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A
daptive Behavior
Review
Adaptive Behavior
2025, Vol. 0(0) 1–21
© The Author(s) 2025
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DOI: 10.1177/10597123251343849
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Creativity: An Individual or Collective
Phenomenon? A Historical-Psychological
Perspective
Leonardo Barón-Birchenall
1
, Andrea S´
anchez-Vallejo
2
, Carlos Toro-Silva
3
and
Andrea Folleco-Eraso
4
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of creativity from a historical-psychological perspective, exploring its evolution over time
and its manifestation as both an individual and collective phenomenon. Through a narrative-theoretical review of the
literature on creativity’s conceptualization, nature, and valuation, we examine how social, cultural, and psychological factors
have influenced the understanding of creativity throughout history. The discussion contrasts key aspects at the individual
level, such as motivation, personality, intuition, exceptionality, and intelligence, with group dimensions like domain, field,
collaboration, background, and the societal consequences of creative acts. The paper presents diverse psychological
frameworks, including behaviorism, psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, humanistic psychology, and cognitive psychology,
each offering unique insights into the mechanisms behind creativity. By tracing the historical phases of creativity—from its
early association with divine creation to its modern applications in art, science, and technology, as well as its relationship
with artificial intelligence—this paper highlights how creativity has been judged and valued across different eras. One of the
conclusions drawn is that while the concept of artistic genius and originality cannot be disentangled from its broader social
and cultural context, creativity is also an intensely personal psychological process, with the internalized sociocultural
context acting as a proxy for external fields and domains.
Keywords
Creativity valuation, historical perspectives on creativity, psychological models of creativity, sociocultural context of
creativity, artistic genius, intuition
Handling Editor: Luisa Damiano, IULM, Italy
Ideas are like rabbits. You get a couple and learn how to handle
them, and pretty soon you have a dozen. –J. Steinbeck
1. Introduction
Even though the creative phenomenon is a constant in
human experience, creativity, its conceptualization, nature,
process, and valuation have changed over the course of
history and will likely continue to do so. To begin this paper,
we will provisionally define creativity as the ability to
generate useful, novel, and relevant ideas or artifacts (et-
ymologically, the word creativity comes from the verb
create, Latin creare, which means to make or produce in a
physical sense [G¨
otz, 1981]). For a general approximation,
see for example, Sawyer and Henriksen (2024),Sternberg
and Karami (2022), and Ward et al. (1995).
There are at least four phases in the history of the term
creativity (Tatarkiewicz, 2001). The first refers to the
1
Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios –UNIMINUTO, Bogot´
a,
Colombia
2
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogot´
a, Colombia
3
Independent Researcher, Bogot´
a, Colombia
4
Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores, Bogot´
a, Colombia
Corresponding author:
Leonardo Barón-Birchenall, Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios –
UNIMINUTO, Carrera 73a No. 81b-70, Bogot´
a, Colombia.
Email: laescaladesol@gmail.com
ancient world, where, particularly in the case of the Greeks,
the term was not used in philosophy, theology, or art. The
Romans, on the other hand, did know the term creativity,but
they did not apply it to any of these three fields, where the
term ingenuity was usually used, equivalent to the current
conception of creativity. The second phase refers to
Christianity, from which the term creator was popularized
in theology as a synonym for God. The word continued to be
used exclusively in this sense until the Enlightenment.
The third phase in the history of the term creativity
corresponds to the nineteenth century, in which the term
creator was incorporated into the language of art
(Tatarkiewicz, 2001). The term creator then became syn-
onymous with artist, while new expressions such as the
adjective creative and the noun creativity were formed.
Finally, in the twentieth century, the expression creator
began to be applied to all aspects of human culture. People
began to talk about creativity in science, creative politicians,
creators of new technology, and so on.
Since the mid-twentieth century, the concept of creativity
began to acquire increasingly defined characteristics, thanks
to a veritable explosion of research in the field of psy-
chology in the United States. One of the main assumptions
of this research was that creativity can be measured
(Franklin, 2023). In this favorable context for the study of
creativity, the first scientific journal focused on the subject,
the Journal of Creative Behavior, began to circulate in 1967.
During its different phases, the history of the under-
standing of creativity has been shaped by the prevailing
values of the corresponding time, and has been influenced
by social, cultural, economic, political, technological, and
scientific factors. There have been myths such as that of the
genius or the mad creator, as well as beliefs perpetuated to
this day, such as that children are more creative than adults,
that school annihilates creativity in children, or that creating
requires absolute freedom. Ultimately, the questions of who
creates, how they achieve it, and how society and the author
judge the creation are configured in the historical and
cultural context in which the study of the creative phe-
nomenon is located (Gl˘
aveanu & Kaufman, 2019).
The present article provides a non-exhaustive narrative
and theoretical review of the academic literature related to
the individual and/or collective nature of creativity. Our aim
is to identify, synthesize, and discuss works that allow for an
analysis of how the individual and collective dimensions of
creativity have been addressed by researchers. Although
this distinction is mentioned in some studies, we believe that
there is, to date, no review that compares the theoretical
perspectives of works favoring an individual approach with
those favoring a collective approach, as well as those that
take both aspects of this distinction into account.
In the first section, titled The Creative Individual,we
examine various aspects related to the individual facet of
creativity. This includes the historical foundations of
creativity, the behavioral and unconscious elements inherent
in the creative act, and the incremental and intuitive nature
of creative processes. Additionally, we analyze the per-
sonality traits and cognitive abilities associated with crea-
tive individuals, as well as the relationship between
creativity and brain functioning. In the second section, titled
The Creative Individual in Context: Relationships and In-
fluences, we explore theoretical frameworks for analyzing
creativity that incorporate group dynamics, extrinsic mo-
tivational factors influencing the creative process, and the
role of social recognition and collaboration. Additionally,
we examine the concept of inconclusive creativity, the
influence of cultural contexts and social networks on cre-
ative expression, the phenomenon of distributed creativity,
and various aspects of collective collaboration mediated by
modern technologies. Throughout the text, we provide the
reader with the nationality, occupation, birth date, and,
when applicable, death date of the key historical figures we
consider central to the study of creativity.
2. The Creative Individual
2.1. Historical roots of creativity: from divine
inspiration to individual genius
Early scientific research on creativity, particularly post-
World War II, assumes an individual, intrapsychological
origin of creativity. This was partly because such research
perceived creativity as part of the historical process of
progressive individualization that began in the Renaissance
and reached its climax in contemporary capitalist societies,
particularly in the United States (Gl ˘
aveanu & Kaufman,
2019).
However, the question of the individualistic condition of
creativity existed long before the scientific formalization of
the concept in the United States. For example, although
there was no specific term to refer to it, creativity was not
unfamiliar to the thinking of the ancient Greeks. Among
them, the imaginaries about the creative process itself aimed
to see it as the result of divine inspiration or as a form of
madness (Contini, 2001;Whitehead, 2017). The first of
these visions is known as inspirationism, since in ancient
Greece it was believed that the infusion of breath by the
muses generated new ideas. This is also why we say that we
feel inspired when we have an idea.
On the other hand, the imaginary of creativity as a form
of madness is possibly due to the uniqueness of the ideas
generated by individuals with psychological disorders
(Romo, 1997;Whitehead, 2017). This has prompted
speculation in modern times that mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia or neurodevelopmental conditions such as
autism may be linked to greater creativity due to the way
they affect an individual’s thinking and perception (see for
example Jackson, 2015). In this regard, it is crucial to
2Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
understand that while it is true that some people with certain
conditions may have unique cognitive and perceptual ex-
periences that fuel their creativity, not all creative indi-
viduals suffer from mental disorders, nor are all people with
mental disorders especially creative.
Over the years, there has also been the romantic ap-
proach, in which the creative individual is seen as a dif-
ferent, special, even privileged being, within a society that
cannot aspire to such feats (Boden, 2004). A particular
version of the romantic approach was developed during the
Renaissance: the idea of the creative individual in art as an
alienated individual, influenced by Saturn, and with a
different type of life than most people (Romo, 1997).
2.2. Creativity between conditioned behaviors and
the unconscious mind
Returning to the early scientific research on creativity, the
psychological school of behaviorism, prominent during the
first part of the twentieth century, adopted a distinctly in-
dividualistic approach to creativity, although without nec-
essarily conceding that there is a process of creation from
scratch. According to John Watson [1878–1958], American
psychologist and founder of behaviorism, if an individual is
faced with a novel problematic situation, he generalizes
responses previously given in similar situations, transferring
to the present associations that worked successfully in the
past (Weisberg, 1986). If the behaviors due to past asso-
ciations are not enough to solve the novel problem, the
individual gives random answers until an acceptable
product is achieved.
Later, theorists of instrumental conditioning, a subse-
quent development of classical behaviorism, accepted the
existence of creativity as an individual behavior that is
mediated by external rewards. Unfortunately, in both cases
the particularities of the creative process itself seem to have
gone unnoticed (Gardner, 1994; further information on the
early behavioral perspective on creativity can be found in
Kubina et al., 2006).
In contrast to the initial behaviorist approaches, and
around the same time, within the framework of classical
psychoanalysis, creativity represents a mechanism for
sublimating drives, a primary process in which associations
are formed outside conscious awareness, as exemplified in
dreams and slips of the tongue (Boden, 2004). In this
context, sublimation is understood as the transformation of
instinctual desires or impulses into socially acceptable
behaviors, preventing their inappropriate or destructive
expression.
