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Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
Does decentralization lead to school improvement? Findings
and lessons from research in West-Africa
A. De Grauwe1, C. Lugaz, D. Baldé, C. Diakhaté, D. Dougnon, M.
Moustapha, and D. Odushina2
Citation:
De Grauwe, A., Lugaz, C., Baldé, D., Diakhaté, C., Dougnon, D., Moustapha, M., &
Odushina, D. (2005). Does decentralization lead to school improvement? Findings and
lessons from research in West-Africa. Journal of Education for International
Development, 1(1). Retrieved Month Date, Year, from
http://www.equip123.net/JEID/articles/1/1-1.pdf
Abstract
Decentralization is a fashionable reform, adopted by many countries with different
characteristics. There are doubts, though, about its objectives and impact. Did inspiration
come from a desire to improve quality or from a need to share the financial burden? Does
it not increase disparities and the workload for local officials and headteachers? Against
this background, the International Institute for Educational Planning, in collaboration
with ministries of education, a national institute and the NGO Plan, co-ordinated research
on the challenges that local offices and schools encounter. Results are partly
disheartening, as they indicate the limits to the implementation of decentralization but
they also show that successful innovations are taking place. They help to identify
principles of good practice: complementarity between actors; equilibrium between their
mandate and resources; reform of school supervision; and the need to counterbalance
autonomy by an effective accountability framework. One principle stands central:
decentralization does not imply that the State is abandoning control, but rather a change
in its role.
1 Corresponding Author: International Institute of Educational Planning (IIEP);
a.de-grauwe@iiep.unesco.org
2 The research on which much of this article is based, was undertaken by four teams, led by Moussiliou
Moustapha and David Odushina (Benin), Djénabou Baldé (Guinea), Denis Dougnon (Mali) and Cheikh
Diakhaté (Senegal). It was co-ordinated by Anton De Grauwe (IIEP) and Candy Lugaz (IIEP).
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 1
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
The preoccupations concerning decentralization in developing countries
Decentralization is a buzzword in current discussions on public management, including
education. In countries as diverse as Mali or Mexico, Sri Lanka or Senegal, the central
authorities are giving more responsibilities to the regional or district offices, to the
municipalities or to the schools. Discussions on decentralization have increased in
complexity in recent years because of the realization that the ‘school’ as an institutional
unit is a core actor in ensuring educational quality. A growing number of studies
demonstrate that the management of a school, the relationships between the different
actors (the headteacher, the teachers and the community) and the school’s own
involvement in defining and evaluating its improvement have a profound impact on the
quality of education (see, on developing countries, Dalin et al, 1994; Carron & Chaû,
1996 and Heneveld & Craig, 1996). This ‘autonomization’ of the school, in combination
with the more traditional forms of decentralization, has led to greater diversity in the
policies implemented in different countries. They carry many names: deconcentration,
delegation, school-based management, school self-governance, privatization, charter
schools, and so on.
The debate on decentralization has always been a contentious one. It has been argued that
in many of the least developed countries the decentralization of public services, including
education, has not been the result of an internal debate, even if there was a conviction that
such a policy would lead to higher quality services. Pressure from the local authorities or
communities, who demand a more participatory decision-making process, has generally
been absent. Rather, in many countries two forces combine to push for decentralization:
first, external pressure by international development agencies and experts; and second,
internal political expediency in national contexts, where the public authorities are unable
to organize or finance basic public services. In quite a few cases, specific political
objectives play a major role, such as weakening the power base of the teachers’ union or
preventing secessionist demands.
This leads to three concerns:
Firstly, advocates of decentralization, and the governments which have heeded their
advice, do not sufficiently take into account a country’s specific context. Countries vary
considerably: In some, the State is strong and efficient; in others, it is weak and
inefficient, especially in the more remote areas. Some countries are homogeneous; others
are characterized by several cleavages – ethnic, regional or religious. Policies need to be
adapted to each country’s context, its strengths and its weaknesses.
Secondly, several countries have adopted this policy without paying sufficient attention
to the strategies needed for its successful implementation. In many countries legislation
reflects the willingness to share authority and resources, but this has not always translated
into efforts to reform existing structures, to strengthen an appropriate information system,
to review career profiles, or – the greatest challenge – to change the institutional culture.
