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Children's Trait Inference and Partner Choice in a Cooperative Game
Child Development
Abstract
A series of experiments conducted in Central Europe (Hungary, Austria) and East Asia (Japan) probed whether 5- to 10-year-old children (n = 436, 213 female) and adults (n = 71, 43 female; all data collected between July 2020 and May 2023) would infer traits and choose partners accordingly, in a novel touchscreen game. The participants observed third-party actions and interactions of animated agents whose behavior varied in prosociality and skill, and subsequently selected whom to play with in potentially cooperative endeavors. Overall, the results indicate (1) that trait inference may not naturally follow from action understanding but relies on learning and experimental task framing, and (2) that by 7 years of age, children begin to capitalize on such inferences in partner choice.
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Choosing adequate partners is essential for cooperation, but how children calibrate their partner choice to specific social challenges is unknown. In two experiments, 4‐ to 7‐year‐olds (N = 189, 49% girls, mostly White, data collection: 03.2021–09.2022) were presented with partners in possession of different positive qualities. Children then recruited partners for hypothetical tasks that differed with respect to the quality necessary for success. Children and the selected partner either worked together toward a common goal or competed against each other. From age 5, children selectively chose individuals in possession of task‐relevant qualities as cooperative partners while avoiding them as competitors. Younger children chose partners indiscriminately. Children thus learn to strategically adjust their partner choice depending on context‐specific task demands and different social goals.
This research examines the proximate evaluative mechanisms underlying prosocial partner choice-based reciprocity. Across four studies we presented 855 university undergraduates (online for course credit) and 76 4- to 6-year-olds (offline at a university laboratory) with vignettes describing prosocial, social and non-social characters, and asked participants about their person preferences in prosocial, social and general contexts. Adults demonstrated sophisticated appraisals, coordinating between relevant trait and contextual cues to make selections. Adults were particularly attentive to prosocial cues in costly conditions, suggesting that they were using dispositional attributions to make their selections. By contrast, children were largely unable to integrate trait and contextual cues in determining their partner preferences, instead displaying valenced preferences for non-social cues, suggesting the use of affective tagging. Together, these studies demonstrate that the mechanisms underlying prosocial, partner choice-based reciprocity are not early emerging and stable but show considerable development over the lifespan.
When facing social exclusion, children seek to strengthen existing social connections and form new ones. This study asked whether they also make strategic choices about the targets of their affiliative goals. Three‐ to six‐year‐olds (N = 69; 36 female; mostly non‐Hispanic White) observed characters acting inclusively or exclusively. All ages viewed excluders more negatively than includers, but only five‐ and six‐year‐olds preferred includers as play partners. Despite easily detecting and remembering exclusion events, younger children expressed no play partner preference. Children's verbal justifications revealed that older children choose partners more carefully and draw on a richer understanding of exclusion. More generally, the initial dissociation between social evaluation and preference formation underscores that these are distinct processes with different developmental trajectories.
When deciding whom to choose for a cooperative interaction, two features of prospective partners are especially relevant: ability to provide benefits, and willingness to provide those benefits. Often, these traits are correlated. But, when ability and willingness are in conflict, people often indicate that they value willingness over ability, even when doing so results in immediate losses. Why would such behavior be favored by natural selection acting at the level of the individual? Across nine experimental studies (seven preregistered) and a mathematical model we explore one way of explaining this costly choice, demonstrating that choosing a willing over an able partner affords one a moral reputation and makes one more likely to be chosen as a cooperation partner. In fact, even people who choose an able over a willing partner for themselves prefer others who choose a willing over an able partner. Crucial to our model, we find that valuing willingness over ability is an honest signal of both higher levels of generosity in an economic game and lower levels of trait Machiavellianism. These findings provide the first extensive exploration of the signaling benefits of partner choice decisions. Furthermore, this work provides one explanation for why we choose those who are willing over those who are able, even at a cost to ourselves: By doing so, we in turn look like good potential partners. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
The ability to consider multiple possibilities forms the basis for a wide variety of human‐unique cognitive capacities. When does this skill develop? Previous studies have narrowly focused on children's ability to prepare for incompatible future outcomes. Here, we investigate this capacity in a causal learning context. Adults (N = 109) and 18‐ to 30‐month olds (N = 104) observed evidence that was consistent with two hypotheses, each occupying a different level of abstraction (individual vs. relational causation). Results suggest that adults and toddlers identified multiple candidate causes for an effect, held these possibilities in mind, and flexibly applied the appropriate hypothesis to inform subsequent inferences. These findings challenge previous suggestions that the ability to consider multiple alternatives does not emerge until much later in development.
