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Developing a Method for Analyzing Institutional Change
Abstract
"If we are to understand these changes, we must develop new tools (Jones, 2003). Several colleagues and I are in the early stages of a study of the 'dynamics of rules' (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2004; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). We will use agent based modeling as one of our tools since that does enable one to examine the pattern of likely outcomes over time when agents who have limited information are making choices over time (Janssen, 2002). We also intend to study institutional choice overtly, both in the experimental laboratory as well as in the field with companion modeling by participants who have experience in working with irrigation, fisheries, and forest resources (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004; Cardenas, 2000; Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis, 2000; Bousquet et al., 2002). We have already examined the difference in cooperative behavior when participants in an open-access foraging experiment have a chance to choose rules to regulate their behavior as contrasted to just learning from experience about the structure of the experiment (Janssen et al., 2006). "The remainder of the paper is organized in the following fashion. In the first main section, I provide an overview of our findings from studying irrigation systems in the field so that readers who are not familiar with our prior research gain an initial sense of these findings. In the next section, I provide a second overview--this time of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework that we have been developing at the Workshop since the early 1980s in an effort to provide a general method for doing institutional analysis (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994; Ostrom, 2005). In the third section, I introduce the possibility of looking at the change of rules as an evolutionary process. "The new method for studying the evolution of rules, which is introduced in the fourth section, will be based on the IAD framework and on our long-term study of rules related to irrigation systems. Before one can really think of developing a general theory of institutional change, it is helpful to begin to understand change in a specific type of setting. The method will focus on a technique for arraying a norm and rule inventory and recording changes in that inventory over time brought about by diverse processes for making changes. In the conclusion, I return to the question as to why it is important to authorize resource users' relative autonomy in the development of their own rules and to learn from the resulting institutional diversity. Rule diversity can generate higher outcomes than the institutional monocropping of imposed rules by external experts (Evans, 2004)."
... Additionally, in recent years, new institutional economics, with which the grammar is associated, addressed in particular issues like ideology and mental models (Denzau and North, 1994;North, 2005), which can be best represented within institutional analysis with the help of delta parameters. This paper is a contribution to a currently emerging strain of literature, which is working on the adaptation and use of the grammar of institutions in empirical studies (Basurto et al., 2009;Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl, 2008;Ostrom, 2008;Schlüter and Vollan, 2009;Smajgl et al., 2008). 2 Its aim is to advance the usefulness and therefore increase the applicability of the grammar. ...
... In the following we propose a possible avenue for empirically investigating the grammar of institutions further. So far the grammar of institutions is still a theoretical construct, where only first attempts at empirical application have been made (Basurto et al., 2009;Ostrom, 2008;Schlüter, 2008;Schlüter and Vollan, 2009). 20 However, empirical applicability is the litmus test for the usefulness of the grammar. ...
... However, being an inductive learner and pattern-matcher (Holland et al., 1986;North, 2005: 27), this person might quickly transfer internal deltas from a similar realm of life to the institutional setting around the dishwasher, as shown in the description of the dishwasher norm above. Ostrom (2008) started this process of classification for an empirical case. This avenue would need to be elaborated further, so that delta parameters become more nuanced and that the entire array of sanctions (including internal, external deltas and fines) would be covered. ...
The grammar of institutions developed by Crawford and Ostrom presents a common syntax for analysing institutions and dismantles them into their components. This is a promising undertaking given the huge diversity of definitions of institutions, even within a single discipline. Additionally, the grammar opens a long existing black box regarding why individuals do or do not follow an institution. It differentiates between formal sanctions ('or elses' in the language of the grammar) which are already well analysed and more moral and emotion based factors (so called delta parameters). This process of differentiation is currently widely observed, particularly in economics. Recognising that it is a necessary step forward in analysing institutions, this paper analyses and develops the grammar: first, in relation to its syntactical clearness; and second, in relation to its particular emphasis on delta parameters as central elements for understanding the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions.
... The results of the above analysis are in line with several opinions, including [49,50], which state the effectiveness of focusing on the goals of an organization or institution in providing services, one measure of which is the level of management. So, if the level of waste management is as expected, for the results of waste management, it means that the waste management is running effectively. ...
... By looking at the results of the performance of waste management in Kambu District, Kendari City, most of which are still not good, showing that the performance results do not fully meet expectations, the role of the Kendari City Environment and Forestry Service is needed to provide more waste management roles and support institutional sub-elements/other actors to support sustainable waste management in Kambu District, Kendari City. In line with this, to achieve the success of a sustainable waste management policy program, it is necessary to have integrated coordination between stakeholders and related Regional Government Work Units/Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPD) [36,50,51]. ...
This research aims to analyze 1) waste management in terms of the institutional capacity aspect involved in waste management, and 2) analyze the objectives of the waste management program to overcome problems that occur in the sustainability of waste management. A qualitative approach was used by conducting a Focus Group Discussion with seven selected respondents and then analyzed using a quantitative approach using Interpretive Structural Modeling. The results show that the key factor from the relevant agencies, or the most crucial in determining the sustainability of waste management in Kambu District, Kendari City, is the Kendari City Cleanliness and Parks Service, which is assisted by government involvement in Kendari City. Therefore, waste management requires good institutional synergy to ensure the sustainability of waste managementby conducting activities based on program objectives in the environmental cleanliness improvement program as the key factor. This can increase community involvement by reducing the volume of waste, utilizing waste recycling, and reusing waste, which can increase people's incomes. Another important element to ensure sustainable waste management is the improvement and maintenance of waste management facilities and infrastructure.
... Social rules serve as the fundamental building blocks of institutional arrangements and are therefore essential elements in resilience analysis and design. They form the conceptual foundation upon which the analysis and design of resilient systems are built [42,43]. Ostrom emphasizes that in the process of evolutionary institutional change, the variation in rules and norms is frequently a product of deliberate and rational design, rather than being driven solely by random factors. ...
... Additionally, the actions of individuals within the system can alter the environment, and external factors may also impact the system's dynamics [46]. Our framework ReNo shares conceptual similarities to Ostrom's analysis and design of resilient systems, as outlined in her works ( [42,43]). The objective of our framework is to design and implement resilient socio-technical systems by adjusting either the social layer or the technical layer to fulfill the resilient requirements of stakeholders. ...