Thirdly, in developing countries relatively little is known about the impact of
decentralization on the ways in which schools and districts function (an exception is
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 2
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
Davies et al, 2003). Anecdotal evidence indicates that presently not all district offices are
able to exercise to the fullest the responsibilities that they have been assigned. This lack
of capacities within some district offices helps to explain that disparities in quality and
access between districts and schools might have worsened. There has, however, been
little systematic research on the implementation of decentralization at the local level.
Field research to identify in some depth the ways in which districts and schools manage
the process of decentralization, the challenges they encounter and the strategies they
introduce to overcome these could be very useful for further implementation of such a
policy.
The research programme
The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) decided, therefore, to launch a
research programme on the functioning of local offices and schools in a context of
decentralization. In a first phase, on which this article comments, the focus was on West-
Africa, where four countries were selected: Benin, Mali, Guinea and Senegal. The
research itself consisted of two stages: one focussing on the functioning of district offices
and a second on the management of schools.
Each country set up a national team consisting of one or two members of staff from the
ministry of education, a senior researcher from a national institute, and the education
programme officer of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Plan. The choice of
these three partners was a conscious one. The reason for including the ministry was to
increase the chances that the programme would influence ministerial structures and
policy-making. In this regard, it is interesting to learn that in Guinea the research
conclusions were discussed during a one-day seminar with all the regional and provincial
directors at the beginning of the 2004 school year. The field research was undertaken by a
national institute and was under the charge of a senior researcher. Collaborating with
these national research and training institutions had as objective to build their capacities,
as they will have a crucial role to play in the implementation of decentralization through
for instance the organization of training programmes. The involvement of the NGO Plan
(previously Plan International) was justified by the fact that it is increasingly interested in
reaching out to national policy makers. It is therefore working not only with schools, but
also with district offices and municipalities. Plan’s experience in working at the local
level and its support to innovations taking place in different schools offered enriching
insights.
The programme went through different phases, which are briefly summarized hereafter.
- Each national team prepared a diagnosis on decentralization in the area of education.
It examined the structures, the responsibilities of various actors in some core
decisions, and the evaluation mechanisms.
- A first technical workshop (in Bamako, Mali) brought together the four teams to
discuss the state of decentralization in the region and to prepare the field work on the
functioning of local offices.
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 3
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
- Through a pilot exercise, the four core researchers and IIEP staff prepared a case-
study on the functioning of a local district office in Benin and its relationship with the
municipalities and the schools.
- Each team prepared a similar detailed case-study on three education offices. These
were chosen to reflect as far as possible the country’s variety: one concerned an urban
area; a second was based in a rural poorly developed environment and a third was
equally in a rural area, but received support from the NGO Plan.
- A second technical workshop (in Dakar, Senegal) discussed the findings on the local
offices and prepared the field work on the management of schools.
- A pilot exercise on two schools in Guinea was undertaken. The senior researcher
from Senegal later accompanied the Benin team in their field work, as the researcher
from Benin had been unable to participate in the pilot exercise.
- Each team prepared case-studies on six schools chosen within two of the three
examined districts. Three were in the urban area, three in the area where Plan
operates. The six schools were again chosen to reflect the variety of circumstances
which schools face, with differences in the available resources, the types of teachers
they work with and the support they receive from the local authorities and NGOs.
- Each country team prepared a brief synthesis of the main findings and completed the
case-studies. The teams undertook in total 36 case-studies: nine per country, namely
of three local education offices and of six schools. IIEP drafted a synthesis report.
- During a policy seminar (Cotonou, Benin), the teams presented the complete research
results to senior decision-makers in the West-Africa region, and to representatives of
the NGO Plan and of international agencies.
Some core findings
The insights offered by the field research are rich and plentiful. We will attempt to
summarize some key findings around four themes. Beforehand though, we briefly recall
the nature of the decentralization process implemented in the four countries.
