Does a Lack of Health Insurance Elicit an Increase in the Rate of Voluntary Military Enlistment in the U.S.? The “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis,” 1974-2007

Abstract

This study addresses a question that has not been researched much previously, namely, does the unavailability of health insurance act as an incentive for persons to enlist in the military in the U.S.? This relationship is proffered as the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.” The present study endeavors to provide insight into this issue within a cost-benefit framework. The empirical analysis uses annual data for the years 1974 through 2007, the only years to date for which all of the variables in the model are dependable after the end of military conscription in the U.S. in 1973. Both OLS and 2SLS results demonstrate, among other things, that the greater the percentage of the civilian population without health insurance, the greater the rate of enlistment in the U.S. Army.

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Does a Lack of Health Insurance Elicit an Increase in the Rate
of Voluntary Military Enlistment in the U.S.?
The “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis,” 1974-2007
Richard J. Cebula (Corresponding Author)
Department of Economics
Armstrong Atlantic State University
Savannah, Georgia, U.S.A
E-mail: Richard.Cebula@armstrong.edu
Usha Nair-Reichert
Department of Economics
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A
E-mail: Usha.Nair@gatech.edu
Kyle Taylor
Department of Economics
Armstrong Atlantic State University
Savannah, Georgia, U.S.A
E-Mail: cebulari@mail.armstrong,edu
Abstract
This study addresses a question that has not been researched much previously, namely, does the unavailability of health
insurance act as an incentive for persons to enlist in the military in the U.S.? This relationship is proffered as the
“Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.” The present study endeavors to provide insight into this issue within a
cost-benefit framework. The empirical analysis uses annual data for the years 1974 through 2007, the only years to date
for which all of the variables in the model are dependable after the end of military conscription in the U.S. in 1973.
Both OLS and 2SLS results demonstrate, among other things, that the greater the percentage of the civilian population
without health insurance, the greater the rate of enlistment in the U.S. Army.
Keywords: Military enlistment, Health insurance unavailability, Cost-benefit model
1. Introduction
In recent years, various dimensions of the health care industry have attracted considerable attention. The topics debated
range from hospital costs, profitability, and efficiency issues to medical malpractice to physician staffing to the health
care inflation rate (Chirikos, 1998-99; Daniels and Gatsonis, 1999; Given, 1996; Glied, 2003; Goodman and Stano,
2000; Hart et al., 1997; Jordan, 2001; Karsten, 1995; Koch, 1992; Okunade, 2001, 2003; Olsen, 1996).One of the most
important and contentious issues in U.S. healthcare that has received the greatest increase in attention in recent years is
health insurance coverage (Bharmal and Thomas, 2005; Bundorf and Pauly, 2002; Cebula, 2006; Dushi and Honig,
2003; Frick and Bopp, 2005; Gruber, 2003; Harris and Keane, 1999; Holahan et al, 2003; Kronick and Gilmer, 2002;
Marstellar et al, 1998; de Meza, 1983; Newhouse, 1994; Nyman, 2003; Swartz, 2001; 2003).
This tremendous scrutiny and debate can be attributed to several reasons. Presumably, as argued in Dushi and Honig
(2003, p. 252), at least part of this increased attention can be attributed to the fact that there has been a noticeable
decline in health insurance coverage over the last two decades. Indeed, over a decade ago, Cutler (1994, p. 20) had
observed that “About 15 percent of the population…are uninsured.” More recently, for the year 2003, Bharmal and
Thomas (2005, p. 643) observe that the number of uninsured reached 43.6 million or 17.3 percent of persons under the

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age of 65. Even more recently, Frick and Bopp (2005) also emphasize that 17 percent of this population is without
health insurance.
To provide perspective, “economic” concerns can in effect largely be categorized into those relating to efficiency issues
and those relating to equity issues. The topic of the percent of the population without health insurance effectively falls
into both of these categories. From a purely financial perspective, those persons without health insurance create an
efficiency problem in that the healthcare system must, in the final analysis, “balance its books,” i.e., payments for the
uninsured must somehow be made. At issue is the efficiency/equity question of having those with private insurance
and/or some other entity (be it government, taxpayers in general, or other source of funds) pay for the medical care of
those without health insurance. From the perspective of medical care per se, one provocative issue is whether or not
those without health insurance receive the same quality and quantity of medical care as those with health insurance. It
could be argued that those without health insurance should not receive the same level and quality of medical care
because their revealed preference/demand for health insurance is lower and therefore they value health care at a lower
level than the medically insured do. This argument might seem substantive if in fact not having health insurance merely
reflected health insurance preferences as opposed to limited purchasing power/income and/or other constraints to
obtaining health insurance. For whatever reason, the percent of the U.S. population without health insurance is an issue
of considerable political interest, as evidenced by the major health care reform pursued by the Obama administration in
2009.
