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Altruism and fairness: Unnatural selection?
Abstract
Darwin admitted that the evolution of moral phenomena such as altruism and fairness, which are usually in opposition to the maximization of individual reproductive success, was not easily accounted for by natural selection. Later, authors have proposed additional mechanisms, including kin selection, inclusive fitness, and reciprocal altruism. In the present work, we explore the extent to which sexual selection has played a role in the appearance of human moral traits. It has been suggested that because certain moral virtues, including altruism and kindness, are sexually attractive, their evolution could have been shaped by the process of sexual selection. Our review suggests that although it is possible that sexual selection played such a role, it is difficult to determine the extent of its relevance, the specific form of this influence, and its interplay with other evolutionary mechanisms.
... In the case of this review, nurses displayed nonkin altruism towards patients. The behaviourist paradigm of analysis of behaviour does not support the evolutionshaped explanation of altruistic behaviour (44). According to behaviourist researchers 'temporal or social discounting' evokes altruism. ...
Background:
Discussions on ethics of care are needed to shape the identity of nurses and nursing. In light of the discourses surrounding nursing and altruism, nurses should initiate research on altruism and nursing.
Aim:
The purpose of this literature review was to explore the meaning of altruism as a value in nursing.
Review methods:
A hermeneutic approach, using a circular framework, was followed to search for literature, review and understand the text.
Results:
The conceptualisation of altruism as a value in nursing care in this review strives to describe what altruism is; in what situations does it appear; for what purpose is it used; and how is it practiced.
Conclusion:
Altruism enables nurses to tolerate difficult situations and motivates them to sacrifice themselves and do what is best for the patient, especially when patients are compromised in their ability to care for themselves.
... With Darwin's theory of heredity through pangenesis [10] and his work on sexual selection [11][12][13], we are led to consider the consistency -or inconsistency -of his central enquiry on evolutionary mechanisms, his own position on the debates of naturalists about humans, and the prejudices of his day about women. It is striking that no unity can be found in his studies on humans and behaviour [14][15][16][17], and we can wonder how it is possible that his book on the expression of emotions in humans and the other animals was written with so little regard to their common descent. The invited editors of this issue feel deeply indebted to the contributors for having raised so many long-neglected issues in the field of classical Darwinian studies. ...
Direction de revue : Comptes rendus Biologies, vol. 333, n°2, 2010
Can moral theories of the kind Evagrius Ponticus upheld be useful today? Is his ethics one of many other virtue ethical theories or is it something else entirely? I argue that Evagrius’s theory of virtue is an instance of traditional Christian moral theory. Moreover, as a Christian theory, Evagrius’s moral system stands apart from non-Christian moral theories, virtue, consequentialist and deontological. I further maintain that his morality is robust, because it is able to undercut some of the strongest critiques generally made against moral theories: those of inconsistency and selfishness. It is also successful, because it produced fertile cultural movements that continue at present. I conclude, however, that its theistic, kenotic and inverted nature presents a direct challenge to ethical assumptions of today.
The hypothesis of group selection fell victim to a seemingly devastating critique in 1960s evolutionary biology. In Unto Others (1998), we argue to the contrary, that group selection is a conceptually coherent and empirically well documented cause of evolution. We suggest, in addition, that it has been especially important in human evolution. In the second part of Unto Others, we consider the issue of psychological egoism and altruism - do human beings have ultimate motives concerning the well-being of others? We argue that previous psychological and philosophical work on this question has been inconclusive. We propose an evolutionary argument for the claim that human beings have altruistic ultimate motives.
Sexual reproduction is associated with the evolution of anisogamy and sperm-producing males and egg-laying females. The ensuing competition for mates has led to sexual selection and coevolution of the sexes. Mathematical models arc extensively used to test the plausibility of different complicated scenarios for the evolution of sexual traits. Unfortunately, the diversity of models is now itself equally bewildering. Here we clarify some of the current debate by reviewing evolutionary explanations for the relationship between anisogamy, potential reproductive rates, parental care, sex roles, and mate choice. We review the benefits females might gain by mating with certain males rather than others. We also consider other forms of selection that can make females mate nonrandomly. One way empiricists can contribute to resolving theoretical disputes is to quantify the cost of expressing mating biases in the appropriate life-history currency.
