No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Injustices and Insecurities: Victimhood in Rodrigo Duterte's Populist Script of Philippine Foreign Policy
Abstract
Philippine foreign policy under Rodrigo Duterte is notorious for its abrupt pivot to China and the unraveling of the country's longstanding alliance with the United States. His pronouncements have vividly reflected these to rationalize significant foreign policy recalibrations. It is from this understanding that this article seeks to explore the specific discourses that he has promoted in relation to China and the United States in pursuit of a coherent foreign policy logic for his administration. This article introduces victimhood as a framework to analyze Duterte's salient policy discourses and explores how these discourses influenced his administration's foreign policy behavior and informed his unique populist leadership. By invoking a discourse of suffering from past and present injustices, along with perceived insecurities arising from shifting power dynamics between the two major powers, Duterte constructed and internalized a victim identity for the Philippines, which has profoundly influenced the country's external relations during his tenure.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Right-wing populists often mobilize popular support by employing a people-versus-elite dichotomy in which they cast ‘the people’ as the underdog, or by ‘performing’ crisis to discredit the elite. Such ‘underdogism’, and the reliance on crisis more broadly, remains an effective strategy for as long as populists are in opposition. But what happens when populists gain power? One would expect that they would not be able to exploit their position as effectively and their appeal would weaken drastically. In certain cases, however, they still manage to sustain the underdog illusion. This article argues that memory politics are an important locus for populists to maintain their underdog rhetoric, and within that field the performance of victimhood is key. Building on theories about the performance of crisis and recent trends in research on memory politics in Central Europe, we propose a framework for understanding how governing right-wing populists justify vindictive policies and thus try to cement their power.
To the surprise of many, populist leader Rodrigo Duterte instigated major shifts in Philippine foreign policy. His antagonism against the United States and European Union, fascination towards the revisionist Russia and China, and disdain for international law and institutions were viewed as significant departures from the nation's orthodox stances. Drawing on Moffitt and Tormey's conception of populism as a political style, and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde's securitization theory, we develop and test the populist securitization framework in the context of Duterte's foreign policy-making. We argue that populist performances are securitizing acts comprised of distinctly populist performative repertoires used by political leaders to frame and execute an ‘anti-establishment’ foreign policy with sufficient level of audience consent. Using discursive interpretative analysis, we examine the impacts of Duterte's populist securitization of the liberal West as a threat to Philippine sovereignty. We find that while populist performances function as securitizing acts that can reorient established foreign policy positions and biases, such performances lead to uncertainty and erosion of credibility amid institutional fragmentation and domestic political distractions. Thus, the sustainability of populist performances on foreign policy depends on reconciling the tensions and overlaps between the populist leader's varying audiences and their mass constituencies.
This article introduces the concept of “hijacked victimhood” as a form of strategically leveraging victimhood narratives. It is a subset of strategic victimhood, which is a relatively common communicative strategy whereby groups claim victimhood status in contests over power and legitimacy. Political leaders who use the strategy of hijacked victimhood present dominant groups as in danger, as current or future victims, and in need of protection (especially by the crafter of the narrative) from oppressive forces consisting of—or indirectly representing—marginalized and subaltern groups. In the process, leaders hijacking victimhood blunt the rights-based claims of such groups. Analyzing Viktor Orbán’s and Donald Trump’s elite rhetoric in Hungary and the United States, respectively, we inductively document varieties of hijacked victimhood in their political communication, showing how Orbán leverages historical suffering and resistance while Trump constructs economic and value-based harms for dominant groups. Making both conceptual and empirical contributions, we argue that at the heart of hijacked victimhood is a reversal of the victimizer–victim dichotomy, a new portrayal of moral orders, a teleological ordering of past and future harms, and a mobilization of security threats—all used to preserve or expand a dominant group’s power.
This article contributes a new layer to the existing analyses of Duterte's foreign policy by arguing that he epitomized a transactionalist approach to Philippine foreign policy. This approach favored bilateral to multilateral relations, focused on short-term wins rather than long-term foresight, adhered to a zero-sum worldview, rejected value-based policymaking, and did not follow a grand strategy. Most of these qualities have been apparent in Duterte's relationship with China, Russia, and the United States but became even more prominent during the COVID-19 crisis. The analysis revealed that Duterte's transactionalist foreign policy rhymed with his domestic politics, and his obsession with winning now resulted in contradictions in his foreign policy, indicating a lack of a grand strategy that informed his decision-making. This article contributes a real-world case of a transactionalist foreign policy while considering whether it would persist in future policymaking in the Philippines.
Who speaks for ‘the people’? Populists across the globe have mobilised this question to attack liberal institutions, political opponents, and the democratic process itself, communicating a political reality in which globalist elites have allegedly betrayed the sovereign will of the popular community. The recent ‘surge’ (Mudde, 2016) or ‘wave’ (Aslanidis, 2016) of populism around the world has encompassed electorally successful right-wing populist leaders in the Northern Hemisphere such as Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Marine Le Pen, Jaroslav Kaczynski, Recyp Erdogan, and Victor Orbán, who have advanced nationalist, exclusionary, protectionist and Eurosceptic political agendas. In parallel, left-wing populists in Greece, Spain and Bolivia have attracted voters disillusioned with neoliberal economic policies and existing representational mechanisms of liberal democracy with anti-elitist and anti-globalist platforms. In the Southern Hemisphere, Narendra Modi, Jair Bolsonaro and Yoweri Museveni are oft-cited examples of contemporary populist leaders who have enjoyed continued electoral success with agendas promoting ethnocultural and religious-Nationalist slogans in post-colonial contexts. Prior analyses of these populists’ electoral success and political leadership have usually focused on the ideas, ideologies and strategies populism encompasses, especially in the domestic political arena.
