Special Prosecutor’s Offices and Their Position in a State Governed by the Rule of Law: Is the Abolition of Office of Special Prosecution in Slovakia Unconstitutional?

Abstract

The specialization of public prosecution offices has been a growing international trend, particularly in addressing complex forms of crime such as corruption, economic crime, and organized crime. Many countries have established specialized prosecution bodies to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement in these areas. However, Slovakia has recently taken a different approach by abolishing its Office of the Special Prosecution, a decision that contrasts sharply with prevailing global tendencies. This paper explores the reasons behind this shift, analyzing the political and legal arguments presented by both proponents and opponents of the abolition. The paper examines whether this move aligns with the rule of law and international legal obligations and considers its potential consequences for the effectiveness of criminal justice in Slovakia. While the paper is based on legal principles and comparative methods, it acknowledges the inherently political nature of decisions concerning the structure of prosecution services.

Full text

Academic Editor: Patricia Easteal
Received: 30 January 2025
Revised: 25 March 2025
Accepted: 9 April 2025
Published: 13 April 2025
Citation: Klimek, Libor, and Bystrík
Šramel. 2025. Special Prosecutor’s
Offices and Their Position in a State
Governed by the Rule of Law: Is the
Abolition of Office of Special
Prosecution in Slovakia
Unconstitutional? Laws 14: 25.
https://doi.org/10.3390/
laws14020025
Copyright: © 2025 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license
(https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
Article
Special Prosecutor’s Offices and Their Position in a State
Governed by the Rule of Law: Is the Abolition of Office of
Special Prosecution in Slovakia Unconstitutional?
Libor Klimek 1and Bystrík Šramel 2,*
1Department of Criminal Law, Criminology, Criminalistics, and Forensic Disciplines, Faculty of Law,
Matej Bel University, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovakia
2
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ss. Cyril
and Methodius in Trnava, 917 01 Trnava, Slovakia
*Correspondence: bystrik.sramel@ucm.sk
Abstract: The specialization of public prosecution offices has been a growing international
trend, particularly in addressing complex forms of crime such as corruption, economic
crime, and organized crime. Many countries have established specialized prosecution bod-
ies to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement in these areas. However,
Slovakia has recently taken a different approach by abolishing its Office of the Special
Prosecution, a decision that contrasts sharply with prevailing global tendencies. This paper
explores the reasons behind this shift, analyzing the political and legal arguments presented
by both proponents and opponents of the abolition. The paper examines whether this move
aligns with the rule of law and international legal obligations and considers its potential
consequences for the effectiveness of criminal justice in Slovakia. While the paper is based
on legal principles and comparative methods, it acknowledges the inherently political
nature of decisions concerning the structure of prosecution services.
Keywords: specialization; public prosecution office; Slovak Republic; constitutionality;
rule of law; criminal law
1. Introduction
The increasing complexity of serious crime—including corruption, economic crime,
terrorism, and organized crime—has led many countries to rethink their approaches to
prosecution. One prevailing trend in contemporary legal systems has been the establish-
ment of specialized prosecution offices, designed to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in
tackling these forms of crime. The specialization of public prosecution services has been
widely regarded as a necessary response to the sophisticated nature of criminal activities,
which often require expert knowledge and targeted legal tools.
However, Slovakia has recently taken a contrasting approach by abolishing its Office
of the Special Prosecution. This move diverges from prevailing European and international
trends that emphasize specialization as a key strategy in law enforcement. The abolition of
the Office of the Special Prosecution has sparked debates about whether this step aligns with
the principles of the rule of law, Slovakia’s constitutional framework, and its international
obligations. This article examines this issue by exploring the rationale behind specialization
in public prosecution, the reasons for Slovakia’s departure from this trend, and the potential
implications of this decision.
The main goal of the paper is to find an answer to the question of how widespread the
trend of specialization of public prosecution offices is in EU countries and, consequently,
Laws 2025,14, 25 https://doi.org/10.3390/laws14020025

Laws 2025,14, 25 2 of 23
whether the current abolition of the Office of Special Prosecution in the Slovak Republic
is a step that denies these trends and whether it can be considered a step contrary to the
principles of the rule of law and EU law.
In addressing these questions (goals), the paper is structured as follows: first, it
provides an overview of the specialization of public prosecution services and their role
in contemporary legal systems. Next, it examines the historical background and legal
framework of the Office of the Special Prosecution in Slovakia. The subsequent section
focuses on the legal and political arguments behind the decision to abolish this institution
and considers the broader implications for Slovakia’s criminal justice system. Finally, the
article discusses the lessons that can be drawn from this case in relation to international
trends in specialized prosecution.
2. Methods
From the methodological perspective, this paper primarily employs a legal-dogmatic
approach, focusing on the analysis of legal sources, including national legislation and
judicial decisions relevant to the organization of public prosecution in Slovakia. The
paper also uses a comparative method, contrasting the Slovak model with approaches
adopted in other European countries to highlight broader trends in the specialization of
prosecution services.
In addition to these core legal methodologies, the research on which this paper is based
is embedded within a broader interdisciplinary framework. Although this specific paper
presents a legal perspective, the study also incorporates political science and institutional
analysis, examining the intersection between legal reforms and political decision-making
in Slovakia. Furthermore, historical research methods were applied to trace the evolution
of specialized prosecution and its role in combating crime.
To ensure a more comprehensive analysis, this paper incorporates recommendations
and reports from the Council of Europe, including the Venice Commission’s opinions on
prosecutorial independence, the European Commission for Democracy through Law, and
the European Commission’s Rule of Law Reports. These sources provide essential insights
into the harmonization of prosecution systems across Europe and the legal standards that
ensure compliance with the principles of the rule of law.
Additionally, this paper takes into account the legal framework set by international
anti-corruption treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(
UNCAC
) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, both of which emphasize the necessity
of specialized institutions for prosecuting financial crimes and corruption. These interna-
tional perspectives are crucial for assessing whether the abolition of the Slovak Office of
the Special Prosecution aligns with or deviates from broader global and European trends.
Based on the applied methods, we have come to the conclusion that the organization
of prosecution offices in a given state is a matter of political discretion (supported by expert
arguments). If the needs and circumstances of crime prevention require it, tasks may be
carried out by a separate, independent, or specialized national body (as was the case in
Slovakia until 2024). If circumstances change and socio-political arguments favor a different
model, nothing prevents such a transformation. In the context of the Slovak Republic, this
conclusion also logically follows from the fact that the organizational structure of the Slovak
prosecution office and its functional relationships in the exercise of its competencies are
governed by statutory principles, not constitutional ones. The legislator, who establishes
the principles of organization and functional relationships in the exercise of the prosecution
office’s powers, as well as the rules for the appointment, removal, rights, and duties of
prosecutors, may also modify and change these principles and rules, naturally with due
respect for other constitutional provisions.

