Article

The Unpacking Effect in Allocations of Responsibility for Group Tasks

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Abstract

Individuals tend to overestimate their relative contributions to collaborative endeavors. Thus, the sum of group members! estimates of the percentage they each contributed to a joint task typically exceeds the logically allowable 100%. We suggest that this tendency stems partly from individuals! inclination to regard their fellow group members as a collective rather than as individuals, and that leading people to think about their collaborators as individuals should therefore reduce the perceived relative magnitude of their own contributions. Consistent with this thesis, four experiments demonstrate that people!s tendency to claim more than their fair share of the credit for a group task is attenuated when they "unpack" their collaborators, conceptualizing them as separate individuals, rather than as "the rest of the group."

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... Second, experimental manipulations that draw attention to people's own versus others' contributions can change how they allocate responsibility. Increasing a person's focus on their own contributions exacerbates their tendency to over-claim for themselves (Burger & Rodman, 1983;Ross & Sicoly, 1979), whereas increasing focus on others' contributions diminishes over-claiming (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). Because these interventions directly manipulate the accessibility of others' contributions, their effects are clearly consistent with a reduced egocentric bias. ...
... This mechanism not only predicts what will increase over-claiming, but also what should decrease overclaiming in groups. Specifically, if focusing on one's own contributions and failing to consider others' contributions creates overclaiming, then focusing on others' contributions should reduce it (Caruso et al., 2006;Savitsky et al., 2005). Therefore, we expect the most over-claiming among large groups that allocate responsibility without being led to consider others' contributions. ...
... One explanation for the results in the authorship study is that indicating the percentage contributed by each coauthor in the other-focused condition simply made the 100% contribution limit salient. To explore this possibility, we added a more implicit other-focused condition in which participants merely considered their other group members' contributions before reporting their own, but did not explicitly indicate contributions that summed to 100% (Savitsky et al., 2005). We again hypothesized that implied responsibility would increase with group size, and that considering others' contributions (both explicitly and implicitly) would reduce over-claiming. ...
Article
Full-text available
Logically, group members cannot be responsible for more than 100% of the group's output, yet claims of responsibility routinely sum to more than 100%. This "over-claiming" occurs partly because of egocentrism: People focus on their own contributions, as focal members of the group, more than on others' contributions. Therefore, we predicted that over-claiming would increase with group size because larger groups leave more contributions from others to overlook. In 2 field studies, participants claimed more responsibility as the number of academic authors per article and the number of MBA students per study group increased. As predicted by our theoretical account, this over-claiming bias was reduced when group members considered others' contributions explicitly. Two experiments that directly manipulated group size replicated these results. Members of larger groups may be particularly well advised to consider other members' contributions before considering their own. (PsycINFO Database Record
... In comparing the categorical and overall approaches, we add to the unpacking literature (Savitsky et al. 2005;Tversky and Koehler 1994). The classic unpacking effect (Tversky and Koehler 1994) shows that when people are asked to give an estimate for an overarching category (e.g., the probability of death resulting from natural causes) versus estimates for the subcategories (e.g., the probability of death resulting from heart disease, cancer, or some other natural cause), the total estimate is higher in the latter approach. ...
... We contribute to two streams of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on unpacking effects (Redden and Frederick 2011;Savitsky et al. 2005;Sloman et al. 2004;Tsai and Zhao 2011;Tversky and Koehler 1994) by highlighting the role of motivation. Reconciling the contraction effect with the classic expansion effect of unpacking, we show a contraction effect when people are motivated to decrease their consumption (e.g., calorie intake and nicotine intake), but obtain an expansion effect when people have a motive to increase their consumption (e.g., fiber intake and exercise time). ...
... The multifaceted category judgment (or the packed judgment) is similar to our overall approach, whereas the component-category judgment (or the unpacked judgment) is similar to our categorical approach. Prior research on the unpacking effect has typically found that the unpacked judgment increases the magnitude of numeric judgments compared to the packed judgment (Savitsky et al. 2005;Tversky and Koehler 1994). We hereafter refer to this classic effect of unpacking as the expansion effect. ...
Article
Consumers set a lower consumption budget when they set individual calorie budgets for constituent categories (e.g., breakfast, lunch, dinner, and snacks; categorical approach) versus when they set a total budget (overall approach). This contraction effect of unpacking a judgment is driven by motivated reasoning. Consumers are motivated to reduce calorie consumption, and this motive directs their cognitive elaboration for the budget decision to be on what to cut and how much to cut. Furthermore, the categorical (vs. overall) approach brings to mind more thoughts that are consistent with the motive to reduce consumption, which then leads to a lower calorie budget. Consistent with this explanation, the level of elaboration on reducing calorie intake—especially on occasions where overconsumption is less salient—mediates the contraction effect. In addition, the contraction effect is attenuated when the motive to reduce consumption is deactivated. Finally, while the contraction effect occurs when consumers have a motive to reduce consumption, the classic expansion effect of unpacking occurs when consumers are prompted to think about what to consume or are motivated to increase consumption. The results for calorie budgeting are shown to have downstream consequences on actual food consumption.
... Spouses overclaim the amount of house-work they complete (M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979), basketball players overclaim responsibility on the court (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005), and academics even overclaim their contributions to journal articles (Schroeder, Caruso, & Epley, 2016; for reviews see Gilovich, Kruger, & Savitsky, 1999;Leary & Forsyth, 1987). Recent research has also shown that people overclaim responsibility for their groups. ...
... Prior work has shown that drawing attention to the contributions of other group members reduces overclaiming (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006;M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979, Experiment 5;Savitsky et al., 2005). Consistent with support theory, providing more support for alternative hypotheses reduces support for the central hypothesis. ...
... We predicted that rating isolated territories would lead to higher estimates of the target territory than rating all of the territories at once. This latter conditionthe unpacked conditionrequired subjects to explicitly evaluate each of the territories rather than evaluate them as a group (Savitsky et al., 2005). Experiment 2 was conducted twice; in Experiment 2A subject responses in the unpacked conditions were forced to sum to 100%, whereas in Experiment 2B they were not. ...
Article
Prior research has demonstrated that Americans massively overestimate how much their home state has contributed to US history. Why does such collective overclaiming occur? We argue that although self-serving biases undoubtedly influence overclaiming, non-motivated factors, such as a failure to consider the contributions of other states, also play a large role in overclaiming effects. In the current studies, subjects read descriptions of territories within a fictitious country and evaluated how much a territory within that country contributed to its history. Experiment 1 showed that overclaiming of responsibility increased as more territories were added to the country. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that requiring subjects to explicitly consider all territories reduced estimations of responsibility. Experiment 4 showed that people provided higher ratings of responsibility when more details were provided about the territory. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that retrieval fluency did not affect overclaiming. We conclude that support theory – based on the availability of content – provides a strong explanation for why the collective overclaiming of responsibility occurs, with both theoretical and practical implications.
... Self-serving bias in collaborative work tends to occur because individuals have more access to all the steps and details of work that goes into their own contributions (Ross & Sicoly, 1979) and because they are prone to view other members as a collective category (e.g., the rest of the team) rather than as unique individuals (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). This greater availability of one's own contributions and tendency to lump team members together as a collective category decreases the availability of information about other individuals' instances of contribution to team outcomes, while one's own instances of contribution remain readily available (e.g., the unpacking problem; cf. ...
... This greater availability of one's own contributions and tendency to lump team members together as a collective category decreases the availability of information about other individuals' instances of contribution to team outcomes, while one's own instances of contribution remain readily available (e.g., the unpacking problem; cf. Ross & Sicoly, 1979;Savitsky et al., 2005). As such, self-serving bias can occur not because people tend to purposely underestimate others, but merely because people undervalue others' contributions because they are less available in their own mind (Kruger & Savitsky, 2009;Ross & Sicoly, 1979). ...
... We also note that this effect was found even when participants in both studies did both self and peer ratings. Previous research has found that this type of rating exercise forces individuals to unpack the contributions of others more carefully (Savitsky et al., 2005). Although this may have dampened the bias they exhibited, both our samples produced significant differences in evaluations based on levels of team satisfaction. ...
Article
Research on self-serving bias in teams has focused on bias after team feedback. Many teams, however, work for extended periods of time before receiving feedback. This paper proposes that team members exhibit biases prior to receiving feedback, depending on the level of team satisfaction. The results of a field study of 35 MBA teams demonstrate that members of unsatisfied teams make more self-serving claims about contribution toward the team’s task, while the most highly satisfied teams demonstrate an "other-centric" bias -- assigning more credit to other team members than to themselves. Both biases -- self-serving and other-serving -- are eliminated in teams with strong psychological safety norms.
... And indeed, reducing egocentric biases by considering another person's perspective has been found to have a variety of beneficial effects in social interaction. Considering others' perspectives, for instance, increases the likelihood of helping another person in need (Batson, 1994), reduces the use of stereotypes when forming impressions (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), increases negotiation effectiveness (Neale & Bazerman, 1983), and diminishes a variety of problematic egocentric biases in judgment (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005;Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). It is therefore of little surprise that actively considering the other side's perspective is considered to be a critical component of successful conflict resolution (Paese & Yonker, 2001). ...
... One reason people believe it is fairer to satisfy their own interests than others' interests is because they do not notice, attend to, or care about others' interests as much as their own. These results make it clear why increasing the focus on others' contributions and interests may highlight information that an individual might have naturally overlooked and might reduce self-serving allocations of responsibility and judgments of fairness (Savitsky et al., 2005). ...
... Simply thinking about what others would think is fair, in contrast, requires relatively little mental effort and readily activated relevant information that people would have otherwise overlooked. The manipulation used in our research is more analogous to what has been called unpacking in past research (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) and is a manipulation that has proven successful in reducing egocentric biases (Savitsky et al., 2005). actually are (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995), this kind of perspective taking may have been particularly likely to activate cynical thoughts about others' motives in competitive contexts. ...
Article
Full-text available
Group members often reason egocentrically, believing that they deserve more than their fair share of group resources. Leading people to consider other members’ thoughts and perspectives can reduce these egocentric (self-centered) judgments such that people claim that it is fair for them to take less; however, the consideration of others’ thoughts and perspectives actually increases egoistic (selfish) behavior such that people actually take more of available resources. A series of experiments demonstrates this pattern in competitive contexts in which considering others’ perspectives activates egoistic theories of their likely behavior, leading people to counter by behaving more egoistically themselves. This reactive egoism is attenuated in cooperative contexts. Discussion focuses on the implications of reactive egoism in social interaction and on strategies for alleviating its potentially deleterious effects.