This paper offers a theory of incremental theoretical evolution connecting the practice of international politics with disciplinary IR. It theorizes how international political actors engaged in strategic local decision-making exert productive power over dominant scientific ontologies of the international system. We refer to the narratives emerging from these processes as strategic ontologies, defined as gradual reformulations of the subjects, objects, and relational logics of the international system according to positionally determined priorities. As strategic ontologies gain acceptance, their innovations endure beyond the context of their utterance, leading to meso-level theoretical evolution. We substantiate this account with comparative case studies of contested strategic ontologies that have yet to become dominant in either the international arena or IR theory. Without strategic ontology as an analytical lens, scholarship might miss embryonic theoretical innovations in the process of gaining traction. First, we examine how Israel and West Germany engaged in strategic ontological contestation when negotiating a reparations agreement following the Holocaust. Second, we analyze how states have used vulnerability in climate negotiations in 2020–2021 to recast global policy priorities. Recognition of strategic ontologies across contexts illuminates theoretical innovations in real-time and opens a path for dynamic new bridges between the academy and policymaking.
Narratives of wartime suffering, communist evils, and maltreatment by the ‘West’ have started featuring prominently in the political discourse across eastern Europe in the past decade and half. Permeating the public sphere, such narratives imply complex victimhood and often gain a hegemonic status. Why have such victimhood narratives become so pervasive? And what has been their purpose across eastern Europe? This interdisciplinary article provides a conceptual and empirical explanation of how hegemonic narratives of victimhood have been used to enhance ontological security and as an instrument of power-seeking political leaders, especially (but not exclusively) right-wing populists. It shows that although the local attachment to memory and history is often portrayed as irrational, victimhood as a narrative has clear benefits regarding national ontological security as the self-understanding of a state and a tool to justify policies. Using concrete examples, the articles identify three main sub-narratives of direct, historical and structural victimhood linked to World War II, communism and the precarious relationship with the ‘West’, arguing that the combination of historical traumas and the post-1989 transformations explain the pan-regional proliferation of victimhood.
What is the basis of status in world order? Status is assumed to come from strength, even if strength is reconfigured to be social and normative, not just material. Status, however, can also come from perceived weakness – it is conferred to those recognised as ‘victims’. We make four theoretical contributions to the scholarship on status in world affairs. First, we examine how the category of victim is produced. Two, we expand the possible sources of status in world affairs by adding the category of victim. Three, focus on victimhood status further demonstrates that status is independent of material power. Lastly, victimhood as status exhibits the paradox that power depends on perceived powerlessness. We illustrate these arguments with three features of victim status in modern international politics: the changing desirability of victim status in Israel, the gendered construction of ideal victim in the Congo, and the hierarchy of victimhood in Bosnia.
This article explores how notions of conservative populism animate Turkish foreign policy. It explicates the construction of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in conservative populism and how it became the dominant or hegemonic discourse of the AKP regime. While demonstrating various aspects of the peculiar conservative populism, the paper will try to point out the specific governmental ethos that conservative populism generates in the case of the AKP. By emphasizing how conservative populism is intermingled with Turkish-Islamist ideology, the paper explores the background of the AKP’s pro-active and assertive foreign policy as well as the devastating effects of the de-institutionalization of the bureaucratic state structure and decision-making mechanisms.
Populists in power often resort to the politicisation of foreign policy to generate domestic support. This article explores this process. First, it conceptualises populist politicisation of foreign policy. Second, it develops expectations on how such politicisation will take place: the distinctive features of populism (the intensity of populist discourse, the relative weight of anti-elitism and people-centrism, and a transnational understanding of the ‘people’ or the ‘elite’) will have an impact on how foreign policy is politicised. The empirical analysis focuses on selected public speeches and tweets by two populist leaders from the Global South: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Narendra Modi. The analysis reveals huge differences: the more populist Erdoğan emphasises anti-elitism and extensively resorts to the politicisation of Turkish foreign policy by constructing foreign threats. Modi is less populist and his discourse emphasises people-centrism; as expected, he only marginally politicises foreign policy, highlighting the greatness of the Indian nation.
After five years of pursuing a policy of appeasement towards China, the Philippines is incrementally and reluctantly shifting to “limited hard balancing.” The goal is to constrain China's revisionist agenda in the South China Sea. This strategy entails building up the Philippine military's territorial defence capabilities, maintaining its alliance with the U.S., and forging security partnerships with other middle power like South Korean, Japan, and Australia. During his six-year term, the late President Benigno Aquino III stood up to China's expansive claim in the South China Sea. When Rodrigo Roa Duterte assumed the presidency in June 2016, he unravelled his predecessor's balancing policy towards China. Nonetheless, recent developments such as the People's Liberation Army Navy's hostile moves against the Armed Forces of the Philippines units on Philippine-occupied islands in the South China Sea and the delays in the promised Chinese public investments in the country prompted the Duterte Administration to review the appeasement approach and to mull over on a limited hard balancing policy. In conclusion, this article contends that the Duterte Administration is at the crossroads, figuring out if it will continue its appeasement stance or adopt a limited hard balancing policy towards China.