Among the many factors that influence our moral judgments, two are especially important: whether the person caused a bad outcome and whether they intended for it to happen. Notably, the weight accorded to these factors in adulthood varies by the type of judgment being made. For punishment decisions, intentions and outcomes carry relatively equal weight; for partner choice decisions (i.e., deciding whether or not to interact with someone again), intentions are weighted much more heavily. These behavioral differences in punishment and partner choice judgments may also reflect more fundamental differences in the cognitive processes supporting these decisions. Exploring how punishment and partner choice emerge in development provides important and unique insight into these processes as they emerge and mature. Here, we explore the developmental emergence of punishment and partner choice decisions in 4- to 9-year-old children. Given the importance of intentions for partner choice decisions-from both theoretical and empirical perspectives-we targeted the sensitivity of these two responses to others' intentions as well as outcomes caused. Our punishment results replicate past work: Young children are more focused on outcomes caused and become increasingly sensitive to intentions with age. In contrast, partner choice judgments exhibit sensitivity to intentions at an earlier age than punishment judgments, manifesting as earlier partner choice in cases of attempted violations. These results reveal distinct developmental trajectories for punishment and partner choice judgments, with implications for our understanding of the processes underlying these two responses as well as the development of moral judgment more broadly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
Human adults use a range of social cues to obtain information about potential partners in cooperative contexts: we prefer partners who are competent, wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules. One factor that carries particular weight is whether a prospective partner is fair. Here we ask whether children share this preference for fair partners and, if so, whether a prospective partner’s past fair behaviour influences children’s behaviour in a cooperative dilemma. Six- to nine-year-olds chose between partners who accepted or rejected resource allocations that were either strongly advantageously unequal, strongly disadvantageously unequal, or equal. They then played a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with their chosen partner. Children overwhelmingly preferred to play with the partner who accepted rather than rejected allocations. Regardless of their partner choice decisions, children tended to defect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, yet expected that their partners would be relatively more cooperative. Finally, children were more likely to cooperate with those they believed would cooperate. Together, these findings shed new light on the links between partner choice, fairness and cooperation in child development.
Like psychology more broadly, developmental psychology has long suffered from a narrow focus on children from WEIRD societies—or those that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic. In this review, we discuss how developmental scientists have sought to correct this bias through two complementary approaches: one centered on detailed, ethnographic investigations of child development within populations (increasing the depth of our understanding) and one focused on larger, multi-site studies that test children on standardized tasks across populations (increasing breadth). We review key papers from each of these approaches, describe how they are currently practiced, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. Next, we highlight exemplary papers from the adult literature that offer useful insights, namely the importance of formal modeling and a greater focus on studying variation at multiple levels of analysis. We end by outlining best practices for future waves of cross-cultural, developmental science. Overall, we argue that a more integrated perspective, combining the strengths of the breadth & depth approaches, can help better elucidate the developmental origins of human behavioral diversity.
In the context of reciprocity, behaving cooperatively only when it enhances one’s reputation is a strategy that brings reputational benefits at minimal cost; however, if other members of society notice an individual employing such a strategy, any accumulated positive reputation may be negated. The present study addresses the development of this social judgement by examining how preschoolers and adults evaluate agents with or without reputational management. We presented Public-only Helpers (cooperative only when they were seen) with Private-only Helpers (cooperative only when they were not seen) or Unconditional Non-Helpers (never cooperative regardless of being seen). Results showed that children less preferred Public-only Helpers presented with Private-only Helpers than with Unconditional Non-Helpers. Adults avoided Public-only Helpers irrespective of compared agents. Our findings indicate that although preschoolers’ evaluations of reputational management are not as salient as those of adults, they less prefer people who provide help to gain personal reputational benefits.
Hamlin et al. found in 2007 that preverbal infants displayed a preference for helpers over hinderers. The robustness of this finding and the conditions under which infant sociomoral evaluation can be elicited has since been debated. Here, we conducted a replication of the original study, in which we tested 14- to 16-month-olds using a familiarization procedure with three-dimensional animated video stimuli. Unlike previous replication attempts, ours uniquely benefited from detailed procedural advice by Hamlin. In contrast with the original results, only 16 out of 32 infants (50%) in our study reached for the helper; thus, we were not able to replicate the findings. A possible reason for this failure is that infants' preference for prosocial agents may not be reliably elicited with the procedure and stimuli adopted. Alternatively, the effect size of infants' preference may be smaller than originally estimated. The study addresses ongoing methodological debates on the replicability of influential findings in infant cognition.
To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there should exist agreement between people in their judgments of others' character. In Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on global character and relevant character traits for a total of 802 observations. Judges disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty but agreed more on hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs about what traits constitute character but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable moral dispositions may not be universal.