We model a multiagent system (MAS) in socio-technical terms, combining a social layer consisting of norms with a technical layer consisting of actions that the agents execute. This approach emphasizes autonomy, and makes assumptions about both the social and technical layers explicit. Autonomy means that agents may violate norms. In our approach, agents are computational entities, with each representing a different stakeholder. We express stakeholder requirements of the form that a MAS is resilient in that it can recover (sufficiently) from a failure within a (sufficiently short) duration. We present ReNo, a framework that computes probabilistic and temporal guarantees on whether the underlying requirements are met or, if failed, recovered. ReNo supports the refinement of the specification of a socio-technical system through methodological guidelines to meet the stated requirements. An important contribution of ReNo is that it shows how the social and technical layers can be modeled jointly to enable the construction of resilient systems of autonomous agents. We demonstrate ReNo using a manufacturing scenario with competing public, industrial, and environmental requirements.
... But we try to go beyond his framework by considering dynamic "overlapping social embededdness" (Aoki 2001) of different modes of economic transaction, as well as feedback impacts of change in mode of economic transaction on social norm. Also Ostrom (2007) and Heath (2001) may be referred to as recent works dealing with relationships between social norm and economic choices (instrumental choices) in an integrated, quasi-game theoretic manner. 5 ...
... The norms are treated as exogenous parameters of preference functions of agents in the social-dilemma game. However, recently, they are interpreted as evolving as a response to the lawless "state of nature" (Ostrom 2007), although game-theoretic language is not explicitly used. The philosopher Heath (2001, pp.135-45) versed well with game theory also introduces the individual utility function composed of desired-based ranking of actions and categorical preferences (normative reason) of actions. ...
Why are corporations engaged in various non-economic activities to meet societal demands (such as environmental protection) beyond their legal obligations? In other words, why do corporations ‘over-comply’ (Heal 2005) with the social demands? Does it benefit corporations (their stockholders)? If so, how? Common-sense-wise an answer may appear obvious. However, it may not necessarily be so for the prevailing framework of economists’ thinking: ‘corporations do not need to do anything beyond legal obligations in order to serve stockholders interests’. The object of this chapter is to suggest an analytical framework to challenge such orthodox views without abandoning the premise of a bounded-rationality of agents concerned (various stakeholders of corporations as well as the citizens of the society). An essential idea is to endogenize the relevance of such social constructs as (individual) social capital, norms, status ascriptions and the like to economic behaviors within an expanded framework of game-theoretic thinking.
... This mirrors the description of Curtis (1992) in one of the early text based multiplayer games, LambdaMOO, where he details the requests he received from players to codify norms so that they could be enforced. In both these cases the response was due to community growth, as Ostrom (2008) suggests from the commons situations she studied. ...
There are a number of pressing issues facing contemporary online environments that are causing disputes among participants and platform operators and increasing the likelihood of external regulation. A number of solutions have been proposed, including industry self-governance, top-down regulation and emergent self-governance such as EVE Online’s “Council of Stellar Management”. However, none of these solutions seem entirely satisfying; facing challenges from developers who fear regulators will not understand their platforms, or players who feel they are not sufficiently empowered to influence the platform, while many authors have raised concerns over the implementation of top-down regulation, and why the industry may be well-served to pre-empt such action. This paper considers case studies of EVE Online and the offshore gambling industry, and whether a version of self-governance may be suitable for the future of the industry.
... Understanding the interaction between institutional and organizational change thus enables us to better identify its impact on the ability of governance actors to achieve their goals. Ostrom (2008), Kingston and Caballero (2009) and Thiel, Pacheco-Vega, et al. (2019) highlight the difficulty of finding a single, conclusive theory that explains the processes of institutional change, i.e. how different mechanisms and actors can lead to the renegotiation of institutions. It was therefore necessary to turn to a theory of institutional change that would allow us to understand the interaction between institutional and organizational change. ...
The question of the performance of polycentric governance over time is insufficiently addressed in the literature. By performance, we refer to the ability of polycentric governance actors to design rules and engage in coordination processes that allow them to achieve their goals. Through an institutional analysis, this paper seeks to answer a question that remains unresolved in the field, namely the effectiveness of the overarching set of rules and coordination relationships in their ability to drive institutional and organizational change in polycentric governance processes. To this end, we conduct an in‐depth case study of farmland governance in southeastern France. Through the attributes of polycentric governance, we examine the changes brought about by the goal of local food supply comparing it with other historical goals such as farmland preservation. We show that farmland governance is characterized by an institutional mismatch that prevents its actors from moving closer to the objective of local food supply. We argue that the evolution of farmland governance comes down to organizational change that does not lead to an evolution of rules‐in‐use. We discuss this result in light of the findings of the literature on polycentric governance and its implications for public policy.
... Study of the position and role of management actors or institutions is related to their authority and role. Institutions will influence the involvement of actors and objectives in management, thus having implications for the sustainability of natural resources (Ostrom, 2008). The actor or stakeholder in this research is the pentahelix which has been stated in Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy Regulation Number 9 of 2021, concerning Guidelines for Sustainable Tourism Destinations, which states that it is important to encourage the tourism system through optimizing the roles of Business, Government, Community, Academic (Academics), and Media (Publications) or abbreviated as BGCAM. ...
The existence of Sebangau National Park in Central Kalimantan is a government effort to save and protect ecosystems that have started to deteriorate in the Sebagau area due to logging, poaching, and forest burning for land clearing conducted illegally by the community. In addition to these problems, the existence of Sebangau National Park is also to minimize the impact caused by global warming in the form of high air temperatures, which can trigger forest and peatland fires which occur almost every year in Palangka Raya City. Forest fires can damage ecosystems, releasing carbon and greenhouse gases into the atmosphere so that they can pollute water, soil and air. In addition, the smoke produced can also interfere with public health. The involvement of Pentahelix actors in the management of the Sebangau National Park tourism destination in Palangka Raya City is to make tourism at this destination sustainable. This research is designed as qualitative research supported by quantitative data, often referred to as a mixed method. Data collection was conducted through observation, semi-structured interviews, document studies, and questionnaires. The analysis method used in this study is Interpretative Structural Modeling (ISM) to map the role of Pentahelix with three elements consisting of: actor elements, need elements, and constraint elements. The ISM analysis results identified the main actors in the management of the Sebangau National Park tourism destination in Palangka Raya City as the Sebangau National Park Office in Palangka Raya City (government) and the Getek Maju Mandiri Group (community). The primary need in management is the Pentahelix collaboration and sustainable ecotourism. The main constraints in management are the incomplete availability of facilities and infrastructure and the lack of coordination between the government, private sector, and community.