... Increasing participants' focus on their own contributions exacerbates the tendency to overestimate one's contributions (Burger & Rodman, 1983;M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979), whereas increasing their focus on others' contributions diminishes this tendency (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). Even the most dispassionate group members, it appears, would conclude that they have contributed more than is warranted simply because their own contributions are so much easier to notice and recall than are others' contributions. ...
... The impact of differential accessibility in responsibility allocations may be compounded by a related tendency for people to think of other group members as a collective rather than as individuals, even further masking their unique contributions (Savitsky et al., 2005). This tendency for people to pack the constituent elements of a category into a single unit is best seen in research on support theory (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997;Tversky & Koehler, 1994), which demonstrates that the perceived likelihood of an event is determined by the amount of support that can be generated in favor of a focal hypothesis relative to alternative hypotheses. ...
... Our point is not to disentangle these two mechanisms but to simply point out that either can produce egocentric assessments of responsibility. unpack their collaborators (Savitsky et al., 2005). Reducing egocentric allocations of responsibility by simply asking people to think about others' contributions therefore seems like a logical way to help restore perceptions of fairness and reduce conflict over inequity in group interactions. ...
Article
Full-text available
Individuals working in groups often egocentrically believe they have contributed more of the total work than is logically possible. Actively considering others’ contributions effectively reduces these egocentric assessments, but this research suggests that undoing egocentric biases in groups may have some unexpected costs. Four experiments demonstrate that members who contributed much to the group outcome are actually less satisfied and less interested in future collaborations after considering others’ contributions compared with those who contributed little. This was especially true in cooperative groups. Egocentric biases in responsibility allocation can create conflict, but this research suggests that undoing these biases can have some unfortunate consequences. Some members who look beyond their own perspective may not like what they see.
... Second, experimental manipulations that draw attention to people's own versus others' contributions can change how they allocate responsibility. Increasing a person's focus on their own contributions exacerbates their tendency to over-claim for themselves (Burger & Rodman, 1983;Ross & Sicoly, 1979), whereas increasing focus on others' contributions diminishes over-claiming (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). Because these interventions directly manipulate the accessibility of others' contributions, their effects are clearly consistent with a reduced egocentric bias. ...
... This mechanism not only predicts what will increase over-claiming, but also what should decrease overclaiming in groups. Specifically, if focusing on one's own contributions and failing to consider others' contributions creates overclaiming, then focusing on others' contributions should reduce it (Caruso et al., 2006;Savitsky et al., 2005). Therefore, we expect the most over-claiming among large groups that allocate responsibility without being led to consider others' contributions. ...
... One explanation for the results in the authorship study is that indicating the percentage contributed by each coauthor in the other-focused condition simply made the 100% contribution limit salient. To explore this possibility, we added a more implicit other-focused condition in which participants merely considered their other group members' contributions before reporting their own, but did not explicitly indicate contributions that summed to 100% (Savitsky et al., 2005). We again hypothesized that implied responsibility would increase with group size, and that considering others' contributions (both explicitly and implicitly) would reduce over-claiming. ...
Article
Full-text available
Logically, group members cannot be responsible for more than 100% of the group’s output, yet claims of responsibility routinely sum to more than 100%. This “over-claiming” occurs partly because of egocentrism: People focus on their own contributions, as focal members of the group, more than on others’ contributions. Therefore, we predicted that over-claiming would increase with group size because larger groups leave more contributions from others to overlook. In 2 field studies, participants claimed more responsibility as the number of academic authors per article and the number of MBA students per study group increased. As predicted by our theoretical account, this over-claiming bias was reduced when group members considered others’ contributions explicitly. Two experiments that directly manipulated group size replicated these results. Members of larger groups may be particularly well advised to consider other members’ contributions before considering their own.
... Specifically, individuals tend to view other team members as a collective category (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005) and may impose their interpretation of team characteristics on individual team members. As such, perceivers may be less prone to detect and utilize behavioral cues of individual team members and instead rely on their evaluation of team characteristics to derive probabilistic/likely judgments about the target's behavior. ...
... Members of teams with higher levels of psychological safety likely perceive that their standing within the team is secure and that they can freely express themselves without fear of reprimand. Given the tendency for individuals to view other team members as a generalized category (Savitsky et al. 2005), higher levels of psychological safety could increase the likelihood that perceivers adopt a cognitive heuristic implying that any given team member is an effective and supportive contributor, irrespective of that team member's actual behavior. As stated earlier, psychological safety may contribute to social categorization processes (Srull & Wyer, 1989), where people use the team context, in addition to small samples of others' behaviors, to derive general impressions of individual team members. ...
Article
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Recent trends indicate that organizations will continue their strategic pursuit of teamwork for the foreseeable future, which will create a need for accurate assessments of individuals’ performance in teams. Although individual behaviors can be perceived and assessed by fellow team members (i.e., peers), the extent to which the team shapes perceivers’ judgments versus the target’s behavior is unclear. We conducted two studies to understand how and why team context influences peer ratings of individual performance. In study 1, we conducted cross-classified modeling on a sample of 7160 performance observations of 568 targets made by 567 perceivers, who were each members of four separate teams. Results indicated that team membership accounted for a substantially higher proportion of perceiver, relative to target, variance. In study 2, we conducted social relations modeling with a sample of 679 performance observations collected from 217 individuals nested in 46 teams to test the effects of psychological safety on perceiver, target, and team variance components. Perceptions of psychological safety accounted for proportionally larger perceiver, relative to target, variance in OCB, and task performance ratings. Altogether, team context appears to affect perceivers’ judgments of behavior more than the target’s behavior itself, implying that peer ratings sourced from different teams may not be comparable. We consider the implications for the collection and interpretation of peer performance ratings in teams and the potential implications for social cognitive theory, such that certain aspects of the team context, including psychological safety, may act as a cognitive heuristic by molding perceiver judgments of targets.
... Applied to behavioral prediction, an unpacking intervention prompts forecasters to break down a multifaceted future event into its smaller constituent parts before generating an overall prediction. Unpacking procedures have been advocated to address a variety of biases in self-relevant prediction and evaluation (Kruger & Evans, 2004;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). Kruger and Evans (2004) showed that unpacking can curb people's tendency to underestimate task completion times (i.e., the planning fallacy; Buehler et al., 2010). ...
... Moreover, the studies provided the first empirical test of an approach to prediction that has proven effective in other domains, and thus extend our knowledge of factors that moderate spending estimates. The findings also extend the research literature on debiasing strategies in general (Larrick, 2004;Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009) and the unpacking strategy in particular (Kruger & Evans, 2004;Moher & Koehler, 2013;Savitsky et al., 2005). Our findings highlight the importance of assessing multiple forms of predictive accuracy (e.g., calibration and discrimination) across multiple judgmental contexts (e.g., contexts with preexisting bias and no preexisting bias) when evaluating the effectiveness of an intervention. ...
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People often underestimate their future personal spending. Across four studies we examined an “unpacking” intervention to reduce this bias. Participants predicted spending for an upcoming week (Study 1), a weekend (Study 2a), a vacation (Study 2b), and for weeks versus self-nominated events (Study 3), and subsequently reported actual spending. In each case, unpacking the details of expected expenses increased spending predictions. In contexts where predictions tended to be too low (Study 1, 3), unpacking eliminated underestimation bias. However, in contexts where predictions were already unbiased, unpacking introduced an overestimation bias (Study 2, 3). Unpacking appears to make predictions bigger, not necessarily better.
... Furthermore, our research provides insight into biases in creativity evaluation in contexts in which only one team member is evaluated-future research is needed to examine how creative ability is assigned to individual team members in contexts in which multiple team members are evaluated concurrently (cf. Savitsky et al., 2005). We also hope future research will explore new aspects of how lay theories about groups affect the assessment of individual and group abilities. ...
... This could be accomplished by having teams present their work together or presenting evaluators with reminders of the other team members' contributions when evaluating individual employee ability (cf. Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). ...
Article
Creativity is highly valued in organizations as an important source of innovation. As most creative projects require the efforts of groups of individuals working together, it is important to understand how creativity is perceived for team products, including how observers attribute creative ability to focal actors who worked as part of a creative team. Evidence from three experiments suggests that observers commit the fundamental attribution error—systematically discounting the contribution of the group when assessing the creative ability of a single group representative, particularly when the group itself is not visually salient. In a pilot study, we found that, in the context of the design team at Apple, a target group member visually depicted alone is perceived to have greater personal creative ability than when he is visually depicted with his team. In Study 1, using a sample of managers, we conceptually replicated this finding and further observed that, when shown alone, a target member of a group that produced a creative product is perceived to be as creative as an individual described as working alone on the same output. In Study 2, we replicated the findings of Study 1 and also observed that a target group member depicted alone, rather than with his team, is also attributed less creative ability for uncreative group output. Findings are discussed in light of how overattribution of individual creative ability can harm organizations in the long run.
... This ability is positively related to sensitivity (Parker and Axtell, 2001) and helps people empathize with others' feelings (Batson, 1994). PT has been found to diminish egocentric biases in judgments (Savitsky et al., 2005;Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996), to favor successful conflict resolution (Eiseman, 1978;Paese and Yonker, 2001), and to support the coordination of social goals by creating social bonds (Galinsky et al., 2005). ...
Article
In this paper we investigate how the entrepreneur's ability of taking the perspective of the user in a market enhances opportunity identification. We also show how prior knowledge of the market positively moderates the relationship between user perspective taking and opportunity recognition. Our study is grounded in entrepreneurship contributions that try to disentangle the role of cognitive processes in opportunity recognition. We confirm our intuition through a one-factorial between-subject experiment and we discuss our findings for entrepreneurship research and user innovation literatures.
... First, given the centrality of self-related information in outperformers' mind, we reasoned that relying on others should not reduce their self-perceptions of their competence (cf., Ross & Sicoly, 1979;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). Moreover, as the centrality of self-related information in their mind leads people to feel like they uniquely stand out (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000;Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001;Zuckerman et al., 1983), outperformers should think others attributed their successes to them to the same extent. ...
