The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy

Abstract

During the early 1990s, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments promoted Australia's diplomatic credentials as an activist and independent middle power. Labor claimed that by acting as a middle power Australia was constructing a novel diplomatic response to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. But a closer reading of the official foreign policy record since 1945 reveals that previous conservative governments have also taken a similar view of Australia's place and position on the international stage. This essay traces the historical evolution of the middle power concept in Australian foreign policy and concludes with an assessment of the Howard government's more recent reluctance to use this label and its implications for Australia's future middle power credentials. Although its use has waxed and waned in official policy discourse and it is more commonly associated with Labor governments, the middle power concept itself and the general diplomatic style it conveys have been one of the most durable and consistent elements of Australia's diplomatic practice.

Full text

Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 53, Number 4, 2007, pp. 538-551.
© 2007 The Author.
Journal Compilation © 2007 School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, School of Political
Science and International Studies, University of Queensland and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
The “Middle Power” Concept
in Australian Foreign Policy
CARL UNGERER
Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland
During the early 1990s, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments promoted Australia’s
diplomatic credentials as an activist and independent middle power. Labor claimed that by
acting as a middle power Australia was constructing a novel diplomatic response to the
challenges of the post-Cold War world. But a closer reading of the official foreign policy
record since 1945 reveals that previous conservative governments have also taken a similar
view of Australia’s place and position on the international stage. This essay traces the historical
evolution of the middle power concept in Australian foreign policy and concludes with an
assessment of the Howard government’s more recent reluctance to use this label and its
implications for Australia’s future middle power credentials. Although its use has waxed and
waned in official policy discourse and it is more commonly associated with Labor
governments, the middle power concept itself and the general diplomatic style it conveys have
been one of the most durable and consistent elements of Australia’s diplomatic practice.
Introduction
As the Cold War structures began to collapse in the early 1990s, the Australian Foreign
Minister, Gareth Evans, set about positioning Australia as an activist “middle power”
on the international stage.1 Through a series of high profile foreign policy initiatives
ranging from the protection of the Antarctic environment, peace building in Cambodia
to arms control and disarmament, Australia’s self-proclaimed middle power credentials
gained widespread international recognition and support.2 Moreover, the application of
Evans’s middle power approach, usually in the form of coalition-building with other
“like-minded” countries, became a key feature that distinguished Australian diplomacy
from the growing ranks of secondary powers in the post-Cold War world.
Although grounded in the foreign policy traditions of the Australian Labor Party,
Evans claimed that Labor’s middle power approach to post-Cold War diplomacy
represented a new and significant departure. In a book co-authored with Bruce Grant,
Evans sought to resuscitate an idea which he believed had fallen into disrepair since the
1970s. “Middle power diplomacy” had “regained some currency as the most useful
way of describing the kind of role that some nations like Australia have been playing in
recent times, or to which they might reasonably aspire”. Evans would later embroider
this claim further, suggesting that the middle power model was one that he had needed
1 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Melbourne,
1995), pp. 344-348.
2 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers (Vancouver
1993); Andrew Cooper, Niche Diplomacy (New York, 1997).

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 539
to “construct” for the brave new world of the 1990s.3 These were large and important
claims. If true, they suggested that Australia’s adoption of middle power diplomacy
was largely a function of Evans’s own imagination and creativity. However, a closer
reading of the official foreign policy record over the past sixty years offers some pause
for thought before such claims can be accepted.
In this essay I trace the conceptual and operational foundations of Australia’s
middle power diplomacy by examining a number of parliamentary debates and
speeches made since 1945. These show how the central themes of middle power
diplomacy — a broad commitment to liberal internationalism and a belief in the
leadership role that small and middle powers could play in international relations —
were established and re-established in Australian foreign policy and practice. While
notions of Australia as a middle power have been more commonly articulated during
the tenure of post-war Labor governments, conservative governments too have made
similar assumptions about Australia’s place and position on the international stage.
Evans was wrong to claim that Australia’s middle power diplomacy was somehow a
unique or novel reaction to the diplomatic opportunities and challenges presented by
the end of the Cold War. Since the Second World War Australian foreign policy
practitioners and policy-makers from both sides of the political divide have framed
most diplomatic activity within the broad rubric of Australia’s middle power status and
role in international affairs.
The Evolution of the Middle Power Concept
It should be noted at the outset that there is no agreed definition of a middle power and
middle power diplomacy. The term has been used variously to describe geographic,
material, normative and behavioural attributes among a diverse group of middle-
ranking states from Iran to Japan.4 Such ranking exercises based on selective criteria,
however, are fraught with difficulty because, as other scholars have shown, there is
little or no correlation between a country’s size or position in the international system
and the conduct of its diplomacy.5 In short, being a middle-sized country does not
determine foreign policy behaviour. But having middle-ranking economic, military and
diplomatic capabilities and actively pursuing a middle power approach to international
affairs does offer some insight into what certain states can do.
Clearly, when foreign policy practitioners make declaratory statements about
exercising a country’s “middle power” role in the international system, they are
employing a type of shorthand for a pre-defined and generally agreed set of foreign
policy behaviours. That set of behaviours includes a preference for working through
multilateral institutions and processes, a commitment to promoting international legal
norms and a pro-active use of diplomatic, military and economic measures to achieve
selected political outcomes. Despite obvious definitional difficulties with the concept,
middle power diplomacy continues to resonate with politicians, practitioners and
3 Gareth Evans, “The Labor Tradition: A View from the 1990s” in David Lee and Christopher
Waters, eds, Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney,
1997), p. 18.
4 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York, 1984); Cooper, Higgott and
Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; John Ravenhill, “Cycles of Mi ddle Power Activism:
Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 52, 3 (1998), pp. 309-327.
5 Ramesh Thakur, “The Elusive Essence of Size: Australia, New Zealand and Small States in
International Relations” in Richard Higgott and John Richardson, eds, International
Relations: Global and Australian Perspectives on an Evolving Discipline (Canberra, 1991).