... Mantzavinos (2004) and North (2005), for instance, argue that since individuals have a limited capacity to evaluate the relative benefits of alternative institutions, what matters for institutional change is the beliefs that individuals hold. Indeed, numerous authors, including Aoki (2001Aoki ( , 2008; Greif (2006); Mantzavinos (2004); North (1990North ( , 2005; North et al. (2009), andOstrom (2008) note the importance of shared mental models for institutional change. Aoki, in particular, argues that the key element for understanding institutional change is the way in which shared beliefs are formed and transmitted. ...
I construct a simple theoretical model that incorporates the role of ideas and contested persuasion in processes of institutional change, specifically democratization. The model helps reconcile the view that extensions of the franchise in Western Europe tended to occur as a response to the threat of revolution with the view that these occurred based on a change of social values due to the Enlightenment. In particular, the model puts forward the argument that institutional changes become possible once ideological entrepreneurs –the carriers of an alternative worldview– win an ideological contest against the holders of traditional ideas so that the rest of society adopts their worldview, and a revolutionary threat becomes credible. The model shows that the preferences of the ideological entrepreneurs are key. A revolution takes place only if they prefer it to a peaceful transition. Also, the model predicts that actual revolutions occur only when the probability of them being successful is either low or high. Finally, the ideological benefits associated with adhering to a specific ideology affect whether institutional change is peaceful or not. A strong traditional ideology generating large psychological benefits of adhering to the status quo makes it more likely that democratization occurs through revolution. On the contrary, a strong alternative ideology favoring the extension of the franchise makes it more likely that democracy emerges but has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of a revolution.
... Currently, the other participants are roughly divided into social organizations, enterprises and individuals, and function through government, market and voluntary supply [42]. The participation of multiple parties will be encouraged by more participants, diversified ways of participation and stable institutional rules [43]. ...
The natural forest protection and restoration (NFPR) system is imperfect due to contradictions between the objectives of natural forest protection and the reality of situations, outdated cultivation concepts, conflicting interests among participating parties, and the lack of regulation guarantees and assessment criteria. These problems are not only common in China but also in international forest protection. As the NFPR system is more focused on the protection of natural forests, the level of natural forest restoration in China has been poor, with low natural forest quality and forest productivity. At the same time, the value of natural forest ecosystem services does not match the demand of farmers, forest management, and other multiple participating parties. As a result, except for the government, other multiple parties lack the intrinsic motivation to participate in NFPR, ultimately forming a sustainable management dilemma. Under the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, the objective of this research was to explore the influencing factors and outcomes of the participation of multiple parties in NFPR and to construct a multiple parties’ participation mechanism for solving this dilemma. This research found that among external variables, multiple parties’ characteristics, biophysical conditions, attributes of community, and rules-in-use jointly influence and constitute the driving mechanism of multiple parties’ participation in NFPR. The rules-in-use directly impact the participation action scenario and regulate the other three external variables. Various factors and mechanisms in NFPR interact in the action space and produce outcomes that create positive incentives for each external variable, thus promoting the whole mechanism to achieve a virtuous cycle of sustainable management. This study provides a theoretical contribution to understanding the behavior of multiple parties participating in NFPR.
... Penataan kelembagaan ditentukan oleh beberapa unsur seperti aturan operasional untuk pengaturan pemanfaatan sumber daya, aturan kolektif untuk menentukan, menegakan hukum atau aturan itu sendiri, dan untuk merubah aturan operasional serta mengatur hubungan kewenangan organisasi. Oleh karena itu, untuk mewujudkan kebijakan pengelolaan diperlukan kelembagaan yang baku seperti tersaji pada gambar 7. Menurut Ostrom et al. (2007) kelembagaan akan mempengaruhi pelibatan aktor-aktor dan tujuan dalam pengelolaan, sehingga berimplikasi terhadap kondisi keberlanjutan sumber daya alam. Oleh karena itu, kelembagaan TNRA penting dibentuk untuk memperjelas aturan main dari masing-masing pemangku kepentingan terkait. ...
Konversi hutan mangrove akibat faktor anthropogenik semakin meningkat di Kawasan Taman Nasional Rawa Aopa. Kajian keanekaragaman biota hutan mangrove, valuasi lingkungan ekonomi mangrove telah banyak dilakukan, tetapi penelitian tentang kebijakan kelembagaan belum pernah dilakukan untuk mengantisipasi perubahan kawasan hutan mangrove. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis elemen pemanfaatan hutan mangrove; menganalisis peran lembaga yang terlibat dalam pengelolaan Taman Nasional Rawa Aopa; dan menganalisis model kelembagaan dalam pengelolaan Taman Nasional Rawa Aopa. Penelitian dilakukan selama bulan Juni sampai Desember 2021. Metode penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode teknik analisis Interpretif Structural Modeling (ISM). Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa 11 lembaga yang terkait dalam pengelolaan Taman Nasional Rawa Aopa terdapat tiga lembaga yakni (Balai Taman Nasional Rawa Aopa, Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara dan Dinas Lingkungan Hidup Propinsi Sulawesi Tenggara) yang memiliki pengaruh paling besar dan menjadi faktor kunci dalam perumusan kebijakan pemerintah dalam hal pengelolaan keberlanjutan hutan mangrove di TNRA. Elemen tujuan yang merupakan elemen kunci dalam pengembangan model pengelolaan Taman Nasional Rawa Aopa adalah penegakan supremasi hukum, dukungan antar pemangku kepentingan dan upaya perlindungan hutan mangrove TNRA untuk keberlanjutan flora dan fauna. Kondisi ini menjelaskan beberapa subelemen tersebut menjadi penggerak utama dan mempengaruhi subelemen pada level berikutnya. Kelembagaan pengelolaan hutan mangrove memiliki kinerja rendah karena ketiadaan kelembagaan khusus yang bertanggungjawab atas pengelolaan TNRA. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan kehadiran kelembagaan formal yang dibentuk berdasarkan memorandum understanding Balai TNRA Dinas Kehutanan dan Lingkungan Hidup Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara yang mampu mengakomodir kepentingan pemangku kepentingan dan bertanggungjawab atas pengelolaan hutan mangrove TNRA. Title: Policy on Sustainable Use of Mangrove Forest Using Interpretative Structural Modeling Techniques in Rawa Aopa National Park, Southeast SulawesiThe conversion of mangrove forests due to anthropogenic factors is increasing in the “Rawa Aopa National Park (RANP)” area. Studies of diversity and economic valuation have been widely carried out. Still, research on institutional policies has never been carried out to anticipate changes in mangrove forest areas. This study aims to analyze the elements uses of mangrove forest, the role of agencies in the RANP management, and institutional models. Research carried out from June to December 2021, which used the Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) analysis. The results show three institutions involved in management of the RANP Center consist of the Forestry Service and the Environment Service of Southeast Sulawesi Province. The three institutions have the most influence and are key factors in formulating government policies in terms of managing the sustainability of mangrove forests in RANP. The critical elements in developing the RANP management model are the enforcement of the law, support between stakeholders, and efforts to protect RANP mangrove forests for the sustainability of flora and fauna. Some of sub-elements are the main drivers and affect the sub-elements at the next level. However, the management institutions of mangrove forest have low performance due to the absence of particular institutions responsible for RANP management. Therefore, it is necessary to have a formal institutional presence formed based on a memorandum of understanding of the three institutions that can accommodate the interests of stakeholders and responsible for the management of mangrove forests..
