Effects of Intentional Motor Actions
on Embodied Language Processing
Shirley-Ann Rueschemeyer, Oliver Lindemann, Daan van Rooij,
Wessel van Dam, and Harold Bekkering
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Abstract. Embodied theories of language processing suggest that this motor simulation is an automatic and necessary component of meaning
representation. If this is the case, then language and action systems should be mutually dependent (i.e., motor activity should selectively modulate
processing of words with an action-semantic component). In this paper, we investigate in two experiments whether evidence for mutual
dependence can be found using a motor priming paradigm. Speciﬁcally, participants performed either an intentional or a passive motor task while
processing words denoting manipulable and nonmanipulable objects. The performance rates (Experiment 1) and response latencies (Experiment 2)
in a lexical-decision task reveal that participants performing an intentional action were positively affected in the processing of words denoting
manipulable objects as compared to nonmanipulable objects. This was not the case if participants performed a secondary passive motor action
(Experiment 1) or did not perform a secondary motor task (Experiment 2). The results go beyond previous research showing that language
processes involve motor systems to demonstrate that the execution of motor actions has a selective effect on the semantic processing of words. We
suggest that intentional actions activate speciﬁc parts of the neural motor system, which are also engaged for lexical-semantic processing of action-
related words and discuss the beneﬁcial versus inhibitory nature of this relationship. The results provide new insights into the embodiment of
language and the bidirectionality of effects between language and action processing.
Keywords: embodiment, semantics, action, motor resonance
Embodied approaches to language comprehension suggest
that neural resources generally used for perception, action,
and emotion are also recruited during language comprehen-
sion (Barsalou, 2008). In support of this, numerous studies
have shown interactive effects between language compre-
hension and action execution. For example, in the action
compatibility effect Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) showed
that execution of speciﬁc actions (i.e., movement of the hand
toward or away from the body) was facilitated by sentence
materials describing an action in a congruent direction (e.g.,
she opened/closed the drawer). Likewise, Zwaan and Taylor
(2006) showed that sentences describing manual rotation
(e.g., she turned the volume up/down) facilitated a congru-
ent manual rotation of the hand (e.g., rotation of a knob to
the right/left). In both of these studies, active responses were
made in response to sentence comprehension, that is, the
facilitated action followed sentence presentation. In contrast,
Buccino et al. (2005) asked participants to make an active
response during sentence presentation (i.e., participants exe-
cuted a given action in the middle of presentation of a verb
within a sentence). They found that participants were slower
to respond with their hands to sentences describing hand
actions and slower to respond with their feet to sentences
describing foot actions. In other words, responses were
impaired if made with an effector implicitly referred to in
the sentence materials.
These studies suggest that language and action systems
are highly interconnected resulting in both positive and neg-
ative interactions. The polarity of the effect of language on
action appears to be determined by the temporal relationship
between presentation of language stimulus and initiation of
action execution (Boulenger et al., 2006). Irrespective of this
polarity however, language comprehension is proposed to
elicit motor resonance, thus allowing for interactive effects
between action and language.
Neuroimaging studies on language describing actions
further support this conclusion. For example, comprehen-
sion of action verbs (e.g., grasp) elicits greater levels of acti-
vation in the cerebral motor system than comprehension of
abstract language (e.g., think) (Rueschemeyer, Brass, &
Friederici, 2007). The response of the neural motor system
to language is suggested to be effector speciﬁc (Buccino
et al., 2005; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermu¨ller, 2004), auto-
matic (Pulvermu¨ ller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005), and lar-
gely dependent on premotor rather than primary motor
cortex (Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Further-
more words denoting familiar manipulable objects, such as
tools, also show selective involvement of neural motor areas
when compared to words denoting nonmanipulable objects
(Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Saccuman et al., 2006). This
is suggested to reﬂect the strong association between manip-
ulable objects and hand-motor actions.