In all four countries, decentralization is a combination of four quite different, at times
complementary, trends. We use here to some extent the terminology developed by,
among others, Rondinelli (1981) and McGinn & Welsh (1999), though the actual
translation of these terms in the reality of West-Africa is somewhat different from what
the literature describes. Firstly, there is an aspect of devolution: elected local authorities
(generally municipalities or village councils) are given a number of responsibilities in the
field of basic education. In Senegal, the central level transfers some funds to these local
authorities to allow them to take care of nine competencies, including construction,
equipment and maintenance of pre-primary and primary schools, the recruitment of
support staff, and several tasks related to literacy eradication. In Benin, where
municipalities have only recently been installed, they are responsible for the construction,
equipment and maintenance of primary schools. In Mali, these municipalities have
existed for more than a decade, their function being to take charge of education in their
area. It is the intention of policy-makers that in the future they will manage those
teachers, who are currently recruited by communities. The corps of community teachers
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 4
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
should therefore disappear as it is integrated into that of municipal teachers. This trend of
devolution is least visible in Guinea, partly because it has not passed through the same
democratization movement as the other three countries.
A second trend is that of widening the role of regional and district education offices and
offering them a greater say in certain decisions, e.g. concerning the use of their budget or
the nomination of principals. This deconcentration is most evident in Mali, where there
has been a major reform of the district structure. The previous inspectorates have been
transformed into Centres d’Animation Pédagogique (CAP) – the Pedagogical Animation
Centres. They have a new mandate: to offer support. They are rather well staffed and
work in new, fairly well equipped offices. The official texts offer heads of the CAP a
much bigger say than their predecessors (the district inspectors) in the nomination of
school principals. In the other countries, the reform has not been so profound. Efforts
have been made, however, to improve the efficiency of district offices, either by ensuring
that more resources are available or through the creation of a professional corps of
pedagogical advisors, as is the case in Benin.
A third trend, less prevalent in the legislation than the two previous ones, consists in
allowing schools somewhat more autonomy in resource management. This timid school-
based management concerns for instance the evaluation of teachers, where the principal’s
role has expanded somewhat. More significant is probably a reform in Benin, where,
since 2001-2002, funds are transferred directly from the central level to the schools,
which have their own bank account, something which is not the case for most schools
elsewhere. In Guinea, a step was taken in the same direction through the initiation of a
project in the mid-1990s which provided a selection of bulk funds to finance the
implementation of the improvement proposals. More significant than these ‘official’
amendments, however, are the changes on the ground. Faced with a lack of finances and
teachers, principals recruit teachers from the community, who are paid small stipends,
and ask parents to contribute to the school’s financing through contribution to the Parents
Teachers Association (PTA) funds and other fees.
A fourth trend is least evident, namely decentralization as a form of community
empowerment. Although nearly everywhere structures exist to represent the community
within the school, their at times unrepresentative constitution and their limited
involvement mean that they have seldom led to genuine community participation, even
less to their empowerment. In policy declarations though, this objective is quite
prevalent, and in some cases, especially where NGO support has focussed on this issue,
the relationship between schools and community has become tighter and more balanced.
These four trends are thus in part the result of a larger administrative reform, which
impacts on education and on other sectors, such as health or rural development. But they
are also caused by a lack of involvement by the central government, which forces the
local actors to take initiatives. National governments face nearly insurmountable
difficulties to ensure expansion and improvement in the quality of the education service,
and other actors, by default, are taking over that responsibility. This is most clear at the
school level. The context of scarcity, in which decentralization is being implemented,
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 5
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
intensifies the challenges local actors encounter while making it more necessary for the
State to offer support to them. The purpose of the research was not to distinguish
between the impact of poverty and that of decentralization but to study a process of
decentralization in a context of lack of resources.
From among the many themes that deserve closer study, we decided to focus on the
following:
- What is the nature of the relationships between the various actors (local
authorities, education offices, communities and school staff), whose involvement
in school is being promoted by the decentralization policy? How are these
relationships working?
- How effective is the quality monitoring of schools? How competent are local
offices and school managers in this area?
- What resources are available to local offices and schools, and how are they used?
- How are the different categories of teachers (public servant, contract, volunteer,
…) recruited, managed and supported?
The following sections address these points.
The relationships between education offices, local authorities, schools and communities
One of the core objectives of decentralization is to widen the implication of actors who
do not belong to the community of education professionals, in particular elected local
authorities and community or parent representatives.
