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IPGovernance Working Paper No. 1
July 2008
Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims
The Role and Function of Collective Action Networks
Sebastian Haunss and Lars Kohlmorgen*
This work is published under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 license.
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
The outcomes of two recent policy conflicts about two EU directives
on intellectual property rights question the assumptions of interest
groups research: Why were »weak« actors able to successfully mobi-
lize against one directive but failed in the other case? We argue that,
to explain policy influence, the existing literature focuses only on ac-
tor characteristics but neglects actor relations and is therefore not
able to explain the success of weak actors in certain conflicts. We em-
ploy social network analysis to analyze the actor networks of both
conflicts and conclude that a broad mobilization in combination with
a dense network and the construction of a convincing master frame
are conditions for successful campaigning and influence of weak ac-
tors. In more abstract terms we can see that in order to be successful
weak actors have to built situational coalitions that fulfill the condi-
tions of a collective actor with a recognizable collective identity.
Keywords:
European Union, Interest Groups, Intellectual Property, Social Network Analysis
*Sebastian Haunss (sebastian.haunss [at] uni-konstanz.de) is lecturer (Akademischer Mitarbeiter) at the University
of Konstanz, Germany. Lars Kohlmorgen (lars.kohlmorgen [at] uni-hamburg.de) is research fellow (wis-
senschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the University of Hamburg, Germany.
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 1
1. Introduction
In autumn 2003 two proposals for EU directives that would affect the future develop-
ment of rules governing intellectual property in Europe were pending in the responsible
committees of the European Parliament. Two years later in both cases the decision-mak-
ing process had come to an end – with opposing outcomes:
In March 2004, the European Parliament adopted with 330 to 150 votes the »Directive
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights« (IPRED 1), which intends to
strengthen and harmonize the enforcement of intellectual property rights, including
copyright, trademark and patents, in the EU member states (COM 2003). It gives rights
holders more possibilities to prosecute counterfeiters and other infringers using civil law
measures. Big companies, business associations, MEPs and the commission backed this
directive, since they saw it as a proper tool to fight product piracy, while civil society
and consumer interest groups and other MEPs were against it. They claimed that this di-
rective would threaten consumer and civil rights. Additionally, also some big compa-
nies, such as telecommunication companies and generic manufacturers, lobbied against
this directive arguing that IPRED 1 could impose high costs on internet providers.
In July 2005, the European Parliament (EP) rejected the »Directive on the patentability
of computer implemented inventions«, the so called software patent directive, with a
huge majority of 648 to 14 votes. This directive was drafted by the European Commis-
sion to introduce patents on inventions »implemented on a computer or similar appara-
tus which is realized by a computer program« (COM 2002, 13). The decision of the EP,
which terminated the legislation process of this directive, stands at the end of about four
years of discussion, lobbying, campaigning and bargaining in EU institutions, networks
of business associations and civil society groups, national parliaments and the media.
Although powerful actors such as big companies, business associations, some Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the European Commission were in favor of the
proposal for the directive, a coalition of business associations of small and medium en-
terprises (SMEs), civil society groups and MEPs succeeded in preventing this directive.
They argued that this directive would hamper innovation and competitiveness as it
would be a danger for SMEs. The proponents brought forward similar arguments, but
from a different angle, when they claimed that this directive would foster research and
development and secure the competitiveness of the European economy.
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 2
These two conflicts occurred largely at the same time, in the same policy field, with a
partially similar actor constellation – but with opposing outcomes. Why did this
happen? Why would interest groups that are traditionally regarded as strong succeed in
one case but fail in the other? Why were »weak interests« able to mobilize in a way no-
body had expected to prevent the adoption of the software patents directive? So far nei-
ther the literature on European policy making, on interest groups in Europe (Eising
2004; Greenwood 1997; Richardson 2000; Bouwen 2004; Bennett 1999) nor the liter-
ature on policy networks (Börzel 1998; Kenis and Schneider 1991; Kohler-Koch
2002; Kriesi, Adam, and Jochum 2006; Peterson 2003; Rhodes 1997) can give satis-
factory answers to these questions. Our empirical puzzle therefore leads to a reconsider-
ation of the existing literature in light of recent conflicts in the field of politics of intel-
lectual property (IP). Are there additional factors that have to be considered to explain
the outcomes of the two conflicts?
In this article we suggest that research on social movements and social networks pro-
vides some tools that allow us to uncover a set of mechanisms that complement existing
approaches and help us to explain the unexpected trajectories of these IP conflicts.
In a first step we discuss the literature on interest groups in Europe and on policy net-
works to assess the factors that determine potential influence on European policy pro-
cesses. Arguing that their focus on actor characteristics and on stable longtime interac-
tion neglects important aspects of the dynamics of action in the conflicts, we discuss the
explanatory potential of other approaches that focus on more fluid relational aspect of
actor mobilization.
We then present results of an analysis of the actor networks involved in both conflicts,
showing that the network analysis corroborates important assumptions of the interest
groups literature but, in addition, can identify some mechanisms that can explain the
outcomes that effectively contradict some central assumptions about the role of interest
groups in Europe.
We argue that dynamic relational aspects are crucial to understand the structure of the
conflicts and to explain their outcomes. It is important to take a closer look at the rela-
tions between the actors, at specific network forms and at the characteristics and dy-
namics of the networks. We will show that the structures of the action networks and co-
alitions between single actors have an impact on the decision making processes and on
the actors’ chances to influence this process. With this approach we still are not able to
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 3
directly measure influence. But by measuring co-operation we go beyond simply substi-
tuting influence with access (Bouwen 2004).