Hedging is one of the more commonly used but least studied concepts in international relations. This essay conceptualizes hedging and operationalizes it to the alignment choices of Southeast Asian smaller states. I define hedging as insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-à-vis competing powers to have a fallback position. I argue that while Washington and Beijing understandably dislike small-state hedging, they both overlook that it is the uncertainties stemming from their actions that push the weak to hedge. As uncertainties deepen, the non-great powers in Southeast Asia—as elsewhere—are compelled to hedge one way or another, even as the space to hedge is shrinking. Hedging is not a panacea and it entails its own problems. But acting out of their survival instincts, smaller states opt to hedge for as long as conditions compel. Unless US–China rivalry escalates into a direct conflict, or unless strategic certainty prevails, e.g., if Washington retreats or reduces its long-term commitment to Asia—raising certainty about the absence of a reliable aligned support—then states will stop hedging and start bandwagoning with China; or if Beijing’s actions directly threaten most actors on all major fronts—heightening certainty about an imminent, across-the-board danger—then hedging will be replaced by balancing against China. Short of that, hedging is likely to persist, making ambiguities a defining theme of our time.
This article examines how communicative practices, emotion, and everyday experiences of insecurity interlink in processes of populist political mobilization. Combining insights from international security studies, political psychology, and populism research, it demonstrates how populist political agents from the right of the political spectrum have constructed a powerful security imaginary around the loss of past national greatness that creates affinities with the experiences of those who feel disempowered and ties existential anxieties to concerns with immigration, globalization, and integration. As we show, within the populist security imaginary, humiliation is the key discursive mechanism that helps turn abstract notions of enmity into politically consequential affective narratives of loss, betrayal, and oppression. Humiliation binds together an ostensibly conflicting sense of national greatness and victimhood to achieve an emotive response that enables a radical departure from established domestic and international policy norms and problematizes policy choices centered on collaboration, dialogue, and peaceful conflict resolution.
Cet article examine la mesure dans laquelle les pratiques de communication, l’émotion et les expériences quotidiennes d'insécurité sont liées aux processus de mobilisation politique des populistes. Il allie des renseignements issus d’études internationales sur la sécurité, de la psychologie politique et de recherches sur le populisme pour montrer la manière dont les agents politiques populistes de droite ont construit un puissant imaginaire de la sécurité autour de la perte de la grandeur nationale passée. Cet imaginaire crée des affinités avec les expériences des personnes qui se sentent mises à l’écart et associe les anxiétés existentielles à des préoccupations liées à l'immigration, à la mondialisation et à l'intégration. Comme nous le montrons, dans l'imaginaire populiste de la sécurité, l'humiliation est le mécanisme discursif clé qui permet de transformer des notions abstraites d'inimitié en récits de perte, de trahison et d'oppression qui font appel à l'affectif et ont des conséquences politiques. Cette humiliation associe deux sentiments ostensiblement contradictoires, celui de grandeur nationale et celui d’être victime, qui amènent à une réaction émotive conduisant à s’éloigner radicalement des normes politiques nationales et internationales établies tout en trouvant problématiques les choix politiques centrés sur la collaboration, le dialogue et la résolution pacifique des conflits.
Este artículo investiga de qué manera las prácticas comunicativas, las emociones y las experiencias cotidianas de inseguridad se conectan con los procesos de movilizaciones políticas populistas. Combinando los conocimientos de los estudios de seguridad internacional, la psicología política y la investigación del populismo, demuestra cómo los agentes políticos populistas de la derecha del espectro político han construido un imaginario de seguridad poderoso en torno a la pérdida de la grandeza nacional pasada, el cual crea afinidad con las experiencias de aquellas personas que sienten que carecen de poder y relaciona las ansiedades existenciales con las preocupaciones por la inmigración, la globalización y la integración. Tal como lo presentamos, dentro del imaginario de seguridad populista, la humillación es el mecanismo discursivo clave que ayuda a convertir las nociones abstractas de la enemistad en discursos afectivos de derrotas, traiciones y opresiones que son relevantes en términos políticos. La humillación une un sentido ostensiblemente opuesto de grandeza nacional y victimismo para lograr una respuesta emotiva que permita la divergencia radical de las normas políticas nacionales e internacionales establecidas y problematiza las elecciones políticas centradas en la colaboración, el diálogo y la resolución pacífica de conflictos.
This article examines recent interest in hedging as a feature of international politics in the Asia Pacific. Focusing on the small states of Southeast Asia, we argue that dominant understandings of hedging are misguided for two reasons. Despite significant advances in the literature, hedging has remained a vague concept rendering it a residual category of foreign policy behavior. Moreover, current accounts of hedging tend to overstate the strategic intentions of ostensible hedgers. This article proposes that a better understanding of Southeast Asia's foreign policy behavior needs to dissociate hedging from neorealist concepts of international politics. Instead, we locate the concept in the context of classical realism and the diplomatic practice of second-tier states. Exploring Southeast Asia's engagement with more powerful actors from this perspective reveals the strategic limitations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the dilemma that Southeast Asian Nations and the dilemma that Southeast Asian states face from a rising China challenging the status quo in the western Pacific.