Results to date have thus shown that language process-
ing affects the neural motor system. Embodied theories hold
that this link between language and action is crucial for lex-
ical-semantic processing and propose that mental simulation
is critical to action-word understanding (Barsalou, 2008;
Pulvermu¨ ller, 2001). On the other hand, proponents of
Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266
2009 Hogrefe Publishing
disembodied perspectives argue that there is little evidence
that motor representations actually precede or contribute to
lexical processing. For instance, Mahon and Caramazza
(2008) argue that the existing literature may be in agreement
with an embodied account, but also with an account in
which comprehension of a word induces imageryofamotor
act. In such an account, motor simulation follows word com-
prehension, and thus cannot be considered part of the
semantic representation of a word.
However, if motor simulation is merely a consequence of
lexical-semantic understanding (i.e., if it follows rather than
contributes to lexical-semantic comprehension), then activa-
tion of the motor system preceding word presentation should
have no inﬂuence on lexical-semantic processing. There is
limited evidence available regarding selective motor effects
on lexical-semantic processing: Pulvermu¨ller, Hauk, Nikulin,
and Ilmoniemi (2005) demonstrated in a transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) study that giving a single excitatory
pulse over selective regions of the primary motor cortex
150 ms prior to presentation of an action-word leads to facil-
itated action-word recognition. The authors argue that resid-
ual neural motor activation resulting from the TMS pulse
facilitates access to a word with an overlapping motor corre-
late (i.e., motor activation primes word recognition). In a
similar vein, Helbig, Graf, and Kiefer (2006) demonstrated
that naming a picture of an object used in a speciﬁc way
(e.g., a nutcracker) primes subsequent naming of objects
used in a similar manner (e.g., pliers), even if these two
objects have no other obvious semantic relationship. The
authors argue that motor information activated by presenta-
tion of the ﬁrst item is also called upon in order to semanti-
cally process (i.e., name) the second item. Therefore, a direct
effect of motor modulation on naming is postulated. Myung,
Blumstein, and Sedivy (2006) report a similar priming effect
using words rather than pictures (but see also Helbig et al.
(2006), Experiment 2). All of these studies have in common
that activation of the neural motor system prior to word pre-
sentation is postulated. Activation of the motor system is
introduced by (1) TMS (Pulvermu¨ller, Hauk, et al., 2005)
or (2) a stimulus suspected to elicit motor activation (Helbig
et al., 2006; Myung et al., 2006).
While TMS undoubtedly activates a selective population
of neurons in the cerebral motor system, we wondered
whether more general actions might also interfere selectively
with processing language related to actions. Additionally, in
the studies by Helbig et al. (2006) and Myung et al. (2006),
it is difﬁcult to rule out the explanation that priming might
result from overlapping visual rather than motor features,
since objects used in a similar manner tend to have a similar
form. Therefore, we attempted to prime words with a motor
component using actual motor execution in the absence of
visual or language input. Speciﬁcally, we used an arbitrary
motor task (i.e., Experiment 1: tracing the outline of a circle
on the table; Experiment 2: depressing a button) to activate
the cerebral motor system. Simultaneously we had partici-
pants respond to words referring to functionally manipulable
(FM: e.g., cup) or nonfunctionally manipulable (NM, e.g.,
bookend) objects. It should be noted that while NM objects
in this study could be hand-held, they require no direct manip-
ulation for use (e.g., once the bookendhas been placed on the
shelf, it holds the books with no further manipulation
required). FM objects on the other hand must be interacted
upon continuously in order to fulﬁll their function (e.g., a
cup can only fulﬁll its function as a cup if brought to and from
the mouth). Both FM and NM items might therefore have
been included in a category of artifacts or manipulable items
in previous studies comparing manipulable to nonmanipula-
ble objects (Beauchamp & Martin, 2007; Chao & Martin,
2000; Saccuman et al., 2006). Several recent studies have
demonstrated, however, that not all types of object manipula-
bility are equivalent in determining neural representations of
objects and words. Speciﬁcally, Masson and colleagues have
shown that information about how an object is used (e.g., pok-
ing the keysof a calculator) is activated in a very fast and auto-
matic manner in response to manipulable object words (e.g.,
calculator), whereas information about how an object is dis-
placed (e.g., how the calculator is lifted from the desk) is acti-
vated in a much slower and less reliable manner (Bub,
Masson, & Cree, 2008; Buxbaum, Kyle, Tang, & Detre,
2006; Masson, Bub, & Newton-Taylor, 2008). In a similar
vein, several neuroimaging studies have shown different brain
activation patterns for participants making judgments about
how an object is usedversus how an object is moved (Boronat
et al., 2005; Canessa et al., 2008; Kellenbach, Brett, &
Patterson, 2003), as well as differences in brain activation
for objects which can be both manipulated and displaced ver-
sus objects which are usually only displaced (Rueschemeyer,
van Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, in press).
