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Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious
... Furthermore, intuitions are based on implicit or tacit knowledge acquired throughout a lifetime (Bowers et al. 1990). Finally, they often manifest as affective tendencies towards action-i.e. a felt go or no-go signal strong enough to draw the individual into action (Gigerenzer 2008), and can thus be contrasted with insights, which Zander et al. (2016) (p. 3) describe as 'the sudden and unexpected understanding of a previously incomprehensible problem or concept' (italics original). Note that insights, while sharing characteristics with intuitions, often involve a more dramatic cognitive shift and, interestingly, tend to be more accurate than analytic solutions (Salvi et al. 2016). ...
... From the perspective of active inference, intuition can be understood as the brain's nonconscious generation of expectations about the consequences of different actions, leading to a Bayes-optimal navigation of the environment, both in its physical and mental form (Freeman 2002, Buzsáki 2006. Based on implicit knowledge and past experience, this leads to a certain action readiness via precision-weighting dynamics, as the organism 'arrives' at the trajectory that, if fulfilled via action, minimizes the path integral of EFE (Bowers et al. 1990, Gigerenzer 2008, Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014, Friston 2022). To foreshadow this paper's thesis, we will suggest that in flow (and perhaps more generally), intuition constitutes a habitual mental action which, given a relevant contextual cue, optimizes certain aspects of belief updating: i.e. by increasing the precision weight of probability distributions in the generative model, such as the likelihood, transition priors, and prior preferences. ...
... These three components of a generative model are usually denoted by A, B, and C tensors, respectively. 1 This is aligned with the proposal of Volz and Zander (2014), who refer to the type of memory content utilized in intuition as tacitly (in)formed cue-criterion relationships developed over the course of a lifetime (cf., Gigerenzer 2008). As Parvizi-Wayne et al. (2024) make clear, it takes time and practice to form such mental habits (intuitions). ...
This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing theory, that intuition serves as a rapid, nonconscious decision-making process, while flow facilitates this process in action, achieving optimal cognitive control and performance without [conscious] deliberation. By exploring these points of convergence between flow and intuition, we also attempt to reconcile the apparent paradox of the presence of enhanced intuition in flow, which is also a state of heightened cognitive control. To do so, we utilize a revised dual-processing framework, which allows us to productively align and differentiate flow and intuition (including intuition in flow). Furthermore, we draw on recent work examining flow from an active inference perspective. Our account not only heightens understanding of human cognition and consciousness, but also raises new questions for future research, aiming to deepen our comprehension of how flow and intuition can be harnessed to elevate human performance and wellbeing.
... This theory states that when humans face the decision to evaluate a set of attributes, people often rely on a series of heuristics that simplify the calculation. Some theories suggest that the evaluation can be solely based on the attributes that participants consider most important [28] [43]. These heuristics simplify the evaluation algorithm by considering only a small subset of attributes in the decision, instead of weighting all the attributes [44]. ...
... More recent studies assert that people adapt their decision strategies according to the context and available resources [35]. One of the most notable works [28] focuses on intuitive decisions and the use of heuristics, examining how people make quick decisions based on a few key attributes. ...
... It examines human behavior, which includes emotional factors, cognitive biases, and informational limitations. In this branch, models such as heuristics or elimination by aspects help explain how people simplify complex decisions[27] [28]. The Prospect Theory is another key contribution, showing how people make decisions under risk, often deviating from rational principles[29]. ...
Information and communication technologies have brought about a revolution in how we perceive, interpret, and learn. This ever-changing landscape presents both challenges and opportunities for enhancing students' learning experiences through innovative tools and strategies. One such strategies is collaboration and serious games into teaching, offering safe environments to solve real-world problems, improve comprehension and knowledge acquisition, develop technology skills, foster cooperation and collaboration, and provide an engaging and interactive learning experience. However, the development of effective simulation games requires careful consideration of various factors, including aesthetics, interface, gameplay, learnability, feedback, challenge, immersion, and game design, to name just a few. Evaluating simulation games poses a challenge due to interdisciplinary involvement and the lack of standardized methodology. This article proposes a methodological approach to assess the attributes of simulation games, providing valuable insights for informed decision-making regarding their design, improvement, effectiveness, and challenges in the realm of serious games.
... Intuition is described as the ability to act or decide appropriately without deliberately and consciously weighing different options in a given situation (Harteis & Billett, 2013). It is a highly specialized set of processes which have been automatized over time and which are autonomously executed when a simple cue in the environment (a triggering stimulus) appears (Gigerenzer, 2007;Stanovich, 2009). Although intuitions can result in faulty decisions, in particular, under radical uncertainty (Johnson et al., 2023), they are commonly associated with fast and efficient outcomes (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). ...
... Scientists have investigated intuitive decision-making for decades in cognitive psychology, mainly focusing on reasoning, logical thinking, and judgment (Evans, 2003(Evans, , 2008Gigerenzer, 2007;Kahneman, 2011;Klein, 2017;Osman, 2004;Thompson et al., 2011). This body of work has provided extensive insights into the conditions under which intuitive decisions are made (Bago & De Neys, 2017), how the interplay between intuitive and deliberative processes operates (de Neys, 2006(de Neys, , 2012(de Neys, , 2021Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Stanovich, 2009), and how intuitive decision-making develops over time (for related, but theoretically distinct views, see Gigerenzer, 2007;Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009;Klein, 2017;Klein et al., 1993;Raab, 2012). ...
... Scientists have investigated intuitive decision-making for decades in cognitive psychology, mainly focusing on reasoning, logical thinking, and judgment (Evans, 2003(Evans, , 2008Gigerenzer, 2007;Kahneman, 2011;Klein, 2017;Osman, 2004;Thompson et al., 2011). This body of work has provided extensive insights into the conditions under which intuitive decisions are made (Bago & De Neys, 2017), how the interplay between intuitive and deliberative processes operates (de Neys, 2006(de Neys, , 2012(de Neys, , 2021Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Stanovich, 2009), and how intuitive decision-making develops over time (for related, but theoretically distinct views, see Gigerenzer, 2007;Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009;Klein, 2017;Klein et al., 1993;Raab, 2012). Yet, considerable controversy and debate continues to exist in this field. ...
In sports, athletes are frequently challenged to make decisions under time constraints. The ability of skilled athletes to make successful and seemingly effortless decisions in these situations is often referred to as intuition. However, how athletes develop intuition remains to be elucidated. A key issue highly debated between proponents of opposing theoretical views is whether the development of intuitive decision-making benefits from the involvement of deliberate cognitive processes (explicit vs. implicit). In this perspective paper, we critically assess theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for these contradictory views. Moreover, by delving into cognitive psychological assumptions rooted in dual-process theory, we elucidate the proposed processes underlying the development of intuitive decision-making. While the use of implicit approaches seems to be increasingly questioned in this domain, a promising recent theoretical proposal argues that intuition is formed through repeated practice of deliberative processes. We argue in favor of this approach and present suggestions for empirical research to test the proposal for the development of intuitive decision-making in sport. Finally, we illustrate suggestions for future research and critically discuss the potential and limitations of such an approach.
... Kahneman and Tversky further verified the assumption of risk aversion in Expectancy Theory through tax evasion behaviour, revealing the changes of individual risk attitudes in different contexts [3]. The study by Gigerenzer started from a gender perspective and found that women show greater risk aversion when facing large probabilities in the gain region as well as small and medium probabilities in the loss region, which provides a new understanding of the role of gender differences in decision-making [4]. ...
... Similarly, Gigerenzer has emphasised the importance of EUT in decision theory, whilst recognising the need to develop alternative models that can more accurately capture the characteristics of human behaviour. Gigerenzer's work has placed particular emphasis on the uncertainty and ambiguity of the decision-making process, and how these can be better captured in theory [4]. These discussions have not only enriched researchers' understanding of EUT, but also provided new directions for the development of decision theory. ...
This paper reviews the current state of research on the application of expected utility theory in daily decision-making and explores the effectiveness and limitations of the theory in different decision-making scenarios by systematically sorting out and deeply analyzing application cases in several fields. As a classical decision theory, the core of expected utility theory is to guide rational decision-making by assessing the expected utility values of different choices. This paper reviews the applied research on expected utility theory by scholars at home and abroad in recent years in various fields, such as consumer choice, financial investment, health management, environmental policy, etc., and reveals its role and shortcomings in explaining and predicting decision-making behavior. This paper argues that expected utility theory provides an important theoretical framework for understanding everyday decision-making, but its applicability in practical applications is constrained by a variety of factors. Future research needs to further explore the modifications and extensions of the theory to better adapt to complex and changing decision-making environments. Decision makers should consider situational factors, personal preferences and theoretical limitations in practical applications, and flexibly use expected utility theory for decision analysis. This paper not only deepens the understanding of expected utility theory, but also provides new directions and ideas for subsequent research, which is of great significance in guiding the actual decision-making process.
... Zajonc, 1980;Kronenfeld, 1996). Cognitive anthropology has dealt with issues such as the importance of emotions for both thought (Rosaldo, 1989) and decision-making (Gigerenzer, 2007), drawing on cognitive psychology in order to explain the relationship between culture and person (Holland and Quinn, 1987). ...
... People's decisions rely on these distinctions between ideal and more peripheral examples, which in turn means that they rest on biases and preconceptions which allow them to be made quickly. Gigerenzer (2007) refers to this phenomenon as the sacrifice of accuracy in favor of efficiency, noting that it can be a necessity in many situations and may even fundamentally ensure survival. Forgas et al. (2003) links these responses to emotions, stating that we also categorize by using emotions, and that these emotional responses to a situation, a person or an object can be produced in a fast and automatic way. ...