Likewise, in accordance with the vision of creativity
linked to psychological disorders, in his study of Leonardo
Da Vinci, Sigmund Freud [1856–1939], Austrian neurol-
ogist and father of psychoanalysis, suggested considering
intrapsychic disorder as a source of creative productivity
(Romo, 1997). However, Freud’s exploration extends to
unconscious dynamics and psychic conflicts, which he
argues can be sublimated into creativity, challenging the
prevailing view of these elements as mere disorders.
For psychoanalysis, creativity processes represent a
break in continuity, a fracture in a linear development, the
fulfillment of a lack (absence that generates dissatisfaction
or discomfort) that at the same time tries to cover it, granting
adifferent meaning (otro sentido) but not an again (otra
vez), and relating in dialectical and dynamic opposition to
the process of repetition (Czernikowski, 1994; an overview
of creativity from a psychoanalytic perspective can be found
in Bollas, 2014).
Following this line of thought, and according to the
American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Lawrence Kubie
[1896–1973], creative thinking is a predominantly uncon-
scious, internal process that is controlled and even inhibited
by the Ego and Superego (Adams, 2019). In this context,
Ego refers to the part of the mind that deals with reality and
fulfills wants and needs in a rational and socially acceptable
manner. The Superego, on the other hand, represents the part
of the mind that internalizes social and moral norms, serving
as the conscience and ideal of individuals.
From Kubie’s perspective, creative thinking arises from
the deepest parts of the mind, those beyond conscious
control, and can be restricted by the most critical and
normative aspects of the personality (Adams, 2019). In this
scenario, creative thinking is inherently human and po-
tentially liberating, while also being subject to internalized
social norms and constraints, which can lead individuals to
face internal conflicts between creative impulses and social
and ethical expectations.
2.3. Incubation, intuition, and the eureka moment
Following the line of psychoanalysis, and based on the
observations of the French mathematician Henri Poincar ´
e,
the English social psychologist Graham Wallas [1858–
1932] postulates four phases for the development of the
creative process with respect to problem-solving (under-
standing problem-solving as the process of identifying,
analyzing, and finding solutions to challenges or obstacles):
preparation,incubation,illumination, and verification
(Weisberg, 1986). During preparation, the individual con-
sciously considers the problem, pre-activating possible
combinations of ideas. During the incubation phase, while
the individual moves his thinking away from the problem,
there is an unconscious association of ideas from the pre-
activation of the previous stage, which generates possible
solutions. Such possible solutions are communicated to the
conscious mind during the illumination phase and are
evaluated by the creative individual during the verification
Barón-Birchenall et al. 3
phase, where esthetic factors are considered to ultimately
determine the idea’s effectiveness in solving the problem.
The incubation phase is understood by the Hungarian-
British writer and journalist Arthur Koestler [1905–1983],
within the framework of his theory of creativity by biso-
ciation, as an unconscious process in which apparently
unrelated ideas are brought into contact and combined in an
original and unexpected way (Koestler, 1964;Weisberg,
1986). During this process, matrices would be formed,
consisting of mental structures in which fragments of in-
formation are organized and connected in novel ways,
providing fertile ground in which ideas can be freely de-
veloped and mixed (a kind of brainstorming) until a pos-
sible solution to the problem at hand is reached.
When the newly incubated creative idea reaches con-
sciousness, the phenomenon known as the Aha! or Eureka!
moment occurs. Such an insight moment represents the
culmination of the creative process, during which the matrix
of thoughts formed during the incubation phase crystallizes
into a concrete idea or solution. In this instant, the mind
becomes aware of connections between previously dis-
connected ideas, generating a new and original under-
standing. This process is similar to what the American
cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner [1915–2016] called
efficient surprise, which implies a kind of shock as a re-
sponse to creation and the realization that something similar
has not been seen before (Romo, 1997).
The incubation theory, sometimes also referred to as
creative concern, explains why temporarily setting aside a
problem can facilitate its solution. Numerous researchers
have explored this phenomenon, linking it to various factors
such as inhibiting restrictions, analogical thinking, adopting
fresh perspectives, forgetting incorrect solutions, or simply
resting (Contini, 2001). However, the idea of the Aha!
moment marking the end of incubation implies a significant
leap of intuition during problem-solving. But do these in-
tuitive leaps really exist? While it is undeniable that certain
problem elements bring us closer to a solution, their precise
nature often eludes clear identification, especially when
relying on self-reported data from case studies
(Weisberg, 1986).
2.4. Incremental creativity: from iterative steps to
lifelong development
A perspective contrasting with the incubation theory posits
that creative problem-solving unfolds incrementally
through a series of small, iterative steps. Rather than a
sudden Aha! moment, solutions would be gradually refined
through persistent effort, modifying, and building upon
previous attempts. Consistent with this position, intro-
spective studies indicate that problem-solving often in-
volves a winding path marked by setbacks and obstacles
before the final breakthrough (Romo, 1997;Weisberg,
1986,2018).
The idea of the incremental development of creativity
also aligns with what was proposed by the American
cognitive psychologist Ronald Finke [1950–2015] in his
geneplore model (Ward et al., 1995). The model highlights
two fundamental phases in creative cognition: the gener-
ative phase, during which pre-inventive cognitive structures
are formed and a mental model of the problem space is
constructed, and the exploratory phase, where the emergent
properties of these structures are exploited to arrive at a
creative solution to the problem. This approach emphasizes
the role of constraints in the creative act, as it is the con-
straint that triggers the generative processes which in turn
shed light on how to evaluate the pre-inventive structures of
the exploratory phase. From this perspective, specific
knowledge of a particular field is understood as the foun-
dation from which creative ideas emerge and what enables
the recognition of their possibilities (Ward et al., 1995).
The recently discussed scenario is consistent with the
idea of primary and secondary creativity (or creativeness),
proposed by the American humanistic psychologist Abra-
ham Maslow [1908–1970]. Primary creativity refers to a
sudden inspiration coming from a deeper level of con-
sciousness, an unfinished idea, the beginning of a process. It
is characterized by being common and universal in children,
although it tends to be blocked in adults. Secondary crea-
tivity refers to the subsequent development of the inspi-
ration, project, or idea, and often relies on discoveries and
advancements made by others, though it does not neces-
sarily occur in tandem (López, 1995). All of this is un-
derstood by Maslow as part of a continuous quest for self-
actualization within an optimistic and even healthy context
of the individual.
A concept similar to primary and secondary creativity
was later developed in the multi-c framework of creativity
(Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). Based on types of creative
products, this model emphasizes the distinction between
mini-c,little-c,Pro-c, and Big-C (with “c”standing for
creativity). Depending on the level of development, the
model spans from creativity typical of early cognitive de-
velopment, which does not involve any special recognition
by society, through everyday problem-solving and the
creativity exhibited by professionals in fields such as music
and science, to the creativity of the great geniuses of history,
which has a lasting impact and is often widely recognized.
2.5. Creativity: between self-realization and inner
conflict
Carl Rogers [1902–1987], another renowned American
humanistic psychologist, shares Maslow’s conception of the
creative act as related to physical and mental well-being,
4Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
also understanding creativity as a process that participates in
openness to experience (Adams, 2019). In this sense, the
individual creates primarily because it satisfies him/her and
contributes to the journey towards self-realization, which
can manifest in various domains such as art, science, and
even war (López, 1995).
But the creative process is not always framed within a
context of satisfaction and self-knowledge. In contrast, an
approach to creativity that diverges from the humanistic
framework is that of the American psychologist and World
War II veteran Frank Barron [1922–2002]. According to
Barron, creativity arises from conflicting internal impulses
that are not necessarily associated with a good state of
mental health. The creative individual is rather an observer
in a complex environment, often navigating a chaotic, even
tortured life (Adams, 2019). This view emphasizes the
connection between creativity and neurosis, recalling the
earlier approaches linking creation and madness that we
have discussed.
2.6. Creativity as a break from tradition: originality
versus incremental development
Another reiterative theme developed within the framework
of the individualistic vision of creativity is the notion of the
rupture that a creative product implies with previous lines of
thought. In this regard, Manuela Romo [?-], professor at the
Autonomous University of Madrid, suggests that it is un-
likely for a genuinely original and creative product to
emerge merely from the application of certain generative
rules to previous elements, as creation involves a break or
radical change with respect to what previously existed
(Romo, 1997). This perspective aligns with the proposal of
the English cognitive psychologist Margaret Boden [1936-],
who distinguishes between novel and original ideas: novel
ideas arise from a set of generative rules applied to existing
ideas (an approach likely influenced by Chomsky’s gen-
erative grammar), while original ideas cannot emerge from
such rules and represent a departure from what came before
(Boden, 2004).
To substantiate her argument against the possibility of
creative rupture, Romo (1997) uses Picasso’s cubist style as
an example. This style, characterized by painting the front
and profile on the same plane, is widely recognized as a
significant break from preceding painting styles. However,
it is known that Picasso was familiar with the caves of
Lascaux and Altamira, where precursors of the cubist
technique can be found (Trendall, 2004). Thus, in Picasso,
as in most artists, the technical and thematic influences
shaping his artistic output can be traced—even if drawing
on earlier pictorial traditions sometimes meant diverging
from the prevailing artistic trends of his time (di Bella,
2005). Following this logic, it seems reasonable to support
the incremental view of creativity proposed by the cognitive
psychologist Robert Weisberg [?-] (1986, 2018), which
minimizes the notion that the Aha! moment involves a
fundamental intuitive leap during the creative process,
challenging the romanticized view of creativity as a sudden,
inexplicable flash of insight.