2. Interest Groups in the European Polity
Both our conflicts were characterized by intense lobbying and political mobilizations.
An obvious avenue to look for explanations for the outcomes of the conflicts is there-
fore the sizable literature on interest groups in Europe. This literature was initially dom-
inated by the question whether neo(corporatist) or pluralist structures of interest repre-
sentation would develop in Europe (Eichener and Voelzkow 1994; Eising and Kohler-
Koch 1994; Mazey and Richardson 1993; Streeck and Schmitter 1994). In the mean-
time, a large agreement exists that neither model can sufficiently describe the specific
arrangements in the European Union. The complex multi-level system of European gov-
ernance rather combines supranational and intergovernmental elements of decision
making and is shaped by a strong functional segmentation, where the possibilities of in-
terest groups differ decidedly from existing national and international settings (Benz
2003, 2004; Eising 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch 1997, 1999; Marks,
Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Scharpf 2002). As an action and governance system sui
generis it is characterized by a multiplication of the negotiation arenas.
Following Olsons (1968) classical theorem that incentives to invest resources in the re-
alization of collective goods diminishes with group size, studies on interest repre-
sentation in Europe usually assume that small groups with specific interests or individu-
al large firms have the best chances to influence policies (Eising 2004). This general
asymmetry should be even more pronounced at the European level as interest represen-
tation there requires actors to be active on multiple levels of the multi-level governance
system simultaneously. A prerequisite that presupposes resources usually available only
to national states and large, mostly transnational, firms (Bennett 1997, 1999; Bouwen
2002; Buholzer 1998; Eising and Kohler-Koch 1994; Grande 1996; Kohler-Koch
1996; Kohler-Koch, Conzelmann, and Knodt 2004).
Studies from an exchange theory perspective (Bouwen 2002, 2004) largely support this
argument, stating that influence depends on the actor’s ability to provide the specific
critical access good for the respective institution (expert knowledge, information about
the European and domestic encompassing interest), which large firms and national or
European associations are able to provide best. Others stress that the duration of mutual
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 4
relationships with European institutions is a critical factor (Broscheid and Coen 2003;
Eising 2004). Again, resourceful actors are seen in a better position to establish contin-
uous contacts with the relevant European institutions.
The mainstream of research on interest groups in Europe clearly sees public and social
interests as well as small and middle enterprises (SMEs) in a disadvantaged position
compared to transnational companies and large business associations. They usually nei-
ther have the necessary resources to establish a continuous presence in Brussels nor can
they satisfy the specific information and knowledge needs of the two most powerful Eu-
ropean institutions, the Council of the European Union and the Commission (Burns
2004; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). Peterson and Bomberg summarize accord-
ingly that »the European Union is a ›mobiliser of bias‹ not only in favour of states, but
also in favour of private interests that are most powerful at the state level« (Peterson and
Bomberg 1999, 27). It is argued that consumers, workers or civil society groups might
compensate their structurally weak position with politicizing contentious issues (Beyers
2004; Kohler-Koch 1997), but until now no systematic research has substantiated this
proposition.
Based on the interest groups literature the constellation of actors that were involved in
the two IP conflicts, as shown in table 1, would have suggested relatively clear out-
comes.
Table 1: Actors supporting and opposing the CII and IPRED 1 directives
CII (Software Patents) IP Enforcement
Pro • Commission
• large firms
• business associations
• most national governments
• Commission
• business associations
• most national governments
Contra • SMEs
• NGOs
• CSOs
• some national parliaments
• large firms
• NGOs
In the software patent case all the »strong« actors support the directive while those op-
posing the directive are generally seen as weak. Theoretically the EU interest group lit-
erature would have predicted here an easy win for the Commission. In the IPRED 1
case the situation is more complicated. While the most European business associations
have supported the directive a significant number of large firms and business associa-
tions (mainly from the telecommunication, generic medicines, and car replacement parts
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 5
industries) were also opposing the directive. From the perspective of the interest group
literature the outcome of this conflict would have been much less clear than in the other
case. But in both cases the de facto conflict trajectories were quite different: IPRED 1
was smoothly adopted whereas the software patent directive failed. These results sug-
gest that other factors than those usually considered by the interest group literature
might have actually been decisive in these two conflicts.
The strength of interest group research is that it highlights the structural unevenness of
the political field. It shows how the resourcefulness of an actor usually corresponds with
its ability to get its interests heard, or more precise how different key resources matter at
different levels of the European governance system. But the EU literature focuses main-
ly on strong actors and elite interaction (Imig and Tarrow 2001) and is not well suited
to explain the occasional success of actors that are regarded in this perspective as weak.
Moreover, actors are regarded as strong or weak mainly because of their resources. This
static view ignores the possibility that in some conflicts relational aspects may be more
important than actor characteristics, and that in these conflicts not the attributes of dif-
ferent actors but the structure and dynamics of networks of interaction might explain
success or failure.
One body of research that analyzes European policy making from such a relational per-
spective is the literature on policy networks (Börzel 1998; Kenis and Schneider 1991;
Kohler-Koch 2002; Kriesi, Adam, and Jochum 2006; Peterson 2003; Richardson
2000; Rhodes 1997). But unfortunately this research focuses either on new forms of
governance characterized by »informal, decentralized and horizontal relations« (Kenis
and Schneider 1991, 32) or on relatively stable interactions of established actors. Tem-
porary issue-oriented networks, social movements, or networks of NGOs and other civil
society actors have not been systematically studied so far. Instead it is often assumed,
that »policy communities«, the most stable and integrated type of policy networks will
generally have better chances to accomplish their goals than less integrated networks
(Rhodes 1997). This assumption, again, is not helpful in explaining the success of a
loosely integrated ad-hoc network such as in the software patents conflict.