... This research gap becomes even more significant as at the same time scholars complain about a general lack of understanding of pastoral systems and their institutions (Fernandez-Gimenez & Le Febre 2006). This is due to the fact that the most popular subjects for field studies on 'commons' have been participatory protected areas and forest management (see for example Agrawal 2007, Carney & Farrington 1998, Gibson, McKean & Ostrom 2000, Ostrom 1999), fisheries (see for example Basurto & Coleman 2010, Cinner et al. 2012, Haller & Merten 2008, Young 2010, and irrigation systems (see for example Ostrom 2008a, Sarker 2001, Svendsen 2005. Empirical evidence for natural resource use and institutional issues from pastoral or agropastoral societies is much less dense (for some well-known works see Agrawal 1999, Bromley 2001, Ensminger 1996, Ensminger & Rutten 1991. ...
It is well known that the development and adaptation capacities of rural communities in the developing world largely depend on the flexibility of the communities’ ‘social structure’ (the community as a norm-group itself, together with its ‘institutions’ as the legal, moral and ideological framework). ‘Structures’ that have been identified by research as being crucial for rural livelihoods are found to be specific non-market security structures that are based on concepts of solidarity, reciprocity, and kinship. It is also widely acknowledged that ‘agency’ (understood as the decision-making and action-taking of individuals, including their aims to influence others) also plays a role. However, very little is known about how the interplay between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ shapes institutional change and adaptation. Specifically, proper analytical frameworks for analyzing this interplay are missing. This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of development and adaptation capacities of rural communities against the backdrop of current mechanisms of social security and their evolution, to the interplay of different factors in such processes of institutional change, and the relationship between structure and agency, as well as to the required development of appropriate analytical frameworks. Empirical research was conducted on the Mahafaly Plateau in South-West Madagascar with three detailed micro-studies on cases of change, analyzing them through the lens of Contemporary Classical Institutional Economics and the Framework for Modeling Institutional Change (Ensminger 1992), then proposing suggestions on how to improve the framework. The cases reveal that indeed ‘agency’ is an important factor shaping institutional change on the local or regional level. Institutional change is found to be both driven by collective action as well as evolutionary mechanisms. Importantly, agency is influencing both of these mechanisms. The results may be transferred to other rural societies of the developing world that also base the enforcement of their formal institutions on orality, ideologically value personal freedom and procedural liberty, and show a high diversity of institutions of all kinds. For such societies, the results suggest that the societal environment on the one hand favors adaptation on the level of individuals or small groups and allows these actions to evolutionary change institutions. On the other hand, adaptation based on designed institutional change and collective action is difficult to plan and execute. The framework applied to the cases is shown to be suitable as it allows us to shed light on changes in institutions including ideology as a result of the interplay between individual actors and their behavior, changes in external factors such as relative prices, the constellations of actors, and their bargaining power. By modifying the framework by adding ‘agency’ as one of the core elements, the analysis becomes even more comprehensive.
... A governança ambiental de acordo com Young (2005) pode ser definida em dois grandes grupos em relação à escala da gestão. Um grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em nível local, considerados pequenos e que o autor, assim como Ostrom (2008 concordam que são mais eficientes na gestão ambiental. O segundo grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em escala maior, global em última instância, para os quais o autor identifica uma dificuldade para a aquisição dos resultados, inclusive porque falta um foco claro por parte da comunidade científica no sentido de definição de uma agenda comum de pesquisa capaz de agregar os diferentes campos disciplinares e abordagens acadêmicas. ...
Cogestão Adaptativa e Capital Social na Gestão de Unidades de
Conservação Integrais Brasileiras - O Estudo de Caso do Parque
Estadual da Ilha do Cardoso e da Comunidade do Marujá
... All rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability among humans" (Ostrom 2011, 17). This definition includes formalised laws and regulations (but of course goes far beyond legislative acts) and makes it possible to capture the whole range of participants' behaviour, from implementation of a law both in the letter and the spirit; to partial and selective implementation; and to shirking, circumventing and outright ignorance of the law (Cole 2017;Ostrom 2008). ...
China’s law to control international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) has sent shockwaves through international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and expert communities as the epitome of a worldwide trend of closing civic spaces. Since the Overseas NGO Management Law was enacted in January 2017, its implementation has seen mixed effects and diverging patterns of adaptation among Chinese party-state actors at the central and local levels and among domestic NGOs and INGOs. To capture the formal and informal dynamics underlying their mutual interactions in the longer term, this article employs a theory of institutional change inspired by Elinor Ostrom’s distinction between rules-in-form versus rules-in-use and identifies four scenarios for international civil society in China – “no change,” “restraining,” “recalibrating” and “reorienting.” Based on interviews, participant observation and Chinese policy documents and secondary literature, the respective driving forces, plausibility, likelihood and longer-term implications of each scenario are assessed. It is found that INGOs’ activities are increasingly affected by the international ambitions of the Chinese party-state, which enmeshes both domestic NGOs and INGOs as agents in its diplomatic efforts to redefine civil society participation on a global scale.
... Sosyal olguları etkileşimli eylem alanları olarak yapılandırma, hem araştırmacının tek seferde basitleştirilmiş bir probleme odaklanmasını sağlaması hem de gerektiğinde araştırmacının sosyal kurallar ve normlar ağının karmaşıklığı içerisinde boğulmadan birleştirilmiş eylem alanlarından ilgili tüm ayrıntılara bakma perspektifi sunması açısından çok önemlidir. Dahası, bu yaklaşım, kişinin hem tamamen betimleyici (yani sadece dışsal bir bakış açısıyla anlamaya çalışmak, toplumsal değişim sürecinde yer alan güçleri ve farklı türdeki sosyal düzenlemelerin ne tür çıktılar üretme eğiliminde olduklarını anlamaya çalışmak (Ostrom, 2008) ) hem de normatif analizler (belli bir kurum, kural değişikliğinin benimsenmesi lehine, belirli bir normatif bakış açısıyla tartışıldığı) yapmasına izin vermektedir. ...
