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Developing a Method for Analyzing Institutional Change

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"If we are to understand these changes, we must develop new tools (Jones, 2003). Several colleagues and I are in the early stages of a study of the 'dynamics of rules' (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2004; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). We will use agent based modeling as one of our tools since that does enable one to examine the pattern of likely outcomes over time when agents who have limited information are making choices over time (Janssen, 2002). We also intend to study institutional choice overtly, both in the experimental laboratory as well as in the field with companion modeling by participants who have experience in working with irrigation, fisheries, and forest resources (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004; Cardenas, 2000; Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis, 2000; Bousquet et al., 2002). We have already examined the difference in cooperative behavior when participants in an open-access foraging experiment have a chance to choose rules to regulate their behavior as contrasted to just learning from experience about the structure of the experiment (Janssen et al., 2006). "The remainder of the paper is organized in the following fashion. In the first main section, I provide an overview of our findings from studying irrigation systems in the field so that readers who are not familiar with our prior research gain an initial sense of these findings. In the next section, I provide a second overview--this time of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework that we have been developing at the Workshop since the early 1980s in an effort to provide a general method for doing institutional analysis (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994; Ostrom, 2005). In the third section, I introduce the possibility of looking at the change of rules as an evolutionary process. "The new method for studying the evolution of rules, which is introduced in the fourth section, will be based on the IAD framework and on our long-term study of rules related to irrigation systems. Before one can really think of developing a general theory of institutional change, it is helpful to begin to understand change in a specific type of setting. The method will focus on a technique for arraying a norm and rule inventory and recording changes in that inventory over time brought about by diverse processes for making changes. In the conclusion, I return to the question as to why it is important to authorize resource users' relative autonomy in the development of their own rules and to learn from the resulting institutional diversity. Rule diversity can generate higher outcomes than the institutional monocropping of imposed rules by external experts (Evans, 2004)."

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... The sustainable governance of land and water resources has become one of the major challenges for environmental policy in the 21 st century due to factors such as population growth, climate variability and uncertainty, regulatory requirements, and transboundary considerations [3,[8][9][10][11]. Addressing the challenges posed for sustainable resource governance is hampered by serious knowledge gaps and the lack of a sound conceptual base to understand learning and change in multilevel governance regimes [3,[12][13][14]. In this light, more emphasis has to be given to network governance and processes of social learning [5,15,16]. ...
... Multi-loop social learning goes much further than just learning in a group setting, it involves 'understanding the limitations of existing institutions and mechanisms of governance and experimenting with multi-layered, learning oriented and participatory forms of governance' [88]. Addressing challenges posed for the sustainable governance of land and water resources requires, therefore, a sound knowledge base and (technical) capacity at both national and local levels to understand learning and change in multi-level governance regimes [3,[12][13][14]106]. An important mechanism to foster multi-loop social learning is to have a driven emergent leadership (consisting of technically competent actors and stakeholders) with a clear vision that begin to challenge the existing assumptions and act as a persistent driving force to facilitate and coordinate the development of new knowledge, infrastructure and various inputs from other actors and stakeholders [105,108,119]. ...
... Tolerance of ambiguity [80,82] Promoting system orientation and system thinking [27,41] Vertical and horizontal integrated cooperation through networked governance [21,108,113] Crisis events, climate change and uncertainty [8,111,112,121] Openness and commitment to change and learning [79,148] Facilitating institutional interplay [107,108] Innovative learning structures and partnerships [21,36,51,87,109,125,126] Political support and buy-in [8,111,112] Capability for critical self-reflection [21,49,79,114,149] Extended participation and engagement [27,41,137] Commitment to ongoing multi-loop social learning [41,49] National and regional funding and support instruments [114] Locus or perceptions of power and control [81,111] Co-management through collaboration and negotiation [27,41,107,109] Sound knowledge base and (technical) capacity [3,[12][13][14]112] Supportive regulatory frameworks [8,111,112,114,121] Flexibility and open-mindedness [111,150,151] Developing bridging organizations that facilitate integration and synthesis of knowledge [5,41,107,110,138] Emergent leadership with clear vision [111,114,124] Reliable, consistent and respectful of others' viewpoints [49,148] Facilitating ongoing reflection & reflexivity by embracing an intentional approach to learning [5,41,86,87,94,139,140] Advanced information management [42,112,126] Creating an enabling and democratic environment characterized by informal and open discourse [21,41,49,114,124] Dealing with sustainability management issues from a regional scale level [34,49,131,132] Following rules and principles of dialogue [27,41] Building trust, good will and mutual understanding [49,111,] and may provide a defensive wall against uncertainties [153]. Schön calls this tendency dynamic conservatism-the fight to remain the same -and emphasizes that people must learn to understand, guide, influence and manage these transformations as well as become adept at reflecting and learning. ...
Article
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Managing social-ecological systems and human well being in a sustainable way requires knowledge of these systems in their full complexity. Multi-loop social learning is recognized as a crucial element to sustainable decision-making for land and water resources management involving a process of managing change where the central methodological concern is with effectively engaging the necessary participation of system members in contributing to the collective knowledge of the system. Ensuring the inclusion of the community of concern may help to ensure robust knowledge, the necessary plurality of views, responsibility sharing and trust enhancement. This will also provide more dynamic lines of input to problem solving: local and changing forms of knowledge, emerging concerns and constraints all feed into an ongoing decision-making process. This conceptual paper is focused specifically on identifying the key drivers and conditions that facilitate multi-loop social learning and the untapped potential of virtual learning platforms in this context. The hyper-connectivity that characterizes digitally mediated networks opens up significant possibilities for information exchange, knowledge creation, feedback, debate, learning and innovation, social networking, and so on. This paper provides a thorough literature review of the conditions and affordances that are conducive to multi-loop social learning in the context of sustainable land and water governance. The insights from this review confirm the potential of a ‘learning ecology’ or virtual learning platform for knowledge co-production, trust building, sense making, critical self-reflection, vertical and horizontal collaboration, and conflict resolution, while serving as a facilitating platform between different levels of governance, and across resource and knowledge systems. To conclude this paper, a developmental research agenda is proposed to refine and improve understanding of multi-loop social learning processes and their effective facilitation through virtual learning platforms.
... The typical association of such consequences is a physiological or material punishment or a reward. There is, however, growing awareness that the prediction of human behaviour can be improved if one considers alternative, more internalised consequences as well (Ostrom 2008) such as self-blame or self-praise. We therefore distinguish three types of enforcement mechanisms based on the character of incentives they provide: 1. material or physiological enforcement (mp), 2. social enforcement (s), and 3. moral enforcement (m) Material or physiological enforcement (mp) is mainly based on incentives which influence the material well-being as domain of quality of life (Cummis 1996) or physiological needs satisfaction (Maslow 1987). ...
... Moral Enforcement (m) in contrast does not rely on outside incentives to comply with an imperative. Ostrom (2005Ostrom ( , 2008 relates moral enforcement to the institution of norms where internal rewards or sanctions add or deduct value to the actor's utility function. ...
... The acceptance of an external incentive seems to crucially support complementarity with social and moral enforcement. This has strong implications for a sophisticated social planner and supports calls for participatory policy making (Ostrom & Nagendra 2006, Ostrom 2008. The government has not to waste resources by enforcing rules which farmers do not expect and accept to be externally enforced! ...