2.1. Social Movements and Networks
Social movement research, on the other hand, has traditionally focused on weak actors.
Moreover it pays close attention to networks of interaction in mobilization processes.
Studies from the political opportunity structure perspective (Kriesi 1995; McAdam
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 6
1996; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978) underline that social movements act within a social
environment that structures their chances to mobilize adherents and to influence policy-
making processes. A recurring claim is, that the relative openness or closure of the polit-
ical system, the stability of political alignments, the availability of elite allies and the
state’s capacity and propensity for repression are central structuring factors. In Euro-
pean policy conflicts it would therefore be advisable to look for alliance structures, es-
pecially with strong allies inside and outside the institutions, and to look for fissures and
conflicts between the European institutions.
Some authors (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Snow
and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986) add that the discursive level – besides sufficient
resources – has to be taken into account to explain success or failure of social move-
ments. To mobilize a relevant number of adherents, social movements have to construct
collective action frames that join diagnosis and solution of a problem convincingly to-
gether. Especially for weak actors the construction of persuasive master frames is a cen-
tral element to counter their lack of resources. Constructivists go even further and stress
in their research the necessity of developing a collective identity as a prerequisite of col-
lective action (Gamson 1992; Haunss 2004; Melucci 1995, 1996). Following this line
of thought weak actors should try not to act as a (lose) coalition of individual interest
but to construct some sort of collective identity that allows them to identify the field of
opportunities and constraints of their action and that holds them together as a collective
actor.
The explicit integration of network analysis into social movement research is still an
emerging field. This is surprising since the definition of social movements as »informal
networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual is-
sues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest« (della Porta and Diani 1999,
16) is widely accepted. The network perspective on social movements draws attention
to the multiplicity of linkages that connect people, organizations, events, and frames
(Diani and McAdam 2003) and focuses on the social structures that facilitate or hinder
mobilization along existing interpersonal ties and embedded in larger social structures
(McAdam 2003).
Social network analysis in general developed in explicit opposition to the methodologi-
cal individualism of other approaches that focus on attributes of discrete social units or
groups. It interprets behavior as the result of patterned interaction between social actors
embedded in a social structure that is itself a network of networks (Wellman 1988, 20).
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 7
Its central assumption is, that often not the absolute characteristics of an actor determine
its role and influence but its embeddedness in the network of interaction and its ties to
other actors in the network. Depending on the specific situation strong or weak ties, di-
rect or indirect ties can be more important (Granovetter 1973). Obviously, the number
of links with which an actor is connected to the network is an relevant measure to deter-
mine its importance. But sometimes (degree) centrality may not be the most important
point. Actors that bridge otherwise unconnected subnetworks may sometimes be more
powerful than those that act as a hub inside a network (Burt 1992).
The literature on social movements and on social networks both support the notion that
in the two European IP conflicts the topography of the collective action network has to
be taken into account. Social movement research moreover explicitly focuses on those
actors that interest group research usually classifies as »weak«. Our research design
therefore draws mainly on these two perspective – without neglecting the power and re-
source aspects.
3. The networks of interaction in two IP conflicts
The existing literature does not provide a solid basis to formulate strong hypotheses on
the expected nature of successful actor networks. In the absence of an explanatory
framework exploratory network analysis can be used to explain success or failure by
identifying important relational characteristics of the network.
Drawing on the existing research the analysis should focus on four key aspects:
1) Cooperation intensity and collection action frame: Actors in influential policy net-
works and actors that are part of a social movement process usually form strong cooper-
ation links among each other (Rhodes 1997; Diani and Bison 2004). Strong coopera-
tion is generally interpreted as an expression of social cohesion that facilitates consen-
sus building within a group (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 250 f.). Groups of actors
should have a greater chance to exert influence when they appear not as a loose alliance
of disparate special interests but as a dense network and a coherent collective actor with
a clear profile and a collective action frame. They should be able to formulate a com-
mon position and develop a unified strategy. Successful coalitions in political conflicts
should be characterized by a high density of links.
2) Location of actors in the network: In large networks usually not all actors are equally
important. Some actors are better connected than others, some act as hubs that are con-
nected to many other actors, or they may be brokers that connect otherwise unconnected
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 8
or only weakly connected subnetworks. The distribution of central actors should distin-
guish formal coalitions and established policy networks from conflict networks that de-
velop through social movement-like mobilization. Moreover, different types of net-
works should show differing degrees of network centralization, i.e. the variance of cen-
trality scores within a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 169 ff.). Highly centralized
networks show star-like or polycephalous structures while less hierarchical networks
will show less variance with regard to centrality (Diani 2003).
3) Duration of cooperation: Interest groups research often assumes that regular and es-
tablished contacts with the EU institutions or in other words an insider status are crucial
for influencing decision-making processes in the EU (Broscheid and Coen 2003). This
view is largely supported by the policy networks literature (Peterson 2003). An analysis
of the actor networks should therefore pay attention to the extent to which the observed
collective action networks are built on pre-existing structures of formal or informal co-
operation.
4) Size: And obviously the size of the networks may be an important factor. A large net-
work of actively cooperating actors may be able to mobilize significant resources even
if each contribution is relatively small. A large network, on the other hand, may be less
flexible and react slower to changing conditions.