There is a lot of variety in the involvement of local authorities in education. In quite a
few cases it is very low, quasi nil, with teachers complaining about the total lack of
support from the municipalities. Others do spend some resources on school construction
or the hiring of teachers. In general, their interest does not go beyond the visible, which is
in many cases superficial. In Benin, where elected municipalities started to function only
a few months before the field research, this is not all that surprising, but the scenario is
not very different in Mali, where they have existed since the early 1990s. There is a
variety of reasons for this. Few municipalities have a lot of resources. Their tax base is
low, and many complain that the delay of transfers of funds from the central level is too
long. In one rural community in Mali, no local taxes were collected in 2003 because of a
famine, the priority being to find food for the people rather than to tax them. There are
many competing demands on municipalities, with schooling not always being a priority.
Few have the expertise necessary to address complex educational issues. In some cases
though, municipalities, especially the bigger ones, do take educational initiatives which
go beyond the superficial, for instance working with NGOs to improve principals’ and
teachers’ skills. The lack of involvement should therefore not be interpreted as an
inherent characteristic of decentralization but more as the result of implementing
decentralization in a context of scarcity.
A related factor is that the relationship between elected authorities and local education
offices is as much one of conflict as of collaboration. Two different legitimacies are in
confrontation: education officials refer to their professional legitimacy, while local
authorities emphasize their political legitimacy. The balance between the two does not
depend on an official framework, which does not exist everywhere, but on the
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 6
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
characteristics of each one and on the personal relationships between them. At times their
collaboration is mutually beneficial, with the education office acting as technical support
to the local authority. At other times there is conflict regarding the recruitment of
teachers or the transfer of funds. The district education officer is seldom invited to
participate, as an observer, in municipal council meetings – even if they concern
education.
At the school level, the relationship between the school and the community is a much
closer one than that between the local education office and the municipality, but is not
without problems either. Firstly, the relationship is especially strong between the school
principal and the chair of the PTA. Teachers and other PTA members are poorly
informed, if not excluded altogether. One reason concerns the profile of the PTA
members: many are illiterates and have been chosen as members because of their possible
usefulness as, for example, mechanics or plumbers. Many do not know the decrees which
rule PTAs and accept easily that their role is mainly one of mobilizing funds and offering
practical help. The principal in all four countries is, because of his/her position, the
secretary of the PTA. As he (or she, though most principals are men) is also in many
cases the only well educated person and the only one with a good knowledge of
education issues, this position offers him great leverage over the decisions made by the
PTA. Therefore, the PTA seems to have become an instrument in the hands of
headteachers – at times in collaboration with the PTA chairperson – to reinforce their
authority over the school and the teachers, rather than an organ representing parents.
At times, conflicts arise between the school and the surrounding community, especially
regarding the use of land. The PTA structure does not seem to be of much help in such
cases as it is not representative of the community as a whole, but only – and imperfectly
so – of parents. There are also quarrels between the PTA and the principal, e.g. about the
use of funds. The principal, then, will lean on his teachers to gain an advantage, but
generally an outsider, such as the district education officer, will have to intervene.
Dissatisfaction with the PTAs has led Mali and Senegal to set up an alternative structure:
the School Management Committee (SMC). But this structure is not functioning much
better. One reason for this is that it was created only recently. But there are two other
factors at play, which are more worrying: Firstly, the authority of this SMC comes into
conflict with that of the PTA, and their relative powers, while they might be clear on
paper, are much less evident in reality, especially as PTAs have a tradition to refer to.
Such conflicts are already visible in some schools. Secondly, what is needed is not so
much the creation of a new structure, but the development of a culture of accountability
and participation. In the absence of such a culture, any structure will easily be hijacked
by those who have the power at the local level. Building up such a culture is time-taking
and complex. At the end of this article, we offer some hints how such a transformation
can be achieved.
Quality monitoring
One key mission of a local education office is to monitor the quality of the teaching in its
schools. Inspectors are expected to visit schools and examine the teaching provided at
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 7
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
regular intervals. Their recommendations should be followed up by the administration
and the school itself. Statistical information, transformed into indicators, should be of
assistance to the monitoring process. The reality, though, is quite different.
