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The authoritarian syndrome as an attempt to restore control and its mediating role in anti-Semitism and xenophobia in Germany

May 2025
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 25(2)

DOI:10.1111/asap.70009

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Authors:

Marius Dilling

Leipzig University

Elmar Brähler

Leipzig University

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For many people, the coronavirus pandemic meant an enormous and existential loss of control. At the same time, an increase in right-wing extremist attitudes like xenophobia could be observed in Germany. In this study, we hypothesize that the loss of control caused by the pandemic has contributed to the rise in xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. We propose that this occurs through an attempt to restore control via elements of a revised authoritarian syndrome understood as both the classic authoritarian dynamic of aggression, submission and conventionalism on the one hand, and a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other. In a representative, probability-based study, N = 2522 participants were surveyed on locus of control, right-wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. It was found that right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality mediated the relationship between external locus of control and xenophobia (partial mediation) and anti-Semitism (full mediation). Surprisingly, internal control beliefs had a direct effect on right-wing authoritarianism—an effect that also leads to increased resentment. We conclude that social crises make people particularly vulnerable to regaining control via conspiracy theories and authoritarianism, which harbors dangers such as right-wing extremism as a consequence. Limitations are discussed.

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Received:  November  Revised:  February  Accepted:  April 

DOI: ./asap.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The authoritarian syndrome as an attempt to

restore control and its mediating role in

anti-Semitism and xenophobia in Germany

Marius Dilling1Alina Sorrentino2Elmar Brähler3

Jörg M. Fegert4Oliver Decker1,5

Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute,

University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany

InstituteofPsychology,Universityof

Bonn, Bonn, Germany

University of Leipzig, University of

Mainz, Leipzig, Germany

University Hospital Ulm, Ulm, Germany

Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute,

Department of Medical Psychology and

Medical Sociology, University of Leipzig,

Sigmund Freud University, Germany

Correspondence

Marius Dilling, University of Leipzig,

Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute

Dittrichring -,  Leipzig,

Germany. Email:

marius.dilling@uni-leipzig.de

Marius Dilling and Alina Sorrentino

should be considered joint first author.

Abstract

For many people, the coronavirus pandemic meant an

enormous and existential loss of control. At the same

time, an increase in right-wing extremist attitudes like

xenophobia could be observed in Germany. In this study,

we hypothesize that the loss of control caused by the

pandemic has contributed to the rise in xenophobic and

anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. We propose that this

occurs through an attempt to restore control via ele-

ments of a revised authoritarian syndrome understood

as both the classic authoritarian dynamic of aggression,

submission and conventionalism on the one hand, and

a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other. In

a representative, probability-based study, N= par-

ticipants were surveyed on locus of control, right-wing

authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, xenophobia, and

anti-Semitism. It was found that right-wing authoritarian-

ism and conspiracy mentality mediated the relationship

between external locus of control and xenophobia (par-

tial mediation) and anti-Semitism (full mediation). Sur-

prisingly, internal control beliefs had a direct effect on

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and

reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Anal Soc Issues Public Policy ;:e. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/asap 1of25

https://doi.org/./asap.

2of25 DILLING  .

right-wing authoritarianism—an effect that also leads to

increased resentment. We conclude that social crises make

people particularly vulnerable to regaining control via

conspiracy theories and authoritarianism, which harbors

dangers such as right-wing extremism as a consequence.

Limitations are discussed.

KEYWORDS

authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, locus of control, anti-

semitism, xenophobia, structural equation modelling

Public significance statement

This study examines how a perceived loss of control dur-

ing the COVID- pandemic may have contributed to rising

xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. Find-

ings suggest that individuals may attempt to regain control

through authoritarian attitudes and a general belief in

conspiracy theories, reinforcing prejudice. We conclude

that social crises make people particularly vulnerable to

these dynamics, which harbors dangers such as right-wing

extremism as a consequence.

INTRODUCTION

Societies worldwide are confronted with multiple, overlapping crises—a phenomenon increas-

ingly referred to as a polycrisis (Tooze, ). Among these challenges, the COVID- pandemic

not only triggered a public health emergency but also precipitated a profound collective loss of

control. In Germany, for example, the temporary expansion of executive powers to combat the

crisis was accompanied by significant restrictions on individual freedoms, leaving citizens feeling

powerless in the face of an invisible, potentially lethal threat. One’s own dependence on the state,

science, and on chance as well as the anomie that accompanies it, became very salient during the

pandemic. This loss of control is not merely situational; it strikes at a fundamental human need

(Brehm, ). Extensive research has demonstrated that a sense of control is vital for well-being,

whereas its absence is associated with increased anxiety, depression, and other negative emotions

(Fritsche et al., ). When an entire society experiences a diminished internal belief in personal

control, the political consequences can be profound. Theories linking a deprived need for control

with political radicalization suggest that feelings of powerlessness may foster right-wing extrem-

ist attitudes, including xenophobia and anti-Semitism (Decker, Kiess et al., ; Zick & Mokros,

).

Empirical studies provide further support for this idea. For instance, research indicates that

individuals with an external locus of control—those who believe that outcomes are determined

by external forces—are more likely to endorse xenophobic and anti-Semitic views (Holtmann &

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AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 3of25

Görl, ; see also Duckitt, , for similar results regarding racist attitudes). This phenomenon

is observable in various groups, such as voters of the right-wing extremist German party Alterna-

tive für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD; Mays et al., ) and right-wing extremist

adolescents (Sturzbecher et al., ).