Laws 2025,14, 25 3 of 23
3. Public Prosecution Offices: Their Models, Organizational Principles,
and Competencies
3.1. International Trends in Public Prosecution Models and Competencies
Before examining the role of specialization as an organizational principle within public
prosecution, it is essential to outline the international trends and discussions surround-
ing the models of public prosecution and the scope of their competencies. Across legal
traditions, the structure and powers of prosecution services vary significantly, reflecting his-
torical, political, and institutional factors. However, several broad trends can be identified
in the ongoing European and international debates regarding the role and scope of public
prosecution services. The Council of Europe (CoE) has played a key role in shaping these
discussions. The Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee of Ministers on the Role
of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System outlines the functions of prosecution
services in democratic societies and emphasizes the importance of specialization. It high-
lights that prosecutors should not only be involved in criminal prosecution but also have
responsibilities in other areas of legal protection. Another recommendation that should
be mentioned is Recommendation Rec(2012)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member
states on the role of public prosecutors outside the criminal justice system
1
which focuses
on the non-criminal functions of public prosecutors and provides guidance to ensure that
their intervention outside the criminal justice system is lawful, transparent, and consistent
with democratic principles. It recognizes that prosecutors in many member states have
tasks beyond criminal proceedings, such as civil, administrative, and constitutional matters
(Šramel 2012).
In several continental European legal systems, public prosecutors exercise non-
criminal competences, including family law and child protection (e.g., in France, Portugal,
and Italy, public prosecutors intervene in cases involving child custody, parental rights, and
the protection of minors), labor law disputes (e.g., in Belgium and Germany, prosecutors
may be involved in enforcing labor regulations and ensuring legal compliance in workplace
conflicts), public administration supervision (in Scandinavian countries, prosecution ser-
vices participate in overseeing government accountability and administrative legality), or
environmental law enforcement (some jurisdictions, such as Norway and the Netherlands,
have specialized prosecutorial units dealing with environmental crimes and regulatory
violations) (Šramel 2015a).
These broader competencies reflect a shift in the function of public prosecution beyond
traditional criminal proceedings, reinforcing its role as a guardian of legality and public
interest in multiple areas of law.
Professional networks and associations of prosecutors, which serve as platforms for ju-
dicial cooperation, exchange of best practices, and policy recommendations, also influence
the international discourse on prosecution models, competencies, and specialization. The
best known organizations are the following: the International Association of Prosecutors
(IAP),
2
which promotes standards for prosecutorial independence, ethical conduct, and
best practices; the Network of Public Prosecutors or Equivalent Institutions at the Supreme
Judicial Courts of the European Union (NADAL Network),
3
which facilitates cooperation
between high-level prosecutorial institutions in Europe; the Council of Europe’s Consulta-
tive Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE),
4
which provides guidance on prosecutorial
independence, specialization, and ethical standards; the European Network of Prosecutors
1PREMS 72813 GBR 2070Rec(2012)11 RoleOfPublicProsecutors 7670 TXT A5.indd
2https://www.iap-association.org/ (accessed on 8 April 2025)
3https://nadal2024.public.lu/en.html (accessed on 8 April 2025)
4https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccpe (accessed on 8 April 2025)

Laws 2025,14, 25 4 of 23
for the Environment (ENPE),
5
which focuses on the specialization of prosecutors dealing
with environmental crimes.
These networks contribute to ongoing debates about the role and structure of pros-
ecution services, particularly in balancing specialization with general jurisdiction. They
also issue recommendations on prosecutorial autonomy, division of competencies, and
institutional reforms, which influence national legislative changes and judicial policies.
3.2. Specialization as an Organizational Principle of the Structure of Public Prosecution Offices
At the introduction of this chapter, it is necessary to clarify the basic terminology used
in the analysis of key questions related to the topic. This includes the concept of specializa-
tion. Specialization can generally be defined as “a restriction or concentration on a specific,
narrower area or type of activity” or as “a focus on a narrower field, usually accompanied
by deeper expertise and qualifications” (Kraus 2005). Specialization involves narrowing
the scope of activity or interest to focus on a more specific area or problem. It contrasts with
universality and allows for more precise attention to specific issues. Specialization requires
a higher level of theoretical knowledge and practical skills, presupposing a certain degree
of expertise and qualification. Specialization in a particular field also leads to more efficient
processes, enhanced skills, deeper existing knowledge, and the acquisition of new insights.
In the judiciary, specialization is associated with focusing on specific branches of law
and addressing selected legal questions. Basic specialization is applied and respected in
organizing the work of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, senior court officers, and other legal
professions. Here, specialization involves a selective approach to specific issues, concen-
trating on addressing a narrower range of legal problems. The essence of specialization lies
in a subject consistently handling matters of a specific type. Simpler cases are managed
routinely over time, while in complex cases, continuous education is required. As a result,
the subject becomes capable of understanding what is essential in their area of expertise
and may also train less experienced colleagues (Crha 2007, p. 30).
Within the same legal branch, further, even narrower specialization can occur. The
advantages of such specialization in the legal field are numerous. First, it allows the re-
spective subject more time to perform their tasks. Handling a large variety of assignments
requires significant time for proper preparation and thorough understanding. Specializa-
tion in the judiciary also enables more thorough and high-quality execution of tasks. With
more time, the subject can delve deeper into issues, considering all aspects and contexts.
Specialization also affects the quantity of cases handled, as limiting focus to a specific area
frees the specialized subject from handling less significant cases, which can be resolved
more quickly and effectively by general bodies. Another advantage of specialization lies
in the development of new, more effective ways to address specific problems, including
procedures, mechanisms, and methods for eliminating undesirable phenomena. For ex-
ample, in Switzerland, the establishment of specialized departments for financial crime
prosecution in the 1980s led to more effective handling of such cases, breaking a tradition
of leniency and inefficiency (Giddey 2022). However, despite its undeniable advantages,
specialization also carries certain disadvantages (Wasserman and Slack 2021). It involves
higher costs for the proper execution of selected tasks. Detecting serious crime is not only
technically demanding but also requires highly skilled personnel. Specialization risks a
potential loss of general perspective or the ability to address broader legal questions. By
focusing on a single area, attention naturally shifts away from other issues, and upon
reassignment, the subject may lack sufficient relevant knowledge and experience to tackle
new challenges effectively.
5https://www.environmentalprosecutors.eu/ (accessed on 8 April 2025)

Laws 2025,14, 25 5 of 23
While specialization in public prosecution is widely recognized as an effective mech-
anism for addressing complex crimes, it also carries inherent drawbacks. Specialized
prosecution offices, by their very nature, operate independently from general prosecutorial
structures. While this autonomy can help shield them from external influences, it can also
create a disconnect between specialized prosecutors and the broader criminal justice system.
This separation may lead to inconsistencies in prosecutorial decision-making and hinder co-
operation with general prosecutors, police forces, and the judiciary (
Buribayev et al. 2023
).
A frequent criticism of specialized prosecution offices is that their autonomy can
lead to diminished oversight. Unlike general prosecution structures, which are subject
to hierarchical supervision, specialized offices often operate with greater discretion. This
can raise concerns about potential abuses of power, selective enforcement, or politically
motivated prosecutions (Kim and Byeon 2017). The Slovak case highlights how such
concerns—whether justified or not—can contribute to the eventual abolition of special-
ized structures.
Given that specialized prosecution offices often deal with high-profile cases, they are
particularly susceptible to political scrutiny. Governments may perceive them either as
essential tools for fighting corruption or as institutions that can be leveraged for political
purposes. In some instances, specialized prosecutors may be accused of bias, eroding
public trust in their legitimacy (M. Davis 2025). The Slovak experience suggests that even
well-intentioned specialized prosecution bodies can become the focal point of political
controversy, leading to calls for reform or dissolution.
While specialized prosecution units require dedicated resources to function effectively,
they also risk diverting funds and personnel away from general prosecution offices. This
can create disparities in the legal system, where less serious but still significant crimes
receive inadequate attention. Additionally, the restructuring or abolition of specialized
prosecution offices, as seen in Slovakia, can lead to disruptions in case management, delays
in prosecutions, and inefficiencies in resource redistribution (Denyer 2012).
The introduction of specialized prosecution offices often requires the development of
distinct procedural rules, which may lead to legal fragmentation. Specialized units may
operate under different evidentiary standards, procedural mechanisms, or investigative
practices than their general prosecution counterparts. This divergence can create legal
uncertainties, making it more difficult for courts, defense attorneys, and law enforcement
agencies to navigate the criminal justice process.
Another issue with specialized prosecution is that excessive focus on particular crime
categories may lead to tunnel vision. Prosecutors within specialized units may develop
rigid investigative approaches, limiting their ability to adapt to evolving criminal methods
(Findley and Scott 2006). Additionally, specialized units may be reluctant to relinquish
jurisdiction over cases that fall within their mandate, even when collaboration with general
prosecutors could lead to more effective outcomes.
The specialization of public prosecution authorities in criminal law can be divided into
several types. In this context, Crha (2007) states that, based on the criterion of territorial
jurisdiction, one can distinguish so-called regional specialization. This involves a public
prosecutor, tied to a specific jurisdiction, becoming an expert on the matters occurring
within that area. Such a prosecutor can easily identify the fundamental problems of the
region, quickly connect the dots, and efficiently handle cases without major difficulties. The
author further identifies so-called personal specialization and organizational specialization.
Personal specialization, which assigns specialization to a specific individual, is deemed less
advantageous and serves its purpose only if rules of consistent assignment of similar cases
are followed—i.e., if the individual is not assigned an excessive variety of specializations.
For this reason, Crha considers organizational specialization, which involves creating spe-