This article explores historical victimhood as a feature of contemporary populist discourse. It is about how populist leaders invoke meta-history to make self-victimising claims as a means for consolidating power. I argue that historical victimhood propagates a forked historical consciousness – a view of history as a series of junctures where good fought evil – that enables the projection of alleged victimhood into the past and the future, while the present is portrayed as a regenerating fateful choice between humiliation and a promised golden age. I focus on the cases of the United States and Turkey and examine two key speeches delivered by presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2017. My case-study approach aims to show how the same narrative form of historical victimhood, with its temporal logic and imaginary, latches on widely different contexts and political cultures with the effect of conflating the leader with the people, solidifying divisions in society, and threatening opponents.
Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippines' 2016 presidential elections thanks to a well-orchestrated campaign and his populist appeal among Filipinos. Soon after he assumed the presidency, he surprised and upset most of his domestic and western international audiences by pragmatically rejecting the pro-Western approach followed by the previous Aquino administration and adopting a China-friendly one. Adopting Critical Discourse Analysis, this research reveals President Duterte's bicephalous leadership: populist in domestic policies, and pragmatic but unpopular in foreign relations. To qualitatively describe the dichotomy between the populist and pragmatic nature of Duterte's leadership, this article surveys the Philippines' mainstream media from 2016 to 2019. Furthermore, this analysis shows that Duterte is using a defensive neorealist approach in building Philippines-China relations and that Filipinos are willing to consider China as a constructive partner for their country.
Contemporary populist movements have inspired political pundits in various contexts to opine on the resurgence of victimhood culture, in which groups demonstrate heightened sensitivity to slights and attempt to evoke sympathy from third parties to their conflicts. Although reference to victimhood’s politics oftentimes surfaces examples of egregious microaggressions, when victimhood claims are scaled up to the realm of nationalisms, oftentimes so too are their consequences. Current literature on victimhood in international politics, though, lacks a unifying theorisation suitable for the comparative analysis of victimhood nationalisms as important identities in the international arena. This gap prevents scholarship from investigating how the severity of perceived or real suffering relates to the formation of victimhood, as well as how victimhood nationalisms legitimize the projection of grievances onto third parties, potentially sowing new conflicts. This article theorises victimhood nationalism as a powerful identity narrative with two key constitutive elements. First, drawing on the narrative identity approach, it outlines how victimhood nationalisms are constructed via narrations of perceived or real collective trauma. Second, it argues that victimhood nationalist narratives, unlike other narratives of collective trauma, break down the idealized victim–perpetrator relationship and project grievances onto otherwise uninvolved international actors, including other nation-states. The article concludes by offering comparative case studies of Slobodan Milošević’s and David Ben-Gurion’s respective invocations of victimhood nationalism to illustrate the empirical applicability of this theorization, as well as victimhood nationalism’s importance in international politics across time and space.
Students of Armenia's foreign policy have broadly treated the troubled relations with neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey as an unsurprising consequence of the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is taken for granted that the volatile geopolitics of the South Caucasus region is the core rationale behind the perpetual confrontations and hostilities (Melander, 2001; Shaffer, 2009). However, this line of thinking tends to overlook the ideational landscape of the turbulence. This article argues that modern Armenia's political identity has been characterized by an acute sense of 'victimhood' arising from the memory of the Armenian Genocide, and that Turkey plays an important role as an 'Other', which enhances Armenia's self-image as a 'victim'. It suggests that negative images of Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan are deeply embedded, rather than being a product of manipulation. Yet the ruling elite has consistently appealed to the enemy images in attempts to assert Armenia's 'victimhood', divert attention from complex problems and legitimate its power by presenting country's plight as 'structurally inevitable' in its 'dog-eat-dog' neighborhood. Furthermore, it argues that Armenia's self-image of a 'victim' has significantly affected the treatment of Russia as an indispensable security ally.
This article argues that the concept of "hedging" should be understood in the context of the "balancing-bandwagoning" spectrum within the "bal-ance of power" theory, in which hedging is located between balancing and bandwagoning as the state's third strategic choice. Although polarity-unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar-largely determines the likelihood of hedging behavior, during a period of power shift, strategic uncertainty emerges. States, particularly secondary powers, attempt to calculate the risk of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging, adopting an optimal strategy. To identify states' strategic behavior, it is important to first examine their economic and military capabilities, and if these indicators are not decisive enough to identify balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging behavior , diplomatic factors should be taken into account, although those are a relatively weaker indicator. The use of this conceptual framework reveals that Japan's foreign policy behavior has not involved "hedging" vis-à-vis China; instead, Japan's behavior is consistently associated with "balancing" against the risks of China's rise. In addition, while Japan's behavior vis-à-vis the United States is considered to be bandwagoning, Japan made political efforts to strengthen its own military capabilities-internal balancing-which began in the 2010s when Japan relaxed its political constraints on use of its military. This behavior also aimed both to illustrate Japan's efforts related to alliance burden-sharing and to enhance its external balancing with the United States. Yet, the periods from 1997 to 2005 and from 2010 on represent an aberration because Japan engaged one type of hedging-security hedging-vis-à-vis the risk of US commitment reduction to East Asia. In this sense, while concurring with the realists' argument that Japan's current behavior is characterized as balancing, the argument differs from that of realists who believe that Japan's policy shift to balancing toward China only began with China's rise in the late 2000s or 2010s.