540 Carl Ungerer
scholars alike as a simple way of characterising the foreign policy activities of certain
countries which are neither great powers nor small. As the Canadian scholar Dennis
Stairs has argued, “the impression that there really are certain powers of secondary
rank with similar capabilities and similar minds, and with a similar approach to the
maintenance of the international system, seems somehow to survive the ‘real-world’
observation that things are in fact a jumble”.6
Ultimately, engaging in middle power diplomacy is no less self-interested than the
behaviour of any other state in the international system. That self-interest, however, is
filtered through the practical consideration of when and where middle-ranking states
can achieve successful diplomatic outcomes in pursuit of national interests. In the
absence of what Evans referred to as “clout” in the international system, middle powers
must look for specific, niche opportunities to exercise their power and influence. If
great powers are defined by having global interests and reach, then the middle power
category defines a group of states with a more limited regional set of core national
interests and force projection capabilities.7 As such, the middle power category remains
consistent with classical realist interpretations of international relations.
Australia’s own reputation as a middle power became associated most often with the
tenure of Evans as foreign minister (1988-1996), because it was Evans who trumpeted
the middle power concept most vociferously.8 However the foundations of Australia's
middle power diplomacy are much deeper, and were developed over a much longer
time period. A scrutiny of official parliamentary speeches and debates throughout the
post-war era provides a more comprehensive account of Australia’s middle power
approach. In particular, the public record during this period shows that for more than
fifty years the middle power concept was sufficiently robust to capture the attention
and acceptance of both conservative and Labor leaders. As such, the argument here is
that Australia’s self-identification as a middle power has been one of the strongest
influences on the form and conduct of Australian diplomatic practice.
Curtin, Chifley and Evatt: 1941-49
Dr H.V. Evatt became Minister for External Affairs with the election of the Curtin
Labor government in October 1941. Although Evatt’s early period in office coincided
with a more assertive national outlook, particularly in relation to Australia’s dealings
with the United Kingdom over the conduct of the Pacific War, it was not until the April
1945 United Nations Conference on International Organisation in San Francisco that
Evatt first adopted and promoted a more independent middle power approach for
Australian foreign policy. Evatt went to the San Francisco conference with a
determination to progress Australia’s interests in a range of foreign policy matters from
disarmament to decolonisation. Even his critics conceded that throughout his whole
period as minister, Evatt’s primary interest was in securing a greater voice for Australia
in world affairs.9
It is worth considering Evatt’s arguments at San Francisco in some detail. From the
earliest planning stages for post-war reconstruction, Australia — the most vocal of the
6 Dennis Stairs, “Of medium powers and middling roles” in Ken Booth, ed, Statecraft and
Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge, 1998), p. 282.
7 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London, 1978), pp. 295-301.
8 Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations; Gareth Evans, “Australia’s Middle Power
Diplomacy”, The Inaugural Sir Zelman Cowan Annual Address on International Relations,
Australia Institute of Jewish Affairs, Melbourne, 10 November 1993.
9 Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-47 (Melbourne 1980).