Building on these findings, we propose that this devaluation of outgroups—a central element of

German right-wing extremist ideology (Kreis, )—can be understood partly as a dysfunctional

attempt to restore a lost sense of control via an authoritarian detour. We thereby refer to a recent

conceptualization of authoritarianism, called the authoritarian syndrome, which was developed

by a group of German researchers (Decker et al., ). The authoritarian syndrome is understood

as the dynamic of authoritarian aggression, submission and conventionalism (nowadays mainly

referred to as Right-Wing Authoritarianism; RWA; see Altemeyer, ) on the one hand, comple-

mented by a general belief in conspiracy theories on the other.Most importantly, we hypothesize

that the attempt to re-establish control through the authoritarian syndrome is dysfunctional:

although these mechanisms may temporarily alleviate feelings of powerlessness, they simulta-

neously contribute to the marginalization of outgroups, thereby posing a threat to democracy.

In this paper, we investigate these interrelationships in greater detail using structural equation

modeling. We hypothesize that internal and external control beliefs are positively related to two

outgroup derogatory attitudes that hold particular significance in right-wing extremist ideology:

that is xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, we assume that these effects are mediated

by the aforementioned elements of the authoritarian syndrome.

Loss of control and control restitution

Rotter’s (, ,) concept of the locus of control suggests that individuals attribute out-

comes either to their own actions (internal control) or to external forces (external control)—which

are not traceable to one’s own behavior—such as luck, fate or other external influences. Empirical

findings from the COVID- pandemic illustrate that social crises can shift these control beliefs:

during the pandemic, individuals’ external control scores increased while internal control scores

decreased, a change that was associated with heightened psychological distress, lower mental

well-being and an increased perception of threat (e.g., Krampe et al., ;Taginietal.,;

Würtzen et al., ).

Compensatory control theory (Kay et al., , ;Landauetal.,) states that such a

perceived loss of control motivates individuals to seek alternative sources of control—ranging

from increased reliance on religious or governmental structures or by identifying patterns in noise,

for example, by holding on to superstitions and conspiracy theories.

Rothbaum et al. () introduced a two-process model of control in which people seek control

not only through direct manipulation of the environment (primary control) but also, if this is not

possible—in particular, when there is perceived uncontrollability—by adapting the self to the

environment (secondary control). According to the authors, secondary control can be perceived as

safer, more continuous and associated with fewer disappointments and can also be preferred for

these reasons. In most cases, however, forms of primary and secondary control are intertwined.

Superstition, that is, the belief in supernatural, magical powers, is also included as part of the dimension projectivity by

Decker et al. (). However, in this paper, we focus on sadomasochist authoritarianism/RWA and conspiracy mentality

and their relevance as potential mediators between Locus of Control and xenophobia and anti-Semitism respectively.

4of25 DILLING  .

Secondary control is regarded by the authors as being close to the concept of external Locus

of Control and can be expressed in four different forms: (a) predictive control, a limitation

of one’s own expectations by attributing an event to one’s own limited abilities and passivity,

(b) illusory control via magical thinking such as belief in luck or fate and the active attempt

to bring luck to one’s side, (c) vicarious control through identification with powerful leaders,

and (d) interpretive control by attributing a deeper meaning to uncontrollable events. How-

ever, Rothbaum et al.’s thesis in their influential paper is not uncontroversial (Skinner, ).

The model of group based control restoration (Fritsche et al., ; Stollberg et al., ), points

out that processes of control restoration through group identification are anchored in the self

and can therefore not be clearly labeled as secondary, arguing for extended primary control

mechanisms.

However, our focus is not on the debate whether the control restoration is secondary or

extended primary. We propose that elements of the revised authoritarian syndrome (Decker et al.,

) may represent an attempt at restoring a diminished sense of control. This can manifest in

two ways: through identification with powerful leaders, as inherent in the “classic” understand-

ing of authoritarianism as already described by the seminal works of Erich Fromm ( [])

and in the form of magical thinking and the tendency to attribute deeper meaning and agency to

uncontrollable events—which is particularly present in a general belief in conspiracies.

The revised authoritarian syndrome

Right-wing extremist attitudes like xenophobia and anti-Semitism (as defined by Heller et al.,

;Kreis,) are multifaceted and deeply rooted social phenomena, extensively investigated

across diverse theoretical traditions and disciplines at various levels (Eicker, ). Initial attempts

on theorizing authoritarianism go back almost a century (e.g., Fromm, ; Stagner, ). Ever

since the Authoritarian Personality of the so-called Berkeley group surrounding Adorno et al.

(), authoritarianism has been considered one of the most influential predictors of right-

wing extremist attitudes.Seeking to explain the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in Europe,

the authors proposed an individual susceptibility to prejudice and fascist tendencies, rooted in

early childhood family dynamics and hindering the development of a stable moral value system

within the personality. This ego weakness, they argued, fosters identification with and submission

to authority while redirecting repressed aggression toward out-groups in the form of discrimi-

nation and prejudice. The Berkeley group developed their California F-Scale, an influential but

highly criticized (Christie, ; for an overview, see Funke,  and Iser, ) measure that

originally captured authoritarianism in nine psychoanalytically based facets. In keeping with

the empiricist trend, Altemeyer () discarded the developmental-psychodynamic and social-

theoretical model and instead adopted a pragmatic approach. He focused on the facets with the

highest discriminatory power and reduced the scale to three subfacets: conventionalism, author-

itarian aggression, and authoritarian submission. His right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale

has been shown in previous research to be an important and reliable predictor of anti-democratic

and far-right–in particular anti-Semitism and Xenophobia–and sexist attitudes, as well as support

for military violence and war (for an overview, see Duckitt, ; for Germany, see also Decker,

Kiess et al., ).

Other explanatory approaches include the modernization loser thesis (Spier, ), the impact of various facets of

deprivation (Rippl & Baier, ), and the cultural backlash thesis (Inglehart & Norris, ).