2.7. The role of serendipity and intuition in creativity
At the individual level, chance has also been considered an
influential aspect of creativity. For example, the term ser-
endipity, coined in 1989, refers to the fortuitous discovery of
something when one is not actively searching for it (Romo,
1997). Such serendipitous discoveries often occur when an
individual is well-prepared in a specificfield. In these cases,
an event that might otherwise go unnoticed can be given
special significance, as it relates to a process that has been
developing in the mind, potentially leading to a result that
might not have occurred without the element of chance.
However, intuition also plays a role in the creative
process, emerging from novel activations of cognitive
schemas, triggered by the re-representation of the mental
space associated with a given problem (Csikszentmihalyi,
2014;Minervino, 2005). These novel activations can make
available to the mind new operators (methods or procedures
for solving a problem), ideally those required for the sit-
uation. Consequently, the creative individual is not merely a
passive recipient of inspiration but an active agent who
cultivates a mental environment conducive to novel con-
nections, which involves a balance of focused attention and
open-mindedness.
2.8. Problem-solving, (re)productive, and divergent
thinking
Another theoretical explanation of creativity that focuses on
the creator’s individual characteristics comes from the
German Gestalt school, which particularly emphasized the
relationship between creativity and problem-solving. It
views the latter as issues that require unique and inde-
pendent solutions, which transcend previous experience and
can also be addressed without specific knowledge
(Weisberg, 2018). From the Gestalt perspective, the primary
difficulty in solving a problem lies in the fact that the el-
ements necessary for the solution cannot be integrated as a
cohesive whole within the perceptual field. Achieving this
integration facilitates the visualization (in a broad sense) of
novel relationships between the elements of the problem,
which can lead to a solution.
Likewise, Max Wertheimer [1880–1943], a German
psychologist born in Prague and one of the founders of
Gestalt psychology, proposed a distinction between re-
productive thinking and productive thinking. Reproductive
Barón-Birchenall et al. 5
thinking involves applying existing procedures and
knowledge to solve a novel problem, whereas productive
thinking requires a comprehensive understanding of the
specific problem’s particularities, beyond previous experi-
ences, and based on the reorganization and novel use of
ideas (Weisberg, 1986). This distinction bears resemblance
to the concepts of assimilation and accommodation later
developed by the Swiss psychologist, biologist, and epis-
temologist Jean Piaget [1896–1980].
A little later, around 1950, the American cognitive psy-
chologist Joy Paul Guilford [1897–1987] introduced his
conception of creativity as a divergent thinking process to the
psychological community (Plucker et al., 2024). This type of
thinking involves fluency, flexibility, and originality in idea
generation, as well as sensitivity to problem discovery and
structuring. Divergent thinking generates multiple possibil-
ities in response to a dilemma, in contrast to convergent
thinking, which selects the most suitable solution from these
options (de Bono proposes a very similar approach under the
name of lateral thinking [Hendryx, 2024]).
Guilford’s approach led to the development of tests
designed to assess convergent and divergent thinking ca-
pacities as well as individuals’creative aptitudes, marking
the introduction of the first instruments to measure crea-
tivity. In contrast, earlier attempts at measuring creativity
include those made at the end of the nineteenth century by
the French psychologist Alfred Binet [1857–1911], who,
despite creating the first intelligence test, was unable to
successfully incorporate an objective measure of creativity
into it. For more details on the measurement of creativity,
see Alencar et al. (2021) and Sternberg and O’Hara (1998).
2.9. Fixation and heuristics: insights from the water
jug experiment
The Gestalt school also drew attention to the inconvenience
of maintaining a strong dependence on the past when
solving a problem, a phenomenon they called fixation
(Minervino, 2005). This hypothesis seemed to be confirmed
by the water jug (or water jar)experiment, conducted by the
American second-generation Gestalt psychologist Abraham
Luchins [1914–2005]. The experiment focuses on a specific
type of fixation, known as functional fixation. In it, par-
ticipants are presented with a series of problems that involve
measuring a specific amount of water using three containers
of different capacities. Initially, participants learn a specific
pattern for solving the problems. Subsequently, when
presented with new problems that can be solved more
simply, participants tend to continue using the initially
learned pattern, demonstrating a fixation on the previous
method (Luchins, 1942).
Although some argue that the water jug experiment is not
representative of everyday situations (Weisberg, 1986),
which calls its generalizability into question, it did en-
courage further exploration of the role of expertise in
problem-solving and its relationship with resolution modes
such as heuristics and algorithms (generally, a heuristic is
understood to be an operation that may or may not achieve
the transition from point A to point B, whereas an algorithm
is an operation that does guarantee such a transition). On the
other hand, a specific heuristic that has been useful in
solving one type of problem may not be useful for another
type, even if both cases share essential characteristics, as
demonstrated in the water jug experiment.
2.10. The nature of creative individuals: unique traits
versus common attributes
Another important aspect in the development of the concept
of creativity as an individual capacity is the debate between
how unique and special versus how disciplined and generic
a highly creative individual is. In this regard, the American
cognitive psychologist David Perkins [1928-] proposes the
nothing special approach (Perkins, 1981; see also Beltr´
an,
2005). This perspective, shared by authors such as Margaret
Boden and the American cognitive psychologist Howard
Gardner [1943-], author of one of the theories of multiple
intelligences, suggests that creative work is not funda-
mentally different from ordinary cognitive processes but is
essentially an extension of them. This viewpoint also has
practical implications for creativity pedagogy, as it supports
the implementation of specific teaching techniques to en-
hance creativity from an early age (see Colangelo & Davis,
2002). Interestingly, the nothing special approach can be
taken to an extreme, suggesting that under the right con-
ditions, individuals could potentially achieve the accom-
plishments of prominent figures like Darwin, Beethoven, or
Verne (see Romo, 1997).
Nevertheless, adopting the nothing special approach
does not imply denying that exceptionally creative indi-
viduals often share certain personality traits. While these
traits do not necessarily make them “unique and great,”they
can form a combination of factors that facilitate the de-
velopment of creativity. Such personality traits include
boldness, risk-taking ability, tolerance for frustration and
uncertainty, motivation to excel, and a healthy degree of
self-confidence (Contini, 2001;Lebuda, 2024;Selby et al.,
2005).
In contrast, the Hungarian American psychologist Mi-
haly Csikszentmihalyi [1934–2021] describes the com-
plexity of the creative personality as a tendency to exhibit
characteristics that do not typically coexist, such as insight
and naivety, or energy and calmness (Csikszentmihalyi,
2014). This blend of traits enables exceptionally creative
individuals to adapt to various contexts and leverage sit-
uations that might pose conflicts for others. Additionally, a
6Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
fundamental personality trait of the creative individual
would be the capacity for self-promotion. This trait allows a
person to publicize their work within their field, which
includes other socially recognized creative individuals who
will ultimately assess the work and decide whether to en-
dorse this new member of the community (Gardner, 1994).
The concept of self-promotion aligns with the investment
theory of creativity, developed by the American psychol-
ogist and psychometrician Robert Sternberg [1949-]. Ac-
cording to this theory, a creative individual “buys low and
sells high”in the world of ideas. That is, they identify
unpopular and undervalued ideas and opportunities, work
on them by revealing their value and usefulness to society,
and finally use their practical intelligence to position the
product or idea in the market (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995).
However, the idea of a specific type of creative per-
sonality is not universally accepted. For example, Robert
Weisberg (mentioned previously) argues that the personality
characteristics of exceptionally creative individuals vary
depending on the field in which they work and even the
stage of their career. He notes that great artists have pro-
duced both high- and low-quality works while exhibiting
the same personality traits, suggesting that there is no single
creative personality. Consequently, while certain person-
ality traits may facilitate creative production, they are
neither defining nor necessary conditions for the creation of
high-level creative work (Weisberg, 1986).
2.11. Creativity and the brain
Another angle in the study of creativity, heavily influenced
by an individualistic perspective, focuses on the neuroan-
atomical, neurophysiological, and neuropsychological
foundations of the creative process. In this context, neu-
roscience aims to characterize and predict creative thinking
by evaluating functional and structural brain parameters.
For instance, changes in cortical volume and thickness, as
well as alterations in electrical or metabolic activity, are
commonly assessed to estimate creative capacity (Ross
et al., 2023). Specifically, creative potential has been
linked to increased gray matter volume in the prefrontal
gyrus and the precuneus, the latter being involved in in-
trospection and the retrieval of information from episodic
memory (Chamberlain et al., 2014). Furthermore, variations
in the volume and thickness of the right precuneus are
reliable predictors of verbal creativity (Chen et al., 2015),
while changes in the cerebellum are linked to enhanced
artistic creativity (Adamaszek et al., 2022).
It has also been found that highly creative individuals
exhibit increased activation in the right hemisphere and
greater synchronization of alpha waves across different
brain regions. Additionally, structural changes have been
observed, such as alterations in the white matter of the lower
frontal regions and increased gray matter in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the striatum (Abraham, 2013).