The present study seeks to provide at least preliminary insights into a very different dimension of the overall health
insurance issue. In particular, this study empirically investigates what is proffered here as the “Military Health Care
Magnet Hypothesis.” In particular, this study hypothesizes that the greater the percentage of the civilian population that
is without health insurance, the greater the incentive at the margin for civilians to enlist in the U.S. military, ceteris
paribus. In the interest of relevance, the study period runs from 1974 through 2007, thereby beginning with the first full
year after the end of military conscription (the “draft”) in the U.S. and controls for the Gulf War of 1990 and the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. We adopt a cost-benefit framework to empirically test this hypothesis. We include as independent
variables factors such as the percent of the civilian population without health insurance, measures of real income growth
in the U.S., the percent of the population with a “veteran” status, the risks associated with military service during
ongoing military conflicts, and other factors that are relevant to the enlistment decision process. Both OLS and 2SLS
results provide considerable support for the central health care insurance/enlistment hypothesis.
2. Review of Related Literature
Before providing the framework and results of the present study, we review briefly some of the recent published
literature on health insurance coverage determinants on the one hand and on military enlistment determinants on the
other hand. Beginning with the former, the following observation by Swartz (2003) is relevant. In particular, Swartz
(2003, p. 283) makes the observation that, simply put, many of those who do not have health insurance “…simply
cannot afford to purchase it…” Swartz (2003, p. 283) proceeds to observe that many households “…cannot afford to
purchase health insurance unless it is heavily subsidized.” Swartz (2003, p. 283) also claims that most of those
households that “…do not have access to employer-sponsored coverage…must purchase…health insurance in the
non-group [individual] market…where insurance is typically twice as expensive [to the household] as employer-group
coverage…,” where the likelihood of purchasing health insurance is lower than otherwise (because of “the law of
demand”).
In the study by Dushi and Honig (2003), the focus involving healthcare insurance is rather different. In particular, in
Table 1 of their study, Dushi and Honig (2003, p. 253) provide evidence on gender differences in the propensity to
purchase group health insurance when the latter is available. Their data reveal that, overall, females in the labor force
tend to have a lower “take-up” rate than males in terms of health insurance plans: 73 percent of the time for females
versus 88 percent of the time for males. Dushi and Honig (2003) argue that some significant portion of this male-female
take-up disparity is attributable to married women opting to rely on a spouse’s health insurance plan. This male-female
take-up disparity notwithstanding, when a health insurance plan is available through the employer, nearly three-fourths
of the time women do take advantage of the option. Moreover, the presence of labor unions appears to increase health
insurance availability.
Newhouse (1994) approaches the question regarding the propensity of the elderly to purchase health insurance from a
different perspective. He observes that that most of the U.S. population age 65 and older are covered by Medicare. He
also stresses that as a person advances in years, so does the incidence of health problems. Given the limitations on
Medicare coverage, Newhouse (1994, p. 7) observes that many elderly persons regard Medicare coverage as insufficient
to meet their needs. Indeed, apparently because of the latter consideration, Newhouse (1994, p. 7) finds that “…over 80
percent of Medicare beneficiaries…had some form of supplemental health insurance, with a third having individually
purchased insurance.”

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The study by Frick and Bopp (2005) is concerned with the fact that between 15 and 20 percent of the U.S. population
do not have health insurance. Frick and Bopp (2005) observe that the classic utility-insurance model makes it patently
clear that having a very low income can seriously restrict the ability to purchase health insurance. The Frick and Bopp
(2005) study not only focuses on the effects of poverty on health insurance purchases but also on other factors. Frick
and Bopp (2005) deals with pooled cross-sectional/time series data, with the empirical estimation process revealing the
following: the percent of the population without health insurance is an increasing function of the percent of the
population whose income lies below the poverty level, the percent of the population that is female, and the percent of
the population with only a high school diploma, with the first of these three variables being the most dominant.
