Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU's Cross-Strait Policy

Abstract

This study provides an overview of the major evolutions in the European Union’s (EU) policy toward cross-Strait relations since 1975. Recent developments signify a major shift in the EU’s policy, which historically has been characterized by diplomatic impassivity, anxiety about jeopardizing relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and seemingly little interest in supporting Taiwan’s successful transition to democracy. The recent change of tack is indicative of the EU’s determination to develop a normative role on the global stage. “Defensive normativity” might enable the EU to pursue its “principled pragmatism” abroad, enabling it to maintain strong economic relations with the PRC while supporting a like-minded partner, such as Taiwan, to profile itself as a normative power on the world stage.

Full text

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
137
Contagious Democracy?
A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative
Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
Jasper Roctus✽
Researcher
Department of Languages and Cultures, Ghent University
ABSTRACT
This study provides an overview of the major evolutions in the European
Union’s (EU) policy toward cross-Strait relations since 1975. Recent develop-
ments signify a major shift in the EU’s policy, which historically has been char-
acterized by diplomatic impassivity, anxiety about jeopardizing relations with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and seemingly little interest in supporting
Taiwan’s successful transition to democracy. The recent change of tack is indica-
tive of the EU’s determination to develop a normative role on the global stage.
“Defensive normativity” might enable the EU to pursue its “principled pragma-
tism” abroad, enabling it to maintain strong economic relations with the PRC
while supporting a like-minded partner, such as Taiwan, to prole itself as a
normative power on the world stage.
Key Words: cross-Strait relations, democracy, principled pragmatism,
Sino
–
European relations, normativity
✽
E-mail: jasper.roctus@ugent.be
Received: March 23, 2022; Accepted: July 28, 2022
Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy
Volume 37, Number 1, pp. 137
–
168
Doi: 10.53106/1018189X202207102
©2025 by RCHSS, Academia Sinica. All rights reserved.

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人文及社會科學集刊
I. Introduction1
On April 23, 2021, a draft report by the European Parliament’s Committee on
Foreign Affairs (AFET) explicitly called upon the European Commission to “safe-
guard peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and to sustain democracy in Tai-
wan” (Paragraph 1.C).2 Seven days later, another draft report, A New EU
–
China
Strategy, stated that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “poses threats to liberal
democracy” (Section A). To counter such threats, the report advocated “a Bilateral
Investment Agreement (BIA) with Taiwan… which would ensure that Taiwan’s right
to democratic existence is reaffirmed” (Article 30).3 Since then, efforts to negotiate
such an agreement have gathered pace, while the process of ratifying the extremely
hard-fought EU
–
China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) has stalled
in the face of a series of sanctions imposed by the PRC on European parliamentar-
ians earlier in 2021.4
Such developments are emblematic of the EU’s current attitude toward Taiwan;
despite its small size and (relatively) marginal economic importance to Europe, the
island is viewed as a democratic alternative and counterweight to an increasingly
assertive PRC. Moves to support Taiwan and its democracy are often legitimized
1 This article will denote the power de facto in control of mainland China as the “People’s Republic
of China” (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 中華人民共和國, PRC), while the nation that de facto
rules Taiwan and some additional islands, and constitutionally calls itself the “Republic of China”
(Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國), is denoted as “Taiwan.” No political standpoints about the bound-
aries or de jure ruler of “China” should be derived from this choice; it merely constitutes the author’s
preference.
2 The parliamentary progress (now completed) of “2021/2041(INI) EU
–
Taiwan Political Relations
and Cooperation” and related documents and proposed amendments can be found in Parltrack, 2021a
(accessed March 6, 2022). In addition to adopting the report on September 1, 2021, the AFET changed
the name of the “European Economic and Trade Office” in Taiwan to the “European Union Office
in Taiwan” and incurred the wrath of the Chinese mission at the EU. See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The People’s Republic of China, 2021 (accessed March 6, 2022).
3 The parliamentary progress (now completed) of “2021/2037(INI) A New EU
–
China Strategy” as
well as related documents and proposed amendments can be found at Parltrack, 2021b (accessed
March 6, 2022).
4 On February 14, 2012, point 11 of the “Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th EU
–
China Summit”
indicated that the EU and the PRC agreed to launch negotiations as soon as possible. A preliminary
agreement was reached on January 22, 2021. All related documents can be found at European Com-
mission, 2012
–
2021 (accessed March 6, 2022).

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
139
by the observation that by the 2020s, Taiwanese values had more in common with
the EU than with several of its regional neighbors, especially the PRC (Reilly, 2018:
75). This new European political view is evident in the pro-Taiwanese stance of
several EU member states, such as Lithuania (which, despite robust retaliation by
the PRC,5 persisted in opening a representative office in Taiwan) and the Czech
Republic (which sent a delegation of 90 senators to the island in 2020). These mea-
sures are especially striking given that both nations had previously joined the PRC-
led 17+1 initiative (reduced to 14+1 after the Baltic states’ withdrawal). However,
pro-Taiwanese efforts were not exclusively limited to those of individual member
states. In November 2021, an European parliamentary delegation of seven Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the Special Committee on Foreign Inter-
ference in all Democratic Processes (INGE), led by French MEP Raphael Glucks-
mann, paid an unprecedented official visit to the island.
All these developments signify a major shift in the EU’s policy toward cross-
Strait relations, which historically has been characterized by diplomatic impassivity,
anxiety about jeopardizing relations with the PRC, and seemingly little interest in
supporting Taiwan’s successful transition to democracy. This change is indicative of
the EU’s determination to develop a normative role on the global stage. “Defensive
normativity” may enable the EU to pursue principled pragmatism abroad, enabling
it to maintain its strong economic relationship with the PRC while supporting a like-
minded partner, like Taiwan, to establish itself as a normative power on the world
stage.
This article does not imply that the internal changes described below are the
sole reason for the “change of tack” vis-à-vis cross-Strait relations. However, it
focuses on the “internal” motives, those directly related to the EU, the PRC, and
Taiwan, and explained through subsequent historical review. The external (f)actors,
such as geopolitical pressure from the US and Russia, are excluded for brevity. None-
theless, one external factor is considered—the global trend toward democratic back-
sliding that has occurred over most of the past two decades and has intensified since
the COVID
–
19 pandemic.
II. The EU and the PRC: No Normativity Found?
The EU, along with its predecessor, the European Community (EC), has long
been seen as a latent force in world politics. For instance, Hedley Bull (1982: 151)
5 China recalled its ambassador to Lithuania, a first for any EU member state, and imposed trade restric-
tions on the country. See: Gramer, 2021 (accessed September 24, 2021).

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stated that “‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely
to become one; the Europe with which I am concerned is the actual one of state
governments.” With this dismissal of any major role of the EC on the world stage,
Bull countered François Duchêne’s suggestion that “civilian power” was gradually
superseding traditional military power in international relations. Duchêne had opened
the normative floor of debate ten years prior by stating that Europe “must be a force
for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” by promoting its
“inner characteristics,” such as “equality, justice and tolerance,” abroad (Duchêne,
1973: 20). Duchêne’s notion was known as “civilian power Europe” (CPE).
Bull, a leading proponent of the realist English school of International Relations
Theory, disagreed with this notion and called for the regeneration of (old) Europe
through increased military cooperation between discrete nation-states to counter the
threat posed by the USSR, with each nation-state retaining its traditional authority
over civilian matters (Bull, 1982: 163).6 Furthermore, calling Duchêne’s ideas a
“contradiction in terms,” he insisted that the EC could not, and should not, represent
“Europe” as it was limited to a few loosely connected Western European nations
(Bull, 1982: 151).
This discussion, a precursor to the current debate over whether the EU should
favor hard (e.g., Bull) or soft (e.g., Duchêne) power in its efforts to (re)form itself
as a normative force, continued long after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Since
then, the EU has expanded to the point where it can claim to represent most of Europe.
Furthermore, as the immediate threat from hostile neighbors diminished with the
collapse of the USSR, more space was available to refocus on Europe as a civilian or
normative power. Göran Therborn (1997) suggested a “passive CPE future” for
the declining, but increasingly united, ex-imperial continent akin to its peripheral
geographical position on world maps that use the Peters projection;7 a position simi-
lar to that of Scandinavia relative to Europe—geographically negligent, essentially
powerless, yet prosperous. Contrary to a powerfully economic, or “German,” future
for Europe, which would require maintaining its present economic edge indefinitely
through realist means, Therborn saw a Scandinavian future for Europe as more
rational in the long-term, “my guess is that at least by the second half of the 21st
6 In the spirit of the English school, Bull perceived a supranational defense organization as a weak-
ness of the European defense policy, as it would lack individual nation-states’ ability to inspire
loyalty and wage war. According to him, NATO was feasible only under US auspices, and in the
presence of an Eastern threat.
7 Unlike the prevalent Mercator projection used in world maps, which overstates Europe’s relative
size, the Peters projection does the opposite by understating it.