Hukuk ve İktisat Yaklaşımı (Law and Economics Approach) genel olarak iktisat bilimindeki temel araçları, varsayımları ve metodolojiyi kullanarak formel ve informel kuralları ve kurumları inceleyen bir inter-disipliner / multi-disipliner araştırma alanıdır. Hukuk ve iktisat yaklaşımına dahil edilebilecek ya da bu disiplinle yakın akrabalık bağı olan diğer disiplinler arasında Regülasyon İktisadı, Mülkiyet Hakları İktisadı, İşlem Maliyetleri İktisadı, Akit (Sözleşme) Hukuku ve İktisadı, Kurumsal İktisat, Anayasal Politik İktisat, Sosyal Sermaye İktisadı, Kültürel İktisat, Vergi Hukuku, Suç ve Ceza İktisadı, vb. sayılabilir.
Bugüne değin Hukuk ve İktisat Yaklaşımı şemsiyesi altında bu saydığımız disiplinlerin bir ya da birkaçına doğrudan ve/veya dolaylı olarak yaptıkları katkılar dolayısıyla 10’un üzerinde bilim insanı Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü ile onurlandırılmışlardır.
... A governança ambiental de acordo com Young (2005) pode ser definida em dois grandes grupos em relação à escala da gestão. Um grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em nível local, considerados pequenos e que o autor, assim como Ostrom (2008 concordam que são mais eficientes na gestão ambiental. O segundo grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em escala maior, global em última instância, para os quais o autor identifica uma dificuldade para a aquisição dos resultados, inclusive porque falta um foco claro por parte da comunidade científica no sentido de definição de uma agenda comum de pesquisa capaz de agregar os diferentes campos disciplinares e abordagens acadêmicas. ...
The history of the fisheries management in the Patos Lagoon estuary is a ground in dispute. On the one hand, a group of researches has blamed the fishing communities of the Patos Lagoon estuary by the collapse of fish stocks and the national and international
gustavo g. m. moura | antônio c. s. diegues 117
context for the breakdown of the fishing industries. On the other, a second
group of researches has argued that national policies are responsible for
the collapse of fish stocks, the breakdown of fishing industries and social
crisis in the artisanal fishery. This chapter aims to produce a history of
governmentality of the fisheries management in the Patos Lagoon estuary.
From the Foucault’s approach, the research reveals that the production and
implementation of a modern fishery management system (MM) is resulted
from the mobilization of knowledges and truths made by an epistemic
community inside of the successive contexts of capitalist modernization
of fishing activities, including the civil-military Brazilian dictatorship. In
the implementation of the MM, the two fundamental problems of fisheries
emerge, the allocation and the conservation of fishery resources.
... [ [58][59][60][79][80][81][82][83][84] Involvement of parties Reliability and consistency of partners, continuity of staff in organizations. [15,50,54] ...
Although social learning is a key element of multilevel flood risk governance, it is hardly studied. This paper addresses this knowledge gap. The paper aims to identify enabling conditions for social learning in multilevel flood risks governance arrangements. We first conceptualize social learning and draw up a conceptual framework consisting of enabling conditions for social learning, using the literature on adaptive co-management, sustainable land and water management, and integrated flood risk management. Next, we apply this framework to analyze social learning in the context of the Dutch Room for the River program. Our interview results reveal that social learning about integrated flood protection measures took place at multiple levels. We found that a strong personal commitment to learning and mutual interpersonal trust in working groups are key conditions for successful social learning. Based on our analysis, we conclude with some recommendations for enhancing social learning processes in future flood protection programs.
... The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework aims at examining the use of collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). ...
... The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework aims at examining the use of collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). ...
... Petani pemilik, penggarap, dan buruh tani merupakan aktor dominan di tingkat tapak yang berinteraksi langsung dengan pengelolaan lingkungan di kawasan hutan rakyat, namun secara organisasi lemah. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan konfigurasi aturan yang seimbang, yaitu harus ada proses pilihan aturan berdasarkan informasi yang relatif akurat tentang kinerja komparatif dalam lingkungan tertentu, dan mempertahankan peraturan yang berkinerja lebih baik sesuai kriteria efisiensi, keadilan, akuntabilitas, dan keberlanjutan (Ostrom, 2007). ...
[ACTOR ANALYSIS IN FORMULATING INSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR COMMUNITY-FOREST DEVELOPMENT IN BOGOR REGENCY].
Bogor regency has an area of 16,945 hectares’ community-forests or 22% of the forest area in the regency. Institutional problems of community-forest management include weak interaction of actors within the organization. Since the organization is part of the institution, its existence becomes an important technical part in securing the operation of the institution. Objectives of this research on analyzing actors and the institution in the community-forest area are: (1) to determine the dominant key actors in community-forests action arena; and (2) to formulate community-forests development institutional models. Qualitative descriptive analysis of actors and institutions employs content analysis. Key actors analysis utilized ISM (Interpretive Structural Modeling) analysis methods. Results of the analysis identified seven key actors in community forest management, namely UPTD BP3K, landowners who lives outside the village, farmer landowners, land tenants, farm labors, lumbermens, and middlemen. Of the seven key actors, four key actors are the most dominant in the community-forest action arena, which are farmer landowners, farm labors, lumbermens and middlemen. There are three models of community-forest management institutions for capacity development actors, namely the institutional model related to venture capital, handling waste of resources, and coordination. This study recommends the necessity to strengthen dominant actors at site level according to the criteria of efficiency, equity, and sustainability. The policy makers need to optimize the capacity and coordination function of government agencies through the institutional coordination model.
... North (1984North ( , 1990North ( , 1991 and Williamson (2000), stated that bureaucratic inertia is mainly affected by the outcome of a complex process of playing the economic game according to formal and informal rules that provide incentive structures and channel innovative activities in a certain direction. It means that stakeholders can be successful in using and managing their resources if they can meet their institutions with its contexts (Ostrom 2008), in which the different contexts and cultures can create different institutions because the same rule cannot be executed in different social contexts (Agrawal 2001). ...