Based on this existing literature, the semantic representation
of FM words in the current study is postulated to involve neu-
ral motor resources to a greater degree than that of NM words.
Therefore, we expect to see a modulating effect ofovert action
execution on FM words but not on NM words.
Action and language about action are thought to interact,
because the underlying neural circuitry supporting each
overlaps. However, experiencing an executed action clearly
has many neural consequences not directly involved in the
planning and execution of the action. In order to ensure that
any observed effect could not be related to these visual and
somatosensory components of action, we introduced a con-
trol condition in Experiment 1 in which participants were
engaged in an action, but not an intentional one. In other
words, participants were engaged in a passive action identi-
cal to the intentional action described above with respect to
visual and somatosensory processing, but the action was not
initiated or controlled by participants. The neural correlates
of actively (i.e., intentionally) and passively executed
actions differ with respect to engagement of premotor and
presupplementary motor areas (Kennerly, Sakai, &
Rushworth, 2004; Mima et al., 1999; Passingham,1993).
Speciﬁcally, intentional actions have been shown to engage
the resources of these areas signiﬁcantly more than passive
actions, which require no planning, initiation, or monitoring
on the part of the actor. As previous studies have shown that
action-related words elicit activation in premotor cortex, we
hypothesized that responses to FM words would be modu-
lated by preceding execution of an intentional, but not of
a passive action.
S.-A. Rueschemeyer et al.: Intentional Action and Embodied Language 261
2009 Hogrefe Publishing Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266
Thirty-two right-handed native speakers of Dutch (mean
age = 23.0, SD = 1.8) participated in this experiment. The
data from ﬁve participants was excluded because of exces-
sive errors (> 30% errors) in any one condition, leaving
27 participants in the ﬁnal analysis.
A total of 100 letter string stimuli were created for the exper-
iment (see Appendix). Eighty were real Dutch words denot-
ing familiar objects and comprised the critical experimental
stimuli. The remaining 20 stimuli were Dutch pseudowords
(i.e., phonotactically and orthographically legal letter strings
with no meaning in Dutch) and served as noncritical stimuli
for catch trials (see procedures below). Critical stimuli
belonged to one of two experimental conditions: (1) words
denoting FM objects and (2) words denoting NM objects.
FM words were familiar objects requiring consistent and
constant manipulation when in use (e.g., cup and hammer).
NM words, on the other hand, denoted objects that can be
hand-held, but do not require constant manipulation for
use (e.g., bookend and clock). The 80 critical word stimuli
were matched for word length, frequency, and imageability.
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor.
A microphone recorded vocal responses. Each trial was ini-
tiated by a ﬁxation cross presented in the center of the screen
for 400 ms, followed immediately by a word stimulus.
Words remained visible until participants responded, or for
a maximum of 2,000 ms. No feedback was provided during
the experiment. Participants were instructed to perform a go/
no-go lexical-decision task to word stimuli: in the case that
the word stimulus on the screen was a real word in Dutch,
participants were instructed to read the word aloud; in the
case of a pseudoword, participants should withhold their
response. Voice-onset times (VOTs) were recorded.
The study comprised two experimental blocks differing
in motor task requirements (passive and active). For the
active movement condition, participants used the right index
ﬁnger to follow the edge of a raised disk ﬁxated on the table.
A motion-tracking device (miniBIRD 800, Ascension Tech-
nology Corporation, Burlington, VT) was used to ensure
that participants remained in motion throughout the motor
task block. For the passive movement condition, the index
ﬁnger of the right hand was ﬁxed to a motorized rotating
disk of the same size as that used in the active movement
condition. In this manner, participants in the passive condi-
tion performed an identical motion to the participants in the
active condition, but their movement was neither active nor
intentional. The order of block presentation was counterbal-
anced across participants.