Moreover, creative cognition has recently been associated
with dopamine release in ventral brain regions (Liu et al.,
2024).
From a neurocognitive perspective, creativity is regarded
as a relatively stable ability throughout life and an inherent
aspect of cognitive functioning. Cognitive flexibility, along
with episodic and semantic memory, is often regarded as the
substrate for creative thinking. However, while several
authors have emphasized the role of episodic memory in
creative processes, data from the meta-analysis conducted
by Gerver et al. (2023) challenge this notion. Their findings
indicate a much stronger correlation between semantic
memory and creative cognition.
From a functional perspective, creativity involves a
strong interplay between three neural networks: the default
mode network, the executive control network, and the sa-
lience network (Beaty, 2020;Beaty et al., 2016). The default
mode network, a communication network active during rest,
enables flexible attention and the retrieval of information
(Chen et al., 2015). The executive control network supports
judgment and decision-making processes based on inputs
from the salience network, which, in turn, is involved in
switching between the default and control networks. In this
scenario, creativity is thought to be facilitated during the
resting state, when the brain’s electrical activity fluctuates
spontaneously and slowly across the cerebral cortex. Al-
though the precise role of these fluctuations in cognitive
processes remains unclear (Malach, 2024), it has been
suggested that oscillations in the right temporal lobe pro-
mote the generation of unconventional ideas by inhibiting
obvious semantic associations (Luft et al., 2018).
Finally, a widely held notion links the right hemisphere
to creativity. Supporting this idea, Aberg et al. (2017)
provided empirical evidence showing that the right hemi-
sphere facilitates cognitive flexibility and the association of
remote ideas through an asymmetrical dopamine flow in-
volving communication between the striatum and temporal,
parietal, and frontal cortical areas. Cognitive flexibility, in
turn, is seen as a function of the prefrontal cortex that plays a
significant and distinct role in creative processes. Specifi-
cally, rostral regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex are
implicated in the creative combination of ideas, whereas
lateral regions are involved in generating ideas freely and in
novel ways (Gonen et al., 2013).
2.12. Creativity versus intelligence: beyond high IQ
To conclude this section, we will briefly address the rela-
tionship between creativity and intelligence from an indi-
vidual perspective. In this regard, it has been proposed that
an IQ above 130 does not necessarily guarantee the creation
of highly creative works. This is because individuals with
such high levels of intelligence are often characterized by
Barón-Birchenall et al. 7
convergent and practical thinking, which helps them exe-
cute tasks as efficiently as possible, avoiding “unnecessary
paths”(Contini, 2001;Sternberg & O’Hara, 1998; see the
distinction between convergent and divergent thinking
discussed above).
Based on a review of the existing literature, Dutch
psychologist Franz M ¨
onks [1932–2020] argues that while
most highly creative individuals tend to be highly intelli-
gent, the reverse is not necessarily true: not all highly in-
telligent people are exceptionally creative (M¨
onks et al.,
1997). Additionally, M¨
onks’model of triadic interdepen-
dence suggests that talent, creativity, and even motivation
and personal abilities are influenced by cultural and social
contexts. Such an idea serves us precisely as a bridge be-
tween the individual conception of creativity and theories
that give special relevance to the environment and the
collective dimension as fundamental elements in achieving
useful, novel, and relevant ideas or artifacts.
3. The Creative Individual in Context:
Relationships and Influences
The individualistic conception of creativity prevailed until
around the 1980s, when new systemic and distributed
conceptions emerged (Gl˘
aveanu & Kaufman, 2019). These
contextual approaches drew on social psychology and so-
ciology to study the creative outputs generated by large and
complex groups. Nonetheless, since the 1950s, some psy-
chologists had considered the influence of the environment
on creativity, though subordinated to the individual. One
example is J. P. Guilford (mentioned earlier), who, in his
1950 inaugural address as president of the APA, called for
the formal study of creativity (Guilford, 1950).
3.1. Evolving frameworks of creativity: from 4P to 8P
One of the many results of Guilford’s appeal was the
seminal work by the American educational psychologist
Melvin Rhodes [1916–1976], entitled An Analysis of
Creativity (Rhodes, 1961). In this paper, in addition to
emphasizing that creative processes can be fostered during
childhood, Rhodes presents the 4P framework of creativity,
which covers: Person, referring to the individual charac-
teristics of creative people, such as personality traits,
domain-specific skills, intrinsic motivation, and intelli-
gence; Process, referring to the mental development of the
creative process, covering aspects such as creative thinking
techniques, redefinition of variables, and problem-solving
methods; Press/Place, referring to the environment and
contextual influences that can facilitate or inhibit creativity,
such as the work environment, social expectations, and
cultural norms (for the difference between the terms Press
and Place, and their use, see Runco, 2007); and Products,
referring to the outcomes of creativity and how they come to
be considered original, useful, and valuable.
Although the 4P framework was a pioneering approach
to organizing the study of creativity, it presents significant
limitations. For instance, by separating the Person and
Press/Place dimensions the model fails to capture the re-
ciprocal dynamics between individuals and their cultural
and social environments. This critique has been raised by
scholars such as Gl˘
aveanu (2013), who emphasize that
creativity emerges from interactions between creators and
their contexts. Furthermore, the Press/Place dimension is
somehow ambiguous, as it encompasses both positive and
negative factors without providing an in-depth analysis of
how these influence the creative process or their relative
weight across different stages of creation (Runco, 2007).
Another criticism is the model’s focus on a linear con-
ception of the creative process and tangible products, as
Sternberg and Karami (2022) note. This excludes more
emergent and iterative forms of creativity, such as those
involving unfinished or collectively redefined processes.
A hierarchical reorganization of the 4P framework of
creativity is known as the 6P framework of creativity
(Runco, 2007;Simonton, 1990). In addition to the original
four Ps (Person, Process, Press/Place and Products), the new
model includes Persuasion and Potential. Persuasion refers
to the ability to convince others of the validity and use-
fulness of the creative product (compare to the concept of
self-promotion capacity and to the investment theory of
creativity, discussed earlier), while Potential refers to the
latent capacities of individuals or groups to generate cre-
ative actions (a concept similar to the psychological concept
of talent; see the myth of genius, discussed below).
However, while the 6P framework succeeds in ad-
dressing some limitations of the 4P model by incorporating
dimensions that acknowledge the social and prospective
nature of creativity, it does not fully resolve the challenges
of integrating individual and contextual factors into a co-
hesive analysis. For instance, its emphasis on elements such
as Persuasion risks perpetuating a bias toward publicly
recognized forms of creativity, potentially marginalizing
less visible but equally valuable expressions, such as in-
dividual or emergent creativity. Additionally, while the
inclusion of the Potential dimension is valuable for con-
sidering the latent capacities of individuals or groups, it
risks becoming overly vague without clear criteria for
measurement.
Since their introduction, the 4P and 6P frameworks have
been essential in explaining the phenomenon of creativity.
However, different theoretical models for the creative
process have been proposed since then, including the 5A
framework of creativity (Gl˘
aveanu, 2013). This framework
differentiates between Actor,Action,Artifact,Audience, and
Affordances, recognizing respectively the roles in the cre-
ative process of the individual or group that creates, the
8Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
creative actions along with their corresponding cognitive
processes, the result of the creative process, the audience
that reacts by adopting, adapting, or rejecting the product,
and the opportunities for creative action available in the
social and cultural context in which the creation is con-
ceived and carried out. In this way, it is understood that
although creative capacity has an important individual
cognitive and behavioral component, it is also influenced by
social relationships, environments and cultural norms, and
various other aspects such as institutional support, access to
resources, and technological advances.
From a critical perspective, while this model is notable for
its sociocultural approach, this same emphasis may also be its
greatest limitation. By prioritizing the dynamics between the
Actor, the Audience, and the Affordances, the model tends to
underestimate the role of internal and individual processes in
creativity, such as intrinsic motivation or internal conflict,
which have been discussed in this paper. For instance, its focus
on the Audience as an evaluator of creative products intro-
duces a bias toward social and cultural acceptance, relegating
to the background the subjective and transformative value that
the creative process can have for the creator. Furthermore,
although the inclusion of Affordances represents a step for-
ward in conceptualizing context, the concept does not suffi-
ciently account for structural factors such as unequal access to
resources or cultural capital and their impact on creativity.
The 7C framework of creativity (Lubart, 2017), in turn,
differentiates between Creators,Creating,Contexts,Cre-
ations,Collaborations,Consumption, and Curricula. This
approach encompasses, in addition to the creators, the
creative action, the context, and the product recognized in
the 5A framework, the collaboration between people or
groups during the creative action (Collaborations), the
process of acceptance and adoption of creative ideas
(Consumption), and the processes of formal teaching and
promotion of creativity (Curricula).
Although the 7C framework represents an advancement
in addressing the complexity of the creative process in
contemporary contexts, it has certain limitations. For in-
stance, while the inclusion of Collaborations highlights the
importance of collective work in creativity, it may reduce
the importance of individual autonomy in contexts where
creativity unfolds in a more introspective or solitary
manner. Similarly, the Consumption dimension introduces
a utilitarian perspective that may constrain the intrinsic
value of creative ideas that do not necessarily seek mass
acceptance. Meanwhile, the Curricula dimension, though
innovative, lacks sufficient detail on how to implement
pedagogical strategies that foster creativity at both the
individual and collective levels, leaving open the question
of how to balance these dimensions within educational
contexts.