Little inspection is exercised, and this for several reasons, of which lack of staff and lack
of resources are the most evident. The number of teachers per inspector has increased; for
instance in one Senegalese district, four inspectors supervise nearly 800 teachers. The
profile of teachers has also changed, with many having less training and lower
qualifications than was the case some years ago. This is coupled with a lack of resources,
especially as regards travelling. In Benin pedagogical advisors receive a petrol allowance,
but many do not have vehicles. The result is that inspectors undertake few visits, and that
these are generally short and superficial. The problem, though, is more than one of mere
resources.
The mandate of district offices is demanding, as they are expected to cover all
schools, and conflicting, as they have to exercise control and offer support – tasks
which are not easily combined.
There is a serious discrepancy between the mandate and the available resources.
While some offices have enough staff, they lack nearly always the necessary funds to
allow this staff to undertake their tasks effectively.
The profile of district officials sometimes leaves much to be desired. In Benin, quite a
few offices are used to accommodate teachers who are, for health reasons, unable to
continue classroom teaching.
In their interaction with schools, the officers privilege the traditional visits with little
reliance on other interventions to influence and guide schools, such as holding
workshops or providing assistance in a school self-evaluation process.
District offices very seldom engage in strategic planning. Their actions are more
responses to administrative requests from higher up in the hierarchy, or to
emergencies from further down.
In all four countries, efforts are underway to reform the inspection services. In Mali, the
offices have been renamed and are now called Pedagogical Animation Centres. This
change in terminology reflects a change in their mandate: they no longer inspect, as the
traditional inspection is felt to have no impact and leads to conflict with teachers. They
focus on giving advice. In Senegal a few years ago, one district decided to group
neighbouring schools into clusters and ask the directors to meet regularly and to visit
each school to offer assistance where necessary to teachers, with one director acting as
the cluster head and link with the central and district administration. Directors and
teachers greatly appreciate this clustering initiative, which offers them more regular and
appropriate support. It has recently become national policy, but its implementation is not
without challenges. One somewhat controversial issue is: should these directors be given
the authority to assess teachers, or should the whole structure remain more informal?
Some directors find the latter option frustrating, but turning cluster heads into sub-district
inspectors could simply mean that they will encounter the same problems as inspectors
and lose their originality. In Benin, such clustering in what are called ‘pedagogical units’
has existed for some time and has become a tradition: teachers from neighbouring
Decentralization: Findings and Lessons from West Africa 8
Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
schools meet nearly twice a month to discuss pedagogical and other matters. Every
district office has a few advisors to support these units. The unit heads have no
supervisory authority; their role is simply to ensure that teachers meet regularly and to
guide their discussions.
Supervision by the district offices will never have much of an impact if it is not
accompanied by control and support within the school. This puts emphasis on the
headteachers. However, the latter face a scenario somewhat similar to that of inspectors.
They are increasingly overburdened with tasks for which they are poorly prepared, such
as mobilizing resources, negotiating with the municipality, recruiting volunteer teachers
and getting funds to pay them. They lack time to give significant support to their
teachers. Some have felt it very useful to delegate that task to senior teachers, and such
delegation is greatly appreciated and in bigger schools functions well. Nevertheless,
problems remain. Firstly, and this is especially serious in small schools, few principals
have a suitable profile to be at the same time manager and pedagogical leader. In a small
Malian school, the principal is 27 years old, only has a degree in plumbing, a few weeks
of teacher training and no further experience. While this is an extreme example, it
highlights the inexistence of a policy aimed at transforming the job of principal into a
motivating profession. A related problem is that principals lack the authority and
resources to take action, be it supportive or disciplinary.
The management of financial resources
In all four countries – and this is surely not a surprise – local offices and schools struggle
with a lack of resources. The situation differs quite significantly. In Benin, for instance,
many local offices function only because the schools, through student and parent fees,
participate in their financing, including at times for the construction of new buildings. In
one recent case parents finally refused to do so, arguing that this was surely the
responsibility of the State and that their focus would remain on school construction. In
Senegal, on the other hand, the financing provided by central government is just
sufficient for the office’s daily functioning but does not allow for much initiative-taking.
The lack of resources, beyond the basics, goes some way in explaining why district
offices are seldom able to plan strategically, take initiatives and focus their efforts where
they are most needed. This weakness is not only the result of insufficient resources, but is
compounded by three management related factors.