Individuals affected with developmental disorders of speech and language have substantial difficulty acquiring expressive and/or receptive language in the absence of any profound sensory or neurological impairment and despite adequate intelligence and opportunity(1). Although studies of twins consistently indicate that a significant genetic component is involved(1-3), most families segregating speech and language deficits show complex patterns of inheritance, and a gene that predisposes individuals to such disorders has not been identified. We have studied a unique three-generation pedigree, KE, in which a severe speech and language disorder is transmitted as an autosomal-dominant monogenic trait(4). Our previous work mapped the locus responsible, SPCH1, to a 5.6-cM interval of region 7q31 on chromosome 7 (ref. 5). We also identified an unrelated individual, CS, in whom speech and language impairment is associated with a chromosomal translocation involving the SPCH1 interval(6). Here we show that the gene FOXP2, which encodes a putative transcription factor containing a polyglutamine tract and a forkhead DNA-binding domain, is directly disrupted by the translocation breakpoint in CS. In addition, we identify a point mutation in affected members of the KE family that alters an invariant amino-acid residue in the forkhead domain. Our findings suggest that FOXP2 is involved in the developmental process that culminates in speech and language.
A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the system. Three instances of altruistic behavior are discussed, the evolution of which the model can explain: (1) behavior involved in cleaning symbioses; (2) warning cries in birds; and (3) human reciprocal altruism. Regarding human reciprocal altruism, it is shown that the details of the psychological system that regulates this altruism can be explained by the model. Specifically, friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, aspects of guilt, and some forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy can be explained as important adaptations to regulate the altruistic system. Each individual human is seen as possessing altruistic and cheating tendencies, the expression of which is sensitive to developmental variables that were selected to set the tendencies at a balance ap...
I examine the relationship between evolutionary definitions of altruism that are based on fitness effects and psychological definitions that are based on the motives of the actor. I show that evolutionary altruism can be motivated by proximate mechanisms that are psychologically either altruistic or selfish. I also show that evolutionary definitions do rely upon motives as a metaphor in which the outcome of natural selection is compared to the decisions of a psychologically selfish (or altruistic) individual. Ignoring the precise nature of both psychological and evolutionary definitions has obscured many important issues, including the biological roots of psychological altruism.
THE apex of animal social organization is eusociality, which has three
characteristics: overlapping generations, reproductive division of
labour, and cooperative care of young1,2. So far, eusociality
has been recognized only among social insects and the African
mole-rats3-5. Here I report the first case of eusociality in
a marine animal. The sponge-dwelling shrimp Synalpheus regalis lives in
colonies that may have >300 individuals, but that contain only one
reproductive female. Direct-developing juveniles remain in the natal
sponge, and allozyme data suggest that most colony members are full
sibs. In laboratory experiments, larger colony members, most of whom
apparently never breed, defended the colony against heterospecific
intruders. Ecological similarities among mole-rats, termites and these
sponge-dwelling shrimp, all of which are diploid animals, strengthen
arguments that eusociality is favoured by gradual metamorphosis,
parental care, and occupation of protected, expansible
niches6.
Close inbreeding is known for a variety of small mammal species for which a high probability of mortality during dispersal makes helping and delayed maturation a relatively secure fitness option. Prolonged inbreeding, however, is usually associated with lowered fitness, and it has been shown that most highly inbred small mammals and social insects have inbreeding-avoidance mechanisms that promote some degree of outbreeding. However, previous field and laboratory research on the naked mole-rat (Heterocephalus glaber) suggested that this cooperatively breeding rodent is highly inbred, with new colonies forming by fission. Here we report the discovery of a dispersal phenotype that may occasionally promote outbreeding in naked mole-rats. These dispersers are morphologically, physiologically and behaviourally distinct from other colony members. They are laden with fat, exhibit elevated levels of luteinizing hormone, have a strong urge to disperse, and only solicit matings with non-colony members. These findings suggest that, although rare, a dispersive morph exists within naked mole-rat colonies.