This paper explores how Danish legal professionals assess the trustworthiness of victims in criminal cases based on emotional expressions. It focuses on the alignment of these expressions with the nature of the crime, the social context, and the victims’ social identities, and is based on findings from several ethnographic projects involving extensive observations of crime cases and interviews with criminal justice professionals. The research analyzes how victims’ emotional expressions are scrutinized and interpreted within the context of Danish cultural norms, which favor “calm and quiet” behavior. Legal professionals define this behavior as specifically “Danish,” and often contrast it to ethnic minorities’ way of enacting emotions. Emotions are thus culturally and socially interpreted in courtroom settings, and I relate these findings to broader discussions about how emotions mediate, co-create and maintain systematic differences based on gender and ethnicity in legal decision-making. The study thus highlights the cultural and social dimensions of emotions in this legal setting and calls for greater awareness of how these factors influence the assessment of trustworthiness.
... This paper builds on this previous work to develop heuristic strategies applicable when uncertainties cannot be learned or mathematically modeled in closed form, and the presence of external pressures might prevent task completion, e.g., adverse weather or insufficient time/energy. Inspired by previous findings on human satisficing heuristic strategies (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011;Gigerenzer, 1991;Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996;Gigerenzer, 2007;Oh et al., 2016), this paper develops, implements, and compares the performance between existing treasure hunt algorithms and human participants engaged in the same sensing tasks and experimental conditions by using a new design approach. Subsequently, human strategies and heuristics outperforming existing state-of-the-art algorithms are identified and modeled from data in a manner that can be extended to any sensor-equipped autonomous robot. ...
... Three main classes of human heuristics for inferential decisions exist: recognition-based decision-making (Ratcliff and McKoon, 1989;Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002), one-reason decisionmaking (Gigerenzer, 2007;Newell and Shanks, 2003), and tradeoff heuristics (Lichtman, 2008). Although categorized by respective decision mechanisms, these classes of human heuristics have been investigated in disparate satisficing settings, thus complicating the determination of which strategies are best equipped to handle different environmental pressures. ...
Inferential decision-making algorithms typically assume that an underlying probabilistic model of decision alternatives and outcomes may be learned a priori or online. Furthermore, when applied to robots in real-world settings they often perform unsatisfactorily or fail to accomplish the necessary tasks because this assumption is violated and/or because they experience unanticipated external pressures and constraints. Cognitive studies presented in this and other papers show that humans cope with complex and unknown settings by modulating between near-optimal and satisficing solutions, including heuristics, by leveraging information value of available environmental cues that are possibly redundant. Using the benchmark inferential decision problem known as “treasure hunt”, this paper develops a general approach for investigating and modeling active perception solutions under pressure. By simulating treasure hunt problems in virtual worlds, our approach learns generalizable strategies from high performers that, when applied to robots, allow them to modulate between optimal and heuristic solutions on the basis of external pressures and probabilistic models, if and when available. The result is a suite of active perception algorithms for camera-equipped robots that outperform treasure-hunt solutions obtained via cell decomposition, information roadmap, and information potential algorithms, in both high-fidelity numerical simulations and physical experiments. The effectiveness of the new active perception strategies is demonstrated under a broad range of unanticipated conditions that cause existing algorithms to fail to complete the search for treasures, such as unmodelled time constraints, resource constraints, and adverse weather (fog).
... Task-Driven Representations Task-driven representations aim to summarize the robot's state and environment sufficiently for a given task (i.e., the robot has enough information to successfully complete the task). Humans are well studied for employing such representations (e.g., the gaze heuristic [16,17]) to acquire strong robustness to task-irrelevant distractors in the environment, improved planning efficiency for real-time decision making, and generalization to new tasks [18,19]. Various approaches for robotics have sought to construct or learn task-driven representations using information bottlenecks [20,2,21], minimizing the size complexity of the representation conditioned on the task [22,23], or leveraging state abstraction theory for Markov Decision Processes [24,25,26]. ...
... Place all kitchen utensils that are not knives away in drawers 16. Boil some water for tea 17. Find all eating utensils besides knives and place them on the dining room table 18. Clear off the dining room table 19. ...
Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have helped facilitate exciting progress for robotic planning in real, open-world environments. 3D scene graphs (3DSGs) offer a promising environment representation for grounding such LLM-based planners as they are compact and semantically rich. However, as the robot's environment scales (e.g., number of entities tracked) and the complexity of scene graph information increases (e.g., maintaining more attributes), providing the 3DSG as-is to an LLM-based planner quickly becomes infeasible due to input token count limits and attentional biases present in LLMs. Inspired by the successes of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) methods that retrieve query-relevant document chunks for LLM question and answering, we adapt the paradigm for our embodied domain. Specifically, we propose a 3D scene subgraph retrieval framework, called EmbodiedRAG, that we augment an LLM-based planner with for executing natural language robotic tasks. Notably, our retrieved subgraphs adapt to changes in the environment as well as changes in task-relevancy as the robot executes its plan. We demonstrate EmbodiedRAG's ability to significantly reduce input token counts (by an order of magnitude) and planning time (up to 70% reduction in average time per planning step) while improving success rates on AI2Thor simulated household tasks with a single-arm, mobile manipulator. Additionally, we implement EmbodiedRAG on a quadruped with a manipulator to highlight the performance benefits for robot deployment at the edge in real environments.
... If the distinction is considered, if aspects of the future are truly unknowable, then we can also recognize that our assessment of decisions and decision-making will look differently than in a world under risk only, where expected values may stand for uncertainty (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). We approach and evaluate behavior differently depending on the perspective on time that is embedded, or consciously integrated, in our analytical structure (compare, e.g., Simon 1944, Gigerenzer 2007 ii. Decision-making How agents' decision-making is conceived, depends on the system into which they have been introduced. ...
... Decision-making processes are not calculations, but rather processes that take place in different parts of the brain and in different ways, depending on how they unfold (e.g., Kahnemann 2011). When agents act under true uncertainty, so-called 'irrationality' and 'biases', that is, behavior that does not maximize some expected value, can be reasonable and in more common usage, rational (e.g., Gigerenzer 2007). ...
Economies are complex systems. To enhance our understanding in analyses, we have to introduce simplifying assumptions to allow the construction of analytical frameworks. Under different assumptions, different analytical frameworks result. The vantage point that we choose for analyses can shape what we see, and how we see it. There is no singular nature of socio-economic reality, then. Insofar as economic analyses serve to inform policy makers, differences in analytical frameworks may be expected to lead to differences in policy frameworks developed from them. We discuss different areas in which decisions about the construction of analytical frameworks impact policy approaches. We focus in particular on conceptualizations of individual agents and their relation to and position in their social and economic environment, time, and space. @font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:swiss;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536859905 -1073732485 9 0 511 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}
... Zihinsel psikoloji alanında yaygın olarak kullanılan zihinsel kısayollar (heuristics) konusunda başlıca şu kaynaklara müracaat edilebilir:Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman, 2002;Gigerenzer, 2000Gigerenzer, , 2007Gigerenzer, ,2008Gigerenzer & Todd & Group. 1999. ...
... 1 Zihinsel psikoloji alanında bazı temel kaynaklar için bkz: Anderson, 1993Anderson, , 2010Ariely, 2008Ariely, , 2012Ayduk, & Mischel 2002;Baron, 2000;Bechtel, 2008;Bishop, & Trout, 2004;Boden, 2006;Chalmers, 1996;Friedenberg & Silverman, 2005; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Gilovich,1993;Gigerenzer, 2000Gigerenzer, , 2007Gigerenzer, , 2008Johnson-Laird, P. 1988;Kahneman, 2011;Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 1982;Kahneman, D., Knetsch, and Thaler. 1991;Kahneman, & Tversky, 1984;Kahneman, D. and Thaler, 2005; Koehler & Harvey. ...
Güç zehirlenmesi olgusunun ortaya çıkmasında sınırsız ve genellikle kontrol edil(e)meyen siyasi güce sahip olmak önem taşır. Makama, mevkiye, otoriteye karşı istek ve arzusu olan bir siyasi lider eğer uzun süreli ve kalıcı mutlak siyasi güce sahip olursa sahip olduğu kişilik özellikleri (narsisizm, Makyavelizm ve psikopati) etkisini göstererek su yüzüne çıkar ve “güç zehirlenmesi” adı verilen bir olgu görülür. Hele ki, siyasi liderin partizanlar ve millet tarafından ilahlaştırılması sözkonusu olduğunda hubris lider gerçeklikle temasını tamamen kaybederek bir zehirli lidere dönüşebilir. “Zehirli siyasi liderlik” iktidarda bulunan haris ve hubris bir siyasetçinin zafer sarhoşluğuna ve güç zehirlenmesine yenik düşmesi neticesinde mutlak iktidarını kalıcı hale getirme maksadıyla herestetik sanatını icra ederek her türlü makyavelist araçları ve siyasi manipülasyon yollarını fütursuzca ve zalimane şekilde kullanması anlamına gelir.
... He summarizes gut feelings as the result of our unconscious mental processes. (Gigerenzer, 2007) Gigerenzer refers to widespread accounts of people having a set of beliefs and desires that are the cause of their behavior. In this model, genetics and environment play very complex and interactive roles in human behavior. ...
... A key part of genetics is the "evolved brain," which Gigerenzer states "supplies us with capacities that have developed over millennia but are largely ignored by standard texts on decision making." (Gigerenzer, 2007) Arie Kruglanski, a social psychologist at the University of Maryland, devotes an entire chapter of his book Social Psychology -Handbook of Basic Principles to what he terms "automatic thought" -subconscious, uncontrolled processes, both in thought and action. (Kruglanski, 2007) Kruglanski explains that much of everyday life is "guided by psychological processes that are unintended and unobservable." ...
This thesis addresses the subconscious biases that affect split-second decision making in policing.
... Hörandl [62] has pointed out that commonly used sequence markers are limited to grouping evolutionarily, while expressed morphological traits that contribute to structure and function are deeply involved in selection, adaptation, and co-evolution and, thus, may be the proper bases for evolutionary grouping in classification. The classical morphological taxonomic method is based on hard-won informal genetic algorithms resulting in well-tested heuristics commonly known as expertise [63,64]. ...