Laws 2025,14, 25 6 of 23
cialized organizational units focusing on specific issues, to be more effective (Crha 2007,
pp. 29–30). To ensure the efficient functioning of these specialized organizational units, a
high degree of autonomous operation must be ensured. The influence of traditional hierar-
chical procedures, commonly applied in public prosecution systems, could significantly
disrupt their ability to fulfill their legally prescribed duties.
Currently, the primary purpose of specialization in combating crime is to address
the threats states face to maintain security, stability, and economic development. These
threats, in today’s modern era, are primarily corruption and organized crime, both of which
are on the rise. Corruption undermines the rule of law, democracy, and human rights,
disrupts fair competition, hinders economic development, and threatens the stability of
democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society (Arnone and Borlini 2014).
Organized crime and terrorism endanger the security and economy of individual states,
societal functioning, democracy, the independence of state authorities, and the integrity of
financial institutions. A few decades ago, corruption, organized crime, and terrorism were
perceived as local or national issues. Today, however, these phenomena have taken on a
transnational character, becoming significant global challenges. Addressing them requires
effective measures, as downplaying these issues can destabilize society, jeopardize security
and development, and lower citizens’ quality of life. One effective measure appears to be
improving criminal procedural tools available to states and their institutions. Among the
most efficient measures against serious crime is the establishment of state bodies that do not
deal with all types of crime (such as less serious offenses) but focus solely on exceptionally
severe crimes (Williams 2012;Dandurand 2019). Specialization in this area enables much
more effective crime-fighting and breaks regional connections between serious offenders
and local levels. The creation of specialized prosecution bodies involves centralization
and nationwide jurisdiction, weakening the influence of local criminal elements on the
judiciary’s functioning.
The practical impact of establishing centralized and specialized public prosecution
authorities is evident. If public prosecutors operating at district or regional levels are
removed from handling extremely serious criminal cases, potential existing ties between
organized crime and justice institutions are severed, and the influence of such elements
on the functioning and decision-making of local prosecution authorities is reduced. It
is impossible to overlook that corruption and organized crime have infiltrated official
societal structures, including various components of the judiciary. The most accessible
components of criminal justice appear to be those operating at the lowest territorial levels,
such as district or regional levels. Representatives of these components may, in many cases,
have personal stakes in particular matters, close relationships with certain actors, or be
easily influenced—directly or indirectly—into acting unlawfully or against general legal
standards (Dias 2017). Moreover, the resources available to these authorities are often
insufficient to address extremely serious criminal cases. Procedures designed for handling
less serious cases can be restrictive, inflexible, and unsuitable for effectively, adequately,
and promptly responding to such severe crimes. The aforementioned facts are the reason
why the requirements for the construction of specialized bodies are very strict and must
meet many standards and principles of construction, e.g., sufficient and reliable financial
resources, clear rules and standards of operating procedures, including monitoring and
disciplinary mechanisms, to minimize any misconduct and abuse of power by officers
(Anku-Tsede et al. 2023, p. 4)
4. Specialization of Public Prosecution in Historical Contexts
The organization of public prosecution in the territory of the Slovak Republic (or for-
mer Czechoslovakia) has a typical form in all democratic and rule-of-law states, traditionally

Laws 2025,14, 25 7 of 23
derived from the structure of the judiciary. This means that, similar to judicial authorities,
public prosecution authorities are established at multiple levels. Generally, district public
prosecution offices (district prosecutor’s offices) are established at district courts, and re-
gional public prosecution offices (regional prosecutor’s offices) are established at regional
courts. The territorial jurisdiction of individual public prosecution offices corresponds
to the territorial jurisdiction of the respective courts (Van De Bunt and Van Gelder 2012).
Therefore, district public prosecution offices mirror the territorial jurisdiction of district
courts, and regional public prosecution offices mirror the territorial jurisdiction of regional
courts. This alignment also applies to subject-matter jurisdiction.
One of the most significant historical debates surrounding public prosecution is its
relationship with the executive power. In many civil law countries, the public prosecution
has traditionally been part of the Ministry of Justice, which has raised concerns about the
potential for political interference. However, the degree of prosecutorial independence
has evolved over time. For instance, in France, public prosecutors remain under the direct
authority of the Minister of Justice, although recent reforms have sought to strengthen their
functional independence. In Germany, public prosecutors are also hierarchically subordi-
nate to the executive, as the Minister of Justice retains the power to issue direct instructions
in individual cases. In contrast, Italy and Spain have pursued greater prosecutorial inde-
pendence, particularly in specialized units dealing with corruption and organized crime. In
Romania, the establishment of the National Anticorruption Directorate in 2002 represented
a high degree of independence, with specialized prosecutors operating under strict legal
safeguards against political interference (Šramel 2022;Márton 2024). In post-communist
countries, including Slovakia, prosecutorial autonomy has been a contentious issue, partic-
ularly in the transition from socialist-era hierarchical structures toward more independent
models aligned with European Union standards.
From a historical perspective, the subject-matter jurisdiction of both judicial authori-
ties and public prosecution authorities in the territory of the Slovak Republic (or former
Czechoslovakia) was initially conceived as comprehensive (unlimited) territorial juris-
diction. Consequently, public prosecution authorities dealt with the prosecution of all
criminal offenses committed by all categories of offenders without exception. Neither
the severity of the crime nor the status or characteristics of the offender were taken into
account. There were no restrictions on prosecuting only certain groups of criminal cases,
and such restrictions were generally unnecessary. However, it is worth noting that the idea
of creating public prosecution authorities specialized in certain types of criminal cases—an
idea dominant in today’s modern legal frameworks for organizing public prosecution—is
not entirely new. The gradual development and refinement of legal regulations, as well as
the emergence of new undesirable phenomena, led to the introduction of certain exceptions
to the universally conceived jurisdiction of public prosecution authorities even in the past.
Over time, specific forms of criminal activity were singled out, and their prosecution was
entrusted to specialized authorities. A typical example was the prosecution of treason
(Nuttall 2000, p. 95).
The further development of the organization of public prosecution in the territory
of the Slovak Republic (or former Czechoslovakia), particularly in the second half of the
19th century and the early 20th century, was marked by increasing specialization of public
prosecution authorities. Gradually, certain categories of offenders began to be prosecuted
not by general jurisdiction authorities but by specialized authorities. For this reason, special
public prosecution bodies were established to prosecute specific categories of offenders.
Among the most widespread types of specialized public prosecution authorities were those
dealing with juvenile delinquency. It is important to note that public prosecution authorities
specializing in juvenile offenders were historically the only specialized public prosecution

Laws 2025,14, 25 8 of 23
authorities for a long time, and for almost a century, they were also the most common
(Nuttall 2000, p. 95). The expansion of such a special approach to juveniles was primarily
driven by the introduction of new scientific findings and criminological research. According
to these studies, authorities with general jurisdiction could not devote sufficient attention to
juveniles, which led to inadequate procedures and the adoption of measures that ultimately
proved more harmful to society than the actions of the juveniles themselves. Specialization
thus became a tool enabling the relevant authorities to approach this issue comprehensively,
considering all societal implications of prosecuting and punishing juveniles. At the same
time, it should be noted that the introduction of specialization had practical benefits.
Authorities specializing in the prosecution of juveniles were able to handle cases much
more quickly and effectively than general jurisdiction authorities (Elrod and Ryder 2011,
p. 254).
The development of public prosecution specialization in this direction is also reflected
in legal regulations governing public prosecution in the territory of Slovakia (formerly part
of the Kingdom of Hungary). Since the development of public prosecution in Slovakia
closely mirrored that in other European countries, it is desirable to examine it more closely.
In connection with the specialization of public prosecution authorities in Slovakia, it is
worth mentioning that the Hungarian legal system already recognized a specialized public
prosecution authority at the beginning of the 20th century, namely the State Juvenile
Prosecutor (Šanta 2012). The position and jurisdiction of the State Juvenile Prosecutor were
defined by a specific law—Act No. VII/1913 on Juvenile Courts. According to Section 5
of this Hungarian legal regulation, a State Juvenile Prosecutor’s Office was established at
each so-called Juvenile Court to represent public prosecution. This law remained in force
in the territory of Slovakia even after the establishment of the independent Czechoslovakia
until 1931. That year, based on Act No. 48/1931 Coll. and subsequent Government
Decree No. 105/1931 Coll. on Criminal Justice for Youth under 18, new specialized
public prosecution authorities were established in the field of criminal justice for offenses
committed by juveniles (persons under 18 years of age). These were so-called Youth
Prosecutors, appointed at so-called Youth Courts. Their role was to represent public
prosecution at Youth Courts, which were common for both regional and district courts
at their respective seats, and to oversee the activities of public prosecution deputies in
cases involving juvenile offenders at district courts within the jurisdiction of the relevant
regional court (Šanta and ˇ
Centéš 2018). A Youth Prosecutor thus conducted the prosecution
of juveniles and could decide to discontinue prosecution if it was deemed ineffective or if
the seriousness of the case was negligible. They could also file appeals both in favor of and
against the accused. Youth Prosecutors, selected for their suitability based on their personal
attributes, work, and education, were appointed by the Chief State Prosecutor. It should be
added that under Hungarian law, as defined by Act No. VII/1913 on Juvenile Courts, the
Youth Prosecutor was not an independent institution but rather a specialized unit within
the general prosecution system. The Youth Prosecutor’s Office was established within
the general prosecution structure, meaning it was not a separate, independent institution
but functioned under the broader framework of the Hungarian prosecution system. Each
Juvenile Court had a dedicated Youth Prosecutor, who was responsible for representing the
prosecution in cases involving juvenile offenders.
Throughout the historical development of public prosecution, additional types of spe-
cialized public prosecution authorities were gradually integrated into the system. Besides
the authorities prosecuting juvenile offenders, institutions specializing in military offenses
or crimes committed by members of the armed forces were also established over time.
Military crimes represented a specific category of offenses that, unlike general criminality,
required thorough knowledge of military regulations. Their creation must also be viewed