... A governança ambiental de acordo com Young (2005) pode ser definida em dois grandes grupos em relação à escala da gestão. Um grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em nível local, considerados pequenos e que o autor, assim como Ostrom (2008 concordam que são mais eficientes na gestão ambiental. O segundo grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em escala maior, global em última instância, para os quais o autor identifica uma dificuldade para a aquisição dos resultados, inclusive porque falta um foco claro por parte da comunidade científica no sentido de definição de uma agenda comum de pesquisa capaz de agregar os diferentes campos disciplinares e abordagens acadêmicas. ...
... Better said these methods can be seen as propositions for 11 The IAD framework was developed by Ostrom and colleagues at Indiana University (Ostrom 1990) to provide researchers a systematic way to examine how institutions related to NR interact with biophysical or material conditions, and the characteristics of a community and individuals within that community to produce collective decisions and individual behavioral outcomes. It has most commonly been used to examine collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). 12 Based on the IAD framework, the IFRI research program developed an approach based on a set of standard protocols to empirically assess the governance of shared forest resources (Ostrom 2007;Wollenberg, Merino et al. 2007). ...
Discussion paper on the methodologies used to map institutions in Sentinel Landscapes
... The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework aims at examining the use of collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). ...
... Rules can be classified into seven broad types (see box at the left side of Fig. 1) which define in general: who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, which actions are allowed or constrained, which aggregation rules will be used, which procedures must be followed, which information must or must not be provided and which payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom 2008;Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010;Crawford and Ostrom 1995). Ostrom et al. (1994, pp. ...
It is often claimed that participation empowers local actors and that an inclusive decision-making process is crucial for rural development. We aim to investigate how formal and informal rules are set in local decision-making processes and how those rules may impact the actual level of participation by local actors. In a comparative case study, the rules-in-use for the planning of community projects in Thailand are examined. For our analysis, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which allows for more precise analysis of the impact of the rules. Fifty-three villages are served by four selected Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO) which are either known for success in achieving participation or ranked as problematic in implementing the decentralization and local participation goals of the Thai government. The study is based on 60 semi-structured interviews with TAO staff, a survey of village leaders in 50 villages and a household survey of 104 villagers. We scrutinize seven types of rules and show some particular differences in terms of the impact from the rules-in-use. In the TAOs ranked as less participatory, the attendance rate in the meetings is found to be lower (boundary rule), villagers are informed about a meeting with a shorter notice (information rule) and more villagers mention that elites interfere in the project selection process (aggregation rule). A high level of fuzziness appeared in the position and authority rules. Further, we obtained information on the particular deontic logic, showing generally a high share of de facto may-statements in the implementation of the rules. We conclude that if the policy goal is enhancing participation, rule-setting offers good scope for intervention. From a practical perspective, information on administrative procedures has to be made more accessible and public administrators should receive procedural training.
... In order for rules to be effective, efficient and (perceived as) fair, the rule-making process needs to be participatory in nature and responsive to changing context conditions and needs (Ostrom, 1990(Ostrom, , 2000. Tinkering with rules is necessary to establish the combination of rules best suited to address particular situations, rather than striving for optimal, permanent or unique rules (Ostrom, 2008). ...
Collective action is a community resource crucial to ensure the resilience of communities. However, maintaining cooperation over time is also a significant challenge. Arguing that a major, though neglected, precondition for community resilience is sustained cooperation, this paper analyses the conditions triggering collective action in collective housing communities. Particular attention is paid to micro-level pathways through which characteristics of the common courtyard and the related rules for its use play for the maintenance or decay of collective action. The contours of an integrated theory of sustained cooperation is sketched. Drawing on Goal Framing (GF) theory and Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory, it is argued that CPR management institutions can only be effective in a community in which a normative goal frame is salient. Empirical material is presented from a multi-method comparative case study of four low-income urban collective housing communities in Mexico City in 2010. This evidence corroborates both approaches: the two communities characterized by sustained collective action exhibit a salient normative frame in combination with all elements of CPR managing institutions, whereas the two communities with failed collective action do not meet these conditions. The results suggest that both mechanisms are necessary for sustained cooperation to occur.
The study of complex adaptive systems (CAS) has garnered significant attention across interdisciplinary research, particularly within the realms of social and natural sciences. This paper delves into the multifaceted nature of CAS, exploring its definitions, components, and properties, drawing from various scholarly perspectives. It examines the agricultural sector as a prime example of a CAS, highlighting the interactions, adaptations, and emergent behaviors within farming communities. Using the Konya Closed Basin in Türkiye as a case study, the paper elucidates how agricultural landscapes exemplify the complexities inherent in CAS, underscoring the intricate interplay between human activities, environmental dynamics, and socio-economic factors. By recognizing these interactions, decision-makers can create more efficient and resilient strategies for managing water resources, enhancing crop production, and reducing the effects of climate variability. This comprehensive approach emphasizes the role of adaptation, self-organization, and emergent behaviors in promoting sustainable farming practices and maintaining ecological balance over the long term. Through this analysis, the paper contributes to a deeper understanding of CAS and its implications for sustainable agricultural development and resource management.
The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) has been established for more than 15 years, but limited attention has been given to how the changing political environment may affect the policy. We address this gap by investigating how the EU enlargement after 2004 affected the ETS and how the effects have been buffered. We develop a framework of institutional resilience to investigate how the established norms and institutional constellation of the EU legislative triumvirate have been instrumental for buffering the effects of the enlargement on ETS policymaking. We find that the existing power structure and functional complementarity of the EU legislative settings have fostered a consensus-building atmosphere in the ETS decision-making to accommodate preference heterogeneity and to absorb the compositional impact after the enlargement. The findings highlight the importance of contextual factors and institutional settings in ETS analysis and suggest a new perspective for assessing dynamic ETS performance.
Ecuador constitutes a fascinating case study to explore land policies and reforms. Since colonial times, it has experienced prolonged and ongoing struggles to transform land institutions. This paper investigates how, across levels, historic institutional factors affected land-use decision making in the Mindo parish and western foothills of Pichincha, Ecuador, as perceived by its landowners. Following techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory, we identify four main periods of institutional change related to land by relying on the narratives of landowners. These periods are: a) colonial institutions-hacienda feudal modes of production; b) the way toward an Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law; c) rural development after the Agrarian Reform; and d) forest conservation incentives versus 'neo-extractivism' practices. We reconstruct and explore these in light of the existing literature. Along with individual and collective perceptions, we are also concerned with the drivers underlying these institutional changes and the structure of these changes. Lastly, we discuss and provide conclusions on the key issues that help us explain institutional change in the study area, including theoretical explanations about cognitive variation (cultural-cognitive), power relationships, individual ability to change and perceive, as well as the system's capacity to reorganize, persist, and reproduce.
