Prácticas de gobierno corporativo en América Latina

Academia : Revista Latinoamericana de Administración 01/2009;
Source: DOAJ


El objetivo de este trabajo es proveer un resumen de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo presentes en las empresas de Brasil, Chile y México durante el período de 2000-2002. Este trabajo contribuye a la literatura relacionada con el gobierno corporativo pues examina evidencia empírica en un contexto latinoamericano donde la protección legal de los accionistas, la presencia de inversionistas de referencia, la amenaza de toma de control corporativo, la conformación de las juntas directivas, los directorios entrecruzados y los contratos de incentivos difieren sustancialmente de las de otros países examinados en estudios anteriores. Se puede concluir que aparentemente las prácticas de gobierno corporativo diseñadas para proteger a los accionistas minoritarios son mínimas en las empresas de Brasil, Chile y México durante el período estudiado.

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Available from: Cynthia J Brown
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