The admissibility of offender profiling in courtroom: A review of legal issues and court opinions

Abstract

What is the future of Offender Profiling? Is it an important field of forensic science or is it only a glamorous art? After the trilogy "Daubert-Joiner-Kumho" and after the last version, in 2009, of the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.), the opinion of American Courts concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence has changed, and the questions above can now have new answers. The change is closely tied to the perceived difference between hard and soft sciences and, in this way, the new gatekeeping role of the Courts also concerns whether offender profiling can be regarded as scientific evidence and if offender profiling should be admitted in the Courtroom as scientific evidence. In this work we present a comprehensive review concerning the most important Court opinions in U.S.A, U.K., Canada and Australia, about reliability and admissibility of offender profiling, in its different forensic application, as scientific evidence, and we suggest how and when an expert witness in the field of offender profiling can, in the light of these opinions, be admitted in Court.

Full text

The admissibility of offender profiling in courtroom: A review of legal issues and
court opinions
Dario Bosco
a,
⁎, Angelo Zappalà
a,b
, Pekka Santtila
b
a
Centre of Forensic Science, Turin, Italy
b
Åbo Akademi University, Åbo (Turku), Finland
abstractarticle info
Keywords:
Offender profiling and crime linking
Expert psychological testimony
Legal and court psychology
What is the future of Offender Profiling? Is it an important field of forensic science or is it only a glamorous
art?
After the trilogy “Daubert–Joiner–Kumho”and after the last version, in 2009, of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(F.R.E.), the opinion of American Courts concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence has changed, and
the questions above can now have new answers. The change is closely tied to the perceived difference
between hard and soft sciences and, in this way, the new gatekeeping role of the Courts also concerns
whether offender profiling can be regarded as scientific evidence and if offender profiling should be admitted
in the Courtroom as scientific evidence.
In this work we present a comprehensive review concerning the most important Court opinions in U.S.A, U.K.,
Canada and Australia, about reliability and admissibility of offender profiling, in its different forensic
application, as scientific evidence, and we suggest how and when an expert witness in the field of offender
profiling can, in the light of these opinions, be admitted in Court.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In 1993 the Federal Court of the United States of America was
charged of the case regarding minors Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller.
Reading the core of the “Daubert opinion”; according to Giannelli
(2006b), we can say that the new requirements for the admissibility
of the scientific evidence can be resumed in the following focal points:
1. Reliability. The Daubert Test requires that the methodology and the
theories used must be tested and reliable. The Court, in the opinion
explicitly refers to two scientists and to their theorems, Popper and
Hempel.
2. Peer review and scientific publication. The second evaluation of the
Daubert Test is to verify if the theories that are offered by an expert
witness have previously been published or submitted to the
scientific community for reference, what the scientific community
call peer review.
3. Error rate. The third evaluation to be completed for establishing the
admissibility of an expert witness is the fact that the expert is able
to offer to the Court the potential rate of error of his theory or
methodology.
4. General acceptance. Naturally the Court was forced to make a clear
reference to the general acceptance test, having expressly been
invested for solving the problem about if the Frye test could be
considered applicable. With regard to this matter, the judgment
specifies that the general acceptance from the scientific community
cannot be read like a precondition for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
5. Standard. The Court identifies also the existence and the respect of
standards known and recognized for the procedure and the
methodology adopted in the expert opinion.
6. Applicability to the concrete case (Fit). Finally, the method or the
theory to be scientifically reliable must be fit to the concrete case
and must be logically linked to it.
After the Daubert opinion the Supreme Court, in General Elec. Co. V.
Joiner. 522 U.S. 136, 1997 and in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. V.
Carmichael. 526, U.S.137, 1999, was charged of the problem related to
the object of this article that is if, how and when the Daubert
1
Test
must be and can be applied to soft sciences and to the witness
indicated in the F.R.E. 702
2
. The central point of the opinions clarifies
that the Courts, in their gate keeping role regarding the admissibility
of scientific opinions, should apply the principles pointed out by the
Daubert Test for all expert witness and types of scientific evidence.
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191
⁎Corresponding author. Via F. Palizzi, 75. 80127 Napoli, Italy.
E-mail address: dario_bosco@fastwebnet.it (D. Bosco).
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S 579. 1993.
2
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidenceor to determine a factin issue, a witnessqualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.(F.R.E. 702, 2009).
0160-2527/$ –see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2010.03.009
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry

So, after the trilogy “Daubert, Joiner
3
, Kumho
4
”and after the new
version, in 2009, of the Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 702, the
opinion of the Courts concerning the admissibility of scientific
evidence has changed. The change is closely tied to the perceived
difference between hard and soft science and, in this way, a new issue
for the Courts is whether offender profiling is scientific evidence and if
offender profiles should be admitted in the Courtroom as scientific
evidence.
Between the end of 1980's and the beginning of 1990's, offender
profiling has been presented as forensic evidence in a number of
cases; some prosecutors as well as some defendants have called into
the Courtroom criminologists, psychiatrists, psychologists and F.B.I.
special agents as experts in the field of offender profiling and in the
field of crime scene analysis. The Courts' opinions have been applied
to three specific types of offender profiling evidence: motivational
analysis, modus operandi evidence, and linkage analysis.
–Motivational analysis usually refers to a situation where an expert
offers an opinion regarding the motivation underlying a particular
crime through an analysis of the crime scene.
–Modus operandi or profile evidence refers to a situation where an
expert offers an opinion regarding if a certain type of behavior
committed by the offender is compatible with a particular type of a
person.
–Linkage analysis refers to a situation where an expert offers an
opinion regarding if two or more crimes have been committed by
the same person by analyzing the cases, more specifically the
crime scenes, the modus operandi, the characteristics of the victim
and so called signature behaviors.
Through these three types of consultations offender profiling has
been introduced as evidence in Court. In the present article, we aimed
to verify how and when this type of expertise has been admitted into
Courts and if there is any change in the admissibility decisions, in this
field of forensic science, after the Daubert trilogy. Below, we present a
review of how American Courts have argued in regard of these three
forensic applications of offender profiling quoting some of the most
meaningful opinions in this forensic field.