We study whether and when a second-order collective action problem, like the change of existing formal rules governing cooperation, can be resolved to ultimately solve first-order collective good dilemmas. We do so by examining the conditions under which individuals change cooperation rules when both their material incentives to cooperate and their social preferences for outcome distributions differ. Our experimental findings show that proselfs who benefit the most from cooperation are most likely to initiate a rule change to a higher minimum contribution level. Regarding prosocials, we find that their underlying motives in favour or against this rule change vary depending on their relative earnings’ position. If they are ‘wealthy’, that is, they have a higher earnings potential, they are more concerned about equality. When they are relatively ‘less wealthy’, they seem to care more about enhancing collective outcomes.
Apple production in Republic of Macedonia is an important sector that highly contributes to the economy in terms of employment and income, especially for small-scale farmers in Prespa Region. Th us, producing around 67 percent of the total apple yield in the country in 2012 year is. Therefore, apples are mostly sold at local green markets, which are still dominant points of marketing left by the old socialist system. The rationale is that, the governance structure aff ects other decisions (directly or not) taken by farmers with regard to the membership status and choice of transaction partner. In apple production, traders are other transaction structures besides the cooperative that operates in the apple supply chain in R. Macedonia. With respect to each set of decisions, hypotheses were formulated as study guides. Specifically, these hypotheses relate to
determinants associated with different trading partners (cooperative, traders and combined) and commitment factors in the governance structure of the cooperative.
A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.
In her groundbreaking work, Elinor Ostrom suggested that communities are able to self-organize and develop rules which allow them to effectively manage common-pool resources while avoiding the “tragedy of the commons”, as proposed by Hardin. Based on empirical case studies of how forests, irrigation, grazing land and fisheries are organized all over the world, Ostrom suggested several principles that can serve as guidelines for managing common-pool resources. In the 21st century new initiatives have been based on sharing. There are various examples such as car and bike sharing in cities, internet platforms such as Wikipedia, community gardens and many others. There is a reason to believe that these efforts will continue to grow and become more popular as people realise the economic, social and ecological benefits. The aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent Ostrom’s findings are relevant to these new, often urbanised or digitalised forms of sharing. Can the famous design principles for which she won the Nobel prize be applied or do we need to search for a different set of principles that are more suitable for these new emerging forms of ‘the commons’? Our findings suggest that although Ostrom’s framework needs to be adapted before being applied to the reality of urban and digitalised environments, some of her findings remain relevant.
The success of cooperative sector in many countries (such as Italy or Germany) shows that in the modern world there is room for different ownership and management models. Editors have assembled a creative team of associates from seven countries that in this special edition of LIMES PLUS journal allow readers to confront the scientific
analysis of the phenomenon of the cooperative sector and the common goods, and to meet their specific development characteristics in different countries, and sectors (from agriculture to banking). Field studies were carried out in countries with different traditions (from Italy with a strong cooperative sector to Poland, where after the Soviet cooperation model we can follow the development of new forms).
This chapter explores how the institutional dynamic of modernization limits the potential for the sustainability of urban water systems in Europe (UWSEs), revealing a paradox. Modernization brings with it an increased number of rules intended to regulate UWSEs in a harmonious and sustainable way. However, it appears inherently unable to bring about such a development. This failure comes from the ambivalent effect of the increase in the number of rules in UWSEs, which both generate regulations and inconsistencies. This multiplication of the number of rules stems from two different mechanisms of UWSEs’ expansion (expansion by means of control, and expansion by means of self-organization), which can conflict and impede high coherence of governance.
We develop a framework that quantifies the effect of social norms on the efficient functioning of institutions and thereby their impact on effectiveness of reforms for sustaining common pool water resources under conditions of scarcity. We derive theoretical results and use numerical simulations to provide evidence for performance of a group of farmers that use a common pool resource (reservoir or aquifer) with and without norms, with various marginal utility levels from norm adherence, and with various existing (Social Planner) institutional setting considered in the theoretical model. The theoretical results suggest that with no water trade and with norm adherence, water users will always use less water than the no norms scenario. With possible inter-group water trade, norm-adhering water users would replace excess extraction with increased trade rates. Simulation results for the no-trade case suggest that with higher marginal utility values from norm adherence, the resource is sustained for significantly longer periods.
Contract farming is based on agreements settled prior to the farmer deciding about agricultural production, and influence their judgment regarding inputs and production systems. Therefore, they provide means of production coordination and safety for both farmer and agro-industry/distributor. However, contract farming has its gaps since it is written in abscence of complete information, due to the behavioral assumption of bounded rationality of economic agents. A specific law might generate legal certainty for economic agents, insofar as the Judiciary fulfills the contractual gaps. From the other side, private agents may also fulfill the contractual gaps. As an effort to understand the role of institutions in contract farming, this study aims to analyze the Bill 6,459/2013, which intends to rule contract farming and takes private instituctions into account, through the agency of the Monitoring, Development and Reconciliation of Integration Committee (Cadec). This is an applied research with qualitative approach. The research concludes that the approval of bill might lead to effective typical law for contract farming, provided that the creation of Cadec is encouraged.
Most powerful social science analytical tools are well suited for studying static situations. Static and mechanistic analysis however, is not adequate to understand the changing world in which we live. In order to adequately address the most pressing social and environmental challenges looming ahead, we need to develop analytical tools for analyzing dynamic situations - particularly institutional change. In this paper we develop an analytical tool to study institutional change, more specifically the evolution of rules and norms. We believe that in order for such an analytical tool to be useful to develop a general theory of institutional change, it needs to enable the analyst to understand the processes of change in multiple specific settings so that lessons from such settings can eventually be integrated into a more general predictive theory of change.
Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems
In this article, I recount the intellectual journey that was mine during the last half century. The "Institutional Analysis and Development" (IAD) framework enabled a number of colleagues and me to undertake a series of empirical case studies of common resources management around the world. Over time, a clear set of micro-situational outcomes emerged to identify structural factors that affect likelihood of increased social cooperation. It is now necessary to develop more comprehensive approaches to study more fully the factors that promote or hinder the emergence and robustness of these self-organized polycentric systems. If we really want to understand the complexity of the governance of economic and ecological systems, we should fully embrace it.