Laws 2025,14, 25 9 of 23
within the historical context, as the danger of military threats was particularly significant
during the periods in which these specialized authorities were formed. As a result, military
criminal cases were relatively frequent and required a dedicated prosecution body. During
the First Czechoslovak Republic, the tasks of a specialized public prosecution body for
military crimes were carried out by the military prosecutor’s office, established at military
courts ( ˇ
Centéš et al. 2014). After the establishment of the Slovak State in 1939, the special-
ized military prosecution office was retained, and alongside general public prosecution
offices, a system of military public prosecution offices also existed on Slovak territory
during this period. This system had a two-tier structure: military prosecutor’s offices were
established at military courts (first-instance courts) in Bratislava and Poprad, while the
Main Military Prosecutor’s Office was established at the Main Military Court in Bratislava.
These specialized authorities focused on prosecuting military offenses, continuing their role
from earlier periods (Hubenák 2001, p. 274). After the dissolution of the Slovak State, from
1945 to 1948, the primary task of public prosecution authorities was the prosecution of war
criminals, traitors, and collaborators. However, this task was not assigned to general state
prosecution authorities. Instead, ad hoc prosecution bodies were established at retribution
courts, based on the retribution decrees of the President of the Republic, to handle these
cases (Plundr and Hlavsa 1980, p. 27).
Specialization within public prosecution continued even after the advent of socialism
in 1948. This period saw significant changes, beginning in October 1948 with the expansion
of the structure of public prosecution authorities through the adoption of Act No. 232/1948
Coll. on the State Court. Under this law, a specialized State Prosecutor’s Office was es-
tablished at the new State Court. This office focused exclusively on prosecuting crimes
under the Law for the Protection of the People’s Democratic Republic, effectively contin-
uing the extraordinary measures introduced after World War II to remove undesirable
individuals. The State Prosecutor’s Office was composed of the State Prosecutor and
State Vice-Prosecutors, with the State Prosecutor as its head, directly subordinate to the
Minister of Justice. The office was also responsible for prosecuting individuals subject to
military judicial jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction mirrored that of the State Court, covering
crimes punishable by death or imprisonment of more than ten years, as well as other crimes
or offenses if the public prosecutor proposed that the case be heard by the State Court.
It should be noted that the influence of State Prosecutors on criminal proceedings was
minimal. They became involved only after receiving materials from the State Security
Service during the preparatory proceedings, without the ability to review or supervise
those materials. Consequently, State Prosecutors often acted merely as formal approvers
of unlawful measures taken by the State Security Service (Vališ 2006, p. 8). The existence
of this socialist specialized public prosecution body was relatively short-lived. Its activ-
ities were terminated in 1953 with the adoption of new legal regulations governing the
judicial system.
It is important to note regarding the State Prosecutor’s Office that, while it is naturally
impossible to equate the specialization of totalitarian public prosecution authorities with the
specialization of public prosecution authorities in modern democratic and rule-of-law states,
certain common traits can be identified, particularly in terms of the reasons behind their
establishment. Modern specialized public prosecution authorities are created to protect
society from crimes that pose the greatest threats in terms of consequences. Similarly, the
goal of establishing the socialist State Prosecutor’s Office was to protect the society and
values deemed most significant and prioritized at that time (Zat’ková 2006, p. 235). On the
other hand, a marked difference exists between the two: while modern specialized public
prosecution authorities aim to protect society from crimes that genuinely endanger the

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lives and health of its members, totalitarian specialized public prosecution authorities were
often used as tools for persecuting political opponents and other undesirable individuals.
Apart from the specialized State Prosecutor’s Office, other specialized military prose-
cution authorities also existed during the socialist era in Czechoslovakia. These focused
exclusively on the prosecution of military crimes. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, these
military prosecution authorities were incorporated into the legal systems of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. The entire structure of military prosecution consisted of the Main
Military Prosecutor’s Office (as the military division of the General Prosecutor’s Office), the
Higher Military Prosecutor’s Office (the superior body of the Military District Prosecutor’s
Offices), the Military District Prosecutor’s Offices (as the lowest level in the system), and
the so-called Field Prosecutor’s Offices, which had limited jurisdiction and were intended
to operate only during wartime or states of war. However, the justification for the exis-
tence of specialized military prosecution authorities was frequently questioned after the
establishment of the independent Slovak Republic in 1993. This ultimately led to their
abolition as of 1 November 2011, as distinct prosecution bodies specializing in certain types
of crime. This step became necessary following the abolition of specialized military courts
on 1 April 2009, and the transfer of their cases to general courts. As a result, the structure
of the prosecution system no longer aligned with that of the court system, necessitating
changes in the prosecution system to integrate the military and civil components. The
abolition of military prosecution authorities was also expected to bring several benefits
to the state and the prosecution system as a whole. These benefits included significant
financial savings and increased efficiency in prosecuting general criminality by strengthen-
ing civil prosecution offices with additional prosecutors. However, achieving these goals
remains a long-term endeavor, as highly specialized military prosecutors must adapt to
new roles and integrate into the civil prosecution environment. The evaluation of whether
the legislative objectives were achieved will only be possible after sufficient time has passed,
when concrete empirical data on the activities of the Slovak Republic’s prosecution system
become available.
In terms of the most recent developments in the specialization of public prosecution
authorities, the late 20th century in continental Europe was significantly influenced by
the emergence of new types of criminality. This has been reflected in the structure of
public prosecution systems, which have been continuously supplemented with new types
of specialized prosecution authorities. These authorities primarily focus on prosecuting
crimes in the realm of economic criminality (e.g., money laundering, white-collar crime)
and organized criminality (e.g., terrorism, arms smuggling, drug trafficking). In some coun-
tries, specialized authorities have also been created to address other types of criminality.
For instance, Norway established a specialized public prosecution authority dedicated to
combating environmental crime (Gottschalk 2024, p. 2). This demonstrates that the special-
ization of public prosecution authorities has continually evolved and adapted throughout
history in response to current societal needs and the ability to address emerging forms of
antisocial behavior.
As already indicated, in recent decades, the organization of public prosecution in vari-
ous countries of continental Europe has increasingly leaned toward stricter specialization
than before. The reason lies in the fact that specialization is considered one of the key tools
for effectively combating the rising tide of corruption, economic crime, and organized crime.
The importance of specialization is even emphasized in various international documents
from significant global and regional organizations.
In this regard, it is worth noting that Recommendation No. R (87)18 of the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the simplification of criminal justice, adopted as
early as 1987 (Coscas-Williams and Alberstein 2019), suggests in its third part that cases