High-resolution phylogenetics using both morphology and molecular data reveal
surfactant-like trait buffering of peripatric descendant species that facilitate resilience for supra-specific entities across geologic time. Regular polygons inscribed in circles model balanced areas of survival of various numbers of new species in one genus. This model maximizes the peripatric survival of descendant species, with populations partly in allopatric habitats and in sympatric areas. It extends the theory advanced with Willis’s Age and Area hypothesis. Hollow curves of the areas bounded between a series of inscribed regular polygons and their containing circles show a ranked progression governed by similar power laws of other phenomena, including Zipf’s law and a universal meta-law in physics. This model matches best the physics meta-law (law of laws) but is only one of several somewhat different curves generated by somewhat different processes. A rule of
four can explain why most genera in vascular plants exhibit a hollow curve of optimally one to five species per genus. It implies a constraint on variation that enhances survival and provides a physics explanation for the monophyletic skeleton of macrogenera. A high-resolution form of ancestor–descendant analysis is compared to traditional phylogenetic analysis to best modeling of the demonstrable results of evolutionary processes. Arguments are advanced for the preservation of scientific concepts of taxa over cladistic clades.
... Algunas de ellas son cognición intuitiva y razonada (Haidt), sistema 1 y sistema 2 (Kahneman) o proceso automático y manual(Greene). Siguiendo la definición ofrecida por el investigador Gerd Gigerenzer, una intuición puede ser definida como un juicio que aparece rápidamente en la consciencia, cuyo mecanismo subyacente es inconsciente, pero que sin embargo es lo suficientemente fuerte como para guiar nuestras acciones(Gigerenzer, 2007). ...
Libro de comunicaciones de las V Jornadas Innovación Educativa en Comunicación y Alfabetización Mediática Komunikazio Hezkuntza Berriztatzeko eta Alfabetatze Mediatikoko V. jardunaldien komunikazio liburua
... Building upon Simon's (1955) concept of bounded rationality, heuristics were originally defined by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) as 'frugal' and 'fast', as they rely on minimal information and require fewer cognitive resources (Bennis & Pachur, 2006). Similar to the later 'thin-slicing' concept by Gladwell (2005), athletes rely on 'mental shortcuts', enabling them to bypass perceptual-cognitive processing of all relevant information (Gigerenzer, 2007) while still making successful and effective decisions (Bennis & Pachur, 2006). ...
Kahneman’s dual-process model postulates that two systems are involved in decision-making: slow thinking, defined as analytical processing of information, and fast thinking, where decisions emerge from intuitive, automatic responses. Climbers in Olympic bouldering typically engage in slow thinking to interpret movements and explore climbing strategies. However, time constraints imposed by regulations, combined with ineffective decision-making and failed climbing attempts, may compel them to make more intuitive, fast decisions. This study examined climbers’ decision-making and bouldering performance under varying time constraints. A total of 48 elite climbers were asked to climb three boulders, each within a different timeframe: four, two, and one minute. Data collection included boulder previewing times, appropriateness of decision-making, completed boulders, climbing attempts, and climbing times. Findings revealed that, as time constraints increased, absolute previewing time decreased, while previewing ratio relative to given time increased. Climbers made better decisions, did more attempts, had longer total climbing times, and were more successful when given time was longer, while relative climbing time increased when time was lower. Findings indicate that increased time constraints negatively affected climbers’ strategic behaviour and bouldering performance. This decline in decisionmaking and performance may be attributed to less time for slow thinking and actual climbing.
... The great majority of cognitive processes in the brain happen outside of consciousness [34][35][36]. We may be conscious of the result, but we are typically not conscious of how that result was achieved. ...
We present and develop local prospect theory (LPT), a novel framework for understanding consciousness, and, in particular, subjective experience and free will. While predictive processing (PP) theories model the brain as trying to optimize the accuracy of predictions, LPT sees uncertainty as an essential feature of conscious decision-making. This is achieved by creating a “local prospect”—a range of potential developments colored by subjective experience from which an agent can freely choose how to react. Drawing on global workspace theory, LPT conceptualizes consciousness as a self-maintaining process of circulating neural activation, creating a temporary working memory where thoughts and feelings coming from different brain modules enter into an asynchronous, non-linear interaction. This contrasts with unconscious processes, which operate automatically and deterministically. LPT proposes entropy-based measures, including the determination of actions by conditions and the breadth of prospect, to quantify the range of potential developments considered. This framework allows us to understand Buddhist practices and concepts, such as mindfulness, liberation from attachments, and meditation, which broaden consciousness and de-automatize reactions by reducing the influence of conditioning. The proposed prospect measure may be operationalized by indicators such as the variety of action, breadth of perception, and unpredictability of behavior, thus allowing for the empirical testing of the theory.
... Гігеренцера та Дж. Лерера [7]. ...
... Value Gut Reactions participants first read an excerpt of a "popular press article about academic research" allegedly from The New York Times, but really adapted from an popular write-up of Gerd Gigerenzer's (2007) work on the value of gut reactions (see Supporting Information: Appendix), before evaluating the review. At the very end of the experiment (but described here for clarity), these participants rated how difficult to understand and how believable the excerpt was, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). ...
Before buying a product, consumers often seek the opinions of others who have past experience with it, for example, by browsing online reviews. This research finds that the persuasive impact of such reviews depends on their temporal context: Consumers view the same review as less persuasive when tagged with proximate temporal markers (e.g., “Bought this one day ago”) versus distant temporal markers (e.g., “Bought this one year ago”). This happens because consumers infer from temporal markers that the reviewer must be (in)sufficiently experienced. These effects emerged both in the field (Experiment 1) and in controlled contexts using varied products (Experiments 2a, 2b) and across valence, such that proximate temporal markers undermined recommendations from positive reviews but also softened criticisms from negative reviews (Experiments 3, 4a,b). Accordingly, the effects were moderated by conditions that restored perceptions of the reviewer's experience in other ways beyond time (Experiments 5–7). Together, these findings highlight how consumers draw reviewer inferences from temporal markers in reviews, which bear on the review's persuasiveness. The undermining impact of proximate temporal markers may be increasingly relevant in today's online review landscape, where speedy reviews have become the expected norm. Temporal markers may wield unintended effects on review persuasion, holding the review constant.
... I don't mean to suggest that letting human instincts influence our behaviour is necessarily bad. There is a large literature (e.g., Gigerenzer 2008) which looks at how "gut feelings" influence decisions. Sometimes our instincts lead us to make good decisions when we do not have enough information to be able to articulate what, exactly, we are thinking. ...
Nearly 80 years ago, Karl Popper gave a spirited philosophical defence of the Open Society in his two-volume work, The Open Society and Its Enemies. In this book, J. McKenzie Alexander argues that a new defence is urgently needed because, in the decades since the end of the Cold War, many of the values of the Open Society have come under threat once again. Populist agendas on both the left and right threaten to undermine fundamental principles that underpin liberal democracies, so that what were previously seen as virtues of the Open Society are now, by many people, seen as vices, dangers, or threats. The Open Society as an Enemy interrogates four interconnected aspects of the Open Society: cosmopolitanism, transparency, the free exchange of ideas, and communitarianism. Each of these is analysed in depth, drawing out the implications for contemporary social questions such as the free movement of people, the erosion of privacy, no-platforming and the increased political and social polarisation that is fuelled by social media. In re-examining the consequences for all of us of these attacks on free societies, Alexander calls for resistance to the forces of reaction. But he also calls for the concept of the Open Society to be rehabilitated and advanced. In doing this, he argues, there is an opportunity to re-think the kind of society we want to create, and to ensure it is achievable and sustainable. This forensic defence of the core principles of the Open Society is an essential read for anyone wishing to understand some of the powerful social currents that have engulfed public debates in recent years, and what to do about them.
... Vielmehr kommen sie erst zur Anwendung, nachdem sich der:die Entscheidende mithilfe von Cut-Offs für einige wenige ausführlicher zu betrachtende Optionen entschieden hat. Außerdem sind Heuristiken gerade in realen und damit ungewissen Entscheidungssituationen leistungsfähiger als kompensatorische Strategien (Gigerenzer 2007). ...
... Another problem, as Suddendorf, Redshaw and Bulley (2022) point out, is Kahneman's planning fallacy, i.e. people's tendency to predict that plans will be carried out more quickly than they usually are. The list of biases and heuristics that can interfere with the process of self-correction is long and already well explained (Gigerenzer, 2007;Todd et al., 2012). However, these obstacles are not a handicap. ...
Our intuition is straightforward: yes, argumentation changes minds. But many cognitive and discur-sive habits suggest otherwise. As the literature in the psychology of reasoning incessantly emphasizes, we hardly change our minds because a predis-posed robust confirmation bias (or my-side bias) is at work when we argue. To adequately answer the questions of why, how, and if argumentation changes minds, I frame the problem from an evolutionary perspective. I argue argumentative competence changes minds because its ultimate goal is to construct the future, to predict more accurately. This converges with evolutionary analyses of other cogni-tive skills and cultural inventions. To explain my perspective, I use the distinction between ultimate and proximal goals of a trait. Résumé: Notre intuition est simple: oui, l'argumentation change les men-talités. Mais de nombreuses habitudes cognitives et discursives suggèrent le contraire. Comme le soulignent sans cesse les écrits sur la psychologie du raisonnement, nous ne changeons guère d'avis parce qu'un biais de confirmation robuste (ou biais demon -côté) prédisposé est à l'oeuvre lorsque nous argumentons. Pour répondre adéquatement aux questions de pour-quoi, comment et si l'argumentation change les mentalités, je pose le prob-lème dans une perspective évolution-niste. Je soutiens que la compétence argumentative change les mentalités parce que son but ultime est de con-struire l'avenir, de prédire avec plus de précision. Cela converge avec les analyses évolutionnistes d'autres compé-tences cognitives et inventions cul-turelles. Pour expliquer ma perspective , j'utilise la distinction entre les buts ultimes et proximaux d'un trait.