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To succeed in today's workplaces, people often need to outperform the persons who helped them succeed. In three studies we assessed how doing so affects well-being, prosocial behavior and social perceptions. In the first two studies participants took part in a competitive version of a virtual ball-toss game, with different financial incentives in each study. Depending on condition participants either obtained the majority of the ball tosses or almost no ball tosses. Importantly, participants either “earned” this outcome as a result of their own performance or were “granted” this outcome as a result of the performance of the other players. Study 3 featured the same conditions and a combination of the incentives. However, participants now observed one of the games and rated the anticipated reaction of a focal player. The results revealed that (1) winning was better than losing, (2) especially when people's win was granted to them and less so when they earned it for themselves, (3) which resulted in higher well-being and prosocial behavior, and also maintained meta-perceptions and other-perceptions of competence and enhanced meta-perceptions and other-perceptions of warmth. These results advance theories on interpersonal competition, social comparison, and in/exclusion.
... According to the support theory, consumers are more likely to pay attention to and estimate that a given future event/outcome would happen when described in more detail (i.e., prediction bias, see Buehler et al. 2010;Tversky and Koehler 1994). By extending these findings, another stream of research shows the so-called unpacking effects in various domains, such that consumers tend to have a lower estimate for an overarching category than the sum of their estimates for all subcategories (Rottenstrich and Tversky 1997;Savitsky et al. 2005;Kruger and Evans 2004). For instance, when consumers estimate their spending needs, they are likely to have a higher estimate with the detailed (vs. ...
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This research explores how consumers plan for their personal finances, focusing on the simultaneous effects of spending and saving needs in budget-setting. The current research proposes that the number of budget categories and salient savings goals interactively influence consumers’ budget estimation. In two lab studies, we showed that participants with a salient savings goal tend to experience conflicts when they have the same (vs. different) number of budget categories for spending and saving needs, thereby perceiving the increased savings goal importance, which leads to the increased money allocation to saving. Our results further suggest that a detailed financial plan may not always help consumers to pursue financial success. This research contributes to the body of work on budgeting and consumer finance. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.
... Becoming smarter after taking the perspective of a professor should facilitate interaction with such a person, allowing the perspective-taker to be good in conversation. Other studies show that considering others' perspectives, for instance, increases the likelihood of helping another person in need (Batson, Turk, Shaw and Klein 1994), reduces the use of stereotypes when forming impressions (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000), increases negotiation effectiveness (Neale and Bazerman 1983), and diminishes a variety of problematic egocentric biases in judgment (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley and Wight 2005). ...
... This ability is positively related to sensitivity (Parker and Axtell, 2001) and helps people empathize with others' feelings (Batson, 1994). PT has been found to diminish egocentric biases in judgments (Savitsky et al., 2005;Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996), to favor successful conflict resolution (Eiseman, 1978;Paese and Yonker, 2001), and to support the coordination of social goals by creating social bonds (Galinsky et al., 2005). ...
... At this point, the question arises whether team members will always engage in perspective taking, leading to collective reappraisal during SSNE. Perspective taking relates to helping behaviors (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005), which team members may not be always motivated to do. We discuss both when team members are initiators as well as respondents of SSNE. ...
Article
This paper presents an integrated view of the formation of teams by examining individuals' emotions in relation to trust in the context of identity and exchange. We recognize the importance of trust within a team, especially in the process of team formation. By looking at the issue of trust within a framework of social exchange and identity, this paper provides an extensive view of the psychological aspects of team formation and development, from assignment to a team at the beginning, to evolving into a cooperative team on the one hand, or into a non-cooperative team on the other. Most newly formed teams somehow function despite the fact that the members are strangers to each other, however some of them regress into non-functioning teams as members become familiar with each other i.e. the team working status is worse than when the team started. We argue that emotions are crucial in defining the direction of team development to either the functional or dysfunctional side by influencing formation of affect based trust (or distrust). Identity as a mental framework and exchange as behavioral interaction are important to understanding the affective experience of individuals within a team.
... At this point, the question arises whether team members will always engage in perspective taking, leading to collective reappraisal during SSNE. Perspective taking relates to helping behaviors (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005), which team members may not be always motivated to do. We discuss both when team members are initiators as well as respondents of SSNE. ...
Article
In this conceptual paper, we argue that Socially Sharing Negative Emotions (SSNE) could lead to positive outcomes beyond an individual level. SSNE is an intentional verbal communication where both a sharer, who experienced the original affective event, and team members, who noticed the emotional distress of a potential sharer, could be an initiator. Although SSNE has received little attention in the literature to date, it is a relatively common and beneficial process in the workplace. The goal of this paper is therefore to explore how/when SSNE can be effective for members of a team. ‘How’ SSNE could be functional will be examined by looking at the overall process of SSNE, and the question of ‘when’ will be explored in line with boundary conditions influencing the effectiveness of SSNE. We specify testable propositions to guide future research and consider boundary conditions for such SSNE to occur. As many boundary conditions could be time constrained, the main SSNE context taken into consideration in this paper is a newly formed team. Our exploration of SSNE highlights positive functions of negative emotions which contribute outcomes at an inter-personal and/or a group level where SSNE takes place.
... However, the narrowing approach taken by asking participants to first think back to the group meeting and imagine what each other member said has been shown to reduce egocentric bias and allow people to make more accurate contribution estimates (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006). Additionally, the process of thinking about each other group member individually, as opposed to collectively, has been shown to attenuate this bias (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). ...
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People routinely exert less effort when working in groups than when working individually. Additionally, groups often encounter problems coordinating the efforts of their members. These deficiencies prevent groups from efficiently utilizing the talents of their members. In two field studies, transpersonal efficacy, or one's confidence in another person's ability to produce a given outcome, partially explained these shortcomings. In the first study, transpersonal efficacy negatively influenced the amount of effort basketball players exerted on offense and positively influenced the amount of effort they exerted on defense. Transpersonal efficacy also positively predicted who the players passed the ball to and who they set screens for. Further, task interdependence increased whether player's transpersonal efficacy accurately reflected the true skill of their teammates, and thus affected whether player's exerted their effort appropriately. Study 2 replicated these findings and extended them by providing evidence that group interaction moderates the relationship between transpersonal efficacy and effort allocation such that transpersonal efficacy is only predictive of behavior when groups are interacting. This finding was attributed to the resource scarcity inherent in group interaction creating the need for a resource distribution mechanism.
... The present research adds to the field of temporal distance judgment by examining whether presenting a time interval in a detailed way rather than compact way could lengthen time perception. A large body of research has already reported that the whole is less than the sum of its parts in quantity estimation (Tversky and Koehler, 1994;Ayton, 1997;Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997;Fox and Tversky, 1998;Idson et al., 2001;Van Boven and Epley, 2003;Kruger and Evans, 2004;Savitsky et al., 2005;Levine, 2007;Bernasconi et al., 2009;Tsai and Zhao, 2011;Moher, 2012;Haselhuhn, 2014). For example, the sum of subjective probabilities for a person dying from "heart disease, cancer, or other natural causes" tends to be judged greater than the subjective probability for the same person dying simply from "natural causes" (Tversky and Koehler, 1994); the estimated compensation for a type of pollution is bigger when that is described as an origin of "asthma, lung cancer, throat cancer, and all other varieties of respiratory diseases" than as an origin of "all varieties of respiratory diseases . ...
Article
Full-text available
In quantity estimation, people often perceive that the whole is less than the sum of its parts. The current study investigated such an unpacking effect in temporal distance judgment. Our results showed that participants in the unpacked condition judged a given time interval longer than those in the packed condition, even the time interval was kept constant between the two conditions. Furthermore, this unpacking effect persists regardless of the unpacking ways we employed. Results suggest that unpacking a time interval may be a good strategy for lengthening its perceived temporal distance.
... Unpacking effects have been observed not just in individual predictions, but also in cases of group projects. Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley and Wight (2005) asked students completing group projects to either estimate how much of the completed project they were responsible for (control), or how much they and each of their group members were responsible for (unpack condition). ...
... In negotiations, perspective taking helps the parties overcome cognitive biases, such as anchoring (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001) or the fixed-pie perception (Galinsky et al. 2008;Moran and Ritov 2007;Thompson 1995). Considering the other party's contributions helps negotiators process information that he or she would otherwise naturally disregard, thus reducing the self-serving allocation of resources (Savitsky et al. 2005). Specifically, taking the other party's perspective is particularly important for people in close relationships, as they have a history of exchanges with that particular person. ...
Article
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Three experimental studies show that interpersonal relationships influence the expectations of negotiators at the negotiation table. That is, negotiators expect more generous negotiation offers from close others (Study 1), and when expectations are not met, negative emotions arise, resulting in negative economic and relational outcomes (Study 2). Finally, a boundary condition for the effect of interpersonal relationships on negotiation expectations is shown: perspective taking leads the parties to expect less from friends than from acquaintances (Study 3). The findings suggest that perspective taking helps negotiators reach agreement in relationships. The article concludes with implications for practice and future research directions. © 2017 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature
... In experiments of elementary school students and university undergraduates, Savitsky et al. found that over-claiming is reduced substantially when people are prompted to think of collaborators as separate individuals rather than as "the rest of the group." 12 While research shows that over-claiming is widespread and that conscious efforts to consider fellow group members' contributions reduce it, relatively little is known about how group size affects the magnitude of over-claiming. Studies to date have focused largely on small groups, where individual perceptions of con- tributions have added up to relatively modest over-claiming of 110% or less on average. ...
Article
Full-text available
People often believe that they do more than their fair share of work. This tendency plays out across daily life, from married couples to workplace collaborations. While the inclination to “over-claim” credit is pervasive and has potentially serious consequences, little is known about the factors that make it more or less likely to occur. This article considers two predictors—group size and the role of indirect participants, such as supervisors, teachers, coaches, and office assistants—on the phenomenon known as over-claiming. It offers practical steps for individuals, managers, and organizations to take to moderate the damaging effects of over-claiming.
... However, there are many contexts in which referent-specific judgments involve the self as the target of judgment, with peers or others as referents. There are, in fact, research literatures devoted to biases affecting each of the following 3 types of questions (e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 2005;Chambers, & Windschitl, 2004;Chambers et al., 2003;Gilovich, Epley, & Hanko, 2005;Kruger, 1999;Kruger & Dunning, 1999;Kruger & Savitsky, 2009;Larrick et al., 2007;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005;Weinstein, 1980): 1. comparative ability-e.g., How good are you compared to your peers? 2. comparative optimism-e.g., Compared to others, how likely are you to suffer X? 3. responsibility/contribution-e.g., What proportion of this task did you do? ...