Laws 2025,14, 25 11 of 23
related to economic crime, where the collection of evidence is technically highly complex,
should be handled and decided by judges and other state bodies with appropriate training,
knowledge, and experience. The recommendation further states that, where the constitution
permits, such cases should be dealt with by public prosecution offices, investigative bodies,
or possibly courts that are specially organized and adapted to handle the difficulties arising
from the nature and complexity of economic crime. These offices should also have access to
a sufficient number of experts, as necessary, from fields such as social psychology, medicine,
psychiatry, accounting, economics, or forensic science, particularly due to the increasing
technical demands of crimes and the evidence-gathering process.
The necessity of specialization for public prosecution authorities is also highlighted by
a document from the Council of Europe, the Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Commit-
tee of Ministers on the Role of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System, adopted
in 2000 (Kamber 2017). In point 8, it states that “as new types of crime, especially organized
crime, develop, specialization should also be a priority concerning the organization of pros-
ecution offices, training, or career progression. The formation of specialist teams, including
multidisciplinary ones, which could assist prosecutors in fulfilling their tasks, should also
be encouraged”. According to the provisions of this recommendation, specialization is
essential in highly expert fields (e.g., economic and financial crime) as well as in areas of
highly organized crime for the sake of efficiency. Therefore, the Committee of Ministers also
recommends two types of specialization in the explanatory memorandum to this document.
The first type is classical specialization, involving the formation of teams of prosecutors
specializing in specific areas within the prosecution service (at regional and national levels).
In this sense, distinguishing ranks and roles could contribute to strengthening specializa-
tion. The second type, which should be supported, involves creating multidisciplinary
teams consisting of professionals from various fields (e.g., in combating financial crime
and money laundering: accountants, customs officers, banking specialists, etc.) under the
leadership of specialized prosecutors. The aggregation of competencies in a single unit
may, in fact, be one of the prerequisites for the effectiveness of the system.
A manifestation of specialization as a prevailing trend in the current organization of
public prosecution is the establishment of various national prosecution offices combating
the most serious types of crime, primarily organized crime, financial crime, and economic
crime (Strémy et al. 2021). The characteristic features of these specialized offices include
teamwork between police, public prosecutors, and experts, and nationwide jurisdiction
regardless of judicial organization. The aim of these changes is primarily to ensure the
concentration of resources and enable a flexible response, which can be considered the
most effective way to combat the most severe forms of crime. The trend of creating
specialized public prosecution authorities can be observed in the legal systems of virtually
all European countries, with the introduction of specialized nationwide prosecution offices
for prosecuting certain types of crimes dating back to the 1970s.
5. The Office of the Special Prosecution in Slovak Republic
5.1. The Position of the Office of the Special Prosecution in the Legal Order of the Slovak Republic
from 2004 to 2024
The Slovak Office of the Special Prosecution was established with effect from 1 May
2004, by Act No. 458/2003 Coll. on the Establishment of the Special Court and the Office
of the Special Prosecution, and on Amendments to Certain Laws. The reason for estab-
lishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor as a distinct part of the General Prosecutor’s
Office of the Slovak Republic was to create specialized bodies for detecting, investigating,
and prosecuting corruption and organized crime. The primary goal was to ensure better
specialization while also providing protection and, in the case of corruption-related crimes,

Laws 2025,14, 25 12 of 23
breaking certain local ties that could influence the detection, investigation, and potentially
even the judicial proceedings in such cases. In its explanatory report, the Slovak govern-
ment in 2003 stated that corruption and organized crime were among the greatest threats
that states must confront to maintain security, stability, and economic development. It was
stated that corruption endangered the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, disrupted
economic competition, hindered economic growth, threatened the stability of democratic
institutions, and undermined the moral foundations of society. Organized crime jeopar-
dized the security and economy of individual states, the functioning of society, democracy,
the independence of state authorities, and the integrity of financial institutions. Before 2003,
the problem of corruption and organized crime in Slovakia was perceived merely as a local
or national issue. In 2003, corruption and organized crime had a transnational character
and were becoming a significant global problem for humanity, requiring effective measures
to address them. According to the legislator, the effective suppression of corruption and
organized crime could only be achieved through a comprehensive set of measures at a high
professional level.
As indicated above, the creation of the Office of the Special Prosecution within the
prosecution system was necessitated by the need to ensure effective legal measures for
uncovering and prosecuting the most serious forms of crime, particularly corruption and
organized crime (Demoviˇc 2023, p. 1008). Its jurisdiction covered the entire territory of Slo-
vakia, with its tasks including supervising the observance of legality before the initiation of
criminal proceedings and during the preparatory phase, prosecuting individuals suspected
of committing crimes, and exercising the prosecutor’s authority in court proceedings in
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court.
According to the Act on Prosecution
6
in its version effective from 1 May 2004, until its
abolition in 2024, the prosecution system included, among others, the General Prosecutor’s
Office, of which the Office of the Special Prosecution was a distinct part with nationwide
jurisdiction. The Office of the Special Prosecution was established and operated throughout
its existence as a component of the General Prosecutor’s Office. While it held the status
of a distinct unit within the General Prosecutor’s Office,
7
this distinction arose from its
institutional integration within the prosecution system as part of the General Prosecutor’s
Office.
8
The Office of the Special Prosecutor was not established as an independent state
body within the prosecution system, nor as a prosecution body independent of the General
Prosecutor’s Office. This structure ensured that the Office of the Special Prosecution passed
the constitutionality test. The Constitutional Court stated that the establishment of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor and the definition of its position and jurisdiction did not
conflict with the constitutionally defined mission of the prosecution as a body protecting
the rights and legally protected interests of individuals, legal entities, and the state, nor
with the constitutionally defined position of the General Prosecutor, who, under Article 150
of the Constitution, heads the prosecution system. Furthermore, the position of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor and, in particular, the Special Prosecutor was not so autonomous
as to negate the supervisory and control authority of the General Prosecutor
9
(case no.
PL. ÚS 17/08).
The Office of the Special Prosecutor was headed by a Special Prosecutor, through
whom the General Prosecutor managed its activities. The Special Prosecutor was elected by
the National Council of the Slovak Republic based on a selection process from among the
6Section 38(1)(a) of the Act on Prosecution in its version effective from 1 May 2004.
7See Section 55b to 55l of the Act on Prosecution.
8
Section 55d(1) and (3), Section 55f, Section 55h(1) and (2), and Section 55k of the Act on Prosecution in its
version effective until the contested provisions came into effect.
9As defined in Section 10 of Act No. 153/2001 Coll.

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prosecutors of the General Prosecutor’s Office for a term of five years, upon the proposal of
the General Prosecutor. The Special Prosecutor was accountable to the General Prosecutor
for the performance of their duties (Svák et al. 2017, p. 116). However, under the Act on
Prosecution,
10
in matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Special Pros-
ecutor, the General Prosecutor was not authorized to issue so-called negative directives
(e.g., directives to not initiate criminal proceedings, not press charges, not request the deten-
tion of an accused, transfer the case for resolution to another authority, terminate criminal
proceedings, not file an indictment or an appeal, or not use extraordinary legal remedies to
the detriment of the accused), nor could the General Prosecutor carry out actions on behalf
of the Special Prosecutor or prosecutors of the Office of the Special Prosecutor or decide
that such actions would be performed by another subordinate prosecutor. Additionally, the
General Prosecutor could not intervene in the review of the legality of the procedures of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor or in the decision-making on appeals against decisions
of the prosecutors of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (ˇ
Collák 2016, p. 206).
Thus, it can be concluded that the Office of the Special Prosecutor had a certain degree
of autonomy vis-à-vis the General Prosecutor’s Office, which distinguished it from other
components of the prosecution system. This degree of autonomy frequently raised concerns
within the professional community about its compliance with the fundamental principles of
the prosecution system in Slovakia. Moreover, such an arrangement raised questions about
whether this structure created a dualism in the management of the prosecution and the
execution of criminal policy. However, it is believed that despite establishing a relatively
autonomous specialized body of public prosecution, the principle of unity and the absence
of dualism in its management were not undermined. The creation of specialized public
prosecution bodies in this manner was justified and not exceptional, as evidenced by similar
arrangements in several European countries (e.g., Spain, Romania, Croatia). Moreover,
the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, in the aforementioned ruling (case no.
PL. ÚS 17/08), concluded that the position of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was
not so autonomous as to undermine the supervisory and control authority of the General
Prosecutor. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the level of autonomy granted to the Office
of the Special Prosecutor contradicted the basic organizational principles of the Slovak
prosecution system, particularly the principle of centralism. This is because the General
Prosecutor remained the superior prosecutor to the Special Prosecutor and managed the
activities of the Office of the Special Prosecutor through them. As noted, the Special
Prosecutor remained accountable to the General Prosecutor for their performance, and the
General Prosecutor retained significant influence over the appointment and number of
prosecutors in the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the election of the Special Prosecutor.
5.2. The Abolition of the Office of Special Prosecution in Slovakia and Its Political–Legal Aspects
As previously indicated, the Slovak Office of the Special Prosecution was abolished
following the adoption of Act No. 40/2024 Coll., effective from 20 March 2024. Members
of the Slovak Parliament approved the abolition on 8 February 2024. The office ceased
to exist as of 20 March 2024, and its prosecutors were transferred under the General
Prosecutor’s Office.
According to the explanatory memorandum to this law, the Slovak government jus-
tified the abolition by claiming that the de facto autonomy of the Office of the Special
Prosecution had grown beyond what was provided for by law, thereby disrupting both the
hierarchy and the uniformity of procedures within the prosecution system, particularly in
the application of several procedural institutes of criminal proceedings. The government
10 Section 55d(2) of the Act on Prosecution.

