Article

Comparing the determinants of concern about terrorism and crime

Authors:
  • ISDC - International Security and Development Center
  • Social Development Direct, London, UK
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Abstract

Both crime and terrorism impose costs onto society through the channels of fear and worry. Identifying and targeting groups which are especially affected by worries might be one way to reduce the total costs of these two types of insecurity. However, compared to the drivers of the fear of crime, the determinants of concerns regarding global terrorism are less well known. Using nationally representative survey data, we analyse and compare the individual determinants of concern about global terrorism and crime, and show that worries about terrorism are driven by similar determinants as those about crime, which could have important policy implications. We furthermore provide an insight into the structure of the determinants of concerns regarding other public and private goods.

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... illegal drug use) is the largest contributor to social costs (Manzoni, Brochu, Fischer & Rehm, 2006). For example, a study in Germany shows that criminal activity costs the community in the form of "fear" and "anxiety" (Brück & Müller, 2010). According to Brück and Müller (2010), unlike terrorism, criminal activity (though not all) may also affect the behaviour, mental health, welfare and priorities of the public who are driven by fear, especially if the criminal activity is frequent. ...
... For example, a study in Germany shows that criminal activity costs the community in the form of "fear" and "anxiety" (Brück & Müller, 2010). According to Brück and Müller (2010), unlike terrorism, criminal activity (though not all) may also affect the behaviour, mental health, welfare and priorities of the public who are driven by fear, especially if the criminal activity is frequent. Furthermore, compared to property crime, violent crime is less sensitive to economic conditions (Gould, Weinberg & Mustard, 2002). ...
... Other studies focus on politics, social, demography, psychology and law or justice (Bechdolt JR, 1975;Tatalovich, 1976;Howsen & Jarrell, 1987;Meera & Jayakumar, 1995;Masih & Masih, 1996;Manzoni et al., 2006;Rickman & Witt, 2007;Buonanno & Montolio, 2008;Loureiro, Mendonca, Moreira & Sachsida, 2009;Aaltonen, Kivivuori & Martikainen, 2011;Haddad & Moghadam, 2011;Khan et al., 2015;Eriksson, Hjalmarsson, Lindquist & Standberg, 2016;Tarling & Dennis, 2016). Others focus on factors causing fear of crime and violence (Vitèlli & Endler, 1993;Bennett & Flavin, 1994;Miceli, Roccato & Rosato, 2004;Brück & Müller, 2010;Khruakham & Lee, 2014;Crowl & Battin, 2016). However, Masih and Masih (1996) theoretically classified factors that can influence rates or criminal activity into demographic-socio-economic, economic and barrier factors. ...
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This study examines the relationship between criminal activities and the multi-macroeconomic factors of economic growth, unemployment, poverty, population and inflation in Malaysia from 1980 to 2013. The ARDL bounds testing of the level relationship was used to establish the long-run relation, and the Toda-Yamamoto Augmented VAR approach was used to test the short-run impact based on partial Granger non-causality analysis. Empirical results suggest that economic growth, inflation, poverty and population are significant factors affecting criminal activities in Malaysia with economic growth and poverty recording positive effects, whereas negative effects were recorded for inflation and population in the long-term. Further investigation using Granger non-causality analysis revealed that only population does Granger caused the criminal activities in the short-run. The findings provide useful information for policymakers to strengthen the existing crime-related policies in order to improve safety and security while maintaining economic sustainability in Malaysia.
... However, the effect of drug-related violence on the mental health of non-victims has been less studied and more contested because causal pathways via indirect violence are more uncertain. The literature on crime shows that the mental health of non-victims is influenced by vicarious exposure to violence (witnessing and hearing about it), fear, and the victimization of individuals' close acquaintances (Brück & Müller, 2010;Clark et al., 2008;Dustmann & Fasani, 2014;Lopes et al., 2015;Paula et al., 2008;Scarpa, Hurley, Shumate, & Haden, 2006). ...
... Another way in which violent crime can hurt the mental health of non-victims is through fear. Fear of crime impacts mental health by causing anxiety and mental distress in the population (Brück & Müller, 2010;Dustmann & Fasani, 2014;Lopes et al., 2015;Ross, 1993;Stafford, Chandola, & Marmot, 2007) or by restricting individuals' movement and participation over time and space (Whitley & Prince, 2005). For instance, Stafford et al. (2007) find that people with fear of crime exercise less, see friends less often, and participate in fewer social activities than their counterparts. ...