Article
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Institutional development in communal resource management under environmentally stress crucially depends on successful user cooperation. By adapting economic experiments to the conditions of communal areas of southern Namibia we analyze the context, evolution and stability of preferences and social norms of resource users related to cooperation which strongly affect their livelihoods, rural development and environmental sustainability. Based on a wide range of experiments combined with surveys and other empirical field methods undertaken between 2000 and 2010 we concentrate in this paper on two topics: the measure of social preferences that are detrimental to economic development and which were widely neglected in the experimental literature until recently. Second, we focus on the efficiency of internal and external enforcement mechanisms for cooperative water use within the context of participatory water management reforms in Namibia.
... The typical association of institutional consequences is a physiological or material punishment or reward. The prediction of human behaviour can, however, be improved if one considers alternative, more internalised consequences as well (Ostrom 2008) such as self-blame or self-praise. For our analysis we will distinguish three types of enforcement mechanisms based on the character of incentives which they provide: ...
... Moral enforcement (m), in contrast, does not rely on external incentives to comply with an imperative. Ostrom (2005Ostrom ( , 2008 relates moral enforcement to the institution of norms where internal rewards or sanctions add or deduct value to the actor's utility function. Moral enforcement is based on incentives influencing emotional well-being within the domain of the quality of life satisfaction (Cummin 1996, Frey and Stutzer 2002), or, in Maslow's (1987 words the satisfaction of the norm addressees' needs for self-esteem and self-actualisation. ...
... He stresses that it is cheaper to adapt external enforcement to existing social institutions because the costs of altering norms are higher compared to altering rules. Ostrom (2008) argues that the actors have to agree to any institutional change which implicitly means that the change has to be internalised to a minimum degree. Formal institutions survive due only to the legitimacy bestowed by the socio-cultural system (Cleaver 2000). ...
Article
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In our research region in southern Namibia ineffective enforcement contributes to natural resource degradation. We analyse the root causes of ineffective enforcement applying multiple methods such as small surveys, economic experiments as well as case studies. Our conceptual framework distinguishes between moral, social, and material enforcement. Transactions costs of altering, monitoring and enforcing institutions vary depending on the used enforcement instrument. This has implications for policy making. In a second step we analyse water and rangeland management regulations in the research area through the filter of our conceptual framework. We observe that the rural water supply reform is also making considerable progress because an institutional framework has been established which makes efficient use of different enforcement instruments. In contrast, Namaland rangeland management is characterized by ambiguous and inconsequent exogenous and endogenous material enforcement and conflicting moral norms. In a third step we apply economic experiments in order to gain additional insights into the characteristics of selected elements of the framework in the context of our case studies. The experiments help us to bridge the gap between abstract concepts and real life observations. We found that social enforcement had the strongest impact on encouraging cooperative behaviour. We conclude that existing moral and social norms should be considered as starting points for the establishment of formal rules because norms are more costly to establish but cheaper to apply. The rule addressees' acceptance of external material enforcement influences whether it substitutes or complements more internal enforcement.
... Contreras-Hermosilla/ Fay (2005)/ Peluso (1992 cited by Hideyuki & Xin 2008); see also Dogmo (2008a,b). 16 Ostrom (1998Ostrom ( , 2005Ostrom ( , 2007; Berkes (2002Berkes ( , 2006; Agrawal (2002). 17 Priscoli (1998). ...
... In another example Ostrom (2005) highlights that one can think of human interactions as situations composed of actors choosing among actions at particular stages of a decisionmaking process. 202 She shows also that before predicting likely actions of actors and resulting outcomes, a theorist must make assumptions about the individual participants the information they have, their preferences, and how they make decisions. ...
... CPSWG builds a network of key individuals representing stakeholders and institutions at the local level (FMU level). 212 Adapted from Ostrom (2005). 213 Adapted from Buttoud (1999a.)) ...
Article
The structure of this working paper is as follows. In the first part after the introduction, the theory underlying the IGS is discussed (Chapter 2); specifically the conceptual framework for which the IGS of a forest management planning design can be developed. Five concepts are discussed here, namely the rationalist view of forest planning versus the community based view of planning on the one hand, and the “common”, the “co-management” and the participatory and conflict management concept on the other. Then, based on the problem resulting from these five theories, the next section addresses the need for a new approach in forest planning. The second part of this working report emphasises the design of the institutional governance system (IGS), built primarily on the basis of the ‘institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework’ developed by Ostrom and colleagues.31 This approach facilitates the analysis of the actors’ interactions and incentives in a given forest planning process (chapter 3). The IGS also incorporates interactive and active participatory forest planning and conflict management (democratic resolution of a problem) based on the establishment of a working group called the Combined Planning System Working Group (CPSWG), and also communication/consultation, negotiation and consensus building (Chapter 4). The third part of this report highlights the conclusions of the study (Chapter 5). --
... Additionally, in recent years, new institutional economics, with which the grammar is associated, addressed in particular issues like ideology and mental models (Denzau and North, 1994;North, 2005), which can be best represented within institutional analysis with the help of delta parameters. This paper is a contribution to a currently emerging strain of literature, which is working on the adaptation and use of the grammar of institutions in empirical studies (Basurto et al., 2009;Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl, 2008;Ostrom, 2008;Schlüter and Vollan, 2009;Smajgl et al., 2008). 2 Its aim is to advance the usefulness and therefore increase the applicability of the grammar. ...
... In the following we propose a possible avenue for empirically investigating the grammar of institutions further. So far the grammar of institutions is still a theoretical construct, where only first attempts at empirical application have been made (Basurto et al., 2009;Ostrom, 2008;Schlüter, 2008;Schlüter and Vollan, 2009). 20 However, empirical applicability is the litmus test for the usefulness of the grammar. ...
... However, being an inductive learner and pattern-matcher (Holland et al., 1986;North, 2005: 27), this person might quickly transfer internal deltas from a similar realm of life to the institutional setting around the dishwasher, as shown in the description of the dishwasher norm above. Ostrom (2008) started this process of classification for an empirical case. This avenue would need to be elaborated further, so that delta parameters become more nuanced and that the entire array of sanctions (including internal, external deltas and fines) would be covered. ...
Article
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The grammar of institutions developed by Crawford and Ostrom presents a common syntax for analysing institutions and dismantles them into their components. This is a promising undertaking given the huge diversity of definitions of institutions, even within a single discipline. Additionally, the grammar opens a long existing black box regarding why individuals do or do not follow an institution. It differentiates between formal sanctions ('or elses' in the language of the grammar) which are already well analysed and more moral and emotion based factors (so called delta parameters). This process of differentiation is currently widely observed, particularly in economics. Recognising that it is a necessary step forward in analysing institutions, this paper analyses and develops the grammar: first, in relation to its syntactical clearness; and second, in relation to its particular emphasis on delta parameters as central elements for understanding the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions.
... In the theory of institutional change developed by scholars such as Ostrom, North and Williamson [50][51][52], institutions are made up of the formal and informal constraints (rules and norms, respectively) that structure human interaction. On this basis, institutional change can result from change in the formal rules, the informal norms, or the enforcement of either of these [51]. ...
... On this basis, institutional change can result from change in the formal rules, the informal norms, or the enforcement of either of these [51]. Rules and norms should here be differentiated from strategies, which are the plans of actions that individuals or organizations adopt primarily for prudential reasons to achieve preferred outcomes [50]. Ostrom showed that for rule configuration and related learning to evolve towards more productive outcomes, there must be processes that lead to: (1) the generation of variety, (2) the selection of rules based on relatively accurate information about comparative performance in a particular environment, and (3) the retention of rules that perform better in regard to criteria such as efficiency, equity, accountability, and sustainability [50]. ...