4. Data and Methods
For an exploratory network analysis that focuses on the above mentioned aspects the
relevant network is the network of all actors actively involved in the two policy con-
flicts. More specific we were interested in the networks of cooperation between the ac-
tors actively involved in the conflicts. To identify this network we used a triangulation
method, combining data from different sources. A content analysis of the news coverage
in major national newspapers was the first step. Using the political claims analysis
framework developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999) we coded the newspaper arti-
cles published in quality news papers of four countries (Germany, France, UK, and
Poland) that mentioned one or both of the conflicts.1 This led to a list of actors men-
tioned in the press. In a second step we interviewed 25 key actors in semi-structured in-
terviews about their perception of the conflict, their role, and their cooperation net-
works. And we further expanded the list of actors and relations by doing a content anal-
1For more information on the coding and a detailed list of the codes used see (Haunss and Kohlmorgen 2008a)
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 9
ysis of documents published on the web, and via a questionnaire sent to the so far iden-
tified actors.
The number of actors involved in the two conflicts was very large. More than 90.000 in-
dividuals and firms had signed the EuroLinux petition2 until the End of 2001; all 785
MEPs have received emails and other lobbying material; EICTA, the European Infor-
mation & Communications Technology Industry Association, one of the major propo-
nents of software patents, claims on its website3 to represent more than 10.000 Euro-
pean firms. Obviously not all of these actors did play an important role in one of the
conflicts. Most of the IT firms represented by EICTA did possibly not even know what
the disputed directive was about and most of the supporters of the EuroLinux petition
did not do anything beyond signing the petition. The relevant networks were therefore
limited to all actors mentioned in the press, the interviews and the questionnaires, the
immediate members of the business and civil society associations, NGOs, and ad-hoc
coalitions, and those members of the large mobilization networks that showed signifi-
cant commitment beyond their signature.4
5. Conflicts about the EU directives on software patents and IP enforcement
The two directives that we have chosen have played a central role in shaping the regula-
tory framework for intellectual property rights in the EU during the last decade. The
»directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights« (IPRED 1) aims to
strengthen and harmonize the enforcement of intellectual property rights, including
copyright, trademark and patents, in the EU member states. It requires all member states
to apply »penalties which must be effective, proportionate and deterrent« (COM 2003,
19) against counterfeiting and piracy. The directive gives rights holders more possibili-
ties to prosecute counterfeiters and other infringers using civil law measures. Rights
holders e.g. are to be able to call on judicial authorities to issue an interlocutory injunc-
tion to prevent further infringement of intellectual property rights or to demand destruc-
tion of counterfeited goods.
The »directive on the patentability of computer implemented inventions« was intended
to introduce patents on inventions »implemented on a computer or similar apparatus
2http://petition.eurolinux.org/
3http://www.eicta.org/index.php?id=10
4In the case of the EuroLinux Alliance these are the firms and individuals mentioned as sponsors, in the case of
economic-majority.com these are those supporters with financial contributions of 100 € and more. In the case of
the German patentfrei.de network we show only those actors that have signed a number of central statements or
have been mentioned as regional representatives.
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 10
which is realised by a computer program« (COM 2002, 13). Whether this definition
would include »software as such«, which is explicitly exempted from patentability in
the European Patent Convention, was highly disputed among the opponents in the con-
flict around this directive. Certainly the opponents of the directive succeeded in framing
it as the »Software Patent Directive« and only the core supporters were talking about
the CII directive.5
If we compare the scope of these two directives we see that the subject areas affected by
them differ significantly. The Enforcement Directive touches several issues such as in-
tellectual property rights in music, movies, drugs, luxury goods, automotive spare parts
and initially also software, and it includes different forms of intellectual property rights,
such as patents, copyrights and trademarks. The Software Patent Directive had a much
narrower scope. For potential mobilizations the broader and the narrower scope might
have advantages and disadvantages. A broader issue might appeal to a larger constituen-
cy that is affected by the directive. At the same time the breadth of the issue might hin-
der effective mobilization as it might be less easy to construct a convincing overarching
collective action frame. The narrow focus of the Software Patents Directive may, in
contrast, make it easier to construct a collective action frame, while – like in many sin-
gle issue movements – frame bridging, i.e. building coalitions with others not directly
affected by the directive, might become more complicated.
Aside from this the similarities between the two directives are striking. As we can see in
table 1 the time frame and the institutional setting of both directives was nearly identi-
cal. We can see here that it took little over four years from the initial Green Paper to the
Commission’s proposal for the IP Enforcement Directive and another 15 months to
reach a final decision. In the case of software patents it took only a little longer – four
and a half years – from the Green Paper to the proposal, but another three and a half
years until the proposal was finally rejected. Both directives were drafted in the same
directorate general of the Commission (DG Internal Market). Both legislation processes
were carried out under the codecision procedure, which requires the Council and the
European Parliament to agree on an identical text before the proposal can become law.
The Commission argued in both proposals with the need to harmonize the internal Euro-
pean market and to comply with international treaties. It furthermore claimed to
strengthen with the directives the competitiveness of European industries in the world.
5According to a former commission employee even the Commission circulated its the preparatory documents with
filenames containing »swpat«.
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 11
Table 1: Decision Making Process of the Software Patents and IP Enforcement Directive
Software Patents IP Enforcement
June 1997: Green Paper: Promoting innovation
through patents (COM(1997) 314 final)
Oct. 1998: Green Paper: Combating counterfeiting
and piracy in the single market (COM/98/0569)
European practice: European Patent Convention
(EPC) and most member states’ national patent
laws clearly prohibited granting patents for soft-
ware »as such«, but in the practice of the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO) a significant and steadi-
ly growing number of patents were nevertheless
granted for software solutions.
European practice: Different legal frameworks.
Product piracy and copyright infringement were il-
legal in all member states, but the actual legisla-
tion differed in breadth and scope.