Firstly, resources made available by the central level generally come within tight budget
lines, based at times on provisions made by the offices and the schools. Once the budget
is in place, district and school managers have little, if any, autonomy in deciding how to
spend them. Any change in planned spending needs approval from higher up in the
hierarchy. This leads to absurd situations, which one would have liked to see as a thing of
the past. One school in Guinea received at the beginning of the school year 40 staplers
and 30 registers, but no notebooks or chalk.
Secondly, the level of financial support given by the government generally does not take
into account the characteristics and needs of each district and its schools. In Senegal, for
instance, the same budget for transport expenses is provided to all regions and districts,
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Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
regardless of the geography and the number or quality of schools. One district, whose
total primary school population is nearly the same as the number of sixth graders in
another district, receives the same budget as the second. This is not only inefficient; it
also frustrates district managers, whose complaints in this regard are left unanswered.
A third problem concerns the lack of transparency in the use of resources. This is
especially the case when funds are collected from parents or students. In nearly all
schools in all four countries the headteacher and/or the chairperson of the PTA make/s
decisions concerning the use of these funds, which can add up to sizeable amounts.
Although in principle the PTA members have the right to control the use of these funds
they are generally unable to do so. Many are illiterate or do not have, within the locality,
the standing to contradict the headteacher or PTA chair. The ambivalent character of the
fees (which could be considered public as well as private funds) complicates matters. The
issue of transparency is equally preoccupying when it comes to spending by regional and
district offices. Although there is an ex ante control through the tight budget lines, this
control does not check for what specific purpose a sum was spent, neither in how far that
spending contributed to educational improvement, as long as it respected the budget
ceiling. In one country the research team visited a regional office, where the director had
at his disposal a computer, printer, fax machine and television. The district office in the
same region did not even have a telephone line. The lack of transparency reinforces the
monopoly of power exercised by certain individuals within many offices and localities,
which is in itself the cause of that lack of transparency.
The situation is paradoxical. Where autonomy is needed it is lacking because of a rigid
control which, however, is inefficient and counterproductive. And where control is
needed, for example as regards the use of parent contributions, it is equally lacking. As a
result, without doubt, the already scarce resources are not used as much as they could be
for educational improvement.
Teacher management
In all four countries there exist now different categories of teachers. Volunteer, contract
and community teachers have joined the public servants to make up for the lack of
recruitment in the public service resulting from the governments’ financial difficulties.
The nomination and posting of teachers in the public service remains a somewhat
contested domain. Headteachers argue that they are the best placed to decide who should
teach in their school and that they cannot be held accountable for the results of their
school if they have no say in teacher posting. District officials feel the interests of a
single school should make place for those of the district as a whole and that they have a
better insight into the needs of all of their schools. The central level, which pays salaries,
keeps, in quite a few cases, control over this process; partly because teacher posts are
scarce assets to be distributed. There is disagreement also over the best practice for
headteacher nomination: headteachers are quite satisfied with the present arrangement,
whereby the decision is made at a fairly high level and is based mainly on the grade.
Teachers suggest two changes: that their voice in the process should be heard, and that
the criteria should take into account personal competencies and leadership skills.
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Journal of Education for International Development – 1(1) Research
More contentious than these issues is the question of how to manage teachers recruited
under contracts other than public service contracts. Governments did not go about the
creation of these categories of teachers in the same way. In Senegal in the 1990s, the
government took the initiative of recruiting volunteer teachers, and there is now a fairly
clear career path open to all teachers, whatever their category. Volunteers can move from
one category to another, until ultimately they become civil servants. Elsewhere, the
existence of these various types of teachers has been more the result of initiatives taken
by local communities, municipalities, NGOs, and even PTAs. In certain districts, the
teaching corps now contains a minority of public servants, and some schools have only
volunteer or community teachers. Somewhat surprisingly, the co-existence of these
different categories in many, if not most schools does not create great tension between
teachers. That does not mean, however, that there is no jealousy or conflict, but these are
not played out within the school. Each category prefers to attack the policy-makers.