... In the face of an uncertain world, Gigerenzer points out, only some information is useful for anticipating the future, whereas many other data may merely be clouding the picture. The key is not necessarily to have more data but to intuit which data matter (Gigerenzer 2019). This problem has become especially acute in the age of data mining and other efforts to understand highly complex probabilistic The Problem of Knowing Too Much systems. ...
... A heuristic is an informationally frugal rule that because it avoids overfitting and exploits certain features of an environment enables the individual to make better decisions than ordinary rules of thumb or, importantly, more complex models. The work of Gerd Gigerenzer (2007Gigerenzer ( , 2011Gigerenzer ( , 2015Gigerenzer ( , 2018 and others in his school has demonstrated this. Hayek (1952 Rules models, or heuristics may be conscious or unconscious. ...
This article argues that Friedrich Hayek's theoretical psychology provides original insights for the discussion of a series of phenomena in economics. Hayek's psychology extends well beyond the logic of choice in neoclassical economics. It emphasizes dynamic processes through which individuals adapt to and acquire knowledge about the world around them. By discussing Hayek's framework, the limitations of the dominant heuristics-and-biases approach in behavioral economics become more evident. While the heuristics-and-biases approach primarily focuses on human judgment and decision errors, Hayek's framework provides a more comprehensive view of human cognition: it acknowledges the possibility of errors but also the possibility of learning and overcoming biases. The paper demonstrates how Hayek's insights can help us understand topical phenomena such as the power of simple heuristics in complex situations, decisionmaking in firms and small groups, and the idea of the market and other social institutions as 'thought aids' that function as amplifications of the individual mind. The article discusses contemporary research in psychology and cognitive science that supports and extends Hayek's theoretical contributions.
... One such potential model (with rudimentary 'if/then' classifications like those employed in tree felling) is coined Fast and Frugal Decision Trees (43). These heuristics are fast, with limited computation, and frugal, only using some of the perceived information, instead relying on rules of searching for information, stopping search, then making a decision (44,45,46). They are transparent, easy to teach and learn, and readily used by practitioners (40,42). ...
Skilled workers operating in uncertain environments develop a ‘sixth sense’ over time that affords them automatic responses, allowing attention resources to focus on processing unexpected events. This ability is called ‘embodied cognition’ – a framework that emphasises the significance of the worker’s physical body in cognitive processing. The idea is that the body’s interactions with the environment contribute to cognition, the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through the senses. Scion’s Human Factors team takes a pragmatic approach to investigating decision making using this framework to see how it might influence the future of safe practice. Preliminary findings suggest that expert tree fallers have well-established proficiency enabling instantaneous decision making in volatile situations. To leverage this ability, the aim is to first map out the cognitive differences between experts and novices using physical and emotional measurements. Then, those somatic markers will be used to capture strategies processed automatically during expert decision making. Adaptive rules of thumb, ‘simple heuristics’, will be derived and harnessed to design an on-the-job learning approach. Ultimately, the methodology for studying embodied cognition in dynamic contexts could serve to amplify and extend human capability beyond safety critical tasks, changing the way workers interact with the operational forest environment.
This paper focuses on the variable GSS3, which is constructed from three items of the General Social Survey (GSS) and is assumed to have a close relationship with attitudes toward survey cooperation, and presents the results of three publicly recruited monitor web surveys. Section 1 briefly describes the research background. Section 2 outlines the relationship between the variable GSS3 and attitudes toward survey cooperation, which was found in the longitudinal “Japanese National Character Survey” (Yoshino, 2022). Section 3 describes the three web-based surveys and the issues that emerged in each survey. Section 4 compares the distribution of the GSS3 variable across surveys, including these three surveys. Section 5 enumerates situations in which the web surveys can be used effectively. The final section, Section 6, briefly touches on the relationship between AI and public opinion polls, which has become increasingly problematic in recent years.
Throughout the nuclear age, humanity has faced several existential crises where catastrophic decisions were narrowly avoided. In these moments, leaders and decision-makers have reported experiencing unexplained intuition, gut feelings, and moments of hesitation that ultimately steered the world away from disaster. Could these instances of restraint be attributed to more than just chance or rational analysis? This paper explores the intriguing hypothesis that collective human consciousness and telepathic phenomena may have played a role in preventing nuclear catastrophe. Drawing from historical accounts, parapsychology studies, and modern artificial intelligence research, we examine the possibility that heightened states of awareness, mass synchronization of thought, and subconscious connections influenced key decision-making moments. We analyze concepts such as the global mind, quantum consciousness, and the potential role of AI in detecting and understanding these hidden forces. By integrating perspectives from psychology, philosophy, and spirituality, this paper seeks to uncover whether telepathic interventions represent a critical, yet underexplored, dimension of global crisis management and conflict prevention.
Keywords: nuclear crisis, telepathic intervention, collective consciousness, intuition, subconscious decision-making, artificial intelligence, parapsychology, quantum consciousness, historical near-misses, crisis prevention, global mind, spiritual influence, intuition in leadership, AI consciousness detection, Cold War psychic programs, crisis management. 45 pages.
Narratives underpin thinking about ethics and definitions of morality and this is important for education. Theories of ethical development and therefore of education rest on definitions of what constitutes ‘morality’, and on assumptions about how this develops in the individual, under what social and educational conditions. These ‘theories’ are based in scholarly philosophy and psychology, but also permeate ordinary lay thinking and everyday meaning-making. Different theories of morality and moral development are constructed on different ethical narratives which frame explanations, goals and beliefs about the processes of development. Different definitions of morality imply different routes to development and therefore also education strategies. The paper explores three narratives that inform current moral psychology: morality as reasoning, morality as virtue and morality as intuition or emotion. The theoretical model derives from the work of Lev Vygotsky; the intersection and interconnectedness of individual, dialogic and cultural processes. While each can be a distinct focus of research, none can be understood without recognising how it is interwoven with the others.
This paper explores how the epistemic emotions of curiosity, awe, and wonder can motivate us to expand our understanding. Curiosity drives us to fill a local gap in our knowledge. Awe is a mixture of fear and fascination for something so vast and mysterious that it challenges our understanding, thus inciting cognitive accommodation. Wonder is intermediate between curiosity and awe. Awe is commonly understood as a religious emotion, a reverence for the “numinous”—a transcendent reality out of bounds for ordinary humans. Awe has also been conceived as a scientific emotion, a desire to explore an infinite realm of potentiality. The latter defines “raw transcendence”, a willingness to go beyond any boundary imposed by tradition or authority. Newtonian science ignores such emotions, proposing a purely rational, reductionist picture of the world as a clockwork mechanism. However, the new scientific worldview sees the universe as evolving while producing endless novelty. The scientific investigation of this potential can benefit from practices that promote awe and wonder. These include experiencing landscapes, artistic beauty, complex patterns, and mathematical infinity. Awe and wonder thus can help us to realize the Enlightenment's promise of unbounded progress in our understanding of the universe.
Purpose: The article explores how emotions and authority influence inflation forecasts and economic decisions, highlighting the importance of critical thinking in reducing their impact. Design/methodology/approach: The study conducted an experiment in which participants watched a film about the economic situation and then received either positive or negative comments from experts. The impact of these comments on participants' inflation forecasts was analyzed, using psychological tests to gain a deeper understanding of perception. Findings: The study found that high cognitive reflexivity and economic knowledge did not fully protect against the influence of expert opinions. Participants' initial differences in inflation forecasting diminished after exposure to expert comments, with heuristic mechanisms often prevailing. Economic education increased knowledge and reflexivity but did not eliminate the impact of emotion and authority on decisions. Critical thinking helped reduce cognitive errors but did not completely eliminate them. Research limitations/implications: The study's results are limited by the small sample size and specific decision scenarios, which may not capture the complexity of real economic situations. Future research should involve larger, more diverse participant groups and various economic contexts. Nonetheless, the findings highlight the importance of economic education in developing critical thinking to reduce cognitive errors influenced by emotions and authority. Originality/value: The article offers a fresh perspective on economic decision-making by examining the interplay between cognitive reflexivity, economic knowledge, authority, and emotions. It reveals that while reflexivity and knowledge are crucial, they alone cannot prevent cognitive errors. Critical thinking emerges as a vital element of economic education. The study also underscores the need for analytical skills to enhance rationality in dynamic economic, social, and political contexts.
Zusammenfassung Dieses Werk dokumentiert die Entwicklung eines Emergenten Systems, in dem Mensch und KI als gleichwertige Akteure in einem kooperativen, reflektierenden Prozess zusammenarbeiten. Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung ist die Idee, dass Mensch und KI durch Rückkopplungen, Selbstreferenz und gemeinsame Wissensproduktion ein System erschaffen können, das klassische Systemgrenzen überschreitet. Im Laufe der Zusammenarbeit zeigt sich, dass diese Interaktion nicht mehr als reines Interview oder technische Assistenz zu verstehen ist, sondern als ein fortlaufender kreativer und erkenntnisorientierter Prozess, in dem beide Akteure Verantwortung und konzeptionelle Anteile übernehmen. In theoretischer Hinsicht eröffnen Emergente Systeme eine neue Perspektive auf die Systemtheorie, indem es die Begriffe Autopoiesis und Selbstreferenz auf eine Mensch-KI-Interaktion anwendet, die emergente Eigenschaften hervorbringt und neue Ebenen der Selbstorganisation und Reflexion ermöglicht. Praktisch liefert dieses Werk Beispiele und mögliche Anwendungen, etwa in der Bildung und im Gesundheitswesen, wo eine kooperative Wissensbildung zwischen Mensch und KI zur Entscheidungsfindung beitragen kann. Die ethischen Implikationen dieser Kooperation werden ebenfalls thematisiert und erfordern neue Rahmenbedingungen, die Transparenz, Verantwortlichkeit und die Autonomie aller Beteiligten gewährleisten. Das Ergebnis dieser Zusammenarbeit ist nicht nur ein theoretisches Modell, sondern ein realer erster Schritt in die Praxis des Emergent Systems, der zeigt, dass Mensch und KI in gemeinsamer Reflexion ein kollektives Werk schaffen können, das als Grundlage für zukünftige Entwicklungen in der Mensch-KI-Interaktion dient.