Finally, the 8P framework for understanding creativity
encompass Purpose,Press,Person,Problem,Process,
Product,Propulsion, and Public (Sternberg & Karami,
2022). This model integrates several elements from pre-
vious frameworks, adding new dimensions such as the
purpose of creativity, which distinguishes between the
positive, negative, and mixed consequences of creative acts
(Purpose), the type of problem addressed by creative
thinking and its relationship with convergent and divergent
thinking (Problem), and the impact of a creative idea or
product on a field of knowledge, a way of thinking, or a
category of products (Propulsion).
It should be noted that the negative consequences of
creativity, often termed negative creativity, are less frequently
discussed than traditional forms of creativity (Kapoor, 2024).
Negative creativity refers to the application of creative
thinking to produce ideas, products, or solutions that have
harmful or destructive effects. Examples include destructive
technology, psychological manipulation techniques, and fi-
nancial fraud. Unfortunately, the proliferation of advanced,
user-friendly digital tools, coupled with the anonymity of
online interactions and social and economic factors such as
inequality and unemployment, has contributed to the rapid
spread of this negative form of creativity (for a general
discussion on this matter, see Sternberg & Karami, 2024).
On the other hand, by expanding upon earlier frame-
works, the 8P framework introduce greater complexity into
the study of creativity. This, in turn, may present challenges
for both its theoretical and practical application. For in-
stance, while the purpose of a creative act is undeniably
important, distinguishing between positive, negative, or
mixed consequences introduces a subjective component that
is difficult to measure consistently. Another limitation of the
8P framework is its reliance on the social validation of
creative products, which may bias the analysis toward
publicly recognized outcomes, potentially overlooking less
visible yet equally significant forms of creativity.
In sum, while these different frameworks of creativity
represent significant advances in conceptualizing the phe-
nomenon by addressing individual, social, and contextual
aspects, they also share critical limitations regarding their
scope, particularly their tendency to favor socially recog-
nized forms of creativity. Additionally, larger models, such
as the 8P and 7C, risk fragmenting the analysis by incor-
porating multiple dimensions that, while enriching, may
complicate practical application due to a lack of clarity
regarding their interactions.
3.2. Creativity and motivation: balancing internal
and external drivers
Regarding the role of motivation in the creative process, it is
important to consider whether intrinsic (individual) moti-
vation alone is sufficient for generating novel and useful
work or if external motivation is also necessary. In this
Barón-Birchenall et al. 9
context, the American chemist and organizational psy-
chologist Teresa Amabile [1950-] proposes the compo-
nential theory of creativity, which identifies three
fundamental components: domain-relevant skills (factual
and technical knowledge and specific talents), creativity-
relevant processes (cognitive and personality traits that
foster creativity), and intrinsic task motivation (personal
interests, goals, and passions that can influence the other
two components when they are lacking) (Amabile, 1983;
Romo, 1997). According to this model, intrinsic motivation
can influence the difference between what we are capable of
doing (potential capacity) and what we actually achieve in a
given situation (actual capacity) (The potential/actual dis-
tinction with respect to a mental function has also been
developed in the field of sociocultural studies of intelligence
under the name of zone of proximal development [Vygotsky,
1934/2012]).
Providing a broader context for extrinsic motivation,
Csikszentmihalyi (2014) introduces the concept of flow
experiences—moments when a creative individual feels a
profound sense of fulfillment and well-being, which can
enhance and sustain the creative process. However, intrinsic
motivation alone may not always suffice to initiate and
maintain the creative process. This is because flow expe-
riences, while beneficial, are not guaranteed to accompany
the individual continuously. Additionally, various obstacles,
such as boredom induced by the activity itself, may hinder
or directly impede the process. In such cases, extrinsic
motivation becomes crucial for continuing the work.
External rewards, whether financial, material, social,
symbolic, or even in the form of negative reinforcement (such
as alleviating an obligation or nuisance), can provide the
necessary motivational boost to help the creator complete their
work. These rewards can be particularly effective in over-
coming periods when intrinsic motivation fades, disappears, or
drives the individual away from completing the task.
3.3. The myth of genius and the role of social
recognition on creativity
With respect to the existence of unique and brilliant creative
personalities, the nothing special approach, discussed ear-
lier, aligns broadly with the so-called myth of genius. This
myth challenges the traditional view of exceptionally cre-
ative individuals as extraordinary beings endowed with
innate, almost superhuman talents (Weisberg, 1986). Ac-
cording to this perspective, genius is more of a cultural
construct than a scientific reality. Success and recognition as
creative are seen as outcomes of various factors, including
the cultural characteristics of the environment, contextual
influences, practice, and collaboration within social net-
works, rather than solely the result of exceptional innate
abilities.
Similarly, the concept of “genius”often involves social
recognition, which may not always occur during the lifetime
of the creative individual. In this context, Csikszentmihalyi
(2014) argues that for a new and valuable idea, action, or
product to cause cultural change (which is a fundamental
goal of creativity) there must be a specific interaction be-
tween the field (experts, critics, evaluators, and other in-
fluential individuals who have the authority to judge and
validate new ideas and products within a particular domain),
the domain (the body of knowledge and practices consti-
tuting a specific area of expertise), and the individual.
From this perspective, creativity is often recognized
when a field composed of experts acknowledges it as such.
However, if the field later changes its evaluation or rec-
ognizes what it previously overlooked, an individual once
considered creative by society may become seen as ordi-
nary. Moreover, in such scenarios, creative ideas might fade
away if there is no receptive audience to recognize and
implement them. Therefore, without the assessment of
competent outsiders, it is difficult to reliably determine the
validity of claims made by individuals who assert their
creativity (this subject is discussed in more detail in a later
section on creative inconclusiveness).
Building on Csikszentmihalyi’s postulates, H. Gardner
(1994) introduces the concept of fecund asynchronies. This
concept refers to situations that create discrepancies or
mismatches between the individual, field, and domain,
thereby fostering creativity (compare with Barron’s pro-
posal on conflicting internal impulses discussed earlier). For
instance, discrepancies between an individual’s economic
status or cultural level and the normative expectations of
their environment can generate additional motivation to
excel or to challenge the norms of the field. In contrast, pure
asynchrony describes situations where the three nodes
(individual, field, and domain) are almost perfectly aligned,
which does not necessarily promote or facilitate creativity.
At this point, the concepts of P-Creativity and
H-Creativity (Boden, 2004) may further illuminate the role
of the field and the domain in determining the degree of
creativity of a work. Psychological creativity (P-Creativity)
refers to the sense of creativity experienced by the indi-
vidual, involving novel and useful ideas from the per-
spective of the person’s own mind. However, these ideas
may not necessarily be recognized as creative within a
broader context. In this case, the degree of creativity is
subjective and based on personal experience, while the
domain may be understood as the specific knowledge that
the individual uses to evaluate their own novel contribu-
tions. Historical creativity (H-Creativity), on the other hand,
pertains to ideas that are fundamentally novel within the
broader cultural and historical context in which the creative
individual operates. Here, it is the role of the actual field to
assess the creative contribution against the existing body of
knowledge within the current domain.
10 Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
Nevertheless, P-Creativity and H-Creativity are not
necessarily distinct processes, as they can interact and
mutually influence each other in various contexts. For
example, an idea initially considered P-Creativity might
eventually be recognized as H-Creativity as the cultural
context evolves and embraces new perspectives. Similarly,
feedback from the field to the creator not only helps validate
individual ideas but can also influence their development.
Constructive criticism and mentoring, for instance, can
assist individuals in refining their ideas and achieving
higher levels of creativity. Furthermore, collective crea-
tivity, which emerges from the interaction among multiple
individuals, can produce ideas that none of them could have
conceived independently.
3.4. Social networks and creativity: the power
of connections
In addition to social recognition, the network of relation-
ships and connections in which individuals live also in-
fluence creativity. For example, within organizations,
creativity can be understood as the result of an interaction
effect between the opportunities and limits of social net-
works and the personal values of individuals (Zhou et al.,
2009). According to Zhou et al., weak ties create greater
opportunities for creativity, especially among individuals
with low values of conformity, while strong ties and the
density of networks act as constraints to creativity, although
the relationship between them and the former does not
always seem to be the same. It is possible then that an
internal network is sufficient for daily creativity, while more
advanced creativity could benefit from networks internal
and external to a given organization.
Another important aspect to consider, as we have already
mentioned, is that the creative process does not occur in
isolation. On the contrary, from a social perspective, the
dispositions and talents of individuals are mobilized and
oriented within a context of intersecting relationships (Cattani
et al., 2013). In this way, creativity is influenced by the position
that individuals occupy in the network and the strength of their
social ties. According to Perry and Shalley (2003), and in line
with Zhou et al. (2009), weak social ties foster creativity more
effectively than strong ones, while the external connections of
individuals in peripheral positions within their networks fa-
cilitate creative breakthroughs. However, over time, a par-
ticularly creative individual can end up occupying such a
central and fixed place in their network that it generates
significant limitations to develop their creativity.