Public servants feel that the teaching profession is undermined by the existence of
unqualified and poorly trained youngsters. These same youngsters feel that they perform
as well as their colleagues who have job security and higher salaries.
Policy-makers have not remained indifferent to these complaints, but have rather tried to
better regulate teacher management through legislation specifying minimum recruitment
criteria. But as long as the State does not have the financial resources to contribute to the
salaries of these teachers, its legislation is poorly respected. To some extent, local offices
prefer not to intervene too strongly in the recruitment process of volunteer or community
teachers for fear that such intervention will lead to demands for greater financial
involvement. Recruitment at the local level at times leads to the selection of candidates
who belong to the community and therefore show greater commitment to the local
school, but without regulation or a motivational career path. This creates many problems:
a rapid turnover rate is one; another is that community teachers are left unpaid and get
little response to their complaints, as both the principal and the district chief disclaim
responsibility. A third problem – and not the least important – is that principals or PTA
chairs select friends or relatives as teachers.
Constructing a decentralization policy
The above summary paints a somewhat frustrating picture of the implementation of
decentralization, but the research has also highlighted some elements of hope. First,
parents contribute strongly to the education of their children, even going as far in some
places as financing the functioning of local education offices. While this is not a
sustainable policy and while its impact on equity is probably negative, it shows a
commitment to education, which is an indispensable building block for any
decentralization policy. It also puts into perspective a core belief that has pervaded
educational planning since the 1980s: that the slow progress of enrolment in rural Africa
was to a large extent the result of a lack of demand for education. This dedication to
education can surely be used for better purposes than that of resource mobilization. The
case-studies have offered examples of parents participating in school life without
financial repercussions, and of how such involvement strengthens the linkages between
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the school and the community. Two such examples can be given. In one school, PTA
members contact the parents of kids who have been absent from school for a while to
enquire why and, if necessary, attempt to convince them of sending their child back to
school. In a second case, an older woman in the village has become the “school mother”:
she takes care of practical or minor health problems pupils experience and in this way she
makes the school a more child-friendly one.
A second positive element is that there is a strong belief among parents, teachers, local
councillors and education officials who were interviewed in the research that
decentralization is the way forward. There are of course differences of opinion: many
teachers in Mali, for instance, are among the most disappointed and feel that
decentralization has made no difference whatsoever. The support for decentralization
among many other actors is not an indication of gullibility. They are all conscious of
what decentralization should entail and of its weaknesses, but this does not translate into
a refusal of the policy. The feeling expressed the most is: if only everybody would play
their role fully….
A third encouraging finding concerns the fact that several schools and local offices,
although they struggle with resource constraints, have taken innovative initiatives.
Arguably, the lack of support from the central level obliges them to do so, while the
absence of a regulatory framework makes room for such initiatives. We have already
referred to the reorganization of quality monitoring. Several others can be mentioned;
many are small scale, but they do point to possible ways forward. In one school, teachers
and parents are working together on the preparation of a school improvement plan with
support from the NGO Plan. In another locality, the inspector systematically assists the
mayor and the council with decisions concerning education.
This commitment to education and to decentralization, linked to the existence of effective
initiatives, provides fertile ground for the successful implementation of decentralization.
The challenge remains to transform these initiatives into national practice, which
demands strong and concerted government efforts. The research has helped to identify
key principles to guide such efforts and has highlighted examples of a number of
promising ways forward.
A first principle concerns the need for complementarity. The essence of decentralization
is to incite more actors to work together towards Education for All. While the efforts of
one single individual are easily outweighed by the challenges, collaboration between all
can make a difference. Indeed, the schools which function most satisfactorily are those
where there is a good relationship between the community and the teachers, and where
the PTA assists the headteacher. Legislation recognizes this principle, but isolation or
conflict are often the order of the day.
One reason for such conflict lies precisely in the disrespect of a second principle, namely
that the mandate of all actors should take into account their resources, competences and
assets. The opposite is at times the case: parents contribute from their very scarce
resources but are refused control over teacher presence. Principals manage finances and
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recruit teachers (delicate and intricate tasks) but their involvement in pedagogical
supervision has not been strengthened. Inspectors have to supervise all teachers, while
their resources allow them very few visits during each term. A strategic reflection is
needed on the balance between the mandate and resources of all actors. The term
‘resource’ in this regard should be understood in a broad sense. It includes not only the
finances at the disposal of actors or their formal qualifications, but also for instance their
credibility and social network. In that sense, school principals might have better assets to
supervise the teachers than inspectors because of their credibility.