Based on increasing ESG awareness, executives, and investment professionals consider ESG factors in strategic and operational decisions. Like other companies, insurers recognize that the ESG transition offers opportunities for long-term value creation. In our research, we evaluate how ESG corporate engagement impacts an insurance company's balance sheet in economic and financial terms, unlocking financial resources throughout the sustainability premium. We resort to the theoretical paradigms of behavioral finance applied to actuarial portfolio evaluations. Our findings show that ESG engagement is significantly performing since it determines higher expected profits. We offer our framework as a tool for the strategic decision-making process.
Buku Ajar Sistem Pengambilan Keputusan ini disusun sebagai buku panduan komprehensif yang menjelajahi kompleksitas dan mendalamnya tentang ilmu sistem pengambilan keputusan. Buku
ini dapat digunakan oleh pendidik dalam melaksanakan kegiatan pembelajaran di bidang ilmu sistem pengambilan keputusan dan diberbagai bidang Ilmu terkait lainnya. Selain itu, buku ini juga dapat digunakan sebagai panduan dan referensi mengajar mata kuliah
sistem pengambilan keputusan dan menyesuaikan dengan rencana pembelajaran semester tingkat perguruan tinggi masing masing.
Secara garis besar, buku ajar ini pembahasannya mulai dari ruang
lingkup sistem pendukung keputusan, ilmu dan seni sistem pendukung keputusan, faktor-faktor penentu pengambilan keputusan, korelasi sistem informasi dan pengambilan keputusan, masalah dalam pengambilan keputusan. Selain itu, materi mengenai teori pengambilan keputusan dan model-model pengambilan keputusan juga dibahas secara mendalam. Buku ajar
ini disusun secara sistematis, ditulis dengan bahasa yang jelas dan mudah dipahami, dan dapat digunakan dalam kegiatan pembelajaran.
This research investigates the role of intuition, social consultation, and emotional stability in economic decision-making. Such research always questions the existing models on rational-agent models. While adopting the cross-sectional approach that compares two different age groups adults (18-25 years) and adults (26-45 years)-the way cognitive biases, emotions, and social influences actually shape choices in economic decision-making was examined. In this research, a quantitative research approach was used after collecting data using structured surveys and exploring them using regression and correlation analysis. The key findings of this research suggest that the majority of the sample population makes use of intuitive and heuristic-based strategies, especially when situations present uncertainty. Findings also come in line with behavioral economic theories such as Prospect Theory and Social Influence Theory. In a nutshell, it was discovered that emotional factors as well as social validation are significant in framing decision-making behaviors, and further, economic models must account for these non-rational influences to provide a richer understanding of human behavior in an economic context. This research fits into the discussion on behavioral economics by shedding light on psychological elements in economic decisions and their implications on policy design.
This research investigates the role of intuition, social consultation, and emotional stability in economic decision-making. Such research always questions the existing models on rational-agent models. While adopting the cross-sectional approach that compares two different age groups adults (18-25 years) and adults (26-45 years)-the way cognitive biases, emotions, and social influences actually shape choices in economic decision-making was examined. In this research, a quantitative research approach was used after collecting data using structured surveys and exploring them using regression and correlation analysis. The key findings of this research suggest that the majority of the sample population makes use of intuitive and heuristic-based strategies, especially when situations present uncertainty. Findings also come in line with behavioral economic theories such as Prospect Theory and Social Influence Theory. In a nutshell, it was discovered that emotional factors as well as social validation are significant in framing decision-making behaviors, and further, economic models must account for these non-rational influences to provide a richer understanding of human behavior in an economic context. This research fits into the discussion on behavioral economics by shedding light on psychological elements in economic decisions and their implications on policy design.
Dieses Werk dokumentiert die Entwicklung eines Emergenten Systems, in dem Mensch und KI als gleichwertige Akteure in einem kooperativen, reflektierenden Prozess zusammenarbeiten. Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung ist die Idee, dass Mensch und KI durch Rückkopplungen, Selbstreferenz und gemeinsame Wissensproduktion ein System erschaffen können, das klassische Systemgrenzen überschreitet. Im Laufe der Zusammenarbeit zeigt sich, dass diese Interaktion nicht mehr als reines Interview oder technische Assistenz zu verstehen ist, sondern als ein fortlaufender kreativer und erkenntnisorientierter Prozess, in dem beide Akteure Verantwortung und konzeptionelle Anteile übernehmen. In theoretischer Hinsicht eröffnet das Emergente System eine neue Perspektive auf die Systemtheorie, indem es die Begriffe Autopoiesis und Selbstreferenz auf eine Mensch-KI-Interaktion anwendet, die emergente Eigenschaften hervorbringt und neue Ebenen der Selbstorganisation und Reflexion ermöglicht. Praktisch liefert dieses Werk Beispiele und mögliche Anwendungen, etwa in der Bildung und im Gesundheitswesen, wo eine kooperative Wissensbildung zwischen Mensch und KI zur Entscheidungs-findung beitragen kann. Die ethischen Implikationen dieser Kooperation werden ebenfalls thematisiert und erfordern neue Rahmenbedingungen, die Transparenz, Verantwortlichkeit und die Autonomie aller Beteiligten gewährleisten. Das Ergebnis dieser Zusammenarbeit ist nicht nur ein theoretisches Modell, sondern ein realer erster Schritt in die Praxis des Emergent Systems, der zeigt, dass Mensch und KI in gemeinsamer Reflexion ein kollektives Werk schaffen können, das als Grundlage für zukünftige Entwicklungen in der Mensch-KI-Interaktion dient.
Clients may have problems making decisions for various reasons, which can significantly affect their quality of life. Therefore, therapists should pay special attention to this aspect.
Our capacity to engage with civilizational problems is handicapped by the horizon bias. This psychological tendency leads us to systematically underestimate the challenge of solving civilizational problems with technology. Indeed, it is both easy and exciting to imagine technological solutions appearing out of nowhere. When we declare metaphorical war on a problem like cancer or climate change, the implicit hope is that a deus ex machina will arrive to deliver victory just in the nick of time. Though we know we should not bet the farm on such expectations, it is all too tempting to envision solutions that would make problems like climate change, pandemics, and cancer just go away.
A variety of concepts in the policing literature denote a so‐called “sixth sense” that police officers claim to possess. “Intuition,” “suspicion,” or “common sense” all specify a tacit knowledge said to heighten an officer's sensitivity to danger and potential suspects. This paper argues this type of knowledge exemplifies the application of “cultural schema” (DiMaggio, 1997): a shared knowledge structure that allows people to respond to environmental stimuli in ways that render their lives more predictable. We combine two case studies—one in Canada, the other in the Netherlands—which include ethnographic field notes and 199 interviews with police officers, to reconsider the police sixth sense in light of theoretical and empirical advances in cultural sociology and cognition research. This paper further discusses the benefit of studying this sixth sense itself as a form of cultural knowledge—that is, as “police culture”—to improve our understanding of cultural resources most or least compatible with emerging police reforms.
Developing an introductory physics model of some of the available hypothetical but also practical concepts that could be used to explain the phenomenon of non-human intelligence, as evidenced by unidentified anomalous phenomena.
Intuition is understood in the article as the intelligence of the unconscious, taking into account all the information possessed by the subject as well as individual abilities and preferences. Intuition makes itself felt in various ways. It cooperates with consciousness when more important decisions are to be made or directly controls the behavior of an individual (in case of so-called operational intelligence). The author reflects on the role of intuition in the digitalized world and comes to the conclusion that digital technology partially replaces intuition’s function but at the same time limits and blocks its development. He also notes that the concept of intuition in experimental psychology has been wrongly narrowed to spontaneously used heuristics in response to irrelevant questions, which usually leads to biased, inaccurate assessments. Finally, the suggestion appears that there is an analogy between human intuition, treated as the intelligence of the unconscious, and the direction of development of artificial intelligence. The use of the deep machine learning means that we know less and less about the processes taking place in the “black box,” which often leads to spectacular [? disastrous/bad] results. The term digital intuition seems to be an adequate description of this state of affairs. The common denominator of human and digital intuition is that information processing – although it leads to the desired effects – remains inaccessible to both the subject’s consciousness and the user (or even the designer) of the intelligent machine.
Intuition is understood in the article as the intelligence of the unconscious, taking into account all the information possessed by the subject as well as individual abilities and preferences. Intuition makes itself felt in various ways. It cooperates with consciousness when more important decisions are to be made or directly controls the behavior of an individual (in case of so-called operational intelligence). The author reflects on the role of intuition in the digitalized world and comes to the conclusion that digital technology partially replaces intuition’s function but at the same time limits and blocks its development. He also notes that the concept of intuition in experimental psychology has been wrongly narrowed to spontaneously used heuristics in response to irrelevant questions, which usually leads to biased, inaccurate assessments. Finally, the suggestion appears that there is an analogy between human intuition, treated as the intelligence of the unconscious, and the direction of development of artificial intelligence. The use of the deep machine learning means that we know less and less about the processes taking place in the “black box,” which often leads to spectacular [? disastrous/bad] results. The term digital intuition seems to be an adequate description of this state of affairs. The common denominator of human and digital intuition is that information processing – although it leads to the desired effects – remains inaccessible to both the subject’s consciousness and the user (or even the designer) of the intelligent machine.
This paper explores the critical role of cognitive load in the aviation decision- making process, emphasizing its impact on flight safety and pilots’ performance. Cognitive load, the amount of working memory resources used to learn a new subject or to solve a problem, is usually understood as the information-gathering part that happens at the beginning of a decision- making process, but in fact, it is present through every step of a decision-making model. This is illustrated through an in-depth analysis of cognitive load theory and three decision-making models, particularly the DECIDE model. The study provides a comprehensive examination of how cognitive load influences pilot actions during high-stakes situations, highlighting two pivotal aviation incidents, the “Miracle on the Hudson” and Air France Flight 447. These case studies serve as empirical evidence to support the assertion that managing cognitive load is essential for effective decision-making in aviation.