Reputational concerns are known to promote cooperation. Individuals regularly act more prosocially when their behavior is observable by others. Here, we investigate 4- and 5-year-old (N = 144) children’s reputational strategies in a competitive group setting. The aim of the current study was to explore whether children’s sharing behavior is affected by the future possibility of being singled out publicly as the most generous or, alternatively, the least generous member of the group. Children were told that they could share stickers with other children and that the picture of either the (1) most generous or (2) least generous donor would be displayed publicly. In both conditions, children shared significantly more than in a control condition. Moreover, 5-year-old, but not 4-year-old children’s sharing was affected more by the possibility of being presented as the most generous than being presented as the least generous member of the group. This study is the first to show that children as young as 4 invest in their future reputation and that by age 5 children flexibly apply different reputational strategies depending on context.
Preschoolers are sensitive to differences in individuals’ access to external resources (e.g., tools) in division of labor tasks. However, little is known about whether children consider differences in individuals’ internal resources (e.g., abilities) and whether children can flexibly allocate roles across different goal contexts. Critically, factors that are relevant to role allocation in collaborative contexts may be irrelevant in competitive and prosocial ones. In three preregistered experiments, we found that 4- and 5-year-olds (mean: 54 months; range: 42–66 months; N = 132) used age differences to infer relative ability and appropriately allocate the harder and easier of two tasks in a dyadic cooperative interaction (Experiment 1), and appropriately ignored relative ability in competitive (Experiment 2) and prosocial (Experiment 3) contexts, instead assigning others the harder and easier roles, respectively. Thus, 3-and-a-half- to 5-year-olds evaluate their own abilities relative to others and effectively allocate roles to achieve diverse goals.
We investigated whether and how infants link the domains of harm, help and fairness. Fourteen-month-old infants were familiarized with a character that either helped or hindered another agent's attempts to reach the top of a hill. Then, in the test phase they saw the helper or the hinderer carrying out an equal or an unequal distribution toward two identical recipients. Infants who saw the helper performing an unequal distribution looked longer than those who saw the helper performing an equal distribution, whereas infants who saw the hinderer performing an unequal distribution looked equally long than those who saw the hinderer performing an equal distribution. These results suggest that infants linked the hindering actions to a diminished propensity for distributive fairness. This provides support for theories that posit an early emerging ability to attribute moral traits to agents and to generate socio-moral evaluations of their actions.
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
- Infants expect agents that previously helped another agent to perform egalitarian distributions, but they do not generate such expectation about agents that previously hindered another agent.
- This ability to link hindering and distributive actions is important because it may help the development of reasoning about agents' stable moral traits.
- Results provide support for recent theories on early social evaluation skills and they constraint theories on the acquisition of moral competence.
The ability to reason about fairness plays a defining role in the development of morality. Thus, researchers have long been interested in understanding when and how a sensitivity to fairness first develops. Here, we examined infants’ ability to use fairness information in selecting social partners. Using a novel experimental paradigm that combined pre-recorded stimuli with an active behavioral measure, we tested whether infants preferred to socially engage with an individual they had previously seen behave fairly or unfairly. After viewing an individual distribute goods to third parties either equally (i.e., 3:3 distribution) or unequally (i.e., 5:1 distribution), both 13- and 17-month-old infants selectively chose to engage in a social interaction with (i.e., take a toy from) an individual who distributed resources equally. The use of a novel paradigm to assess infants’ fairness preferences demonstrates that infants’ previously established fairness preferences extend across different, more demanding paradigms, and may therefore be more enduring in nature. Together, these findings provide new insights into the nature of infants’ fairness representations, and fill in key gaps in the developmental timeline of infants’ ability to use fairness information in their consideration of potential social partners. In sum, these findings build on previous research by demonstrating that infants not only hold an expectation that resources should be distributed fairly, they also preferentially interact with those who have previously done so. The early-emerging ability to both reason about and use fairness information may play an influential role in the development of complex prosocial behaviors related to morality more broadly.
Despite the importance of human cooperation, the psychological mechanisms by which humans choose their cooperative partners and divide the spoils of cooperation are still unclear. To address these questions, we first contextualize human cooperation within biological market theory and then present results from a series of economic games in which we test how a cooperative partner’s generosity and productivity affect their desirability as a partner and intuitions about how entitled they are to keep the spoils of cooperation. We found that the evaluation of productivity and generosity cannot be fully explained by the incentive structure of the game, but appeared calibrated for choosing long-term cooperative partners and dividing cooperatively created resources within a biological market. Specifically, productivity mattered more to men than to women, and productivity mattered more when it revealed underlying skill rather than luck. In addition, generosity had far larger effects than productivity, but the effect of productivity was moderated by generosity, suggesting sophisticated heuristics for choosing cooperative partners. We discuss implications of our data for the study of social perception and suggest avenues for future research.
Psychology must confront the bias in its broad literature towards the study of participants
developing in environments unrepresentative of the vast majority of the world’s population. Here,
we focus on the implications of addressing this challenge, highlight the need to address over-reliance
on a narrow participant pool, and emphasize the value and necessity of conducting research with
diverse populations. We show that high impact-factor developmental journals are heavily skewed
towards publishing papers with data from WEIRD populations (Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich and Democratic). Most critically, despite calls for change and supposed widespread awareness
of this problem, there is a habitual dependence on convenience sampling and little evidence that the
discipline is making any meaningful movement towards drawing from diverse samples. Failure to
confront the possibility that culturally-specific findings are being misattributed as universal traits has
broad implications for the construction of scientifically defensible theories and for the reliable public
dissemination of study findings.