This principle of complementarity helps in rethinking quality monitoring, a key concern
in a context of decentralization. Initiatives in Benin and Senegal show the potential of
school networks, where teachers exchange experiences and which develop a tradition of
peer support. Research in Africa and elsewhere shows that many principals are competent
to monitor the performance of their teachers, while parents, community organizations and
municipalities can exercise responsibility in supervising teacher presence and maybe in
their recruitment. The district office is best placed to offer intensive support to a few
schools that are seriously under-performing. There is a need to reform school supervision
by changing: its mandate, from inspection to professional development; its focus, towards
the most needy schools; and its practices, from school visits to a mixture of visits,
workshops, exchanges and the creation of networks.
Comparing the present situation to such an ideal scenario could easily lead to a sentiment
of pessimism: actors at the local level do not have many resources, whatever meaning we
give to that term, and those who do have them might be tempted to use them for their
personal interest rather than for the benefit of society. This pessimism should not lead to
inaction, but should rather be taken as a call for action on two fronts. On the one hand,
resources, competencies and assets are not immobile; they change continuously, and
governments have opportunities and the obligation to impact upon them. Legislation,
capacity-building and awareness-raising are indispensable steps in this regard. It might
also be useful to review recruitment criteria and procedures in order to close the gap
between the expected role of an actor and his or her profile.
On the other hand, autonomy at the local level needs to be counterbalanced by an
effective evaluation and accountability framework. One of the more disappointing
findings of the research is that in none of the four countries has much attention been
given to monitor the actions taken at the lower levels. Information on the performance of
local offices or on how schools use the funds, which in some cases are put at their
disposal, is scarce, if not completely lacking. This is particularly worrying when
disparities are vast, and decentralization might aggravate them further. An effective
accountability mechanism also informs, therefore, about the evolution of disparities.
When the decentralization process is more the result of abandonment than policy, then its
regulation and monitoring pose serious problems.
The absence of transparency in the local management of resources is probably the
clearest expression of the challenges of decentralization. Ensuring that rules and
regulations are known to all and that parents who contribute to school financing have an
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explicit right to know how these were spent is indispensable. Training and setting up
financial control structures is equally important. This could be part of a wider
accountability framework linking the actors to whom the district office and the school are
responsible: the administration; the other teachers and schools; the students and parents;
and the public at large. Such transparency and accountability, though, may encounter
serious resistance when it threatens the existing power relations. It takes time to change
traditions of power monopolization and refusal of participation. Arguably, NGOs who
work at the local level are the best placed outsiders to work on a cultural transformation.
The existence of different corps of teachers is not a result of a policy of decentralization,
but it is surely an issue that decentralized actors need to face. The profile of the teaching
force has changed considerably because of the inclusion of volunteer, contract and
community teachers. The motivation and quality of this new teaching corps need to be
addressed. The development of a transparent career plan, allowing for a movement from
volunteer to contract teacher to public servant based on commitment and on performance,
and their inclusion in school-level management and decision-making help retain their
motivation. Quality improvement demands regular support from within the school and
outside, some basic resources, and recruiting teachers who belong to a community, be it
that of the school or that of the locality.
A core principle runs through the previous paragraphs: decentralization does not imply
abandonment by the State, but rather a change in the role of the State. Where its
supervision and support is weak and where its absence is not counterbalanced by strong
local accountability, the inefficiency and mismanagement which characterized central
management might be repeated, if not multiplied, at lower levels. Decentralization is
therefore neither a panacea nor a shortcut. In all countries disparities will continue to
exist. Some municipalities, districts and schools have all that is needed to benefit from
more autonomy, others need support, orientation and control. In all countries, changing
the social and institutional cultures will take time. The implication is two-fold: on the one
hand, decentralization is not a policy objective in itself, it is a management strategy,
adopted when and where centralized management is felt to be inefficient. On the other
hand, decentralization demands flexible implementation, with a balance between the
autonomy and the characteristics of its beneficiaries.
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