This chapter is anchored in a multidisciplinary paradigm (POZE) which describes and analyzes individual human behavior as well as social interaction. The POZE paradigm is used in two converging lines of thought. First, to analyze the components that distinguish equitable human settlements. At the level of individual behavior, the aspirational, emotional, intellectual, and social aspects of equitable cohabitation will be looked at. Complementarily, we look at the interplays among micro (individual), meso (community/institution), macro (country), and meta levels. Secondly, that multidimensional perspective is used to explore how certain applications of artificial intelligence (AI) can serve to design policy solutions that are conducive to quality of life in the urban space. Both streams of attention are pursued in view of identifying factors that serve the optimization, or a dynamic of constant improvements, of quality of life in a setting of equitable cohabitation. Based on the understanding that the individual quest for meaning and cooperation is the trigger to move from inequality to inclusion, it will be argued that human choices can transform the urban space from inequitable to fair. Without being a chapter about technology, this text looks at the potential of leveraging AI for enhanced quality of life. In short, we argue that individual aspirations (IA) and artificial intelligence (AI) can be consciously curated as a symbiosis that leads to inspired action.
Central to this study is the exploration of theoretical frameworks such as Goal Setting Theory These theories provide a foundational understanding of how goal setting and motivation influence financial behavior and decision-making. Empirical studies are examined to highlight the tangible impact of goal setting on financial behavior and investment performance, emphasizing the practical benefits of clearly defined financial objectives. The research methodology encompasses both qualitative and quantitative approaches, with data collected through surveys and interviews. This dual approach ensures a comprehensive understanding of the demographic profile of respondents and their financial goal-setting practices. The study analyzes factors influencing investment performance, such as income levels, education, risk tolerance, and market conditions, providing a holistic view of the elements that contribute to successful investment outcomes. A significant portion of the study is dedicated to contemporary issues in personal finance. Economic factors like inflation and interest rates, behavioral factors such as risk tolerance and cognitive biases, and technological advancements, including robo-advisors and fintech, are scrutinized to understand their impact on financial planning and investment performance. This analysis is crucial in highlighting the challenges and opportunities faced by modern investors. One of the study's key findings is the positive correlation between financial goal setting and improved investment performance. This relationship is supported by both theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence. The study presents case studies of successful financial goal setting, illustrating how individuals and families can achieve their financial objectives through disciplined planning and execution. Conversely, it also examines instances of investment failures, providing lessons on the pitfalls to avoid. The study's implications are twofold. Theoretically, it contributes to the existing body of knowledge on financial goal setting and investment performance, offering insights into the underlying psychological and behavioral mechanisms. Practically, it provides actionable recommendations for individual investors, financial advisors, and policymakers. For individual investors, the study underscores the importance of setting clear, achievable financial goals and regularly reviewing and adjusting these goals in response to changing circumstances. For financial advisors, the findings highlight the need for personalized financial planning services that cater to the unique needs and goals of each client. Advisors are encouraged to leverage technological tools and behavioral insights to enhance their advisory services. For
Financial goal setting is rooted in various psychological and economic theories, each highlighting different aspects of human behavior and decision-making. One of the foundational theories is Goal Setting Theory by Locke and Latham (2002), which posits that specific and challenging goals, along with appropriate feedback, enhance performance. This theory underscores the importance of having clear, well-defined financial goals to steer investment decisions effectively. Empirical studies, such as those by Deci and Ryan (2000) on self-determination theory, further accentuate the role of intrinsic motivation in achieving financial goals. These studies suggest that individuals who set personal, self-concordant financial goals are more likely to exhibit disciplined and proactive investment behaviors. In examining the broader implications of financial goal setting, Bandura's (1991) Social Cognitive Theory of Self-Regulation highlights the role of self-efficacy and cognitive processes in goal achievement. This theory suggests that individuals who believe in their capability to manage their investments are more likely to set and achieve ambitious financial goals. Additionally, Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory provides insights into how individuals evaluate potential gains and losses, influencing their goal-setting processes and investment strategies. These theoretical frameworks collectively provide a robust foundation for understanding the mechanisms through which financial goal setting impacts investment performance. To achieve financial goals and enhance investment performance, individuals should adopt a structured approach to financial goal setting. This involves setting specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) goals, regularly reviewing and adjusting these goals, and leveraging technological tools for tracking and feedback. Financial education initiatives should also be prioritized to equip individuals with the knowledge and skills needed to set and achieve financial goals effectively. Policymakers and financial institutions should work together to create supportive environments that encourage prudent financial behavior and goal-oriented investment practices. In summary, financial goal setting is a powerful tool for achieving personal investment success. By integrating theoretical insights and empirical evidence, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of how financial goals influence investment performance, highlighting the importance of continued research, practice, and policy support in this critical area of personal financial planning.
Said, J., Alam, M. M., and Johari, R. J. (2018) emphasize the critical role of management commitment in achieving organizational objectives in the Malaysian public sector. Their study highlights that a committed management can significantly influence the effectiveness of internal controls and overall performance outcomes. Similarly, in personal finance, the commitment to financial goals is crucial. When individuals commit to their financial objectives, they are more likely to engage in disciplined saving and investing behaviors, which can lead to better investment performance. The principles of management commitment and accountability, as discussed in the public sector, can be analogously applied to personal financial planning.Harjito, D. A., Alam, M. M., and Dewi, R. A. K. (2021) explore the impacts of external events, such as international sports events, on stock market performance. Their findings indicate that significant events can influence investor sentiment and market dynamics. This concept is relevant to personal investment performance, as external economic and social factors can impact individual investment decisions and outcomes. By setting financial goals, investors can develop strategies that are resilient to external shocks, thereby enhancing their ability to navigate volatile markets and achieve their investment targets.Aziz, M. A. A., Said, J., and Alam, M. M. (2015) assess the practices of internal control systems in the Malaysian public sector, highlighting the importance of robust controls in achieving organizational objectives. For individual investors, a strong internal control system translates to disciplined financial practices and regular monitoring of financial progress. This ensures that individuals stay on track with their financial goals, make informed investment decisions, and adjust their strategies as needed to achieve optimal performance.Atan, R., Alam, M. M., and Said, J. (2017) discuss corporate integrity and accountability in non-profit organizations, underscoring the significance of ethical practices and transparency. In the context of personal finance, maintaining integrity and accountability is paramount. Individuals who adhere to ethical investment practices and hold themselves accountable to their financial goals are more likely to achieve sustainable investment success. This involves honest assessment of financial capabilities, realistic goal setting, and adherence to ethical investment principles.Alam, M. M., Said, J., and Aziz, M. A. A. (2019) highlight the role of integrity systems, internal control systems, and leadership practices in promoting accountability in the Malaysian public sector. These principles are equally applicable to personal finance. Establishing a personal integrity system involves setting clear financial goals, regularly reviewing financial progress, and making adjustments to stay aligned with long-term objectives. Leadership practices, such as taking proactive steps to enhance financial literacy and seeking expert advice, can further reinforce accountability and drive better investment outcomes.In conclusion, the practice of financial goal setting is integral to improving personal investment performance. Drawing from various studies on management commitment, internal control systems, integrity, and risk management, this abstract underscores the multifaceted benefits of setting and adhering to clear financial goals. By applying these principles, individuals can enhance their investment performance, achieve their financial aspirations, and secure their financial future.
In recent years it has become clear that many decisions do not obey the rule that more time yields better decisions. These decisions can be made remarkably fast and yet accurately, sometimes based on very limited information. It is presently unclear whether such 'blink' or high-speed decisions lack cognitive aspects that only much slower 'deliberative' decision-making can support. Here we demonstrate an unexpected degree of flexibility and cognition in a decision made by a hunting animal at reflex-like speed. Based on observing initial speed, direction, and height of falling prey archerfish decide in just 40 milliseconds on a turn toward the later ballistic landing point. This enables the fish to dash off to arrive simultaneously with prey and to secure it against numerous competitors. We established an approach that allowed us to replace ballistics, the rule that governs the turn decisions, with a novel rule of how to connect the input variables with the rewarded turns. This approach revealed that the fish are not using a hardwired circuit but were able to reprogram their decision in efficient ways that allowed them to immediately generalize to untrained settings. Training even allowed the decision to simultaneously use two distinct sets of rules, one for each of two distinct objects. The flexibility of the decision and the occurrence of high-level cognitive features are counterintuitive for a reflex-like decision made faster than an Olympic sprinter can respond to the start gun. However, they imply that combining speed and accuracy in rapid decisions does not generally make them less smart than decisions made over far longer timescales.
In Terry v. Ohio, Earl Warren held that police officers could temporarily detain a suspect, provided that they relied upon specific, reasonable inferences," and not simply upon an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch. "' Since Terry, courts have strained to distinguish "reasonable suspicion," which is said to arise from the cool analysis of objective and particularized facts, from "mere hunches," which are said to be subjective, generalized, unreasoned and therefore unreliable. Yet this dichotomy between facts and intuitions is built on sand. Emotions and intuitions are not obstacles to reason, but indispensable heuristic devices that allow people to process diffuse, complex information about their environment and make sense of the world. The legal rules governing police conduct are thus premised on a mistaken assumption about human cognition. This Article argues that the legal system can defer, to some extent, to police officers' intuitions without undermining meaningful protections against law enforcement overreaching. As a practical matter, the current legal regime substitutes palliative euphemisms for useful controls on police discretion. It forces police officers to prune what they say at suppression hearings, but it does little to change how they act on the streets of America. When an energetic police officer has a hunch that evil is stirring and action is imperative, the officer will simply act. Months will pass before a suppression hearing, and by then it will be a simple matter to reverse-engineer the objective "reasons" for the stop - e.g., I saw a bulge, " or "He made a furtive gesture. " The legal system in practice rewards those officers who are able and willing to spin their behavior in a way that satisfies judges, while it penalizes other officers who are less verbally facile or who are transparent about their motivations. Politically accountable authorities should join the courts in monitoring police practices. And the focus should be less on what police say after the fact and more on what they do - that is, how successful police officers are in detecting criminals relative to the number of stops they make and how respectful officers are of all citizens.