Partner choice is an important force underpinning cooperation in humans and other animals. Nevertheless, the mechanisms individuals use to evaluate and discriminate among partners who vary across different dimensions are poorly understood. Generally, individuals are expected to prefer partners who are both able and willing to invest in cooperation but how do individuals prioritize the ability over willingness to invest when these characteristics are opposed to one another? We used a modified Dictator Game to tackle this question. Choosers evaluated partners varying in quality (proxied by wealth) and fairness, in conditions when wealth was relatively stable or liable to change. When both partners were equally fair (or unfair), choosers typically preferred the richer partner. Nevertheless, when asked to choose between a rich-stingy and a poor-fair partner, choosers prioritized fairness over wealth—with this preference being particularly pronounced when wealth was unstable. The implications of these findings for real-world partner choice are discussed.
Cooperation is essential for human society, and children engage in cooperation from early on. It is unclear, however, how children select their partners for cooperation. We know that children choose selectively whom to learn from (e.g. preferring reliable over unreliable models) on a rational basis. The present study investigated whether children (and adults) also choose their cooperative partners selectively and what model characteristics they regard as important for cooperative partners and for informants about novel words. Three-and four-year-old children (N = 64) and adults (N = 14) saw contrasting pairs of models differing either in physical strength or in accuracy (in labeling known objects). Participants then performed different tasks (cooperative problem solving and word learning) requiring the choice of a partner or informant. Both children and adults chose their cooperative partners selectively. Moreover they showed the same pattern of selective model choice, regarding a wide range of model characteristics as important for cooperation (preferring both the strong and the accurate model for a strength-requiring cooperation tasks), but only prior knowledge as important for word learning (preferring the knowledgeable but not the strong model for word learning tasks). Young children's selective model choice thus reveals an early rational competence: They infer characteristics from past behavior and flexibly consider what characteristics are relevant for certain tasks.
Several studies indicate that infants prefer individuals who act prosocially over those who act antisocially toward unrelated third parties. In the present study, we focused on a paradigm published by Kiley Hamlin and Karen Wynn in 2011. In this study, infants were habituated to a live puppet show in which a protagonist tried to open a box to retrieve a toy placed inside. The protagonist was either helped by a second puppet (the "Helper"), or hindered by a third puppet (the "Hinderer"). At test, infants were presented with the Helper and the Hinderer, and encouraged to reach for one of them. In the original study, 75% of 9-month-olds selected the Helper, arguably demonstrating a preference for prosocial over antisocial individuals. We conducted two studies with the aim of replicating this result. Each attempt was performed by a different group of experimenters. Study 1 followed the methods of the published study as faithfully as possible. Study 2 introduced slight modifications to the stimuli and the procedure following the guidelines generously provided by Kiley Hamlin and her collaborators. Yet, in our replication attempts, 9-month-olds' preference for helpers over hinderers did not differ significantly from chance (62.5% and 50%, respectively, in Studies 1 and 2). Two types of factors could explain why our results differed from those of Hamlin and Wynn: minor methodological dissimilarities (in procedure, materials, or the population tested), or the effect size being smaller than originally assumed. We conclude that fine methodological details that are crucial to infants' success in this task need to be identified to ensure the replicability of the original result.
Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple reputation domains on cooperation. To bridge this gap, we analyse how prosocial and competency reputations affect cooperation in two Latin American communities (Bwa Mawego, Dominica, and Pucucanchita, Peru) across a number of social contexts (Dominica: labour contracting, labour exchange and conjugal partnership formation; Peru: agricultural and health advice network size). First, we examine the behavioural correlates of prosocial and competency reputations. Following, we analyse whether prosocial, competency, or both reputation domains explain the flow of cooperative benefits within the two communities. Our analyses suggest that (i) although some behaviours affect both reputation domains simultaneously, each reputation domain has a unique behavioural signature; and (ii) competency reputations affect cooperation across a greater number of social contexts compared to prosocial reputations. Results are contextualized with reference to the social markets in which behaviour is embedded and a call for greater theory development is stressed. © 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
In recent years, ample research has shown that preschoolers choose selectively who to learn from, preferring, for example, to learn novel words from a previously accurate over a previously inaccurate model. But this research has not yet resolved what cognitive foundations such selectivity builds upon. The present article reports 2 studies that investigate whether preschoolers’ selective trust is based on global impression formation (halo effects), on the close matching of past and future behavior or on trait-based inferences, and moreover whether the cognitive strategies used are the same for both positive and negative information (high and low competent models). Four- and 5-year-old children (N = 96) were presented with 2 high-competence models (strong vs. knowledgeable; Study 1) or 2 low-competence ones (weak vs. unknowledgeable; Study 2). In 5 subsequent task groups, which required strength and knowledge to different degrees, children were asked to choose between the 2 models. Children in both studies chose models selectively in accordance with their corresponding attributes, preferring the strong (or avoiding the weak) model for strength-related tasks and preferring the knowledgeable (or avoiding the unknowledgeable) model for knowledge-related tasks. This pattern of selective model choice held only for those children who correctly identified the attributes of both models (strong, smart), as indicated by their answers to trait questions at the end of the session. This suggests that trait reasoning plays a crucial role in young children’s selective social learning.