Outliers (3 ·SD ± mean VOT) were excluded (1.3% of
data) from statistical analyses. In all tests, a Type I error rate
Performance rates (PRs) in the lexical-decision task were
calculated for each participant in each condition and block
(see Table 1). A repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was calculated with the within-subjects factors
Movement Task (active and passive) and Word Meaning
(FM and NM). The accuracy with which participants
responded to words in each of the conditions differed
between the two movement tasks, as indicated by a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between Word Meaning and Movement
Task, F(1, 26) = 5.93, p=.02, partial g
the main effect of Movement Task nor Word Meaning
reached signiﬁcance (both ps > .1).
The post hoc simple main effects analysis of the interac-
tion between Movement Task and Word Meaning revealed
that during the active Movement Task participants were
more accurate in responding to FM words than to NM
words, F(1, 26) = 6.30, p< .05. During the passive Move-
ment Task, PRs between the two word meaning conditions
did not differ signiﬁcantly, F(1, 26) = 1.03, p>.10.
Responses to FM words beneﬁted from an intentionally
made action in comparison to a passively made action,
F(1, 26) = 6.39, p< .05, while responses to NM words
did not differ signiﬁcantly in the two movement conditions,
F(1, 26) = 2.07, p> .10.
Table 1. Average PRs and VOTs with standard error for responses to FM and NM words in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
PR VOT PR VOT
Active action (Experiment 1) FM 99.2 (0.37) 738 (26) 98.5 (0.004) 719 (37)
Motor (Experiment 2) NM 96.6 (0.96) 742 (25) 99.3 (0.002) 741 (38)
Passive action (Experiment 1) FM 97.3 (0.58) 765 (21) 97.3 (0.006) 668 (21)
No Motor (Experiment 2) NM 98.1 (0.55) 763 (21) 96.2 (0.040) 675 (23)
262 S.-A. Rueschemeyer et al.: Intentional Action and Embodied Language
Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266 2009 Hogrefe Publishing
VOTs were averaged for each participant in each word con-
dition and movement task. A repeated-measures ANOVA
was calculated with the same factors used on performance
data. No signiﬁcant differences in vocal response times were
detected (all ps>.10).
A selective modulation of responses to words denoting
manipulable objects was observed while participants were
engaged in an active and intentional motor task. Speciﬁcally,
participants made fewer errors when processing words refer-
ring to FM objects (such as cup) as compared to NM objects
(such as bookend) while performing an arbitrary, but volun-
tary action. This selective modulation brought on by volun-
tary actions suggests that an activation of the neural motor
system has a positive impact on the processing of words
Nevertheless, there were several unexpected aspects to
the data we collected. First, signiﬁcant effects were observed
in PRs, but not in VOTs. However, the PRs were extremely
high, indicating that participants were virtually at ceiling and
rendering interpretation of this data difﬁcult. A complemen-
tary effect in the VOT data would thus be very helpful.
Effects in the VOTs in this study may have been uninten-
tionally diminished by the rhythmic nature of the secondary
motor task. Speciﬁcally, participants were required to move
their dominant hand in a circle on the table in front of them
while reading words aloud. It is possible that participants
thus synchronized word reading to the rhythm of their hand
movement, such that any effects in VOTs were smoothed
out across conditions. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we intro-
duced a secondary motor task with no rhythmic component.
Secondly, it is possible that the results reﬂect a beneﬁt
for self-paced compared to experimenter-paced tasks, that
is, participants may have found the experimenter-paced sec-
ondary task more irritating than the condition in which they
could move themselves. Therefore it is necessary to com-
pare the effects of the lexical-decision task while performing
a voluntary secondary motor task to a condition in which no
secondary motor task is performed. These two ideas were
pursued in a follow-up experiment.
Twenty-eight native speakers of Dutch (mean age = 22,
SD = 2.8) participated in this experiment. The data from
all participants entered the ﬁnal analysis.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli and the procedure for the lexical-decision task
were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except that
rather than reading real words aloud, participants were
required to say the Dutch word ‘‘ja’’ (meaning ‘‘yes’’). This
further reduced variance in VOTs resulting from different
phoneme onsets between words. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two groups (Motor Task and No Motor
Task). Participants in the Motor Task group performed the
lexical-decision task as described above, while simulta-
neously depressing a button controlling a force pad. Partic-
ipants were required to apply a minimum level of force to
the button in order to initiate a trial and were required to
maintain pressure on the button throughout the duration of
the trial. Between trials participants released the button. In
the No Motor Task, participants performed the lexical-deci-
sion task in the absence of any secondary motor task.