Article
Full-text available
Judgments of direct comparisons, probabilities, proportions, and ranks can all be considered referent-specific judgments, for which a good estimate requires a target to be compared against a referent(s). This paper presents a Referent-Specific Judgment Framework (RSJF) to organize and integrate over- and under-estimation biases commonly associated with these judgments. RSJF assumes a dual-process structure in which one key source of bias can arise from spontaneous comparisons whose input—unless offset by a controlled process—can yield an underweighting of evidence about referents. Another key source of bias is the misaggregation of evidence associated with multiple referents. Two studies tested RSJF predictions about similarities and differences in patterns of bias in comparative versus probability judgments. As expected, there was similarity in patterns tied to misweighting and differences in patterns tied to misaggregation. The findings support the utility of RSJF for organizing and advancing the study of referent-specific judgments.
... Alternatively, the overestimation of the tax rates can be explained by the phenomenon known as "over-claiming" -when individuals tend to overestimate their relative contribution to their collective work. Over-claiming has been observed in several studies and in various contexts like married couples sharing household chores (Kruger & Savitsky, 2009;Ross & Sicoly, 1979), academics collaborating on research projects (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006), and students working on joint assignments (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005;Schroeder, Caruso, & Epley, 2016). In all these studies, the participants were asked to estimate the share that they personally contributed to their group's work. ...
... 65 Research suggests that a different de-biasing strategy-perspective-taking, i.e., the attempt to prompt people to consider and articulate how the world looks to others-is more effective in mitigating egocentric judgments about what is "fair" in social or competitive settings. Perspectivetaking prompts have been shown, for example, to reduce egocentric biases in individuals' views about what is fair pay for themselves versus others on an assigned work task, 66 their perspectives about the relative value of their own contributions to a group project, 67 and their views about what is a fair allotment of resources in settings where limited resources must be divided. 68 In legal dispute settings, a perspective-taking intervention might, for example, ask a disputant or his lawyer to "step into the shoes" of the opposing party, for example by considering how the opponent's actions might have a different and more innocent explanation. ...
Article
Full-text available
Previous research demonstrates that lawyers and law students are, on average, prone to overconfidence bias and self-serving judgments of fairness when they take on a representative lawyering role. This is the first study to investigate individual differences in susceptibility to these biases. Expanding on two previous experiments, and utilizing as our sample 468 law students from twelve geographically diverse U.S. law schools, we examined whether differences in students’ Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) — a motivational desire for clear answers over ambiguity — would affect both their judicial outcome predictions and their assessments of the “fair settlement value” of a simulated personal injury case when assigned randomly to the role of plaintiff’s or defendant’s counsel. We also investigated whether high- or low-NFC scores would have any effect on the efficacy of a “consider-the-opposite” (“list the weaknesses of your case”) prompt given to half of our subjects in an effort to de-bias these assessments. We found that a high need for closure intensifies self-serving bias in both students’ judicial predictions and fair value assessments, and that bias in students’ judicial predictions could be mitigated through debiasing interventions, even with students high in need for closure. Bias in fairness assessments persisted, despite de-biasing prompts.
... This perspective helps explain research showing that overclaiming of responsibility increases as group sizes grow (Schroeder et al., 2016). Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, and Wight (2005), for example, suggested that in small groups, people lump the other members of the group together, which causes them to underestimate the contributions of other individual members (subadditivity). In our study, the "group" was the 50 U.S. states; thus, subjects were likely evaluating the contribution of their own state in detail but treating the other 49 states as a single unit and underestimating their contribution. ...
Article
Collective narcissism—a phenomenon in which individuals show excessively high regard for their own group—is ubiquitous in studies of small groups. We examined how Americans from the 50 U.S. states (N = 2,898) remembered U.S. history by asking them, “In terms of percentage, what do you think was your home state’s contribution to the history of the United States?” The mean state estimates ranged from 9% (Iowa) to 41% (Virginia), with the total contribution for all states equaling 907%, indicating strong collective narcissism. In comparison, ratings provided by nonresidents for states were much lower (but still high). Surprisingly, asking people questions about U.S. history before they made their judgment did not lower estimates. We argue that this ethnocentric bias is due to ego protection, selective memory retrieval processes involving the availability heuristic, and poor statistical reasoning. This study shows that biases that influence individual remembering also influence collective remembering.
... Alternatively, the overestimation of the tax rates can be explained by the phenomenon known as "over-claiming" -when individuals tend to overestimate their relative contribution to their collective work. Over-claiming has been observed in several studies and in various contexts like married couples sharing household chores (Kruger & Savitsky, 2009;Ross & Sicoly, 1979), academics collaborating on research projects (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006), and students working on joint assignments (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005;Schroeder, Caruso, & Epley, 2016). In all these studies, the participants were asked to estimate the share that they personally contributed to their group's work. ...
Conference Paper
Allingham and Sandmo (A-S) model is perhaps the most popular and influential model of tax evasion in the economics literature. This model presumes that by maximizing their expected utility function, taxpayers decide if and by how much they should evade taxes (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). This function depends on exogenous parameters like the probability of detection, tax rates and penalties, and it is assumed that taxpayers are well-informed about them. The current paper provides novel empirical evidence that there are sizable gaps between taxpayers’ perceptions and the actual values of the audit, tax and penalty rates in the US. Some plausible explanations for these perception gaps are considered and discussed in the paper. The paper also provides profiles of people who are susceptible to these misperceptions and biases. These profiles can help policy makers develop targeted tax compliance policies. This paper uses data from the RAND Corporation’s American Life Panel (ALP) Tax Evasion Survey, a survey of a nationally representative sample of 1029 US adults. The survey dataset contains self-report variables for perceived audit rates, penalty rates, and effective tax rates, as well as demographic, social network and attitudinal data. For comparison, actual values for the audit, penalty and tax rates are taken from publicly accessible IRS publications.
... The difference between self-oriented and other-oriented reaction is that observers might attend to information that a perpetrator overlooks (Epley et al., 2006) possibly due to the observers' lack of personal interests. Thus, an observer's perception of a perpetrator's moral affect can be considered as reliable (Savitsky et al., 2005). ...
Article
Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine whether users’ perceived moral affect explains the effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on responsibility judgment of a perpetrator and company, respectively, in an ill and good intention breach. Design/methodology/approach Participants completed a questionnaire containing items measuring their perceived intensity of emotional distress, perceived moral affect and responsibility judgment of a perpetrator and company, respectively. Findings The results support the mediating hypothesis on responsibility judgment of a perpetrator regardless of intention. The mediating hypothesis is also supported in an ill intention breach in responsibility judgment of a company. However, the mediating effect is not observed in a good intention breach when users assess a company’s responsibility. Originality/value The findings support the notion that users use the consequentialism approach when assessing a perpetrator’s responsibility because they focus on the victims’ emotional distress and discount a perpetrator’s intent, resulting in similar mediating effect of perceived moral affect in an ill and good intention breach. The results also indicate that perceived moral affect increases the negative effect of perceived intensity of emotional distress on responsibility judgment of a company, suggesting that users may exhibit empathetic feelings toward a company and perceive it as a victim of an ill intention breach. The lack of mediating effect in responsibility judgment of a company in a good intention breach may be attributed to the diminished effect of a perpetrator’s feelings of regret, sorrow, guilt and shame for causing emotional distress to the victims.
... V praxi to znamená třeba to, že lidé nadhodnocují množství práce, kterou oni sami vykonali, protože si s větší snadností vybaví vlastní práci než práci kolegů (Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley & Wight, 2005), nebo že lidé přeceňují nebezpečí, které jim hrozí v důsledku nepravděpodobných událostí (Morewedge & Todorov, 2012), přičemž zároveň podceňují nebezpečí, která způsobují nemoci (jako např. cukrovka) a jejichž pravděpodobnost rizika je mnohem větší . ...
Book
The book you are holding contains thirteen thematic essays introducing intriguing topics of cognitive and social psychology and other related disciplines. Because of its popular-science form this publication is suitable not only for psychology students and experts, but also for the general public. In his work the author presents original and interesting psychological phenomena reflecting current society-wide topics in many aspects, while being based on an extensive range of specialist publications. The reader will learn about the Forer effect, which explains people’s tendency to believe in horoscopes, and about phenomena trying to understand war atrocities in the last century, such as the Holocaust. In following chapters, readers will find interesting information about for instance the human altruism, the quantum consciousness and the soul, and the reasons why there is really no point in arguing with a fool. Finally, the author explains why people cheat, why their opinions gradually become radicalized in society-wide debates, and also how this trend can be prevented. This publication titled “Why a fool remains a fool and other psychological phenomena” offers all the aforementioned topics and much more.
... Thus, when evaluating a group while the contribution of each group member is not clear, people overestimate their own responsibility for the group's outcomes. However, when the contribution of each group member is salient, this effect does not take place (e.g., Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). In our studies, even when judging the group as one unit, both group members' actions are described in detail, and it is clear that both take part in the task and are responsible for the outcomes. ...
Article
People lie more when they work as a group rather than alone. However, do people suspect and morally evaluate groups and individuals differently when they are suspiciously successful? In four experiments, we examine whether (a) suspiciously successful individuals and groups are judged and punished differently and (b) individual group members are judged differently from the group as one unit. Results suggest that people suspect successful groups and individuals to the same extent. However, group members are less likely to be suspected, judged negatively, punished, and reported on, when they are judged as separate individuals compared with as a group. The findings demonstrate a bias in judgment of group members, stemming from the method of evaluation—holistic or separate. We suggest that in order to minimize bias when judging misconduct by a group, the moral evaluation and punishment of all group members should be considered simultaneously.