Among immediate-return societies, cooperative social relationships are maintained despite the lack of centralized authority, strong norms of ownership and the punishment of free-riders. The prosocial signaling theory of cooperation solves the puzzle of social cohesion in such societies by suggesting that costly forms of generosity can function as an honest signal of prosocial intent, and that the reputations for prosociality signalers build generate trust between individuals, supporting the formation of cooperative partnerships. However, not all forms of costly generosity are prosocial: we contrast two types of generosity, aggrandizing and prosocial, and suggest that only prosocial generosity provides benefits through cooperation. Prosocial generosity is accompanied by pecuniary distancing: the payment of a higher relative cost to share, and a manner of sharing that disengages the acquirer from ownership over the rights to benefit from his or her harvest. We test the prosocial sharing hypothesis among Martu hunters and find that there is a significant association between the propensity of an individual to share a higher proportion of her income and centrality in the cooperative hunting network. Those who consistently pay higher costs to share, not necessarily those who are better hunters, are preferred partners for cooperative hunting. While many have emphasized the direct, status enhancing, competitive aspects of generosity, we suggest here that prosocial generosity produces benefits indirectly, through the formation of trusting, cooperative partnerships.
Cultural differences in impression formation are well known and multiply determined. Spontaneous impressions (which occur relatively freely from conscious strategies) are basic components of impressions, and spontaneous trait transference (STT) is perhaps the most elemental form. We used process dissociation procedures to estimate the contribution of automatic and controlled processes to STT among Japanese and American participants. STT occurred in both samples, but more frequently among Americans. Controlled processes were equally important in both samples, but automatic processes were weaker among Japanese. Thus, these cultural differences in the most elemental form of impression formation were largely attributable to automatic processes. The results are discussed in terms of both stage theories of trait inference and views of culture as consisting of automatic patterns of thought and action.
Prosocial behavior requires expenditure of personal resources for the benefit of others, a fact that creates a “problem” when considering the evolution of prosociality. Models that address this problem have been developed, with emphasis typically placed on reciprocity. One model considers the advantages of being selective in terms of one’s allocation of prosocial behavior so as to improve the chance that one will be benefitted in return. In this review paper, we first summarize this “partner choice” model and then focus on prosocial development in the preschool years, where we make the case for selective partner choice in early instances of human prosocial behavior.
By 15 months of age infants are sensitive to violations of fairness norms as assessed via their enhanced visual attention to unfair versus fair outcomes in violation-of-expectation paradigms. The current study investigated whether 15-month-old infants select social partners on the basis of prior fair versus unfair behavior, and whether infants integrate social selections on the basis of fairness with the race of the distributors and recipients involved in the exchange. Experiment 1 demonstrated that after witnessing one adult distribute toys to two recipients fairly (2:2 distribution), and another adult distribute toys to two recipients unfairly (1:3 distribution), Caucasian infants selected fair over unfair distributors when both distributors were Caucasian; however, this preference was not present when the fair actor was Asian and the unfair actor was Caucasian. In Experiment 2, when fairness, the race of the distributor, and the race of the recipients were fully crossed, Caucasian infants’ social selections varied as a function of the race of the recipient advantaged by the unfair distributor. Specifically, infants were more likely to select the fair distributor when the unfair recipient advantaged the Asian (versus the Caucasian) recipient. These findings provide evidence that infants select social partners on the basis of prior fair behavior and that infants also take into account the race of distributors and recipients when making their social selections.
What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed.
Virtually all theories of the evolution of cooperation require that cooperators find ways to interact with one another selectively, to the exclusion of cheaters. This means that individuals must make reputational judgments about others as cooperators, based on either direct or indirect evidence. Humans, and possibly other species, add another component to the process: they know that they are being judged by others, and so they adjust their behavior in order to affect those judgments - so-called impression management. Here, we show for the first time that already preschool children engage in such behavior. In an experimental study, 5-year-old human children share more and steal less when they are being watched by a peer than when they are alone. In contrast, chimpanzees behave the same whether they are being watched by a groupmate or not. This species difference suggests that humans' concern for their own self-reputation, and their tendency to manage the impression they are making on others, may be unique to humans among primates.
