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Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940
Abstract
This lively and original book re-evaluates Lloyd George's part, crucial but enigmatic, in the `lost peace' of Versailles. Each chapter examines a separate episode between 1919 and 1940. The first chapters review Lloyd George's protean role at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, his strategy of `making Germany pay' and the part played in it by Lord Cunliffe, ex-Governor of the Bank of England; the causes and consequences of Lloyd George's abortive guarantee treaty to France; and the emergence at the conference of the phenomenon of `Appeasement' -the `worm in the bud'. The final chapters reassess the two episodes commonly considered most damaging to Lloyd George's reputation: his visit to Hitler in 1936 and his bids to halt World War II after the fall of Poland. The author sees Lloyd George as both mercurial and consistent: brilliant and volatile in method, but constant in furthering Britain's interests through his personal diplomacy.
... He was also adamant, against domestic and foreign opposition, that the former Kaiser should be brought to trial. He enjoyed greater support to extend international law beyond prosecuting persons accused of wartime operational crimes to include arraignments of those responsible for the political and military decisions which had occasioned the war and the manner in which it had been fought.[23] In 1915 Britain, France and Russia made extravagant promises in the Treaty of London to secure Italian intervention in the war. ...
A survey of the major decisions of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and of its consequences. YOU DO NOT NEED TO REQUEST A FULL TEXT BECAUSE THE CHAPTER IS FREELY AVAILABLE AT
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/the_paris_peace_conference_and_its_consequences
... It is possible that Keynes, Nicolson, Dulles, Headlam-Morley, Lippmann, Lamont and many of the other critics simply did not understand what Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando were attempting to accomplish and what their true beliefs were. Lloyd George's account in particular was a highly political document intended to protect, advance, and/or salvage his own legacy following Hitler's rise to power (Lentin, 2001). Williamson (1985) advanced a "semi-strong" conception of rationality that retains the notion of maximization while acknowledging human limitations of attention and memory. ...
The Paris Peace Conference was arguably the most complex negotiation ever undertaken. The principal product of the conference, the Treaty of Versailles, failed to accomplish any of its framers' major goals. Relations between the Allies themselves and the Allies and their defeated enemies seriously deteriorated as a consequence of the negotiations and attempts to implement the treaty. Economic conditions in Germany, the rest of Europe, and eventually the United States declined as well. At the time of the Treaty's publication, John Maynard Keynes and a considerable number of other participants predicted these events, pointing to the negotiators' errors and oversights as a primary cause. The logic of Keynes' argument is re-examined in light of recent research on the psychology of human information processing, judgment and choice. It reveals that his approach is actually very consistent with and anticipates both Simon's conception of bounded rationality and recent work on cognitive heuristics and illusions. Negotiator bias has been studied almost exclusively using simple laboratory settings. The catastrophic lose-lose nature of the Versailles Treaty illustrates the way in which complexity necessitates reliance on simplifying heuristics while propagating and amplifying the impact of the bias that is generated. Evidence from the treaty negotiations and the failed implementation of the treaty suggest some very significant boundary conditions for the application of rational choice models in the business, politics, and international relations contexts. It also demonstrates the need for negotiations researchers to focus more attention on the implementation of agreements and the long-term effects of those agreements on relationships.
... It is possible that Keynes, Nicolson, Dulles, Headlam-Morley, Lippmann, Lamont and many of the other critics simply did not understand what Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando were attempting to accomplish and what their true beliefs were. Lloyd George's account in particular was a highly political document intended to protect, advance, and/or salvage his own legacy following Hitler's rise to power (Lentin, 2001). Williamson (1985) advanced a "semi-strong" conception of rationality that retains the notion of maximization while acknowledging human limitations of attention and memory. ...
The Paris Peace Conference was arguably the most complex negotiation ever undertaken. The principal product of the conference, the Treaty of Versailles, failed to realize any of the major goals of its framers. Relations between Allies and with the defeated enemies seriously deteriorated as a consequence of the negotiations. Economic conditions in Germany, the rest of Europe, and eventually the United States deteriorated as well. At the time of the Treaty’s publication, Keynes and a number of other participants predicted these events, pointing to the errors and oversights of the negotiators as a primary cause. The logic of Keynes ’ argument is re-examined in light of recent research on the psychology of human information processing, judgment and choice. It reveals that this approach is actually very consistent with and anticipates both Simon’s conception of bounded rationality and recent work on cognitive heuristics and illusions. Negotiator bias has been studied almost exclusively using simple laboratory settings. The catastrophic lose-lose nature of the Versailles Treaty illustrates the way in which complexity necessitates the reliance on simplifying heuristics while propagating and amplifying the impact of the bias that is generated. Evidence from the treaty negotiations and the failed application of the treaty suggest some very significant boundary conditions for the application of rational choice models in business, politics, and international relations. Versailles Treaty
The cultural shift that France experienced after the First World War has commonly been analysed through the prism of attitudes towards Germany, and the continuation of wartime prejudices in the immediate post-war period. Yet, an exploration of imaginings of future relations with a wartime ally reveals a broad spectrum of assumptions and expectations that span the transition from war to peace. Taking as its focus the prospect of a tunnel under the English Channel, this article situates thinking about France’s future within cultures of nationalism and ideas about international connection. It uses a collection of answers to a 1919 exam question which asked what might be the likely consequences of a Channel tunnel, and analyses the themes that emerged as the candidates picked and chose from a variety of different national symbols and images. In so doing, they offered a vision of a tunnel that was rooted in the past and in wartime experiences, but that equally represented a means to strengthen and sustain the Franco-British partnership that would be key to France’s future. Read alongside government and lobby group records, their essays afford a glimpse into grassroots imaginings of both the French nation and the new international order after 1919.