... Rules and norms should here be differentiated from strategies, which are the plans of actions that individuals or organizations adopt primarily for prudential reasons to achieve preferred outcomes [50]. Ostrom showed that for rule configuration and related learning to evolve towards more productive outcomes, there must be processes that lead to: (1) the generation of variety, (2) the selection of rules based on relatively accurate information about comparative performance in a particular environment, and (3) the retention of rules that perform better in regard to criteria such as efficiency, equity, accountability, and sustainability [50]. Applied to adaptation, this could for instance entail the involvement of a variety of stakeholders (including citizens) who have a voice and/or autonomy in changing rules, norms and/or adaptive behavior, which generates a diversity of approaches that need to be evaluated and communicated through multi-level collaborations. ...
Article
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Climate change poses a serious challenge to sustainable urban development worldwide. In Sweden, climate change work at the city level emerged in 1996 and has long had a focus on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. City planners’ “adaptation turn” is recent and still ongoing. This paper presents a meta-evaluation of Swedish municipal adaptation approaches, and how they relate to institutional structures at different levels. The results show that although increasing efforts are being put into the identification of barriers to adaptation planning, in contrast, there is little assessment or systematization of the actual adaptation measures and mainstreaming strategies taken. On this basis, opportunities for advancing a more comprehensive approach to sustainable adaptation planning at both the local and institutional level are discussed.
... But we try to go beyond his framework by considering dynamic "overlapping social embededdness" (Aoki 2001) of different modes of economic transaction, as well as feedback impacts of change in mode of economic transaction on social norm. Also Ostrom (2007) and Heath (2001) may be referred to as recent works dealing with relationships between social norm and economic choices (instrumental choices) in an integrated, quasi-game theoretic manner. 5 ...
... The norms are treated as exogenous parameters of preference functions of agents in the social-dilemma game. However, recently, they are interpreted as evolving as a response to the lawless "state of nature" (Ostrom 2007), although game-theoretic language is not explicitly used. The philosopher Heath (2001, pp.135-45) versed well with game theory also introduces the individual utility function composed of desired-based ranking of actions and categorical preferences (normative reason) of actions. ...
Chapter
Why are corporations engaged in various non-economic activities to meet societal demands (such as environmental protection) beyond their legal obligations? In other words, why do corporations ‘over-comply’ (Heal 2005) with the social demands? Does it benefit corporations (their stockholders)? If so, how? Common-sense-wise an answer may appear obvious. However, it may not necessarily be so for the prevailing framework of economists’ thinking: ‘corporations do not need to do anything beyond legal obligations in order to serve stockholders interests’. The object of this chapter is to suggest an analytical framework to challenge such orthodox views without abandoning the premise of a bounded-rationality of agents concerned (various stakeholders of corporations as well as the citizens of the society). An essential idea is to endogenize the relevance of such social constructs as (individual) social capital, norms, status ascriptions and the like to economic behaviors within an expanded framework of game-theoretic thinking.
... When evaluating and designing institutional arrangements, E. Ostrom (2008) considers values such as efficiency, resilience, fairness, and participation rate. Similarly, Jorgensen and Bozeman (2007) suggest an entire list of attributes: stability, social cohesion, common good, responsiveness, adaptability, productivity, and effectiveness. ...
... The first element avoids "institutional monocropping" and creates the conditions for a resilient and adaptable system (E. Ostrom, 2008). The second one addresses the monitoring and enforcement problem; by allowing a certain amount of selfgovernance, the monitors have a vested interest in enforcing the rules. ...
Article
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Revisiting the theory of institutional hybridity and diversity developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to cope with the challenge of the “neither states nor markets” institutional domain, this article reconstructs the Ostromian system along the “value heterogeneity–co-production–polycentricity” axis. It articulates the elements of a theory of value heterogeneity and of the fuzzy boundaries between private and public. It rebuilds the model of co-production, clarifying the ambiguity surrounding a key technical public choice theoretical assumption, and it demonstrates (a) why it should not be confused with the Alchian-Demsetz team production model and (b) how co-production engenders a type of market failure that has been neglected so far. In light of this analysis, the article reconsiders polycentricity, the capstone of the Ostromian system, explaining why polycentricity may be seen as a solution both to this co-production market failure problem and to the problems of social choice in conditions of deep heterogeneity. It also discusses further normative corollaries.
... This research gap becomes even more significant as at the same time scholars complain about a general lack of understanding of pastoral systems and their institutions (Fernandez-Gimenez & Le Febre 2006). This is due to the fact that the most popular subjects for field studies on 'commons' have been participatory protected areas and forest management (see for example Agrawal 2007, Carney & Farrington 1998, Gibson, McKean & Ostrom 2000, Ostrom 1999), fisheries (see for example Basurto & Coleman 2010, Cinner et al. 2012, Haller & Merten 2008, Young 2010, and irrigation systems (see for example Ostrom 2008a, Sarker 2001, Svendsen 2005. Empirical evidence for natural resource use and institutional issues from pastoral or agropastoral societies is much less dense (for some well-known works see Agrawal 1999, Bromley 2001, Ensminger 1996, Ensminger & Rutten 1991. ...
Thesis
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It is well known that the development and adaptation capacities of rural communities in the developing world largely depend on the flexibility of the communities’ ‘social structure’ (the community as a norm-group itself, together with its ‘institutions’ as the legal, moral and ideological framework). ‘Structures’ that have been identified by research as being crucial for rural livelihoods are found to be specific non-market security structures that are based on concepts of solidarity, reciprocity, and kinship. It is also widely acknowledged that ‘agency’ (understood as the decision-making and action-taking of individuals, including their aims to influence others) also plays a role. However, very little is known about how the interplay between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ shapes institutional change and adaptation. Specifically, proper analytical frameworks for analyzing this interplay are missing. This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of development and adaptation capacities of rural communities against the backdrop of current mechanisms of social security and their evolution, to the interplay of different factors in such processes of institutional change, and the relationship between structure and agency, as well as to the required development of appropriate analytical frameworks. Empirical research was conducted on the Mahafaly Plateau in South-West Madagascar with three detailed micro-studies on cases of change, analyzing them through the lens of Contemporary Classical Institutional Economics and the Framework for Modeling Institutional Change (Ensminger 1992), then proposing suggestions on how to improve the framework. The cases reveal that indeed ‘agency’ is an important factor shaping institutional change on the local or regional level. Institutional change is found to be both driven by collective action as well as evolutionary mechanisms. Importantly, agency is influencing both of these mechanisms. The results may be transferred to other rural societies of the developing world that also base the enforcement of their formal institutions on orality, ideologically value personal freedom and procedural liberty, and show a high diversity of institutions of all kinds. For such societies, the results suggest that the societal environment on the one hand favors adaptation on the level of individuals or small groups and allows these actions to evolutionary change institutions. On the other hand, adaptation based on designed institutional change and collective action is difficult to plan and execute. The framework applied to the cases is shown to be suitable as it allows us to shed light on changes in institutions including ideology as a result of the interplay between individual actors and their behavior, changes in external factors such as relative prices, the constellations of actors, and their bargaining power. By modifying the framework by adding ‘agency’ as one of the core elements, the analysis becomes even more comprehensive.
... The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework aims at examining the use of collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). ...