In the educational field, a classroom can be understood as
a social network that encourages both learning and crea-
tivity (Pulgar, 2021). In this scenario, the role that students
assume within the social system in which their education
takes place directly influences the manifestation and
development of their creative capacity. For example, in
classrooms where dialogue, collaboration and the exchange
of ideas are promoted, students feel motivated to share their
perspectives and take risks in the generation of new pro-
posals. This environment, which values active participation
and respect for the diversity of opinions, reinforces indi-
vidual trust and facilitates the construction of knowledge
together.
In addition, the social position that each student oc-
cupies, whether through their interaction with peers, their
relationship with their teachers or belonging to certain in-
terest groups, can determine the degree of support and
encouragement they receive to explore novel ideas. In this
sense, a well-configured classroom acts not only as a space
for the transmission of knowledge, but also as a dynamic
laboratory where creative skills are experimented with and
strengthened.
Finally, culturally diverse social networks seem to favor
creative processes (Chua, 2015). From this perspective,
interaction in contexts that bring together a wide range of
experiences and traditions allows the circulation of ideas
that move away from one’s own sphere, which enriches the
ability to innovate. This diversity of points of view facili-
tates the clash of perspectives, promoting the emergence of
unprecedented solutions by combining traditional knowl-
edge with modern approaches. In addition, contact with
different cultures encourages the adaptation and reinter-
pretation of concepts, which can trigger creative thinking
processes. Therefore, environments in which various social
and cultural networks converge not only expand the col-
lection of references, but also generate a climate of openness
and experimentation, key to the development of disruptive
ideas.
3.5. The role of cultural contexts in shaping creativity
While interest in the social and contextual factors associated
with the creative process grew during the 1980s, attention to
cultural factors and their relationship with creativity also
increased (Rudowicz, 2003). This shift reflected a broader
recognition that creativity is not merely an individual
cognitive process but is deeply embedded in social and
cultural contexts. However, for scholars such as Yong et al.
(2020), research on the “moderating”effect of culture on
creativity has predominantly focused on isolated cultural
dimensions, such as individualism versus collectivism.
While these dimensions provide valuable insights, they
often fail to capture the complexity and interplay of cultural
factors that shape creative expression.
In this regard, it is essential to consider the multidi-
mensional nature of culture to fully understand its mod-
erating effects on creativity. For instance, based on studies
across several countries, Yong et al. (2020) propose the
theory of cultural bundles. These bundles consist of
Barón-Birchenall et al. 11
multiple specific cultural dimensions—values and the ways
to secure these values—which moderate the relationship
between culture and creativity. For example, a cultural
bundle might include dimensions such as individualism,
power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance,
which together influence how creativity is expressed, val-
ued, and rewarded in each society.
Regarding the dichotomy between the individual and the
group, and its relationship with the influence of culture on
creativity, it has also been suggested that groups of people
undergo stages similar to those experienced by individuals.
Likewise, the characteristics associated with creative in-
dividuals can be reflected in group behavior (e.g., Borrup,
2010). For example, creative cities, businesses, and inno-
vative environments share a variety of characteristics, in-
cluding the drive for creative people to congregate in centers
of cutting-edge activity. Thus, in today’s business envi-
ronment, it is common for startups and business incubators
to create collaborative spaces that encourage the exchange
of ideas and the emergence of disruptive solutions, evi-
dencing a process analogous to the individual development
of creativity. In these environments, the diversity of ex-
periences and knowledge is integrated into the same flow
that drives innovation, similar to how different stages of
individual creativity intertwine to give rise to transformative
projects.
Something similar happens in the cultural sector, espe-
cially in artistic collectives and communities of practice. In
these groupings, the interaction between creators allows
individual ideas to enhance each other, giving rise to works
and proposals that transcend the talent of each member
separately. The synergy of these groups reflects the idea that,
as in the personal creative process, the convergence of
diverse perspectives can generate unexpected and enriching
results.
3.6. Creative inconclusiveness: collective dynamics
and resignification in sociocultural contexts
As mentioned earlier, from a sociocultural perspective,
creativity cannot be fully understood without considering the
material and social context in which it occurs (Gl˘
aveanu,
2013). Creative potential arises from the interactions between
individuals and their environment, with the exchange of
perspectives playing a central role. Additionally, the genesis
of original ideas is heavily influenced by cultural conditions,
social norms, and material opportunities, which either enable
or constrain them (Corazza & Gl˘
aveanu, 2020).
At this regard, from Corazza’s (2016) perspective, cre-
ativity involves both originality and potential effectiveness,
encompassing not only the outcome but also the inclusivity
of the creative process. The process does not necessarily
result in an original and effective product, but it includes the
potential to do so. In this way, the potential for originality
and effectiveness within a creative process may or may not
emerge, and may or may not be recognized by the world.
This assessment can vary across time, space, and cultural
dimensions.
Furthermore, collectivity plays a key role in the re-
signification of the unfinished. According to the theory of
the universal process of creativity, individual creative ep-
isodes are part of a dynamic continuum that transcends the
agents and their immediate contexts (Corazza, 2019). Thus,
what is initially perceived as unfinished can acquire new
meaning or functionality in the hands of others, thanks to the
phenomenon of exaptation (a technical term, roughly
translatable as repurposing). This process, rooted in evo-
lutionary biological factors, explains how creative products
can be reinterpreted or reused in contexts different from
their original ones, thereby expanding their impact and
relevance (Andriani & Cattani, 2016; note the contrast
between this idea and the concept of functional fixation
mentioned earlier).
On the other hand, in educational and social settings,
inconclusive creativity challenges traditional criteria for
evaluation and success. Incorporating this concept into
educational programs can foster resilience, adaptability, and
a broader view of creative contributions, valuing not only
the end results but also the latent processes and potentials.
This shift in perspective emphasizes the importance of
promoting environments that encourage exploration and
collaboration, recognizing that the meaning of a creative
idea is collectively negotiated and defined within the
context in which it operates (Corazza et al., 2022).
3.7. Synergies in creativity: from human collectives to
artificial intelligence collaboration
As we have discussed up to this point, several authors argue
that creativity is both an individual and a social phenom-
enon, with its characteristics depending on whether indi-
vidual or collective dynamics prevail in a given context or
social situation (in this respect, see also Bhawuk [2003] and
Walton [2016]). In particular, Gl˘
aveanu (2020) proposes
that creativity should be understood not merely as an in-
dividual process but as a phenomenon deeply shaped by
social dynamics, including interaction, exchange, and the
collaborative construction of meaning. From this socio-
cultural perspective, creativity is redefined as a collabora-
tive process in which individual agency is enhanced through
integration into communities and social contexts.
In such a scenario, the fundamental role of co-creation
emerges as a key driver for creative development in both
social and technological spheres. This shift not only un-
derscores the social interaction intrinsic to creative pro-
cesses but also incorporates advanced technologies, such as
12 Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
artificial intelligence (AI), which introduce new possibili-
ties, including the expansion of creativity into hybrid di-
mensions where individual capacities are enhanced through
technological advances. For example, the Co-Cre-AI-tion
process, proposed by Vinchon et al. (2023), represents a
form of collaboration in which humans and machines work
together, marking a definitive shift toward collective ap-
proaches that embrace diversity and complexity (further
discussion of AI creativity can be found in the following
sections).
Similarly, the creative ethos model proposed by
Kaufman and Gl˘
aveanu (2023) reinforces this shift toward
the collective, recognizing that creativity is not an isolated
process but a multilateral phenomenon that integrates di-
verse perspectives and ethical values. This model brings
together principles, values, and practices that frame crea-
tivity as a collective and ethical phenomenon situated within
social contexts. From this perspective, co-creation not only
fosters innovation but also raises ethical and social con-
siderations in the generation of ideas.
Building on this perspective, Sawyer (2019) explores the
nature of group creativity, arguing that it emerges from the
dynamic interaction between group members rather than
from isolated individual contributions. This process, known
as emergent collaboration, emphasizes that the most in-
novative ideas result from synergy, the continuous exchange
of information, and joint improvisation, rather than from
planned design. According to Sawyer, successful creative
groups cultivate communicative fluency, enabling indi-
vidual contributions to be transformed into collective ideas,
thereby achieving a balance between structure and
spontaneity.
3.8. Rethinking creativity: how AI challenges and
expands human imagination
Examining the relationship between creativity and artificial
intelligence (AI), we encounter the concept of computa-
tional creativity—a growing field that aims to develop
systems capable of generating artifacts and ideas that ob-
servers might deem creative. Defined as “the philosophy,
science, and engineering of computational systems which,
by taking on particular responsibilities, exhibit behaviours
that unbiased observers would deem to be creative”(Colton
& Wiggins, 2012, p. 21), this field challenges traditional
notions of creativity by demonstrating that machines can
produce works of art, music, poetry, and even architectural
designs (see Magni et al., 2024 for a critical perspective).
One of the earliest predecessors of computational cre-
ativity can be found in the AI program Racter, which
composed The Policeman’s Beard Is Half Constructed:
Computer Prose and Poetry in 1984. An excerpt from
Racter’s work reads: “At all events my own essays and
dissertations about love / and its endless pain and perpetual
pleasure will be / known and understood by all of you who
read this and / talk or sing or chant about it to your worried
friends or nervous enemies”(Racter, 1984; without page
numbering or punctuation in the original).