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 541
middle powers alongside Canada — had expressed its concerns regarding the influence
of the great powers on the post-war peace negotiations.10 Their claims for greater
diplomatic recognition rested on three main points: (1) that the smaller Allied countries
had made a significant military contribution to the war effort and therefore deserved an
equal place at the peace negotiation table; (2) that diplomatic representation in any new
international organisation should be based on geographic spheres of interest; and (3)
that the ongoing maintenance of international peace and security would require a
decision-making approach which utilised the specialised and task-related skills of all
states, not just the great powers.11 For the most part, Evatt concentrated his arguments
in San Francisco on the first and second points — employing the middle power label in
terms of a relative military capability and the pursuit of Australia’s regional security
interests.12 As the largest Allied power in the Southwest Pacific area, Evatt expected
that Australia would be afforded a special position in the United Nations (UN) security
structures commensurate with its perceived regional responsibilities. For Evatt, middle
powers were those states “which by reason of their resources and geographic position
will prove to be of key importance for the maintenance of security in different parts of
the world”.13 Journalists covering the San Francisco conference noted that the force and
consistency of Evatt’s arguments had delivered for Australia a more prominent seat at
the table, including Evatt’s own participation in several important sub-committees.14
As the other leading middle power, Canada favoured differentiation of
international responsibilities on the basis of functional specialisation.15 In the
view of senior Canadian diplomats such as Hume Wrong, political representation
on any new international body should take into account the nature of the problem
and the capacity of individual states to contribute to a resolution. In this way,
Canada fully expected that it would play a more significant role through the
provision of technical and expert advice on the major questions of international
peace and security.16 On the basis of these criteria, Australia and Canada began
directing their attention towards the application of middle power diplomacy in
their own spheres of geopolitical interest. Australia pursued its brand of middle
power leadership through the establishment of regional institutions such as the
South Pacific Commission in 1947, at times in direct opposition to the stated
interests of the great powers.17 For Canada, the golden years of middle power
10 Evatt’s fears were well founded. As Robert Hilderbrand has argued in his study of the
Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944, the British, American and Soviet architects of the
United Nations Organisation were far more interested in constructing a version of Roosevelt’s
Four Policemen concept than a truly international organisation that acknowledged and
respected the rights of all states in the maintenance of peace and security. See Robert
Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Post-
War Security (Chapel Hill 1990).
11 Herbert V. Evatt, Australia in World Affairs (Sydney 1946).
12 In fact, Evatt used the terms “middle power” and “security power” interchangeably in many of his
San Francisco conference statements.
13 Evatt, Australia in World Affairs, p. 10.
14 H.A. McClure Smith, “Australia’s AIM at UNCIO — Bid for Seat on Security Council”,
Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 1945, p. 3.
15 John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-
1957(Toronto 1982).
16 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto 1997), pp. 53-55.
17 I.M. Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991 Vol. 1 (Canberra 1995), pp.
41-42.

542 Carl Ungerer
activism under Lester Pearson (1948-57) were concerned mostly with playing a
pivotal role between the U.S. and Western Europe in the negotiations over the
Atlantic alliance. As a result, this period of heightened middle power activity
began to draw increasing attention from scholars of international relations.18
Thus, Evatt’s term as minister established the three defining characteristics of
the middle power tradition in Australian foreign policy: nationalism,
internationalism and activism. The nationalistic strain in foreign policy emerged
as a direct result of Evatt’s attempts to construct a more independent foreign
policy line from Great Britain after the war. This is not to suggest that by the mid-
1940s, Australia was able to divorce itself from the processes and patronage of the
British Empire. It was clear, however, that through the debates at San Francisco
and initiatives such as the Anzac Agreement of 1944 and the South Pacific
Commission, Australian foreign policy by the late 1940s had assumed a much
more independent style and focus than in the whole period since Federation.19
Moreover, the growing bureaucratic independence of the Department of External
Affairs following its formal re-establishment in 1936, including the introduction
of a graduate intake programme after the war, established the administrative
foundations for a more uniquely Australian approach to diplomatic affairs.20
The second characteristic — internationalism — was a direct by-product of
this more assertive independence. Evatt clearly recognised that Australia’s
potential for diplomatic influence in the post-war world would rest principally on
its ability to persuade others on a particular course of action. The obvious lack of
what Evans would later refer to as “clout” in international politics, meant that
Australia’s interests in progressing specific issues on the expanding international
agenda were inexorably tied to the vagaries of multilateral diplomacy and the
exercise of “soft”, or persuasive power. The success of the Canberra Conference
(1947) and the important mediatory role Australia played in the Indonesian
independence negotiations with the Dutch through the UN Good Offices
Commission (1947-49) had reaffirmed for Evatt the utility of multilateral
approaches in the conduct of foreign policy.21 Moreover, multilateral diplomacy
gave middle powers such as Australia a greater opportunity to contribute to the
broader questions of economic and social development that increasingly occupied
the agenda of international politics in the post-war years.
The third foundational characteristic of Australia’s middle power diplomacy
— activism — is perhaps the most important. In the absence of structural or
material capacity to affect outcomes, middle powers must rely on diplomatic
skills and energy in the pursuit of their national interests. Their success
invariably depends on the degree to which foreign policy initiatives can be
promoted and sustained on the international stage over time. The critical
18 George Glazebrook, “The Middle Powers in the United Nations System”, International
Organization, Vol. 1, 2 (1947); H.A. Wolfsohn, “Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian
Outlook, Vol. 5, 2 (1951), pp. 67-76.
19 Perhaps the only exception to this was Prime Minister W.H. (Billy) Hughes thumping the table at
the Versailles peace conference in 1919 seeking a mandate for Australia over the former German
territories in New Guinea.
20 See Russell Trood, “Australian Dip lomatic Practice: Methods and Theory”, Journal of
African and Asian Studies, Vol. 35, 1-2 (1990), pp. 88-113.
21 See the range of essays in David Day, ed., Brave New World: Dr H.V. Evatt and Australian
Foreign Policy (St Lucia, 1996).