Mean PR in the lexical-decision task was calculated for each
participant for each of the word conditions separately (see
Table 1). An ANOVA was calculated with the within-
subjects factor Word Meaning (FM and NM) and the
between-subjects factor Group (Motor and No Motor).
The accuracy with which participants responded to word
stimuli differed in the two Groups, as indicated by a main
effect of Group, F(1, 26) = 5.79, p< .05, partial g
This reﬂected signiﬁcantly better performance for the Motor
as compared to the No Motor group. Neither the main effect
of Word Meaning, nor the interaction between Word Mean-
ing and Group reached signiﬁcance, all ps > .1.
Mean VOT for the lexical-decision task was calculated for
each participant and word condition (see Table 1). An
ANOVA with the same factors used on PRs was calculated.
The main effects of Word Meaning and Group were also
both signiﬁcant; F(1, 26) = 17.96, p< .001, partial
= .41, F(1, 26) = 1.77, p< .1, partial g
cally, the impact of the factor Word Meaning differed for
the two Groups, F(1, 26) = 5.15, p< .05, partial g
Simple main effect analysis to resolve the Word Meaning
and Group interaction indicated that participants were faster
to respond to FM words than to NM words while perform-
ing a secondary motor task, F(1, 26) = 21.17, p< .001, but
participants responded to FM and NM words equally
quickly in the absence of a secondary motor task,
F(1, 26) = 1.93, p>.1.
The results of Experiment 2 show a clear facilitation effect
(faster responses but similar accuracy rates for FM vs.
S.-A. Rueschemeyer et al.: Intentional Action and Embodied Language 263
2009 Hogrefe Publishing Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266
NM words) while participants performed a secondary motor
task. No response latency difference was observed between
the word conditions when participants were not engaged in a
secondary motor task. This indicates that performing an
arbitrary secondary motor task modulates the processing
of words with different action associations differently.
Importantly, selective motor interference effects could now
be observed in VOTs, suggesting that our failure to detect
these differences in Experiment 1 was indeed caused by
the rhythmic nature of the secondary motor task. In Exper-
iment 2 no signiﬁcant difference was observed in PRs, how-
ever this is probably because the nature of the secondary
motor task was much easier than that in Experiment 1,
and participants therefore performed at ceiling.
The current series of experiments demonstrates a selective
modulation of responses to words denoting manipulable
objectsif participants are engaged in an active and intentional
motor task. Speciﬁcally, in Experiment 1 participants made
fewer errors when FM words (such as cup) as compared to
NM words (such as bookend) while performing an arbitrary,
but voluntary, action. Similarly, in Experiment 2 participants
were faster to respond to FM words than to NM words while
engaged in a voluntary secondary motor task. Importantly,
participants showed no difference between processing of
FM and NM words while their hands were passively rotated,
or while not engaged in a secondary motor action. This selec-
tive impact of voluntary actions suggests that activation of
the neural motor system has a positive impact on the process-
ing of words with a putative motor component. Our ﬁnding
thus shows that action execution can affect lexical-semantic
processing, supporting the view that action and language are
Our ﬁnding is conceptually in line with that of the
behavioral experiment reported by Buccino et al. (2005).
The two studies complement one another, by showing that
language and action modulate one another bidirectionally.
Speciﬁcally, while Buccino and colleagues report slower
action execution as a result of congruent lexical-semantic
processing, we show here facilitated language processing
resulting from congruent action execution. Thus we provide
good evidence that resonance between language and action
systems is bidirectional.