... In order for rules to be effective, efficient and (perceived as) fair, the rule-making process needs to be participatory in nature and responsive to changing context conditions and needs (Ostrom, 1990(Ostrom, , 2000. Tinkering with rules is necessary to establish the combination of rules best suited to address particular situations, rather than striving for optimal, permanent or unique rules (Ostrom, 2008). ...
Article
Collective action is a community resource crucial to ensure the resilience of communities. However, maintaining cooperation over time is also a significant challenge. Arguing that a major, though neglected, precondition for community resilience is sustained cooperation, this paper analyses the conditions triggering collective action in collective housing communities. Particular attention is paid to micro-level pathways through which characteristics of the common courtyard and the related rules for its use play for the maintenance or decay of collective action. The contours of an integrated theory of sustained cooperation is sketched. Drawing on Goal Framing (GF) theory and Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory, it is argued that CPR management institutions can only be effective in a community in which a normative goal frame is salient. Empirical material is presented from a multi-method comparative case study of four low-income urban collective housing communities in Mexico City in 2010. This evidence corroborates both approaches: the two communities characterized by sustained collective action exhibit a salient normative frame in combination with all elements of CPR managing institutions, whereas the two communities with failed collective action do not meet these conditions. The results suggest that both mechanisms are necessary for sustained cooperation to occur.
... 3 The typical association of institutional consequences is a punishment or reward. The prediction of human behaviour can, however, be improved if one considers alternative, more internalized consequences (Ostrom 2008) such as self-blame or self-praise. For our assessments, we will distinguish three types of institutional consequences based on the nature of incentives which they provide: material consequences 1. ...
Article
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In southern Namibia ineffective enforcement contributes to natural resource degradation. We analyse the root causes of ineffective enforcement applying diverse methods. In the first step we develop a conceptual framework distinguishing between moral, social, and material enforcement. In the second step we analyse water and rangeland management regulations through the filter of our conceptual framework. In the third step we conduct economic experiments in order to gain additional insights into the characteristics of selected elements of the framework. We observe that social enforcement has the strongest impact on encouraging cooperative behaviour. Water governance in our cases makes more direct use of social enforcement, which is one factor contributing to its relative success compared to rangeland governance. We draw the general conclusion that existing moral and social norms should be considered as starting points for the establishment of formal rules because norms are more costly to establish but cheaper to apply.
... For references to the institutional analysis and design framework of Ostrom, seeOstrom (1986Ostrom ( , 1990Ostrom ( , 1998Ostrom ( , 1999Ostrom ( , 2000Ostrom ( , 2005Ostrom ( , 2008Ostrom ( , 2009Ostrom ( , 2010;Ostrom and Walker (1991);Ostrom et al. (1992Ostrom et al. ( , 1994Ostrom et al. ( , 2002, andPoteete and Ostrom (2008). ...
Article
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Much of the electricity grid was planned, sited, and constructed decades ago. Upgrades and new lines are required to maintain reliability and to bring electricity to load or population centers. Recent mandates for renewables necessitate new lines to be built to connect remote areas where utility-scale wind, solar, and other resources are usually found. The investment needed is at least in the tens of billions of dollars. New transmission lines may run hundreds or even over a thousand miles, crossing federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction may require a separate approval for a project, depending on its specific geography.
... A governança ambiental de acordo com Young (2005) pode ser definida em dois grandes grupos em relação à escala da gestão. Um grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em nível local, considerados pequenos e que o autor, assim como Ostrom (2008 concordam que são mais eficientes na gestão ambiental. O segundo grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em escala maior, global em última instância, para os quais o autor identifica uma dificuldade para a aquisição dos resultados, inclusive porque falta um foco claro por parte da comunidade científica no sentido de definição de uma agenda comum de pesquisa capaz de agregar os diferentes campos disciplinares e abordagens acadêmicas. ...
... Moreover, this approach allows one to engage in both purely descriptive research (i.e. simply trying to understand from an outside vantage point the forces involved in the process of social change and to understand what kinds of outcomes different types of social arrangements tend to generate; Ostrom, 2008) and in normative analysis (in which one argues from a particular normative perspective in favour of the adoption of a specific change of institutions and rules). From a simple and general perspective, we can consider four important nested action arenas: the operational level (the set of rules about everyday activities, directly involving the use of various resources); the collective choice level (the set of rules about how to change the operational rules); the constitutional level (the set of rules about how to change the collective choice rules and about who occupies certain key positions at the collective choice level); and the meta-constitutional level (constituted by moral intuitions, social norms and traditions that determine what kinds Bloomington school 'is an attempt to contribute to a "revolution" in the social sciences' and 'has found itself in the middle of the major social sciences debates of the twentieth century and, at the same time, has tried to transcend them by presenting itself as a comment and an extension of a 500-year-old intellectual tradition' going back to Hobbes, a tradition preoccupied with 'the relation between spontaneous dynamics of social order, and rule-guided behavior and rule systems' (ibid.: 99, 101). ...
Article
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Traditional economic models of how to manage environmental problems relating to renewable natural resources, such as fisheries, have tended to recommend either government regulation or privatisation and the explicit definition of property rights.These traditional models ignore the practical reality of natural resource management. Many communities are able to spontaneously develop their own approaches to managing such common-pool resources. In the words of Mark Pennington: ‘[Professor Ostrom’s] book Governing the Commons is a superb testament to the understanding that can be gained when economists observe in close-up detail how people craft arrangements to solve problems in ways often beyond the imagination of textbook theorists.’In particular, communities are often able to find stable and effective ways to define the boundaries of a common-pool resource, define the rules for its use and effectively enforce those rules.The effective management of a natural resource often requires ‘polycentric’ systems of governance where various entities have some role in the process. Government may play a role in some circumstances, perhaps by providing information to resource users or by assisting enforcement processes through court systems.Elinor Ostrom’s work in this field, for which she won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009, was grounded in the detailed empirical study of how communities managed common-pool resources in practice.It is essential that we avoid the ‘panacea problem.’ There is no correct way to manage common-pool resources that will always be effective. Different ways of managing resources will be appropriate in different contexts – for example within different cultures or where there are different physical characteristics of a natural resource.Nevertheless, there are principles that we can draw from the detailed study of the salient features of different cases to help us understand how different common-pool resources might be best managed; which rules systems and systems of organisation have the best chance of success or failure; and so on.Elinor Ostrom’s approach has been praised by the left, who often see it as being opposed to free-market privatisation initiatives. In fact, her approach sits firmly within the classical liberal tradition of political economy. She observes communities freely choosing their own mechanisms to manage natural resource problems without government coercion or planning.In developing a viable approach to the management of the commons, it is important, among other things, that a resource can be clearly defined and that the rules governing the use of the resource are adapted to local conditions. This suggests that rules imposed from outside, such as by government agencies, are unlikely to be successful.There are important areas of natural resource management where Elinor Ostrom’s ideas should be adopted to avoid environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the most obvious example relevant to the UK is in European Union fisheries policy. Here, there is one centralised model for the management of the resource that is applied right across the European Union, ignoring all the evidence about the failure of that approach.
... Both of these authors contrast these institutional levels according to their pace of change. The higher an institutional layer in this "hierarchy", the slowest it changes (see for instance Williamson, 2000, p. 596-597, andOstrom, 2007). 3 In this "institutions as rules", perspective, evolutions may occur because of shift in exogenous parameters like relative prices (due to access to stock of resources) or technological innovation (Libecap, 1989). ...