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 543
variables in this aspect of middle power diplomacy are the depth and breadth of a
country’s diplomatic resources. The Chifley government’s emphasis on
developing a professional diplomatic service, and the rapid expansion in the
number of Australian diplomatic missions overseas, including new embassies or
high commissions in places such as India (1945), China (1948) and Indonesia
(1950), established the organisational means by which Australia could pursue a
more activist and independent foreign policy after the war.
Menzies and Others: 1949-72
During the 1950s and 1960s under the Liberal-Country Party governments of Robert
Menzies and his successors, foreign policy was constructed around a number of
conservative assumptions regarding Australia’s place in international system. In the
context of the Cold War, Menzies believed that international politics could be viewed
through the prism of the conflict between global communism on the one side, led by
the Soviet Union and China, and the West on the other, led by the United States. As a
result, Menzies argued that in order to meet this existential threat, Australia would not
only need to rely on its “great and powerful friends” (as he had called them), but that
the central themes of Australian foreign policy should be support and loyalty to the
great protectors. Liberal leaders such as Menzies and Richard Casey comprehensively
rejected the idea of a more independent foreign policy for Australia. Casey went so far
as to claim that “as a government our foreign policy being moulded on that of Great
Britain and arrived at in consultation with her, is the best we can achieve”.22 This
polarised worldview and derivative foreign policy was clearly the source of Australia’s
unswerving support for both Britain during the 1956 Suez crisis and the United States
during the Vietnam War.23
Obviously, Menzies was not an advocate of a particularly activist or independent
role for Australia in world affairs. More importantly, he held sufficient control in
Cabinet over his foreign ministers (Spender, Casey, Barwick and Hasluck) to limit any
significant attempts to progress Evatt’s early lead in that direction. Nonetheless, a
number of statements made by senior ministers during the Menzies period pointed to
the fact that the middle power theme continued to underwrite much of Australia’s post-
war foreign policy orientation. Although Casey’s views very much accorded with
Menzies, Garfield Barwick later readopted Evatt’s middle power concept in describing
Australia’s emerging Asia-policy orientation. In a statement to parliament as Minister
for External Affairs in 1964, Barwick declared:
Australia is a middle power in more senses than one. It is clearly one in the general sense in which
the expression is used. But also it has common interests with both the advanced and the
underdeveloped countries; it stands in point of realized wealth between the haves and the have-
nots. It has a European background and is set in intimate geographical propinquity to Asia [...]
This ambivalence brings some strength and offers promise of a future of which Australia can be
confident, a future of increasing influence. As well, it emphasizes the need to seek and to accept
collective security, with all the compromises which such a course so often entails.24
22 Quoted in Wolfsohn, “Australian Foreign Policy”, p. 71, emphasis added.
23 William Hudson, Blind Loyalty: Australia and the Suez Crisis (Melbourne 1989); Hedley
Bull, “The New Course for Australian Foreign Policy” in Hedley Bull, ed., Asia and the
Western Pacific: Towards a New International Order (Melbourne, 1975), p. 358.
24 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives, 11 March 1964, p.
486.

544 Carl Ungerer
In this way, the middle power concept shifted slightly during the 1960s away from
Evatt’s description of a relative power position in terms of material capabilities and
regional importance, to a more functional description of a mediatory or bridging role in
international politics. This was much more in line with the Canadian doctrine of middle
power diplomacy which was enjoying a revival under the administration of Pierre
Trudeau at the time. Australia’s enhanced cultural diplomacy towards Indonesia, India
and other Asian countries during this period, such as the combined efforts of Radio
Australia and the Department of External Affairs to broadcast news and entertainment
programs to the region, can be seen as a direct product of Barwick’s preferred bridging
role. Consequently, the basic characteristics around which notions of Australia as a
middle power were first constructed under Evatt remained central to Barwick’s
understanding of the concept, including the link between middle power status and
influence in international affairs and the central importance of “soft” cultural
diplomacy to Australia’s broader security interests.
A year later, Paul Hasluck’s first parliamentary speech as External Affairs Minister
was littered with references to “power politics” and the “balance of power”.25 This was
a rather crude and unsophisticated reflection on the dominant strain of international
relations theory. The fact that Hasluck’s period as minister was overshadowed by the
war in Vietnam perhaps clouded his view of Australia’s role in international affairs.
That little else would occupy his time led to the enduring perception of Hasluck as the
great underachiever in the foreign affairs portfolio. Whereas Woodard and Beaumont
found little evidence in their reappraisal of Hasluck’s time as minister that would
link him to Evatt’s or indeed Barwick’s conceptualisation of foreign policy — other
than that he was “a strong nationalist who recognised the significance of Australia’s
geography” — his views were not completely antithetical to the same arguments that
had informed Evatt at San Francisco twenty years earlier.26 In a speech to parliament in
his second year as minister, Hasluck adjusted his hardline approach by incorporating
the middle power theme in the following way:
Australia works for a world order based on the principles and purposes of the United Nations. We
are conscious of the great world issues of power and their interaction with issues of regional
security. We recognise the special responsibilities of the great powers, as the charter of the United
Nations does, but we also insist on a proper role being accorded to the middle and small powers,
which for their part have responsibilities to discharge and rights to be respected.27
It was precisely the same argument that Evatt had made twenty years earlier. Despite
these contradictory strains in Hasluck’s foreign policy pronouncements, however, and
his obvious distaste for Evatt’s previous posturing at the United Nations conference, he
had been a member of the Australian delegation to the San Francisco meeting in 1945
and was undoubtedly influenced by the force of Evatt’s arguments there.28 Indeed,
Hasluck’s articulation of Australia’s rights and responsibilities in international affairs
found concrete expression in the formation of what could be considered one of the first
Asian middle power groupings — the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 1966. In
repeating Barwick’s “bridge” metaphor, Hasluck’s assessment of Australia’s role in
25 CPD (House), 23 March 1965, pp.230-238.
26 Gary Woodard and Joan Beaumont, “Paul Hasluck as Minister for External Affairs:
Towards a Reappraisal”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, 1 (April 1998),
p. 74.
27 CPD (House), 26 March 1968, p. 446.
28 See Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness.