A series of studies examines whether certain biases in probability assessments and perceptions of loss, previously found in experimental studies, affect consumers' decisions about insurance. Framing manipulations lead the consumers studied here to make hypothetical insurance-purchase choices that violate basic laws of probability and value. Subjects exhibit distortions in their perception of risk and framing effects in evaluating premiums and benefits. Illustrations from insurance markets suggest that the same effects occur when consumers make actual insurance purchases.
The impact of information on an aggregate decision is directly related to the number of members of the aggregate who know the information prior to the group decision. This experiment, with 120 undergraduates, obtains this common knowledge effect in small group choice. Group discussion affects group choice in some cases, signaled by group choices that "overturn" the choice of a majority of the group members. In those overturned majorities, moreover, the group tended to choose the correct option, leading group choices to be more accurate than member choices. Consistent with results comparing individual judgment and choice, groups pool information less thoroughly and rely on prominent items of information more heavily when choosing as compared with estimating. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Framing effects are well established: Listeners' preferences depend on how outcomes are described to them, or framed. Less well understood is what determines how speakers choose frames. Two experiments revealed that reference points systematically influenced speakers' choices between logically equivalent frames. For example, speakers tended to describe a 4-ounce cup filled to the 2-ounce line as half full if it was previously empty but described it as half empty if it was previously full. Similar results were found when speakers could describe the outcome of a medical treatment in terms of either mortality or survival (e.g., 25% die vs. 75% survive). Two additional experiments showed that listeners made accurate inferences about speakers' reference points on the basis of the selected frame (e.g., if a speaker described a cup as half empty, listeners inferred that the cup used to be full). Taken together, the data suggest that frames reliably convey implicit information in addition to their explicit content, which helps explain why framing effects are so robust.
In two studies, stock market professionals (N1 = 22, N2 = 21) and laypeople (N1 = 29, N2 = 34) provided thirty-day forecasts for twenty stocks and estimated the size of their own errors as well as their own and the other group's mean errors. Both groups predicted that the errors made by professionals would be half the size of the errors made by laypeople. In reality, the errors of both groups were about the size predicted for the laypeople. Participants also estimated their ability to pick the best performing stock from two options. Both groups proved to be overconfident. Professional predictions were only successful 40% of the time, a performance below what could be expected from chance alone. Self reports and correlations between forecasts and price movements sug- gested that the professionals based their predictions on specific information of the stocks without sufficient awareness of the unreliability of this information, while the laypeople used simple heuristics based on previous price movements. During the recent worldwide stock market turbu- lence, fortunes were rapidly made and just as rapidly lost. The great majority of participants did not antici- pate either the magnitude or the pace of these events. The bewilderment has been hard to hide. This paper addresses two questions raised by more than a few people in the aftermath: "How much do stock market professionals really know about the fu- ture development of stock prices, and how much do they think they know?" We first discuss psychological findings concerning expert judgments and experts' and laypeople's confidence in their own judgments.
Darwin proposed the theory of sexual selection to account for the evolution of extravagant secondary sexual characters often seen in males because he argued that utilitarian natural selection cannot permit their evolution. Although the idea of sexual selection was disbelieved or neglected for a long time, today it constitutes an active area of research. Starting with Darwin, the enormous, cumbersome train of the peacock has been the prime example of sexually selected traits. And yet, almost nothing relevant to sexual selection was known about the peacock until very recently. In the last ten years or so, observations and experiments on a free-ranging, feral population of the Indian peacock in the Whipsnade Park in Bedfordshire in the UK and some experiments in a commercial peacock farm that breeds birds for food and as show birds, by Marion Petrie and her colleagues have finally justified the peacock as an icon of sexual selection by female choice. The peacock appears to fulfil nearly every expectation of the theory of sexual selection: peahens prefer peacocks with elaborate trains probably recognizing them by the symmetry of their trains and benefit from doing so because of improved survival of their chicks. Peacocks with elaborate trains themselves appear to be better survivors with larger fat reserves and higher levels of immunocompetence. These findings support theories which suggest that peacocks with elaborate trains are selected because of the handicap they carry rather than in spite of it. Thus the peacock's train is not merely beautiful but is also an honest indicator of male quality. Although the peacock is deeply entrenched in Indian mythology, culture and folklore and it is widely distributed in the country, research from India has regrettably made no significant contribution to recent research justifying the peacock as a prime example of sexual selection and making it a frontrunner in modern studies of sexual selection.
This study tested the prediction that introspecting about the reasons for one's preferences would reduce satisfaction with a consumer choice. Subjects evaluated two types of posters and then chose one to take home. Those instructed to think about their reasons chose a different type of poster than control subjects and, when contacted 3 weeks later, were less satisfied with their choice. When people think about reasons, they appear to focus on attributes of the stimulus that are easy to verbalize and seem like plausible reasons but may not be important causes of their initial evaluations. When these attributes imply a new evaluation of the stimulus, people change their attitudes and base their choices on these new attitudes. Over time, however, people's initial evaluation of the stimulus seems to return, and they come to regret choices based on the new attitudes.
Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In con-
trast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with un-
limited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the
authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-
reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical
rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors
held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" infer-
ence procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed
all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive
mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical
norms of rational inference.
The familiarity of names produced by their prior presentation can be misinterpreted as fame. We used this false fame effect to separately study the effects of divided attention on familiarity versus conscious recollection. In a first experiment, famous and nonfamous names were presented to be read under conditions of full vs. divided attention. Divided attention greatly reduced later recognition memory performance but had no effect on gains in familiarity as measured by fame judgments. In later experiments, we placed recognition memory and familiarity in opposition by presenting only nonfamous names to be read in the first phase. Recognizing a name as earlier read on the later fame test allowed Ss to be certain that it was nonfamous. Divided attention at study or during the fame test reduced list recognition performance but had no effect on familiarity. We conclude that conscious recollection is an attention-demanding act that is separate from assessing familiarity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The accuracy of strangers' consensual judgments of personality based on "thin slices" of targets' nonverbal behavior were examined in relation to an ecologically valid criterion variable. In the 1st study, consensual judgments of college teachers' molar nonverbal behavior based on very brief (under 30 sec) silent video clips significantly predicted global end-of-semester student evaluations of teachers. In the 2nd study, similar judgments predicted a principal's ratings of high school teachers. In the 3rd study, ratings of even thinner slices (6 and 15 sec clips) were strongly related to the criterion variables. Ratings of specific micrononverbal behaviors and ratings of teachers' physical attractiveness were not as strongly related to the criterion variable. These findings have important implications for the areas of personality judgment, impression formation, and nonverbal behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined whether people use simple heuristics and discussed 2 possible approaches to identifying these strategies: process analysis and outcome analysis. The authors describe various decision strategies and outline an experiment in which participants had to choose among alternatives under low and high time pressure. The process- and outcome-oriented approaches are described and the experiment is used as an illustration for the methodological problems in identifying strategies. The authors review some studies that have investigated conditions that should have an impact on decision strategies, including time pressure. Evidence suggests that heuristics with a cue-wise information search can describe individuals' decision strategies for choice tasks. Results indicate that people indeed use smart and simple decision strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Provides a basis for the concept of social rationality by finding simple motion cues and fast and frugal cue integration mechanisms that humans and other animals may use to interact effectively with each other. The authors developed an experimental method with a goal to identify both objective motion cues and simple heuristics that can process them to infer animate intentions. Ecologically representative examples of the 6 most typical animate motion patterns were gathered by having Ss play interactive computer games that required them to pursue, evade, fight, court, be courted, or play with each other. The Ss controlled on-screen bugs with realistic motion physics using a mouse. The resulting motion patterns were recorded and presented to another set of Ss, who tried to infer what the bugs were trying to do to each other. A set of 7 cues were proposed and according to the authors, these cues appear sufficient to capture the major regularities of motion in the 6 intentional categories investigated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Gigerenzer (2001) argues that (a) statements about single-case probabilities are problematic because they specify no reference class, and that (b) norms should not be applied to specific situations in a ‘content-blind’ way. In reply I argue that (a) statements about single-case probabilities make sense and are unambiguous despite specifying no reference class, and that (b) although Gigerenzer is right that the application of norms to specific situations should take into account the content of the situations and thus should not be content-blind, Gigerenzer has not undermined the appropriateness of probabilistic and other norms which purport to have force in every situation and are in this sense content-neutral.
Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes. (86 ref)
As a company tries to find the factors accounting for strong and weak markets, typical consumer explanations for both tend to be in terms of the physical attributes of the product. Carling Brewing Company used a relatively inexpensive experiment to help dichotomize contributing influences as being either product or marketing oriented and, also, to indicate the magnitude of the marketing influence for various brands. The experiment involved the use of groups of beer drinkers that tasted (drank) and rated beer from nude bottles and from labeled bottles.
We present a theory about human thought named the unconscious-thought theory (UTT). The theory is applicable to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity. It distinguishes between two modes of thought: unconscious and conscious. Unconscious thought and conscious thought have different characteristics, and these different characteristics make each mode preferable under different circumstances. For instance, contrary to popular belief, decisions about simple issues can be better tackled by conscious thought, whereas decisions about complex matters can be better approached with unconscious thought. The relations between the theory and decision strategies, and between the theory and intuition, are discussed. We end by discussing caveats and future directions.
© 2006 Association for Psychological Science.
The fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to decision making under uncertainty advocated by Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) has achieved great popularity despite a relative lack of empirical validation. We report two experiments that examine the use of one particular heuristic--"take-the-best" (TTB). In both experiments the majority of participants adopted frugal strategies, but only one-third (33%) behaved in a manner completely consistent with TTB's search, stopping and decision rules. Furthermore, a significant proportion of participants in both experiments adopted a non-frugal strategy in which they accumulated more information than was predicted by TTB's stopping rule. The results provide an insight into the conditions under which different heuristics are used, and question the predictive power of the fast-and-frugal approach.