Article
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We analyze the process of emergence and evolution of institutions by pointing out how self-interests shape the design of institutional settings. We provide a framework in which "local and voluntary" institutions endogenously turn into more "generic and mandatory" ones. This leads us to analyze how a competitive process is automatically launched when institutions are decentrally created by agents, which leads to a race for generalization by which promoters of local orders are led to promote adhesion to their preferred rules among alternatives. We see then institutions as sponsored by groups of core members — often the founders — who have incentives, in certain circumstances, to cooperate with other sponsors playing on the same battlefield or imposing a higher rank order.
... Затова, при намирането на точните практически решения, в изследването се адаптират части от теориите на институционалната промяна на Ostrom (2007), Норд (2000) и Cheung (1986). Ostrom (2007) разработва концепция за анализ на институционалната промяна на база социо, икономико, политически връзки, създадени от въздействието на средата върху ресурсите. Тази промяна е колективна, действията на участниците са съвместни, a произведените ефекти -групови. ...
Thesis
ABSTRACT After 1989 society has undergone multiple transformations. Most importantly is the recovery of private property. This happened with the liquidation of the old organizational structures and property restitution of agricultural land. In the agricultural sector gradually developed: (1) new markets, (2) new organizations and (3) new patterns of behavior of economic act.Changes strongly affected the agricultural land market. Main factors were the rules and their changes. Norms also influenced, imposing the belief that there may be a centralized model of efficient allocation of property rights, such as the one from before 1989. Imprecise written rules, the numerous inconsistent changes in laws have created a market with a high degree of non-market regulation. It was implemented through the participation of many administrators processes. All this created difficulties in the transfer and protection of property and affect the amount of costs paid by market participants. Because of the effect of the institutional environment, the agricultural land market functioning in unjustified high transaction costs. Institutional factors are a prerequisite for the existence of high market transaction costs known as. It should examine the institutional factors responsible for installation of additional, unnecessary effort by operators in adapting to the agricultural land market. The problem is relevant because the transaction costs of agricultural land market, adding to the cost of producing an additional burden. They lowered the real incomes of those who are indirectly dependent on agriculture (families, businesses, etc.). High transaction costs of agricultural land market should be considered as part of the problem of market distortion and polarization structures of production in the country. Aim of the study is an analysis of institutional factors to justify alternatives to improve marketing of agricultural lands, and finally the size of the transaction costs in the process is permanently lowered. The dissertation detailing clarifies actions and costs of participants in the process of transformation of the ownership of the land market in the country. Under study are the contractual processes for transferring property rights from agricultural lands within the region of Plovdiv. The choice is dictated (1) the traditions of agriculture, (2) the sustained agriculture land use, (3) the availability of sufficient number and type of administrative units. Local characteristics of behavior, relevant only for market participants in the region.
... The individual's exhibited degree of cooperative behavior (3) is in itself part of the institution's ''descriptive norm'' [45], which through people's experiences will feed into their beliefs about how people in general behave. The last arrow (5) represents that an individual's personal experiences of living under a certain institution may provide motives to prefer a certain change [19,58]. Altogether, we findFigure 3 a helpful tool for thinking about how research on determinants of cooperation fits together and how these factors constitute a dynamic system with feedback loops. ...
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Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the "hard problem of cooperation" as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.
... Better said these methods can be seen as propositions for 11 The IAD framework was developed by Ostrom and colleagues at Indiana University (Ostrom 1990) to provide researchers a systematic way to examine how institutions related to NR interact with biophysical or material conditions, and the characteristics of a community and individuals within that community to produce collective decisions and individual behavioral outcomes. It has most commonly been used to examine collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). 12 Based on the IAD framework, the IFRI research program developed an approach based on a set of standard protocols to empirically assess the governance of shared forest resources (Ostrom 2007;Wollenberg, Merino et al. 2007). ...
Method
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Discussion paper on the methodologies used to map institutions in Sentinel Landscapes
... Rules can be classified into seven broad types (see box at the left side of Fig. 1) which define in general: who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, which actions are allowed or constrained, which aggregation rules will be used, which procedures must be followed, which information must or must not be provided and which payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom 2008;Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010;Crawford and Ostrom 1995). Ostrom et al. (1994, pp. ...
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It is often claimed that participation empowers local actors and that an inclusive decision-making process is crucial for rural development. We aim to investigate how formal and informal rules are set in local decision-making processes and how those rules may impact the actual level of participation by local actors. In a comparative case study, the rules-in-use for the planning of community projects in Thailand are examined. For our analysis, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which allows for more precise analysis of the impact of the rules. Fifty-three villages are served by four selected Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO) which are either known for success in achieving participation or ranked as problematic in implementing the decentralization and local participation goals of the Thai government. The study is based on 60 semi-structured interviews with TAO staff, a survey of village leaders in 50 villages and a household survey of 104 villagers. We scrutinize seven types of rules and show some particular differences in terms of the impact from the rules-in-use. In the TAOs ranked as less participatory, the attendance rate in the meetings is found to be lower (boundary rule), villagers are informed about a meeting with a shorter notice (information rule) and more villagers mention that elites interfere in the project selection process (aggregation rule). A high level of fuzziness appeared in the position and authority rules. Further, we obtained information on the particular deontic logic, showing generally a high share of de facto may-statements in the implementation of the rules. We conclude that if the policy goal is enhancing participation, rule-setting offers good scope for intervention. From a practical perspective, information on administrative procedures has to be made more accessible and public administrators should receive procedural training.
... The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework aims at examining the use of collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). ...
... North (1984North ( , 1990North ( , 1991 and Williamson (2000), stated that bureaucratic inertia is mainly affected by the outcome of a complex process of playing the economic game according to formal and informal rules that provide incentive structures and channel innovative activities in a certain direction. It means that stakeholders can be successful in using and managing their resources if they can meet their institutions with its contexts (Ostrom 2008), in which the different contexts and cultures can create different institutions because the same rule cannot be executed in different social contexts (Agrawal 2001). ...
... Petani pemilik, penggarap, dan buruh tani merupakan aktor dominan di tingkat tapak yang berinteraksi langsung dengan pengelolaan lingkungan di kawasan hutan rakyat, namun secara organisasi lemah. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan konfigurasi aturan yang seimbang, yaitu harus ada proses pilihan aturan berdasarkan informasi yang relatif akurat tentang kinerja komparatif dalam lingkungan tertentu, dan mempertahankan peraturan yang berkinerja lebih baik sesuai kriteria efisiensi, keadilan, akuntabilitas, dan keberlanjutan (Ostrom, 2007). ...
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[ACTOR ANALYSIS IN FORMULATING INSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR COMMUNITY-FOREST DEVELOPMENT IN BOGOR REGENCY]. Bogor regency has an area of 16,945 hectares’ community-forests or 22% of the forest area in the regency. Institutional problems of community-forest management include weak interaction of actors within the organization. Since the organization is part of the institution, its existence becomes an important technical part in securing the operation of the institution. Objectives of this research on analyzing actors and the institution in the community-forest area are: (1) to determine the dominant key actors in community-forests action arena; and (2) to formulate community-forests development institutional models. Qualitative descriptive analysis of actors and institutions employs content analysis. Key actors analysis utilized ISM (Interpretive Structural Modeling) analysis methods. Results of the analysis identified seven key actors in community forest management, namely UPTD BP3K, landowners who lives outside the village, farmer landowners, land tenants, farm labors, lumbermens, and middlemen. Of the seven key actors, four key actors are the most dominant in the community-forest action arena, which are farmer landowners, farm labors, lumbermens and middlemen. There are three models of community-forest management institutions for capacity development actors, namely the institutional model related to venture capital, handling waste of resources, and coordination. This study recommends the necessity to strengthen dominant actors at site level according to the criteria of efficiency, equity, and sustainability. The policy makers need to optimize the capacity and coordination function of government agencies through the institutional coordination model.
