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PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Who Knows What About a Person? The Self–Other Knowledge
Asymmetry (SOKA) Model
Simine Vazire
Washington University in St. Louis
This article tests a new model for predicting which aspects of personality are best judged by the self and
which are best judged by others. Previous research suggests an asymmetry in the accuracy of personality
judgments: Some aspects of personality are known better to the self than others and vice versa. According
to the self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model presented here, the self should be more accurate
than others for traits low in observability (e.g., neuroticism), whereas others should be more accurate than
the self for traits high in evaluativeness (e.g., intellect). In the present study, 165 participants provided
self-ratings and were rated by 4 friends and up to 4 strangers in a round-robin design. Participants then
completed a battery of behavioral tests from which criterion measures were derived. Consistent with
SOKA model predictions, the self was the best judge of neuroticism-related traits, friends were the best
judges of intellect-related traits, and people of all perspectives were equally good at judging extraversion-
related traits. The theoretical and practical value of articulating this asymmetry is discussed.
Keywords: self-knowledge, accuracy, personality judgment, behavior, peer ratings
[The observer] sometimes reaches truths about people’s character and
destiny which they themselves are very far from divining. (Santayana,
1905/1980, p. 154)
Why do others sometimes know things about us that we don’t
know about ourselves? We are far from perfectly accurate about
ourselves, and, as Santayana (1905/1980) observed, outsiders are
often at least as good as the self at describing what a person is like
(Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996; Vazire & Mehl, 2008). These
findings violate the commonsense conviction that nobody knows
you better than you do (Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross, 2001;
Vazire & Mehl, 2008) and challenge philosophical accounts of the
privileged position of the self with respect to knowing what a
person is like (e.g., Augustine and Descartes). As accurate as
self-perceptions can be, the self’s position as the “best expert” on
what a person is like is on shaky empirical ground. However, the
data accumulated to date do not explain why others sometimes
know us better than we know ourselves, or in what domains this is
likely to occur. The goal of this article is to present a model of self-
and other-knowledge that begins to address these issues and to test
this model empirically.
It is by now evident that neither perspective—the self or oth-
ers—is unequivocally the best perspective from which to judge
personality. Self-ratings of personality predict behavior and im-
portant outcomes to an impressive degree (Funder & Colvin, 1991;
Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006; Ozer & Benet-Martı´nez,
2006; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi,
& Goldberg, 2007), and self-perceptions must undeniably play an
important role in any conception of personality (McAdams, 1995).
However, the last 2 decades have also seen a wealth of empirical
demonstrations of the self’s surprisingly limited insight into ev-
erything from mental and emotional states (Bargh & Chartrand,
1999; Bargh & Williams, 2006; Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Dunn,
2004; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; see also Haybron, 2007, for an
interesting theoretical argument) to preferences (Eastwick &
Finkel, 2008), motives (Schultheiss, Jones, Davis, & Kley, 2008;
Schultheiss, Wirth, et al., 2008), and behavior (Epley & Dunning,
2006; Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998; Robins & John,
1997a; Vazire & Mehl, 2008). Furthermore, an equally compelling
empirical case can be made for the validity of informant reports
(Fiedler, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2004; Hofstee, 1994; John &
Robins, 1994; Kolar et al., 1996; Levesque & Kenny, 1993;
Portions of this research were supported by National Science Founda-
tion Grant 0422924 to Sam Gosling.
Thanks to Sam Gosling for financial support and for his invaluable input
on this project. Thanks to Erika Carlson, John Doris, Matthias Mehl, and
Tom Oltmanns for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks to
Oliver John for his input on the SOKA model and to Dave Kenny for his
help with the social relations model analyses. Thanks to Natasha Botello,
Cindy Chung, Hani Freeman, Pranj Mehta, Christina Baquero, Natalie
Morgan, Heather Harrison, Allison Connelly, Samantha Beard, Ashley
Smith, Vanessa Martinez, and Ashish Chavda for their help with data
collection. Thanks to the dozens of research assistants at the University of
Texas who helped with the codings and ratings.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Simine
Vazire, Department of Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis,
One Brookings Drive, Campus Box 1125, St. Louis, MO 63130. E-mail:
svazire@artsci.wustl.edu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2010, Vol. 98, No. 2, 281–300
© 2010 American Psychological Association 0022-3514/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017908
281
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