Finally, the study by Cebula (2006) uses an aggregate state-level cross-section data set to examine the percent of the
population without health insurance in the year 2000, and includes as an explanatory variable a measure of the effects
of being either self employed or an independent contractor. The most interesting finding is that the percent of the
population without health insurance is an increasing function of the percent of the population that is either self
employed or independent contractors. The study also concludes that the percent of the population without health
insurance is a decreasing function of median family income and the percent of the population age 65 and older and an
increasing function of the percent of the population that is Hispanic. Thus, a basic conclusion found in the Cebula (2006)
study involves the inability of people to afford health insurance, as found in Frick and Bopp (2005).
The political basis and economics of the military draft and the subsequent formation of the AVMF (all-volunteer
military force) are set forth in a series of insightful, original studies by Tollison (1970) and by Tollison, Amacher,
Miller, Pauly, and Willett (1973). Beyond the scope of these studies, Seeborg (1994) conducted a provocative study
based on data derived from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, in which he concluded that the probability of
enlistment is directly related to minority and poverty status, while controlling for ability and a number of other
socioeconomic background variables. In addition, the Seeborg (1994) analysis of poverty “transitions” shows that a
very large percentage of enlistees in the early 1980s who were living in poverty at age 17 had escaped poverty by 1990,
i.e., that the military can serve as a mechanism for upward economic mobility for disadvantaged youth.
Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley (1999) study the differences in the propensity to enlist of various subgroups of potential
enlistees into the U.S Military. The analysis furthers the idea that black youth regard the military as a vehicle for
upward social and economic mobility. Hence black youth are more likely to enlist in the military compared to white
youth. Furthermore the presence of a military parent, military grandparent or a military sibling within the family
increases the propensity of a potential enlistee to enlist. This is consistent at least in principle with recent studies such as
Kleykamp (2006) and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008), that find the institutional and cultural presence of the
military within an area has a significant influence on enlistment decisions.
Warner, Simon, and Payne (2003) conclude that civilian job opportunities are the key consideration for high school
graduates when pondering the decision to enlist. Although post high school educational opportunities and access played
a role in such a decision, it was the overall economic opportunity available that was the most significant factor in an
enlistment decision, especially among rural youth.
A very relevant recent study by Kleykamp (2006) highlights three areas of influence on military enlistment: individual
educational goals; the institutional presence of the military in communities (as observed above); and race and
socioeconomic status. The study was conducted in the state of Texas and based on individual survey data. The study
analyses the relative risk ratios associated with each choice made by a potential enlistee.
Lastly, a study by Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008) provides panel least squares (PLS) evidence at the state level for
factors influencing military enlistment. This study deals with data for the 2003 through 2005 period and finds that,
consistent with Kleykamp (2006) and Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley (1999), the stronger the institutional and cultural
presence of the military within an area, the greater the proportion of the age-eligible population that enlists in the
military. Furthermore, Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008) also find that the greater the opportunity costs to military
enlistment, the lower the enlistment rate, a finding consistent with Warner, Simon, and Payne (2003), as well as
Seeborg (1994). Moreover, this study also finds a higher casualty rate as discouraging military enlistment.
Our review of the literature indicates that the lack of health care coverage reflects substantially the inability of the
people to afford healthcare costs. The military could serve as an avenue to improve one’s socio-economic status,
especially when the opportunity cost is low and alternate opportunities are scarce. One important way in which the
military could contribute to an individual’s well being is by providing health care. Hence the argument that in an era
of rising heath care costs access to health care through the military could provide an important incentive to enlist. The
flip side of this issue is also poses an interesting question: If our hypothesis were indeed to be true, how would
universal health care coverage impact military enlistment?
3. The Basic Framework
The basic framework adopted in this study focuses on the decision to enlist in the U.S military as a cost-benefit decision.