... A governança ambiental de acordo com Young (2005) pode ser definida em dois grandes grupos em relação à escala da gestão. Um grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em nível local, considerados pequenos e que o autor, assim como Ostrom (2008 concordam que são mais eficientes na gestão ambiental. O segundo grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em escala maior, global em última instância, para os quais o autor identifica uma dificuldade para a aquisição dos resultados, inclusive porque falta um foco claro por parte da comunidade científica no sentido de definição de uma agenda comum de pesquisa capaz de agregar os diferentes campos disciplinares e abordagens acadêmicas. ...
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Cogestão Adaptativa e Capital Social na Gestão de Unidades de Conservação Integrais Brasileiras - O Estudo de Caso do Parque Estadual da Ilha do Cardoso e da Comunidade do Marujá
... All rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability among humans" (Ostrom 2011, 17). This definition includes formalised laws and regulations (but of course goes far beyond legislative acts) and makes it possible to capture the whole range of participants' behaviour, from implementation of a law both in the letter and the spirit; to partial and selective implementation; and to shirking, circumventing and outright ignorance of the law (Cole 2017;Ostrom 2008). ...
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China’s law to control international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) has sent shockwaves through international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and expert communities as the epitome of a worldwide trend of closing civic spaces. Since the Overseas NGO Management Law was enacted in January 2017, its implementation has seen mixed effects and diverging patterns of adaptation among Chinese party-state actors at the central and local levels and among domestic NGOs and INGOs. To capture the formal and informal dynamics underlying their mutual interactions in the longer term, this article employs a theory of institutional change inspired by Elinor Ostrom’s distinction between rules-in-form versus rules-in-use and identifies four scenarios for international civil society in China – “no change,” “restraining,” “recalibrating” and “reorienting.” Based on interviews, participant observation and Chinese policy documents and secondary literature, the respective driving forces, plausibility, likelihood and longer-term implications of each scenario are assessed. It is found that INGOs’ activities are increasingly affected by the international ambitions of the Chinese party-state, which enmeshes both domestic NGOs and INGOs as agents in its diplomatic efforts to redefine civil society participation on a global scale.
... Sosyal olguları etkileşimli eylem alanları olarak yapılandırma, hem araştırmacının tek seferde basitleştirilmiş bir probleme odaklanmasını sağlaması hem de gerektiğinde araştırmacının sosyal kurallar ve normlar ağının karmaşıklığı içerisinde boğulmadan birleştirilmiş eylem alanlarından ilgili tüm ayrıntılara bakma perspektifi sunması açısından çok önemlidir. Dahası, bu yaklaşım, kişinin hem tamamen betimleyici (yani sadece dışsal bir bakış açısıyla anlamaya çalışmak, toplumsal değişim sürecinde yer alan güçleri ve farklı türdeki sosyal düzenlemelerin ne tür çıktılar üretme eğiliminde olduklarını anlamaya çalışmak (Ostrom, 2008) ) hem de normatif analizler (belli bir kurum, kural değişikliğinin benimsenmesi lehine, belirli bir normatif bakış açısıyla tartışıldığı) yapmasına izin vermektedir. ...
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Hukuk ve İktisat Yaklaşımı (Law and Economics Approach) genel olarak iktisat bilimindeki temel araçları, varsayımları ve metodolojiyi kullanarak formel ve informel kuralları ve kurumları inceleyen bir inter-disipliner / multi-disipliner araştırma alanıdır. Hukuk ve iktisat yaklaşımına dahil edilebilecek ya da bu disiplinle yakın akrabalık bağı olan diğer disiplinler arasında Regülasyon İktisadı, Mülkiyet Hakları İktisadı, İşlem Maliyetleri İktisadı, Akit (Sözleşme) Hukuku ve İktisadı, Kurumsal İktisat, Anayasal Politik İktisat, Sosyal Sermaye İktisadı, Kültürel İktisat, Vergi Hukuku, Suç ve Ceza İktisadı, vb. sayılabilir. Bugüne değin Hukuk ve İktisat Yaklaşımı şemsiyesi altında bu saydığımız disiplinlerin bir ya da birkaçına doğrudan ve/veya dolaylı olarak yaptıkları katkılar dolayısıyla 10’un üzerinde bilim insanı Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü ile onurlandırılmışlardır.
... A governança ambiental de acordo com Young (2005) pode ser definida em dois grandes grupos em relação à escala da gestão. Um grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em nível local, considerados pequenos e que o autor, assim como Ostrom (2008 concordam que são mais eficientes na gestão ambiental. O segundo grupo é formado pelos sistemas de governança em escala maior, global em última instância, para os quais o autor identifica uma dificuldade para a aquisição dos resultados, inclusive porque falta um foco claro por parte da comunidade científica no sentido de definição de uma agenda comum de pesquisa capaz de agregar os diferentes campos disciplinares e abordagens acadêmicas. ...
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The history of the fisheries management in the Patos Lagoon estuary is a ground in dispute. On the one hand, a group of researches has blamed the fishing communities of the Patos Lagoon estuary by the collapse of fish stocks and the national and international gustavo g. m. moura | antônio c. s. diegues 117 context for the breakdown of the fishing industries. On the other, a second group of researches has argued that national policies are responsible for the collapse of fish stocks, the breakdown of fishing industries and social crisis in the artisanal fishery. This chapter aims to produce a history of governmentality of the fisheries management in the Patos Lagoon estuary. From the Foucault’s approach, the research reveals that the production and implementation of a modern fishery management system (MM) is resulted from the mobilization of knowledges and truths made by an epistemic community inside of the successive contexts of capitalist modernization of fishing activities, including the civil-military Brazilian dictatorship. In the implementation of the MM, the two fundamental problems of fisheries emerge, the allocation and the conservation of fishery resources.
... The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework aims at examining the use of collective action in the management of 'common pool resources' such as forests, fisheries, grazing lands or irrigation systems, focusing on how human beings interact with ecosystems to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields, and considering the ways that societies have developed diverse institutional arrangements for managing NR; with or without success in avoiding ecosystem collapse (Ostrom 2007;Ostrom 2008). ...
... [ [58][59][60][79][80][81][82][83][84] Involvement of parties Reliability and consistency of partners, continuity of staff in organizations. [15,50,54] ...
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Although social learning is a key element of multilevel flood risk governance, it is hardly studied. This paper addresses this knowledge gap. The paper aims to identify enabling conditions for social learning in multilevel flood risks governance arrangements. We first conceptualize social learning and draw up a conceptual framework consisting of enabling conditions for social learning, using the literature on adaptive co-management, sustainable land and water management, and integrated flood risk management. Next, we apply this framework to analyze social learning in the context of the Dutch Room for the River program. Our interview results reveal that social learning about integrated flood protection measures took place at multiple levels. We found that a strong personal commitment to learning and mutual interpersonal trust in working groups are key conditions for successful social learning. Based on our analysis, we conclude with some recommendations for enhancing social learning processes in future flood protection programs.