... strategies such as placing security cameras in public spaces or improving the built environments of neighborhoods might help increase the perception of security and help the population feel safer regardless of the use of narcomessages by criminal groups. Specific social and cultural interventions could be designed and implemented to target older people, women and social minorities, who report being the most concerned about these issues (Brück & Müller, 2010;Cornaglia & Leigh, 2014;Dustmann & Fasani, 2014;Evenson et al., 2002;Stafford et al., 2007;Troped et al., 2001;Wilbur et al., 2003). The literature finds a dose-response relationship between the degree of exposure to violence and the severity of mental disorders that people develop. ...
Article
Background: Research has shown the substantial impact on mental health for victims of drug-related crime in Mexico, especially individuals who have been heavily exposed to violence. However, the effect of drug-related violence in non-victims has been less studied because causal pathways via indirect violence are more ambiguous. We argue that drug-related violence does have an influence on the mental health of non-victims: For example, because of how violence is publicized by criminal groups, including their use of gruesome killing methods in executions, or via news about government confrontations with these criminal groups. Methods: We estimate linear models of the effect of drug-related violence (CIDE-PPD database) on depression symptoms (MxFLS 2009-2012). We use lagged violence variables to match the time when individuals' depression symptoms were reported, using different proxies of violence. Findings: Our findings suggest a negative effect of drug-related violence on the mental health of individuals, specifically in relation to communication used by criminal groups (narcomessages), the brutality of executions, and the confrontations between government forces (specifically local police) and criminal groups. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that the general population is a direct victim of the psychological violence imposed by the use of narcomessages. This additional effect of the war on drugs should be considered when deciding how to address the psychological effects of drug-related violence. The government should provide safer public spaces to improve perceptions about security, and more mental health services in communities that are most affected by organized crime violence. Mental health is also affected when police forces fight criminal groups. These findings corroborate the crisis of local institutions, the low confidence citizens have in police, and/or the infiltration of organized crime in local police corps. Mexico requires police reform, not only to avoid the involvement of the military in public security operations, but also to avoid social and psychological damage produced by weak police forces fighting organized crime.
... Our paper contributes to the scant literature on the determinants of fear of terrorism, but it differs in significant aspects. Previous contributions have been based on experimental evidence or surveys of the general population and have referred to the risk of terrorism in general (Br?ck and M?ller 2010, Drakos and M?ller 2014, Lerner et al. 2003, Sj?berg 2005) or of being killed by terrorists (Rosenboim et al. 2012, Viscusi 2009). In contrast, we focus on terror effects on the economy as perceived by carefully selected experts. It is not only a much more focused issue; experts are also better informed and thus less prone to perception ...
... We control for gender, age, educational background, and level of education, as these variables have been shown to affect terror risk perceptions (Br?ck and M?ller 2010, Lerner et al. 2003, Sj?berg 2005, Viscusi 2009). We include a dummy " Female " that is one if the respondent is a woman, zero otherwise. To allow for a possible nonlinear relationship between age and perceptions on terror effects we experimented with a set of age dummies. In the end we included dummies for people aged 55 to 66 years an ...
... 5 Individuals with a PhD are more optimistic concerning the effects of terror at home, but not worldwide. Lastly, older people are more likely to perceive terror as detrimental to the economy; a finding that is also in line with previous studies (Sj?berg 2005, Br?ck and M?ller 2010). The effect is significant at usual levels for the 55 to 65 year old individuals for the domestic economy and for people over 65 years for the world economy. ...
Article
We examine sources of biased terror perceptions. In particular, we investigate how international experts of the IFO World Economic Survey assess the effect of terror on the world economy and the economy of their own country. The results show that respondents from terror stricken countries have more favorable views on the effect of terror on the word economy (but not on their own countries). Male respondents and those from democratic and richer countries are likewise more optimistic.
... Although theory and research have helped illuminate the nature of fear of crime (e.g., Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016;Vilalta, 2011), as mentioned above, little attention has been paid to fear of terrorism (Brück & Müller, 2010;Shechory-Bitton & Silawi, 2016). The current study attempts to expand the existing literature by suggesting a model for predicting fear of terrorism, based on methods provided for predicting fear of crime. ...