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argued that the purpose of the law was to restore public trust in the prosecution system and
to achieve “unity” within the structure of the prosecution, aligning its internal organization
with the common practices observed in most European countries.
When presenting the reasons for and causes of the abolition, the Slovak government
also noted that public opinion regarding the nearly two decades of operation of the Office
of the Special Prosecution was significantly divided. According to the government, the
activities of the Office in recent years elicited unprecedented public reactions and were
sometimes perceived by parts of the professional community as political and marked by
arbitrariness. The truth is that during the operation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
there had been relevant and practical application issues, which were also highlighted by
professional literature (Šanta 2015, p. 668). Several actions and decisions by the Office
were said to have violated the constitutional rights of complainants or rights guaranteed
by international conventions. The government emphasized that the unprofessional and
unlawful decisions of prosecutors from the Office of the Special Prosecutor were criticized
not only by academic and legal circles but also by the General Prosecutor’s Office of the
Slovak Republic itself. Legislative efforts by the National Council of the Slovak Republic
during its eighth electoral term to limit the interventions of the Slovak General Prosecutor in
preparatory proceedings under the supervision of the Office of the Special Prosecutor were
deemed to have failed. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, the government
claimed, also resisted political pressure to declare unconstitutional one of the fundamental
legal mechanisms enabling the Slovak General Prosecutor to rectify deficiencies in the
activities of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
The Slovak government further stated in its explanatory memorandum that the impar-
tiality of prosecutors from the Office of the Special Prosecutor had been questioned even by
the Specialized Criminal Court, which sought a review of the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Act on Prosecution by the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.
One of the reasons cited was the lack of valid legal provisions allowing the transfer of a
case from the Office of the Special Prosecution, even in cases of apparent lack of objectivity.
According to the government, this issue also stemmed from the fact that the Specialized
Criminal Court, in the court system, held the status of a regional court, while the Office
of the Special Prosecutor was a distinct component of the Slovak General Prosecutor’s
Office, with its prosecutors being prosecutors of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the
Slovak Republic.
To clarify the system for the reader, according to the Slovak law on courts, the judicial
system consists of district courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. The legislator
has also incorporated the Specialized Criminal Court into the judicial system. Within this
system, district courts serve as first-instance courts. Regional courts act as appellate bodies
for decisions made by district courts.11
Therefore (in the interest of ensuring parity among the main subjects of criminal
proceedings), the government proposed to entrust the authority over the investigation
of criminal activities falling under the jurisdiction of the Specialized Criminal Court to
regional prosecutor’s offices, with the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Slovak Republic
overseeing their activities. According to the government, the regional prosecutor’s offices
have a sufficient, impartial, and professionally competent prosecutorial staff.
11
However, in certain cases, regional courts also function as first-instance courts. The Specialized Criminal
Court holds the status of a regional court as well. The Supreme Court reviews and decides on ordinary
legal remedies against decisions of regional courts and the Specialized Criminal Court (Giba et al. 2019). In
contrast to the aforementioned, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was established as a distinct part of the
General Prosecutor’s Office of the Slovak Republic, with jurisdiction over the entire territory of Slovakia
(Svák et al. 2017).

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The Slovak government concluded that its goal was to find a compromise between the
differing opinions on the existence of the Office of the Special Prosecution and to adopt
legislation that would not only increase the efficiency of prosecutorial proceedings as a
whole, strengthen the independence of the prosecution from political influence, and uphold
the principles of the rule of law but also endure changes in the government. According
to the Slovak government, it was unacceptable for the criminal prosecution system to
be dominated by any parliamentary majority. The inclusion of regional prosecutor’s
offices in criminal proceedings before the Specialized Criminal Court was cited as one of
the guarantees of independence and impartiality in the decision-making process of each
prosecutor, supported by legal safeguards against unlawful directives from their superiors.
Given the strong public, political, and partially professional opposition triggered by
the abolition of the Office of the Special Prosecution (Tomášková 2024, p. 756), the President
of the Slovak Republic and a group of members of parliament filed a motion with the
Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of the government’s actions after the
law was passed.
Before we move on to the individual reasons presented by the petitioners, we consider
it necessary to clarify the issue of the composition and formation of the Constitutional
Court of the Slovak Republic. According to Article 134(1) of the Constitution of the Slovak
Republic, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic consists of 13 judges. The
process of appointing a constitutional judge has three phases. The first phase involves the
submission of proposals for candidates for constitutional judges to the National Council of
the Slovak Republic. The second phase consists of the selection of candidates for the position
of constitutional judge by the National Council. The third phase involves the selection
of a suitable candidate by the President of the Slovak Republic and their subsequent
appointment as a constitutional judge.
12
In this process, both electoral and appointment
principles are applied (Drgonec 2012). The second phase takes place in the parliament itself.
The task of the parliament is to select, in a secret vote, the required number of candidates
for the position of constitutional judge. It is evident that the selection of candidates is
the result of political decision-making, which may raise justified concerns regarding the
expertise and independence of the candidates. In the third phase, the President of the
Slovak Republic enters the process of appointing constitutional judges. The decision on
the election of candidates is submitted to the President by the parliament, and the role of
the head of state is to select those candidates who provide genuine guarantees of a proper,
professional, and independent performance of the function of a constitutional judge.
13
The President is bound by the proposal submitted by the parliament and cannot select a
candidate who was not nominated (Šramel 2015b).
As indicated above, the petitioners presented several arguments asserting that the
abolition of the Office was unconstitutional.
Argument 1: Procedural Delays Due to Case Transfers. The abolition of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor resulted in the transfer of ongoing cases to eight regional prosecutor’s
offices, where they were reassigned to new prosecutors. The new prosecutors would need
to familiarize themselves with case files, often comprising thousands of pages, leading to
inevitable delays. The contested law did not include any transitional period (legislation)
12
Proposals for the election of candidates for judges may be submitted to the National Council of the Slovak
Republic by the following: (a) members of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, (b) the Government of
the Slovak Republic, (c) the President of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, (d) the President of
the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, (e) the Prosecutor General of the Slovak Republic, (f) professional
organizations of lawyers, (g) scientific institutions.
13
The Constitution of the Slovak Republic requires that the National Council always propose twice the number
of candidates for judges that the President of the Slovak Republic is to appoint. From this group, the President
selects the necessary number of judges, without being bound by any specific instructions.