This article examines the shifts in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte Administration, and how these changes impact 21st century Philippine–US alliance. Unlike the Aquino Administration that challenged China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, the Duterte Administration keeps silent on this maritime dispute in exchange for Chinese trade concessions, aid, and investments. President Duterte fosters closer economic and diplomatic relations with China and distances the Philippines from the US Specifically, he seeks China’s assistance for the building of drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents, soft loans for the construction of railways in Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In consideration of this largess, President Duterte has degraded the country’s strategic security ties with the US by terminating the joint Philippine–US naval patrols in the South China Sea, and limiting the scope and number of US military interactions with the AFP. These moves, which are a dramatic departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of maintaining close security ties with the US, have strained the Philippine–US alliance. This article addresses this central question: How do the foreign policy changes under the Duterte Administration adversely impact the Philippine–US alliance? It also raises the following questions: (1) What are the foreign policy goals of the Duterte Administration? (2) How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? (3) In what ways does the pursuit of these goals affect Philippine–US alliance? (4) What is the future of Philippine–US alliance in the light of the Duterte Administration’s shifting foreign policy goals?
Domestic politics has played an important role in in the dramatic shifts in Philippine policy toward the United States and China, particularly as the South China Sea disputes have intensified. The Arroyo administration attempted to reduce dependency on the United States by engaging China and adopting an equibalancing policy while the subsequent Aquino administration abandoned equibalancing in favor of aligning with the United States against an increasingly assertive China. Today, President Duterte has expressed an intent to separate from the United States and move closer to China in pursuit of a more “independent” foreign policy. Duterte’s rapid consolidation of political power has strengthened his ability to chart the course of Philippine foreign policy, but domestic opposition and potential threats from China could undermine or reverse his course.
From 2010 to 2016, then-President Benigno Aquino balanced China’s expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea. President Aquino challenged China by shifting the AFP’s focus from domestic security to territorial defence, bolstering closer Philippine–US security relations, acquiring American military equipment, seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT), and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. However, the Duterte administration is unravelling its predecessor’s balancing agenda by distancing itself from the United States and gravitating closer to China, despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) July 12 2016 award to the Philippines. President Duterte’s foreign policy is directed at reviving the equi-balancing policy on China, in contrast to then-President Aquino’s balancing strategy. This is best exemplified by his efforts to harness China for several major infrastructure and investments projects in the Philippines and to resort to bilateral negotiations with Beijing. The present article argues that instead of relying on the US, President Duterte is fostering closer security partnership with Japan to equi-balance an emergent China. © 2016, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. All rights reserved.
Early in his administration, Rodrigo Duterte, the controversial sixteenth president of the Philippines, did what no other Filipino president has done before – announce a separation from the geopolitical interests of its former colonial master, the United States of America. Beyond the personal slights caused by the US criticism of his anti-drug campaign lies a deeper sense of historical grievance that has been ingrained in Duterte's generation and his identity as a Mindanaoan. Not only does he represent Mindanao's resentment towards " imperial Manila, " but also a historical blowback against " US imperialism. " Duterte's nationalist exhortations can be traced to the cycle of regime narratives in the Philippines, which serves as a medium for institutional continuity and change through the mobilisation of ideas at a discursive level. By reviving the anti-US nationalism of his youth, Duterte is repudiating the liberal reformist, albeit elitist, narrative of the Aquino-to-Aquino regimes. Duterte's so-called " pivot to China " is also a dramatic reversal of his predecessors' strong anti-China and rabidly pro-American foreign policy position. This paper blends Vivien A. Schmidt's discursive institutional analytical framework with Stephen Skowronek's concept of presidential leadership in political time to analyse how crafted narratives are transformed into governance scripts that bind together a coalition of interests within a particular institutional setting. Manuscript
What Aquino had started was now left for Duterte to
pursue. In addition to this legal manoeuvre, and a major campaign to
draw international support for it, Aquino sought greater involvement
by the United States through an Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) that allows for the rotational presence of US
troops and the construction of support facilities in selected Philippine
defence facilities. Not surprisingly, China has said that it will reject
any ruling from the arbitration panel — whose jurisdiction it refuses
to accept — and has accused the United States (and other countries
such as Japan) of “meddling” in the dispute.
This leaves President Duterte with two major foreign policy
challenges: how to manage relations with China, now that the
arbitration ruling has been announced; and defining what role the
Philippines’ security alliance with the United States should play as
the next chapter unfolds in the South China Sea dispute.
Inter-group competitive victimhood (CV) describes the efforts of members of groups involved in violent conflicts to establish that their group has suffered more than their adversarial group. Such efforts contribute to conflicts’ escalation and impede their peaceful resolution. CV stems from groups’ general tendency to compete with each other, along with the deep sense of victimization resulting from conflicts. The authors point to biases that contribute to groups’ engagement in CV, describe five dimensions of victimhood over which groups may compete, and contend that such competition serves various functions that contribute to the maintenance of conflicts. Drawing on the Needs-Based Model, they suggest that CV may reflect groups’
motivations to restore power or moral acceptance. They then review evidence of the negative consequences of CV for inter-group forgiveness and suggest potential strategies to reduce CV. Finally, the authors discuss potential moderators and directions for future research.