... 65 Research suggests that a different de-biasing strategy-perspective-taking, i.e., the attempt to prompt people to consider and articulate how the world looks to others-is more effective in mitigating egocentric judgments about what is "fair" in social or competitive settings. Perspective-taking prompts have been shown, for example, to reduce egocentric biases in individuals' views about what is fair pay for themselves versus others on an assigned work task, 66 their perspectives about the relative value of their own contributions to a group project, 67 In legal dispute settings, a perspective-taking intervention might, for example, ask a disputant or his lawyer to "step into the shoes" of the opposing party, for example by considering how the opponent's actions might have a different and more innocent explanation. ("From Plaintiff Platt's perspective, can you think of some other reason, other than that he was inventing his injuries, why he might have waited two months to consult a doctor?") ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Previous research demonstrates that lawyers and law students are, on average, prone to overconfidence bias and self-serving judgments of fairness when they take on a representative lawyering role. This is the first study to investigate individual differences in susceptibility to such biases. Expanding on two previous experiments (Loewenstein, et al., 1993; Babcock, Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1998), and utilizing as our sample 468 first-year and upper division law students from twelve geographically diverse U.S. law schools, we examined whether differences in students’ Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) — a motivational desire for clear answers over ambiguity — would affect both their judicial outcome predictions and their “fair settlement value” assessments of a simulated personal injury case when assigned randomly to the role of plaintiff’s or defendant’s counsel. We also investigated whether high- or low-NFC scores would have any effect on the efficacy of a “consider-the-opposite” (“list the weaknesses of your case”) prompt given to half of our subjects in an attempt to de-bias these assessments. We found that a high need for closure intensifies self-serving bias in both students’ judicial predictions and fair value assessments, and that bias in students’ judicial predictions could be mitigated through de-biasing interventions, even with students high in need for closure. Bias in fairness assessments persisted, despite de-biasing prompts.
... People, more or less, tend to be overconfident. It is known that the sum of self-reported contributions to a group exceeds 100 per cent (Ross & Sicoly, 1979;Savitsky et al., 2005) and that 93 per cent of drivers say that their driving skills are above average (Svenson, 1981). In comparing group and individual performance, Puncochar and Fox (2004) show that groups tend to be more confident about wrong answers and less so about the correct ones. ...
Article
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Japanese corporate law (the Companies Act) requires that boards have three or more directors, and thus makes group decision making obligatory within firms. But according to some observers, boards of directors are often a mere formality in Japan, especially for non-public and small-to-medium-sized firms. The literature of behavioural science shows that group decision making does not necessarily produce better outcomes than individual decisions. In fact, a model of a group decision making shows that it can cause underinvestment at firms. The three-or-more requirement was formed with path dependency dating back to the late 19th century when Japan transplanted legal systems from overseas, but it was by no means the standard. Giving managers flexibility in organizational design is desirable in that it can accommodate firms’ internal characteristics and tendencies and facilitate the establishment of start-ups, new subsidiaries and joint ventures.
... 65 Research suggests that a different de-biasing strategy-perspective-taking, i.e., the attempt to prompt people to consider and articulate how the world looks to others-is more effective in mitigating egocentric judgments about what is "fair" in social or competitive settings. Perspectivetaking prompts have been shown, for example, to reduce egocentric biases in individuals' views about what is fair pay for themselves versus others on an assigned work task, 66 their perspectives about the relative value of their own contributions to a group project, 67 and their views about what is a fair allotment of resources in settings where limited resources must be divided. 68 In legal dispute settings, a perspective-taking intervention might, for example, ask a disputant or his lawyer to "step into the shoes" of the opposing party, for example by considering how the opponent's actions might have a different and more innocent explanation. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Previous research demonstrates that lawyers and law students are, on average, prone to overconfidence bias and self-serving judgments of fairness when they take on a representative lawyering role. This is the first study to investigate individual differences in susceptibility to such biases. Expanding on two previous experiments (Loewenstein, et al., 1993; Babcock, Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1998), and utilizing as our sample 468 first-year and upper division law students from twelve geographically diverse U.S. law schools, we examined whether differences in students' Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC)-a motivational desire for clear answers over ambiguity-would affect both their judicial outcome predictions and their "fair settlement value" assessments of a simulated personal injury case when assigned randomly to the role of plaintiff's or defendant's counsel. We also investigated whether high-or low-NFC scores would have any effect on the efficacy of a "consider-the-opposite" ("list the weaknesses of your case") prompt given to half of our subjects in an attempt to de-bias these assessments. We found that a high need for closure intensifies self-serving bias in both students' judicial predictions and fair value assessments, and that bias in students' judicial predictions could be mitigated through de-biasing interventions, even with students high in need for closure. Bias in fairness assessments persisted, despite de-biasing prompts.
... • Estimate while keeping in mind that the estimator will not participate in the completion of the activity, or take into account the level of everyone's contribution. Adopt a thirdperson perspective (Buehler et al., 2010;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005). ...
Thesis
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The goal of this thesis was to establish whether an index of uncertainty in projects based on project value and estimates results in more objective information and is prognosticative for the go/no-go decision of a project (Atkinson, Crawford, & Ward, 2006). The project management profession has a problem; common project management practice does not address many fundamental sources of uncertainty, particularly in 'soft' projects where flexibility and tolerance of vagueness are necessary (Atkinson et al., 2006). The main research question was therefore: What is the prognosticative value of an index of project uncertainty for informing the go/no-go decision of projects? Better information leads to better decisions (Davis & Metcalf, 2014). Accordingly, an index summarising these sources of uncertainty may enhance the information provided by business cases and other means of selecting projects in organisations before executing these projects. Because there are no indexes available that provide information about the sources of uncertainty before the project go/no-go decision, an index was created as a research artefact. This index is based on literature findings. In order to present some evidence about prognostication of the index that was created, four tests were executed: correlation, predictive value, Brier score method test, and comparison with the Project Evaluation Review Technique (PERT). Using microwork sites and test design, participants were recruited from all over the world. The index used used for testing is the research artefact index developed. It was found that an index helps to gain insight into some of the sources of uncertainty in projects by means of providing more objective information about estimates and perceived value for the go/no-go decision of projects. Four recommendations for future research were established based on the findings: First, the science of estimates is based on research with mostly students. Therefore the project management profession may benefit from replicating the findings with other cohorts. The second recommendation is that the research artefact index may be enhanced by incorporating multiple stakeholder views. The third recommendation is including project complexity and the forth recommendation is that case studies are needed to increase the research artefact index validity.
Book
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Monografia "Intuicja w podejmowaniu decyzji kierowniczych" stanowi interesującą poznawczo i oryginalną pracę dotyczącą problematyki intuicji w procesach podejmowania decyzji. Przemawia za tym ważkość podjętego problemu i jego wnikliwe ujęcie, oparte na solidnych podstawach teoretycznych, wzmocnione rzetelnymi badaniami empirycznymi. Na podstawie szeroko zakrojonej analizy literatury przedmiotu dokonano udanej konceptualizacji i operacjonalizacji intuicji w praktyce podejmowania decyzji poprzez zaprojektowanie autorskiego narzędzia umożliwiającego pomiar poziomu potencjału intuicyjnego oraz stopnia jego wykorzystania w procesach decyzyjnych. Narzędzie to może być z powodzeniem wykorzystane przez praktyków zarządzania w celu określenia braków kompetencyjnych w tym obszarze. W wyniku realizacji części empirycznej pracy zidentyfikowano i stworzono także typologię determinant wykorzystania intuicji w procesach decyzyjnych oraz dokonano hierarchizacji sytuacji i warunków decyzyjnych wymagających odwołania się do intuicji. Otrzymane w tym obszarze rezultaty mają także wymiar aplikacyjny poprzez uświadomienie decydentom szczególnej roli intuicji w określonych sytuacjach decyzyjnych. Za kolejny wkład w rozwój nauk o zarządzaniu uznać można nakreślenie i empiryczną weryfikację profilu intuicyjnego decydenta. Jako bardzo wartościowy recenzenci wydawniczy monografii ocenili opracowany przez autorkę konceptualny model procesu podejmowania decyzji integrujący intuicję z racjonalną analizą. W trakcie realizacji postępowania badawczego model ten został poddany rekonstrukcji, w wyniku której został sformułowany model empiryczny. W tym modelu sprecyzowano poszczególne etapy oraz podjęto próbę odtworzenia przebiegu procesu decyzyjnego zakładającego współistnienie podejścia intuicyjnego i racjonalnego w praktyce podejmowania decyzji. Zidentyfikowano etapy wspólne dla obydwu podejść oraz te, które je różnicują. Opinie menedżerów przyczyniły się do wyróżnienia faz procesu, w których szczególną rolę odgrywa intuicja, oraz tych o charakterze analitycznym. Efektem dialogu z decydentami było także zidentyfikowanie występujących między poszczególnymi fazami sprzężeń zwrotnych. Dodatkowo model ten został uzupełniony o determinanty, które decydują o przewadze podejścia intuicyjnego lub racjonalnego w realizowanym procesie decyzyjnym. Uzyskane w tym obszarze rezultaty poznawcze z pewnością mogą stanowić punkt wyjścia dla przyszłych zamierzeń badawczych podejmowanych przez przedstawicieli nauki. Przeprowadzone studia literaturowe oraz badania empiryczne na reprezentatywnej grupie przedsiębiorstw pozwalają na sformułowanie implikacji dla praktyki gospodarczej. Podstawową kwestią w tym aspekcie jest uświadomienie decydentom roli intuicji we współczesnych procesach decyzyjnych oraz możliwości jej doskonalenia, a także sformułowanie rekomendacji dla kadry zarządzającej dotyczących perspektyw wykorzystania intuicji w przyszłości. Podsumowując, można stwierdzić, że uzyskane rezultaty poznawcze wnoszą nowe treści do nauk o zarządzaniu, a opracowana monografia jest pierwszą w Polsce pracą, która gruntownie przedstawia problematykę intuicji w procesach podejmowania decyzji kierowniczych w wymiarze zarówno teoretycznym, jak i empirycznym.
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This paper argues that the time has come to focus attention on the search for factors that affect decision making because decision making errors are costly and are growing more costly, decision makers are receptive, and academic insights are sure to follow from research on improvement. In addition to calling for research on improvement strategies, this paper aims to conclude the main factors that affect decision making, and how these factors have a great impact and influence on decision makers. The researcher focuses on literature review to come up with these main factors.
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This paper argues that the time has come to focus attention on the search for factors that affect decision making because decision making errors are costly and are growing more costly, decision makers are receptive, and academic insights are sure to follow from research on improvement. In addition to calling for research on improvement strategies, this paper aims to conclude the main factors that affect decision making, and how these factors have a great impact and influence on decision makers. The researcher focuses on literature review to come up with these main factors.