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 5of25

While Altemeyer’s three-dimensional scale is still a suitable and widely used operational-

ization of what Fromm (, []) understood as a “sadomasochist”psychodynamic, his

rather pragmatic conceptualization of authoritarianism may, however, overlook aspects crucial

for understanding contemporary authoritarianism (e.g., Aho, ; Funke, ). This is high-

lighted by the variety of theoretical approaches that exist today. Examples of recognized theories

include the authoritarian reaction (Oesterreich, ), which emphasizes authoritarianism as a

reaction to perceived threats; Feldman’s () exploration of authoritarianism in the context of

social conformity and the Dual-Process Motivational Model (DPM; Duckitt, , ), which

situates authoritarianism within a broader framework of social and ideological attitudes.

Recently, the COVID- pandemic and the accompanying protests that were particularly

prominent in Germany and Austria, have reignited the academic debate in Germany about the

dimensionality of authoritarianism. These protests revealed a mix of conspiracy beliefs, well-

known authoritarian attitudes, and even openness to overt neo-Nazism–an overlap of phenomena

already considered by the Berkeley group.

Conspiracy theories usually propose intentional malevolent forces operating in the background

as an explanation for an event, and, although legally protected by freedom of expression, are

regarded as a threat to democracy: they are associated with political extremism (van Prooijen et al.,

)—especially with right-wing extremist attitudes and group-based enmity (Dilling et al., ;

Imhoff & Decker, ; Rees & Lamberty, ). Individuals who believe in one conspiracy theory

usually believe in multiple conspiracy theories, even if they contradict each other (Goertzel, ;

Wood et al., ). Imhoff and Bruder () therefore postulate a general conspiracy mentality

(Moscovici, ) that should be distinguished from specific conspiracy theories due to its greater

stability and less ideological coloration. Although the relationship between authoritarianism and

conspiracy beliefs is ambiguous (Abalakina-Paap et al., ; Baier & Manzoni, ; Douglas

et al., ; Grzesiak-Feldman, ), most studies indicate a positive correlation (Dilling et al.,

; Đorđević et al., ; Decker et al., ; Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, ; Richey, ).

The overlap between conspiracy beliefs and right-wing authoritarianism is not confined to the

German context; it can also be observed in phenomena such as post-factual politics and Trump-

ism, highlighting the need to adjust the RWA concept to contemporary times. Drawing on classic

studies of authoritarianism, some scholars argue for renewed theoretical focus on conspiracy

beliefs, related phenomena, and the broader social context (see Amlinger & Nachtwey, ;Hei-

demeyer et al., in preparation; Henkelmann et al., ; Jäger, ;King,). This scientific

reorientation and reconceptualization are reflected in the concept of the authoritarian syndrome

(Decker et al., ), which we highlight in this study. Decker et al. () suggest that the gen-

eral belief in conspiracy theories or in the omnipresent existence of sinister and evil machinations

should be (re-)integrated into this concept of contemporary authoritarianism. They present a two-

factor model, with the ‘authoritarian syndrome’ as higher order factor encompassing both the

classic “sadomasochistic” authoritarianism (aggression, submission and conventionalism) and

conspiracist alongside superstitious beliefs as lower order factors, thus proposing two distinct yet

authoritarian social dynamics. With reference to the Berkeley group, they call this second dimen-

sion “projectivity”, which, psychoanalytically speaking, represents a denial of reality. It is based

Within the Studies on Authority and the Family, Erich Fromm ( []) used the term sadomasochism to describe

both the “masochist” aspect of the renouncing and voluntary authoritarian submission on one hand and the “sadist”

aspect which is expressed in the authoritarian aggression against the weak on the other. Oesterreich later pointed out that

the term “sadomasochism” evokes a clinical association for everyday, non-pathological processes—a problem that Fromm

himself later addressed by replacing the term “sadomasochism” with authoritarianism (cf. Oesterreich , p. ).

6of25 DILLING  .

on the defense mechanism of splitting into “good” and “bad” parts, followed by the identifica-

tion with the “good” parts of one’s own self or group and the externalization of the “bad” parts

onto “others”. In the debate on the dimensionality of authoritarianism, we follow the analysis of

Decker et al. () and understand conspiracy beliefs in the following as a sub-dimension of the

authoritarian syndrome.

The authoritarian syndrome as an attempt to restore control

We argue that the revised authoritarian syndrome may represent an attempt to restore control,

especially in the case of feeling dependent on external forces or losing control. In Studies on

Authority and Family (Horkheimer,  []), Fromm already spoke of the reassuring func-

tion and “prosthetic” security (p. ) of authoritarianism, through which the world would lose its

chaotic character for the individual. Rothbaum et al. () state that “by aligning themselves with

more powerful others, individuals can share in their victories and in their accomplishments—in

short, in their control.” (p. ) and compare their concept of vicarious control to Fromm’s ()

process of deindividuation, in which the individual flees from their own individual freedom due to

an “unbearable state of his powerlessness and loneliness” (p. ) in order to gain power through

identification with authorities. According to Fromm, however, this mechanism is only a tem-

porary relief (p. ), which cannot establish permanent control, but leads to a vicious circle of

dependency,insecurity and powerlessness. The previously mentioned approaches by Oesterreich

(), Feldman (), and Duckitt (, ) also support this idea as they all link authoritar-

ianism to uncertainty, threat, and the desire for stability and security, all of which are ultimately

related to control in some way.