2. The review of American court opinions.
2.1. Motivational analysis
An interesting opinion concerning the admissibility of Motiva-
tional Analysis in Simmons v. State (709 So. 2d 1134. Ala.1999). The
defendant Clarence Simmons was accused of having killed an elderly
woman in Alabama in such an extremely violent and eccentric
manner that the F.B.I. had also been involved in the investigation
through one of their profilers. Although there was no doubt on the fact
that Simmons was guilty, there was no direct physical evidence
showing that the homicide would have been perpetrated with sexual
motivation and during an attempted rape and sadistic attack.
To prove the motivation the prosecutor decided to refer to the
Behavioral Unit of the F.B.I., which provided the advice of a special
agent who testified that the murder was sex-related. Simmons's
appeal was based on claiming that the first degree Court had made a
mistake in allowing the special agent to testify on the sex motivation
of the crime. The Court of Appeal justified its decision with regard to
the matter as follows:
Initially, we find it imperative to note that the evidence offered
through expert testimony was not “profile”testimony. “Profile”
evidence attempts to link the general characteristics of serial
murderers to specific characteristics of the defendant. Expert
testimony did not accuse Simmons of committing the crime. The
testimony concentrated on his opinion of what the crime scene and
the physical condition of M.A.'s body suggested happened during the
murder. There is an enormous difference in testimony identifying a
person who bears certain characteristics as being more likely to have
committed the offense and in testimony that the physical evidence of
a crime indicates certain characteristics about the offense. […]
Therefore, with the principles enunciated in Daubert and Kumho in
mind, we must determine whether the fields of victimology and
crime-scene analysis constitute reliable specialized knowledge;
whether the F.B.I. agent is an expert within these fields; and whether
the subject matter of his testimony is relevant and assists the trier of
fact in this case.
[…]
F.B.I. agent testified that he had been
investigating homicide crime scenes for approximately 20 years
and that he had extensive experience. […] He detailed the theories
supporting crime scene analysis and victimology, the way the
specialized knowledge was applied in this particular case and the
factors considered in reaching his determination. […] We note that
experienced officers are qualified to give their opinion regarding their
field of expertise. Thus, we conclude that the expert testimony
adequately established that crime-scene analysis and victimology are
reliable fields of specialized knowledge and that, based upon his
studies and experiences in these fields, he was an expert […].
Additionally, we must determine the relevance of the evidence and its
ability to assist the jury. […] The state was required to prove that
Simmons subjected M.A. to sexual contact by forcible compulsion.
[…] Whether the offender received sexual gratification while
committing the offense was a critical issue of the case, and expert's
testimony was probative on that issue. The expert offered observa-
tions of the crime scene and the elderly female victim that would
assist the jury in evaluating the circumstances surrounding the
murder and the reasons for the method employed by the offender. We
conclude that, the trial court did not err in admitting expert
testimony because the jury would be greatly assisted by a
professional analysis of the crime scene in comparison to other
murder cases. [Post Daubert —Admitted.].
In 2002 the Supreme Court of Tennessee gave an opinion in the
case State v. Stevens. (Tennessee, Supreme Court, 78 S.W. 3d 817.
2002 Tenn.). The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County
jury of hiring eighteen-year-old Corey Milliken to murder his wife,
Sandra Jean Stevens, and his mother-in-law, Myrtle Wilson. The
defendant retained a crime scene expert to conduct a crime scene
analysis to determine the motive for the crime. The expert described
the murder as disorganized sexual homicide. After classifying this
crime scene in disorganized/sexual crime scene, he compared this to a
contract murder crime scene, that is the charge, to underline all the
difference between the two types of homicide.
The Supreme Court decided that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting the testimony of the defendant's crime scene
expert to his analysis of the evidence at the crime scene. The Supreme
Court justified its decision in the following way:
The defense offered an expert witness to prove that Milliken
committed sexually motivated murder as a violent response to a fight
with his mother and stepfather just hours before the crime. The expert
testified that he had worked as a special agent for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for approximately twenty-five years, and he served
his last ten years with the FBI in the Behavioral Science Unit. He explained
that the FBI used criminal investigative analysis to discern the probable
motive of the criminal by analyzing the evidence found at the crime scene
“primarily from a behavioral perspective”. Based on his review of this
evidence, the expert categorized the crime scene in this case as a
“disorganized sexual homicide scene”and he testified that criminals
usually commit disorganized violent crimes as a result of some
“precipitating stresser, [or] stressful event”in the criminal's life. […]
185D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191
3
General Elec. Co. V. Joiner.522 U.S. 136. 1997.
4
Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. V. Carmichael. Supreme Court of U.S.A. 1999, 526, U.S.137.

Also he testified that the perpetrator in this case spent a fair amount of
time at the crime scene “trashing”the place to make it look like a burglary
or a “for profit”motive. […] In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), the United
States Supreme court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a
“gatekeeping”obligation on the trial court to “ensure that any and all
scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.”The trial court
correctly reasoned that such nonscientific testimony must still meet the
fundamental requirements of relevance and reliability. In this case, the
trial court found that expert's testimony failed to pass the test of scientific
reliability. In resolving the evidentiary issue before us, the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 147, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999), provides useful
guidance, because the Court concluded that when assessing the reliability
of nonscientific expert testimony, the trial court may consider the
Daubert factors. Turning to the facts in this case, we cannot conclude that
the trial court erred in refusing to admit the expert opinion. We do not
doubt the usefulness of behavioral analysis to assist law enforcement
officials in their criminal investigations, we cannot allow an individual's
guilt or innocence to be determined by such “opinion evidence connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit”of the expert. Moreover, we find
that the FBI's study revealing a seventy-five to eighty percent accuracy
rate for crime scene analysis lacks sufficient trustworthiness to constitute
evidence of this technique's reliability. Although the frequency with
which a technique leads to accurate or erroneous results is certainly one
important factor to determine reliability, equally important is the method
for determining that rate of accuracy or error. In this case, there is no
testimony regarding how the FBI determined the accuracy rate of this
analysis. Therefore, because the behavioral analysis portion of expert's
testimony does not bear sufficient indicia of reliability to substantially
assist the Trier of fact, we conclude that this testimony was properly
excluded. [Post Daubert. Excluded.].
In 2002, the Court of Appeal of Ohio give an opinion involving an
expert witness in crime scene analysis and profiling in the case State v.