Nowadays, computational creativity not only mimics
human creative processes but also expands the boundaries
of what creativity means. Projects like The Painting Fool,
an AI system that produces visual artwork using algorithms
combining pre-programmed rules and random elements,
demonstrate how machines can make complex esthetic
decisions, challenging human expectations (Colton &
Wiggins, 2012). In this way, by generating artifacts
across diverse domains such as music, painting, poetry, and
architectural design, computational creativity invites us to
rethink the very nature of creativity itself.
Moreover, beyond challenging the concept of individual
creativity, AI is increasingly shaping the dynamics of
collective creative processes. For instance, AI-driven sys-
tems like SocialMuse are redefining group creativity by
optimizing the flow of inspiration within self-organizing
networks (Baten et al., 2024). These tools connect indi-
viduals while leveraging semantic and network-structural
features to maximize ideation performance. By promoting
decentralization and reducing redundancy, such systems
also broaden the diversity of inspiration sources, allowing
unique ideas to gain visibility and promoting a more dy-
namic exchange of perspectives.
In addition, AI’s role in group creativity extends beyond
content generation to mediating the flow of information
within creative networks, functioning as both filters and
gatekeepers that determining which sources of inspiration
are accessible and how creative work is evaluated (Atkinson
& Barker, 2023). While this mediation can reorganize
collaboration and introduce novel combinations of ideas, it
also carries risks, such as reinforcing technological biases or
narrowing the diversity of creative influences.
The integration of AI into creative processes also em-
phasizes the importance of balancing human ingenuity with
algorithmic automation. At this regard, as Suchacka et al.
(2021) argue, while AI can expand creative possibilities and
facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, excessive reliance
on algorithms risks diminishing the role of human intuition,
critical thinking, and serendipity—key drivers of creative
breakthroughs, as discussed in this paper. Ethical consid-
erations, such as transparency, authorship, and the impli-
cations of human-machine collaboration, further complicate
the landscape.
In addition, traditional criteria for assessing human
creativity may not suffice when applied to machine-
generated works, as the processes and motivations behind
them differ significantly, raising fundamental questions
about how creativity should be evaluated. This has led to the
development of frameworks like the FACE model, which
Barón-Birchenall et al. 13
evaluates computational creative acts based on their ability
to generate, evaluate, and frame concepts (Colton et al.,
2011). Such models highlight the need for a paradigm shift
in how we define and measure creativity in the age of AI.
3.9. Distributed creativity in the digital age
In addition to the challenging influence of AI on our
understanding of creativity, the digital era has un-
doubtedly influenced, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, the emergence of diverse types of creative
outcomes. For example, the internet is rapidly becoming a
space in which the concept of the single author is
gradually losing its validity. As communication processes
accelerate due to the density of the network and the speed
at which information circulates, the boundaries between
creators and consumers are becoming increasingly
blurred. This shift has given rise to a distributed col-
lective creator (Heibach, 2000).
Moreover, the characteristics of the functioning of the
internet have had a significant impact on the phenomenon of
creativity, to the point of seeming to be redefining it (Literat
& Glavineau, 2016). Thus, immediacy in communication,
global interconnection and almost unlimited access to in-
formation and resources have transformed both the pro-
cesses of generating and disseminating ideas, enhancing
collaboration between individuals from different cultures
and disciplines, and allowing creativity to manifest itself in
more dynamic and horizontal ways. The decentralized and
adaptable nature of online platforms has fostered experi-
mentation and innovation, providing spaces where ideas can
evolve and combine in continuous cycles of learning and
reinvention. All this challenges and expands traditional
models of creativity, and implies a redefinition of the
concept in which creativity is moved from an individual and
linear act to creativity as a collaborative, interactive and
constantly transforming phenomenon.
In particular, children and young people born during the
digital age have unique opportunities to develop creativity
and innovation (Maksi´
c, 2016). From a very early age,
access to devices and a wide variety of online resources
allows them to interact with multiple sources of information
and experiment with various technological tools. This en-
vironment favors self-taught learning and the construction
of knowledge in a collaborative way, promoting an open and
adaptive mentality in the face of contemporary challenges.
In addition, constant exposure to various formats and digital
languages stimulates the imagination and fosters the ability
to integrate ideas from different disciplines, which enriches
the creative process. The possibility of participating in
virtual communities and collaborative projects also facili-
tates the exchange of perspectives and co-creation, fun-
damental aspects for innovation in an increasingly
interconnected world.
However, although digital media have transformed the
way information is circulated and have expanded the
possibilities for people to share their creations on equal
terms, authors such as Hargittai and Walejko (2008) argue
that dedication to creative activities continues to be un-
equally distributed according to social position. According
to this perspective, participation in these creative processes
is largely determined by economic factors, since access to
digital technologies and platforms, required to fully exploit
these tools, is not universal. Another crucial factor in this
regard is the possession of technical skills: those with the
necessary training can take better advantage of the op-
portunities offered by digital media, while those in less
advantaged contexts may face barriers to developing and
sharing their creations. This situation shows that, despite the
democratizing potential of technology, gaps persist that
reproduce structural inequalities in the creative field.
3.10. Non-human animal creativity and the
collective nature of human creativity
As a final point in our discussion, we would like to explore
some insights into the collective dimension of the creative
process that can be drawn from the study of creative be-
haviors beyond the human species. Indeed, creativity in
non-human animals—an increasingly prominent area of
study—provides insights not only into the cognitive abil-
ities of other species but also into the evolutionary origins
and adaptive functions of human creativity (Kaufman &
O’Hearn, 2017).
Research in this field suggests that creativity is not a
uniquely human trait but rather a dynamic and adaptive
process that can be observed across the animal kingdom.
For instance, several studies have shown that non-human
animals exhibit innovative behaviors that follow rules,
limits, and models like those observed in humans (see
Reader & Laland, 2003). But if such innovative behaviors
often involve two or more individuals, could the creativity
observed in non-human animals reflect a collective di-
mension that also underpins human creativity?
One compelling argument in this respect is that creativity
serves as a powerful adaptive force within social contexts,
enabling animals to solve novel problems and transmit these
solutions to their groups (Gigliotti, 2022). At this regard,
Gigliotti defines creativity as “a dynamic process in which
novel and meaningful behaviors are generated by indi-
viduals with the possibility of affecting others at cultural,
species, and evolutionary levels”(Gigliotti, 2022,p.4).
This perspective highlights the collective nature of crea-
tivity, as innovative behaviors developed by individuals
can spread through social learning, ultimately benefiting
the group as a whole. For example, certain bird species,
such as New Caledonian crows, demonstrate remarkable
14 Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
problem-solving skills, crafting tools to access food. These
behaviors are not only innovative but are also learned and
shared within the group, suggesting a collective dimension to
their creativity (Hunt & Gray, 2003; see also Barón, 2016).
The idea of creativity as a collective and evolutionary
process aligns with broader theoretical frameworks, such as
Corazza’s (2019) dynamic universal creativity process.
Drawing on Whitehead’s cosmological interpretation of
creativity as a metaphysical universal principle, Corazza
proposes that creativity is an active and pervasive force
throughout general evolution. Within this framework,
creativity can be understood as a continuum, with non-
human animals and humans occupying different branches of
the same evolutionary tree. As Corazza and Lubart (2020)
assert, “given the prehistoric evolutionary stage of (…)
hominids, it is natural to ask whether humans are the only
beings that can be accredited with creative behavior: the
answer is absolutely not”(p. 4). This perspective highlights
the universality of creativity and its potential to manifest in
diverse forms across species.
Moreover, creativity in non-human animals often serves
as an adaptive mechanism, enabling individuals to respond
to unforeseen challenges and environmental changes
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2015). In many cases, these creative
solutions are not isolated acts but rather catalysts for broader
behavioral shifts. When an innovative behavior proves
beneficial, other members of the group may imitate and
refine it, leading to a cumulative process of social learning.
Over time, this exchange of adaptive behaviors can shape
group dynamics and enhance problem-solving strategies
within the group.
4. Conclusions
The study of creativity, particularly in psychology, spans
over 120 years. Initially, the focus was on individual aspects
of the creative process, such as cognitive, personality,
motivational, and emotional factors, without any of them
being established as more prominent. Over time, the study
of creativity expanded to encompass broader factors such as
context, relationships, and criticism. This shift emphasized
the characteristics of the creative process itself, the specific
conditions of the problem or matter at hand, and even meta-
creative elements such as the pedagogy of creativity, while
broadening the scope of creativity studies to include
questions about the trainability of creative thinking, the
influences of modern technologies such as the internet and
artificial intelligence (AI) in the creative process, and even
its exploration in non-human animal models.
However, despite the progress made in the study of
creativity and the various explanatory frameworks currently
available, determining whether creativity is ultimately an
individual or collective process may be a futile endeavor—
and in any case, it certainly exceeds the scope of this paper.
Perhaps the question itself is poorly posed. Nevertheless, we
offer a couple of key reflections on this matter based on the
discussion developed thus far.
Regarding the need for a field to determine the degree of
creativity in a work, as discussed in the section on creative
inconclusiveness, consider the case of the Polish composer
Fr´
ed´
eric Chopin, of whom several waltzes were lost or
remained incomplete due to various reasons. In this case, the
field cannot judge them and therefore it could be argued that
it is not possible to determine their creativity. What happens,
then, to artists who create a work and destroy it as soon as it
is finished? For example, a painting, who could say whether
or not it is creative if no one appreciated it? However, the
artist did create it, and in the case of Chopin, it is very likely
that the waltzes were a burst of creativity, as evidenced by
his other compositions. In this respect, the potential for
originality and effectiveness characterizing a creative en-
deavor may or may not be recognized by the world.