As for the empirical relationship between LoC and RWA, the literature is sparse and incon-

clusive. Some older studies primarily show no relationship between the constructs (Baron, ;

McCollaum & Lester, ; Nicol, ), while others indicate positive relationships with internal,

rather than external, locus of control (Diakonova & Gilgen, ), particularly in relation to the

dimension of conventionalism (Chertkova et al., ). However, the idea that authoritarianism

in particular could also be used as a control restitution mechanism in uncertain times of crisis is

supported by a large body of literature that shows that RWA reacts strongly to and interacts with

societal threats (e.g., Duckitt, ; Duckitt & Sibley, ; Haase et al., ; Russo et al., 

provides an overview). In line with these findings, increasing RWA scores were observed during

the pandemic (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., ). Hartman et al. () even showed that as fear

of the pandemic increased, RWA had a stronger effect on the expression of nationalistic or anti-

immigrant attitudes. In Germany in particular, it has been observed that the pandemic has led to a

social division into the two camps of the unvaccinated and the vaccinated, with Decker, Kalkstein

et al. () identifying authoritarian dynamics in both. While many unvaccinated individuals

sought to restore their sense of control via projection in the form of conspiracy beliefs, a small

portion of the vaccinated—most of whom were moderate, non-authoritarian—also attempted to

do so through a sadomasochistic reaction (Decker, Kalkstein et al., , p. ), characterized

by identification with state-imposed COVID- regulations and exhibiting hostility towards rule

violators.

However, we do acknowledge that the study of conspiracy beliefs itself is a broad and independent field of research that

recognizes the phenomenon not as a form of authoritarian attitudes, but as a phenomenon sui generis.

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 7of25

In terms of conspiracy mentality, the idea that belief in almighty conspirators can be an attempt

to deal with an external locus of control or loss of control might appear contradictory at first

glance. However, it can be explained well by their underlying existential, epistemic and social

motivations (Douglas et al., ): Conspiracy theories give order to the world, because they divide

the world into good and evil and place external control in the hands of powerful others. Thus,

“the world loses its chaotic character” (Fromm,  [], p. ). Especially during crises and

uncertain situations—for instance, at the onset of the COVID- pandemic—perceived loss of

control not only heightens risk perception but also foster greater belief in pandemic-related and

general conspiracy beliefs (Šrol et al., ; van Prooijen & Douglas, ). Conspiracy beliefs may

restore control at least on an intrapsychic level (Lamberty, ), as they provide the feeling of

“having uncovered the conspiracy” and the belief that historical processes can be controlled and

planned (Celik et al., ). Instead of feeling powerless against the “system” as a whole, they

offer a kind of abbreviated critique of capitalism while also enhancing the status of one’s own

group. In this regard, a substantial body of research suggests that a diminished sense of control

is strongly linked to a propensity for conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., ; Whitson &

Galinsky, ), a finding that is complemented by evidence linking political (Bruder et al., ;

Kofta et al., ) and economic deprivation as well as insecure employment (Imhoff & Decker,

) with conspiracy mentality. On the other hand, reinforcing individuals’ sense of control may

help to reduce these tendencies (Mao et al., ; van Prooijen & Acker, ).

However, it remains unclear whether the desired control restitution, should it be sought, actu-

ally occurs. While Van Prooijen () contends that conspiracy theories exacerbate feelings of

existential threat, leading to an even stronger belief in further conspiracies and a general con-

spiracy mentality, Stojanov et al. () critique conspiracy theories as ineffective for control

restoration. They argue that such theories are not socially accepted, offer too much control,

and compete with more credible explanations. In later work (Stojanov & Halberstadt, ;Sto-

janov et al., , ), they find evidence that this effect is domain-specific and only occurs if

other, less stigmatized sources of control are unavailable. Jolley and Douglas (a, b) fur-

ther show that rather than restoring control, conspiracy theories can actually increase political

powerlessness—questioning direction of causality. Regardless of their success, however, the lit-

erature to date suggests that conspiracy beliefs can be a problematic attempt to cope with lack of

control, indicating both phenomena are positively associated.

The theoretical model and present study

Based on the literature, we argue that external control beliefs activate a need for control restitu-

tion, the satisfaction of which can be approached in a functional as well as dysfunctional ways.

This paper focuses on a dysfunctional and problematic process: Coping with lack of control

through authoritarian compensation. Previous research suggests that there is also a direct link

between external locus of control beliefs and anti-Semitism and xenophobia, however, we explic-

itly hypothesize that this effect is at least partially mediated by authoritarianism and conspiracy

mentality.

The following hypotheses can be summarized:

Hypothesis 1a/b. External LoC directly predicts conspiracy mentality/RWA.

Hypothesis 2a/b. External LoC directly predicts anti-Semitism/xenophobia.

8of25 DILLING  .

Hypothesis 3a/b. Conspiracy mentality predicts anti-Semitism/xenophobia.

Hypothesis 4a/b. RWA predicts anti-Semitism/xenophobia.

Hypothesis 5a/b. External LoC is hypothesized to have an indirect effect on Xenophobia /

anti-Semitism through the mediator conspiracy mentality.

Hypothesis 6a/b. External LoC is hypothesized to have an indirect effect on Xenophobia /

anti-Semitism through the mediator RWA.

As previously mentioned, the evidence on the relationship between authoritarianism and inter-

nal control beliefs in particular is unclear. Since we build on the argument that authoritarianism

and right-wing extremism increase as a result of an experienced loss of control and that internal

control beliefs do not represent a loss of control, we would not expect a positive correlation at this

point. However, since there are ambivalent research results (Chertkova et al., ;Diakonova&

Gilgen, ), we nevertheless test the path exploratively.

METHOD

STATA . as well as IBM Statistics SPSS .. () were used for the subsequent analyses.