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How do shopping lists affect purchasing behavior? On the one hand, breaking down a shopping task into its subcomponents might increase predicted budget for the shopping trip and consequently increase the number of purchases made and dollars spent. On the other hand, a shopping list may function as a concrete action plan for the shopping task and decrease the number of purchases made and dollars spent. In two studies, participants were randomly assigned to make a shopping list for their next grocery trip or not make a list and then completed the shopping trip virtually without the shopping list (Study 1) or with the shopping list (Study 2), using a popular online grocery store website. Those who were induced to make a shopping list prior to shopping bought marginally (Study 1) or significantly fewer (Study 2) items in an online grocery trip and spent marginally less money (Study 1). Simply making an overall spending prediction did not have the same effect as writing an itemized shopping list (Study 2), and purchases in this condition did not differ from those in the control group. We also document descriptive information on frequency of use and beliefs about functionality of shopping lists.
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Taking another person’s perspective is widely presumed to increase interpersonal understanding. Very few experiments, however, have actually tested whether perspective taking increases accuracy when predicting another person’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or other mental states. Those that do yield inconsistent results, or they confound accuracy with egocentrism. Here we report 25 experiments testing whether being instructed to adopt another person’s perspective increases interpersonal insight. These experiments include a wide range of accuracy tests that disentangle egocentrism and accuracy, such as predicting another person’s emotions from facial expressions and body postures, predicting fake versus genuine smiles, predicting when a person is lying or telling the truth, and predicting a spouse’s activity preferences and consumer attitudes. Although a large majority of pretest participants believed that perspective taking would systematically increase accuracy on these tasks, we failed to find any consistent evidence that it actually did so. If anything, perspective taking decreased accuracy overall while occasionally increasing confidence in judgment. Perspective taking reduced egocentric biases, but the information used in its place was not systematically more accurate. A final experiment confirmed that getting another person’s perspective directly, through conversation, increased accuracy but that perspective taking did not. Increasing interpersonal accuracy seems to require gaining new information rather than utilizing existing knowledge about another person. Understanding the mind of another person is therefore enabled by getting perspective, not simply taking perspective.
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In four studies employing multiple manipulations of psychological closeness, we found that feeling connected to another individual who engages in selfish or dishonest behavior leads people to behave more selfishly and less ethically themselves. In addition, psychologically connecting with a scoundrel led to greater moral disengagement. We also establish that vicarious justification is the mechanism explaining this effect: When participants felt psychologically close to someone who had behaved selfishly, they were more likely to consider the behavior to be less shame-worthy and less unethical; it was these lenient judgments that then led them to act more unethically themselves. These vicarious effects were moderated by whether the miscreant was identified With a photograph and by the type of behavior. Importantly, we establish a general process of vicariousness: psychological closeness produced both vicarious generosity and selfishness depending on the behavior of the person one feels psychologically connected to. These findings suggest an irony of psychological closeness: it can create distance from one's own moral compass.
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Regulators have expressed concerns about auditors' tendency to over-rely on imprecise compensating controls when evaluating the severity of control deficiencies. We provide evidence on whether prompting auditors to use a prudent official's evaluative perspective will mitigate this tendency. We hypothesize that auditors who are prompted to adopt the prudent official's perspective evaluate compensating controls and the severity of control deficiencies more effectively than those who are not prompted. We examine our hypotheses by manipulating a prompt to adopt the prudent official's perspective (present versus absent) and the precision of compensating controls (precise versus imprecise) in a 2 × 2 between subjects experiment where experienced auditors evaluate a revenue control deficiency that resulted in an immaterial misstatement. The experimental results are consistent with our hypotheses and support the conclusion that regulators and firms can alter auditors' evaluative perspective to achieve more effective assessment of risk-related conditions.
Article
The more similar the members of a group are to one another, the less reliable their collective judgments are likely to be. One way for individuals to respond to negative feedback from a group may thus be to adjust their perceptions of the group's homogeneity, enabling them to dismiss the feedback as unreliable. We show that individuals appreciate this logic (Study 1) and that they put it to strategic use by regarding the members of a group as more homogenous when the group judges them negatively than when it judges them positively (Studies 2, 3, and 4). We underscore the self-protective nature of this tendency by showing that individuals adjust their perceptions of a group's homogeneity more when they themselves are the target of the group's judgment than when the group judges someone else (Study 4).
Chapter
For persons to apply the contract test adequately they must not only be able to form moral judgments through perspective-taking, which Chap. 3 established, but also do so with sufficient accuracy. This chapter therefore examines how good we are at perspective-taking. Empirical findings show that we often make mistakes regarding the perspectives of others. Our ability for perspective-taking is constrained by three factors: available cognitive resources, available information about differences between oneself and the occupant(s) of the target perspective, and one’s own present perspective regarding the object. It is argued that this means that persons are prone to draw mistaken conclusions about whether principles would be the object of general agreement.
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Humans make decisions jointly with others. They share responsibility for the outcome with their interaction partners. Today, more and more often the partner in a decision is not another human but, instead, a machine. Here we ask whether the type of the partner, machine or human, affects our responsibility, our perception of the choice and the choice itself. As a workhorse we use a modified dictator game with two joint decision makers: either two humans or one human and one machine. We find no treatment effect on perceived responsibility or guilt. We also find only a small and insignificant effect on actual choices.
Article
We developed a method to synthesize game levels that accounts for the degree of collaboration required by two players to finish a given game level. We first asked a game level designer to create playable game level chunks. Then, two artificial intelligence (AI) virtual agents driven by behavior trees played each game level chunk. We recorded the degree of collaboration required to accomplish each game level chunk by the AI virtual agents and used it to characterize each game level chunk. To synthesize a game level, we assigned to the total cost function cost terms that encode both the degree of collaboration and game level design decisions. Then, we used a Markov-chain Monte Carlo optimization method, called simulated annealing, to solve the total cost function and proposed a design for a game level. We synthesized three game levels (low, medium, and high degrees of collaboration game levels) to evaluate our implementation. We then recruited groups of participants to play the game levels to explore whether they would experience a certain degree of collaboration and validate whether the AI virtual agents provided sufficient data that described the collaborative behavior of players in each game level chunk. By collecting both in-game objective measurements and self-reported subjective ratings, we found that the three game levels indeed impacted the collaboration gameplay behavior of our participants. Moreover, by analyzing our collected data, we found moderate and strong correlations between the participants and the AI virtual agents. These results show that game developers can consider AI virtual agents as an alternative method for evaluating the degree of collaboration required to finish a game level.
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A series of studies examines whether certain biases in probability assessments and perceptions of loss, previously found in experimental studies, affect consumers' decisions about insurance. Framing manipulations lead the consumers studied here to make hypothetical insurance-purchase choices that violate basic laws of probability and value. Subjects exhibit distortions in their perception of risk and framing effects in evaluating premiums and benefits. Illustrations from insurance markets suggest that the same effects occur when consumers make actual insurance purchases.
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When branches of a fault tree are pruned, their probabilities are not fully transferred to the "all other" branch. Three explanations for this underestimation of the "all other" probability were tested: availability, ambiguity, and credibility. In an experiment, the authors varied the credibility of a cover story and separately observed the generation of a fault's causes to isolate availability, and the categorization of causes to assess ambiguity. The results identify biased availability as a broad threat to the validity of likelihood estimates. Ambiguity adds to the problem whenever tree designers are unable to eliminate it from causes or categories. Finally, though Ss had clear expectations for what constitutes a credible fault tree, none of the "all other" underestimation could be traced to credibility factors. The discussion covers both underlying mechanisms and corrective techniques. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Fault trees represent problem situations by organizing "things that could go wrong" into functional categories. Such trees are essential devices for analyzing and evaluating the fallibility of complex systems. They follow many different formats, sometimes by design, other times inadvertently. The present study examined the effects of varying 3 aspects of fault tree structure on the evaluation of a fault tree for the event "a car fails to start." The fault trees studied had 4 to 8 branches, including "battery charge insufficient," "fuel system defective," and "all other problems." Six experiments were conducted, 5 of which used a total of 628 college community members and 1 of which used 29 experienced auto mechanics. Results show the following: (a) Ss were quite insensitive to what had been left out of a fault tree. (b) Increasing the amount of detail for the tree as a whole or just for some of its branches produced small effects on perceptions. (c) The perceived importance of a particular branch was increased by presenting it in pieces (i.e., as 2 separate component branches). Insensitivity to omissions was found with both college Ss and mechanics. It is suggested that, aside from their relevance for the study of problem solving, results have implications for (a) how best to inform the public about technological risks and to involve it in policy decisions and (b) how experts should perform fault tree analyses of the risks from technological systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Conducted 5 experiments to assess biases in availability of information in memory and attributions of responsibility for the actions and decisions that occurred during a previous group interaction. The S populations sampled included naturally occurring discussion groups (of undergraduates), 37 married couples, 74 female and 84 male players on intercollegiate basketball teams, and groups of undergraduates assembled in the laboratory. Data provide consistent evidence for egocentric biases in availability and attribution: The S's own contributions to a joint product were more readily available, i.e., more frequently and easily recalled, and Ss accepted more responsibility for a group product than other participants attributed to them. In addition, statements attributed to the self were recalled more accurately and the availability bias was attenuated, though not eliminated, when the group product was negatively evaluated. When another S's contributions were made more available to the S via a selective retrieval process, this S allocated correspondingly more responsibility for the group decisions to the coparticipant. The determinants and pervasiveness of the egocentric biases are considered. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Presents a new theory of subjective probability according to which different descriptions of the same event can give rise to different judgments. The experimental evidence confirms the major predictions of the theory. First, judged probability increases by unpacking the focal hypothesis and decreases by unpacking the alternative hypothesis. Second, judged probabilities are complementary in the binary case and subadditive in the general case, contrary to both classical and revisionist models of belief. Third, subadditivity is more pronounced for probability judgments than for frequency judgments and is enhanced by compatible evidence. The theory provides a unified treatment of a wide range of empirical findings. It is extended to ordinal judgments and to the assessment of upper and lower probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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causal attributions / cognitive processes involved when people attempt to identify the causes of behaviors and events / intrapsychic processes / interpersonal aspects of attributions / attributional processes in groups / diffusion of responsibility attributions and group outcomes / sources / attributional conflict / attributional bases of negative group processes / attributions and performance / status, reward allocation, and satisfaction (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Evidence from several lab and field studies is presented that indicates that people have cynical intuitions about how others assess responsibility. Married couples (Study 1), video game enthusiasts (Study 2), debaters (Study 3), and darts players (Study 4) divided responsibility for a series of desirable and undesirable joint outcomes and anticipated how others would apportion responsibility. In all studies, participants expected the responsibility allocations of others–but not their own–to be motivationally biased. This was true regardless of whether responsibility assessments actually were biased. In Studies 3 and 4, participants assumed that their teammates would be less biased than their opponents, suggesting that factors known to influence motivation can moderate the strength of this "naive cynicism." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Reviews what is known about the causes and effects of anchoring. This chapter begins with some definitions, and then identifies some styled facts about this heuristic. Next, the authors examine 2 families of causes of anchoring. They close by reviewing other phenomena related to anchoring and potential applications. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Recent studies have demonstrated subadditivity of human probability judgment: The judged probabilities for an event partition sum to more than 1. We report conditions under which people's probability judgments are superadditive instead: The component judgments for a partition sum to less than 1. Both directions of deviation from additivity are interpreted in a common framework, in which probability judgments are often mediated by judgments of evidence. The 2 kinds of nonadditivity result from differences in recruitment of supporting evidence together with reduced processing of nonfocal propositions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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In each of 3 experiments it was demonstrated that under certain conditions individuals who work on a task in a dyad will tend to attribute greater responsibility for a positive outcome to their partners than to themselves. In Exp I 56 college students, who had qualifying scores on the Beck Depression Inventory, working in dyads on a crossword puzzle attributed more responsibility to their partners than to themselves for an outcome they were led to believe was quite good, thus contradicting the expected "egocentric bias" effect. This was true across depression categories. In Exp II, 100 college students working in dyads on the puzzle attributed more responsibility to their partners than to themselves for a positive outcome when asked immediately after the task to make the attribution. However, Ss attributed greater responsibility to themselves than to their partners when asked to make the attribution 3 days later, thus replicating the egocentric bias effect. Half of the 30 dyads in Exp III believed they were being videotaped while working on the puzzle, whereas the other half did not. "Videotaped" Ss attributed more responsibility for the positive outcome to themselves than to their partners, whereas the nonvideotaped Ss attributed more responsibility to their partners than to themselves when both groups were asked to give their attributions immediately after the task. The relationship between the egocentric bias effect and the actor–observer difference phenomenon is discussed. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Five experiments with a total of 268 university students tested the hypothesis that overinference of quantity from numerosity (number of units into which a stimulus is divided) relates to the degree to which higher-order cognitive resources are taxed when making judgments. Exp 1 examined judgments of geometric figures that were or were not divided into multiple units. Exp 2 compared judgments under 1-task and 2-task conditions. In Exp 3 Ss estimated the value of coin arrays presented in rapid succession. Exp 4 assessed Ss' preferences for desirable or undesirable activities whose probabilistic outcomes were either unrelated or negatively related to their numerosity. Exp 5 examined the role of the numerosity heuristic in social perception. Results suggest the numerosity heuristic is likely to be used during (1) inherently difficult judgments, (2) judgments rendered while performing concurrent tasks, and (3) especially rapid judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Any category or event can be described in more or less detail. Although these different descriptions can reflect the same event objectively, they may not reflect the same event subjectively. Research on Support Theory led us to predict that more detailed descriptions would produce more extreme evaluations of categories or events than less detailed descriptions. Four experiments demonstrated this unpacking effect when people were presented with (Experiments 1 and 4), generated (Experiment 2), or were primed with (Experiment 3) more rather than less detailed descriptions of events. This effect was diminished when the details were less personally relevant (Experiment 4). We discuss several psychological mechanisms, moderators, and extensions of the unpacking effect.
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Experienced ease of recall was found to qualify the implications of recalled content. Ss who had to recall 12 examples of assertive (unassertive) behaviors, which was difficult, rated themselves as less assertive (less unassertive) than subjects who had to recall 6 examples, which was easy. In fact, Ss reported higher assertiveness after recalling 12 unassertive rather than 12 assertive behaviors. Thus, self-assessments only reflected the implications of recalled content if recall was easy. The impact of ease of recall was eliminated when its informational value was discredited by a misattribution manipulation. The informative functions of subjective experiences are discussed.
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Research in cognitive psychology has indicated that alternative descriptions of the same event can give rise to different probability judgments. This observation has led to the development of a descriptive account, called support theory, which assumes that the judged probability of an explicit description of an event (that lists specific possibilities) generally exceeds the judged probability of an implicit description of the same event (that does not mention specific possibilities). To investigate this assumption in medical judgment, the authors presented physicians with brief clinical scenarios describing individual patients and elicited diagnostic and prognostic probability judgments. The results showed that the physicians tended to discount unspecified possibilities, as predicted by support theory. The authors suggest that an awareness of the discrepancy between intuitive judgments and the laws of chance may provide opportunities for improving medical decision making.
Article
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This research provides evidence that people overestimate the extent to which their actions and appearance are noted by others, a phenomenon dubbed the spotlight effect. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who were asked to don a T-shirt depicting either a flattering or potentially embarrassing image overestimated the number of observers who would be able to recall what was pictured on the shirt. In Study 3, participants in a group discussion overestimated how prominent their positive and negative utterances were to their fellow discussants. Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence supporting an anchoring-and-adjustment interpretation of the spotlight effect. In particular, people appear to anchor on their own rich phenomenological experience and then adjust--insufficiently--to take into account the perspective of others. The discussion focuses on the manifestations and implications of the spotlight effect across a host of everyday social phenomena.
Article
Prior research has found that people tend to overestimate their relative contributions to joint tasks (e.g., Ross & Sicoly, 1979). In the present research we investigate one of the causes of this bias, and in doing so, identify an important moderator of the effect. In three studies we demonstrate that when people estimate their relative contributions to collective endeavors they focus on their own contributions and give less consideration to the contributions of their collaborators. This can cause overestimation of relative contributions when absolute contributions are numerous, but underestimation of relative contributions when absolute contributions are few. These results extend Ross & Sicoly's (1979) original egocentrism analysis of bias in responsibility attributions, but also suggest that the tendency to overestimate one's relative contributions to collaborations is not as ubiquitous as once thought.
Article
Reactions to other's claims of resposibility were investigated by assessing group members' evaluations of a fellow group member who took high, moderate, or low personal responsibility for a positive or negative outcome. As predicted, individuals whose attribution were self-serving (blaming others for failure or claiming credit for success) were liked less than (1) group members who allocated responsibility equally, and (2) members whose "other-serving" attributions indicated they took the blame for failure or credited others for success. These results suggest that attributions-when exchanged among group members-significantly influence social perceptions and group relations.
Article
The attributional egotism of individuals may be particularly important when they serve as members of cooperative groups. Within a group one's fellow members may be granted or denied credit for a group performance in order to manipulate one's own perceived responsibility for the outcome. In this study, group members privately or publicly reported their assessments of their own and others' responsibility for group successes and failures. Subjects privately claimed more responsibility for success than for failure but did not do so (in public) when the other members were expected to see their reports. Moreover, under public conditions, subjects claimed less responsibility for a group success than they gave to the other members, an effect which disappeared in private. Subjects were clearly sensitive to the interpersonal implications of their attributions, displaying less egotism under public conditions.
Article
Following announcements of plans for a new nuclear power station in south-west England, local residents were sent questionnaires in which they were asked to give estimates, in percentage terms, of the present, future (2000 AD) and ideal contributions to the UK electricity supply of different energy technologies. In Expt 1, 184 subjects rated five technologies (plus an ‘other’ category), and 10 months later they were split into five groups, each of which had to rate only one of the technologies previously presented. In Expt 2, three versions of the questionnaire were used, requiring ratings of (a) nuclear only, (b) nuclear, coal, plus ‘other’ and (c) eight technologies (including nuclear and coal) plus ‘other’. These were first completed by 220 subjects; six months later a subsample of 134 were each sent one of the two versions other than the one they had previously completed. In Expt 3, 164 subjects gave ratings, in four conditions, of (a) nuclear only, (b) coal only, (c) four technologies plus ‘other’ and (d) seven technologies plus ‘other’; the order of ratings was also changed with preferences first, present estimates second, and future predictions third. Broadly, all three experiments showed that the more technologies subjects had to rate, the smaller were the percentage ratings they gave to any single technology. These findings are considered in relation to context effects in judgement, and to the availability heuristic. Implications for interpretation of opinion poll findings are discussed.
Article
Decision theory distinguishes between risky prospects, where the probabilities associated with the possible outcomes are assumed to be known, and uncertain prospects, where these probabilities are not assumed to be known. Studies of choice between risky prospects have suggested a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale that overweights low probabilities and underweights moderate and high probabilities. The present article extends this notion from risk to uncertainty by invoking the principle of bounded subadditivity: An event has greater impact when it turns impossibility into possibility, or possibility into certainty, than when it merely makes a possibility more or less likely. A series of studies provides support for this principle in decision under both risk and uncertainty and shows that people are less sensitive to uncertainty than to risk. Finally, the article discusses the relationship between probability judgments and decision weights and distinguishes relative sensitivity from ambiguity aversion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Abstract—People's subjective probability judgments of external events are often subadditive (i.e., the probability estimates of component parts of a single event sum to greater than one)—a clear violation of the extensional nature of probability theory. We show that people's frequency judgments of personal events can also be subadditive. We found subadditivity even when component events made up a proper subset of a wider composite event. Our findings imply that the somewhat arbitrary choice of the specificity with which questions are asked can produce widely different reports for the same composite events.
Article
Biases in husbands' and wives' reports of the relative distribution of child-care responsibility, and the effect of those biases on marital adjustment, were examined in this study. Two hundred and sixty-eight married couples estimated each spouse's percentage contribution to 32 specific child-care tasks and to five global aspects of child-care responsibilities, and completed the Spanier dyadic adjustment scale. The t tests comparing husbands' and wives' estimates on the child care measures showed a consistent credit-taking bias. Spouses gave themselves more credit for participation on a given task than they were given by their partners. Pearson correlations between the degree of credit-taking and marital satisfaction were not significant. The inconsistency between credit-taking for child care and other evidence suggesting an idealization bias between spouses is discussed.