... Overall, age and gender were found to be very good predictors of worries regarding all life domains (Fox, Nobles, & Piquero, 2009;Hayman, 2011;Scarborough et al., 2010). Women and older people are more inclined to express high levels of concern on both issues of crime and of terrorism (e.g., Brück & Müller, 2010;Franklin et al., 2008;Shechory-Bitton & Cohen-Louck, 2016;Vilalta, 2011). This although both are, relatively speaking, less likely to be assaulted (e.g., Chui, Cheng, & Wong, 2012). ...
Article
The purpose of the study was to suggest a model for predicting fear of terrorism using theoretical explanations that predict fear of crime. The study focused on two different levels of analysis: community and individual. The sample consisted of 507 Israeli adults. Predictions of fear of terrorism and fear of crime were conducted with two path analysis models, calculated using AMOS software. Fear of terrorism was predicted directly by gender, age, prior victimization, religiosity, and neighborhood disorder. The findings allow the researchers to offer a predictive model for fear of terrorism based on a combination of theories that explain fear of crime as well as a theory concerning the link between fear of death and religion. A combination of environmental theories (e.g., the Broken Windows theory), theories related to personal variables (e.g., the Vulnerability theory), and the Terror Management theory can produce an adequate theoretical framework for explaining fear of terrorism.
... Individuals in the western world describe the threat of terrorism to be one of the greatest concerns in their daily lives (Brück & Müller, 2010). As such, it is becoming increasingly important to gain a better understanding of the psychological reactions to media reports of mass murder events. ...
Article
What happens when entire populations are exposed to news of impending existential threats? In the current study, we address this question by investigating the association between existential threats and the certitude of societal discourse. According to appraisal theory, threats give rise to anxiety and perceptions of uncertainty; as such, it predicts that exposure to life-threatening events will increase expressions of uncertainty. An alternative possibility is that people will respond to threats by utilizing psychological compensation mechanisms that will give rise to greater expressions of certainty. Across two studies, we measured linguistic certainty in more than 3.2 million tweets, covering different psychological contexts: (i) the 15 major terrorist and school shooting events that took place between 2016 and 2018; (ii) the COVID-19 pandemic. Consistent with the idea of compensatory processing, the results show that levels of expressed certainty increased following intentional and natural existential threats. We discuss the implications of our findings to theories of psychological compensation and to our understanding of collective response in the age of global threats.
... Individuals in the western world describe the threat of terrorism to be one of the greatest concerns in their daily lives (Brück & Müller, 2010). As such, it is becoming increasingly important to gain a better understanding of the psychological reactions to media reports of mass murder events. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
What happens when entire populations are exposed to news of impending existential threats? In the current study, we address this question by investigating the association between existential threats and the certitude of societal discourse. According to appraisal theory, threats give rise to anxiety and perceptions of uncertainty; as such, it predicts that exposure to life-threatening events will increase expressions of uncertainty. An alternative possibility is that people will respond to threats by utilizing psychological compensation mechanisms that will give rise to greater expressions of certainty. Across two studies, we measured linguistic certainty in more than 3.2 million tweets, covering different psychological contexts: (i) the 15 major terrorist and school shooting events that took place between 2016-2018; (ii) the COVID-19 pandemic. Consistent with the idea of compensatory processing, the results show that levels of expressed certainty increased following intentional and natural existential threats. We discuss the implications of our findings to theories of psychological compensation and to our understanding of collective response in the age of global threats.
... Theories, such as the Vulnerability Theory (Pantazis, 2000;Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) and research focused on personal variables shows that people who feel physically and socially vulnerable report higher levels of fear of crime (Fox, Nobles and Piquero 2009;Hayman, 2011;Scarborough et al., 2010), with women and older people more concerned about crime and terrorism (Brück and Müller, 2010;Franklin, Franklin and Fearn, 2008;Vilalta, 2011). Interestingly, both these groups are, relatively speaking, less likely to be assaulted (e.g., Chui, Cheng and Wong, 2012). ...
Chapter
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The objective of the chapter is to broaden the understanding of the determinants of fear of crime and fear of terrorism while expanding the existing literature. Israel and Sweden provide case studies of two countries with a relatively similar population size, whereas their cultures are inherently different in their attitude toward terrorism and refugees. Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. The findings show higher rates of fear of crime and terrorism in the Israeli group than among the Swedes, despite the similar rates of actual exposure to crime. This finding could be explained by the Israeli society’s higher exposure to terrorism. In addition, the comparison between the Israeli and Swedish samples may indicate the significance of cultural explanation in accounting for differences between the two groups, especially with regard to fear of being a victim of crime. It is suggested that the diverse perception of the government’s responsibility for preventing the negative effects and of the “other” as a source of harm may account for the higher rates of fear of crime among Israelies explain this finding.