Sample

The probability-based dataset of the German population used in this paper was collected as part

of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Studies (Decker, Kiess et al., ). These studies have been

conducted in Germany since  and aim to survey authoritarian and far-right attitudes. The

dataset, collected between March and May , was gathered while the country was still under

the impact of the COVID- pandemic. Residents of the New Federal States (Neue Bundesländer)

were overrepresented. The minimum age of participation was . The dataset was collected using

the paper-pencil method in face-to-face interviews by the independent polling firm USUMA. To

ensure randomness, Germany was divided into  sample points, and households were randomly

selected via random route method. The target respondents within these households were selected

using the Kish selection grid, a method for randomly selecting respondents from households with

more than one person. In order to reduce the social desirability bias for items that are subject to

such an effect in Germany (such as classic anti-Semitism in particular), respondents completed

their questionnaire independently and were able to hand it over to the interviewers sealed in an

envelope if they wished. Informed consent was obtained by all participants, at least one parent

and/or legal guardian was informed as well in case of minors. The response rate was .%. The

samples include persons with an immigrant background and persons without German citizen-

ship. The sample consists of , individuals, with a nearly equal distribution of females (.%)

and males (.%), and a small percentage identifying as other (.%). The age range of partic-

ipants spans from  to over  years, with an average age of . years (SD =.). In terms

of education, .% of participants have a university entrance qualification or higher. Regard-

ing income, the average equivalent household income is €,. (SD =€.), with .%

of households earning between €, and €, per month. Unemployment in the sample is

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 9of25

TABLE 1 Demographic characteristics of the sample.

Demographic variable N%

Sex

Female  .

Male  .

Other .

Age

– years  .

– years  .

– years  .

– years  .

– years  .

– years  .

≥ years  .

Employment status

Unemployed  .

Education

University entrance qualification or higher educational attainment  .

Missing  .

Income

≤ EURO  .

>– EURO  .

>– EURO  .

> EURO  .

Missing  .

Note:N=. Missing values are indicated for some variables.

relatively low at .%. The sample is representative of the population in terms of key demographic

variables. Table above provides a more detailed overview of the demographic characteristics.

Instruments

A full overview of the following instruments, their wording and scaling, can be found in

Appendix A.

Locus of control

We use the IE-, a two-dimensional conceptualization of Kovaleva et al. (, ), which mea-

sures control beliefs using four items on a five-point-Likert scale, two of which capture internal

control (“I am my own boss.”, “If I work hard, I will succeed.”) and two that capture external con-

trol (“Whether at work or in my personal life: What I do is mainly determined by others.”, “Fate

often gets in the way of my plans.”).

10 of 25 DILLING  .

Right-wing authoritarianism

We use the KSA- (Beierlein et al., ), a nine-item German modern version of the RWA Scale.

Three items each are assigned to the dimensions: authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submis-

siveness, and conventionalism. The scale was developed to address problems of traditional RWA

scales due to a) their time and context boundedness and b) the non-distinctness of their sub-

scales. Example items include “Traditions should absolutely be cultivated and maintained.” and

“We need strong leaders in order to live safely in society”. The scale has a five-point Likert format.

Conspiracy mentality

We captured conspiracy mentality (CM) using a three-item short form of the Conspiracy Men-

tality Scale (Imhoff & Bruder, ) on a seven-point Likert scale. Items are “Most people do

not recognize to what extent our life is determined by conspiracies that are concocted in secret.”

and “Politicians and other leaders are nothing but the string puppets of powers operating in the

background”.

Anti-Semitism and xenophobia

We used the Questionnaire on Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes—Leipzig Form (FR-LF) (Decker

et al., ; Heller et al., ), which captures right-wing extremism on six dimensions on a five-

point Likert Scale. Xenophobia and anti-Semitism represent two dimensions of this scale, each

measured with three items. Example items are “The foreigners only come here to exploit our

welfare state” for xenophobia and “Even today the influence of the Jews is too great” for anti-

Semitism.

RESULTS

Descriptive analysis

Descriptive statistics for every item can be found in Appendix-Table A. Skewness lies between −.

(internal LoC) and . (anti-Semitism), while kurtosis ranges from −. (Xenophobia) and .

(internal LoC).

Reliability and correlation analysis

The reliability of the scales used was tested using both Cronbach’s 𝛼and McDonald’s ω.The

indices can be seen in Table .Cronbach’s𝛼and McDonalds ωrange from . (anti-Semitism)

to . (Conspiracy Mentality). These indices indicate a good to very good internal consistency of

the scales used.

A full correlation matrix for all items can be found in Appendix-Table B. Additionally, a cor-

relation matrix of mean indices for measures used can be found in Table . The mean index of

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 11 of 25

TABLE 2 Mean values, standard deviations, internal consistencies, and intercorrelations of the measures.

MSD Loc-E Loc-I Xeno AS AGR SUB CONV CM RWA

Loc-E . . /

Loc-I . . −.** /

Xeno . . .** −. (.; .)

AS . . .** −.** .** (.; .)

AGR . . . . .** .** (.; .)

SUB . . .** −. .** .** .** (.; .)

CONV . . .** .*.** .** .** .** (.; .)

CM . . .** −.** .** .** .** .** .** (.; .)

RWA . . .** . .** .** .** .** .** .** (.; .)

Note:N=; due to the listwise deletion, the number of cases differs here from the total data set. The number of cases here corresponds to that used later in the SEM. Because the missing

values for each indicator do not exceed %, we assume that exclusion did not bias our results (Schafer & Graham, ).

*=p<.; ** =p<. (two-tailed); Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels. Loc-E, external locus of control; Loc-I, internal locus of control; Xeno, xenophobia; AS, anti-Semitism; AGR,

authoritarian aggression; SUB, authoritarian submission; CONV, conventionalism; CM, conspiracy mentality; RWA, mean index of the indicator itemsofSUB,AGR,CONV;Cronbach’salpha

(first) and McDonald’s omega (second) are presented in parentheses. McDonald’s omega and Cronbach’s alpha require at least three variables for estimation, so not applicable for locus of control

(see Appendix-Table Bfor pairwise correlation).

12 of 25 DILLING  .

internal locus of control is not significantly correlated with the mean index of xenophobia. The

sub-dimension of conventionalism and internal locus of control are positively correlated. All other

correlation coefficients are statistically significant at p<. and their direction is in line with

the theory.