Garcia. (2002 4179; Ohio App.). Angela Garcia, appealed her
convictions by a jury on two counts of aggravated murder, two
counts of murder and three counts of aggravated arson. At trial, Garcia
maintained the fire was accidental and that she tried to save her girls,
but could not because of the fire's intensity. One of arguments behind
the appeal was that the trial Court would have made an error when it
allowed a “crime scene analyst”to testify about the motivation of the
crime based on the crime scene analysis, and to provide opinions
tantamount to “profiling”for consideration by the jury.
The Court of Appeal wrote:
In the case at bar, we first note that neither McCrary nor Saunders
testified about anything other than the charge of arson. McCrary
testified the fire was arson and Saunders testified that Garcia had a
financial motive for committing arson. McCrary testified that though
he regards himself as a criminal profiler, his role in the case at bar
was to provide an expert opinion based upon his criminal
investigative analysis of the evidence in the case. McCrary stated
that he became experienced in crime scene analysis during his
25 years with the FBI. McCrary admitted that he is not an arson
expert. McCrary listed the items he reviewed before reaching his
conclusions about the fire. When asked to proffer his opinion about
what type of arson had been committed in this case, McCrary offered
the following testimony: “when we look at all the totality of the
circumstances, in my opinion it looks more like positioning one's self
for potential insurance fraud”. Saunders testified that he is a forensic
auditor and that in that capacity, he reviews information to
determine whether there is a financial motive for the commission
of a particular crime. Saunders told the jury that, based upon his
review of Garcia's financial situation before the fire, he believed that
she “did have a financial motive”to commit arson. According to
Garcia, McCrary's and Saunder's testimony was highly improper
because they should not have been qualified as experts nor allowed
to invade the province of the jury by stating that it was arson for
profit and that Garcia had a financial motive for setting the fire. These
conclusions belong to the jury and only the jury. We agree such
testimony improperly invaded the jury's province. We must conclude,
therefore, that McCrary's and Saunders' testimony was improperly
admitted. [Post Daubert —Excluded.].
2.2. Modus operandi or profile evidence
The first case concerning Modus Operandi or Profile Evidence that
we will consider refers to 1993 and is State v. Roquemore (85 Ohio
App. 3d 448. 620 N.E. 2d 110). Defendant–appellant, Dennis
Roquemore, appealed his convictions in the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas of two counts of rape and one count of involuntary
manslaughter. In this case the expert was admitted to testify as
criminal profiling. His expert opinion is about the motivation of the
rape. The expert classified the crime scene as disorganized, and he
described the rape as an anger–retaliatory rape. Defendant raised five
incidents of error one of which was as follows: “The trial court
committed reversible error and deprived appellant of due process of
law by permitting introduction of inadmissible opinion testimony by a
criminal profiler.”
The Court so decided:
The prosecution's expert witness testified about a crime scene
assessment and the witness concluded that this crime scene fell into
patterns of known violent behaviour that he had studied in the past.
The purpose of the testimony was to render an opinion given the
crime assessment. The prosecution argued that this testimony was
necessary to rebut the defense argument that a rape did not occur.
The witness testified as a “profilist.”He described “profiling”as:
basically a method of examination which looks at the issue of motive.
It ties to crime assessment[…][…]“From that crime behaviour then
and that assessment, then one, again using probability, looks at the
issues of the type of person and/or situation of which the crime was
committed.”The “crime scene assessment”then involves an analysis
of whether the crime scene falls into patterns of “known”violent
behaviour that the witness claims to have studied in the past and, if
so, identifying and labelling such behaviour. The witness testified that
the crime scene was “disorganized”[…] The witness classified this
case as fitting into an anger retaliatory type of motivational structure
pattern.Not only does the evidence need to be reliable in order to be
admissible, it must also be helpful to the trier of fact. In this case,
there is a distinct possibility of stereotyping the defendant. The
witness testified only concerning the “typical”crime scene pattern
and the “typical”violence associated with such a crime scene. The
witness did not interview or evaluate the defendant or “profile”a
specific person. He profiles for a type of person who would do a
particular crime that has been assessed. Although relevant, evidence
is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of
misleading the jury. […]. This witness testified about only the
generalities and these generalities and typical facts rather than
specific facts tend to place the defendant into a stereotype. […]This
type of character evidence is inadmissible at least unless the
defendant has first put his character at issue and probably not even
then. Since admission of the opinion evidence was prejudicial error,
defendant's first assignment of error is well taken. [Post Daubert.
Excluded.].
In 2006 the 4th Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeal of the United
States give an opinion in the case U.S.A. v. Thomas III ( CCB-03-0150.
2006 U.S. Dist. Maryland), in relation to the admissibility of two
different expert opinion, the first related to an evaluation by a forensic
psychiatrist and the second one by a profiler or forensic psychologist.
186 D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191

The Court opinion was:
The United States charged Gordon Elliott Thomas, III with sexual
exploitation of a child and the receipt and possession of child
pornography and moved for his pre-trial detention, on the grounds
that the charged offenses are crimes of violence, as defined by
Congress, and that no conditions of release could reasonably assure
the safety of the community. The ruling is on the testimony of the two
experts presented, Dr. Neil Blumberg and Supevisory Special Agent
James Clemente. The government did not specifically challenge the
bases of Dr. Blumberg's opinions, or even generally question the
utility of psychiatric evaluation as a tool for assessing the defendant's
future dangerousness. In the instant case, the court found Dr.
Blumberg's opinion reliable for the following reasons. First, a review
of Dr. Blumberg's curriculum vitae, revealed that he was eminently
qualified as an expert in forensic criminal psychiatry. Second, Dr.
Blumberg conducted a standard forensic psychiatric evaluation. Thus,
the court found Dr. Blumberg's opinions reliable. Next the court
assessed the testimony of the government's expert. The court
recognized that SSA James Clemente had certain expertise in criminal
investigative analysis regarding the characteristics and behavioral
patterns of child sex offenders, based on specialized knowledge. In
contrast to Dr. Blumberg's opinion, however, the court found SSA
Clemente's methodology in reaching his conclusion that there was a
“high”risk that Mr. Thomas would re-offend if released pending trial
insufficiently reliable. First, SSA Clemente was unable to demonstrate
that his risk assessment methodology had been (or could be) tested.