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141
century the best Europeans can hope for is to constitute a nice, decent periphery of
the world, with little power but with some good ideas” (Therborn, 1997: 33).
While emphasizing such passive normativity as Europe’s (only) strength, Ther-
born did not elucidate how the said “good European ideas” would be spread world-
wide.8 Ian Manners (2002) made such an attempt in his exploration into the EU’s
campaign for a global ban on capital punishment, and concluded that the EU pos-
sessed some active and passive tools to increase its normative clout. Manners (2002:
244
–
245) identified six ways in which European norms were being diffused abroad
by the turn of the 21st century:
• Contagion, that is, unintentional diffusion from the EU to non-European
actors (e.g., integrational efforts in other regions that have been directly or
indirectly inspired by the EU’s “virtuous example”)9
• Informational diffusion via the communication of official EU policies and
positions (e.g., declaratory notes)
• Procedural diffusion through the establishment of formal relations between
the EU and external partners (e.g., the World Trade Organization)
• Transference diffusion through material and financial exchanges with third
parties (e.g., the implementation of “carrot-and-stick” regimes of sanctions
and rewards)
• Overt diffusion by establishing a physical presence in other nation-states (e.g.,
embassies and monitoring missions)
• Cultural filtering, which may modify and thereby limit the impact of diffused
norms in the recipient country, region, or organization
The question is how to apply this to the EU vis-à-vis cross-Strait relations. One has
to start by recognizing that, along with the EU, also the PRC is an “upcoming actor”
yearning for greater recognition of its normative power. As Emilian Kavalski (2013:
249) stated, one has to recognize that normative power is not entirely an intrinsic
8 Therborn was primarily preoccupied in his article with describing Europe’s relative economic and
demographic decline. Hence, he ambiguously stated that “the future of Europe in the world is a
function of its weight, its specificity, and its unity.” See: Therborn (1997: 32).
9 This article does not deny the possibility that contagion occurs outside the scope of passive diffusion
of norms and values, and involves the active dissemination of economic and security principles. Ian
Manners (2002: 250) implicitly held this view in mentioning the EU’s participation in partnerships
and co-operation agreements. However, for the scope and purpose of this article, subsequent men-
tions of contagion roughly pertain to the idea of a passive (“unintentional”) distribution of values
and norms through a “virtuous example” by Brussels, with democracy at its core.

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property of an actor, but depends on the kind of interactions it engenders in specific
contexts and the way such interactions frame the responses of its fellow actors. While
shared values underpin the EU’s quest to become a normative force, the PRC’s
normative appetite is driven by different contexts and inputs. The inviolability of the
PRC’s sovereignty, for example, has been a key factor in shaping its foreign policy,
as has its self-identification as a “victim” in the international arena vis-à-vis the West
(Kavalski, 2013: 257
–
258).
Kavalski (2013: 258; emphasis in original) pointed out, “China’s normative
power has been preconditioned on the reflexive construction of the past of national
humiliation as other.” Returning to Ian Manners’ terminology, one might argue that
this “othered past” of humiliation constitutes a powerful “cultural filter” that reduces
the impact of the EU’s exported normative values due to the PRC’s focus on main-
taining sovereignty and unity at all costs. In contrast, Taiwan has no such filter10
because it has no normative ambitions on the world stage and its experiences of
humiliation are different from the PRC.11 Instead, it merely craves the recognition
of its independent and democratic status. The recognition of Taiwan by the PRC is
an existential contradiction as it majorly infringes on Beijing’s objective of removing
past humiliation; hence, Taiwan can only hope for sympathetic political entities like
the EU to provide it with its sovereign needs. However, this has not been a straight-
10 While this goes beyond the scope of this article, the “cultural filter” mentioned here does not per-
tain to the cultural applicability of democracy to the PRC and Taiwan; merely to their divergence in
historical memory. As Shi Tianjian empirically showed in his The Cultural Logic of Politics in
Mainland China and Taiwan (Shi, 2015), people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, despite the
discrepancy in governmental systems, intrinsically defined and evaluated governmental legitimacy
and democratic success according to roughly the same terms: the concept of minben (民本, lit.
“the people at the root”), or “guardianship democracy,” which set a higher bar for popular inter-
vention in the governmental process and was inclined to hand more power to authorities. For a
general overview on the Asian experience of democratization and how Asian democracies differ
from the West and from each other, see Democratization in China, Korea and Southeast Asia?
Local and National Perspectives (Zhou et al eds., 2014).
11 While the PRC’s experiences of humiliation are mainly preconditioned by the “one-hundred years
of national humiliation” (bainian guochi 百年國恥, 1839
–
1945/9), that is, the imperialist excesses
by Western and Japanese hands that devastated China, Taiwanese historical memory of said events
differs, as they experienced the latter half of said century under Japanese rule (1895
–
1945) and
largely escaped the horrors of the Warlord Era (1916
–
1928) and Sino
–
Japanese war (1937
–
1945)
on the Chinese mainland. This divergence has increased over the last several decades, as Taiwanese
education has decreased the focus on (mainland) Chinese history and fewer people identify them-
selves with Chinese historical events, and, for that matter, see themselves as Chinese.

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
143
forward process, as elucidated by a historical review of the EU’s wobbly treading
of the cross-Strait relations tightrope.
III. The Absence of “European Expectations”
throughout the 1980s
Formal ties between the PRC and the EC were established on May 8, 1975;
roughly four years after the United Nations’ (UN) expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek’s
蔣介石 (1887
–
1975) delegation that enabled the PRC to fill the contentious “China”
seat12—when each party announced its official recognition of the other.13 The (ini-
tially informal) cornerstone of these relations was the “one China” principle (yi ge
Zhongguo yuanze 一個中國原則), which was uncontested at the time because both
the Chinese Communist Party (中國共產黨, CCP) and the Chinese Kuomintang
(中國國民黨, KMT)—in control of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, respectively
—claimed to be the constitutionally legitimate ruler of the whole of Greater China,
including Taiwan. Most foreign nations implicitly accepted this concept, as recog-
nition of one entity invariably entailed severing relations with the other. Since most of
the EC’s member states had shifted recognition from Taiwan to the PRC by 1975,14
formalizing the trading bloc’s relationship with the de facto ruler of mainland China
was the logical next step.
After the recognition of the PRC, the next decade was characterized by the EC’s
averseness of developing a coherent policy on its relationship with Taiwan. As
Reinhard Drifte noted in 1985, Taiwan was seen, at best, as a strategic asset in the
Pacific, however, its political value and pivotal role as a constructive regional power
were largely ignored. Only European right-wing political organizations and individu-
als, desperate for a viable non-communist alternative to the PRC and willing to over-
look Taiwan’s lack of democracy, advocated establishing political ties that would
12 In October 1971, a US-sponsored motion, which would have allowed Chiang’s delegation to keep
its seat, was defeated by 59 votes to 55, with 19 abstentions. This enabled a roll-call vote on an
Albanian draft to grant the “China” seat to the PRC, which passed by 76 to 37, with 17 abstentions.
Hence, Chiang’s government was formally expelled from the UN. See: “United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2758” at UN. General Assembly, 1971 (accessed September 24, 2021).
13 Broadbent (1976: 190) noted that the PRC’s recognition of the EC was remarkable as it had accused
the trading bloc of being a “center of imperialist contradictions backed by the Americans” merely
three years earlier.
14 Denmark recognized the PRC as early as 1950, France did the same in 1964, and most other member
states followed suit about a decade later. The sole exception was Ireland, which maintained rela-
tions with Taiwan until 1979.