SEM analysis

Since the relationship and mediation of effects of multidimensional constructs are to be investi-

gated, the procedure of structural equation modeling (SEM) with mediator effects (Hayes, )is

used. For this purpose, the assumed dimensionality of the constructs is first examined confirma-

tory with a measurement model. Based on the theoretical considerations, the measured indicator

items are then assigned to different factors and transferred into a structural model. Since the indi-

rect effect of the mediator effect is the product of two regression coefficients, the assumption of

normal distribution of these effects in the population may be violated (Hayes, ). Additionally,

the Doornik-Hansen omnibus test rejects the null hypothesis of multivariate normality (chi()

=.; p<.). To test our indirect effects we therefore make use of a bootstrap with 

replications. The results of the SEM are presented in Figure and Table .

In the model depicted in Figure , we permitted two additional correlations among the resid-

uals. Firstly, there is a correlation (rε, ε =.) between the residuals of xenophobia and

anti-Semitism latent constructs (MI =.), reflecting their position as interconnected facets

within a broader syndrome of right-wing extremist attitudes or group-focused enmity (e.g., Heller

et al., ). Additionally, we allowed for a residual correlation between internal and exter-

nal locus of control constructs, correlating rinternal, external =−. (MI =,), reflecting their

theoretically contrasting positions as suggested in the literature.

Allfactorloadingsaresignificantatp<.. The likelihood-ratio-χ-test compares our model

with a saturated model (df =), which always perfectly fits the data. Our model significantly

differs from a saturated model by χ() =. with p<.. Given the test’s sensitivity to

sample size (Bollen, ), global fit indices provide a more accurate evaluation. The CFI for the

measurement model is ., and the TLI is ., indicating a good model fit. The RMSEA is .

[CI =.; .; pclose =.], also suggesting an adequate fit. Finally, the SRMR of . indi-

cates a good model fit. Overall, these results suggest a good model fit (see Appendix-Table Cfor

comparison with a model without permitted residual correlations).

Direct effects

Based on the structural equation model (Table ), hypotheses Ha/b can be accepted, as we observe

a positive direct effect of external control beliefs on conspiracy mentality (β=.) and RWA

(β=.). In contrast, the exploratively tested direct paths between internal control beliefs and

conspiracy mentality, anti-Semitism and Xenophobia are not significant. Surprisingly, internal

locus of control has a medium-strength positive direct effect on RWA, which is significant at

p=.. The direct effect of external locus of control on anti-Semitism is not significant (p=.),

therefore hypothesis Hamust be rejected. Hypothesis Hbcan be accepted: external locus of con-

trol directly predicts Xenophobia (β=.). However, this is due to full mediation (in terms of

anti-Semitism), and partial mediation (in terms of Xenophobia) by RWA and Conspiracy Men-

tality. Unsurprisingly, the direct effects of conspiracy mentality and RWA on xenophobia and

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 13 of 25

FIGURE 1 Path diagram of the SEM analysis.

Note:N=. Standardized factor loadings. AGR, authoritarian aggression; SUB, authoritarian submission;

CONV, conventionalism; AUT, authoritarianism/RWA; Xeno, xenophobia; AS, anti-Semitism; VM, conspiracy

mentality; Internal, internal locus of control; External, external locus of control.

anti-Semitism are positive and significant, with standardized coefficients ranging from β=.

to β=.—Hypotheses Ha/b and Ha/b can be accepted. In comparison, the effect of RWA is sig-

nificantly stronger (β=.; β=.), but the effect of conspiracy mentality on anti-Semitism (β

=.) and on xenophobia (β=.) is nevertheless not negligible.

Indirect effects

Given that the exploratively tested direct effect of internal locus of control on RWA was significant,

an indirect effect was also tested. Indeed, our model reveals two significant indirect effects of

internal locus of control on RWA, with an effect of β=. on xenophobia and β=. on anti-

Semitism. We will discuss these surprising effects in the discussion.

14 of 25 DILLING  .

TABLE 3 Direct, indirect and total effects of our SEM.

→Dependent variable

Independent variable ML-estimator (standardized coefficients) SE z

Direct effects

→Conspiracy mentality

Internal LoC . . .

External LoC .** . .

→RWA

Internal LoC .** . .

External LoC .** . .

→anti-Semitism

Internal LoC −. . −.

External LoC . . .

Conspiracy mentality .** . .

RWA .** . .

→Xenophobia

Internal LoC . . .

External LoC .*. .

Conspiracy mentality .** . .

RWA .** . .

Indirect effects (bootstrap =)

I-LoC →CM →Xenophobia .,  % CI [−., .] . .

I-LoC →CM →anti-Semitism .,  % CI [−., .] . .

I-LoC →RWA →xenophobia .**,  % CI [., .] . .

I-LoC →RWA →anti-Semitism .**,  % CI [., .] . .

E-LoC →CM →xenophobia .**,  % CI [., .] . .

E-LoC →CM →anti-Semitism .**,  % CI [., .] . .

E-LoC →RWA →xenophobia .**,  % CI [., .] . .

E-LoC →RWA →anti-Semitism .**,  % CI [., .] . .

Total effects

→Xenophobia

Internal LoC .** . .

External LoC .** . .

→Anti-Semitism

Internal LoC . . .

External LoC .** . .

Note:N=. In the model, we controlled for gender ( =woman), age, university entrance qualification and the equivalent

household income. For reasons of clarity and better readability, we do not show the corresponding paths in the model. Modification

indices (MI) <. *p<., **p<..

The mediation effects (Ha/b und Ha/b) are statistically significant and, there is even a full

mediation of the effect of external locus of control on anti-Semitism through the mediators RWA

and conspiracy mentality. The indirect effects of external control beliefs mediated by conspiracy

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 15 of 25

mentality are β=. (xenophobia), and β=. (anti-Semitism). In the case of mediation via RWA,

the indirect effects are β=. (xenophobia) and β=. (anti-Semitism).