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 545
ASPAC was consistent with classic middle power theory. Hasluck stated: “we in
Australia are in a position to be a bridge between the non-Asian and the Asian […]
Australia, in all its foreign policy is trying most purposefully to perform this role
[…]”.29
The period between the end of Hasluck’s term as minister in February 1969 and the
election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972 was something of a
hiatus in Australian foreign policy. Of the four ministers responsible for the foreign
affairs portfolio30 during this period, not one of them held the job for more than
eighteen months.31 The rapid turnover in both governments and ministers meant that
the ship of state was confined to a predictable and uncontroversial course. Little time or
effort was devoted to developing or reconstructing notions of Australia's place or
position in world affairs. When one minister did seek to chart a slightly different
course, such as Gordon Freeth’s August 1969 parliamentary speech warmly
welcoming the increased Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean region, he
was quickly removed from the portfolio.
Whitlam and Fraser: 1972-83
At first blush it might appear unusual to lump Whitlam and Fraser together in a study
of Australian foreign policy themes, but both leaders pursued similar diplomatic
approaches and methods in the 1970s that demonstrated a high degree of continuity in
Australia’s middle power role. Whitlam’s efforts to craft a more independent line
between the imperatives of the American alliance and the rigidity of Cold War
divisions can be seen as a direct expression of what Evatt, Barwick and Hasluck had all
agreed was the need to balance Australia’s “rights” and “responsibilities” in
international affairs. To be sure, the Whitlam government’s emphasis on closer
relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region was both qualitatively and
quantitatively different from the anti-communist thinking that had dominated the
Menzies period.32 However, the assertion of greater independence and regionalism in
foreign policy were simply consistent with the application of middle power diplomacy
to the changing circumstances of international politics. As decolonisation and détente
came to influence political debates in the 1970s, Whitlam responded by re-adopting the
middle power bridging role that Barwick had alluded to the mid-1960s. Initiatives such
as the formal diplomatic recognition of Communist China in 1973, establishing
relations with the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN and leading the protest against
French nuclear testing in the South Pacific were all part of the broader exercise of
Australia’s enhanced middle power role.
The fact that Malcolm Fraser did not seek to reverse the foreign policies of the
Whitlam government was further evidence that the activist, independent and
internationalist strains of Australia’s middle power diplomacy were broadly accepted
across the political divide. Fraser’s conservative Liberal/National government
continued Whitlam’s emphasis on improving relations with Asia and in some areas,
such as opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa, took Australian policy
29 Cited in David Goldsworthy, Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia,
Volume 1 (Melbourne 2001), p. 281.
30 The ministry was renamed Foreign Affairs in 1970.
31 The ministers were G. Freeth (11 February 1969–12 November 1969); W. McMahon (12
November 1969–22 March 1971); L.H.E. Bury (22 March 1971–2 August 1971); and N.J.I.
Bowen (2 August 1971–5 December 1972).
32 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government (Melbourne 1985), pp. 25-181.