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exceed basic economic ties with the KMT regime (Drifte, 1985: 1121
–
1122).15
For most other European policymakers, the focus was on maintaining and deep-
ening relations with the PRC, which had, in 1979, embarked on its “Reform and
Opening Up” campaign (gaige kaifang 改革開放) under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping 鄧小平 (1904
–
1997) and was in the early stages of an unprecedented
economic boom with seemingly limitless potential. Since there seemed little like-
lihood of full democracy on either side of the Taiwan Strait, the EC felt no moral
impediment in collaborating with the PRC to the detriment of Taiwan, even though
the latter had been a more important trading partner before the PRC’s economic
boom (Broadbent, 1976: 191).
The EC’s policy to “solve” the Taiwan issue might have been based on the
political model of “One Country, Two Systems” (yi guo liang zhi 一國兩制), pro-
posed in 1982 by Deng Xiaoping to gain PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.16 The British
and Portuguese accepted this framework during the protracted negotiations that led
to the transfer of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and 1999,
respectively. The PRC intended to use this as a showcase to convince Taiwan to
reunite.17 This framework was grounded in a pragmatic interpretation of the “one
China” principle. It stated that the two regions would come under the PRC’s sov-
ereignty, however, could retain their economic and administrative systems, and a
high degree of autonomy, for at least 50 years.
Hong Kong and Macau were seen as test cases for Taiwan. The European
nations, mollified by the PRC’s guarantee that it would respect a 50-year grace period
before assuming full control over the two territories, saw no reason to oppose the
seemingly well-ordered solution to a complicated problem. The EC did not play a
significant part, neither proactive nor normative, in these negotiations. Thatcherite
Great Britain saw no role for Brussels in its consultations with the PRC and Portugal
15 For instance, Drifte mentioned that the conservative German Christian Social Union (CSU) and
its leader Franz-Josef Strauss (1915
–
1988) forged close (personal) relationships with the political
elite in Taipei.
16 While peaceful overtures to Taiwan, albeit with belligerent overtones, had been made since the
1950s, this approach was not systemized until the late 1970s. On June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping
elucidated the frameworks’ details, such as the limits of Taiwan’s autonomy, for the first time. See:
Deng (1993: 30
–
31).
17 This can, for example, be seen in Deng Xiaoping’s remarks to the British, listed as “We are very
concerned about the transition period in Hong Kong” (women feichang guanzhu Xianggang de
guodu shiqi 我們非常關注香港的過渡時期), dated July 31, 1984, where Deng emphasized the
need for a proper implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong to resolve the
Taiwan issue. See: Deng (1993: 67
–
68).

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
145
was not a member of the Union for most of its negotiations.18 Furthermore, the EC
did not disapprove of the “One Country, Two Systems” solution, despite Taiwan’s
unwillingness to settle for this solution.19 Bull’s point in 1982 that the Europe of
separate nation-states prevailed seemed sensical in this regard—the integration
project of the union was too barebones to serve as a negotiation force or inspiration
for the Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau issues.
However, the EC’s passivity changed along with significant political develop-
ments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the second half of the 1980s. In 1986,
the KMT regime on Taiwan allowed the opposition Democratic Progressive Party
(Minzhu jinbu dang 民主進步黨, DPP) to be founded, and, in the following year, it
finally ended almost four decades of martial law.20 Meanwhile, in the PRC, student
demonstrations in December 1986 and January 1987 failed to achieve their goal of
greater democracy and inadvertently brought about the downfall of Hu Yaobang 胡
耀邦 (1915
–
1989), the relatively liberal, reformist general secretary of the CCP.21
A few years later, new waves of dissent achieved radically different results. The
Tiananmen Square protests (bajiu minyun 八九民運), which were triggered by the
18 Portugal became an EC member in 1986, a year before it signed the Sino
–
Portuguese Joint Decla-
ration. Portuguese sovereignty over Macau had diminished significantly, as it had handed the de
facto political control to the Chinese after the riots of December 3, 1966. In the wake of the 1974
Carnation Revolution, Portugal formally recognized the PRC’s sovereignty over the territory and
stated its intent to hand it back as soon as possible. The subsequent negotiations were, therefore,
centered on finalizing the details of the transfer of power, with little Portuguese leverage. Great
Britain, in contrast, aimed for concessions from the PRC, such as a (still unfulfilled) guarantee for
universal suffrage in Hong Kong. For a comparison between the handover of Hong Kong and Macau
to the PRC, see Chan Ming K.’s “Different Roads to Home: The Retrocession of Hong Kong and
Macau to Chinese Sovereignty” (Chan, 2003).
19 The KMT regime in Taiwan reacted in 1981 to the PRC’s overtures by proposing its “the Three
Principles of the People unite China” (sanmin zhuyi tongyi Zhongguo 三民主義統一中國), based
on the ideology of its founder Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866
–
1925), to achieve reunification under
its demands. As the KMT knew that several of the ideological components of this concept would
be unacceptable to the CCP, the proposal became an elaborate rejection of the PRC’s reunification
framework.
20 The KMT governed Taiwan under martial law (commonly known as jieyan shiqi 戒嚴時期 on the
island) between May 20, 1949 (when it became clear that the CCP had won the war for control of
the Chinese mainland) and July 14, 1987.
21 Hu Yaobang was forced to step down due to his perceived sympathy for the students’ demands
and refusal to expel the movement’s prominent leaders, “radical intellectuals” Liu Binyan 劉賓雁
(1925
–
2005) and Fang Lizhi 方勵之 (1936
–
2012).

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death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, were violently suppressed by the PRC less
than two months later. In contrast, in March 1990, Taipei’s Wild Lily student move-
ment ( yebaihe xueyun 野百合學運) paved the way for Taiwan’s adoption of full,
pluralistic democracy a few years later.
While all these events may be considered aspects of, what Samuel Huntington
(1993: 103, 138) described as, the “snowballing effect” of democracy’s third wave,22
their outcomes were different. The CCP displayed great authoritarian resilience and
defied all democratic expectations with its successful retention of state power after
the June 4, 1989, crackdown (Nathan, 2003), despite considerable US and European
sanctions.23 In contrast, the KMT acceded to the demands of Taiwan’s dissidents
by implementing democracy in less than a decade. Therefore, by the early 1990s,
the situation was different from the one Drifte had described in his article—Taiwan
was on the road to liberal democracy, whereas the PRC had chosen to suppress
any pro-democratic dissent. While the EC’s “economic choice” for the PRC still
appeared sensical under the given developments, Taiwan was proving to be a poten-
tial partner that aligned (much) better with Europe’s democratic norms and values.
Hence, a difficult choice between principles and pragmatism was taking shape.
Nevertheless, the EC remained silent on the democratic developments on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait, aside from imposing a handful of economic sanctions and
issuing some critical declarations against the PRC. Despite the lack of a coherent
European cross-Strait relations strategy, the EC’s normative influence grew in this
transitional period, which came from a value close to zero vis-à-vis the PRC. The
exponentially growing Chinese economy brought about the need to formalize the
relationship with the PRC, which occurred through the establishment of trade offices,
formal delegations, and agreements. Specifically, concerning Manners’s (2002)
framework, one could state that there was an increase of procedural,24 transfer-
22 The downfall of the Philippines’ Fernando Marcos (1917
–
1989) in February 1986 was influential
in generating anxiety among other authoritarian leaders in Asia. The legalization of the DPP in Sep-
tember 1986 and the lifting of the martial law 10 months later were far from coincidental in this
context.
23 Both the EC/EU and the US introduced arms embargoes against the PRC, specifically to restrict
the latter’s acquisition of high-end (military) technology. Most of these measures remain in place
to this day. In addition, several joint economic projects were (temporarily) frozen after June 1989,
and diplomatic relations with Western countries were (temporarily) constrained. Unlike the weapon
embargoes, these measures seized to exist by the late 1990s.
24 Before the 1970s, except for Denmark and France, there had been little to no official ties between
the EC member states and the PRC. However, by the 1990s, all the member states, including new