Recent International Relations scholarships and policy publications have used the term “hedging” as an alternative to “balancing” and “bandwagoning” in describing small states’ strategies towards a rising power. In the case of Southeast Asian countries’ responses to a reemerging China, more and more analysts have asserted that none of the smaller states are pursuing balancing or bandwagoning in the strict sense of the terms, and that the states are in fact adopting a “middle” position that is best described as “hedging”. This paper seeks to assess this assertion by performing three principal tasks. First, it attempts to identify the key defining attributes and functions of hedging as a strategy that is distinguishable from pure forms of balancing and bandwagoning. Second, it aims to operationalize the term within the context of Southeast Asia-China relations, by focusing on the cases of Malaysia and Singapore’s response to China in the post-Cold War era. Third and finally, the study explains why these two states have chosen to hedge in the way they do. The central argument of the essay is that the substance of the two smaller states’ policies are not determined by their concerns over the growth of China’s relative power per se; rather, it is a function of regime legitimation through which the ruling elite seek to capitalize on the dynamics of the rising power for the ultimate goal of justifying their own political authority at home.
Recent International Relations scholarships and policy publications have used the term “hedging” as an alternative to “balancing” and “bandwagoning” in describing small states’ strategies towards a rising power. In the case of Southeast Asian countries’ responses to a reemerging China, more and more analysts have asserted that none of the smaller states are pursuing balancing or bandwagoning in the strict sense of the terms, and that the states are in fact adopting a “middle” position that is best described as “hedging”. This paper seeks to assess this assertion by performing three principal tasks. First, it attempts to identify the key defining attributes and functions of hedging as a strategy that is distinguishable from pure forms of balancing and bandwagoning. Second, it aims to operationalize the term within the context of Southeast Asia-China relations, by focusing on the cases of Malaysia and Singapore’s response to China in the post-Cold War era. Third and finally, the study explains why these two states have chosen to hedge in the way they do. The central argument of the essay is that the substance of the two smaller states’ policies are not determined by their concerns over the growth of China’s relative power per se; rather, it is a function of regime legitimation through which the ruling elite seek to capitalize on the dynamics of the rising power for the ultimate goal of justifying their own political authority at home.
We start our chapter by introducing the notions of 'critique', 'ideology', and 'power'. These three concepts are constitutive for every approach in CDA, albeit frequently employed with different meanings. Therefore, it is important to clarify how they are conceptualised in the DHA. We then proceed with the delineation of other terms significant for our purposes, such as 'discourse', 'genre', 'text' 'recontextualization', 'intertextuality', and 'interdiscursivity'. Section 2 summarises some analytical tools and general principles of the DHA. In section 3, we illustrate our methodology step by step by focussing on 'discourses about climate change'. In the final section we discuss the strengths and limitations of the DHA and point to future challenges for the field.
This contribution explores the rhetoric of populist governments in their diplomatic interactions. We ask if and to what extent populist governments adopt a more aggressive rhetoric with key international partners and adversaries. In theoretical terms, there are reasons to expect populist governments to adopt a more confrontational way of communication: populists claim to embody the popular will and might therefore be less amenable to compromise. Moreover, populism goes along with a Manichean, highly moralistic worldview. Such black-and-white understanding of politics might lead to a harsher approach vis-à-vis competitors and enemies. Our findings are based on a qualitative content analysis of official statements and speeches by representatives of non-populist vs. populist governments in four country cases (India, Italy, the Philippines, and Turkey). For each country case, we assessed whether the shift to a populist government led to a less cooperative rhetoric in their approach to three important international partners or adversaries. In several cases, the shift to a populist government led to the expected adoption of a more confrontational rhetoric. Some exceptions, however, suggest that the expected effect of populism will fade if domestic voter salience of foreign policy is low. Moreover, in some cases, populist governments became much friendlier in their interaction with another populist government.
A long-awaited and critical review of a key topic, this book shows how different empirical approaches to the study of social representations are viable and can be complementary. Empirical examples of the analysis of particular social representations - from museums to new technology - are included. The ten chapters in the first half of the book present the key arguments concerning the relationship between the theory and methods. The second half looks at a wide variety of research topics. Of central concern to all the topics are the circumstances under which one can be certain of having described a social representation. The answer lies in the use of multivariate statistical analysis, the use of which is clearly explained.
During the Duterte presidency from June 2016 to June 2022, the government of the Philippines limited its affinity with the United States and pursued an ostensibly pro-China policy. This bold move took place amid the ongoing US–China rivalry. This paper carries out a retrospective examination of Duterte's China policy from the perspective of Philippine domestic politics. Specifically, we assess the international relations literature on hedging as a foreign policy strategy and argue that domestic factors play a major role in filtering systemic influences and leaving state leaders with sufficient room for strategic discretion and maneuvering. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, where strong presidentialism gives clout to the president in foreign policy development. We argue that much of the “audacious” behavior in the foreign policy of the Duterte government can simultaneously be understood as pragmatic, as it was believed to better serve the regime's short-term goals. While the alliance with the United States remained largely intact, the Duterte government emphasized its success in stabilizing Sino–Philippine relations.