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Neo-institutional contributions to the study of human-environment interactions have made tremendous headway within the last several decades. Although the different strands of institutionalism offer distinct ontological pathways for understanding the dynamics of change in social-ecological systems, none can independently account for the inherent complexity of such transformations. Using the struggle to achieve sustainable forest resource governance within the Canadian context as a backdrop for further investigation, this paper provides a succinct overview of the strengths and limitations of neo-institutional theories applicable to the study of change in public property regimes. We argue that in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of change, analysts require a meta-theoretical approach that not only provides complementary insights into how rules change over time, but also pushes the boundaries of conventional analysis to consider the constitutional arrangements that structure collective action and the subsequent performance of forest governance structures.
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Most powerful social science analytical tools are well suited for studying static situations. Static and mechanistic analysis however, is not adequate to understand the changing world in which we live. In order to adequately address the most pressing social and environmental challenges looming ahead, we need to develop analytical tools for analyzing dynamic situations - particularly institutional change. In this paper we develop an analytical tool to study institutional change, more specifically the evolution of rules and norms. We believe that in order for such an analytical tool to be useful to develop a general theory of institutional change, it needs to enable the analyst to understand the processes of change in multiple specific settings so that lessons from such settings can eventually be integrated into a more general predictive theory of change.
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Ecuador constitutes a fascinating case study to explore land policies and reforms. Since colonial times, it has experienced prolonged and ongoing struggles to transform land institutions. This paper investigates how, across levels, historic institutional factors affected land-use decision making in the Mindo parish and western foothills of Pichincha, Ecuador, as perceived by its landowners. Following techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory, we identify four main periods of institutional change related to land by relying on the narratives of landowners. These periods are: a) colonial institutions-hacienda feudal modes of production; b) the way toward an Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law; c) rural development after the Agrarian Reform; and d) forest conservation incentives versus 'neo-extractivism' practices. We reconstruct and explore these in light of the existing literature. Along with individual and collective perceptions, we are also concerned with the drivers underlying these institutional changes and the structure of these changes. Lastly, we discuss and provide conclusions on the key issues that help us explain institutional change in the study area, including theoretical explanations about cognitive variation (cultural-cognitive), power relationships, individual ability to change and perceive, as well as the system's capacity to reorganize, persist, and reproduce.
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We study whether and when a second-order collective action problem, like the change of existing formal rules governing cooperation, can be resolved to ultimately solve first-order collective good dilemmas. We do so by examining the conditions under which individuals change cooperation rules when both their material incentives to cooperate and their social preferences for outcome distributions differ. Our experimental findings show that proselfs who benefit the most from cooperation are most likely to initiate a rule change to a higher minimum contribution level. Regarding prosocials, we find that their underlying motives in favour or against this rule change vary depending on their relative earnings’ position. If they are ‘wealthy’, that is, they have a higher earnings potential, they are more concerned about equality. When they are relatively ‘less wealthy’, they seem to care more about enhancing collective outcomes.
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Apple production in Republic of Macedonia is an important sector that highly contributes to the economy in terms of employment and income, especially for small-scale farmers in Prespa Region. Th us, producing around 67 percent of the total apple yield in the country in 2012 year is. Therefore, apples are mostly sold at local green markets, which are still dominant points of marketing left by the old socialist system. The rationale is that, the governance structure aff ects other decisions (directly or not) taken by farmers with regard to the membership status and choice of transaction partner. In apple production, traders are other transaction structures besides the cooperative that operates in the apple supply chain in R. Macedonia. With respect to each set of decisions, hypotheses were formulated as study guides. Specifically, these hypotheses relate to determinants associated with different trading partners (cooperative, traders and combined) and commitment factors in the governance structure of the cooperative.
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We develop a framework that quantifies the effect of social norms on the efficient functioning of institutions and thereby their impact on effectiveness of reforms for sustaining common pool water resources under conditions of scarcity. We derive theoretical results and use numerical simulations to provide evidence for performance of a group of farmers that use a common pool resource (reservoir or aquifer) with and without norms, with various marginal utility levels from norm adherence, and with various existing (Social Planner) institutional setting considered in the theoretical model. The theoretical results suggest that with no water trade and with norm adherence, water users will always use less water than the no norms scenario. With possible inter-group water trade, norm-adhering water users would replace excess extraction with increased trade rates. Simulation results for the no-trade case suggest that with higher marginal utility values from norm adherence, the resource is sustained for significantly longer periods.
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Contract farming is based on agreements settled prior to the farmer deciding about agricultural production, and influence their judgment regarding inputs and production systems. Therefore, they provide means of production coordination and safety for both farmer and agro-industry/distributor. However, contract farming has its gaps since it is written in abscence of complete information, due to the behavioral assumption of bounded rationality of economic agents. A specific law might generate legal certainty for economic agents, insofar as the Judiciary fulfills the contractual gaps. From the other side, private agents may also fulfill the contractual gaps. As an effort to understand the role of institutions in contract farming, this study aims to analyze the Bill 6,459/2013, which intends to rule contract farming and takes private instituctions into account, through the agency of the Monitoring, Development and Reconciliation of Integration Committee (Cadec). This is an applied research with qualitative approach. The research concludes that the approval of bill might lead to effective typical law for contract farming, provided that the creation of Cadec is encouraged.
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Comparative economic systems literature deals extensively with ‘systemic functions’ and ‘performance criteria’ such as growth, efficiency and equity but rarely mentions the topic of resilience. This paper focusses on the issue of resilience while drawing several important lessons from the contributions in this respect of 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics co-recipient, Elinor Ostrom: The effects of alternative institutional arrangements and social norms as a source of both resilience and vulnerability; the problem of ‘highly optimized tolerance’ to specific sources of uncertainty; polycentricity as a possible structural solution to sustainability problems. A key point is that resilience is more than mere ‘absorptive capacity’ or ‘speed of recovery’: it depends on innovation and creative socio-cultural adaptations made possible by flexible and polycentric institutional processes. That has important implications for the ways we define and assess institutional performance and institutional design.Keywords: institutional theory; socio-ecological systems; institutions; comparative economic systems; vulnerability; institutional design; polycentricity
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A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.
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The common property meadows in the Swiss Alps have been managed by local self-organized governance systems since the Middle Ages, thus preventing their overuse. During the past century, socioeconomic developments, such as industrialization and rapid nonagricultural economic growth, have shifted employment opportunities from the agricultural sector towards the service sector. In the agricultural sector, this has led to less intensive use and maintenance of the meadows in the Alps and consequently to a reduction in biodiversity. We use the example of Grindelwald in the Swiss Alps to analyze how the governance system has adapted to these socioeconomic developments. We based our analysis on the Program in Institutional Analysis of Social-Ecological Systems (PIASES). We coded five statutes ranging in date from 1867 to 2003, and conducted interviews to investigate changes in the governance system. In so doing, we focused on changes in the operational rules that structure the focal interactions between the social system and the ecological system, namely harvesting level and investment activities. Our results show that the governance system has adapted to the socioeconomic changes (1) by creating an additional organizational subunit that allows appropriators to alter operational rules relatively autonomously, and (2) through changing several operational rules. We conclude by outlining the properties of the governance system that have allowed for constant harvesting levels and investment activities over time.