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
147
ence,25 and overt26 diffusion to the PRC from Europe as the EC and its member
states strengthened political and trade links with the country. Systemic demands were
rarely made of the PRC; although in 1995, the EC released its position on the PRC
titled “A Long-Term Policy for EU
–
China Relations.” However, this document
showed very little intentional or principled informational diffusion, as several Euro-
pean actors wanted to wait and watch how the “One Country, Two Systems” prin-
ciple fared in practice before formulating a firm policy toward the region; Taiwan
in particular.27
Given that the EC and its member states had terminated all official ties with
Taiwan, it was primarily susceptible to only one form of diffusion—(passive) con-
tagion of the EC and its member states’ (democratic) norms and values.28 Never-
theless, the wave of democratization that swept through the world in the late 1980s
and early 1990s indicated that this was sufficient to set the country on the road to
democracy. This was especially true as Taiwan’s cultural filters, which could poten-
tially block such a move, were much weaker than those of the PRC, which, in the
wake of the 1989 protests and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, was doing everything
to retain authoritarian primacy.
members, such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, had formalized their relations with the PRC. Sub-
sequently, all the EU members would maintain official relations with the PRC, which would not
change with the enlargements of the 20th century. Presently, the Holy See, although not an EU
member, is the sole European state or political entity with relations with Taiwan.
25 The “carrot-and-stick” approach by the EC and many of its member states after the PRC’s crack-
down on the 1989 protests, that is, the freezing of economic projects and instating of a military
embargo, is a prime example of an attempt at transference.
26 Similar to footnote 24, the establishment of formal relations between the EC and its member states
with the PRC was followed by a physical presence in the country through embassies and consulates,
which, in practice, often encompassed an institutional transfer from Taiwan to the PRC by official
diplomatic representations.
27 The short reference in the document to the impeding handover of Hong Kong and Macau empha-
sized “the importance of implementing the principles contained formally in the two Joint Decla-
rations signed by China and the United Kingdom and Portugal respectively,” and showed concern
for safeguarding the trade interests of the EU and its member states in the two cities. See: European
Commission (1995: B.3).
28 It should be noted that the EC and its member states maintained a presence in Taiwan through
informal trade offices, which de facto served as embassies. These trade offices were, however,
limited in their dealings with Taiwan due to the lack of official relations, and, especially during
this period, refrained from any open or formal support for Taiwan’s democratization.

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IV. The EU and Cross-Strait Relations around
the Turn of the Century
Democracy did not become a major theme in the cross-Strait policy of the now
more-unified EU29 in the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the PRC’s continuing
authoritarian resilience. The triumph of liberal democracy seemed inevitable to
cultural commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama (1992) who hailed “the end of
history” in the wake of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and institu-
tional standard-bearers, such as Brussels. The EU celebrated Taiwan’s democrati-
zation and moves toward democracy, however, it made no attempt to provide con-
crete support to the island for fear of jeopardizing increasingly important political
and trading relations with the PRC. Hence, the EU could be characterized as a non-
actor in cross-Strait relations, evident during the third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996,
when it played a negligible role despite the anti-democratic undertone in the PRC’s
assault on the island’s sovereignty.30 Only the European Parliament, the Union body
with the least political power, provided some support for Taiwan’s democratization
efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s (Dent and Johnson, 2000: 122; Lang, 2015: 25
–
26), while the Commission and the Council remained on the sidelines, and sometimes
even actively endorsed the PRC’s one China principle.31
Echoing the UK and Portugal’s acceptance of the “One Country, Two Systems”
framework, the EU—and the rest of the Western world—expected Taiwan’s nascent
democracy to exert a profound influence on the PRC’s governmental systems. One
of the few dissenting voices belonged to Gunter Schubert (2003),32 who insisted that
29 The Maastricht Treaty (1992) ushered in a new stage of European integration as the EC’s 12 member
states voted to transform it into the EU, intending to develop a common currency and a joint for-
eign and security policy.
30 While the primary reason for the PRC’s aggressive stance was Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s
李登輝 (1923
–
2020) alleged abandonment of the one China principle, the PRC feared that demo-
cratic elections might destabilize cross-Strait relations.
31 In 1999, the presidency of the European council issued a motion in support of the statement, “There
is only one China in this world, the PRC is the sole government of China, and Taiwan is an inalien-
able part of China” (世界上只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分，中華人民共和國政府是代
表全中國的唯一合法政府). See: Lan (2004: 116).
32 Schubert (2003: 268
–
277) was critical of Lynn T. White’s assumption that the PRC would democ-
ratize over the next 50 years, noting, “It is obvious, therefore, that White believes that China will
change in the meantime to a more democratic country that would abstain from any violent action

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149
the EU should play a more active role in solving the Taiwan issue through soft power:
If the European Union decided to embark on a policy of active engagement
in the cross-Strait conict by promoting a model of “sovereign (asymmet-
ric) integration” between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait under the roof
of “one China” and thereby advocated a UN seat for Taiwan, it would
follow a path very different from Washington’s long-time Taiwan policy. It
would also meet with strong opposition from the current Chinese govern-
ment. However, it is contended here that European “soft power” and a
model combining divided sovereignty, integration and unication as a
long-term goal (depending on the success of economic, cultural and politi-
cal integration) would ultimately win out against the resistance from both
Beijing and Washington. (Schubert, 2003: 277)
Schubert believed that the EU should promote the normative example embedded
in its existence as a successful project of integration for the PRC to follow to unify
with Taiwan. He further noted that the European Commission and Council were
reluctant to endorse any alternative to the PRC’s interpretation of one China, while
the relatively powerless Parliament showed some interest in supporting Taiwan
(Schubert, 2003: 267). Similarly, Tang Shaocheng noted that the Council, in par-
ticular, was reluctant to issue visas for visiting Taiwanese politicians, and only the
Parliament was open to establishing deeper relations with the island state. He claimed
that this behavior exacerbated Taiwan’s international isolation (Tang, 2003: 523
–
525). Economic ambitions and commercial interests in the Chinese mainland con-
stantly eclipsed any “good feelings” toward political developments in Taiwan (Dent
and Johnson, 2000: 141), while denunciation of PRC aggression remained half-
hearted. François Godement stated:
[The international community’s] pronouncements therefore tend to focus
as much on the condemnation of the use of force (by mainland China) as
on the recognition of the existence of one China (thus trying to discourage
Taiwan from any posture leading to a declaration of independence). With
unfailing regularity, European Union pronouncements on cross-Strait
issues are now based on these two side-by-side elements. (Godement,
2001: 6)
against Taiwan, enabling both sides to agree peacefully on the ultimate political status of the island”
(ibid.: 271).