Kindergartners, 3rd, and 6th graders chose classmates whom they would and would not like to have on their team for an academic contest and as playmates. Ss also rated their classmates on likableness and academic ability. At all ages, children's choices for the academic competition and the play situation were significantly associated with their ratings of their classmates' academic and social competence, respectively. Ss typically referred to academic abilities to explain their teammate choices for the academic contest and to social competence or friendship to explain playmate choices. Questions about the stability of classmates' academic and social competencies revealed that not until 6th grade did Ss indicate that there are limits in the degree to which academic and social competencies could improve with effort. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Growing cross cultural evidence suggests that East Asians are less likely to show the correspondence bias, or a preference for explanations of behavior in terms of traits, dispositions, or other internal attributes of the target. The scope of this evidence spans several research paradigms and diverse methodologies. The cultural difference, however, appears not to be caused by an absence of dispositional thinking in East Asian cultures. Indeed, extensive ethnographic and psychological data indicate that "dispositionism" is a cross-culturally widespread mode of thinking, although East Asians believe dispositions to be more malleable and have a more holistic conception of the person as being situated in a broad social context. The East–West split in attribution thus originates primarily from a stronger "situationism" or belief in the importance of the context of behavior in East Asia. Consequently, East Asians are more likely than Westerners to avoid the correspondence bias as long as situational constraints are salient. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Play appears in many cultures and species, but its purpose remains mysterious. Here, we investigate children’s goals during play, which may help to illuminate play’s function. In two preregistered experiments, we presented 5-to-10-year-old children (n = 124) with a novel game, and directly compared their judgments about how to best configure the game when playing for fun (“have as much fun as you can”) or trying to win (“knock down all the blocks to win stickers”). We found that for task-relevant factors, children chose more difficult settings when playing for fun than when trying to win. For task-irrelevant factors, children generally preferred settings that demanded flexible behavior, such as high randomness and novelty. These results suggest that children approach play as an opportunity for gaining internal and intrinsic rewards, rather than externally-defined rewards. We discuss several hypotheses about the nature of these internal rewards.
This study examined the extent to which children rely on traits to explain behavior. One hundred twenty-eight 4- to 7-year-olds were told stories about actors’ behaviors that led to positive or negative outcomes. Outcomes could be explained with reference to positive or negative traits (niceness or meanness) or transient or irrelevant situational characteristics (such as emotions, biological states, and social categories). Generally, findings indicated that the majority of children referred to traits to explain behaviors and this tendency increased with age. Among non-trait explanations, emotions were used prominently at all ages to explain negative behavior. Older children in particular discounted traits as an explanation for negative outcomes when alternate explanations such as negative emotions were available. Latent Class Analyses captured individual difference attributional profiles among children: although most children were trait theorists, some children referred consistently to non-trait or situational explanations. Two other profiles reflected positivity and negativity biases in children’s explanations. These findings contribute to our knowledge about the relative influence of trait and non-trait explanations for positive and negative behavioral outcomes; we also present the first evidence for profiles of personality attribution.
The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, our propensity to cooperate. Studies showing that humans prefer to interact with cooperative others is often cited as support for partner choice driving the evolution of cooperation. However, these studies are largely drawn from Western samples, where conditions for partner choice to operate may be especially favorable. Here, we investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e., campmate) in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania in 2016 and 2019. A total of 156 Hadza participants from 17 camps ranked their campmates on generosity, foraging ability, and their preference for them as future campmates. In 2016, Hadza preferred more generous people and better hunters as campmates, with evidence suggesting a stronger preference for better hunters; however, the relationship between generosity and being a preferred campmate was greater in 2019 than in 2016, such that the preference for generous people was stronger than the preference for better foragers, suggesting that campmate preferences are changing. These new findings contrast with reports on data from nearly a decade ago, suggesting that the Hadza do not prefer more cooperative campmates. Further, in 2019, there was anecdotal evidence that Hadza with greater exposure to outside cultural institutions (e.g., schooling, having a job, or living in a village) had a stronger preference for generous campmates than those with less exposure. Taken together, the results suggest that preferences for social partners may, in part, be culturally shaped.
Partner choice captures the idea that individuals exist in a biological market of potential partners, and we can therefore choose or reject our social partners. While prior work has principally explored the functional basis of partner choice, here we focus on its mechanistic basis, motivated by a surge of recent work exploring the psychology underlying partner choice decisions. This work demonstrates that partner choice is predictably sensitive to a number of factors, including 1) a potential partner’s generosity and fairness, 2) cooperative disposition, 3) moral decision-making, and 4) intentions. We then broaden our scope, first reviewing work suggesting that, in some cases, the psychology underlying partner choice may be distinct from other responses to a partner’s behavior. We then discuss work demonstrating the sensitivity of partner choice decisions to market characteristics as well as work that illuminates the neural, ontogenetic and phylogenetic basis of partner choice. We conclude by highlighting outstanding questions and suggest directions for future research.