Moreover, the typology of a preferential sex offender, to which SSA
Clemente repeatedly referred as the foundation of his analysis,
apparently was based entirely on anecdotal case studies and
interviews. SSA Clemente was unable to offer even any retrospective
studies establishing the validity of this typology. SSA Clemente
therefore acknowledged that his opinions were based on anecdotal
case studies and interviews, and lacked an empirical basis. Failure to
satisfy four out of the five Daubert factors, and most of the less
rigorous criteria sometimes applied in the social science context,
combined with a lack of any other persuasive indicia of reliability,
forced the court to conclude that the principles and methods
underlying SSA Clemente's opinions were insufficiently reliable. The
government's motion for detention was denied. [Post Daubert.
Excluded in part and Admitted in part.].
2.3. Linkage analysis, signature and profile evidence
The first case related to linkage analysis, we will take into
consideration will be Pennell v. State (602 A.2d 48. Del 1991).
Defendant was convicted by jury in the Superior Court, New Castle
County, of two counts of first degree murder, and two life sentences
were imposed. The defendant appealed. […] F.B.I. agent was allowed
to testify as an expert on serial murders. The appellant, Steven B.
Pennell, was indicted and tried on three counts of first degree murder.
The State claimed that these were “serial”murders. Pennell was
convicted on two of those counts, but the jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the third count. The jury imposed two life sentences on the
defendant. Agent John Douglas, Director of the F.B.I.'s Behavioral
Science Unit, testified as an expert in the area of serial murders. After
reviewing the deaths of Ellis, Di Mauro and Gordon, he opined that
they were all committed by the same person.
The Court opinion was:
Pennell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
F.B.I. Agent Douglas to testify as an expert on serial murders. He
contends that this was not the proper subject of expert testimony.
Pennell's attempt to apply the Frye test and its progeny to Agent
Douglas' testimony is misplaced. Those cases concern the relia-
bility, accuracy and admissibility of certain scientific tests. See, e.g.,
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.App.1923) (lie-detector
test). Agent Douglas, on the other hand, was providing an expert
opinion based upon his knowledge and experience in the field of
crime analysis. This Court has held that when an expert's opinion is
based solely upon his own knowledge and experience, the Frye test
has no application. The admissibility of Agent Douglas' opinion,
therefore, is governed by Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 (“Rule
702”). This Court has held that knowledge is “specialized”only when
not possessed by the average Trier of fact. Douglas' extensive
experience with signature crimes and crime analysis was specialized,
and if accepted by the jury, could be helpful to it in understanding
behaviour unknown to the general public. In addition, Agent Douglas
was unquestionably qualified as an expert. Accordingly, the trial
court properly found his testimony to be admissible opinion
testimony under Rule 702. Also, the trial court permitted Agent
Douglas to testify as to the “signature”aspects of the crime, but
would not allow the introduction of “profile”evidence. “Profile”
evidence is that which attempts to link the general characteristics of
serial murderers to specific characteristics of the defendant. Such
evidence is of little probative value and extremely prejudicial to the
defendant. Defendant argues that Douglas' testimony that the
perpetrator was “not youthful”impermissibly implicated Pennell,
who then was 32 years old. Upon examining the context of the
comment, however, we are satisfied that Douglas' statement was not
improper. The word “Youthful”was in reference to the criminal
experience of the perpetrator rather than his age. Thus, under all of
the circumstances we are satisfied that Douglas did not impermis-
sibly interject “profile”evidence into the case. [Pre-Daubert.
Admitted. Not discussing in reliability].
In 1994 the Court of Appeal of Washington State gave an opinion in
the case State v. Russell (882 p.2d, 747. Wash. 1994). George W.
Russell was convicted by a King County jury of the first degree murder
and the aggravated first degree murders. The fourth issue the
Defendant raised in his appeal was whether the trial court erred in
admitting expert testimony regarding the rarity of posed murder
victims. At issue here are references made by John Douglas and Robert
Keppel to the HITS and VICAP computer programs during their
testimony regarding the rarity of posing. These programs use forms,
filled out by local law enforcement officers, listing the various
characteristics of homicides in Washington and the nation respec-
tively. The trial court found that the expert testimony referring to HITS
and VICAP did not involve novel scientific evidence and was,
therefore, subject only to the requirements of F.R.E. 702.
The Court opinion was the following:
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that both Keppel and Douglas
were widely recognized as authorities in crime scene analysis. Both
men have extensive experience in serial crime analysis and
investigation. The court then found that their testimony would not
involve the application of a new scientific technique and that a Frye
hearing was unnecessary. We agree with the trial court that the Frye
test clearly was inapplicable to the expert testimony regarding the
HITS and VICAP programs. These programs are nothing more than
sophisticated record-keeping systems. The court correctly analyzed
the admissibility of this testimony under ER 702 and we find no
abuse of discretion in the admission of the experts' testimony. Russell
also objects to this testimony on the ground that it was statistical.
Neither expert expressed his opinion about the rarity of posing in
precisely quantified terms, though Douglas testified as to the number
of cases on VICAP and Keppel testified as to the number of cases on
HITS. Russell maintains, however, that by specifying the extent of
these databases, Keppel and Douglas implicitly testified that Russell
was guilty as a matter of mathematical probability. We first note that
there is no prohibition against using well-founded statistics to
establish some fact that will be useful to the Trier of fact. Second, both
experts relied on the databases primarily as support for the
187D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191

conclusion that posing is a rare occurrence and not for the conclusion
that there was a statistical probability that Russell committed the
murders and both expressed their opinions in non-quantifiable terms.
[Post Daubert. Admitted.].
In 1999 the Court of Appeal of the State of Oregon gave an opinion
in the case State v. Dunn [981 p. 2d 809. Or. App. 1999]. The defendant
was charged with first degree robbery and kidnapping. There was no
significant dispute about the facts of the crime; the primary issue at
trial was whether the defendant was the person who actually
committed the crime. The state appealed the trial court's pre-trial
rulings excluding evidence that, the state believed, tended to prove
that the defendant was the offender. The trial court held that the non-
expert evidence was irrelevant and excluded the testimony of a state
expert.