Epithelial gene expression in the lung is thought to be regulated by the coordinate activity of several different families of transcription factors including the Fox family of winged-helix/forkhead DNA-binding proteins. In this report, we have identified and characterized two members of this Fox gene family, Foxp1 and Foxp2, and show that they comprise a new subfamily of Fox genes expressed in the lung. Foxp1 and Foxp2 are expressed at high levels in the lung as early as E12.5 of mouse development with Foxp2 expression restricted to the airway epithelium. In addition, Foxp1 and Foxp2 are expressed at lower levels in neural, intestinal, and cardiovascular tissues during development. Upon differentiation of the airway epithelium along the proximal-distal axis, Foxp2 expression becomes restricted to the distal alveolar epithelium whereas Foxp1 expression is observed in the distal epithelium and mesenchyme. Foxp1 and Foxp2 can regulate epithelial lung gene transcription as was demonstrated by their ability to dramatically repress the mouse CC10 promoter and, to a lesser extent, the human surfactant protein C promoter. In addition, GAL4 fusion proteins encoding subdomains of Foxp1 and Foxp2 demonstrate that an independent and homologous transcriptional repression domain lies within the N-terminal end of the proteins. Together, these studies suggest that Foxp1 and Foxp2 are important regulators of lung epithelial gene transcription.
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
Moral evolution theories have emphasized kinship, reciprocity, group selection, and equilibrium selection. Yet, moral virtues are also sexually attractive. Darwin suggested that sexual attractiveness may explain many aspects of human morality. This paper updates his argument by integrating recent research on mate choice, person perception, individual differences, costly signaling, and virtue ethics. Many human virtues may have evolved in both sexes through mutual mate choice to advertise good genetic quality, parenting abilities, and/or partner traits. Such virtues may include kindness, fidelity, magnanimity, and heroism, as well as quasi-moral traits like conscientiousness, agreeableness, mental health, and intelligence. This theory leads to many testable predictions about the phenotypic features, genetic bases, and social-cognitive responses to human moral virtues.
Introduction
The nature of the following work will be best understood by a brief account of how it came to be written. During many years I collected notes on the origin or descent of man, without any intention of publishing on the subject, but...
The evolution of altruism by natural selection has been called the central theoretical problem of sociobiology (Wilson 1975:3); it is problematic because altruism seems to imply the unfavorable reduction in the personal reproductive fitness of the altruist. Darwin (1871) related altruism to the moral sense, which he saw as a distinctively human attribute, and evolutionists ever since have been intrigued by the subject. The study of the evolution of social behavior - sociobiology - is founded on Hamilton's quantitative analysis of the type of altruistic behavior that is specifically directed at one's kin (1964a, b). In many cases an increase in the overall reproductive fitness of the genes responsible for the behavior can be clearly seen to occur if all the individuals that carry a proportion of the altruist's genes are included in the calculations (inclusive fitness). Altruistic behavior that is not directed at one's relatives can also be advantageous if it elicits reciprocal behavior (Darwin 1871:163, Trivers 1971). An explanation is needed, however, for ordinary types of human altruistic behavior for which (1) the target is not the altruist's kin and (2) there is no reciprocal altruism. For some such seemingly selfless, and characteristically human, behavior I will offer an explanation in terms of sexual selection. In ordinary language, altruism means a concern for the welfare of others. An evolutionary definition of altruism, which is consistent with the ordinary one, is behavior that increases the reproductive fitness of others at the apparent expense of the altruist. The tactical inclusion of the word "apparent" conveniently allows us to continue describing a trait as altruistic, as in ordinary usage, even if we should eventually discover that the trait can actually increase, rather than decrease, the reproductive fitness of the altruist, that is, even if the behavior is selfish. I suggest that altruism can be viewed as a courtship display designed as an honest advertisement of the capacity and the intention of the altruist to be a reliable mate
Sociobiology is characterized by debates between scientists working in different fields. Such debates could profit substantially by a methodological analysis of central concepts. This is shown for “altruism” as an example. It is argued that “altruism” in biology is so complicated a concept that any behaviour can rightly be called altruistic in some respect. “Altruism” therefore does not denote a special class of behaviour calling for special explanations. “Altruism” in the biological sense differs fundamentally from “altruism” as used in psychology or ethics. As a result, biological theories about altruism tell us nothing about the intentions with which altruistic acts are performed.