In particular, the decision to enlist in the military, Denlist, is predicated upon the expected net benefits of enlistment,

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ENBenlist. The latter is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits of enlistment, EGBenlist, and a
decreasing function of the expected gross costs of enlistment, EGCenlist, such that:
ENBenlist = f(EGBenlist, EGCenlist), DenlistEGBenlist > 0, DenlistEGCenlist < 0 (1)
Naturally, as evidenced in the studies referenced in the literature review above, there are a number of variables that
typically are expected to exercise an influence over enlistment rates. To begin addressing these, the first focus is on the
EGBenlist, where:
EGBenlist = g (economic benefits, Family/Cultural benefits) (2)
The central hypothesis being empirically tested in this study is that the greater the percentage of the population without
health insurance [UNINS], the greater the propensity to enlist [ENLIST] in the U.S. military, ceteris paribus. This
hypothesis, dubbed here as the Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis, is based fundamentally on the fact that those
enlisted in the U.S. armed forces, along with their immediate families (spouse, children) receive free medical care
provided through the military. Given the increased proportion of the U.S. population without health insurance since
1974, free medical care provided by the armed forces should act as an attraction/incentive to potential enlistees, i.e.,
increase the EGBenlist. Alternatively stated, the expected economic benefits associated with enlistment are expected to be
greater the higher the percentage of the population without health insurance (UNINS), ceteris paribus. This is because
enlistment brings with it health care without any health insurance premiums. Thus, the higher the percentage of the
population without health insurance, the greater the EGBenlist level.
In addition, the “family/cultural benefits” of enlistment are expected to be greater in an environment which has a higher
presence of persons who are military veterans (Kleykamp, 2006; Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley, 1999; Cebula, Menon,
and Menon, 2008). This is because enlistment is viewed as a socially approved and admired behavior and presumably
receives positive psychological reinforcement, encouragement, and social approval in environments with a higher
percentage of the population being veterans (PVET). Thus, the family/cultural benefits from enlistment are an
increasing of PVET, ceteris paribus.
Hence, (2) initially becomes:
EGBenlist = g (UNINS, PVET), gUNINS > 0, gPVET > 0 (3)
The level of EGCenlist is expected to be an increasing function of opportunity costs of enlistment. These opportunity
costs can be measured by potential economic opportunities from non-enlistment sources, measured here in the broad
sense by the percentage growth rate of real GDP, GRRGDP. Accordingly, in principle paralleling Warner, Simon and
Payne (2003) and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008), based on opportunity-cost reasoning, it is hypothesized that
EGCenlist is an increasing function of GRRGDP, ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, it is also expected that risk-averse behavior would treat a greater degree of risk in the form of the greater
probability of being seriously wounded or a fatality under wartime conditions, namely, in the Gulf War of 1990, the
War in Afghanistan, and in Operation Iraqi Freedom, WARRISK, as elevating EGCenlist, ceteris paribus (Cebula,
Menon, and Menon, 2008). Hence, the EGCenlist is initially expressed as:
EGCenlist = h (GRRGDP, WARRISK), hGRRGDP > 0, hWARRISK >0 (4)
Substituting from (3) and (4) into (1) yields the following:
ENBenlist = f (UNINS, PVET, GRRGDP, WARRISK),
fUNINS > 0, fPVET > 0, fGRRGDP < 0, fWARRISK < 0 (5)
4. The Empirical Analysis
Based on the model expressed in (5), the following model is to be estimated initially:
ARMYRECRt = a0 + a1 UNINSt-1 + a2 PVETt-1 + a3 GRRGDPt-1 + a4 WARRISKt + μ (6)
where (data sources in parentheses):
ARMYRECRt = the number of army recruits in year t, as a percentage of the U.S. population in year t (National
Priorities Project Database, 2008);
a0 = constant;
UNINSt-1 = percentage of the civilian U.S. population without health insurance coverage in year t-1 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 1976; 1978; 1980; 1984; 1987; 1990; 1994; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2008; 2009);
PVETt-1 = the percentage of the U.S. population who have served in the U.S. military as of year t-1 (Congressional
Research Service, 2008; Council of Economic Advisors, 2009, Table B-34);
GRRGDPt-1 = the percentage growth rate of real GDP (expressed in year 2000 dollars) over year t-1 (Council of
Economics Advisors, 2009, Table B-4);

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WARRISKt = a binary dummy variable =1 for the year 1990 (first Gulf War) and the years of the Wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq; and
μ = stochastic error term.