546 Carl Ungerer
further than Whitlam had done. However, this was rare. Fraser’s continuing suspicion
of Soviet communism and the internecine political rivalry with his foreign minister
Andrew Peacock, meant that foreign policy concepts were not developed in any
consistent or comprehensive way during this time.
That said, Fraser himself continued to structure his government’s foreign policy
agenda within the general framework of middle power diplomacy. For example, in his
statement to parliament following the 1981 Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting (CHOGM) in Melbourne and Canberra, Fraser argued that Australia’s
contribution to issues such as the North-South debate was one of an “enlightened and
responsible middle power”.33 For Fraser, CHOGM was one of those multilateral
institutions where small and medium powers could and should exercise a higher degree
of influence over the key issues confronting the international community. And he spent
much of his speech to federal parliament emphasising this point.
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that it was a conservative foreign minister and
not the Labor party who chose to readopt the middle power label in the public
discourse about Australian foreign policy in the early 1980s. In a statement to
parliament in 1981, Foreign Minister Tony Street outlined his version of Australia’s
diplomatic style in the following terms:
The much tighter integration of the international community, the gradual recognition of
interdependence and the emergence of institutions to manage it, the development of Australia
itself, changes in our region — all these have moved us rapidly to the stage where Australia is now
a significant middle power with a range and depth of relations comparable to any country, other
than a handful of great powers [...] In its role as a middle power, Australia needs a foreign policy
which encompasses not just bilateral relations but the multilateral diplomacy of international
organisations and blocs of countries acting together.34
The extent to which Street’s conceptualisation of Australia’s role as a middle power
was a product of an agreed Cabinet position or simply the foreign minister acting alone
remains unclear. One suspects that Fraser was aware of the contents of the speech (it
was Street’s first major ministerial statement to parliament) and that the Liberal and
National parties supported the general thrust of the arguments it contained. It is
interesting because the middle power concept was so central to Street’s understanding
of foreign policy. Not since Evatt had left the portfolio in 1949 had notions of middle
power status and diplomacy been used so prominently to describe Australia’s emerging
role in international affairs. Two years later, the Coalition government was ejected
from office and remained in opposition for 13 years. Street’s enthusiasm for Australia’s
middle power credentials is even more interesting, therefore, given that the next time a
conservative government was elected to power in Canberra, the middle power concept
would be so thoroughly rejected.
Hawke, Hayden, Keating and Evans: 1983-96
Bill Hayden’s tenure as foreign minister (1983-88) is remembered as one of heightened
diplomatic activity but limited success in the pursuit of a more fiercely independent
foreign policy for Australia.35 Hayden did not seek to invoke the middle power
framework of previous ministers on a regular basis and, despite the obvious similarities
with Evatt’s sense of active internationalism, there was no attempt to systematically
33 CPD (House), 13 October 1981, p. 1891.
34 CPD (House), 24 March 1981, pp.829-30.
35 Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, p. 30.

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 547
apply the middle power concept to the range of initiatives he undertook in the mid-
1980s. Hayden has since made it clear, however, that he did not reject the idea that
Australia was a middle power — he simply did not use the term in the day-to-day
conduct of foreign policy.36
Nonetheless, the middle power bridging role alluded to by his conservative
predecessors provided a conceptual framework that Hayden believed he could employ.
Hayden’s November 1984 disarmament initiative, in which he personally intervened to
bring US and Soviet negotiators together for nuclear arms control talks, was consistent
with a middle power approach to Cold War power politics.37 Following Pierre
Trudeau’s “peace initiative” a year earlier, the Australian government during the 1980s
was looking for opportunities to engage in nuclear disarmament debates. Although
unable to stray very far from the orbit of US strategic guarantees and therefore
ultimately unsuccessful, Hayden’s diplomatic efforts to bring Washington and Moscow
closer together reflected the activist and internationalist strains of Australia’s middle
power diplomacy.
When Evans took over the foreign affairs portfolio from Hayden in September 1988,
he brought a lawyer’s mindset to the job, and sought to establish new conceptual
frameworks and predictable patterns of behaviour in foreign policy. “His mind craves
structures” was a common refrain in the hallways of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade at the time. Somewhat surprisingly, therefore, Evans’s early statements on
foreign policy did not incorporate the middle power theme in any consistent way. But
as the collapse of the Cold War structures in 1990-91 opened up greater opportunities
for middle powers to play a more assertive role in international relations, Evans seized
the chance to provide a more solid conceptual basis for the conduct of Australian
foreign policy.
Recognising this fact, a number of scholarly publications sought to relocate the
middle power concept in the changed circumstances of international politics.38 Partly
on the basis of this new thinking and the history of Labor party traditions, Evans
weaved together the main threads of Australia’s middle power diplomacy into an
overarching conceptual framework for the conduct of Australia’s post-Cold War
foreign policy. In his book Australia’s Foreign Relations, co-written with Bruce Grant,
Evans spelt out in some detail his own characterisation of Australia’s middle power
role:
The characteristic method of middle power diplomacy is coalition building with ‘like-minded’
countries. It also usually involves ‘niche’ diplomacy, which means concentrating resources in
specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field.
By definition, middle powers are not powerful enough in most circumstances to impose their will,
but they may be persuasive enough to have like-minded others see their point of view, and to act
accordingly.39
This reinvigorated notion of middle power diplomacy was used by Evans as the
conceptual basis for Australia’s diplomatic responses to the uncertainties and
opportunities of the post-Cold War world. In areas as diverse as agricultural exports
(the Cairns Group), chemical and biological export controls (the Australia Group) and
36 Interview with Bill Hayden, 20 July 1995, Brisbane.
37 Paul Malone, “Hayden’s arms talks plan poll coup”, The Canberra Times, 22 November
1984, p. 1.
38 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers.
39 Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, p. 344.