This chapter discusses internal and external attributions with regard to several common biases people have when attributing the causes of others' behavior and our own behavior. It also discusses evidence for cultural similarities and differences and explore why cultural differences exist. When attributing the causes of others' behavior, a common bias is to explain behavior in terms of internal, dispositional attributes of the target, even when that person's behavior is constrained by external, situational factors. This bias is called the correspondence bias or the fundamental attribution error. Based on this logic, collectivistic cultures' acknowledgment of situational forces is not necessarily more accurate, but highlights a different way of thinking that more often takes the context into account. The chapter discusses the implications of the attribution biases for two social issues: group behavior and academic success.
East Asians and Westerners perceive the world and think about it in very different ways. Westerners are inclined to attend to some focal object, analyzing its attributes and categorizing it in an effort to find out what rules govern its behavior. Rules used include formal logic. Causal attributions tend to focus exclusively on the object and are therefore often mistaken. East Asians are more likely to attend to a broad perceptual and conceptual field, noticing relationships and changes and grouping objects based on family resemblance rather than category membership. Causal attributions emphasize the context. Social factors are likely to be important in directing attention. East Asians live in complex social networks with prescribed role relations. Attention to context is important to effective functioning. More independent Westerners live in less constraining social worlds and have the luxury of attending to the object and their goals with respect to it. The physical ‘‘ affordances’’ of the environment may also influence perception. The built environments of the East are more complex and contain more objects than do those of the West. In addition, artistic products of the East emphasize the field and deemphasize individual objects, including people. Western art renders less of the field and emphasizes individual objects and people.
In this review, I propose a new framework for the psychological origins of human cooperation that harnesses evolutionary theories about the two major problems posed by cooperation: generating and distributing benefits. Children develop skills foundational for identifying and creating opportunities for cooperation with others early: Infants and toddlers already possess basic skills to help others and share resources. Yet mechanisms that solve the free-rider problem-critical for sustaining cooperation as a viable strategy-emerge later in development and are more sensitive to the influence of social norms. I review empirical studies with children showing a dissociation in the origins of and developmental change seen in these two sets of processes. In addition, comparative studies of nonhuman apes also highlight important differences between these skills: The ability to generate benefits has evolutionary roots that are shared between humans and nonhuman apes, whereas there is little evidence that other apes exhibit comparable capacities for distributing benefits. I conclude by proposing ways in which this framework can motivate new developmental, comparative, and cross-cultural research about human cooperation. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology Volume 69 is January 4, 2018. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Culture shapes how we interpret behavior, symbols, customs, and more. Its operation is largely implicit, unnoticed until we encounter other cultures. Therefore deep cultural differences should be most evident in automatic processes for interpreting events, including behavior. In two studies, we compared American and Japanese undergraduates' spontaneous (unintended and unconscious) trait inferences (STIs) from behavior descriptions. Both groups made STIs but Japanese made fewer. More important, estimates of the controlled (C) and automatic (A) components of their recall performance showed no differences on C, but A was greater for Americans. Thus westerners' greater reliance on traits, in intentional and spontaneous impressions, may reflect cultural differences in automatic processes for making and recalling meaning. The advantages of locating cultural differences in automatic processes are discussed.
Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that a person’s morality informs us about their likely intentions, whereas their competence and sociability inform us about the likelihood that they will fulfill those intentions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that whereas morality would be considered unconditionally positive, sociability and competence would be highly positive only in moral others, and would be less positive in immoral others. Using exploratory factor analyses, Studies 1a and 1b distinguished evaluations of morality and sociability. Studies 2 to 5 then showed that sociability and competence are evaluated positively contingent on morality—Study 2 demonstrated this phenomenon, while the remaining studies explained it (Study 3), generalized it (Studies 3-5), and ruled out an alternative explanation for it (Study 5). Study 6 showed that the positivity of morality traits is independent of other morality traits. These results support a functionalist account of these dimensions of person perception.
To adult humans, the task of forming an impression of another social being seems effortless and even obligatory. In two experiments, we offer the first systematic cross-cultural examination of impression formation in European American and East Asian preschool children. Children across both cultures easily inferred basic personality traits, such as nice and mean, about unfamiliar peers from behavioral information, whether or not they were specifically prompted to do so. Children were able to identify peers they had seen before, to remember the traits associated with these peers, and to anticipate future behaviors consistent with the traits they had attributed. Thus, for basic traits, the ability to make behavior-to-behavior predictions, via an intervening trait inference, is present in young children across diverse cultures.