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In the years following Godement’s comments, the EU criticized both the PRC and
Taiwan for destabilizations in cross-Strait relations. For instance, it stated its dis-
approval of both Beijing’s belligerent anti-secession law (fan fenlie guojia fa 反分
裂國家法, 2005) and Taipei’s unilateral suspension of its National Unification
Council (Guojia tongyi weiyuanhui 國家統一委員會) in 2006 (Kerr and Liu eds.,
2007: 262). Other commentators soon joined the calls for the EU to play a more
active role in cross-Strait relations, while respecting the existence of one China. For
instance, Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2005: 8
–
10) suggested that the EU might use its
influence to help Taiwan gain access to international organizations, however, he
stressed the need to oppose both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism. In addition,
he felt that a new definition of one China was in order and called for a one China
policy to replace the EU’s adherence to the one China principle,33 which could no
longer depend on the implicit consensus34 on both sides of the Taiwan Strait after
the pro-independence DPP gained power in Taiwan. Cabestan stated:
[The EU] should also encourage both parties to move towards a more EU-
like denition of “one China,” a supra-national umbrella. In its bilateral
talks, Beijing no longer asks Taipei to acknowledge that Taiwan is part
of the People’s Republic of China as such and conversely the Taiwanese
authorities do not plan to move Taiwan outside of the Republic of China.
(Cabestan, 2005: 8)
Paradoxically, amid the calls for an enhanced EU role in solving the Taiwan issue,
there was little mention of Taiwan’s burgeoning democracy or how it might be safe-
33 Note the distinction between the aforementioned one China “principle” and one China “policy”
(Chin.: yi ge Zhongguo zhengce 一個中國政策). While the former implies embracing either the
CCP or KMT’s standpoint that, constitutionally, there is only one China, the latter implies pragmatic
solutions by third nations to recognize the de jure existence of one China, while dealing with the
de facto independence of Taiwan. The PRC, while hoping that all nations, and the EU (Lim, 2009:
205), will eventually exclusively endorse its standpoint, effectively allowed a pragmatic one China
interpretation (i.e., the existence of unofficial ties with Taiwan) as the bottom line for maintaining
official relations (Reilly, 2018: 76).
34 This implicit consensus between the KMT and CCP was concretized in the 1992 Consensus (Chin.:
jiu er gongshi 九二共識), which was based on a semi-official meeting between the CCP and KMT
in 1992—the first in decades—that accepted to the existence of one China, albeit with differing
constitutional interpretation. The consensus is highly contested and possibly anachronistic, as the
first mention of any consensus at the meeting was not made before the one China principle was
contested after the KMT lost power in 2000.

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151
guarded. Once again, only the European Parliament showed interest in the subject,
for instance, when hailing the March 2000 presidential election as “further proof of
Taiwan’s development into a full-fledged democracy.”35 Regarding the formulation
of an official policy toward the region, the island’s recent democracy remained largely
ignored. While the need for the PRC to democratize was occasionally highlighted
in connection with calls for the country to improve its human rights record, the EU
declined to set any specific goals or targets in this regard.
Similarly, in the policy paper, “A Maturing Partnership—Shared Interests and
Challenges in EU
–
China Relations” (2003), democratic reform was welcomed only
insofar as it would facilitate greater economic cooperation between the two sides,
“Europe thus has a major political and economic stake in supporting China’s success-
ful transition to a stable, prosperous and open country that fully embraces democracy,
free market principles and the rule of law” (European Commission, 2003: 3). The
only mention of any democratic initiatives was that the EU would seek to “continue
promoting grass-roots democracy through support to China’s experiments with direct
suffrage” (ibid.: 14), which had been ongoing since the 1990s.36 The EU hoped that
the limited democratic freedoms under “One Country, Two Systems” would be
conducive to these experiments; the PRC was expected to gradually move toward a
more democratic system (Laursen, 2006: 23). As for Taiwan, the document merely
advocated, “underlin[ing] EU interest in closer links with Taiwan in non-political
fields, including in multilateral contexts, in line with the EU’s ‘One-China’ policy”
(European Commission, 2003: 11). Nevertheless, it attested to a slightly more pro-
active position to cross-Strait relations through the mentioned existence of a one
China policy.
Despite the fifth enlargement of the EU in 2004, which nullified Bull’s argu-
ment that a supranational European institution would never be able to formulate a
coherent foreign policy as it could never represent the majority of Europe’s citizens,
the Council and Commission maintained a passive attitude toward cross-Strait
relations and declined to reinforce the Parliament’s tentative support for Taiwanese
democracy. The PRC, meanwhile, despite its reservations and reluctance over ceding
any national sovereignty, supported further EU integration and saw economic and
35 European Parliament resolution of April 13, 2000, which can be found at European Parliament, 2000
(accessed September 27, 2021).
36 Larry Diamond and Ramon Myers’s Elections and Democracy in Greater China (Diamond and
Myers eds., 2004) provides an overview of the ongoing democratic experiments at the time in main-
land China on the grassroots level, and links and compares them to the situation in Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan.

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geopolitical advantages in line with its aim for a multipolar (non-US dominated)
world (Kerr and Liu eds., 2007: 19). Schucher (2007: 30
–
32) concluded that the
Commission was taking “a hands-off approach to the questions of stability and
security in the Taiwan Strait up until the present and is still just talking business […]
In the relations with China, economic interests prevail over the defense of [human
rights and democracy,] which is reduced to ‘declaratory measures’.” Nevertheless,
like Schubert, Schucher identified significant normative opportunities for the EU as
a role model for integration and unity if it could play a role in solving the Taiwan
issue (Schucher, 2007: 10, 31).
However, the official summary of the 10th China
–
EU Summit in 2007, when
the EU was represented by the Commission and the Council, mentioned Taiwan only
to reiterate the PRC’s standpoint on the island state and voice concerns over some
of the DPP’s political initiatives:
The EU reafrmed its commitment to one China policy and expressed its
hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive
dialogue. The EU reiterated its concern over the intended referendum on
UN membership in the name of Taiwan as this could lead to a unilateral
change of the status quo across Taiwan straits [sic] to which the EU is
opposed. In this context, the EU expressed its concern over the Taipei
authorities’ intentions about the future status of the island. (Glière, 2008:
404)
This summary is emblematic of the EU’s cross-Strait policy in the late 2000s; it con-
tinued to resist any diversion from the one China principle,37 even when its Parlia-
ment called for a more assertive approach. The fall of the USSR and the supposed
eventual “victory of liberal democracy” meant that active promotion of democracy
globally was no longer a priority for Western nations or supranational institutions.
This was apparent regarding the PRC as well. By 2009, the word “democracy”
and related terms (democratization or democratic) were hardly ever mentioned in
European Commission policy papers on the country (Mattlin, 2009: 102).
In the early 2010s, the EU’s business-first approach retained its central posi-
tion in the EU’s foreign agenda. The “EU
–
China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Coop-
37 See, for example, “Taiwan: Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union,” which
begins: “The European Union reiterates its policy of one China. It does not support Taiwan mem-
bership in international organizations which require statehood.” See European Commission, 2008
(accessed March 18, 2022).