548 Carl Ungerer
regional peace-keeping (the Cambodian Peace Plan), Australia sought to apply the
multilateral, coalition-building method of diplomacy to the full range of foreign policy
interests. Moreover, the application of middle power diplomacy provided Australia
with sufficient “weight” that it was often seeking to “punch above” its class in
international forums. In doing so, Australia established a reputation as a competent,
creative and above all, active member of the international community. Viewed in
terms of the nationalist, internationalist and activist strains that Evatt first applied
to the concept, Australia’s middle power status reached a high point in the mid-1990s.
In sum, the immediate post-war period established the central tenets of Australia’s
middle power diplomacy from which all subsequent governments have taken their cue.
For Evatt and others at the San Francisco conference, the middle powers were those
states who had fought alongside the Great Power allies and who had made a
demonstrable commitment to the war effort. Being a middle power was a function of
relative military capabilities — sufficient to warrant inclusion in the post-war peace
negotiations, but clearly not as significant when compared to the overwhelming
military resources of the great powers. But as the nature of power and leadership
became more diffuse throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the middle power term came to
represent one of several typologies in discussions on Australian foreign policy: a
mediatory position in the inter-bloc system (between the superpowers); a moral or
normative strain in foreign policy (a bridge between the North and South or between
Asia and the West); and finally, a description of certain diplomatic behaviour
(multilateral coalition-building). It was this last notion of middle power diplomacy — a
brand of statecraft that blended both the quantitative and qualitative attributes of
Australia’s position in international affairs — that Evans sought to reinvigorate as the
guiding principle of foreign policy decision-making during the late 1980s and early
1990s.
Although the concept has undergone various revisions and reconstructions in the
sixty years since Evatt first employed the term, its core elements — nationalism,
internationalism and activism — have remained constant reference points in the
understanding of Australia’s diplomatic position and behaviour, regardless of which
political party has held power in Canberra. That this has been the case reflects the
broad political consensus around notions of Australia as a middle power in the
international system, and the diplomatic style that follows, among both Labor and
non-Labor governments. Moreover, it is this political consensus that has contributed, in
part, to the general interpretation of Australian foreign policy as essentially a bipartisan
endeavour.
From Middle Power to Pivotal Power
At the 1996 federal election campaign the Liberal/National Coalition under John
Howard distanced itself from notions of middle power diplomacy and the emphasis on
multilateral methods which underpinned that concept. In a speech to the Young
Liberals’ Convention in February 1996, the then shadow foreign affairs minister,
Alexander Downer, claimed that the middle power concept was a self-imposed
limitation on the role that Australia could expect to play in international affairs.
Australia, he said, was “much more than a middle power”.40
In what was an unusual circumstance for a federal election campaign in Australia,
foreign policy featured relatively high on the political agenda in 1996. Both the
40 A. Downer, “Australia: Much more than a middle power”, speech to the Young Liberals’
Convention, Adelaide, 8 February 1996, (mimeo from the Minister’s office), p. 3.

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 549
Keating Labor government and the Coalition opposition were keen to draw attention to
perceived policy differences and their respective foreign policy credentials. In an
explicit effort to differentiate itself from the established mould of Labor diplomacy, the
Coalition expressed its discontent with the notion of Australia as a middle power.
Downer argued that the middle power label was anathema to Australia’s “unique” role
in world affairs. In particular, the Coalition was critical of Evans’s high-profile
approach to regional initiatives under the banner of middle power diplomacy and his
seemingly uncritical faith in the United Nations system. Downer argued his case in the
following terms:
To say Australia is a middle power implies we are merely similar to a multitude of other countries,
a mediocre power defined only by the size of our population. Worse, it suggests we are helplessly
wedged between big and small powers with very little role to play. This sells us short and
overlooks the rich potential that Australia has to play a vital role in the world […] I do not accept
Australia as merely a middle power. Rather, I believe Australia is a ‘pivotal’ power.
Despite Downer’s limited explanation of the “pivotal power” thesis, there were faint
echoes to Barwick’s use of the middle power label some thirty years earlier — that is,
as an economic and security “link” between developed and developing countries.41 The
fact that the two concepts were similar only reinforced the argument that, regardless of
the label, Australian foreign policy demonstrated a consistency of styles and
approaches irrespective of political stewardship.
But switching labels was only part of the story. The Howard government also set
about changing the form and focus of Australian diplomacy with the publication of the
first White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy in August 1997.42 Echoing some of
Downer’s comments before the election, the White Paper, titled In the National
Interest, declared that foreign policy was not a matter of “grand constructs”. It
continued:
A central feature of the Government's approach to foreign and trade policy is the importance it
places on bilateral relationships as a means of advancing Australia's interests [...] Australia must
be realistic about what multilateral institutions such as the United Nations system can deliver.43
This subtle shift away from multilateralism to bilateralism as the main arena for the
future conduct of Australia’s diplomacy represented a conscious downgrading of the
middle power credentials that Evatt, Evans and others had sought to build for Australia.
Conservative governments in Australia have often been uneasy with the liberal
internationalist tones that the middle power label evokes, but it was not since Hasluck
that such a self-conscious effort had been made to construct foreign policy around such
“realist” assumptions. Although the initial focus of the Howard government was on
consistency and indeed “bipartisanship” in foreign policy, the new government made it
very clear that they were not interested in pursuing middle power multilateralism as a
foundation for Australia’s role in international affairs. In keeping with this new
approach, the government reduced financial and human resources for multilateral
diplomacy as part of successive budgetary cuts to the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade.44
41 Ibid., p. 6.
42 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest (Canberra, 1997).
43 Ibid., p. iii.
44 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Corporate Plan 2000-2002, p. 15 for a summary of
staffing reductions over the previous five years.