Interestingly, our results clearly show that participants
experienced a selective facilitation on lexical processing of
FM words during the active motion task. That is, partici-
pants were most proﬁcient when reading FM words while
simultaneously engaged in an intentional action task. This
ﬁnding is in line with a number of recently reported ﬁnd-
ings, showing priming effects of motor activation on word
processing (Helbig et al., 2006; Myung et al., 2006;
Pulvermu¨ ller, Hauk, et al., 2005). It extends the ﬁndings
of these previous studies by showing that action execution
(and not putative action-semantic features shared between
words or objects) affects language processing. In other
words, inﬂuence of action on language crosses modalities
and cannot be explained by semantic or visual similarities
between word and object stimuli.
The temporal relationship between action execution and
language processing appears to be critical in determining
whether cross-talk between action and language systems
will lead to facilitation or inhibition of one domain on the
other (Boulenger et al., 2006). Boulenger and colleagues
investigated effects of word processing on action execution
and found inhibitory motor effects of word reading (i.e.,
movements were slower) on simultaneously performed
actions and facilitatory effects (i.e., movements were faster)
on later executed actions. In the current study, the opposite
effect, that is, the impact of action execution on word pro-
cessing was investigated. This resulted in faster reaction
times to FM words (i.e., words with a putative action com-
ponent), which is in line with previous reports. It is entirely
possible that an inhibitory effect of action execution on word
processing would be observed in the case that participants
should initiate movements at the same moment that they
are presented with word stimuli. However, the distinction
between facilitatory (i.e., priming) and inhibitory effects
remains an exciting topic for further research in this ﬁeld.
As expected, participants showed no difference between
processing of FM and NM object words while their hands
were passively rotated, or while not engaged in a secondary
motor action. That is, while voluntary actions modulated
responses to manipulable object words, involuntary, or pas-
sive actions did not. We suspect that this reﬂects that FM
words and intentional action share neural resources not
shared by NM words or passive actions. Presumably these
neural populations will reside in premotor and supplemen-
tary motor areas; however future neuroimaging studies are
needed to investigate this.
In conclusion, the results of the current study suggest that the
interaction between language and action processing is indeed
bidirectional. The results go beyond previous research show-
ing that language processes involve motor systems to demon-
strate that the execution of motor actions has a selective
effect on the semantic processing of words (i.e., processing
of words with a motor component is modulated by simulta-
neous action). Our ﬁndings indicate furthermore that only
intentional actions interact with lexical-semantic processing.
This suggests that intentional actions activate neural
resources also necessary for lexical-semantic processing.
This study was supported by a VENI Grant (016-094-053)
to the ﬁrst author and a VICI Grant to the last author
(453-05-001) from the Dutch Organization for Scientiﬁc
264 S.-A. Rueschemeyer et al.: Intentional Action and Embodied Language
Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266 2009 Hogrefe Publishing
Research (NWO) and the ICIS project (BSIK03024) spon-
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Words Used in the FM and NM Object
Conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 (Dutch
Words Available Upon Request)
FM words: stethoscope, coffee mill/grinder, steering wheel,
spear, golf club, pipe, shovel, garden hose, pencil sharpener,
pepper mill, shoelace, tongs, pliers, brush, needle, pocket
torch, salt cellar, stapler, doorknob, screwdriver, thumbtack,
hammer, broom, paperclip, tweezers, coat/clothes hanger,
sponge, rope, playing cards, bicycle lock, calculator, comb,
match, cup, umbrella, lighter, guitar, scissors, bottle opener,
hair brush, welder
NM words: exhaust pipe, bust, hourglass, metronome,
garden dwarf, coal, (rooﬁng) tile, ironing board, music
stand, bookend, dream-catcher, padding/stufﬁng, medal,
ﬁshbowl, smoke detector, braces, nightlight, statuette, ﬂower
pot, fountain, pendulum, brick, necklace, bulletin board,
table fan, doormat, vase, calendar, picture frame, coat rack,
balloon, candle, computer screen, small side table, watch,
speaker, clock, mirror, photo, mannequin
S.-A. Rueschemeyer et al.: Intentional Action and Embodied Language 265
2009 Hogrefe Publishing Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266
Received December 12, 2008
Revision received May 8, 2009
Accepted May 11, 2009
Published online: November 6, 2009
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour
Centre for Cognition
6525 HR Nijmegen
266 S.-A. Rueschemeyer et al.: Intentional Action and Embodied Language
Experimental Psychology 2010; Vol. 57(4):260–266 2009 Hogrefe Publishing