... The 9/11 attacks in the United States led to rising interests in the impact and coping mechanisms of terrorism trauma. The 9/11 attacks also stirred a discussion on new normalcy, how to live with increased levels of anxiety, fear, uncertainty, and potential loss (Brück & Müller, 2010;Danieli, Brom, & Sills, 2005). ...
Article
Israeli citizens are exposed to unpredictable and chronic terrorism threats that significantly jeopardize their personal sense of safety. The purpose of the present study is to present how Israeli discourse is structured with regard to emotional, cognitive and behavioral responses to chronic terrorism threats and to understand the range of responses, as well as map the risk and protective factors of this existential threat. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 40 Israeli adults (22 women and 18 men). Qualitative analysis revealed three patterns of responses to ongoing terrorism: emotional, cognitive and behavioral. Emotional responses include fear, worry, sense of empathy, and detachment. Cognitive responses include situational assessment and pursuit of solutions, the use of traumatic imagining, beliefs in fate and luck, and optimism. Behavioral responses include looking for information, alertness, and habituation. The findings also revealed another response, which combines cognitive and behavioral responses. Some of the responses are innovative and unique to the threat of terrorism. By mapping the responses, mental health risk factors are revealed, as well as protective factors that can help structure personal and national resilience. These findings have implications on the treatment and prevention of personal and social pathologies, and how to effectively cope with terrorism threats. Keywords: Terrorism, responses, stress.
... Also, research has shown that the determinants of concerns about crime are similar to those about terrorism (e.g. age, gender, number of household members and education), 9 which suggests that the factors which predict who is afraid of crime might also point to those more likely to be afraid of terrorism. ...
Article
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Spreading fear is the essence of terrorism. Terrorists exploit fear by terrorising the target audience into concessions. Understanding how feelings of fear influence the way people feel, think and act is therefore an important starting point to explore how individuals and societies can learn how to cope with fear of terrorism. In this Discussion Paper, ICCT – The Hague Research Fellows Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker and Ms. Tinka Veldhuis MSc explore the dynamics of fear in response to terrorism, and emphasise the importance of integrating initiatives to manage fear of terrorism and reduce its negative consequences into overarching counter-terrorism strategies. It argues that societies can benefit greatly from promoting resilience and a fear management approach to counter-terrorism.
... The impact of terrorism on individual happiness has been the subject of research by Frey et al. (2007). Terrorism-induced fear is the topic of recent work by Becker and Rubinstein (2011), while the socioeconomic determinants of this fear have been examined by Brück and Müller (2009). ...
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This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked.
... Marital status is also an important determinant, with singles exhibiting a lower propensity to mention terrorism. Overall, the individual characteristics coefficients are similar to results from other studies on the determinants of fear of or concern about terrorism (Boscarino et al., 2003;Huddy et al., 2005;Brück and Müller, 2010). Table IV shows the results when using the attack rate and casualty rate separately. ...
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We investigate whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored on terrorism risk perception across European countries for the period 2003–2007. We find that the average propensity for terrorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. Country and individual heterogeneity contribute substantially to the variation of observed risk perception. Singles and individuals with white collar jobs are less likely to mention terrorism as one of the most pressing issues their country faces, while political positioning towards the right makes it more likely to be concerned about terrorism. As far as competing risks are concerned, we find that the likelihood terrorism is mentioned, decreases with spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP being higher. Finally, based on the Bayesian framework, we also examined the formation of terrorism risk perceptions, and decompose the observed country-level time series of terrorism activity into a long- and a short-run component. We concluded that the observed risk perception variation is only explained by the long-term trend of terrorism activity countries face.
... coefficients are in line with results reported by previous studies on the determinants of fear or concern about terrorism (Huddy et al. 2005, Boscarino et al. 2003, Brück & Müller 2010). Table 3 about here----- ...
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Motivated by the Bayesian framework, we explore terrorism risk perception differences across European countries. Perception variation is explained by the long-term terrorism countries face, while the cyclical part of terrorism does not seem to play any role.