Ce papier propose d’adapter le cadre proposé par Schlager et Ostrom (1992) pour analyser les droits de propriété appliqués à la gestion de ressources communes, afin de réaliser une étude dynamique de régimes de propriété dans le cas de la gestion de ressources génétiques animales. Les ressources génétiques animales, et notamment les races de ruminants (bovins et ovins) sont des ressources communes (appartenant à des communautés d’éleveurs) qui ont fait jusqu’à présent peu l’objet de privatisation comparativement aux ressources végétales (variétés appartenant à des firmes). En décrivant l’évolution de différents « régimes institutionnels de sélection » de ces ressources sur le temps long, et leur déstabilisation actuelle du fait de changements politiques et technologiques (notamment dans le cadre de la sélection génomique), nous montrons en quoi ces ressources communes ne sont pas uniquement des ressources biologiques. Elles sont étroitement liées à des ressources informationnelles et des dispositifs de gestion et de production du progrès génétique, qui représentent une forme de propriété intangible. Nous étudions la co-génération de ressources génétiques et informationnelles, en focalisant l’analyse sur l’évolution des régimes de propriété et des structures de gouvernance associés à ce système de ressources. En effet, une analyse uniquement en termes de droits de propriété sur les ressources biologiques ne permettrait pas de comprendre les changements actuels. Nous montrons en quoi ce cadre, pris dans une perspective dynamique, permet de mettre à jour des changements invisibles autrement, notamment la déstabilisation d’un régime institutionnel vu au travers de sa composante informationnelle.
Cette thèse a pour objet la modernisation des Systèmes Hydriques Urbains de l’Europe des XV (SHUE). Débutant à la fin des années 1990, ce processus de rerégulation des SHUE opère une transformation du cadre réglementaire européen de la gestion de l’eau. Il vise une amélioration du fonctionnement de la gouvernance afin, notamment, d’imprimer une trajectoire soutenable aux SHUE. Or, les bilans intermédiaires s’avèrent mitigés et mettent en avant un besoin de caractérisation et d’explication analytiques de la modernisation des SHUE, afin d’en cerner les effets non anticipés. Par conséquent, la thèse aborde les effets de la modernisation des SHUE dans ses dimensions organisationnelle et soutenable.
L’objectif de la thèse consiste à fournir une interprétation des impacts de la modernisation sur la structure de la gouvernance des SHUE et sur son efficacité dans une perspective de soutenabilité. Ancrée dans une approche d’économie institutionnelle, la démarche adoptée compare les modèles allemand, français et anglais et s’organise en deux temps. Le premier temps relève de l’observation empirique. Les phénomènes caractérisant la modernisation sont identifiés et formulés sous la forme de faits stylisés. Le second temps explique théoriquement ces phénomènes. Au regard des apports et limites des différents institutionnalismes, il est choisi de mobiliser le courant néoinstitutionnaliste pour rendre compte des aspects organisationnels et l’approche par les Régimes institutionnels de ressources pour traiter de la dimension soutenable de la modernisation des SHUE.
Cette thèse soutient que la modernisation entraîne une mutation des modalités de coordination des SHUE, tout en intensifiant et polarisant les problèmes de soutenabilité autour du pilier économique. Au niveau organisationnel, nous mettons en évidence que, d’une part, la modernisation tend à dépolitiser les SHUE et que, d’autre part, le degré d’intégration de ses principes dans un SHUE est positivement corrélé à une dynamique socio-institutionnelle résilience. Ces deux phénomènes résultent principalement d’une hybridation des arrangements institutionnels en direction du pôle marché. Le changement des formes contractuelles et l’atténuation des droits de propriété au sein des SHUE réduisent le contrôle direct de l’Etat et augmenter la capacité de rapide adaptation des acteurs. A propos du potentiel de soutenabilité, un manque de cohérence dans le développement de la rerégulation des SHUE explique les perspectives relativement pessimistes. Nous montrons que ce paradoxe manifeste une incapacité intrinsèque de la modernisation à maximiser le potentiel de soutenabilité des SHUE. Si le développement de la réglementation est censé améliorer la qualité de la gouvernance, dans notre cas, elle s’accompagne d’un accroissement mécanique de coûts de coordination entravant l’atteinte d’une trajectoire soutenable.
The common property meadows in the Swiss Alps have been managed by local self-organized governance systems since the Middle Ages, thus preventing their overuse. During the past century, socioeconomic developments, such as industrialization and rapid nonagricultural economic growth, have shifted employment opportunities from the agricultural sector towards the service sector. In the agricultural sector, this has led to less intensive use and maintenance of the meadows in the Alps and consequently to a reduction in biodiversity. We use the example of Grindelwald in the Swiss Alps to analyze how the governance system has adapted to these socioeconomic developments. We based our analysis on the Program in Institutional Analysis of Social-Ecological Systems (PIASES). We coded five statutes ranging in date from 1867 to 2003, and conducted interviews to investigate changes in the governance system. In so doing, we focused on changes in the operational rules that structure the focal interactions between the social system and the ecological system, namely harvesting level and investment activities. Our results show that the governance system has adapted to the socioeconomic changes (1) by creating an additional organizational subunit that allows appropriators to alter operational rules relatively autonomously, and (2) through changing several operational rules. We conclude by outlining the properties of the governance system that have allowed for constant harvesting levels and investment activities over time.
Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis—together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players—we derive the prediction that the exit option will drain the community or group more of cooperators than of defectors.
But experimental data do not support this prediction; cooperators do not leave more frequently than defectors and, in fact, there is evidence that defectors are more prone to leave than cooperators. We consider and reject the possibility that this failure of prediction results from the (admitted) greater optimism of cooperators about the incidence of cooperation “here,” and present data supporting the hypothesis that cooperators often stay when their personal interest is with exiting because of the same ethical or group-regarding impulse that (presumably) led them to cooperate in the first place. Cooperation can be produced for a group or community either by inducing people to cooperate or by inducing those who are going to cooperate to stay in the game, and ethical considerations seem to underlie the decision to stay as well as the decision to cooperate while staying.
Decentralization has emerged as an important instrument of environmental and development policy in the last two decades. Presumed benefits of environmental policy decentralization depend in significant measure on broad participation in the programs that governments create to decentralize decision making related to resource management. This paper uses data from protected areas in Nepal’s Terai to examine who participates in environmental decentralization programs. On the basis of our statistical analysis, we highlight the fact that the likelihood of participation in community-level user groups is greater for those who are economically and socially better-off. We also find that individuals who have greater access to and who visit government offices related to decentralization policies more often are also more likely to participate in user groups created by state officials. Finally, we find a negative correlation between education and levels of participation. Our study and analysis support the argument that for decentralization policies to be successful on equity issues, it is important to build institutional mechanisms that encourage poorer and more marginal households to access government officials, improve access to educational opportunities, and create incentives to promote more interactions between less powerful rural residents and government officials.