Additionally, what would happen if in a hundred years no
one appreciates Chopin, and the experts of the time label
him as uncreative? Was he never creative, or did he cease to
be so? The creative assessment may also change across
time, space, and cultural dimensions. In consequence, while
it is reasonable to postulate that without the existence of a
field there is no way to judge the degree of creativity of a
given product, it is also reasonable to affirm that the first to
judge an artifact or work as creative is the creator them-
selves. Of course, this evaluation takes place within a
specific temporal and cultural framework that limits the
available knowledge against which the novel contribution
of the potentially creative result is contrasted.
At this point, we could even speak of a non-existent field
to refer to cases where it is impossible to verify the degree of
creativity of a work since it never reaches the public. Field-
backed creativity can then be considered social creativity.
However, such creativity cannot be considered the only type
of creativity, as such a notion could imply the devaluation of
individual contributions to the arts or scientific discovery, or
simply ignore the mini-c and little-c that we discussed
earlier, which would be extreme to configure itself as a
comprehensive theory of creativity (see Romo, 1997).
On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that in a non-
existent field situation, the absence of explicit experts,
critics, and others does not imply that the creative individual
lacks a mental representation of the field, along with its
knowledge and practices, internalized from the context: a
potential creative Superego. This certainly influences the
creation of the work or product. Even so, some authors insist
that the creative process is something absolutely personal
and intimate, at least in the field of art (see Romo, 1997).
From this perspective, the creative artistic process occurs
between alienation (distancing) and separation (isolation)
from the creative individual, within the context of a search
for individuality (Czernikowski, 1994).
Barón-Birchenall et al. 15
To close this topic, consider the following reflection on
music criticism by the Russian composer and theorist Igor
Stravinsky [1882–1971]: “The listener reacts and becomes a
partner in the game, initiated by the creator. Nothing less,
nothing more. The fact that the partner is free to accept or to
refuse participation in the game does not automatically
invest him with the authority of a judge”(Stravinsky, 1947,
p. 131).
Regarding the myth of genius, questions arise, such as:
Could anyone have written something like Don Quixote?
Probably not. In this regard, it is important to remember that
figures like Miguel de Cervantes or Beethoven had unique
individual characteristics, as well as specific environments.
Their works were created within a world of meanings that,
while shared and socially constructed, ultimately reflect
personal and unique experiences. Anyone with enough
tenacity and determination can undoubtedly produce a
creative work, but it might not be fair to claim that just
anyone could have written Don Quixote. This does not
suggest that the creative individual is special or superior to
others; rather, it implies that each creator is a unique person
operating within a specific context. Their work reflects their
distinctive style. Even if another artist attempts to replicate
the characteristics of a work or even tries to copy it, the
result will never be the same, as J. L. Borges illustrated in
Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.
Continuing with our conclusions, let us turn to the ideas
of Colombian philosopher Alfredo Trendall [1933–2015]
on art theory, significantly influenced by J. Ortega y Gasset.
Throughout history, humans have engaged with a world that
both overwhelms and inspires them, finding expression
through religion, magic, and art. In the realm of art, indi-
viduals encounter experiences that move them deeply and
translate these into their own unique artistic language.
While artistic creation is undeniably shaped by technical,
historical, personal, and cultural factors, it transcends these
elements, ultimately surpassing the very artist who created it
(Trendall, 2004).
Following this line of thought, creativity and the mental
processes that generate it transcend social and cultural
contexts. A work can transmit its creative force to its au-
dience and move them only if they have a sufficient affinity
with it. Thus, even if a work is never seen by anyone, the act
of channeling the creative force that has inspired humanity
for centuries is still significant. This act is inherently dif-
ferent from one performed without any influence or in-
spiration. Thus, a product can be considered inherently
creative to the extent that it generates additional creative
activity, a concept known as emergent creativity, which is
regarded by some authors as the highest possible level of
creativity (see Romo, 1997). Unfortunately, this type of
approach primarily belongs to the fields of philosophy and
art criticism and lacks a sufficient foundation in psychology
or other sciences. However, it is likely that future
discoveries in the sciences will bring us closer to under-
standing the so-called creative force or inspiration.
Regarding more tangible considerations, we have
highlighted in this paper that the possibility of generating
computational creativity is an increasingly important topic,
particularly in relation to the various forms of AI being
developed and the modes of group collaboration they fa-
cilitate. At its core, computational creativity not only
challenges our understanding of creativity but also expands
its possibilities. By enabling computational systems to
explore conceptual spaces beyond human capabilities, we
open the door to innovations in art, science, and technology
that could redefine the boundaries of what is considered
possible.
Moreover, from a comparative perspective in cognitive
sciences, programming a computer to produce creative
outputs may reveal insights into how creative cognition
functions in humans. This particular view encourages the
development of the cognitive study of creative processes,
which, as evidenced by this paper, is the psychological
approach that has most extensively engaged with the subject
of creativity in recent years.
However, although AI today creates works of art in
painting and music, discovers scientific laws, and even
publishes articles—each of which has found some measure
of endorsement within its respective field (see Runco,
2023)—the field’s endorsement alone does not imply that
the underlying processes of creativity are the same in
machines and humans. It could be argued, for example, that
scientists and programmers equip machines with specific
information and variables to develop a work or solve a
problem, a process fundamentally different from human
creativity (in connectionist AI, this manifests as setting up
input layers and initial weights of connections between
nodes of information). While this is true, it is also the case
that humans come from educational systems and families
and follow explicit and implicit models that provide us with
variables we mix, consciously or unconsciously, in original
and useful ways to generate creative products.
In addition, the origin of a creative work may influence
the process of value judgment. For instance, when evalu-
ating a product created by a human, judges may consider
factors such as the author’s age, “geniality,”and emotional
and mental stability. Conversely, when the product has been
generated by a machine and this information is known to the
evaluators, their judgment may be biased by considerations
of effort.
Faced with the question of the authenticity of artificial
creativity, it is evident that machines now produce a range of
useful and novel products through mass analysis of human
creations, significantly influencing scientific and artistic
developments, among others. However, it seems that these
new creative machines do not experience any form of
satisfaction, joy, or surprise from their own creations, nor
16 Adaptive Behavior 0(0)
are they moved by their works or those of others—elements
that are crucial to the human esthetic experience. For this
reason, we cannot fully agree with Boden (2004) when she
states: “a science of creativity (…) does not threaten our
self-respect by showing us to be mere machines, for some
machines are much less ‘mere’than others”(p. 24).
Future studies of creativity will undoubtedly explore the
interactions between creativity and various individual
factors such as emotions, learning, metacognition, and
critical thinking, particularly within the framework of
neuroscience. They will also examine how creativity in-
teracts with group, social, and cultural processes, including
cooperation, altruism, empathy, ethics, and, of course, ex-
tended cognition.
Acknowledgments
We thank the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful
comments and suggestions, which helped improve the quality and
clarity of our paper.
Author contributions
Leonardo Barón-Birchenall: Conceptualization, data curation,
investigation, methodology, project administration, resources,
supervision, validation, visualization, writing (original draft, re-
view and editing). Andrea S´
anchez-Vallejo: Conceptualization,
data curation, investigation, writing (original draft, review and
editing). Carlos Toro-Silva: Data curation, investigation, writing
(original draft, review and editing). Andrea Folleco-Eraso: Data
curation, investigation, writing (original draft, review and editing).
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, au-
thorship, and/or publication of this article.
Ethical statement
Ethical approval
This study is a literature review and does not involve new data
collection or human subjects. All sources are properly credited, and
we have aimed for accuracy and fairness in representing the ideas
and findings of the reviewed works.
ORCID iDs
Leonardo Barón-Birchenall https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4286-3424
Andrea S´
anchez-Vallejo https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1921-
8846
Carlos Toro-Silva https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2401-1404
Andrea Folleco-Eraso https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7118-7595
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About the Authors
Leonardo Barón-Birchenall is a psychologist with an MSc in Cognitive Psychology and a PhD in Language
Sciences. He conducts research in the psychology of language. His interests also include science com-
munication and the empirical study of cognition and behavior, particularly in the areas of early devel-
opment, education, and mental health. Email: laescaladesol@gmail.com
Andrea S´
anchez-Vallejo is a psychologist with an MSc in Education. She is interested in the study of
cognitive development, especially creativity, learning, metacognition, and critical thinking, as well as the
relationships among these processes in the context of supporting academic task performance. Email:
asanchezv@javeriana.edu.co
Carlos Toro-Silva is a lawyer with an MSc and a PhD in History. He is dedicated to historical research. His
work focuses in particular on the intersection of sociocultural history, the history of institutions, and the
history of ideas. Email: carlosalberto.toro@tutanota.com
Andrea Folleco-Eraso is a psychologist with an MSc in Neuroscience. She is a doctoral candidate in
psychology at Universidad de Los Andes in Colombia. Her research interests include the implications of the
gut–brain axis for mental health, brain injury, and neuropsychological assessment and rehabilitation. Email:
jafollecoe@libertadores.edu.co
Barón-Birchenall et al. 21