... We expect questions G1 and G2 to allow module users to understand better how individuals and households themselves perceive their own security despite the cycle of conflict in which the survey is conducted. 31 See Brück and Müller (2010) for a discussion of the determinants of fear over terrorism versus fear over other issues such as crime. ...
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The Political Economy of Terrorism, first published in 2006, presents a widely accessible approach to the study of terrorism that combines economic methods with political analysis and realities. It applies economic methodology - theoretical and empirical - with political analysis to the study of domestic and transnational terrorism. Included in the treatment are historical aspects of the phenomenon, a discussion of watershed events, the rise of modern-day terrorism, examination of current trends, the dilemma of liberal democracies, evaluation of counterterrorism, and analysis of hostage incidents. Rational-actor models of terrorist and government behavior and game-theoretic analysis are presented for readers with no prior theoretical training. Where relevant, the authors display graphs using the data set International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), and other data sets.
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A recent article in this journal, Dolan et al. (2005) provided a methodology for estimating the intangible costs (or losses in quality of life) from violent crime. Here, we develop that methodology to provide estimates of the intangible costs arising from the anticipation of possible victimisation; that is, estimates of the costs of fear of crime. These costs are categorised according to whether they result in non-health losses or health losses. Non-health losses are associated with a) changes in behaviour and/or b) changes in how society is viewed. Possible methods for measuring and valuing these non-health losses are discussed. However, the paper focuses on measuring and providing a provisional monetary valuation for the health losses arising from anticipating crime
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Kriminalitätsfurcht ist eine Größe, die oftmals (partei) politisches Handeln initiiert und begründet. Steigende Furcht vor Verbrechen führt häufig zu Forderungen an die Politik, etwas gegen die "überhandnehmende" Kriminalität zu tun. Im gleichen Atemzug werden schärfere Gesetze und härtere Sanktionen gefordert. Die kriminologische Forschung hingegen zeigt, dass es keinen bzw. allenfalls einen geringen Zusammenhang zwischen Verbrechensfurcht und tatsächlicher Kriminalitätsbelastung gibt. Obwohl das Konstrukt "Kriminalitätsfurcht" methodisch schwer zu fassen ist, kommen deutsche und internationale Studien zu diesem übereinstimmenden Ergebnis. Die von Helmut Kury und Joachim Obergfell-Fuchs vorgestellten Studien belegen, dass die individuelle Ausprägung von Verbrechensfurcht weitgehend unabhängig ist von der Kriminalitätsbelastung. Vielmehr wird sie beeinflusst von dem in den Medien dargestellten "Kriminalitätsbild", von der politischen "Großwetterlage", von verschiedenen demografischen Merkmalen der Bürger und Bürgerinnen (z.B. Geschlecht und Alter), von ihren Lebensbedingungen sowie von der Persönlichkeit des Einzelnen. Von daher scheint die Schaffung und Umsetzung kriminalpräventiver Maßnahmen vielversprechender zu sein als der Ruf nach unangemessenen Reaktionen des Staates und härteren Strafen für die Täter.
Article
Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.
Article
After the introduction in Section 2, we very briefly sketch out current theoretical and empirical developments in the social sciences. In our view, they all point in the same direction: toward the acute and increasing need for multidisciplinary longitudinal data covering a wide range of living conditions and based on a multitude of variables from the social sciences for both theoretical investigation and the evaluation of policy measures. Cohort and panel studies are therefore called upon to become truly interdisciplinary tools. In Section 3, we describe the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), in which we discuss recent improvements of that study which approach this ideal and point out existing shortcomings. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of potential future issues and developments for SOEP and other household panel studies.
Article
Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a new perspective on this problem by demonstrating the complexity of the concept "risk" and the inadequacies of the traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise. This paper argues that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. In addition, our social and democratic institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. The public is not irrational. Their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is both simple and sophisticated. The same holds true for scientists. Public views are also influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and values; so are scientists' views, particularly when they are working at the limits of their expertise. The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach--one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.
Article
One hundred twenty-two members (experts) of the Society for Risk Analysis completed a mailed questionnaire and 150 nonexperts completed a similar questionnaire on the World Wide Web. Questions asked included those about priorities on personal and government action for risk reduction, badness of the risk, number of people affected, worry, and probabilities for self and others. Individual differences in mean desire for action were largely explained in terms of worry. Worry, in turn, was largely affected by probability judgments, which were lower for experts than for nonexperts. Differences across risks in the desire for action, within each subject, were also determined largely by worry and probability. Belief in expert knowledge about the risk increased worry and the priority for risk reduction. A second study involving 91 nonexperts (42 interviewed and 49 on the Web) replicated the main findings for nonexperts from the first study. Interviews also probed the determinants of worry, attitudes toward government versus personal control, and protective behaviors.