The Court opinion was:
The state seeks to use the evidence of Sergeant G. of the Seattle
Police Department, whom it offered as an expert in “criminal
investigative analysis.”G. expertise involves attempting to deter-
mine from the nature of a crime the kind of person who may have
committed it in order to help investigators find possible suspects. He
testified to features of the 1982 incident that, he believed, were
relevant to identifying defendant as the person who committed this
crime: Both events showed elevated or extreme amounts of violence
compared to other cases where the potential gain would be the
same, in that the use of a weapon and the confrontation of the
victims was elevated above normal, and both involved the actual
display of force from close proximity. Those things, Gebo thought,
showed intent to exert dominion and control over the victim. Gebo
also testified that the items in defendant's room showed a “very
fruitful fantasy life”that was centred on domination and control.
The Supreme Court discussed the admissibility of evidence of other
crimes when the purpose of the evidence was to prove identity
based on modus operandi. It held that, for the evidence to be
admissible, the state had to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that “(1) there is a very high degree of similarity between
the charged and uncharged crimes; and (2) the methodology is
attributable to only one criminal,”that is, it is so distinctive that it
earmarks the acts as the handiwork of the accused (the “mark of
Zorro”test). It also described three factors for determining whether
there is a high degree of similarity between the charged and
uncharged crimes: (1) the time lapse between the crimes; (2) the
geographic distance between the crimes; and (3) the resemblances
between the methodologies of the crimes. The state argues that the
evidence is admissible under this section and all of the evidence is
relevant “because it has a tendency to establish that defendant has
unusual experience, and interest, and a motivation, that relates to
the manner in which the crimes charged was committed.”However,
the facts in this case do not meet the high level of similarity request.
In 1982, defendant used a gun in a van parked in a campground; he
arrived and fled by car. The criminal in this case used a knife in an
open store; he arrived and fled on foot. The fact that defendant in
1982, and the criminal in this case, each used a strong threat in an
attempt to get the victim to cooperate does not by itself make the
crimes distinctive. Even accepting the expert's testimony that the
level of violence in each case was unusual in light of the apparent
purpose of the crime, and even accepting the state's speculation that
the motive in each case was some “deviant purpose, possibly sexual
bondage and murder,”the similarities are not sufficiently great to
make evidence of the first crime admissible in the trial of the second.
ThereisnomarkofZorro.Weaffirm. [Post Daubert. Excluded.].
In 2000 the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave an opinion in the
case State v. Fortin. (724-A2d 818. N.J. Super A.D. 1999–745 A.2d 509.
N.J. 2000.). This opinion is one of the most important regarding the
applicability of offender profiling as scientific evidence in trial. The
opinion concerns the reliability of the technique of crime linking and
offender profiling. The defendant was charged with capital murder of
Melissa Padilla, on August 1994 in New Jersey. In pre-trial evidentiary
rulings, the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County held that
evidence to the effect that the defendant had sexually assaulted and
non-fatally strangled a female police officer in Maine could be
admitted as other crimes evidence, and that a proposed witness
could testify as an expert on ritualistic and signature crimes. The
State's proposed expert on modus operandi and ritualistic behavior,
summarized his extensive schooling and training. He is a former F.B.I.
agent, has over thirty-two years experience as a law enforcement
professional. He determined that the modus operandi of the crimes
involving Padilla and Gardner demonstrated some fifteen similarities.
The expert's report discussed ritualistic, or signature, behavior of
the violent offender, as follows:
The violent offender who repeats his offenses typically demon-
strates a second type of behavior that is termed “Ritualistic”behavior.
Such behavior is frequently referred to as the “Signature”of a criminal.
This behavior goes beyond what is necessary to commit the crime. Its
sole purpose is to provide the offender with mental and/or emotional
gratification. The expert concludes that the crimes committed against
both victims were anger-motivated, and that the offender demon-
strated anger through the following identified “ritualistic”or
“signature”behavior in both crimes:
1. Bites to the lower chin;
2. Bites to the lateral left breast;
3. Injurious anal penetration;
4. Brutal facial beating;
5. Manual frontal strangulation.
In determining that the same person committed the two attacks,
the expert concluded:
“In my 35 years of experience with a variety of violent crimes, I
have never observed this combination of behaviors in a single
crime of violence. The likelihood of different offenders committing
two such extremely unique crimes is highly improbable. It is my
opinion that the same person was responsible for the two crimes”.
The judge accepted expert under N.J.R.E. 702, qualified to offer an
opinion that the same offender committed both crimes.
The Court opinion was (724-A2d 818. N.J. Super A.D. 1999):
Defendant also contends the judge erred in qualifying the witness as
an expert on modus operandi and ritualistic behaviour, to express his
opinion that the same person who committed the Maine assault
against Trooper Gardner is the same person who committed the
Padilla murder. We agree. Here, as the judge noted, the expert
testified “this analysis is not based on science, but based on his
training and experience with violent crimes.”While not based on
science in the technical sense, his linkage-analysis methodology is
certainly founded in the area of behavioral science. We conclude that
the same detailed analysis regarding admission of scientific evidence
is applicable and necessary in determining whether linkage analysis
expert testimony is admissible. We certainly agree with his
conclusion that expert's testimony would assist the Trier of fact in
understanding how crimes can be linked together through criminal
investigative analysis of the modus operandi and ritualistic beha-
viour associated with the crimes. We also agree that the expert has
extensive expertise in the area of criminal investigative techniques.
Where we differ with the judge is his conclusion that expert's linkage
analysis is sufficiently reliable for admission in this capital murder
prosecution. The State argues that expert linkage analysis testimony
has been admitted in other jurisdictions as sufficiently reliable like in
Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48 (Del.Supr.1991).However those cases
188 D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191

involved serial killers or rapists, with multiple crimes. Here, there is
an attempt to link behaviour in two crimes, under circumstances
where there are as many differences as there are similarities. There
are differences in the age, race, weight and height of the victims.
There is a significant difference in the status of each victim. There are
also differences in the type of assault. The expert testified that modus
operandi and ritualistic behaviour are the subject of articles and
books, and that he teaches this criminal investigative technique to
law enforcement personnel. We have no doubt that these methods
are valid and have great value in performing the very difficult task of
criminal investigation. We are not persuaded, however, that these
techniques are sufficiently reliable for an expert in those fields to
testify that the same person who committed one crime committed the
other under the analysis of the facts and circumstances presented in
this case.In summary reverse the order permitting the witness to give
expert opinion that the same person who committed the Maine crime
also committed the New Jersey crime. (N.J.Super.A.D.,1999).