The study period runs from 1974 through 2007. Basic descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. The ADF and PP
unit roots tests reveal that three of the variables in this initial specification are not stationary in levels: one
(ARMYRECR) is stationary only in first differences; one (UNINS) is stationary in only second differences; and one
(PVET) is stationary in levels but with a trend variable. The variable GRRGDP is stationary in levels. The ADF and PP
results are provided in Table 2. Accordingly, in the estimate of equation (6), ARMYRECR is expressed in first
differences, UNINS is expressed in second differences, and a TREND variable is included. The data deals with total
annual number of army recruits in the US, hence it is not possible to distinguish by gender or race at the aggregate level.
Table 3, column (a) provides the results for our baseline model. We find that all four of the estimated coefficients
exhibit the hypothesized signs, with three statistically significant at the one percent level and one statistically significant
at five percent level. In addition, the TREND variable is statistically significant at the one percent level. The estimated
coefficient on the ΔPVET variable is positive (as expected) and statistically significant at the three percent level,
implying that an environment where there is a greater concentration of veterans is conducive to a greater propensity to
enlist in the U.S. Army (Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley, 1999; Kleykamp, 2006; Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008).
Consistent in principle with Seeborg (1999) Warner, Simon, and Payne (2003), and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008),
the estimated coefficient on the GRRGDP variable is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. This
finding implies that the stronger the growth rate of the economy, the higher the opportunity costs of enlistment and the
lower the net benefits thereof and hence the lower the rate of enlistment. Next, the coefficient on the WARRISK
variable is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. The latter finding implies that volunteers for
U.S. Army duty are deterred from enlisting during actual war-time conditions, presumably because of the perceived
higher risks of being either seriously wounded or killed in military engagements (Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008).
Finally, there is the finding for the key health care variable. The estimated coefficient on the variable UNINS is positive
and statistically significant at the one percent level, implying that the greater the percent of the civilian population
without health insurance, the greater the propensity for eligible young men and women to enlist in the U.S. Army. Thus,
this result provides strong empirical support for the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.”
We test for the robustness of our baseline model with three alternate specifications, the results of which are reported in
columns (b), (c) and (d) of Table 3. We include the following additional variables in these specifications (data source in
parentheses):
POPPRESt-1 = the Presidential job approval rating in year t-1, an index that ranges from
0 to 100 (Gallup Poll, 2008);
TERRORt = a binary variable for the terrorist attach of September 11th: TERRORt = 1 for the year 2001 and = 0
otherwise;
COLLEGEt-1 = percentage of the adult population age 25 and older with at least a bachelors degree in year t-1 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 1976; 1978; 1980; 1984; 1987; 1990; 1994; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2008; 2009).
If a given U.S. President is very popular, his policies, including actual or potential military policies, may attract
enlistees who “believe” in his cause. Alternatively, under certain conditions, even if temporary, there may be expected
benefits from enlistment if a potential enlistee experiences or expects to experience greater self esteem from serving
his/her country. For example, after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11th of 2001, a surge of patriotism
seemingly swept across the nation and at some level united Americans. Thus, the experience of terrorism on September
11th of 2001 (TERROR) and the manifestation of a popular President (POPPRES) each may act to increase the expected
benefits of enlistment, ceteris paribus. Finally, the greater one’s educational attainment, the greater one’s labor force
options. Hence, the greater proportion of the population with a college degree, the less appealing military enlistment
will be (Seeborg, 1999: Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2003), ceteris paribus.
In Table 3, column (b), the variable POPPRES is included in the model; in column (c), the variables POPPRES and
TERROR are included in the model; finally, in column (d), all three of the additional variables [POPPRES, TERROR,
and COLLEGE] are included the model. In all three columns, the estimated coefficients on these additional variables
fail to be statistically significant at even the ten percent level. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on the four
basic explanatory variables, UNINS, PVET, GRRGDP, and WARRISK continue to exhibit their expected signs;
furthermore, nine of these 12 coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, one is statistically
significant at the five percent level, and the remaining two are statistically significant at approximately the six percent
level. Thus, there appears to be strong evidence that the Army recruitment rate is an increasing function of the PVET
variable and a decreasing function of the GRRGDP and WARRISK variables. This conclusion is strengthened by the

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fact that the coefficient on the UNINS variable is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level in all three
estimates.