Article
Examined agreement within couples about their recent dyadic interaction. In the 1st study, 50 married couples (male mean age 32.0 yrs, female mean age 30.6 yrs) used a behavior checklist to report their interaction during the previous 24 hrs. In the 2nd study, members of 50 dating undergraduate couples reported their interaction during the preceding 3–4 days using a similar checklist. In both studies agreement between partners was modest (kappa approximately .5) and significantly related to item and couple characteristics. Items rated high in objectivity and specificity achieved greater levels of agreement, but these same items were rated as lower in importance to the relationship. In addition, couples who scored higher on standard measures of relationship satisfaction achieved higher levels of agreement. All instances of disagreement between partners were examined for systematic bias. Evidence for egocentric bias, which assumes that Ss will overreport their own behavior and/or underreport their partner's behavior, was found. No evidence for gender bias was discovered. As length of the relationship increased, egocentric bias on negative items shifted, indicating more blame and/or denial of responsibility for negative behavior over time. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Splitting an event category into smaller subcategories can increase the subjective frequency of events. Category-split effects are derived from an information-loss model that predicts regressive frequency estimates (rare events are overestimated and frequent events underestimated). The basic regression effect and the overestimation of very low frequencies resulting from category split should increase with information loss in memory. Exps 1 and 2 supported these predictions for graphical stimuli. In Exp 3, the split effect was used to eliminate group-related illusory correlations. Although stimulus split (different subtypes included in the list) and response split (separate judgments for each subtype) are essential, the illusion did not depend on attention to the split during encoding. Implications pertain to many social-inductive processes such as stereotyping, advertising, and media influence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Asked 144 male Ss to work in 4-person problem-solving groups. After providing recommendations for group solutions to a series of problems, Ss learned that they had been consistently in either the group's majority or minority—where majority decisions were binding on the entire group—and that either few (low dissent) or many (high dissent) group members had disagreed with the majority. Ss were then informed that their group had done extremely well, average, or very poorly on the problems. Majority Ss verdically rated their personal performance and personal responsibility for the group's performance more highly than did minority Ss except when the group failed. Under failure conditions, majority Ss defensively took as little responsibility as minority Ss and rated their personal performances equal to those of minority Ss. Ss in failing groups also defensively assigned less responsibility for the group's poor performance to themselves than they assigned to the poorest group member. The results support a self-serving bias explanation for egocentrism and fail to support predictions derived from a logical information-processing model. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Conducted 2 studies based on the research of M. Ross and F. Sicoly (see record 1980-23237-001) to investigate biases in the available information used to make attributions and in the attributions of responsibility for actions or events. In Study 1, 24 men (aged 27–58 yrs) in a doubles tennis league responded to questions requiring recall of important events and turning points during tennis matches. In Study 2, 32 coach–athlete pairs (comprised of male coaches aged 27–40 yrs and athletes aged 15–21 yrs) provided examples of joint interaction inputs. Estimates of perceived responsibility for both dyad members were gathered from each S. The data provided evidence for egocentric biases in available information and in responsibility attributions. Ss' own inputs to team efforts or to a 2-person interaction were more easily and frequently remembered. Ss consistently remembered more of their personal contributions than those of others and accepted more responsibility for joint efforts than granted them by others, regardless of event outcomes. Cognitive processes are thought to affect memory to create bias and unintentional disagreement. Implications for attribution research based on nonegocentric and actor–observer biases and the consequences of these unintended biases for participant interaction are discussed. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Three studies extended M. Ross and F. Sicoly's (see record 1980-23237-001) work on egocentric biases in close relationships. In Study 1 (157 individuals in an ongoing heterosexual relationship), egocentric biases in judging responsibility were evidenced for a number of activities in a relationship, and the percentage of self-instances recalled was related to the responsibility judgment. In Study 2 (56 romantically involved couples), visibility, desirability, and stressfulness of the activity did not contribute to overestimation of responsibility, thus further implicating selective retrieval as a cause of the phenomenon. In Study 3, 54 individual members of ongoing romantic relationships asked what information they had used to make their judgments. Over 90% of the time, typical or dispositional information was reported as the basis of the judgment. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the causes of egocentric biases and for the process by which individuals make judgments about an ongoing relationship. (7 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
Reviews developments in support theory since the initial statements by A. Tversky and D. J. Koehler (1994) and Y. Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). Then this chapter provides some speculations regarding future applications of support theory. The recent developments that the authors review tend to focus on specific properties of the support scale, whereas their discussion of future directions emphasizes potential applications of descriptive dependence and the notion of likelihood judgment as a balance of evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Article
People tend to underestimate how long it will take to complete tasks. We suggest that one reason people commit this planning fallacy is that they do not naturally “unpack” multifaceted tasks (e.g., writing a manuscript) into subcomponents (completing the literature review, general discussion, references section, etc.) when making predictions. We tested this interpretation by asking participants to estimate how long it would take them to complete one of several tasks: holiday shopping in Experiment 1, “getting ready” for a date in Experiment 2, formatting a document in Experiments 3 and 5, and preparing food in Experiment 4. Participants prompted to unpack the task provided longer—and, in Experiments 3–4, less biased—estimates of how long the task would take than did participants who did not. Experiment 5 showed that the debiasing influence of unpacking is moderated by task complexity: the more multifaceted the task, the greater the influence of unpacking.
Article
This paper explores a judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind. In general, availability is correlated with ecological frequency, but it is also affected by other factors. Consequently, the reliance on the availability heuristic leads to systematic biases. Such biases are demonstrated in the judged frequency of classes of words, of combinatorial outcomes, and of repeated events. The phenomenon of illusory correlation is explained as an availability bias. The effects of the availability of incidents and scenarios on subjective probability are discussed.
Article
Prior research has found that people tend to overestimate their relative contribution to joint tasks [e.g., Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 322-336]. The present research investigates one source of this bias, and in doing so, identifies an important moderator of the effect. Three studies demonstrate that when people estimate their relative contribution to collective endeavors they focus on their own contribution and give less consideration to the contribution of their collaborators. This can cause overestimation for tasks in which total contributions are plentiful, but underestimation for tasks in which total contributions are few--despite the fact that both tasks reflect positively on the person who performs them. These results extend Ross and Sicoly's (1979) original analysis of bias in responsibility judgments, but also suggest that the tendency to overestimate one's relative contribution to collaborations is not as ubiquitous as once thought.
Article
John Dean, the former counsel to President Richard Nixon, testified to the Senate Watergate Investigating Committee about conversations that later turned out to have been tape recorded. Comparison of his testimony with the actual transcripts shows systematic distortion at one level of analysis combined with basic accuracy at another. Many of the distortions reflected Dean's own self-image; he tended to recall his role as more central than it really was. Moreover, his memory for even the "gist" of conversations was quite poor except where that gist had been rehearsed in advance or frequently repeated. But while his testimony was often wrong in terms of the particular conversations he tried to describe, Dean was fundamentally right about what had been happening: the existence of a "cover-up" and the participation of various individuals in it. His testimony was accurate at a level that is neither "semantic" (since he was ostensibly describing particular episodes) nor "episodic" (since his accounts of the episodes were often wrong). The term "repisodic" is coined here to describe such memories: what seems to be a remembered episode actually represents a repeated series of events, and thus reflects a genuinely existing state of affairs.
Article
Support theory represents probability judgment in terms of the support, or strength of evidence, of the focal relative to the alternative hypothesis. It assumes that the judged probability of an event generally increases when its description is unpacked into disjoint components (implicit subadditivity). This article presents a significant extension of the theory in which the judged probability of an explicit disjunction is less than or equal to the sum of the judged probabilities of its disjoint components (explicit subadditivity). Several studies of probability and frequency judgment demonstrate both implicit and explicit subadditivity. The former is attributed to enhanced availability, whereas the latter is attributed to repacking and anchoring.
Article
When the probability of a single member of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities is judged, its alternatives are evaluated as a composite "residual" hypothesis. Support theory (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994) implies that the process of packing alternatives together in the residual reduces the perceived evidential support for the set of alternatives and consequently inflates the judged probability of the focal hypothesis. Previous work has investigated the global weights that determine the extent to which the overall evidential support for the alternatives is discounted by this packing operation (Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 1997). In the present investigation, we analyze this issue in greater detail, examining the local weights that measure the specific contribution of each component hypothesis included implicitly in the residual. We describe a procedure for estimating local weights and introduce a set of plausible properties that impose systematic ordinal relationships among local weights. Results from four experiments testing these properties are reported, and a local-weight model is developed that accounts for nearly all of the variance in the probability judgments in these empirical tests. Local weights appear to be sensitive both to the individual component with which they are associated and to the residual hypothesis in which the component resides.
Article
This article argues that (a) ego, or sel L is an organization oJ knowledge, (b) ego is characterized by cognitive biases strikingly analogous to totalitarian inJormation-control strategies, and (c) these totalitarian-ego biases Junction to preserve organization in cognitive structures. Ego's cognitive biases are ego- centricity (selJ as the Jocus oJ knowledge), "beneffectance " (perception oJ responsibility Jot desired, but not undesired, outcomes), and cognitive conservatism (resistance to cognitive change). In addition to being pervasively evident in recent studies oJ normal human cognition, these three biases are Jound in actively Junc- tioning, higher level organizations oJ knowledge, per- haps best exemplified by theoretical paradigms in science. The thesis that egocentricity, benelectance, and conservatism act to preserve knowledge organizations leads to the proposal oJ an intrapsychic analog o! genetic evolution, which in turn provides an alternative to prevalent motivational and inJormational interpreta- tions oJ cognitive biases.
Everyday egocentrism and everyday interpersonal problems The social psychology of emotional and behavioral problems: Interfaces of social and clinical psychology The spotlight effect in social judgment: An egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one?s own actions and appearance
  • T Gilovich
  • J Kruger
  • K K Savitsky
  • Savitsky
Gilovich, T., Kruger, J., & Savitsky, K. (1999). Everyday egocentrism and everyday interpersonal problems. In R. M. Kowalski & M. R. Leary (Eds.), The social psychology of emotional and behavioral problems: Interfaces of social and clinical psychology (pp. 69–95). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 456 K. Savitsky et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005) 447–457 rGilovich, T., Medvec, V. H., & Savitsky, K. (2000). The spotlight effect in social judgment: An egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one?s own actions and appearance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 211–222
A tale of tuned decks? Anchoring as adjustment and anchoring as activation The Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making
  • N Epley
Epley, N. (2004). A tale of tuned decks? Anchoring as adjustment and anchoring as activation. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), The Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp. 240– 256)
An editorÕs love Everyday egocentrism and everyday interpersonal problems The social psychology of emotional and behavioral problems: Interfaces of social and clinical psychology
  • D Gates
  • T Gilovich
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