In the current resurgence of interest in the biological basis of animal behavior and social organization, the ideas and questions pursued by Charles Darwin remain fresh and insightful. This is especially true of The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, Darwin's second most important work. This edition is a facsimile reprint of the first printing of the first edition (1871), not previously available in paperback. The work is divided into two parts. Part One marshals behavioral and morphological evidence to argue that humans evolved from other animals. Darwin shoes that human mental and emotional capacities, far from making human beings unique, are evidence of an animal origin and evolutionary development. Part Two is an extended discussion of the differences between the sexes of many species and how they arose as a result of selection. Here Darwin lays the foundation for much contemporary research by arguing that many characteristics of animals have evolved not in response to the selective pressures exerted by their physical and biological environment, but rather to confer an advantage in sexual competition. These two themes are drawn together in two final chapters on the role of sexual selection in humans. In their Introduction, Professors Bonner and May discuss the place of The Descent in its own time and relation to current work in biology and other disciplines.
To what degree has biology influenced and shaped the development of moral systems? One way to determine the extent to which human moral systems might be the product of natural selection is to explore behaviour in other species that is analogous and perhaps homologous to our own. Many non-human primates, for example, have similar methods to humans for resolving, managing, and preventing conflicts of interests within their groups. Such methods, which include reciprocity and food sharing, reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, and mediation, are the very building blocks of moral systems in that they are based on and facilitate cohesion among individuals and reflect a concerted effort by community members to find shared solutions to social conflict. Furthermore, these methods of resource distribution and conflict resolution often require or make use of capacities for empathy, sympathy, and sometimes even community concern. Non-human primates in societies in which such mechanisms are present may not be exactly moral beings, but they do show signs of a sense of social regularity that -- just like the norms and rules underlying human moral conduct -- promotes a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi.
ABSTRACT The genetic and environmental etiology of the five-factor model of personality as measured by the revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) was assessed using 123 pairs of identical twins and 127 pairs of fraternal twins. Broad genetic influence on the five dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness was estimated at 41%, 53%, 61%, 41%, and 44%, respectively. The facet scales also showed substantial heritability, although for several facets the genetic influence was largely nonadditive. The influence of the environment was consistent across all dimensions and facets. Shared environmental influences accounted for a negligible proportion of the variance in most scales, whereas nonshared environmental influences accounted for the majority of the environmental variance in all scales.
At one level, this paper is a lament and a warning. I lament biologists borrowing well-known terms and then drastically and awkwardly changing their meanings, and I warn about the mischief this does. Biology''s public image is at stake, as is its general usefulness. At another level, I attempt to clarify the misnamed concepts, beyond what has been achieved in recent philosophical writings. This helps to account for the mischief, and to see how it might be avoidable. But the most important thing about the paper is that, at a third level, it is an argument against physicalism and materialism, especially those variants which deny the autonomy of organisms and the existence of intrinsic goods. Interpreting biology from the point of view of those denials leads to unsatisfactory and even bizarre results.
After a long period of dormancy, Darwin's theory of sexual selection in general, and mate choice in particular, now represents one of the most active fields in evolutionary research. After a brief overview of the history of ideas and a short introduction into the main mechanisms of sexual selection, I discuss some recent theoretical developments and empirical findings in the study of mate choice and review the various current models of mate choice, which can be grossly divided into adaptive models and nonadaptive models. I also examine whether available primate evidence supports various hypotheses concerning mate choice. Although primatologists were long aware that nonhuman primates have preferences for certain mating partners, until recently the functions and evolutionary consequences of their preferences remained obscure. Now there is growing evidence that mate choice decisions provide primates with important direct or indirect benefits. For example, several observations are consistent with the hypothesis that by direct or indirect mate choice female primates lower the risk of infanticide or enhance the chance of producing viable offspring. Nevertheless, there are also significant holes in our knowledge. How the male mandrill, one of Darwin's famous examples, got his brightly colored face, is still unknown.