1999: the Commission launched a consultation via
the Internet on the patentability of computer-im-
plemented inventions; it received 1450 responses
in the two months of the consultation. 91% of the
responses to the Commission consultation rejected
the proposed patentability of software
March 1999: Consultation in Munich
Feb. 2002: COM publishes a »Proposal for a Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the patentability of computer-imple-
mented inventions« (KOM 2002).
Jan. 2003: COM publishes a »Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on measures and procedures to ensure the
enforcement of intellectual property rights«
Codecision Procedure Codecision Procedure
Sep. 2003: Parliament adopts a series of substan-
tial amendments and changes to the proposed di-
rective that de facto largely reversed the Commis-
sion’s intentions.
March 2004: Parliament adopts a series of (mostly
minor) amendments and changes.
March 2005: common position adopted by the
Council that largely ignores the Parliament’s
amendments and changes.
April 2004: Council approves Parliament’s first
reading amendments.
July 2005: European Parliament decides in its sec-
ond reading to refrain from trying to change
and/or amend the directive again and instead re-
jected the directive with a huge majority of 648 to
14 votes.
Directive failed Directive approved
In both cases the Commission received strong support by industry lobby groups that
represented a number of powerful key players in the respective fields. But also in both
cases business interests did not unanimously support the Commission’s proposals. Ma-
jor firms from the European telecommunications industry opposed the IP Enforcement
Directive, and a large number of mostly SMEs opposed the Software Patents Directive.
Civil society and consumer interest groups mobilized against the directives in both cas-
es.
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 12
In spite of these similarities of these two decision making processes we can, however,
observe significant differences in the course and intensity of the conflicts: While we
witness a heated debate about the pros and cons of software patents – an issue that
seemed from the outset much less controversial – we see a relatively smooth and undis-
turbed legislative process in the case of the IP Enforcement Directive where one could
have expected much more conflict as the directive touches upon issues like file-sharing
that have received much more public attention than the arcane issue of software patents.
Besides the above mentioned different scope of the directives one reason for this is a
significant difference in the de-facto decision-making process: In the case of the En-
forcement Directive, the decision-making process was considerably speeded up through
the introduction of a so called trialogue; i.e. informal meetings and negotiations be-
tween the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the Euro-
pean Union. The main actors involved in this legislative procedure wanted an adoption
in the 1st reading in order to finish the legislative act before the EU enlargement in May
2004. There were concerns that the new EU member states (with widespread IPR in-
fringement in some countries) might complicate and slow down the decision-making
process. This specific form of decision making lead to reduced avenues of influence for
extraparliamentary informal and weak opponents of this directive.
Other reasons can be seen in the networks and their characteristics. In the following we
will analyze these actor constellation and the networks that were involved in both con-
flicts more thoroughly and discuss what we can learn from these networks about the in-
fluence of different actors – and in particular of weak actors – on the decision-making
process. We will show that the analysis of the social networks is better suited than tradi-
tional power analysis to explain why the conflicts did not end with a clear victory for
the proponents of both directives.
5.1 The Software Patent Directive
In the case of the Software Patents Directive the central actor network comprises about
800 actors. This includes six large membership and support networks. On the side of the
proponents these are the formal membership network of the European Information &
Communications Technology Industry Association (EICTA) with 37 national associa-
tions and 50 companies and the Business Software Alliance (BSA), presenting itself on
its website as »the voice of the world's commercial software industry and its hardware
partners«. Even though some relevant companies are members in both associations
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 13
(SAP, Intel, Adobe Systems, Apple and Symantec), the network data shows that there
was not much cooperation between EICTA and BSA. This may be due to the latent ri-
valry between the two associations as to who represents the major high-tech industries
in Europe.
Figure 1: The software patents network
On the side of the opponents the only formal membership network is that of the Foun-
dation for a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII). The EuroLinux Alliance, Economic-
Majority.com and patentfrei.de are support networks that are actually much larger than
depicted in the network graphics.
The most important difference between the proponents’ and the opponents’ networks is
that the latter did not exist before the conflict. Preexisting networks of e.g. the SME
business associations Confédération Européene des Associations de Petites et Moyenne
Entreprises (CEA-PME) and Union Européenne de l'Artisanat et des Petites et
Moyennes Entreprises (UEAPME) have played only a minor role and did not contribute
much actively to the mobilization and the framing in the conflict – even though they
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 14
provided some infrastructural support. CEA-PME cooperated closely with FFII and
used their established contacts to MEPs. However, these MEPs were not important in
the decision making process. Most of the opponents’ network emerged and was actively
constructed during the mobilization. We can therefore define this network as a situation-
al network.
This ad-hoc character of the oppositional network was combined with a narrow themat-
ic focus on just one issue: software patents. Thus, it is a situational single issue network.
This means that the participating individual and organizational actors joined the net-
work for just this reason so that many of them show a great commitment and dedication.
The majority of those participating in the oppositional network were individual software
programmers or small software companies. Actors from other sectors also joined the
network with the clear objective to prevent the directive.
On the other hand, the preexisting large membership networks of the proponents were
neither situational nor focused on a single issue but already existing and occupied with
many issues, of which one was the Software Patent Directive. Thus, the overall propo-
nent network had a continuous character and its members brought in different interests
and different reasons for being part of the network.