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to allow the prosecution system to prepare technically, personally, and organizationally
for the change in jurisdiction, thereby risking delays in proceedings and undermining the
effective investigation of criminal activity.
Argument 2: Breach of International Obligations. Slovakia is bound by international
treaties to establish specialized bodies or independent authorities to combat corruption
(Michel 2021). The explanatory memorandum to Act No. 458/2003 Coll., which established
the Office of the Special Prosecution, stated that its creation was in line with Slovakia’s
international obligations under anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations
Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (Webb 2005;Rose 2019). Abolishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor created a
situation inconsistent with these international commitments, specifically Article 20 of the
Anti-Corruption Convention, Article 36 of the UN Convention against Corruption, and
Article 29 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The transfer of
cases to regional prosecutor’s offices was deemed insufficient, as these offices cannot be
considered specialized bodies, and their prosecutors are not systematically specialized for
such tasks.
Argument 3: Failure to Pass the Proportionality Test. The abolition of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor failed the proportionality test (Bindi 2016;Lailam et al. 2024)
because lawmakers did not demonstrate that this measure was necessary or essential to
achieve their stated objectives. Moreover, they did not prove that the rights and freedoms
(Funta and Horváth 2024) affected by the abolition would be restricted only to the extent
strictly necessary. The abolition infringed on the rights of victims and injured parties,
particularly their right to an effective investigation, timely proceedings, and the protection
of fundamental rights such as the right to life, human dignity, privacy, property, and judicial
protection. The abolition also contravened the state’s positive procedural obligation to
conduct effective investigations in criminal matters in compliance with efficiency and
expediency requirements. It was evident that the abolition would result in unnecessary
delays, at the very least due to the transfer of case files to new offices. These delays
were compounded by shortened statutes of limitations, the immediate application of new
rules without a transitional period, and the absence of special procedures for ongoing
cases. This significantly increased the risk of unresolved and uninvestigated criminal
cases, undermining public trust in the prosecution system and Slovakia’s adherence to its
international legal obligations.
Argument 4: Non-Compliance with EU Law on Financial Interests. The abolition of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor fails the proportionality test, particularly in its second
step (the necessity test), as it contradicts Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU). This provision obliges Slovakia to combat fraud and other
illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union. The abolition also
violates Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on combating fraud affecting the financial interests of
the European Union by means of criminal law and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939
implementing enhanced cooperation for establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office (EPPO). The abolition jeopardizes the protection of the EU’s financial interests both
materially (by shortening statutes of limitations and lowering penalties) and procedurally
(by reducing the specialization of prosecutors handling cases previously overseen by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor).
Argument 5: Breach of the Principle of Loyal Cooperation. The abolition of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor is clearly incompatible with Articles 4(3), 3(1), and
2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), violating the principle of loyal cooperation
(Klamert 2014). This principle requires member states to refrain from measures that could
threaten the EU’s objectives, including the promotion of its values, such as the rule of law

Laws 2025,14, 25 17 of 23
(
Funta and Králiková 2022
). Additionally, the abolition conflicts with the draft directive of
the European Parliament and Council on combating corruption, which requires member
states to establish specialized anti-corruption bodies. Article 4 of this directive explicitly
calls for the establishment of specialized agencies to prevent corruption.
Argument 6: Violation of the Right to Effective Legal Protection. Article 19(1) of
the TEU obliges member states to establish remedies necessary to ensure effective legal
protection in areas covered by EU law (Gentile 2023;Becková 2018). A member state
cannot amend its legislation in a way that reduces the level of protection for the rule of law,
especially regarding judicial independence and the proper functioning of legal systems.
This obligation extends not only to the judiciary’s structure but also to laws applied in court
proceedings, including criminal law. The abolition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
represents a step back in protecting the rule of law and legal safeguards, thereby failing to
comply with EU standards.
Despite these arguments, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic dismissed
the motion to declare the abolition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor unconstitutional
and inconsistent with international law. The court concluded that the abolition was fully
compliant with Slovak legal provisions and Slovakia’s international obligations. Thus, the
abolition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was deemed lawful and valid.
It should be noted that the final ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak
Republic was adopted under case number PL. ÚS 3/2024-761 and was published in the
Collection of Laws on 6 August 2024. Since this is a decision in which the Constitutional
Court assessed the constitutionality of a law passed by parliament, no appeal can be filed
against the Constitutional Court’s decision. This means that the abolition of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor must be generally accepted, and any change is only possible
through a new legislative process as prescribed by law (if sufficient political will is found
in the future).
In assessing the constitutionality of abolishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Slovak Republic, the Slovak Constitutional Court relied on several legal considerations.
Consideration 1: EU Law Perspective. When assessing the constitutionality of the
abolition of the Slovak Republic’s Special Prosecutor’s Office, the Constitutional Court of
the Slovak Republic considered several legal arguments. Firstly, it referred to the case law
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), according to which the organization
of the judiciary in EU member states falls within the competence of those states, provided
they respect EU law (Harbarth and Spielmann 2023). The same applies to prosecution
services. According to the Advocate General of the CJEU in Case C-634/2022, any model
of criminal justice is permissible—whether specialized or one where general courts rule on
all criminal offenses. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic concluded that the
Slovak Republic, in regulating the structure of its prosecution service, acts within powers
not transferred to the European Union. However, the Court also emphasized that, in
exercising this competence, the Slovak Republic must adhere to the obligations arising from
EU law (e.g., the CJEU ruling of 24 June 2024, Case C-107/23 PPU, para. 127). Therefore,
the structure of the prosecution service must ensure compliance with the requirements
of EU law, particularly the requirement of judicial independence in matters related to the
application or interpretation of EU law (Funta and Schultz 2023). This is to guarantee
effective judicial protection of the rights derived from EU law for individuals subject
to judicial authority (CJEU judgment of 18 May 2021 in Joined Cases C83/19, C127/19,
C195/19, C291/19, C355/19, and C397/19, para. 211). The Constitutional Court argued
that the abolition of the Special Prosecutor’s Office does not interfere with the independence
of the judiciary and does not endanger the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights
under EU law. The legal provision abolishing the Special Prosecutor’s Office, therefore,

Laws 2025,14, 25 18 of 23
does not conflict with Article 19(1), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), nor does it conflict with Articles 2, 4(3), and 3(1) of the TEU.
Consideration 2: Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Constitutional Court also stated
in its ruling that since the Slovak Republic, in regulating the structure of the prosecution
service, acts within the scope of powers not transferred to the European Union, it is not
implementing European Union law (Mahmutovic 2023;Łazowski 2013). As a result, the
Charter’s applicability under Article 51 is not established, meaning that in proceedings
regarding the compliance of legal regulations, the Charter cannot serve as a reference
framework, and it is not necessary to assess the compliance of the relevant legal provision
with Article 17(1) and Article 46 of the Charter.
Consideration 3: Specialization and International Obligations. One of the Consti-
tutional Court’s arguments for declaring the abolition of the Special Prosecutor’s Office
constitutional provisions was the assertion that, given the natural diversity or variability of
national bodies designated to combat crime—all levels of the United Nations, the Council
of Europe, and even the European Union—these documents do not specify the exact in-
stitutional framework for fulfilling the obligations of the contracting party to the relevant
convention or member state of the European Union. On the contrary, considering the goal
to be achieved, the issue of domestic solutions is left to the discretion of the contracting
party to the relevant convention or member state of the European Union. The requirement
for the specialization of national bodies does not necessarily have to be fulfilled by estab-
lishing independent, separate, or specific national bodies dedicated to combating the type
of crime addressed by the particular convention or source of EU law (such a requirement
would not even be met by the Special Prosecutor’s Office). Instead, this requirement can
also be satisfied through internal specialization within an otherwise general body. This
can be achieved, for example, by creating a special, specialized organizational unit or by
specializing specific individuals within the relevant state authority, primarily, given the
nature of the matter, within the General Prosecutor’s Office in the Slovak Republic.
Consideration 4: Legal vs. Constitutional Principles. Finally, the reasoning that led the
Constitutional Court to confirm the constitutionality of the government’s actions also relied
on the fact that the organizational structure of the prosecution service and the functional
relationships in the exercise of its powers are governed by statutory principles rather than
constitutional ones. The legislature, which establishes the principles of organization and
functional relationships in the exercise of the prosecution service’s powers, as well as the
rules for appointing and removing prosecutors and their rights and obligations, also has
the authority to modify and amend these principles and rules (Šramel 2022). Naturally,
this must be achieved with respect for other constitutional provisions, including Articles
149 and 150 of the Slovak Constitution (ref. PL. ÚS 25/2020). These articles define the
fundamental role and responsibility of the prosecution service in the Slovak Republic as
a democratic and legal state and its sole constitutional organizational element: that the
General Prosecutor heads the prosecution service. This role of the General Prosecutor
is reflected as a central element in the statutory regulation of the prosecution service’s
organization and internal relationships (ref. PL. ÚS 2/2023). The Constitutional Court
previously found no violation of Article 150 of the Constitution in the establishment of the
Special Prosecutor’s Office as part of the General Prosecutor’s Office because the General
Prosecutor’s authority concerning the activities of the Special Prosecutor’s Office was
only partially restricted. This restriction was not to an extent that would undermine the
General Prosecutor’s position as outlined in Article 150 of the Constitution. Consequently,
according to the established case law of the Constitutional Court, the legislature’s decision
to abolish the Special Prosecutor’s Office cannot constitute an unconstitutional interference
with the organization and structure of the prosecution service.