Despite a rise in Chinese public diplomacy efforts in the Philippines, Filipino perceptions of China have mainly remained negative during the Duterte period. This article examines why and how China’s public diplomacy efforts have primarily failed despite President Duterte’s pro-China position. It draws on constructivist approaches to demonstrate how national identity mediates the impact of Chinese influence. In particular, Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea, and an influx of China-based offshore gaming businesses in the country, have elicited a strong nationalist response from Filipinos, perpetuating perceptions of China as untrustworthy and threatening. Evidence is drawn to determine correlation between an increase in Chinese public diplomacy and a decrease in public trust towards China. This is followed by process-tracing how national identity dampens any positive effect Chinese public diplomacy may have on Philippine attitudes towards China.
In this article, I combine literature on gender populism and international migration to critically examine Duterte’s populist style towards migrant Filipinos and propose several possible reasons why they have given him immense support. The article utilizes Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis (FCDA) to examine texts surrounding Duterte’s much-publicized kiss of a migrant Filipino woman illustrating how his brand of populism reconfigures the state’s paternalistic- hypermasculine stance towards Filipino women migrants. He does this by positioning himself as a ‘protective and angry father,’ ‘the Filipino everyman,’ and ‘a ladies’ man,’ thereby normalizing and trivializing the controversial act. I interpret these gendered tropes as characteristic of Duterte’s personalistic rhetoric and practices, adding a layer to the usual techno-bureaucratic state language strategically used to govern migrant Filipinos. In doing so, I aim to expand understandings of Duterte’s leadership and populist politics and to add to research grounding gender populism within the context of a non-European migrant-sending state. In unraveling his rhetorical style, I hope that resistant discourses emerge to challenge similar practices in the future.
In The Sovereign Trickster Vicente L. Rafael offers a prismatic view of the age of Rodrigo Duterte in the contemporary Philippines. Framing Duterte as a trickster figure who boasts, jokes, terrorizes, plays the victim, and instills terror, Rafael weaves together topics ranging from the drug war, policing, and extrajudicial killings to neoliberal citizenship, intimacy, and photojournalism. He is less concerned with defining Duterte as a fascist, populist, warlord, and traditional politician than he is with examining what Duterte does: how he rules, the rhetoric of his humor, his use of obscenity to stoke fear, and his projection of masculinity and misogyny. Locating Duterte's rise within the context of counterinsurgency, neoliberalism, and the history of electoral violence, while drawing on Foucault’s biopower and Mbembe’s necropolitics, Rafael outlines how Duterte weaponizes death to control life. By diagnosing the symptoms of the authoritarian imaginary as it circulates in the Philippines, Rafael provides a complex account of Duterte’s regime and the social conditions that allow him to enjoy continued support.
The ongoing shifts in the global distribution of material and normative powers, particularly between the United States and China, have significant repercussions on the foreign policy strategies of smaller, weaker actors in the international system. Due to their limited capacity for dictating international politics in ways that could guarantee their survival, many in IR have argued that they usually prefer to operate within the prevailing status quo rather than attempting to revise it. Nevertheless, the Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, seems to disprove this observation by dramatically pivoting towards Beijing and away from Washington, at least rhetorically. This paper moves beyond the commonly cited systemic factors and domestic intervening variables affecting the states’ foreign policies by examining the neglected emotions and emotional beliefs that help shape these instruments. My investigation of these unseen, albeit existing mechanisms, reveals the centrality of Duterte’s emotionally constituted and strengthened beliefs in providing a more complete and realistic explanation to his China-centric (as opposed to US-centric) foreign policy stance. As I argue and demonstrate throughout the paper, because emotions and emotional beliefs are powerful engines of human behaviour, they exert enormous influence on any state leader’s foreign policy motivations, decisions, and actions.
In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.
The role of victims is increasingly central to discussions in, and practices of, international criminal law. This increased attentiveness to victims, I argue, is leading to a visual and discursive specification of victimhood. Drawing on criminologist Nils Christie’s theorizing of victimhood, and identifying practices inside and outside the international criminal law courtroom, I discuss the social, political and legal construction of an ‘ideal’ victim. The features of an ‘ideal’ victim of international crime are identified as being: (i) weakness and vulnerability; (ii) dependency and (iii) grotesqueness. The features coalesce into a feminized, infantilized and racialized stereotype of victimhood. I argue that this problematic construction of the ‘ideal’ victim is to be contextualized within the ‘attention economy’. The ‘attention economy’ views attention as a finite and highly in-demand resource that rewards the extreme and spectacular at the expense of the moderate and considered.
This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.
In the contemporary Asia-Pacific context, the fault lines leading to the Thucydides trap can be attributed to the continuing strategic competition between a seemingly declining United States and a rising China. Failure to circumvent this trap can ultimately result in a war of all against all. Against this backdrop, this article investigates how a small power re-evaluates its foreign policy and strategic behaviour using neoclassical realism theory. In particular, I examine President Rodrigo Duterte’s method which is characterized by four key elements: cultivating a more favourable image for China; moderating the country’s American-influenced strategic culture; mobilizing state-society relations supportive of ‘Sinicization’; and reorienting the country’s Western-based institutions to better accommodate Chinese pressures and incentives. Does a China-centric approach give a small power an indispensable strategic capital to successfully navigate and exploit both the challenges and opportunities of the impending new order? Do the Philippines’ shifting rules of engagement under the Duterte administration represent a forward-thinking strategic outlook rather than a defeatist and naïve stance? The article answers these questions by examining the factors and dynamics underpinning the conception and construction of the Duterte method, as well as its implications a vis-a-vis a small power’s foreign policy and strategic behaviour.
en The regional security architecture in Southeast Asia, arguably even within the broader East Asian region, has largely revolved in the last 25 years around the viability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the driving force behind Southeast Asian (and East Asian) regionalism. Multilateral institutional arrangements established since 1994 had the ASEAN states as their core component, and the “ASEAN way” of conducting foreign affairs as their normative guide. These arrangements were seen as being a critical aspect of maintaining peaceful relations in the region in the face of long standing disputes and historical suspicions. This state of affairs, underpinned by ASEAN's ability to provide the basis for managing regional relations, has now begun to unravel with the intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States. Is the ASEAN‐driven multilateral security architecture sustainable in the face of intensifying great power competition?
