigrant
ows. Hence, when we calculate their levels (divided by population to obtain immigration rates) the two eects
are multiplicative, so for a given sending country shock, Dot,the eect would be magnied by a large Dod.The
constructed immigration rate represents the exogenous (push-driven) variation in the immigration rates of the
receiving country and will be used as an instrument.
Table 5 shows the 2SLS estimates of the eect of immigration on inputs, productivity and per capita
income. The specications and the dependent variables are as in Table 3. Again, the estimates obtained using
net immigration ows (specication 5) seem too large, but all the other specications (using gross ows) are
consistent with the results obtained using OLS in Table 3. In particular, the eect of immigration on total labor
supply L/L is always very close to one (between 0.96 and 1.02) and precisely estimated (standard error around
32One further source of error in proxying the actual immigration rates with those predicted from the regression is that in the
bilateral regression we only have 74 countries of origin (the most important ones) and add the predicted ows from those. The
immigration rates, instead, measure the total immigration ows from those countries plus any other country in the world.
24
0.09). Similarly, the coecient on the capital adjustment (K/K)is always larger than one (and in most cases
not signicantly dierent from it) suggesting full adjustment of the capital stock within one year, so that the
change in the capital labor ratio (k/k)is always equal to 0. Similarly, there seems to be no signicant eect of
immigrants on productivity changes (A/A).The estimates of these eects are robust to the choice of countries
inthesample(specication 2 omits the US, and specication 3 omits Europe) and to the choice of the period
(specication 4 considers only 1990-2005). All in all, the results of Table 5 conrm the correlations obtained
with the OLS estimates of Table 3. Immigrant ows caused (and predicted) by country-of-origin and geographic
factors increase the employment and labor supply in the receiving country one-to-one. Such an increase in the
pool of workers induces investments and capital accumulation that, even within one year, adjusts the capital-
labor ratio (and therefore the wages and return to capital) to the pre-immigration levels. The economy expands
and there is no signicant eect on the total productivity of factors but only to the overall size of GDP, which
grows in percentage roughly by the same amount as the immigration rates. Hence, for instance, the average
yearly inow of immigrants in the US, recorded between 1995 and 2005 at around 0.3-0.4% of the population,
increased US GDP by around 0.3-0.4% each year, with no appreciable eect on average wages and income per
person.
The reader may nd it puzzling that the capital stock adjusts fast enough to eliminate any eect of immigra-
tion on wages, even within one year. Let us emphasize that immigration ows, even those that are push-driven,
have been quite predictable and, as a percentage of the population, never too large (mostly around 0.5% of
the population). Therefore, with yearly investments on the order of 20-30% of GDP there is ample room to
adjust investment by a relatively modest amount in order to accommodate new immigrant workers. Moreover
international capital movements may also follow migration and help the adjustment. As a further check that
our short-run estimates are not driven by some short-frequency noise in the data we have re-calculated the
responses of employment, capital, TFP and income to immigration over 5-year changes (rather than yearly
changes). Table 6 reports the estimated coecients from four dierent specications. Notice, importantly,
that the coecients on labor adjustment ( L/L)and capital adjustment (K/K)are still close to one and
not signicantly dierent from one another (the capital response still seems to be a bit larger than one). The
eects on productivity (A/A),on the capital-labor ratio and output per hour worked, are all insignicant.
The adjustment within one year seems fairly similar to the adjustment over 5 years and compatible with the
adjustment in the neoclassical model with endogenous capital: more workers encourage investment and do not
aect productivity so that capital per worker and wages remain stable while the size of the workforce and of
the economy grows.
25
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The impacts of immigration on Western-country economies and labor markets have frequently been analyzed
by considering a single receiving country combined with individual or regional data. Similarly, the determinants
of international migrations have mostly been analyzed using only a single receiving country. These studies
are quite useful, however they have brought to light some issues that are dicult to address in the context
of one receiving country, or by focusing exclusively on labor-market eects. For instance, the degree and the
speed of adjustment of capital to immigration is a key determinant of the short-run eect of immigration on
wages (see Borjas and Katz 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008). However, if capital is mobile within a country we
cannot estimate its response to immigrants with data from one country only (unless we have a very long time
series). Furthermore, the literature recognizes that we would need some "purely push-driven" migration ows
to identify the causal eect of immigrants on economic outcomes in the destination country (e.g. Card 2001).
Those shocks, however, are hard to identify in the context of one receiving country only. This paper suggests a
couple of new approaches to address these issues and provides a new framework to estimate the determinants
of migration ows, to isolate the push-driven determinants, and to use them to identify the causal eects of
immigration at the country-level. We also organize an extensive dataset of migration ows and immigration
laws for OECD countries (1980-2005).
We make three main contributions. First, following Grogger and Hanson (2008) we use a bilateral migration
regression model that can be derived from a simple or nested logit model of the migration choices of potential
migrants. Migrants decide where to reside based on utility comparison between locations. Such a model can
explain the logarithm of the stock (and ow) of migrants from country o(origin) to country d(destination) as
a function of the wage dierential between dand o, of bilateral migration costs and country-of-origin specic
eects. Therefore, conveniently, we are microfounding a pseudo-gravity equation for international migrations.
We estimate that an increase in the wage dierential between origin and destination of 1000 US $ (in 2000
PPP prices) increases the ow of migrants by 10-11% of their initial value. We also show that the immigration
reforms that made entry laws more restrictive were eective in reducing migration ows by 6%, on average, for
each reform.