Figure 2: Close cooperation in the SWPat-network core
(line values ≥ 2, k-core ≥ 2, 42 vertices)
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 15
A closer look at the network core (figure 2) illustrates the uneven access the two camps
had to the European institutions. Only the pro-camp was able to establish stable cooper-
ation relationships with the European Commission. This supports the assumption of the
EU interest groups literature that European associations and single large firms would
have the best access to the Commission. None of the camps was able to establish coop-
eration links with the Council directly. This – as well – is in accordance with the re-
search on interest representation in the EU that sees the Council as the institution that is
most likely open to national interest groups via the national lobbying route. Both camps
have established close cooperation relationships with MEPs from all the relevant
groups, but the opponents were clearly more successful in this respect. Moreover – and
this is not shown in the network graphs that only give a static illustration of the conflict
– the opponents had established their cooperations links with the MEPs earlier in the
conflict, because they had, unlike the other side, immediately understood the impor-
tance of the Parliament in the co-decision procedure, whereas the business associations
relied for a long time on their established connections to the Commission.
Looking at the two camps separately reveals even more differences: Figure 3 shows the
core of the oppositional network that consists of all nodes with a k-core greater than 2.
We immediately see the central position of FFII, Florian Müller, and the Green MEPs.
But we also see a dense web of links between many other actors in the sub-network.
Figure 3: SWPat oppositional network core
(left: k-core ≥ 2, 26 vertices; right: without 3 central nodes)
The oppositional network is comparably dense (0.25) has a moderately high degree cen-
tralization (0.58) and a relatively low betweenness centralization (0.24). The moderately
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 16
high degree centralization, which measures the variance of degree centrality in the net-
work, is an indicator for the existence of central actors. The comparably low between-
ness centralization in combination with the high density indicates that the network is
nevertheless relatively unhierarchical and remains strongly connected even if the central
actors are taken out (as done in the right part of figure 3).
Figure 4: SWPat pro network core
(left: k-core ≥ 2, 31 vertices; right: without 3 central nodes)
The internal structure of the pro network differs significantly from the contra network.
The pro network has a density of 0.3, a degree centralization of 0.74, and a betweenness
centralization of 0.55. The network is slightly denser than the oppositional network
more centralized and more hierarchic. If we take out the three central nodes EICTA,
UNICE and Siemens the network decomposes into three sub-networks consisting of Eu-
ropean and national business associations and large IT firms that are BSA members. The
network graph exemplifies that EICTA mainly tried to mobilize other business associa-
tions to support the directive. BSA and EICTA both mobilized essentially the same large
IT firms, and Siemens, with its strong patent department, was the only non-associational
actor that tried to mobilize independently.
The network analysis shows that the opponents managed to built a broad and diversified
and at the same time flexible network. Whereas the network of the proponents was also
relatively big, it was much more institutionalized and had only few important nodes. For
example, only few lobbyists contacted the MEPs, whereas the many different actors
from the opponents’ network contacted them. These manifold avenues of influence have
certainly contributed to the success of the »No Software Patents« camp.
The mobilization against the Software Patent Directive shows many characteristics of a
grassroots mobilization. Many directly affected and committed actors took actively part
in the campaign by writing papers, uploading websites, organizing demonstrations and
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 17
lobbying MEPs. The network was very open so that interested actors were able to par-
ticipate. This kind of grassroots mobilization had also an effect on the discursive level:
As committed individuals they had a high level of credibility among many MEPs. The
decentralized structure of the oppositional network had bases in almost all EU member
countries and thus showed a high level of transnationality. The opponents utilized the
multilevel structure of the EU by being active at the European level but also at the na-
tional level where they lobbied national governments, parliamentarians and parties.
In spite of the plurality of the network as a whole, the FFII was – as noticed above – in
its centre. It was not only a central functional node in terms of connecting different ac-
tors and providing an infrastructure but also an actor that provided the opponent net-
work with expertise and patterns of interpretation and argumentation. It played a central
role in the opponents’ collective action framing. In their framing, the FFII and other op-
ponent actors combined the competitiveness of SMEs with civil rights arguments about
freedom of speech, open access and democratic procedures. This combined set of argu-
ments was convincing for a relevant number of MEPs and the general public, and was
therefore well suited for a political mobilization. 6
The proponents’ network was characterized by a small number of central actors and an
unanimous framing, but it nevertheless did not succeed to construct a collective actor.
This can be explained by the relatively low intensity of commitment of individual net-
work actors and by the fact that predominantly professional lobbyist were running the
campaigns (such as Mark McGann of EICTA, Francisco Mignorance of BSA and Simon
Gentry of the Campaign for Creativity). The proponents did not manage to initiate a
kind of political collective mobilization in which the participants would have been able
to form a collective identity. However, realizing the power of their opponents’ mobiliza-
tion they tried to mimic somehow the methods and forms of grassroots mobilization of
FFII and the opponents. BSA, for example, gathered several SMEs to sign a petition ar-
guing in favor of patents and the Campaign for Creativity7 tried to stage an astroturf
campaign. But in the end EICTA and BSA – did not overcome their rivalries and did not
try to build a strong and dense common network.
6We have analyzed the collective action framing of the actors involved in the conflict in a separate paper (Haunss
and Kohlmorgen 2008b)
7The Campaign for Creativity subsequently won the »Worst Lobbying Award«. The EU lobby awards campaign is
organized annually since 2005 by Corporate Europe Observatory, Friends of the Earth Europe, LobbyControl and
Spinwatch (see: www.worstlobby.eu).
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 18
As might be expected, the MEPs were mostly not part of one of the two camps. They
were usually contacted by both sides and often cooperated with both. Only some indi-
viduals such as the Green MEP Eva Lichtenberger and the adviser to the Greens/EFA
group, Laurence Vandewalle, were important nodes in the opponent network and at the
same time important avenues to the European Parliament. The Commission was – in ac-
cordance to its pro- software patent position – more involved in the proponents network.