Abstract
zh 过去25年里, 东南亚的区域安全架构, 甚至是东亚地区的区域安全架构, 都在很大程度上围绕着东南亚国家联盟（简称东盟, ASEAN）的生存能力（Viability）进行展开, 同时作为东南亚以及东亚区域主义背后的驱动力。1994年建立的多边制度安排（Multilateral institutional arrangements）将东盟国家作为核心组成部分, 并将实施外交事务的“东盟方式”（“ASEAN way”）作为规范性指导。这些安排被视为在区域内维持和平关系的重要方面, 以共同面对长期以来的争端和历史上的猜疑。东盟为管理区域关系提供了基础, 加强了外交事务的状态, 其外交事务已开始与中国和美国之间愈演愈烈的战略竞争逐步分离。面对大国竞争的不断加剧, 东盟驱使的多边安全架构还能保持可持续吗？
Much current research on collective victimhood acknowledges the role of rhetoric but does not fully address the implications for micro-level variation in personal expressions of victimhood. The focus has tended to be on individual differences in collective victimhood construals where people may either see their group as the sole possessor of victim status or may incorporate other groups into an inclusive category. Although recent research sees a strategic element in some ‘inclusivity’, we argue that all claims of victimhood are strategic. By using a discursive approach, we show variability in the expression of victimhood and how this accomplishes different activities in conversations. Several focus groups consisting of victims from Northern Ireland were analysed to identify presentations of victimhood and their relation to the unfolding dynamics of the conversation. We demonstrate that presentation of victimhood is an interactional concern, link this to the concept of ‘needs’ and suggest implications this might have.
This commentary aims to take stock of the 2016 presidential elections in the Philippines that led to the landslide victory of the controversial Rodrigo Duterte. It argues that part of Duterte’s electoral success is hinged on his effective deployment of the populist style. Although populism is not new to the Philippines, Duterte exhibits features of contemporary populism that are befitting of an age of communicative abundance. This commentary contrasts Duterte’s political style with other presidential contenders, characterises his relationship with the electorate and concludes by mapping populism’s democratic and anti-democratic tendencies, which may define the quality of democratic practice in the Philippines in the next six years.
It is often useful within the social sciences to rely on personal experiences, or at least take this as our point of departure. So, given the challenge to lecture on the topic “Society and the victim,” I started out with some reflections on my own past history. Had I ever been a victim, and if so, when and how? And I will ask you in this audience to engage in the same exercise. Have you ever been victims? When was that? Where was it? What characterized the situation? How did you react? How did your surroundings react? Maybe I could ask you to scribble down just a few words from your own personal histories as a victim, not for my use, but for your own. Such personal memories might prove valuable during my presentation, and particularly during our later discussions.
What (and who) is a victim? In contemporary violent conflicts, the construction of grievance-based identity is a fundamentally contested process as the lines between victim and perpetrator are blurred by ongoing cycles of belligerence and retribution. As victims are incorporated into broader political campaigns, it becomes nearly impossible to separate the victim from the politics. The ubiquity of victims in international politics is a serious challenge to International Relations theory as categories of victim and perpetrator are generally treated as ‘prior or external to analysis’ instead of as propositions for further inquiry. This article formulates a political theory of victimhood driven by a distinction between victimisation as an act of harm perpetrated against a person or group, and victimhood as a form of collective identity based on that harm. It proposes a sequence of five stages that victims experience from the act of victimisation to the recognition of victim-based identity: (1) structural conduciveness, (2) political consciousness, (3) ideological concurrence, (4) political mobilisation and (5) political recognition. The article explores the stages with concrete examples and offers three main challenges for future research. First, as an identity, victimhood is more prominent in societies that recognise justice. Second, victimhood accompanies struggles for recognition. Third, victim rivalries obfuscate straightforward analysis of victimhood in conflict zones.
Why do hedging strategies appear so pervasive in Asia? This article argues that hedging – not balancing or bandwagoning –
is the central tendency in Asian international relations, offering three different lenses for making sense of this phenomenon,
focusing in particular on the third: power transition theory, mistrust under multipolarity, and complex networks. Each perspective
highlights different factors that explain the incentives for Asian states to hedge, what hedging looks like, and how long
hedging is likely to endure. Power transition theory tells us that hedging is the result of uncertainty about a possible power
transition between the United States and China. Multipolarity points us to uncertainty about the intentions of a growing number
of states. And the logic of complex networks explains hedging as a response to the topology of Asia's complex network structure
– consisting of sensitivity, fluidity, and heterarchy – which makes it difficult for Asian-foreign policy elites to assess
the future consequences of present day commitments.