As an additional robustness check, we also consider the possibility that there is no reason to expect that there exists a
significant time lag between the influence of either (a) the presence a military parent, military grandparent, and/or a
military sibling or (b) a stronger institutional and cultural presence of the military on the one hand and the decision to
enlist in the Army on the other hand (Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley, 1999; Kleykamp, 2006; Cebula, Menon, and
Menon, 2008). Thus, the analysis now investigates the Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis under the condition that
ARMYRECR and PVET are contemporaneous.
Given that ARMYRECR and PVET are being treated as contemporaneous, the possibility of simultaneity bias arises.
Accordingly, the analysis undertakes a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimation, with the instrumental variable being
the two-year lag of the unemployment rate of the civilian labor force, URt-2 (Council of Economic Advisors, 2009,
Table B-42). This variable was the instrument of choice because (a) URt-2 is highly correlated with PVETt and (b) URt-2
is also not correlated with the error terms in the system.
The following equation is now estimated by 2SLS with the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity correction:
ARMYRECRt = b0 + b1 UNINSt-1 + b2 PVETt + b3 GRRGDPt-1 + b4 WARRISKt +μ’ (8)
The results are presented in Table 3, column (e); all four of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs and are
statistically significant at the one percent level. The DW and Rho statistics imply the absence of any serious
autocorrelation problems. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically significant at the one percent level, attesting to the
overall strength of the model.
Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that the U.S. Army enlistment rate is positively impacted by a stronger institutional
and cultural presence of the military (Segal, Bachman, and O’Malley, 1999; Kleykamp, 2006; Cebula, Menon, and
Menon, 2008). In addition, the greater the growth rate of real GDP, the lower the enlistment rate (Seeborg, 1999;
Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2003; and Cebula, Menon, and Menon (2008). Furthermore, it can be inferred that wartime
conditions and the associated greater expected risk of being seriously wounded or killed create a disincentive to enlist
(Cebula, Menon, and Menon, 2008). Finally, the coefficient on the health insurance variable is positive and highly
statistically significant, implying strong support for the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis.” Clearly, these 2SLS
findings are all consistent with the OLS findings.
5. Conclusion
This study addresses the following question: “Does the unavailability of health insurance act as a incentive for persons
to enlist in the military?” Within a cost-benefit framework, the present study endeavors to provide insight into this issue,
referred to here as the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis”. The OLS and 2SLS results provide substantial
evidence that the greater the percentage of the civilian population without health insurance, the greater the rate of
enlistment in the U.S. Army. Voluntary enlistment in the U.S. Army also is positively impacted by a greater presence of
military veterans (which “promotes” enlistment). Furthermore, it is negatively impacted by a more rapidly growing
economy (a proxy for higher opportunity costs) and military conflicts/wars (risk-averse behavior with military conflict
being a risk factor that elevates the expected probability of being wounded or killed). Thus, the AVMF (all-voluntary
military force) market appears to function as the free enterprise system would expect.
Finally, it may be worthy of note that if the “Military Health Care Magnet Hypothesis” is valid, then it logically follows
that if a system of de facto universal health care is in fact instituted in the U.S., there may be unforeseen externalities
from a military recruitment perspective. In particular, implementation of universal health care would naturally result in
a decline in the expected gross benefits of enlistment. This is because would-be enlistees will factor the same into their
cost-benefit analysis of whether to enlist. Clearly, as the AVMF market factors the availability of universal health care
outside the confines of the military into its marginal enlistment decision calculus, for many the expected net benefits (of
enlisting) will decline sufficiently as to create a no-enlist decision. In turn, it follows that some form of additional
incentives will be needed in order to induce sufficient recruitment/enlistment. We contribute to the debate on universal
health care coverage by pointing out the possibility for an unintended consequence, namely a decline in military
enlistment. Thus if universal health care is instituted, it could increase the cost of military recruitment in the future.
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Table 1. Basic Descriptive Statistics
Table 2. ADF and PP Unit Root Test Results
*Critical value for rejection of null hypothesis at 95 percent confidence level = -2.89.

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Table 3. Estimation Results for ΔARMYRECR
Terms in parentheses are t-values. Δ is the first differences operator;
ΔΔ is the second differences operator.
***indicates statistically significant at one percent level.
**indicates statistically significant at five percent level.
*indicates statistically significant at ten percent level.