Appeal and cross-appeal were taken. The Supreme Court, O'Hern
opinion, is (745 A.2d 509. N.J. 2000):
On the question of expert testimony, the Appellate Division found
that the analysis was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted as expert
evidence. The Appellate Division observed that expert testimony was
essentially “ultimate issue”evidence. If defendant committed the
Maine crime and the same person committed the Maine and New
Jersey crimes, then Fortin had committed the New Jersey crime. […]
For the reasons stated in its opinion, we agree with the judgment of
the Appellate Division that the proposed expert testimony concerning
linkage analysis lacks sufficient scientific reliability to establish that
the same perpetrator committed the Maine and New Jersey crimes.
We add only these observations.The government expert's report fails
to meet the standards for the admission of testimony that relates to
scientific knowledge. The field of linkage analysis is not at a “state of
the art”such that his testimony could be sufficiently reliable. See
Kelly,supra,97N.J.at197,478A.2d364holding three
requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended
testimony must concern a subject that is beyond the ken of the
average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art
such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; (3) the
witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended
testimony. In this case, we are concerned with the second prong of
the test, the scientific reliability of the evidence. As the Appellate
Division noted however, the authorities and literature authored by
the expert and others do not demonstrate that linkage analysis has
attained such a state of the art as to have the scientific reliability of
DNA testing. Moreover, linkage analysis is a field in which only the
expert and a few of his close associates are involved. In this respect,
there are no peers to test his theories and no way in which to
duplicate his results […]. For the reasons noted by the Appellate
Division, we also believe that the cases in other jurisdictions in which
similar evidence has been admitted are distinguishable.We are not so
certain that the M.O. factors cited by the expert, such as that both
victims were mature females and were attacked while alone and at
night time, demonstrate an “unusual pattern”. It is on this question of
an “unusual pattern”that the testimony would be helpful. For
example, if the witness can from a reliable data base offer evidence
that a combination of bite marks on the breast, bite marks on the
chin, and rectal tearing inflicted during a sexual attack is unique in
his experience of investigating sexual assault crimes, that evidence
could help to establish an “unusual pattern”. Such expert testimony
would help a court make an initial determination of whether to
admit the other-crime evidence and would, if presented at trial,
better enable a jury to understand whether the crimes were “unusual
and distinctive so as to be like a signature”. It's not in this case. It is
initially for the court, and ultimately for the jury, however, to
determine whether that inference concerning the ultimate issue of
guilt may be drawn. We are especially concerned about the use of
expert testimony “to interpret matters”that could be considered
commonplace or conduct that could be accounted for commonsensi-
cal. Our concern is that a fact finder's “uncritical acceptance”of
expert testimony can becloud the issues. We have no sense that
expert suggestions are counterintuitive or will receive uncritical
acceptance. Stripped of its scientific mantra, the testimony is nothing
more than a description of the physical circumstances present. The
judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. [Post Daubert.
Excluded.].
3. A review of other countries Court opinions.
It's relevant, at this point, a short section dedicated to other
countries Court's opinion, about admissibility of criminal profiling like
scientific evidence,. The choice is for three countries: United Kingdom,
Canada and Australia, and it's because this countries have a
homogenous Criminal Law System, in fact all these countries have a
common law system as U.S.A. and because they have a long tradition
to use expert witness in Criminal Court in all the field of forensic
science including criminal profiling.
3.1. English Court opinions review.
In the U.K. the key rule for the admission of expert evidence is
expressed in the case Folkes v. Chadd, (1782 3 Doug KB 157) where it
was held: The opinion of scientific men upon proven facts may be given
by men of science within their own science. An expert's opinion is
admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is likely
to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.
And in R. v. Turner (60 Cr App R 80, 1975) the Court said:
An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific
information which is likely to be outside the experience and
knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury
can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an
expert is unnecessary […] the fact that an expert witness has
impressive scientific qualifications does not by that fact alone make
his opinion on matters of human nature and behaviour within the
limits of normality any more helpful than that of the jurors
themselves; there is a danger that they think it does.
This rule was broaden in R. v. Robb, (93 Cr. App. R. 161, 1991) with
this opinion: […] a technique, method or field of knowledge does not
have to be generally accepted before it can be admitted, and, besides, it
must be sufficiently established to be reliable before it can be admitted.
[…] While receiving this evidence the courts would not accept the
evidence of an astrologer, a soothsayer, a witch-doctor or an amateur
psychologist and might hesitate to receive evidence of attributed
authorship based on stylometric analysis.
For the specificfield of offender profiling, in R. v. Stagg, (U.K.
Central Criminal Court, 121, 1994), the prosecutor sought to introduce
in Court an offender profiling expert to prove the correspondence
between the criminal profiling of the killer that had been prepared
during the investigation and the psychological profile of the suspect
charged for that murder. The Court refused to admit the evidence with
this opinion: The notion that a psychological profile is in any
circumstance admissible in proof of identity is to my mind redolent
with the consideration that no judge in any common law court has ever
been treated the criminal profiling as properly admissible in proof of
identity. […] There were doubts as to whether psychological profile
evidence had achieved widespread acceptance or had been adequately
established as to be sufficiently reliable like scientificevidence.
[Excluded].
189D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191

In R v. Gilfoyle, (EWCA Crim 81, 2000), the accused of murder
sought to admit in Court and expert in psychology and criminal
profiling who had prepared a psychological autopsy. The opinion of
the expert was that the victim has committed suicide.
This is the opinion of the Court: We declined to receive the
evidence of Professor C. and we now give our reasons. […]In our
judgment the professor C. is clearly an expert in his field, the evidence
tendered from him was not expert evidence of a kind properly to be
placed before the court for a number of reasons. First, although this
alone would not necessarily be fatal to the admissibility of his evidence,
he had never previously embarked on the task which he set himself in
this case. Secondly, his reports identify no criteria by reference to which
the court could test the quality of his opinions: there is no data base
comparing real and questionable suicides and there is no substantial
body of academic writing approving his methodology. The American
Psychology Association Panel has recommended that psychologists
conducting a psychological autopsy state in their report that the
conclusions drawn are based on a speculative view of events. In our
view unstructured and speculative conclusions are not the stuff of
which admissible expert evidence is made. Thirdly, Professor C.'s views
are based on one-sided information, in particular from the appellant,
and his family who have never given evidence. […]Fifthly, there is
English, Canadian and United States authority which points against the
admission of such evidence. The guiding principle in the United States
appears to be (as stated in Frye v United States 1923 293 F1013) that
evidence based on a developing new brand of science or medicine is not
admissible until accepted by the scientific community as being able to
provide accurate and reliable opinion. This accords with the English
approach […] And so the present academic status of psychological
autopsiesisnot,inourjudgment,suchastopermitthemtobeadmitted
as a basis for expert opinion before a jury. [Excluded].