Total effects

The significant total effect of external control beliefs—mediated by RWA and conspiracy

mentality—is β=. for both xenophobia and anti-Semitism. The total effect of internal locus

of control, which is only mediated by RWA, is β=. for xenophobia and is significant, and

β=. for anti-Semitism. The latter total effect, however, is not significant (p=.).

DISCUSSION

We have argued that xenophobia and anti-Semitism can be seen as a possible outcome of an

authoritarian and problematic attempt to re-establish control. In line with this argumentation,

our data from a comprehensive probability-based sample showed that external LoC, mediated

by elements of the authoritarian syndrome (Decker et al., ), predicts xenophobia and anti-

Semitism. Building on this finding, it may be precisely times of crisis and uncertainty that—due

to an increase in external locus of control—can make people susceptible and vulnerable to author-

itarian and right-wing radicalization, as the example of the COVID- pandemic shows, and

require special political sensitivity. However, a loss of control may not inherently result in cop-

ing in terms of the authoritarian syndrome. Individuals can respond in different ways, with some

exhibiting authoritarian tendencies while others engaging in alternative coping strategies, such as

collective action. Certain predispositions might make individuals more likely to follow the author-

itarian path, though further research is needed to explore these mechanisms. In this context, it is

likely that groups of people who are already economically or politically deprived and are there-

fore limited in their ability to exercise control are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic. Further

research is needed to explore these mechanisms. It is particularly striking that there is no direct

effect between external locus of control and anti-Semitism (p=.) when we control for RWA

and conspiracy mentality, and the direct effect between external locus of control and xenophobia

is only slightly larger and just barely significant (p=.). This underlines all the more that it is

not the loss of control itself, but the authoritarian reaction to it, that poses a particular danger to

democracy. Thus, since a loss of control does not necessarily lead to right-wing extremist attitudes

in forms of xenophobia and anti-Semitism, future research should investigate whether, in addi-

tion to the problematic attempt to restore control discussed in our model, potentially “healthy”

and functional alternatives of (extended) primary and secondary control could counteract author-

itarian and far-right dynamics in uncertain times. In doing so, vulnerable groups should also be

identified and addressed. Strengthening primary control in another area could also be effective:

Kiess and Schmidt (), for example, report that participation, recognition and solidarity in

the workplace—also known democratic efficacy at the workplace—can strengthen democracy and

Loeys et al. () point out that the test for indirect effects has a higher power than the test for total effects. Although

it has already been discussed in the past that a significant total effect should be a prerequisite for the test of an indirect

effect, Loeys and colleagues point out that this need not be a prerequisite in studies whose research interest is primarily

focused on the mediation process. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we draw attention to the non-significant

total effect.

16 of 25 DILLING  .

counteract right-wing extremist tendencies. With respect to their concept of extended primary

control, Fritsche et al. () argue that group identification can also counteract the heightened

ethnocentric response when group norms endorse diversity and nonviolence.

As expected, there is no direct effect of internal control on conspiracy mentality or our mea-

sures of right-wing extremist resentments. However, it is surprising that internal locus of control,

fully mediated by RWA (not CM), also predicts xenophobia and anti-Semitism, since internal con-

trol beliefs have been mostly associated with protective factors, with exception for the findings of

Diakonova and Gilgen () and Chertkova et al. (). While we observe a direct relationship

between the latent factor of RWA and internal control beliefs in the measurement error-adjusted

SEM, the measurement error-unadjusted bivariate correlations indicate that this may be trace-

able to the sub-dimension of conventionalism, as already observed by Chertkova et al. (). The

question that arises is that of causality, as our study cannot determine whether internal control

promotes authoritarianism or whether authoritarianism can successfully restore internal con-

trol, at least temporarily, or whether the identification with external norms rather causes an even

stronger shift towards an external LoC. Future research should address this question using longi-

tudinal or experimental studies. From a more methodological point of view, a closer look to our

applied IE- scale might shed light on this phenomenon, as the internal control belief items seem

to exhibit an intersection with neoliberal beliefs (“I am my own boss” and “If I try hard, I will suc-

ceed”). This capitalistic affirmation of performance and success closely aligns with what Amlinger

and Nachtwey () describe as characteristic of a new and contemporary libertarian authori-

tarianism that submits to neoliberal norms such as their own autonomy. Such beliefs appear to

be less detached from traditional authority figures than one might initially assume. While it is

important to acknowledge potential implications for construct validity at this point, it is equally

crucial to emphasize that we have utilized a well-validated and widely established scale, align-

ing with best practices in psychological measurement. Kovaleva et al. () themselves discuss

this in the context of the construct validity of the IE-, pointing out that, in the literature, there

appear to be positive correlations between internal locus of control and the importance of various

aspects of the workplace (Borg & Noll, ). The observed overlap might not be a matter of con-

struct validity of our scale, but this overlap might indicate that both constructs are theoretically

intertwined. Future research should explore this further.

Apart from a possible overlap with neoliberal beliefs, another plausible explanation could be

that people who excessively believe they have complete control over their lives deny reality as

they fail to recognize the complexity of certain situations—especially during the pandemic in

, from which our data set originates. While they may not need the fantasy that other groups

control everything (in terms of external locus of control and conspiracy mentality), they still

require identification with a strong authority—an identification that corresponds well with the

idea of extended primary control—and subsequent devaluation of outgroups. Future research

should explore whether unhealthy and healthy forms of crisis management exist in both groups

(scoring high in internal respectively external locus of control). Person-centered approaches,

rather than variable-centered methods, could identify patterns among individuals with high and

low external and internal loci of control.