3.2 Enforcement Directive
The whole network of relevant actors involved in the conflict on the Enforcement Di-
rective was much smaller than the Software Patent network (approx. 300 nodes). On the
side of the proponents the main actor and sub-network was the International Federation
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) with its members (50 national record industry asso-
ciations and about 1400 companies in over 70 countries). Together with 12 other busi-
ness association (among them BSA, Motion Picture Association, International Video
Federation, European Newspaper Publishers' Association) IFPI formed the informal
Anti-Piracy Coalition to fight product piracy in Europe and to lobby for an EU legisla-
tion against IP infringement and thus created a situational network that was focused on a
specific issue.
Figure 5: The IPRED1 network
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 19
This Anti-Piracy Coalition under the leadership of IFPI was crucially involved in writ-
ing the first draft of the proposal for the directive and thus exerted great influence on the
whole debate from the beginnings. The BSA was another important actor of the propo-
nent camp. In contrast to the Software Patent Directive, where single MEPs played im-
portant but not central roles, we here can also identify one MEP in the centre of the net-
work: Janelly Fourtou (then EEP, now ALDE), who was the rapporteur in the legislative
process and who had close contacts to the above mentioned industry associations. She
was also already involved in drafting the directive and actively campaigned for it. As
Janelly Fourtou is married to the then CEO of Vivendi Universal, which has interests in
restricting and fighting of illegal copying and downloading of music, she was accused
by some organizations and MEPs of being biased and of pursuing private interests.
Figure 6: Close cooperation in the IPRED1-network core
(line values ≥ 2, k-core ≥ 2, 34 vertices)
The network of the opponents included as main actors/single networks the European
Digital Rights Initiative (EDRI) and the Campaign for an Open Digital Environment
(CODE), two civil society and digital rights initiatives, which were established on the
occasion of the mobilization against this directive. EDRI comprises 25 member organi-
zation, CODE – mainly organized by the US organization civil society organization IP
Justice – 53 members. EDRI had a campaigner only responsible for the campaign
against the Enforcement Directive and tried to bring together civil society groups, scien-
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 20
tists and small software developers. However, at that time many software developers
and FFII were occupied with campaigning against the Software Patent Directive and
therefore were not very active in the campaign against the Enforcement Directive,
which obviously weakened the opponents’ network. There were also attempts to forge
cooperation between this these civil society actors and economic actors, but these at-
tempts by and large failed. The companies that were against this directive were for ex-
ample the telephone companies (telcos) and internet service providers BT Group,
Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone Group, MCI Communications, Verizon, Yahoo und Tele-
com Italia. These companies did not want to be held responsible in case of for IP in-
fringements of their customers. Via the European Telecommunications Network Opera-
tors' Association (ETNO) and the informal European Net Alliance they tried to repre-
sent their interests. Furthermore, the generic medicine producers and producers of
generic automotive parts saw their interests affected negatively by the directive. How-
ever EDRI/CODE representing the civil society and civil rights interests and ETNO/Eu-
ropean Net Alliance representing telecommunication companies and specific economic
interests were too different to built a stable common network.
Figure 7: IPRED1 pro and contra network cores
(k-core ≥ 2, line values ≥ 2; left: pro-network, right. contra-network)
Figure 7 provides a closer look at the two respective network cores. The proponents’
network (density: 0.38, degree centralization: 0.63, betweenness centralization 0.76) is
highly centralized with the IFPI led Anti-Piracy Coalition in its center. The oppositional
network (density: 0.13, degree centralization: 0.28, betweenness centralization 0.48) is
sparse. One important actor, the generic pharma industry is not strongly connected to
the rest of the network, and industry and civil society interest are connected only
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 21
through FFII, which did not invest much energy in the conflict, and through a very in-
formal network between EDRI and some telcos, generic producers and automotive
spare parts producers.
The proponents’ network was characterized by actors with much resource based power.
Its most important actors created a situational network (the Anti-Piracy Coalition),
which focused on IP infringement and the Enforcement Directive. This small network
proved to be relatively dense and functioned as a kind o relay for the interaction of the
proponents. Moreover, the involvement of Janelly Fourtou was an important avenue for
the business associations to exert influence on the European Parliament. IFPI’s crucial
role in drafting the Directive was a great advantage for these proponents. Besides good
contacts into the European Parliament, there was intense cooperation with the Commis-
sion. Although the network was not very big, it proved to be very effective and as-
sertive.
On the opponents side, the network was also in parts characterized by situational net-
works as EDRI and CODE as well as the informal European Net Alliance were specifi-
cally created to lobby against the Enforcement Directive. However, the opponents’ net-
work was too small and developed too late to exert significant influence on the deci-
sion-making process. The network had only a relative low density and the two main civ-
il society initiatives EDRI and CODE showed a comparatively strong overlap, which in-
dicates a smaller mobilization base. EDRI and CODE did not succeed to initiate a rele-
vant political mobilization or a grassroots mobilization – as in the software patents case
– so that no real momentum developed in the campaign against IPRED 1. There were
only few committed organizations and individuals actively involved.
The missing stable connection of the two important sub-networks in the oppositional
camp is also reflected in their failure to establish a master frame able to accommodate
the different interests. In the foreground of the NGO campaign stood the civil rights ar-
gument, whereas the economic argument was inconsistent. The civil rights argument
alone was neither able to convince the majority of the decision makers nor did it provide
a master frame for the mobilization. The opponents were not able to convey why more
rigid enforcement of IPRs would conflict with civil rights. On the other side, the propo-
nents managed to construct a successful master frame that became hegemonic: They
claimed that the directive was about »fighting against criminality and product piracy«.