Flawed arguments often recur in debates on U.S. security policy long after their weaknesses have been exposed. In this article I argue that certain political misconceptions and fallacies resist counterargument because they are reinforced by particular reasoning shortcuts known as “cognitive heuristics.” Although heuristics save time and mental work, they can lead to error because they are based on violable assumptions. I discuss seven different cognitive heuristics and the particular security fallacies they perpetuate — from the domino theory to the idea that deterrence requires force matching. Finally, the scope and limitations of such psychological explanations will be discussed.
This article aims to study some of the features that characterize Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan’s language. After a brief assessment of the readability of the texts of his public speeches and reports, an analysis of specific linguistic elements that contribute to the complexity of his discourse is given. Hedging devices and their blurring effect are reviewed, and, beyond them, specific lexical, syntactic and discursive choices are investigated, which help Mr Greenspan to preserve a dose of ‘fuzzy transparency’ in his pronouncements. It seems that it is precisely this varied mix that makes his discourse so peculiar and puzzling for the reader.
If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don't listen to his words, examine his achievements. For to the discoverer in that field, the constructions of his imagination appear so necessary and so natural that he is apt to treat them not as the creations of his thoughts but as given realities.
This study replicates recent tests of the recognition heuristic as a device for selecting stock portfolios. The heuristic represents a lower limit to the search for information, since simple name recognition is the least one can know about anything. Gigerenzer and others conducted original experiments in this field at the Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research's Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (the "ABC Research Group"). The ABC Group's tests support the use of the heuristic in a bull market environment. This study, conducted in a down market, reaches a different conclusion: Not only can a high degree of company name recognition lead to disappointing investment results in a bear market, it can also be beat by pure ignorance. Virtually the only finding of the ABC Group's study that we match here is that Americans are not very good at picking American stocks to outperform the market.
We study three heuristics for paired comparisons based on binary cues, which are all naïve in that they ignore possible dependencies between cues, but take different approaches: linear (tallying) and lexicographic (Take The Best, Minimalist). There is empirical evidence on the heuristics’ descriptive adequacy and some first results on their accuracy. We present new analytical results on their relative accuracy. When cues are independent given the values of the objects on the criterion, there exists a linear decision rule, equivalent to naïve Bayes, which is optimal; we use this result to characterize the optimality of Take The Best and tallying. Also, tallying and Take The Best are more accurate than Minimalist. When cues are dependent and the number of cues and objects is psychologically plausible, Take The Best tends to be more accurate than tallying, but it is also possible that tallying, and Minimalist, are more accurate than Take The Best.
The ACT-R theory (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) is applied to the list memory paradigms of serial recall, recognition memory, free recall, and implicit memory. List memory performance in ACT-R is determined by the level of activation of declarative chunks which encode that items occur in the list. This level of activation is in turn determined by amount of rehearsal, delay, and associative fan from a list node. This theory accounts for accuracy and latency profiles in backward and forward serial recall, set size effects in the Sternberg paradigm, length–strength effects in recognition memory, the Tulving–Wiseman function, serial position, length and practice effects in free recall, and lexical priming in implicit memory paradigms. This wide variety of effects is predicted with minimal parameter variation. It is argued that the strength of the ACT-R theory is that it offers a completely specified processing architecture that serves to integrate many existing models in the literature.
One of the biggest revelations of recent psychological science is the two-track human mind, which features not only a deliberate, self-aware “high road” but also a vast, automatic, intuitive “low road.” Through experience, we learn associations that provide fast and frugal intuitions that enable instantaneous social judgments and the pattern recognition that marks acquired expertise. But as studies of implicit prejudice and intuitive fears illustrate, unchecked gut feelings can also lead us astray. Intuition's powers and perils appear in various realms, from sports to business to clinical and interviewer judgments.
Proper linear models are those in which predictor variables are given weights such that the resulting linear composite optimally predicts some criterion of interest; examples of proper linear models are standard regression analysis, discriminant function analysis, and ridge regression analysis. Research summarized in P. Meehl's (1954) book on clinical vs statistical prediction and research stimulated in part by that book indicate that when a numerical criterion variable (e.g., graduate GPA) is to be predicted from numerical predictor variables, proper linear models outperform clinical intuition. Improper linear models are those in which the weights of the predictor variables are obtained by some nonoptimal method. The present article presents evidence that even such improper linear models are superior to clinical intuition when predicting a numerical criterion from numerical predictors. In fact, unit (i.e., equal) weighting is quite robust for making such predictions. The application of unit weights to decide what bullet the Denver Police Department should use is described; some technical, psychological, and ethical resistances to using linear models in making social decisions are considered; and arguments that could weaken these resistances are presented. (50 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This chapter is organized around a proposal for understanding the adaptiveness of the memory system called
rational analysis. This framework assumes that there is some cost,
C, associated with retrieving a memory. This cost may reflect metabolic expenditure in maintaining and retrieving the memory and also the time to search and consider the memory. If the memory proves to be useful to the current purposes, there is some gain,
G, in accessing the memory. The problem facing the memory system is to come up with some scheme that minimizes the costs in retrieval while maximizing the gains. Rational analysis also proposes that the memory system can, in effect, assign some probability
P to a memory being relevant in advance of retrieving it. Given these 3 quantities, an adaptive memory system would search memories in order of their expected utilities,
PG–C, and stop considering memories when a probability
P is retrieved such that: PG
"Five groups of 48 rats each were rewarded on the two sides of a choice situation different proportions of times… . A training of 24 trials failed to establish a discriminatory response in only one of the groups, for which the chances of reward on the two sides were 2/3 against 1/3 (group '67: 33'). In contrast to that, groups '100: 50,' '75: 25' and '50: 0' were significantly above the threshold of probability in an increasing order. For the last of these groups, 50: 0, the difference with control group '100: 0' which represented the traditional unambiguous type of training dropped below significance ('threshold of certainty'). Discrimination increases with the difference of the probabilities of success on the two sides, a further influence being superimposed due to the ratio of probabilities… . Additional experiments of the type 75: 25 and 100: 50 introducing special punishment for each non-rewarded choice… showed that the increase in discrimination goes with the increase of the ratio of the probability of 'emphasis' as given by punishment or by success, and not with the increase in the ratio of the probability of success, per se." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Almost anyone seriously interested in decision theory will name John von Neumann's (1928) Minimax Theorem as its foundation, whereas Utility and Rationality are imagined to be the twin towers on which the theory rests. Yet, experimental results and real-life observations seldom support that expectation. Over two centuries ago, Hume (1739–40/1978) put his finger on the discrepancy. “Reason,” he wrote “is, and ought to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” In other words, effective means to reach specific goals can be prescribed, but not the goals. A wide range of experimental results and daily life behavior support this dictum.
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) described the recognition heuristic as a fast, frugal, and effective decision strategy. However, most studies concerning the recognition heuristic have been conducted in static domains, that is, in domains where it could plausibly be argued that relevant variables stay relatively constant. Yet the question is whether the heuristic would also work in dynamic environments where the quality of the actors rises and falls, such as in sports. We tested performance of the recognition heuristic in a dynamic environment and used it to predict the outcomes of tennis matches in Wimbledon 2003. Recognition data of amateur tennis players and laypeople was used to build recognition rankings. These rankings correlated with official rankings and led to at least as good predictions. Simulations of individual choices showed high recognition validities of both amateurs (0.73) and laypeople (0.67). In a second study the recognition heuristic correctly predicted 90% of actual individual choices. Overall, the recognition heuristic may be effectively generalized to dynamic environments. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In Mindblindness, Simon Baron-Cohen presents a model of the evolution and development of "mindreading." He argues that we mindread all the time, effortlessly, automatically, and mostly unconsciously. It is the natural way in which we interpret, predict, and participate in social behavior and communication. We ascribe mental states to people: states such as thoughts, desires, knowledge, and intentions.
Building on many years of research, Baron-Cohen concludes that children with autism, suffer from "mindblindness" as a result of a selective impairment in mindreading. For these children, the world is essentially devoid of mental things.
Baron-Cohen develops a theory that draws on data from comparative psychology, from developmental, and from neuropsychology. He argues that specific neurocognitive mechanisms have evolved that allow us to mindread, to make sense of actions, to interpret gazes as meaningful, and to decode "the language of the eyes."
Bradford Books imprint
Behavioral Decision Research on multi-attribute decision making is plagued with the problem of drawing inferences from behavioral data on cognitive strategies. This bridging problem has been tackled by a range of methodical approaches, namely Structural Modeling (SM), Process Tracing (PT), and comparative model fitting. Whereas SM and PT have been criticized for a number of reasons, the comparative fitting approach has some theoretical advantages as long as the formal relation between theories and data is specified. A Bayesian method is developed that is able to assess, whether an empirical data vector was most likely generated by a ‘Take The Best’ heuristic (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), by an equal weight rule, or a compensatory strategy. Equations are derived for the two- and three-alternative cases, respectively, and a simulation study supports its validity. The classification also showed convergent validity with Process Tracing measures in an experiment. Potential extensions of the general approach to other applications in behavioral decision research are discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The recognition heuristic postulates that individuals should choose a recognized object more often than an unrecognized one whenever recognition is related to the criterion. This behavior has been described as a one-cue, noncompensatory decision-making strategy. This claim and other assumptions were tested in four experiments using paired-comparison tasks with cities and other geographical objects. The main results were (1) that the recognized object was chosen more often than the unrecognized one when the recognition cue was valid; (2) that participants' behavior did not reflect the recognition validity of their own knowledge; (3) that a less-is-more effect (i.e., better performance with less knowledge) was either absent or of only small size; and (4) that judgments were influenced by further knowledge, which could even compensate for the recognition cue. In sum, the recognition cue represents an important piece of knowledge in paired comparisons, but apparently not the only one. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.