Lastly, following Decker et al. (), we assumed the relationship between the rd order fac-

tor of the authoritarian syndrome and selected latent sub-dimensions (conspiracy mentality and

RWA) of the authoritarian syndrome to be reflective. However, considering both the different

dynamics that locus of control has on these syndrome elements as well as the moderate corre-

lations between the manifest indicators of conspiracy mentality and those of sadomasochistic

authoritarianism/RWA, the question arises as to whether alternative modeling strategies, such

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 17 of 25

as a formative relationship between the rd order factor and its lower order constructs is also

applicable—but this has to be discussed on a theoretical level first, since causality between the

higher order factor and its lower order constructs would be reversed in such a model.

With the present study, we aim to contribute to the understanding of psychological mechanisms

underlying contemporary authoritarianism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia during societal crises.

By pointing out their roles in restoring the fundamental need for controls, we also hope to provide

a foundation for future research to address these potential threats to democracy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Fabian Max Hess for their helpful and

valuable comments.

Open access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The dataset analyzed in the current study was generated as a joint project of several different uni-

versities. Due to missing consent of all parties involved, we are unable to make the dataset publicly

available. The parts supporting the findings of this study will be provided by the corresponding

author upon reasonable request.

ORCID

Marius Dilling https://orcid.org/---

Alina Sorrentino https://orcid.org/---

Elmar Brähler https://orcid.org/---

Jörg M. Fegert https://orcid.org/---

Oliver Decker https://orcid.org/---X

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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND TRANSLATED ENGLISH WORDING

OF THE ITEMS

Constructs

Indicator variables at the individual level MSDMin Max

Conspiracy mentality

Most people do not recognize to what extent our life

is determined by conspiracies that are concocted in

secret.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

There are secret organizations that have great

influence on political decisions.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Politicians and other leaders are nothing but the

string puppets of powers operating in the

background.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Authoritarian aggression

Outsiders and under-performers in society should be

severely punished.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Troublemakers should clearly feel the effects of the

fact that they are unwanted in the society.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Social rules should be enforced without compassion. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Authoritarian submission

We need strong leaders in order to live safely in

society.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

People should leave important decisions to those in

charge/their leaders.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

We should be grateful for leaders who tell us exactly

what we should to do.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

(Continues)

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 23 of 25

Constructs

Indicator variables at the individual level MSDMin Max

Conventionalism

Traditions should absolutely be cultivated and

maintained.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Established conducts should not be questioned. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

It’s always best to do things in the usual way. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Xenophobia

Foreigners only come here to abuse the welfare

system.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

When jobs are scarce, foreigners should be sent

home.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Germany is losing its identity because of the large

number of foreigners.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

anti-Semitism

The influence of the Jews is still too strong. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

More than other people, the Jews use dirty tricks to

achieve their goals.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

The Jews just have something peculiar about them

and don’t really fit in with us.

. .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

External locus of control

What I do is mainly determined by others. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Fate often gets in the way of my plans. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

Internal locus of control

I am my own boss. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

If I work hard, I will succeed. . .  “strongly

disagree”

“strongly

agree”

24 of 25 DILLING  .

APPENDIX B: CORRELATION MATRIX

AGR1 AGR2 AGR3 SUB1 SUB2 SUB3 CONV1 CONV2 CONV3 XENO1 XENO2 XENO3 VM1 VM2 VM3 AS1 AS2 AS3 ILoC1 ILoC2 ExLoc1 ExLoC2

AGR 

AGR .*** 

AGR .*** .*** 

SUB .*** .*** .*** 

SUB .*** .*** .*** .*** 

SUB .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

CONV .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

CONV .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

CONV .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

XENO .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

XENO .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

XENO .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

VM .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

VM .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

VM .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

AS .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

AS .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

AS .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 

ILoC .*.*** . . . −. .*** .*. −. −.*−. −.*** −.*** −.*** −.*−.** −.*** 

ILoC .*.*** . . −. −. .*** . . −. −.** −. −.*** −.*** −.*** −.** −.*** −.*** .*** 

ExLoC .** −. . .** .*** .*** . . .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** −.*** −.*** 

ExLoC . −. . .*** .*** .*** .*.*.** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** −.*** −.*** .*** 

Note:N=2,380.

*p<., ** p<., *** p<.. Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels.

AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL 25 of 25

APPENDIX C: MODEL COMPARISON

Model CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR AIC BIC

Model  (with residual correlations) . . . . . .

Model  (no residual correlations) . . . . . .

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Marius Dilling is a research assistant at the Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute for Democracy

Research at Leipzig University and an associate at the Competence Center for Research on

Right-Wing Extremism and Democracy at Leipzig University. He studied sociology and con-

ducts research on political attitudes with a focus on authoritarianism and right-wing extremist

attitudes. He is currently enrolled as a PhD candidate at the University of Hannover.

Alina Sorrentino studied philosophy and psychology at the University of Bonn and special-

ized in political psychology during her studies. She works as a clinical psychologist in a hospital

in Euskirchen.

Elmar Brähler, University of Leipzig, University of Mainz. He was head of the Department

of Medical Psychology and Medical Sociology at the University of Leipzig until . He is a

visiting scientist at the Clinic and Polyclinic for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy

at the Mainz University Medical Center.

Jörg M. Fegert, University Hospital Ulm, is Medical Director of the Department for Child and

Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy at Ulm University Hospital, Past

President and Congress President (Ulm ) of the German Society for Child and Adolescent

Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy (DGKJP) as well as President (-) of

the European Society for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (ESCAP).

Oliver Decker, is Professor of Social Psychology at Sigmund Freud University, Mem-

ber of the Department of Medical Psychology and Medical Sociology and Director of the

Else Frenkel-Brunswik Institute, Leipzig University. Since , he has headed the Leipzig

Authoritarianism Studies together with Elmar Brähler.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.

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