This magisterial new history elucidates a momentous transformation process that changed the world: the struggle to create, for the first time, a modern Atlantic order in the long twentieth century (1860–2020). Placing it in a broader historical and global context, Patrick O. Cohrs reinterprets the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as the original attempt to supersede the Eurocentric 'world order' of the age of imperialism and found a more legitimate peace system – a system that could not yet be global but had to be essentially transatlantic. Yet he also sheds new light on why, despite remarkable learning-processes, it proved impossible to forge a durable Atlantic peace after a First World War that became the long twentieth century's cathartic catastrophe. In a broader perspective this ground-breaking study shows what a decisive impact this epochal struggle has had not only for modern conceptions of peace, collective security and an integrative, rule-based international order but also for formative ideas of self-determination, liberal-democratic government and the West.
John Maynard Keynes died in 1946 but his ideas and his example remain relevant today. In this distinctive new account, Peter Clarke shows how Keynes's own career was not simply that of an academic economist, nor that of a modern policy advisor. Though rightly credited for reshaping economic theory, Keynes's influence was more broadly based and is assessed here in a rounded historical, political and cultural context. Peter Clarke re-examines the full trajectory of Keynes's public career from his role in Paris over the Versailles Treaty to Bretton Woods. He reveals how Keynes's insights as an economic theorist were rooted in his wider intellectual and cultural milieu including Bloomsbury and his friendship with Virginia Woolf as well as his involvement in government business. Keynes in Action uncovers a much more pragmatic Keynes whose concept of 'truth' needs to be interpreted in tension with an acknowledgement of 'expediency' in implementing public policy.
9191 ليت لدو ا لسياساث ا على ] االوىل/ لسنت ا إكليل/ جملت االول/ نون كا (لعدد ا 4) 143 لبلشفيت ا لثورة ا تداعياث 9191 ليت لدو ا لسياساث ا على سياست يف أثرها 0 أملانيا جتاه الربيطانيت االسرتضاء 9191-9111 أ. السلطاني شاكر حيدر د. م. الرتبيت كليت يت/ املستنصر اجلامعت اإلااهُا الاقترا٦ُت، حىعج، لىٍض الاؾترياء، البلكُٟت، الثىعة اإلاٟخاخُت: ال٩لماث مظخخلص في البلكُٟت للثىعة الىُا١ والىاؾٗت ال٨بحرة آلازاع الضعاؾاث مً الٗضًض ٖالجذ (عوؾُا 1917 ج٣غٍغاث و٢ضمذ ، ً صبلىماؾُا وختى ً واحخماُٖا ً وا٢خهاصًا ً ؾُاؾُا) وؤخ٩ام ؤٞ٤ طاث ؾُاؾُت جاعٍخي حىاهب بٌٗ ب٣ُذ طل٪ مً الغٚم ٖلى واؾ٘، الضبلىماؾُت اإلاؿاعاث جىحُه في ألهمُتها ازغي، ٢غاءاث الى بداحت الثىعة جإزحراث الاخضار في البلكُٟت الثىعة جإزحر مضًاث ال٦دكاٝ مداولت البدث هظا ال٨بري. للضو٫ (اإلااهُا قهضتها التي 1918-1919 م اإلاخُغٞحن الاقترا٦ُحن ومداولت) الخجغبت دا٧اة حىعج لىٍض صًُٟض خ٩ىمت اؾخجابت وهىٕ عوؾُا، في البلكُٟت David Lloyd George (البرًُاهُت 1918-1922 للمهالح زُحرا تهضًضا مثلذ التي ألاخضار لخل٪ وَبُٗتها) الى صٞٗها مما الاوعبُت، ؾُاؾتها زىابذ ًٖ ًٞال البرًُاهُت الاؾتراجُجُت وألاهضاٝ الا ؾُاؾت جبني الٗام لالججاه زالٞا اإلااهُا، م٘ للخٗامل صبلىماؾُا همُا ؾترياء ان الى جظهب التي الاوعبُت بغٍُاهُا بؿُاؾت اإلاسخهحن واإلااعزحن الباخثحن ل٨خاباث الثالزُيُاث مغخلت في البرًُاهُت للضبلىماؾُت اإلامحزة الؿمت ٧ان باالؾترياء الٗمل اإلاب٨غة. اإلاغخلت هظه في ولِـ
Since its publication in 1919, John Maynard Keynes's Economic Consequences of the Peace has left a deep imprint on interpretations of the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent reparations discussions. Current scholarship on the treaty has accurately reassessed Keynes's conclusion that French peace aims were purely vindictive, but it has erroneously claimed that Consequences was a biased book barely read in France. By placing the reception of Consequences in the context of domestic French debates on the Versailles peace in 1920, this article demonstrates instead that Keynes's book was substantially discussed in France and that it garnered supporters among academic economists and on the left. Furthermore, examining the French networks that helped Keynes publish a translation of his book in the prestigious Nouvelle revue française problematizes his alleged Germanophilia.