3.2. Canadian Court opinions review.
Canada is the closest country to the U.S.A. so often its judicial
practice reflects the U.S.A.'s trend. For that reason Canada has, more
than other countries, opinion about admissibility of offender profiling
in court.
The most important rule on offender profiling evidence is the
opinion expressed in R. v. Mohan.
In the key case R.v. Mohan [2 S.C.R. 9 N 23063, 1994], the defendant
was charged with four counts of sexual assault, and the defense sought
to introduce in Court a psychiatrist to explain that the psychological
profile of the perpetrator of the first three complaints would likely be
that of a pedophile, while the profile of the perpetrator of the fourth
complaint would likely be that of a sexual psychopath, and if one
perpetrator was involved in all four complaints described in the
hypothetical questions, he would uniquely categorize that perpetrator
as a sexual psychopath. The expert would go on to testify that the
defendant does not have the characteristics attributable to any of the
three groups in which most sex offenders fall.
This is the opinion of the Court on the admissibility of this
evidence: The admissibility of the rejected evidence was analyzed in
argument under two exclusionary rules of evidence: (1) expert opinion
evidence, and (2) character evidence. I have concluded that, on the
basis of the principles relating to exceptions to the character evidence
rule and under the principles governing the admissibility of expert
evidence,thelimitationsontheuseofthistypeofevidencerequirethat
theevidenceinthiscasebeexcluded.Admissionofexpertevidence
depends on the application of the following criteria: (a) relevance; (b)
necessity in assisting the trier of fact; (c) the absence of any
exclusionary rule; (d) a properly qualified expert.
[…]The trial judge was not satisfied that the characteristics
associated with the fourth complaint identified the perpetrator as a
member of a distinctive group. He was not prepared to accept that the
characteristics of that complaint were such that only a psychopath
could have committed the act. There was nothing to indicate any
general acceptance of this theory. Moreover, there was no material in
the record to support a finding that the profile of a pedophile or
psychopath has been standardized to the extent that it could be said
that it matched the supposed profile of the offender depicted in the
charges. The expert's group profiles were not seen as sufficiently reliable
to be considered helpful. In the absence of these indicia of reliability, it
cannot be said that the evidence would be necessary in the sense of
usefully clarifying a matter otherwise unaccessible, or that any value it
may have had would not be outweighed by its potential for misleading
or diverting the jury. Given these findings I must conclude that the trial
judge was right in deciding as a matter of law that the evidence was
inadmissible [excluded].
In R. v. Ranger [R. Ranger v. R. C3 1117, 2003], the Ontario Criminal
Court of Appeal had to review an appeal by the defendant who was
convicted of murders of two teenaged sisters. Part of the appeal was
about the admissibility of prosecutor's expert, the chief of Behavioral
Sciences Section of the Ontario police. The expert testified that the
perpetrator had staged the crime scene to deflect suspicion from him,
and that he had a specific curiosity in one of the two sisters. This is the
opinion of the Court of Appeal:
In this case it becomes important in applying the Mohan criteria, to
distinguish between, first, the expert witness's opinion that the crime
scene appeared staged, and, second, her various opinions on the
motivations and characteristic of the likely perpetrator as a person
associated with the victims, in particular Marsha. I will refer to the
first category as “crime scene evidence”and the second as “criminal
profiling.”
3.2.1. The crime scene evidence
The appellant argues that expert opinion evidence on staging was not
necessary. He submits that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury to
conclude on its own that the crime scene was staged.
Although the appellant's argument on the issue of necessity is not
without merit, I am of the view that it was open to the trial judge to find
that it was necessary to admit some form of expert opinion on this issue.
However, the dangers associated with the reception of expert opinion
evidence do not disappear simply because the evidence, on its face,
meets the four criteria set out in Mohan. As noted earlier, evidence
should not be admitted if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
value. In my view, the manner in which the crime scene evidence was
packaged for the jury in this case exemplifies the usual dangers
associated with expert opinion evidence. Those dangers must be
considered in the balancing process that forms part of the test for
admissibility. However, because of the manner in which the staging
opinion evidence was presented through Detective Inspector Lines, it is
my view that the danger that the jury might give the evidence more
weight than it deserved far outweighed its probative value. Further, the
stage was set for far-reaching opinion evidence on criminal profiling
and, unfortunately, Detective Inspector Lines' evidence did include
matters that went beyond the permissible scope of admissibility. This
leads to the analysis of the criminal profiling evidence.
3.2.2. The criminal profiling evidence
Accepting that criminal profiling may be a useful, albeit potentially
dangerous, aid to police investigations, its use as a means of proof in
a courtroom is quite another matter. It becomes important to
distinguish between matters related to the description and analysis
of a crime scene, the “WHAT”and matters related to the motivation
or characteristics of the offender, the “WHY”or the “WHO”.All aspects
of expert opinion testimony of course must meet the same test for
admissibility and I am not suggesting that the simple characteriza-
tion of the evidence answers the question on admissibility. I am
simply observing that expert opinion testimony about “WHY”or
190 D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191

“WHO”usually raises more concerns. These concerns relate most
frequently to two aspects of the Mohan test for admissibility: the
requirement that the evidence be sufficiently reliable to warrant its
admission and the requirement that its probative value exceed its
prejudicial effect. I note the following examples to explain the
difference. Attempts to adduce expert opinion evidence about WHY
an offense was committed in a particular manner and, more
particularly, about WHO is more likely to have committed the
offense, that is, the kinds of evidence that I have labelled more
particularly as criminal profiling, have generally not met with
success, either in this jurisdiction or elsewhere. The expert testimony
as “opinion about the motivation of staging behaviour.”However her
opinion on WHY a perpetrator would employ staging included and
extended to WHO that person would be.[...] Criminal profiling is a
novel field of scientific evidence, the reliability of which was not
demonstrated at trial. To the contrary, it would appear from her
limited testimony about the available verification of opinions in her
field of work that her opinions amounted to no more than educated
guesses. As such, her criminal profiling evidence was inadmissible.