The shortcomings of present population genetic theory are discussed as they pertain to problems of speciation, extinction and the evolution of genetic systems. It is suggested that the modern theory of games may be useful in finding exact answers to problems of evolution not covered by the theory of population genetics. An outline of relevant topics in the theory of games is given. It is suggested that the most pertinent utility measure for a population is its one-generation probability of survival and that a strategy or a mixture of strategies corresponding to a maximin strategy will be found in natural populations. These notions are applied to a population segregating for two alleles with different norms of reaction in different environments. For the model chosen the optimal strategy is found to be homozygosis for different alleles in different populations due either to inbreeding or genetic isolation. A segregating polymorphism in such populations would be a detriment to the species, although the heterozygotes are more constant in fitness.
How did human cooperation evolve? Recent evidence shows that many people are willing to engage in altruistic punishment, voluntarily paying a cost to punish noncooperators. Although this behavior helps to explain how cooperation can persist, it creates an important puzzle. If altruistic punishment provides benefits to nonpunishers and is costly to punishers, then how could it evolve? Drawing on recent insights from voluntary public goods games, I present a simple evolutionary model in which altruistic punishers can enter and will always come to dominate a population of contributors, defectors, and nonparticipants. The model suggests that the cycle of strategies in voluntary public goods games does not persist in the presence of punishment strategies. It also suggests that punishment can only enforce payoff-improving strategies, contrary to a widely cited "folk theorem" result that suggests that punishment can allow the evolution of any strategy.
Sexual reproduction is associated with the evolution of anisogamy and sperm-producing males and egg-laying females. The ensuing competition for mates has led to sexual selection and coevolution of the sexes. Mathematical models are extensively used to test the plau- sibility of different complicated scenarios for the evolution of sexual traits. Unfortunately, the diversity of models is now itself equally be- wildering. Here we clarify some of the current debate by reviewing evolutionary explanations for the relationship between anisogamy, potential reproductive rates, parental care, sex roles, and mate choice. We review the benefits females might gain by mating with certain males rather than others. We also consider other forms of selection that can make females mate nonrandomly. One way empiricists can contribute to resolving theoretical disputes is to quantify the cost of expressing mating biases in the appropriate life-history currency.
The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence of three necessary conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequence of man’s eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, morally evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Since Darwin’s time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate.
Many philosophers, including perhaps most famously G.E. Moore, have argued that morality is non-natural. Here, Paul Kurtz defends the view that it is, in fact, natural and can in fact be justified empirically.
I want in this article to trace the history of an idea. It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts. The problems are diverse and include not only the behaviour of animals in contest situations but also some problems in the evolution of genetic mechanisms and in the evolution of ecosystems. It is not, however, sufficient to take over the theory as it has been developed in sociology and apply it to evolution. In sociology, and in economics, it is supposed that each contestant works out by reasoning the best strategy to adopt, assuming that his opponents are equally guided by reason. This leads to the concept of a ‘minimax’ strategy, in which a contestant behaves in such a way as to minimise his losses on the assumption that his opponent behaves so as to maximise them. Clearly, this would not be a valid approach to animal conflicts. A new concept has to be introduced, the concept of an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’.
The genetic and environmental etiology of the five-factor model of personality as measured by the revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) was assessed using 123 pairs of identical twins and 127 pairs of fraternal twins. Broad genetic influence on the five dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness was estimated at 41%, 53%, 61%, 41%, and 44%, respectively. The facet scales also showed substantial heritability, although for several facets the genetic influence was largely nonadditive. The influence of the environment was consistent across all dimensions and facets. Shared environmental influences accounted for a negligible proportion of the variance in most scales, whereas nonshared environmental influences accounted for the majority of the environmental variance in all scales.
Problems with altruism Current problems in sociobiology
- B C R Bertram
B.C.R. Bertram, Problems with altruism, in: K.s.C.S. Group (Ed.), Current problems in sociobiology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge MA, 1982, pp. 251–267.
Eusociality in a coral-reef shrimp
- Duffy
A forkhead-domain gene is mutated in a severe speech and language disorder
- C S Lai
- S E Fisher
- J A Hurst
- F Vargha-Khadem
- A P Monaco
- Lai, C.S.