To examine the public's response to future terrorist attacks, we surveyed 1,001 New Yorkers in the community one year after the September 11 attacks. Overall, New Yorkers were very concerned about future terrorist attacks and also concerned about attacks involving biological or nuclear weapons. In addition, while most New Yorkers reported that if a biological or nuclear attack occurred they would evaluate available information before evacuating, a significant number reported they would immediately evacuate, regardless of police or public health communications to the contrary. The level of public concern was significantly higher on all measures among New York City and Long Island residents (downstate) compared to the rest of the state. A model predicting higher fear of terrorism indicated that downstate residents, women, those 45 to 64 years old, African Americans and Hispanics, those with less education/income, and those more likely to flee, were more fearful of future attacks. In addition, making disaster preparations and carefully evaluating emergency information also predicted a higher level of fear as well. A second model predicting who would flee suggested that those more likely to evaluate available information were less likely to immediately evacuate, while those with a higher fear of future attacks were more likely to flee the area. Given these findings and the possibility of future attacks, mental health professionals need to be more involved in preparedness efforts, especially related to the psychological impact of attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.
Article
The trends and consequences of terrorist activities are often captured by counting the number of incidents and casualties. More recently, the effects of terrorist acts on various aspects of the economy have been analyzed. These costs are surveyed and put in perspective. As economic consequences are only a part of the overall costs of terrorism, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses of the people affected are discussed. Results using the life satisfaction approach, in which individual utility is approximated by self-reported subjective well-being, suggest that people's utility losses may far exceed the purely economic consequences. Copyright 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Assessing the impact of CCTV Home Office Research Study No. 292 (London: Home OfficePublic Perceptions of CCTV in Residential Areas: ‘It Is Not As Good As We Thought It Would Be
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Gill, Martin and Spriggs, Angela (2005), ‘Assessing the impact of CCTV’, Home Office Research Study No. 292 (London: Home Office, 2005). 9 rGill, Martin; Bryan, Jane and Allen, Jenna (2007), ‘Public Perceptions of CCTV in Residential Areas: ‘It Is Not As Good As We Thought It Would Be’, International Criminal Justice Review 17(4): 304-325
Entwicklung der Kriminalität in Deutschland -Sinkende Sorgen in Deutschland?', paper presented at 'Soziale Indikatoren' for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie
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Schupp, Jürgen (2002), 'Entwicklung der Kriminalität in Deutschland -Sinkende Sorgen in Deutschland?', paper presented at 'Soziale Indikatoren' for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, Leipzig, Oktober 8, 2002.
Worry about Crime in England and Wales: Findings from the
  • Jonathan Allen
Allen, Jonathan (2006), 'Worry about Crime in England and Wales: Findings from the 2003/04 and 2004/05 British Crime Survey', Home Office Online Report 15/06, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr1506.pdf (accessed July 22, 2008).
Fear of crime in Europe', paper presented at 5th Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology
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Dittmann, Jörg (2005), 'Fear of crime in Europe', paper presented at 5th Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, Krakau, Poland, August 30 -September 3, 2005.
Fear of crime: The impact of age, victimisation, perceived vulnerability to victimisation and neighbourhood characteristics
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Baur, Jenelle (2007), ‘Fear of crime: The impact of age, victimisation, perceived vulnerability to victimisation and neighbourhood characteristics’, ACPR Issues No. 6
The Economic Analysis of Terrorism
  • Tilman Brück
Brück, Tilman (2007), The Economic Analysis of Terrorism, Abingdon: Routledge.
Worry about Crime in England and Wales: Findings from the 2003/04 and 2004/05 British Crime Survey
  • Jonathan Allen
Allen, Jonathan (2006), 'Worry about Crime in England and Wales: Findings from the 2003/04 and 2004/05 British Crime Survey', Home Office Online Report 15/06, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr1506.pdf (accessed July 22, 2008).
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Kury, Helmut and Obergfell-Fuchs, Joachim (2003), ‚Kriminalitätsfurcht und ihre Ursachen', Sicherheit und Kriminalität 1/2003: 9-18.