Laws 2025,14, 25 19 of 23
6. Conclusions
Specialization of public prosecution offices is one of the modern trends dominating
the organization of public prosecution in contemporary democratic and legal states. It
focuses primarily on combating the most serious forms of crime, such as organized crime
and economic crime. However, the current form of specialization in public prosecution has
a relatively short history—the need to establish bodies to combat these forms of crime only
emerged in recent decades. Nonetheless, the existence of specialized public prosecution
bodies is not entirely new. The creation of bodies focusing on specific categories or types
of criminal activity can be traced back to earlier periods, particularly toward the end
of the 19th century. These early examples primarily involved bodies specializing in the
prosecution of juvenile criminal cases and, later, military criminal cases. In conclusion,
the specific form of public prosecution specialization has been, is, and will always be
determined by current societal needs. With the emergence and growth of new forms of
serious crime, it can be expected that such cases will increasingly be excluded from the
jurisdiction of general criminal prosecution bodies, leading to the establishment of new
types of specialized public prosecution bodies.
Despite the significant controversies surrounding the abolition of the Special Prose-
cutor’s Office in Slovakia, it must be noted that it is solely up to the national legislator to
determine the structure of its prosecution office. As mentioned earlier, the organization of
the judiciary and prosecution in EU member states falls within the competence of these
states, provided they adhere to European Union law. The requirement for the specialization
of national bodies does not necessarily have to be fulfilled through the creation of sepa-
rate, independent, or distinct national bodies dedicated to combating crime addressed by
specific conventions or EU legal sources. Instead, this requirement can also be satisfied
through internal specialization within a general body.
For this reason, the organization of prosecution offices in a given state is a matter
of political discretion (supported by expert arguments). If the needs and circumstances
of crime prevention require it, tasks may be carried out by a separate, independent, or
specialized national body (as was the case in Slovakia until 2024). If circumstances change
and socio-political arguments favor a different model, nothing prevents such a transfor-
mation. In the context of the Slovak Republic, this conclusion also logically follows from
the fact that the organizational structure of the Slovak prosecution office and its functional
relationships in the exercise of its competencies are governed by statutory principles, not
constitutional ones. The legislator, who establishes the principles of organization and func-
tional relationships in the exercise of the prosecution office’s powers, as well as the rules for
the appointment, removal, rights, and duties of prosecutors, may also modify and change
these principles and rules, naturally with due respect for other constitutional provisions.
The abolition of the Office of the Special Prosecution in Slovakia raises broader ques-
tions regarding the organization, function, and legitimacy of specialized prosecution offices
in democratic legal systems. While some of the legal issues discussed in this case are unique
to Slovak constitutional law and its relationship with European Union law, the underlying
concerns and debates are relevant to specialized prosecution institutions in general.
In the following text, we will attempt to summarize/develop on the most important
lessons or implications that might be drawn for specialized prosecution generally:
The first lesson addresses the rationale for specialized prosecution. Specialized pros-
ecution offices have been established in various jurisdictions primarily to enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement in complex areas such as organized crime,
corruption, economic crime, and terrorism. Their creation is often justified on the basis that
certain crimes require prosecutors with specialized knowledge, dedicated resources, and
the ability to work independently from general prosecution structures, which may be more

Laws 2025,14, 25 20 of 23
vulnerable to local political and criminal influences (A. J. Davis 2001). The Slovak case
highlights the tension between this rationale and concerns about accountability, oversight,
and potential politicization of specialized prosecution bodies. One key question arising
from Slovakia’s experience is whether specialized prosecution should exist as a structurally
independent body or as an internal division within a broader prosecutorial framework. The
argument in favor of internal specialization—such as maintaining dedicated units within
the general prosecution service—is that it preserves hierarchical oversight and mitigates
the risk of excessive autonomy. However, this model may also reduce the flexibility and
independence needed to investigate and prosecute high-profile cases, particularly where
corruption within state structures is a concern.
The second lesson concerns constitutional and legal frameworks. The Slovak case
demonstrates the importance of establishing specialized prosecution offices on a clear
constitutional or statutory basis. One of the arguments in favor of the abolition of the
Office of the Special Prosecution was that it had grown beyond its legally defined limits,
potentially undermining the principle of unity in prosecution. This raises a broader question
about the legal safeguards necessary to ensure that specialized prosecution offices operate
within a well-defined mandate while maintaining institutional independence and integrity.
In countries where specialized prosecution offices exist, their legal foundation varies.
Some jurisdictions, such as Romania and Spain, have created specialized prosecution
units with clear legislative backing, ensuring their institutional legitimacy. Others rely
on internal organizational measures within the general prosecution service, which may
offer greater flexibility but potentially weaker protections against political interference
(
Popova and Post 2019
). The challenge is to strike a balance between these approaches,
ensuring that specialized offices are sufficiently independent to function effectively while
remaining accountable to constitutional and legal principles.
The third lesson addresses allocation of competences and jurisdiction. A fundamental
issue in the Slovak case was the redistribution of cases following the abolition of the Office
of the Special Prosecution. The transfer of complex cases to regional prosecutor’s offices
led to concerns about delays and potential inefficiencies, particularly given the need for
newly assigned prosecutors to familiarize themselves with extensive case files. This raises
a broader question about how competences should be allocated in specialized prosecution
models. In many jurisdictions, specialized prosecution offices handle cases based on
specific criteria, such as the nature of the crime (e.g., corruption or terrorism), the severity
of the offense, or the involvement of high-profile individuals. An alternative approach,
seen in some systems, is to allow for case-by-case allocation, ensuring that specialized
resources are used efficiently without creating rigid institutional structures. The lesson from
Slovakia is that abrupt changes in competence allocation can lead to operational disruptions,
highlighting the need for transitional mechanisms and clear procedural guidelines when
restructuring prosecution systems.
The fourth conclusion concerns ensuring accountability and avoiding politicization.
One of the most contentious aspects of specialized prosecution is the risk of political
interference or perceived bias in high-profile cases. The abolition of the Office of the
Special Prosecution in Slovakia was partly justified on the grounds that it had become too
autonomous and lacked sufficient oversight. However, critics argued that its dissolution
was politically motivated, aiming to reduce scrutiny over corruption cases linked to high-
level officials. This raises a broader issue of how specialized prosecution offices can be
designed to ensure both independence and accountability. Possible solutions include
clear procedural safeguards, such as judicial review of prosecutorial decisions as well
as transparent appointment and removal processes for specialized prosecutors, ensuring
that changes in government do not lead to politically motivated dismissals. We can also

Laws 2025,14, 25 21 of 23
mention external oversight mechanisms, such as parliamentary committees or independent
review bodies, to monitor the performance and impartiality of specialized prosecution
offices (Sheptycki 2017).
Finally, the fifth lesson addresses international commitments and comparative per-
spectives. The Slovak case also underscores the relevance of international legal obligations
in shaping national prosecution structures. Many international conventions, including
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and EU directives on financial crime,
emphasize the importance of specialized prosecution mechanisms. While these instruments
do not prescribe a single model for specialized prosecution, they establish principles that
member states must respect, including effectiveness, independence, and adequate resourc-
ing (Ritleng 2016). Comparative experiences show that different countries have adopted
diverse models to meet these obligations. The key takeaway is that specialization can take
different forms, but its success depends on a combination of legal guarantees, operational
effectiveness, and institutional credibility.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, B.Š.; methodology, L.K. and B.Š.; validation, L.K. and
B.Š.; formal analysis, L.K. and B.Š.; investigation, L.K. and B.Š.; resources, B.Š.; data curation, L.K.;
writing—original draft preparation, B.Š.; writing—review and editing, L.K. and B.Š.; visualization,
B.Š.; supervision, L.K.; project administration, L.K.; funding acquisition, L.K. All authors have read
and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: The paper was elaborated as a part of the research project VEGA No. 1/0100/24 ‘Imple-
mentation of European Crimes into the Legal Order of the Slovak Republic’ [‘Zavedenie európskych
trestných ˇcinov do právneho poriadku Slovenskej republiky’]. The funding was awarded to the Matej
Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovak Republic.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is
not applicable to this article.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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