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Alltagspsychologie, Absichtlichkeit und Werturteil : Zu einigen Befunden der experimentellen Philosophie
Abstract
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Joshua Knobe (2003a, b) presented data that suggest people’s judgments of a behavior’s intentionality may be significantly influenced by moral considerations. In particular, Knobe (2003b) argues that when people judge the intentionality of an action with moral consequences, they fail to consider an important component of intentionality — the agent’s skill (Malle & Knobe, 1997) — that they do consider when judging an almost identical action with neutral consequences. This finding raises a number of issues about the consistency of intentionality judgments and perhaps even the unity of the folk concept of intentionality. Moreover, it raises the specter of a bias in people’s thinking, namely to ignore important information when judging morally significant actions, which, if true, would have considerable impact on legal proceedings. A replication of Knobe’s results appears to be needed, not only to establish the findings within a different subject population (in this case, first- and second-year college students) but also to examine the robustness of Knobe’s effect when varying certain methodological and conceptual parameters. The parameters that were varied in the present study ranged from presentation format to action formulation to response options. Just over 300 participants were presented with a one-page questionnaire as part of a
It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior.
A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles
it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction
between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation
and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use.
On the surface, it seems plausible that the goodness or badness of an agent's actions should be completely irrelevant to the question of whether she performed them intentionally, but there is growing evidence that ascriptions of intentional actions are affected by moral considerations. Joshua Knobe, for instance, has recently published a series of ground-breaking papers (2003a, 2003b, 2004) in which he suggests that people's judgments concerning the intentionality of an action may sometimes depend on what they think about the action-morally speaking. One of the more interesting results of Knobe's psychological experiments is the discovery that people may have a lower threshold for judging that lucky (or unskilled) actions are intentional when these actions are praiseworthy or blameworthy than they do for judging that equally lucky (or unskilled) morally neutral actions are intentional. In this paper I show that this discovery-when supplemented with some additional empirical data-gives us a way of shedding new light on a controversy that was sparked by Ronald Butler in 1977 when he posed the following problem to the readers of Analysis:
There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g
The contributors to this volume examine recent controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories (belief, desire, intention, consciousness, emotion, and so on) tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common sense psychology from critical to supportive, from exegetical to speculative, are represented. Among the questions posed are: Is common sense psychology an empirical theory, a body of analytic knowledge, a practice or a strategy? If it is a legitimate enterprise can it be naturalized or not? If it is not legitimate can it be eliminated? Is its fate tied to our understanding of consciousness? Should we approach its concepts and generalizations from the standpoint of conceptual analysis or from the philosophy of science?
Michael E. Bratman develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
31 Für welche dieser drei Alternativen man sich entscheidet, oder ob man eine andere präferiert, müsste anhand pragmatischer Kriterien entschieden werden
- Dass Das Subjekt Für Das Konjunkt Optiert
, dass das Subjekt für das Konjunkt optiert. 31 Für welche dieser drei
Alternativen man sich entscheidet, oder ob man eine andere präferiert,
müsste anhand pragmatischer Kriterien entschieden werden. 32