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
153
eration” (2013), for example, was written in the same vein as the 2003 policy paper.
The “economic stake” in the PRC seemed to have become so large that sensitive
subjects, such as “democracy,” “norms,” “values,” and “Taiwan,” were entirely
ignored in favor of an almost singular focus on increasing trade, while just one article
was dedicated to a token statement on human rights.38 Moreover, the document
seemed based on the assumption that there did not exist any possible unbridgeable
impediments that might hamper full-fledged bilateral and multilateral cooperation
with the PRC in the future, despite its retention of what essentially could be seen as
a rival normative system. Therefore, Hu Shaohua argued that the EU’s economic
interest in the PRC would impede any significant support to Taiwan: “The fact that
China is more important than Taiwan makes it unlikely for the EU to side with Taipei
against Beijing.” (Hu, 2011: 57)
Nevertheless, while the EU’s “nice ideas” were not overtly promoted in policy
documents concerning the PRC and Taiwan in the 2000s and early 2010s, there was
an undeniable increase of contagion diffusion of other norms and values to the two
nations as the Union continued to expand horizontally and vertically and moved
ahead with further integration. Moreover, its close economic and commercial links
with the PRC and Taiwan facilitated more procedural, transference and overt dif-
fusion. This was even more evident after the EU, the PRC, and Taiwan39 joined the
WTO in 1995, 2001, and 2002, respectively, and the expanding EU and its member
states continued intensifying their official ties with the PRC. However, despite some
limited initiatives,40 these three forms of diffusion were less pronounced in Taiwan
38 The subsection “trade and investment,” a part of the second chapter “Prosperity,” is the longest
subsection of the document, with 19 articles (European Commission, 2013: 5
–
7). The only reference
to human rights can be found in the eighth article of the first chapter “Peace and Security.” It ambig-
uously states, “Deepen exchanges on human rights at the bilateral and international level on the
basis of equality and mutual respect. Strengthen the Human Rights Dialogue with constructive
discussions on jointly agreed key priority areas” (ibid.: 4).
39 Taiwanese membership of WTO was a conditional requirement by the US in return for support
for the PRC’s membership in the organization. As a compromise to the PRC, the WTO employed
“Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)” to denote
the Taiwanese delegation. The PRC (Zhongguo Taibei dandu guanshuiqu 中國臺北單獨關稅區,
literal translation: Separate Customs Territory of Taipei, China) and Taiwan (Tai Peng Jin Ma gebie
guanshui lingyu 臺澎金馬個別關稅領域, literal translation: Taiwan Penghu Kinmen Matsu Sep-
arate Customs Territory) use different Chinese translations to refer to Taiwan’s delegation at the
WTO.
40 For a case study of formal EU normative diffusion in Taiwan during this period, see “EU Public
Diplomacy in Asia: A Case Study of the EU Center in Taiwan” (Su, 2016), which elaborates the

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due to the EU’s unwillingness to establish formal political and diplomatic relations
with the island for fear of jeopardizing its relationship with the PRC. There was
negligible informational diffusion beyond declaratory statements in either the PRC
or Taiwan, as only the European Parliament, rather than the Council or Commission,
showed interest in playing an active role in the region.
In summary, despite the European normative values being diffused more
intensely to the PRC, Taiwan was moving much faster in the direction that the EU
desired. Hence, the strength of Manners’s contagion (toward Taiwan) and cultural
filter (in the PRC) were apparent.
V. Recent Developments:
The Return of (Democratic) Principles
Francis Fukuyama’s prediction of a global victory for liberal democracy turned
out to be a mirage. While in the early 2000s, there lingered some hopes to surround
the EU with a “ring of friends” (Biscop, 2019: 14), since 2006, the supposedly “irre-
sistible” advance of democracy either stagnated or had started to go into reverse.41
Andrew Nathan (2003: 16) had referred to the PRC’s rise as implying a “disturbing
possibility of authoritarianism being a viable governmental form for highly mod-
ernized regimes.” However, it took Brussels until the demise of local democratic
experiments under the tenure of Xi Jinping 習近平 (2013
–
) and the rise of the
illiberal normative alternative, commonly known as the “Beijing Consensus” (Bei-
jing gongshi 北京共識),42 to realize that they were dealing with a potential systemic
ways the EU Center in Taiwan, founded in 2009, promotes the understanding of EU policies and
values on the island.
41 As measured by Freedom House’s Index of Civil and Political Freedoms and The Economist’s
Democracy Index, among other metrics. Measured from 2006, the global state of democracy reached
an all-time low in 2021 in most indexes. Asia has not been spared from this trend either. See: Tem-
pleman (2020: 2
–
4).
42 The term “Beijing Consensus” was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in his The Beijing Consensus:
“China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply
how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows
them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single
massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new physics of power and development the Beijing
Consensus. It replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory made
famous in the 1990s for its prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to telling other nations
how to run themselves” (Ramo, 2004: 3
–
4). While Ramo proposed some alleged tenets of the con-

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
155
rival that could thrive under a global trend of democratic backsliding. Meanwhile,
support for the “One Country, Two Systems” model as a potential (democratic)
solution to the Taiwan issue waned inexorably, with gradual democratic backsliding
in Hong Kong and Macau during the 2010s, and the PRC’s introduction of the Hong
Kong National Security Law (Xianggang Guo’anfa 香港國安法) in June 2020 as
the final nail in its (partial) democratic coffin.
Diachronic developments in Taiwan were discrepant. Concurrent with the PRC’s
authoritarian resilience, Taiwan’s multiparty democracy proved to be resilient to an
extent that there is little doubt that it is here to stay.43 While increasingly lagging
behind the PRC in scope, the island’s strategic economic relevance has grown, as it
now, among others, controls almost 3/4th of the global chip manufacturing industry.
Furthermore, while still a fraction compared to PRC
–
EU trade, EU exports to Taiwan
have been booming, reaching over 50 billion in 2018 (Dekker, 2020: 2
–
3). By this
time, Brussels had acknowledged that the (authoritarian) PRC and (democratic)
Taiwan had little chance of resolving their differences on their own. Hence, it opted
for a new, more balanced cross-Strait strategy, irrespective of its unprecedented
(economic) dependence on one of the world’s military, economic, and political
superpowers. This formed a part of the EU’s new approach to international affairs—
“principled pragmatism”—which was outlined in June 2016:
The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as
its key principle and the United Nations at its core. We will be guided by
clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the
current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance
a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in
the years ahead. In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only
the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security,
prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in
the world. (European External Action Service, 2016: 8; emphasis added)
This new grand strategy was based on the complexity embedded in the observation
that both the PRC’s authoritarianism and Taiwan’s democracy were extremely resil-
ient. In the “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council:
sensus, the most defining characteristic was its vagueness and the fact that it proposed the possibility
of a non-(neo)liberal/Western-inspired development path.
43 For a concise yet coherent summary of some of the factors that contributed to Taiwan’s democratic
resilience, see Joseph Wong’s “Democratic Resilience in South Korea and Taiwan” (Wong, 2019).

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Elements for a New EU Strategy on China,” released in June 2016, pragmatism
allowed the recognition of one China, although on the EU’s own terms, “The EU
confirms its ‘One China’ policy…” (European commission, 2016: 4; emphasis
added). However, a combination of a principled defense of the EU’s core values and
a pragmatic desire to fulfill its objectives on the world stage ruled the day:
[within its “One China” policy] The EU conrms its commitment to con-
tinuing to develop its relations with Taiwan and to supporting the shared
values underpinning its system of governance […] The EU should promote
practical solutions regarding Taiwan’s participation in international frame-
works, wherever this is consistent with the EU’s “One China” policy and
the EU’s policy objectives. (ibid.; emphasis added)
Furthermore, the document recognized that the previous policy guideline, the afore-
mentioned “EU
–
China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” (2013), which had
not discussed any unbridgeable normative differences that might hamper the develop-
ment of PRC
–
EU ties, was no longer comprehensive enough to cover its needs:
The EU
–
China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation fulls an impor-
tant role as the highest-level joint document guiding the EU
–
China Com-
prehensive Strategic Partnership. But the EU needs its own strategy, one
which puts its own interests at the forefront in the new relationship; which
promotes universal values; which recognises the need for and helps to
dene an increased role for China in the international system; and is based
on a positive agenda of partnership coupled with the constructive manage-
ment of differences. (European Commission, 2013: 2; emphasis added)
Principled pragmatism permeated the “EU
–
China—A Strategic Outlook” (2019),
which built further on the “Elements for a New EU Strategy on China.”44 While
this document came after the ascendency of Donald Trump (1946
–
) to the White
House, it would be unjustified to claim, considering the lineage of documents and
policy changes presented in this paper, that the hardened stance of the EU toward
the PRC was due to the geopolitical pressure of his administration. Instead, Trump’s
44 The fourth footnote of the document pays direct homage to the 2016 strategy: “The EU continues
to adhere to its ‘One China Policy.’ The EU confirms its commitment to continuing to develop its
relations with Taiwan and to supporting the shared values underpinning its system of governance,
as set out in the 2016 EU Strategy on China.” See: European Commission (2019: 1).