550 Carl Ungerer
The Howard government argued that the new bilateralism was about strengthening
key relationships, but the Keating government was doing this anyway through
initiatives such as the 1995 Australia-Indonesia security agreement. More importantly,
the White Paper was driven by a perceived political imperative to distance Coalition
foreign policy from the triumphant “middlepowerism” that Evans and Keating had
attempted to promote for Australia. But the Howard government’s shift from middle
power multilateralism to pivotal power bilateralism had quite a different effect from
the one intended. While at the popular level it achieved the desired objective of
providing a basic political distinction between Labor and Coalition foreign policy
objectives in the heat of an electoral contest, it undercut the real reason why foreign
policy was considered traditionally bipartisan: that is, the deeper political agreement
over Australia’s place and position on the world stage.
As a result of the Howard government’s ambivalence towards the middle power
concept and the rejection of Labor’s “grand constructs”, Australian foreign policy since
1996 has drifted with little or no sense of its own conceptual foundations. In fact, the
pivotal power thesis has not been repeated by either Howard or Downer. The irony of
the Howard government’s rejection of the middle power concept, of course, is that the
major foreign and security policy challenges confronting Australia in the post-9/11
world have all required a stronger coalition-building approach. These diplomatic
challenges have included: bringing the South Pacific Forum countries together in 2003
for the regional assistance mission to the Solomon Islands; constructing the
proliferation security initiative to deal with the threat of a nuclear North Korea; and,
most importantly, participating in the global response to Islamist terrorism. Indeed, at
the same time Australia was rejecting the idea (if not the practice) of coalition-building
diplomacy with like-minded countries, the United States recognised that the world
would require more not less of this type of diplomatic activity. In his assessment of the
main undercurrents of US grand strategy in the Bush Administration, the former US
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has described the necessary approach as a “strategy of
partnerships”.45
Conclusion: The Future of Middle Power Diplomacy?
Given that foreign policy and diplomacy are often just a reaction to external events and
crises, it is tempting to view the history of Australia’s external affairs as a series of ad
hoc and incremental policy responses based on some generic calculation of the
structure of the international system and the pursuit of national interests. Such a
rendering of Australia’s diplomatic history, however, would need to ignore the
emergence of the middle power concept as a common and central theme in Australian
diplomatic practice. However tempting that might be, the historical record suggests
otherwise. Despite frequent changes in political leadership, the post-war evolution of
Australian diplomacy produced a number of recurring patterns of foreign policy
consistent with middle power behaviour: independence of action within alliance
responsibilities; pragmatic approaches to regional engagement with Asia; and a focus
on pursuing political outcomes that benefited the international community as a whole.
Both Labor and Liberal governments described this general approach to foreign policy
as middle power diplomacy. As a result, the middle power concept is perhaps the
closest that Australia has ever come to articulating a self-conscious theory of foreign
policy.
45 Colin Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, 1 (January/February
2004), pp. 22-34.

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy 551
Although difficult to pinpoint at times, there is a discernible Australian “style” in
foreign relations. According to J.D.B. Miller, this diplomatic style encompasses a
range of elements including practicality, an emphasis on legalism, and, in Miller’s own
words, a “dogged low gear idealism”.46 This ongoing sense of practical realism, or
“enlightened self-interest” as Gareth Evans had called it, has found expression in an
approach to international affairs that favours international law over the exercise of raw
national power, and, perhaps most importantly, one which promotes a constant
advocacy for the rights of small and medium-sized powers in the international
system.47 In subscribing to this diplomatic approach, successive Australian
governments, both Labor and Liberal, have constructed a foreign policy that is both
realist and idealist at the same time. I argue that among these core ingredients in the
conduct of foreign policy and statecraft has been the expression of Australia’s role as
an active, independent and internationalist middle power. Although imprecise,
inconsistent and sometimes malleable in the hands of various political leaders since
1945, the middle power concept has provided the one and perhaps only consistent
framework for the conduct of Australian diplomacy.
This analysis suggests that John Ravenhill was correct when he identified the
inherently cyclical nature of middle power diplomacy.48 Australian governments since
the mid-1940s have at various times and to varying degrees supported the notion of
Australia as a middle power. As this paper notes, it has been one of the most enduring
themes in Australian foreign policy discourse for over sixty years. For policy
practitioners and politicians alike, Australia’s middle power role and status has been a
general guide to the conduct of external relations. But being an active, independent,
internationalist middle power is about political choice. Governments can choose to
employ their diplomatic resources in a variety of ways. At the end of the day, Australia
is still a middle power. Whether or not that status is used in a positive and constructive
way depends ultimately on what governments in Canberra seek to do with it.
46 J.D.B. Miller, “The Conduct of Australian Foreign Policy”, The Australian University (Canberra,
1969), p. 4. Miller argued tha t Australia’s foreign policy identity co uld assume one of three
main typologies: a small power amongst other small powers; the subservient client of a great
power; or a trusted and skilled diplomatic “go-between”. His clear preference was for
Australia to assume the third of these typologies.
47 Trood, “Australian Diplomatic Practice”, p. 101.
48 John Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Aust ralia n and
Canadian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, 3 (November
1998), pp. 309-327.