Second, we use our model to separate between push factors, bilateral costs and pull factors, and construct a
prediction of migration ows that is "exogenous" to the economic conditions in the country of destination (pull
factors). Finally, using the predicted ows as an instrument we estimate the eect of immigration on employ-
ment, capital accumulation, and total factor productivity. We nd that, already within one year, employment
responds to new immigrants one for one, and capital adjusts in order to maintain the capital labor ratio. We do
not nd any signicant eect of immigrants on total factor productivity. These results, taken together, imply
that immigration has no negative impact on average wages, or on income per worker in the short run (one year)
26
or in the long run (ve years). The inow of immigrants only increases the overall size of the economy without
altering the distribution of income between workers and capital owners. This is due to the fact that capital
owners respond eciently to a larger labor pool by investing more. We hope that this paper will stimulate the
analysis of the eects of international migrations, encouraging improvements and extensions in the collection
and organization of data on migration ows and immigration laws.
27
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30
A Data on Migration Flows and Stocks
The International Migration Data (2007) published by the OECD originate from contributions of the national
correspondents (National Statistical Agencies) organized in a network called "The Continuous Reporting Sys-
tem on Migration" (SOPEMI). Since the criteria for classifying immigrants and for registering the population
mayvarysignicantly across countries the data are not necessarily homogeneous. Also, for each receiving
country the IMD (2007) records only the immigrants from the 15 countries of origin with the largest number
of immigrants. The OECD statistical annex to the data emphasizes the diculty of measuring the undocu-
mented/illegal immigrants with this method. Only through censuses or after a regularization program are some
of the undocumented immigrants measured.
The total inows and outows of the foreign population are derived from population registers and residence
and work permits. Due to the fact that removal from the registers due to departure is much less common than
the inclusion due to arrival these data are much better at measuring inows than outows of immigrants. The
countries of origin that we are able to record consistently and that therefore constitute our universe in the
bilateral regression analyses are listed in Table A2 of the Appendix.
In the construction of the net immigration ows and immigration stocks for each year and each origin-
destination pair we compute the estimated rate of re-migrationoftheforeignpopulationineachcountry. These
re-migration rates, which measure the percentage of the existing stock of immigrants in a country that leave
the country, are calculated to match the stocks of immigrants (in 1990 and 2000) with the ows between those
years in each country. The imputed re-migration rates, specic to the country of destination, were: 0.005 for
Australia, 0.09 for Belgium, 0.035 for Canada, 0.06 for Denmark, 0.015 for France, 0.05 for Germany, 0.05 for
Japan, 0.08 for Luxembourg, 0.02 for Netherlands, 0.12 for Norway, 0.04 for Sweden, 0.04 for Switzerland, 0.02
for the UK and 0.005 for the US.
31
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Türkiye’de göç hareketlerinin ekonomik ve sosyal yapı üzerindeki etkilerinin özellikle son yıllarda giderek önem kazandığı gözlemlenmektedir. Bu çalışmada, ülkemizde yoğun olarak yaşanan göç hareketliliğinin, 2022 yılı için il düzeyinde kişi başına düşen gayri safi yurt içi hasıla (GSYİH) üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, çalışmada mekânsal yatay kesit modeli tercih edilmiştir. Göç hareketliliğinin ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilmesi amacıyla, iller ve vatandaşlık statüsüne (Türk vatandaşları ve yabancı uyruklular) göre Türkiye’ye gelen ve Türkiye’den giden göç verileri dikkate alınmıştır. Çalışma sonucunda, Türkiye’ye gelen ve Türkiye’den giden Türk vatandaşların il düzeyinde kişi başına düşen GSYİH üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir etkisinin olmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Yabancı uyruklular açısından bakıldığında ise, Türkiye’den giden yabancı uyrukluların il düzeyinde kişi başına düşen GSYİH üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir etkisinin olmadığı ancak Türkiye’ye gelen yabancı uyrukluların il düzeyinde kişi başına düşen GSYİH üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı ve zayıf bir etkisinin olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu bulgu, Türkiye’ye gelen yabancı uyruklularda yaşanacak %1’lik bir artışın, il düzeyinde kişi başına düşen GSYİH’yi %0,08 oranında artırdığını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye’ye gelen yabancı uyrukluların zayıf da olsa ülkenin ekonomik performansını artırdığı ve bu sonucun göçün -özellikle yabancı uyruklular açısından- ekonomi üzerindeki etkisi hakkında politika yapıcılarına önemli bilgiler sunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'nin uluslararası göç yolları üzerinde bulunması, politika yapıcıların uzun vadeli göç politikasını yeniden gözden geçirmelerini gerektirmektedir, böylece kalıcı ve istikrarlı bir ekonomik kalkınma sağlanabilir.
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This working paper is part of the Horizon Europe project GS4S - Global Strategy for Skills, Migration and Development (gs4s.eu). The paper examines the impact of labour shortages on migration aspirations and destination preferences among individuals from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Using a two-stage Heckman selection model, we analyse data from the OeNB Euro Survey and the World Bank’s STEP Measurement Program. The results indicate that labour shortages significantly influence migration decisions: individuals are more likely to aspire to migrate if there is a shortage of workers in their occupation in the aspired destination countries, while shortages in their home country reduce migration aspirations. These findings suggest that both origin and destination countries should consider labour market conditions when formulating migration policies. For destination countries, highlighting demand for specific skills can attract needed workers, while Western Balkan countries should address the education-labour market mismatch to mitigate local shortages. Policy co-ordination between regions is crucial to manage migration flows and address skill gaps without exacerbating local shortages. Keywords: migration drivers, migration aspirations/desires, destination decision, choice model JEL Code: F22, O15 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.14056280
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