Dès sa publication en 1919, Les conséquences économiques de la paix de John Maynard Keynes a profondément influencé les analyses faites par les contemporains et les historiens sur le Traité de Versailles et la question des réparations allemandes. Aujourd'hui, l'historiographie concernant ces questions a beaucoup nuancé l'argument de Keynes selon lequel le traité avait imposé une « paix carthaginoise » à l'Allemagne. Mais elle a aussi erronément conclu que Les conséquences était un livre biaisé et par conséquent peu lu en France. En contextualisant les réactions au livre de Keynes dans les débats politiques français sur la paix de Versailles, cet article démontre qu'en fait, le livre a été considérablement discuté en 1920 et qu'il a réuni l'appui des économistes et de la Gauche. Par ailleurs, l'article problématise l'idée que Keynes fut un germanophile en analysant comment ses réseaux parisiens l'ont aidé à publier la traduction des Conséquences dans la Nouvelle revue française.
This entry analyses the diplomatic style and skills of David Lloyd George, the British premier between December 1916 and October 1922, concentrating in particular upon the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 at which he was the principal British negotiator. It emphasizes his ingenuity and dexterity in conjuring agreements out of impossible situations but suggests that his sometimes unscrupulous pursuit of immediate solutions had the potential to jeopardize longer‐term success.
Pierwsza wojna światowa wymusiła na elitach Europy Zachodniej potrzebę określenia, czym ma być Europa Wschodnia, jak wyglądać będzie nowy porządek polityczny po zakończeniu wielkiej wojny, czy da się utrzymać równowagę między Rosją a Niemcami oraz co zrobić z coraz większymi ambicjami Rosji sowieckiej przywrócenia kontroli nad ziemiami byłego Imperium Rosyjskiego. Niniejszy tekst dotyczy wizji Europy Wschodniej wśród brytyjskich elit politycznych od memoriału Arthura Balfoura z 1916 r. do koncepcji tej części Europy stworzonej w kręgu premiera Davida Lloyda George’a w 1920 r. oraz analiz Halforda Mackindera, ojca brytyjskiej geopolityki.During the Great War elites of Western Europe were forced to decide on their perception of Eastern Europe, on a new political order after the end of the war, and to think out how to keep the balance between Russia and Germany and what to do with increasing ambitions of Soviet Russia to regain control over the territories of the former Russian Empire. This text attempts to re-create the specific frame of mind of early twentieth-century British political elites which influenced their perception of Eastern European developments from Arthur Balfour’s memorial in 1916 to Eastern Europe’s concepts by Prime Minister David Lloyd George in 1920 and analyses of Sir Halford Mackinder, the father of British geopolitics.
This article analyses international scholarship of the early twentieth century by focusing on scholarly networks and the uncomfortable interplay between their claims to universalism and the realities of an international war with global dimensions. Academics, books, and ideas had traversed the world with relative ease and regularity from the mid nineteenth century. The consequences were the creation of a hierarchical and Euro-American dominated ‘academic world’ where mobility and the transnational transmission of knowledge were key features. The rupture of the First World War tested the durability of these connections but the Paris Peace Conference showed that scholarly connections – through shared disciplinary interests, alumni groupings, or mutual acquaintance – were not only durable but sometimes crucial to the recasting of the world envisaged by the peacemakers. While the scholars present at the Paris Peace Conference were there as representatives of their respective nations, they also demonstrated strong allegiance to disciplines and institutions.