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
157
rise, at most, sped up Brussels’ awareness that the EU needed to become its own
actor on the international stage, in general and vis-à-vis cross-Strait relations, because
American and European interests no longer automatically aligned. Hence, a more
assertive approach is visible in the document, as a conclusion seems to have been
reached in Brussels that some “differences” cannot be “managed” due to the PRC’s
identity as a systemic rival:
China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner
with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner
with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic
competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival
promoting alternative models of governance. This requires a exible and
pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defense of inter-
ests and values. (European Commission, 2019: 1; emphasis added)45
Such declarations gave rise to an unavoidable question: how would the EU combine
its principles, which implies support for Taiwan(ese democracy), with pragmatism,
which implies maintaining strong economic and security ties with the PRC? As the
EU became the PRC’s largest trading partner in 2014 and the reverse happened in
2020 (Anthony et al., 2021: 11), the ongoing decoupling debate involves stakes that
have become too large to jeopardize. However, while decoupling seems off-limits,
the EU is “pragmatically” preventing the “stakes” from becoming so large that they
might jeopardize its “principles.” Thus, it was in the EU’s interests to neither pursue
the same route as the US in this regard and restart the bipolar world order of the
Cold War nor continue its “business-first” approach during the unipolar US world
order that followed its conclusion.
An example of the EU’s new principled pragmatic stance came on October 11,
2020. After the 2019 white paper and recommendations from the European Com-
mission during March of that year but before the CAI-breakdown of 2021, the EU
member states decided to “cooperate informally on FDI screening where a foreign
investment could have an effect on the EU single market.”46 While the March 2020
recommendations did not include the word “China,” the suggestions were aimed at
preventing a Chinese buy-out of European health infrastructure and other “critical
45 While the 2016 document had effectively listed several areas where the EU and the PRC’s inter-
pretations differed, the term “(systematic) rival” was absent.
46 See the press release of October 9, 2020, in European Commission, 2020a (accessed June 30, 2022).

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inputs” after the COVID-crisis commenced in Europe.47
Simultaneously, as Brigitte Dekker (2020: 3
–
4) stated, at least for the norma-
tive dimension, strong ties with like-minded powers, such as Taiwan, are imperative
if the EU wants to be taken seriously on the global stage. By balancing its pragmatic
interests in the PRC’s economy with principled support for Taiwan’s resilient democ-
racy such a position could be achieved.
VI. So, What to Do?
It may be necessary to accept that the traditional separation of soft and hard
powers is obsolete. As Jan Orbie (2006: 126) noted in 2005, an integrated approach
is required—military persuasion and soft power should no longer be seen as sepa-
rate (or separable) fields in discussions surrounding the CPE. Sven Biscop (2021a:
95
–
96) recently emphasized the same, “There is no hard, soft or smart power—just
power,” and pertinently stated that the prevalent idea of a CPE without a military
dimension has always been an illusion as nearly all of its members have been mem-
bers of NATO for most of the EU’s existence (Biscop, 2019: 82). Hence, the EU
must learn how to deploy its economic, political, and military48 power simultane-
ously to become more than a minor player in cross-Strait relations. François Duchêne
and Hedley Bull’s argument must be laid to rest: maybe both equally had a point
after all. Furthermore, a deliberate “blurring” of the EU’s tools should tally with its
desired foreign policy strategy underpinned by principled pragmatism.
However, a blurring of the power tools through the integration of hard power
with the CPE should not be viewed as a call for a more aggressive EU on the world
stage. Instead, we must revisit Mikael Mattlin’s 2010 working paper for the Finnish
Institute of International Affairs, “A Normative EU Policy towards China: Mission
Impossible?” Similar to Kavalski’s comments on normativity in the EU and the PRC,
Mattlin concluded that adopting an “offensive normative approach” will lead to
Beijing casting itself as the victim of a bombastic, imperialistic Europe. Therefore,
he advocated a less threatening “defensive normative approach.” Hence, a greater
recognition of the fact that “the gist of the EU’s attraction lies in the quiet example
47 In this regard, note that during the same month the first wave of the COVID-crisis was subsiding in
the PRC, which further increased said fears. See: European Commission, 2020b (accessed June 30,
2022).
48 For a case that argues how the EU might increase its military clout by establishing a European Army,
achieving strategic autonomy, and creating a clear division of labor between the EU and NATO.
See: Biscop (2019: 82
–
125).

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159
set by it” (Mattlin, 2010: 21
–
22), which is the starting point for contagion diffusion
of its principles and values, might be imperative for the EU to exert more normative
pressure in cross-Strait relations.
However, while this might sound similar to Therborn’s notion of a “nice, decent
periphery of the world, with little power but with some good ideas,” Mattlin recog-
nized the EU’s “good ideas” as its latent contagious power and advocated enforcing
them at home to disseminate them abroad:
The alternative “defensive” normative approach advocated here would
not have the EU engage in the futile effort of trying to change other major
powers against their own will, but rather recognises that they are alter-
native value communities in their own right. However, this approach
would also be more insistent in upholding European values within our
own community; resisting the growing pressures emanating from Beijing
and Moscow to dictate solutions for us. In other words, while we should
not impose our version of political democracy on China, neither can China
decree, for example, who European leaders meet on their home turf or how
we should organize our internal affairs. This would be a variation on
“when in Rome, do as the Romans do.” A more realist-tinged normative
policy would be far more understandable to Beijing. (Mattlin, 2010: 21;
emphasis in original)
Indeed, Europe, as a whole, never gained power through hegemonic ambition
(in contrast to some of its member states in the past). Instead, it has enhanced its
power by remaining “passive” and setting an (albeit flawed) example for others.
Notwithstanding the 2003 claim that “the EU cannot afford to be inward-looking”
(European Commission, 2003: 6), the “normative key” to being taken seriously on
the world stage lies in organizing its internal affairs. Even in 2003, an understanding
lingered that attested to its potential normative power in this regard, “as a model
of successful regional integration and of governance under the rule of law, the EU
supports ongoing reforms in China and is ready to help China address current chal-
lenges of its economic and social transition” (ibid.: 24). Hence, as a model for
regional reform and integration, ensuring that there is a Rome for the PRC and
Taiwan to emulate remains the EU’s most pressing task. It must be remembered
that building this Rome does not clash with the PRC’s geopolitical aims, as it has
willingly and publicly pledged support for continuing EU integration on multiple
occasions under the assumption that a stronger Union will bring about a multipolar

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world beneficial to its aims.49 As Su Hungdah and Yeh Kuo-chun stated, the PRC
was not necessarily in favor of Brexit, since a weakened EU cannot constitute a
balancing power against the unipolar American hegemony (Su and Yeh, 2018: 399
–
400). Yet, instead of concerning itself with how the PRC treats, and views, Brussels,
the EU has been solely been concerned with how the PRC treats the Chinese (Biscop,
2021b: 4). However, it is time to look inward to gaze outward; the above-mentioned
FDI screening rules are a much-needed first step in that direction.
When discussing the EU’s (potential) normative power, one has to remember
the context of its interlocutors. While there is a tendency to invoke “Cold War”
analogies when it comes to the EU, often considered to be a part of a unitary “the
West,” and the PRC, it is important to remember that the issues today are starkly
different (e.g., climate change) than during the Cold War (e.g., nuclear non-prolifer-
ation) (Crookes et al., 2021: 2). Unlike then, compartmentalization of relations with
Beijing is a valid option in several new subsections. In his The Guanxi of Relational
International Theory, Kavalski (2018: 92) elaborated on the particularities of dealing
with the PRC, stating that “the difference of China’s rise can be translated through
the relational lens of ‘interdependence-in-antagonism’—a normative stance that treats
cooperation and competition as corresponding forces which underpin the mutual
dependence of all those inhabiting global life.” Rather than a “securitization” of
relations reminiscent of the Cold War, Kavalski called for “a relation that brings
disagreements into the conversation and forces the mechanisms that proscribe other
forms of being and knowing to become visible” (ibid.).
The primary “disagreement” that has to be brought “into the conversation” is
the desired form of cross-Strait relations, the EU’s involvement in this, and Taiwan’s
contentious political status. Previously, the Union’s Parliament, arguably the most
democratic of its institutions, has stood alone in its support for Taiwanese democracy.
As the EU insists that its foreign policy will be guided by principled pragmatism,
more power must be given to this body owing to its efforts in following the guideline
over the past decades. Principled pragmatism might enable the compartmentalization
of Sino
–
European ties that Brussels requires to pursue a normative role on the world
stage. As Biscop (2021b: 2) explained, this should be an attitude of “cooperate when
you can, push back when you must,” and not “push back when you can, cooperate
when you must” that the US administrations adhere(d) to. Such a position, which
49 See, for instance, “China welcomed the new and significant progress made in EU integration, as a
result of the EU agreement on a new Reform Treaty, which further strengthens Europe as a global
player” (Glière, 2008: 403), and, “China reaffirms its support to EU integration” (European Com-
mission, 2013: 2).