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In her groundbreaking work, Elinor Ostrom suggested that communities are able to self-organize and develop rules which allow them to effectively manage common-pool resources while avoiding the “tragedy of the commons”, as proposed by Hardin. Based on empirical case studies of how forests, irrigation, grazing land and fisheries are organized all over the world, Ostrom suggested several principles that can serve as guidelines for managing common-pool resources. In the 21st century new initiatives have been based on sharing. There are various examples such as car and bike sharing in cities, internet platforms such as Wikipedia, community gardens and many others. There is a reason to believe that these efforts will continue to grow and become more popular as people realise the economic, social and ecological benefits. The aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent Ostrom’s findings are relevant to these new, often urbanised or digitalised forms of sharing. Can the famous design principles for which she won the Nobel prize be applied or do we need to search for a different set of principles that are more suitable for these new emerging forms of ‘the commons’? Our findings suggest that although Ostrom’s framework needs to be adapted before being applied to the reality of urban and digitalised environments, some of her findings remain relevant.
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Cette thèse a pour objet la modernisation des Systèmes Hydriques Urbains de l’Europe des XV (SHUE). Débutant à la fin des années 1990, ce processus de rerégulation des SHUE opère une transformation du cadre réglementaire européen de la gestion de l’eau. Il vise une amélioration du fonctionnement de la gouvernance afin, notamment, d’imprimer une trajectoire soutenable aux SHUE. Or, les bilans intermédiaires s’avèrent mitigés et mettent en avant un besoin de caractérisation et d’explication analytiques de la modernisation des SHUE, afin d’en cerner les effets non anticipés. Par conséquent, la thèse aborde les effets de la modernisation des SHUE dans ses dimensions organisationnelle et soutenable. L’objectif de la thèse consiste à fournir une interprétation des impacts de la modernisation sur la structure de la gouvernance des SHUE et sur son efficacité dans une perspective de soutenabilité. Ancrée dans une approche d’économie institutionnelle, la démarche adoptée compare les modèles allemand, français et anglais et s’organise en deux temps. Le premier temps relève de l’observation empirique. Les phénomènes caractérisant la modernisation sont identifiés et formulés sous la forme de faits stylisés. Le second temps explique théoriquement ces phénomènes. Au regard des apports et limites des différents institutionnalismes, il est choisi de mobiliser le courant néoinstitutionnaliste pour rendre compte des aspects organisationnels et l’approche par les Régimes institutionnels de ressources pour traiter de la dimension soutenable de la modernisation des SHUE. Cette thèse soutient que la modernisation entraîne une mutation des modalités de coordination des SHUE, tout en intensifiant et polarisant les problèmes de soutenabilité autour du pilier économique. Au niveau organisationnel, nous mettons en évidence que, d’une part, la modernisation tend à dépolitiser les SHUE et que, d’autre part, le degré d’intégration de ses principes dans un SHUE est positivement corrélé à une dynamique socio-institutionnelle résilience. Ces deux phénomènes résultent principalement d’une hybridation des arrangements institutionnels en direction du pôle marché. Le changement des formes contractuelles et l’atténuation des droits de propriété au sein des SHUE réduisent le contrôle direct de l’Etat et augmenter la capacité de rapide adaptation des acteurs. A propos du potentiel de soutenabilité, un manque de cohérence dans le développement de la rerégulation des SHUE explique les perspectives relativement pessimistes. Nous montrons que ce paradoxe manifeste une incapacité intrinsèque de la modernisation à maximiser le potentiel de soutenabilité des SHUE. Si le développement de la réglementation est censé améliorer la qualité de la gouvernance, dans notre cas, elle s’accompagne d’un accroissement mécanique de coûts de coordination entravant l’atteinte d’une trajectoire soutenable.
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The success of cooperative sector in many countries (such as Italy or Germany) shows that in the modern world there is room for different ownership and management models. Editors have assembled a creative team of associates from seven countries that in this special edition of LIMES PLUS journal allow readers to confront the scientific analysis of the phenomenon of the cooperative sector and the common goods, and to meet their specific development characteristics in different countries, and sectors (from agriculture to banking). Field studies were carried out in countries with different traditions (from Italy with a strong cooperative sector to Poland, where after the Soviet cooperation model we can follow the development of new forms).
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This chapter explores how the institutional dynamic of modernization limits the potential for the sustainability of urban water systems in Europe (UWSEs), revealing a paradox. Modernization brings with it an increased number of rules intended to regulate UWSEs in a harmonious and sustainable way. However, it appears inherently unable to bring about such a development. This failure comes from the ambivalent effect of the increase in the number of rules in UWSEs, which both generate regulations and inconsistencies. This multiplication of the number of rules stems from two different mechanisms of UWSEs’ expansion (expansion by means of control, and expansion by means of self-organization), which can conflict and impede high coherence of governance.
Article
Governance failures are at the origin of many resource management problems. In particular climate change and the concomitant increase of extreme weather events has exposed the inability of current governance regimes to deal with present and future challenges. Still our knowledge about resource governance regimes and how they change is quite limited. This paper develops a conceptual framework addressing the dynamics and adaptive capacity of resource governance regimes as multi-level learning processes. The influence of formal and informal institutions, the role of state and non-state actors, the nature of multi-level interactions and the relative importance of bureaucratic hierarchies, markets and networks are identified as major structural characteristics of governance regimes. Change is conceptualized as social and societal learning that proceeds in a stepwise fashion moving from single to double to triple loop learning. Informal networks are considered to play a crucial role in such learning processes. The framework supports flexible and context sensitive analysis without being case study specific.First empirical evidence from water governance supports the assumptions made on the dynamics of governance regimes and the usefulness of the chosen approach. More complex and diverse governance regimes have a higher adaptive capacity. However, it is still an open question how to overcome the state of single-loop learning that seem to characterize many attempts to adapt to climate change. Only further development and application of shared conceptual frameworks taking into account the real complexity of governance regimes can generate the knowledge base needed to advance current understanding to a state that allows giving meaningful policy advice.
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Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis—together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players—we derive the prediction that the exit option will drain the community or group more of cooperators than of defectors. But experimental data do not support this prediction; cooperators do not leave more frequently than defectors and, in fact, there is evidence that defectors are more prone to leave than cooperators. We consider and reject the possibility that this failure of prediction results from the (admitted) greater optimism of cooperators about the incidence of cooperation “here,” and present data supporting the hypothesis that cooperators often stay when their personal interest is with exiting because of the same ethical or group-regarding impulse that (presumably) led them to cooperate in the first place. Cooperation can be produced for a group or community either by inducing people to cooperate or by inducing those who are going to cooperate to stay in the game, and ethical considerations seem to underlie the decision to stay as well as the decision to cooperate while staying.
Article
Decentralization has emerged as an important instrument of environmental and development policy in the last two decades. Presumed benefits of environmental policy decentralization depend in significant measure on broad participation in the programs that governments create to decentralize decision making related to resource management. This paper uses data from protected areas in Nepal’s Terai to examine who participates in environmental decentralization programs. On the basis of our statistical analysis, we highlight the fact that the likelihood of participation in community-level user groups is greater for those who are economically and socially better-off. We also find that individuals who have greater access to and who visit government offices related to decentralization policies more often are also more likely to participate in user groups created by state officials. Finally, we find a negative correlation between education and levels of participation. Our study and analysis support the argument that for decentralization policies to be successful on equity issues, it is important to build institutional mechanisms that encourage poorer and more marginal households to access government officials, improve access to educational opportunities, and create incentives to promote more interactions between less powerful rural residents and government officials.