In 1935, the prevailing diplomatic culture had been for bilateral alliances designed to defend the interests of individual states in the event of war. The first two months of 1936 marked a continuation of this pattern through the Anglo–French staff talks on maintaining the Rhineland as a demilitarised zone. Strong German press criticism of the discussions led Phipps and François–Poncet to conclude that this was the start of a propaganda war that could culminate in the German reoccupation of the Rhineland.1 François–Poncet was particularly anxious that his government should warn Hitler that if the integrity of the demilitarised zone was violated, the consequences would be severe. Eden was reluctant to sanction such an uncompromising approach.2 He had some sympathy with Mussolini’s argument that the Anglo–French staff talks could undermine the Treaty of Locarno, but was unsure how much notice he should take of a dictator whose invasion of Abyssinia had undermined his credentials as a peacemaker. Eden’s preferred course of action was to reinforce the Locarno treaty with an Air Pact.
The relationship between Britain and France after the Great War has been described not unfairly as a mésentente cordiale.1 In the early 1920s the two powers diverged radically over the basis of European security and the place of Germany in the post-war world order. In the later 1920s the relationship was further strained by differences over commercial policy, the operation of the gold standard, war debts, disarmament and a host of other issues. Two features of the bilateral relationship stand out. One is the extraordinary number of issues on which the two countries differed. The other is the one-sidedness of the anger this caused. In France, there was evidence of impatience, frustration, even cynicism at Britain’s aloofness from the Continent and its efforts to see Germany freed from the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles. After the Treaty was signed and the promised Anglo-American guarantee to France failed to materialise, several Paris cabaret acts caricatured David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, as a trickster or conman. The acts attracted the notice of the French ambassador in London who demanded the intervention of the police on account of their potential damage to relations with Britain.2 Subsequently, efforts by Raymond Poincaré, the French premier, to hold Britain to its Treaty commitments encouraged the impression of hostility.
David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, leaders of their countries in the First World War, are the supreme symbols of the Entente Cordiale in its most momentous phase. Both were imperishably portrayed in Keynes’s hostile vignettes during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Both were highly image-conscious. Lloyd George was silkily loquacious (though also an excellent listener), instantly recognisable with his long mane of hair, his Inverness cloak and his almost feminine pride in his feet. Clemenceau, at least in Keynes’s version, was brusque, usually almost silent, insensitive to his colleagues and his surroundings, equally identifiable with his cape, his cane, his black leather boots with a buckle at the front and always grey suede gloves to hide his eczema.
Gwilym and Megan Lloyd George were brought up in a family in which by virtue of their father’s successful political career their multiple national identities were fully apparent to them. David Lloyd George had utilized his Welshness to strengthen his position in British Liberalism, and then as Prime Minister during the First World War and its aftermath had established himself as a world statesman, although one who represented British interests. The Lloyd George name was Welsh and instantly recognizable. Lloyd George was celebrated as the ‘Welsh wizard’ and criticized as the ‘Welsh goat’.1 Politics was seen as a natural occupation for the Lloyd George children. Megan remarked in a speech in 1928 that ‘I’ve had politics for breakfast, lunch, tea and dinner all my life.’2 With their father being appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908, the children found the family home coincided exactly with the centre of power of the United Kingdom and its Empire in Downing Street. Despite this British context, the Lloyd George family did retain its Welshness, not least through the deliberate and conscious actions of Margaret Lloyd George, the children’s mother. Richard, the oldest son of the Lloyd Georges, wrote of his mother that ‘her love of Wales and everything Welsh was so great as to have left an indelible imprint on all her children’.3
Revisionism Among the VictorsRevisionism Among the VanquishedTreaty Revision Begins: Locarno, 1925German Threats, Allied AppeasementConclusion
This article argues that disarmament negotiations in Geneva played an important but hitherto little understood role in the evolution of French security policy after the First World War. While the majority of French policy-making elites remained unconvinced that collective security and arms reductions could ever form the basis of France's national security policy, they were forced to adapt to the changes in the international and domestic political contexts of the post-war era. Policy makers found it increasingly difficult to ignore the growing prominence of discourses of disarmament and mutual assistance both inside France and in international society. In order to adapt to changes in international norms, foreign policy evolved away from traditional strategies based on the balance of power and military alliances towards multilateral security pacts and an intensified focus on international law. This new approach, which was an amalgamation of traditional alliance politics and liberal internationalist principles, would remain at the centre of French diplomacy through to the mid 1930s.
The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s.
But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad-based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.
Experimental studies consistently indicate that human information processing and decisionmaking violate basic precepts of rationality. Yet rational choice theory is increasingly used to model organizations, politics, and international relations. Experimental evidence of cognitive bias is often discounted as a methodological artifact because analysis, organization, specialization, and the presence of strong incentives are presumed to eliminate bias outside the laboratory. A controversy in the historiography of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 provides an opportunity to address that assumption. Did “the
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