And this master frame was accepted by the majority of the actors as the adequate inter-
pretation. Thus the directive was seen as the proper tool to solve the problem of product
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 22
piracy. Even some of the left wing MEPs agreed to this frame and the proposed problem
solving strategy (see Haunss and Kohlmorgen 2008b).
4. Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that relational characteristics of the actor networks can, indeed,
explain the outcomes of the two conflicts about European IP directives to a certain ex-
tent. Comparing the two conflicts we see two network related factors that were respon-
sible for the partially surprising outcomes:
1. Size, structure & cooperation intensity: The different size of the two networks was
not a result of scope of the directives. On the contrary: The Software Patents Directive
objectively affected a much smaller constituency than the Enforcement Directive. The
larger network in the case of the software patents conflict therefore reflects a much bet-
ter mobilization ratio compared to the enforcement conflict. In the software patents case
the central mobilizing actors, above all the FFII, were able to create a snowball effect,
i.e. at some point during the mobilization individuals and organizations started to join
the protests and lobbying campaign without being explicitly asked to do so. The cam-
paign had a relatively open structure and developed the characteristics of a grassroots
mobilization. At the same time, the opponent network was also dense and only had few
central actors.
Moreover, the network analysis suggests that in both cases the successful networks were
situational and focused collective action networks that did not rely solely on preexisting
membership. These collective action networks were able to mobilize support for their
position even against resourceful established actors that are usually regarded as more
powerful. The dynamic structure of mobilization networks can obviously counter the
static power of resources in some situations.
This was most clearly visible in the case of the software patents conflict where a net-
work of mostly individuals and SMEs was able to compete with a group of transnational
IT firms that not only spent significant sums in their lobbying campaign but were also
supported by major European business associations like the Union of Industrial and Em-
ployers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE, now Businesseurope).
In the case of the Enforcement Directive, the supporters’ and the challengers’ networks
were both to some degree situational networks centered around the Anti-Piracy Coali-
tion and around EDRI/CODE. The nodes of the network were mostly associations or
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 23
NGOs, and the networks did therefore not develop a grassroots dynamic as in the soft-
ware patents conflict. Another reason for the defeat of the anti-Enforcement Directive
campaign was the missing stable connection between the civil society actors and the
economic actors. The supporters of the directive have been successful because they
combined their traditional forms and avenues of lobbying with engagement in an infor-
mal and flexible coalition – using their traditional resource based power and the power
potential of the situational and focused network.
2. Commitment: Directly related to these characteristics of the networks is their ability
to mobilize not just support but highly committed participants. While the resourceful
players relied mostly on traditional lobbying tactics the anti-software patents network
was able to partially substitute their lack of financial resources by the time invested
from many individuals. Unlike lobbyist who are in the European institutions generally
accepted as competent and informed but nevertheless, especially in the parliament, also
regarded with some skepticism, the often very committed individuals, who were mobi-
lized in the software patents conflict, were able to gain significant credibility through
the convincing self-representation of their interests. Here the differences between the in-
stitutions became most visible. The Commission only cooperated with the established
lobbyists and associations, whereas the Parliament was generally much more responsive
to the concerned individuals.
3. Collective action frame and focus: As we have argued above it was not the network
characteristics alone that can explain the outcomes of the two conflicts. The constitution
of the networks relates to the collective action framing of the actors involved. Success
or failure in the two conflicts also depended on the networks’ ability to frame the con-
flict appropriately.
In the conflict around the Enforcement Directive the opponents’ network was fragment-
ed, and there was no shared approach and no consensual framing. Since the precondi-
tion of a focused and convincing master frame was not met the proponents had to deal
with a weak rival in the struggle for discursive hegemony and influence on the decision
making process. This is one central reason for the relatively low level of conflict on the
Enforcement Directive and for the success of the proponents.
In the anti-software patents campaign – in contrast – the economic and civil rights argu-
ments were successfully merged, which both was important for internal processes of
Haunss/Kohlmorgen: Conflicts About Intellectual Property Claims 24
building an collective actor with consensual framing and cohesion as well as had some
influence on the discourse on the SWPat directive. This combined set of arguments was
convincing for a relevant number of MEPs and the general public, and was therefore
well suited for a political mobilization.
Taken together we can conclude that a broad mobilization in combination with a dense
network and the construction of a convincing master frame are conditions for successful
campaigning and influence of weak actors. In more abstract terms we can see that in or-
der to be successful weak actors have to built situational coalitions that fulfill the condi-
tions of a collective actor with a recognizable collective identity: They collectively have
to define the field of opportunities and constraints of their action. This implies the for-
mulation of aims and strategies as well as a shared interpretation of the problem and its
solution.
On a more general level these findings show that relational aspects of collective action
networks have to be taken into account to assess the potential of actors to influence poli-
cy-making. Obviously actor attributes like economic resources and political power play
an important role. But they do not alone determine an actor’s potential to exert influ-
ence. The structure of the collection action networks of which the actors participate is
equally important. In the software patents conflict the power of networks was effective-
ly able to counter the power of resources, and in the IPRED1 conflict the network struc-
ture as well helps to explain why one coalition of resourceful actors was more success-
ful than the other. So far we are not able to generalize the findings of our two cases. But
the results presented in this article suggest that the structure and shape of networks have
to be included in any model that wants to explain the influence of interest groups. Fur-
ther research that includes more cases and more policy fields will possibly be able to
construct a typology of networks and conflicts that will relate network structures and
types of policy conflicts to success or failure of interest representation.
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