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
161
would enable the principled support for Taiwan while maintaining a pragmatic coop-
eration with the PRC, might enhance the EU’s democratic credibility globally,
enabling greater contagious diffusion of its norms and principles outside of the
Union. Furthermore, other formal channels of Manners’s normative diffusion model
could be expanded within the scope of a more pragmatic EU-tailored (“its”) one
China policy.
Both the PRC and EU have changed since 1975. As Reuben Wong (2013: 159)
elucidated, the astronomic growth of both actors—vertically for the PRC and hori-
zontally for the EU—was conducive for the Sino
–
EU relations over the last decades
and allowed for a high degree of pragmatism. In 2003, while a continuing rise of
the PRC was expected, and welcomed, no one expected that, by the 2020s, China
would be involved in every global conversation (Biscop, 2019: 14). Since internal
consolidation has occurred and persists on both ends, a clarification of their normative
identities and principles, and bringing them into the conversation, has become a
critical task. The EU should step into such challenging conversations with confidence,
in the wake of the “Mutually Assured Economic Destruction” that the ever-increasing
trade ties of the last few decades have brought about. Furthermore, the crucial role
the Union could play in providing legitimacy and prestige for the PRC’s Belt and
Road Initiative (yi dai yi lu 一帶一路, BRI), gives Brussels more leverage than it
commonly assumes (Roctus, 2020). Hence, both actors must find a balance in their
interactions. A liberal world order must be promoted by Brussels while cooperating
with a power with distinctly different normative values (Christiansen et al., 2019:
180).
How can Brussels promote this liberal world order beyond solely counting
passively on its democratic contagion? A deliberate blurring of the “principled” and
the “pragmatic” could be a possible answer. The recent advancement of the Global
Gateway project, proposed as a multi-billion “European strategy to boost smart, clean
and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health,
education and research systems across the world,” could be a test case. As noted
in the “principles of the Global Gateway,” “democratic values and high standards”
is the first of six principles that underpin this long-term project; principles that Com-
mission president Ursula von der Leyen (1958
–
) described as “in line with the EU’s
values and standards.”50 It is noteworthy that these principles are not a hard prereq-
uisite for cooperation; hence, once again, blurring the pragmatic and the principle
would suit the EU’s objectives. If Brussels can successfully and convincingly extend
50 All the citations in this paragraph can be found on the official Global Gateway webpage (European
Commission, 2021
–
; accessed July 4, 2022).

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its, in Mattlin’s words, “quiet example” abroad through the project, and other initia-
tives, its powerful contagion could be fully brought into play. Indeed, democratic
dialogues do not always need to occur explicitly, an implicit showcase of the EU’s
values through a successful economic project could serve this purpose much better.
The Global Gateway could provide the world with a democratic alternative to
the PRC’s BRI. Therefore, it is important to ensure, under the context of the conten-
tious cross-Strait relations, that the PRC remains engaged despite the existence of
projects that might be viewed as “rivaling” its initiatives. The retention of a form of
“one China policy” could be the pragmatism that allows the PRC to interact with
the EU, despite its support for Taiwan (Dekker, 2020: 5). While the recognition of
Taiwanese nationhood would imply an unwarranted decoupling of relations with
the PRC, a principled stance on support for the de facto blossoming liberal democ-
racy on the PRC’s shores is the only way forward for Brussels as a norm-setter. The
fact that the norms being promoted are being blocked by the PRC despite the pres-
ence of all diffusion channels in Manner’s normative model does not decrease the
urgency of living up to them at home and thereby, at least passively, diffusing them
on the international stage. As Tsang stated, Taiwan functions as a “democratic mirror”
to many Chinese, as its existence stimulates critical (self-)reflection and debate
(Tsang ed., 2017: 17). Thus, pragmatically supporting this mirror serves the EU’s
interests at home and abroad.
This brings us back to the faltering negotiations involving CAI and the budding
initiatives surrounding a hypothetical BIA with Taiwan. If Beijing can be made
aware that it has to compromise to revive said negotiations, since it has infringed on
the EU’s red lines by sanctioning its MEPs, and tolerate Brussels’ economic outreach
to Taiwan, a pragmatic compartmentalization of the Sino
–
EU relationship is still
possible. As, in the words of von der Leyen, CAI would “provide unprecedented
access to the Chinese market for European investors,”51 it is not in the interest of
the Union to have the hard-fought treaty wither away. Moreover, further sanctioning
the PRC would mean additional fuel for the PRC’s reflexive construction of itself
as the humiliated other on the world stage. The ineffective post-1989 sanctions have
proven that this is an undesirable approach. The 2020s could bring about a new dawn
where the EU, in a spirit of defensive normativity, puts its internal affairs, norms,
and values at the forefront of negotiations over CAI with the PRC.
Finally, it is important to remember and support the audience who are highly
affected by the contagion imbedded in the EU’s identity as a successful liberal
51 As noted by von der Leyen on December 30, 2020, see “EU and China Reach Agreement in Prin-
ciple on Investment” (European Commission, 2020c; accessed July 4, 2022).

Contagious Democracy? A Historical Case for a Defensive Normative Approach for the EU’s Cross-Strait Policy
163
democratic project of integration, and are anticipating more (formal) diffusion of
its norms and values. If the EU falters in this regard, Larry Diamond’s words on the
terrifying prospect of a depression following the ongoing worldwide democratic
backsliding might come true:
Democracy may be receding somewhat in practice, but it is still globally
ascendant in people’s values and aspirations. This creates signicant new
opportunities for democratic growth. If the current modest recession of
democracy spirals into a depression, it will be because those of us in the
established democracies were our own worst enemies. (Diamond, 2015:
154)
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擴散性的民主？
歐盟對兩岸政策防禦性規範路徑的
歷史性論證
Jasper Roctus
根特大學語言與文化學系研究員
摘 要
本文概述了 1975 年以來歐盟對兩岸關係政策的主要演變。正如本文所顯
示的，如今的一些發展標誌著歐盟政策的重大轉變，在歷史上，歐盟政策的特
點是外交上的無動於衷、對於害怕損害與中華人民共和國的外交關係的焦慮，
以及對支持臺灣成功過渡到民主社會似乎並不感興趣。最近的轉變表明歐盟決
心在全球舞臺上發揮規範性作用。正如最後一部分所主張的，「具有防禦特點
的規範性」使歐盟在境外追求具有原則的「務實主義」，從而使其在與中國保
持密切的經濟關係的同時，還能支持像臺灣這樣的政治同道者，最終在世界舞
臺上將自己塑造成一個規範性力量。
關鍵字：兩岸關係、民主、具有原則的務實主義、中歐關係、規範性
《人文及社會科學集刊》
第三十七卷第一期（114/3）
, pp. 137
–
168
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C中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心