The criminal profiling evidence also approached the ultimate issue in
this case and, hence, was highly prejudicial. [Excluded].
3.3. Australian Court opinions review
The Australian general rules about scientific evidence are the same
than on other common law Countries.
The case selected for the aim of this work is Hillier v. The Queen
[ACT SC, 50, 2003]. The defendant was charged with murder and
arson, he sought to introduce in Court an expert in behavioral science
who had studied profiling in the U.S.A. to describe the character and
future behavior of a man that committed those crimes and how it was
different from the defendant. This is the opinion of the Court: The fact
that profiling may sometimes prove to be a valid investigative tool does
not justify a conclusion that its exponents may leap majestically over the
limitations of modern psychology and psychiatry and give expert
evidence as to the personality and conduct of a particular person. I
doubt that the most eminent psychiatrist or psychologist would attempt
to venture a professional opinion as to the underlying personality of a
person whom he or she had neither met nor seen; even if informed of
what had been found at a particular crime scene and invited to infer that
the person had been the offender. Hence, Courts must exercise constant
vigilance to ensure that they are not unwittingly misled. [Excluded].
4. Conclusion
After the Daubert opinion in 1993 the U.S.A. Courts' criteria
concerning scientific evidence have changed. Today, after the trilogy
and after the new version, in 2009, of the F.R.E. 702, it seems to be
clear that the principle of reliability must be applied to all expert
opinions based on both hard and soft sciences. This is true for all
expert witnesses in the fields of psychiatry, psychology and
criminology and, in the light of the opinions above, it is highly
probable that the offender profiling technique and methodology, like
other types of scientific evidence, will be judged on its scientific
reliability and relevance.
This is true not only for the U.S.A. but for the other reviewed
countries as well. The Australian, Canadian and British Courts'
opinions reported in this work show the same trend of judgment in
these fields of forensic science and scientific evidence.
It can be affirmed that the opinions above and this new trend will
be the general rule for admissibility of all the expert witness in the
field of psychology and psychiatry. According to Gudjonsson and
Copson (1999), of ninety studied trials in U.K., only two profilers were
admitted to the Court, and according to Gregory (2005), profilers have
never been admitted as scientific experts in British Courts for lack of
reliability and scientific of their knowledge.
So there is no place anymore for witnesses who claim to testify as
experts in the fields of offender profiling and in psychology and
psychiatry too, only for their ipse dixit; and it seems probable that the
Courts will exclude scientific evidence built by this methodology.
Who intends to use offender profilers as expert witnesses, all
around the world, must be able to overcome the Daubert Test and to
prove that the used methodology is reliable and that the offender
profiling is science and not art.
The scientific community that deals with offender profiling should
be able to standardize a method for its forensic application, making
the research and the education on the issues related to the use in the
courtroom of the criminal profiling. Only in this way this knowledge
can constitute novel and scientific evidence. If this will not happen it
will be more and more difficult for profilers to be admitted in
courtroom as experts and for criminal profiling to find useful
applications in the world of the forensic sciences.
References
Giannelli, P. C. (2006). Understanding evidence. LexisNexis.
Gregory, N. (2005). Offender profiling: A review of the literature. The British Journal of
Forensic Practice,7(3), 29−34.
Gudjonsson, G. H., & Copson, G. (1999). The role of the expert in criminal investigation.
In J. L. Jackson & D. A. Bekerian (Eds.), Offender profiling, theory, research and
practice. Wiley.
TABLE OF CASES
Bryant v. Maryland. 881 A.2d 669. Md App. 2005.
Com. v. Hawkins. 626 A2d 550. Pa. 1993.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S 579 Supreme Court of U.S.A 1993.
Folkes v. Chadd, 1782 3 Doug KB 157.
Folkes v. Chadd. 3 Doug KB 157, 1782.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013. No. 3968. Court of Appeals of District of Columbia
1923.
General Elec. Co. V. Joiner. 522 U.S. 136. Supreme Court of U.S.A 1997.
Hillier v. The Queen ACT SC, 50, 2003.
Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. V. Carmichael. 526, U.S.137. Supreme Court of U.S.A 1999.
Pennell v. State. 602 A2d 48. Del. 1991.
People v. Masters. 33 P.3d 1191. Colo. App. 2001.
R v. Gilfoyle. E.W.C.A. Crim. 81, 2000.
R. v. Beland. 2 S.C.R. 398, 1987.
R. v. Lavellee. 55 C.C.C. 3d 97, 1990.
R. v. Mohan. 2 S.C.R. 9 N 23063, 1994.
R. v. Ranger. C3 1117, 2003.
R. v. Robb. 93 Cr. App. R. 161, 1991.
R. v. Stagg. U.K. Central Criminal Court, 121, 1994.
R. v. Turner. 60 Cr App R 80, 1975.
Sate v. Parkinson. 909 P.2d 647. Idaho App. 1996.
Sate v. Roquemore. 620 N.E 2d 110. Ohio App. 10 Dist, 1993.
Simmons v. State. 797 So 2d 1134. Ala Crim. App. 1999.
State Rusell. 882 P.2d 747. Wash 1994.
State v. Carlson. 30419-8II. Wash App. 2006.
State v. Dunn. 981 P.2d 809. Or. App. 1999.
State v. Fortin. 724 A 2d 818. N.J. Super A.D. 1999.
State v. Fortin. 745 A 2d 509. N.J. 2000.
State v. Garcia. 4179. Ohio App. 2002.
State v. Moeller. 548 N.W. 2d 465. SD 1996.
State v. Stevens. 78 S.W. 3d 817. Tenn. 2002.
State v. Wallace. 528 S.E. 2d 326. N.C. 2000.
Toney v. State. 1503 Texas App. 1996.
U.S.A. v. Fitzgerald. 02-4978 CR-02-164. 4th Circuit, Virginia 2003.
U.S.A. v. Hines. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62. U.S. 1999.
U.S.A. v. Thomas III. CCB-03-0150. Maryland, Fed U.S. Dist 2006.
U.S.A. v. Webb. 115 F.3d 711. U.S Appeal. 1997.
191D. Bosco et al. / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33 (2010) 184–191