Cooperation is crucial to our survival and social success. People typically choose their social partners (e.g., friends, allies, mates), which allows us to avoid bad partners and preferentially interact with better ones. This creates a biological market where people prefer to associate with others who are willing and able to confer benefits upon partners. In such a market, it pays to compete to be (or appear to be) more willing and able to help than competitors are, causing an arms race over any behaviour that signals these traits — including generosity. Biological markets help us understand why we choose the partners we do, when and why people are cooperative and fair (and to what extent), and why individuals differ on these traits.
Kindergartners, 3rd, and 6th graders chose classmates whom they would and would not like to have on their team for an academic contest and as playmates. Ss also rated their classmates on likableness and academic ability. At all ages, children's choices for the academic competition and the play situation were significantly associated with their ratings of their classmates' academic and social competence, respectively. Ss typically referred to academic abilities to explain their teammate choices for the academic contest and to social competence or friendship to explain playmate choices. Questions about the stability of classmates' academic and social competencies revealed that not until 6th grade did Ss indicate that there are limits in the degree to which academic and social competencies could improve with effort.
Adults' social evaluations are influenced by their perception of other people's competence and motivation: Helping when it is difficult to help is praiseworthy, and not helping when it is easy to help is reprehensible. Here, we look at whether children's social evaluations are affected by the costs that agents incur. We found that toddlers can use the time and effort associated with goal-directed actions to distinguish agents, and that children prefer agents who incur fewer costs in completing a goal. When two agents refuse to help, children retain a preference for the more competent agent but infer that the less competent agent is nicer. These results suggest that children value agents who incur fewer costs, but understand that failure to engage in a low-cost action implies a lack of motivation. We propose that a naive utility calculus underlies inferences from the costs and rewards of goal-directed action and thereby supports social cognition.
© The Author(s) 2015.
When organisms can choose whom to interact with, it can create a biological market where individuals need to outbid their rivals for access to cooperative relationships. Each individual's market value is determined by the benefits it can confer (and is willing to confer) upon others, which selects for tendencies to actively confer benefits on others. In this article, I introduce the basics of biological markets and how they relate to traditional models of cooperation, and then elucidate their impact on human cooperation, especially in the tasks of choosing partners, competing over partners, and keeping partners. Since “generosity” is necessarily rated relative to one's rivals, this can result in tendencies to compete over relative generosity, commit to partners, help when help is unnecessary, give strategically, and attack or suppress others' helpfulness. Biological markets explain and make novel predictions about why we desire to associate with particular individuals and how we attract them, and are therefore a useful incorporation into models of cooperation.
2 studies are reported that concern children's use of personality traits and abilities to predict the behavior of other persons. In Study 1, subjects first observed vignettes that were designed to reveal an actor's abilities or personality traits. Then, they made predictions for the actor's behavior in other, related behavioral situations. In Study 2, subjects were told about 1 instance of an actor's behavior, and they were provided with covariation information that implied that the actor's behavior either was or was not caused by personal dispositions. Subjects then predicted the actor's behavior in related situations. In both studies the older subjects (9-10 years old and older) predicted that the actor's behaviors in new situations would be relatively consistent with the behavior that was observed or described, when the behavior was perceived to be a function of dispositional causal factors. Younger children (5-7 years old), on the other hand, did not predict that the actors' behaviors would be consistent across situations (regardless of their perceptions of the causes of the actors' behavior), even though they labeled the actors' behaviors with appropriate personality trait or ability terms (Study 1) and were able to use covariation information cues to infer dispositional causes (Study 2). These results suggest that younger children do not regard dispositional factors as stable, abiding characteristics of other persons.
The information that children use to make dispositional attributions was assessed. 5-13-year-olds received covariation (consistency, distinctiveness) and frequency information about a boy's interpersonally harmful behavior in 3 conditions. Results for children's trait adjective ratings and predictions of the boy's causal responsibility for subsequent property damage revealed that frequency information use decreased while covariation information use increased with age, although use of covariation information appeared at a younger age for adjective ratings than for prediction judgments. Analysis of children's descriptions of the boy revealed that some of the kindergartners and first graders referred to the stability of the boy's behavior across time, people, and situations. Since stability acknowledgment was condition-dependent, it was concluded that even young children form impressions of a person's stable characteristics when the information to which they are normally sensitive is available.
Humans and other animals have a variety of psychological abilities tailored to the demands of asocial foraging, that is, foraging without coordination or competition with other conspecifics. Human foraging, however, also includes a unique element, the creation of resource pooling systems. In this type of social foraging, individuals contribute when they have excess resources and receive provisioning when in need. Is this behavior produced by the same psychology as asocial foraging? If so, foraging partners should be judged by the same criteria used to judge asocial patches of resources: the net energetic benefits they provide. The logic of resource pooling speaks against this. Maintaining such a system requires the ability to judge others not on their short-term returns, but on the psychological variables that guide their behavior over the long-term. We test this idea in a series of five studies using an implicit measure of categorization. Results showed that (1) others are judged by the costs they incur (a variable not relevant to asocial foraging) whereas (2) others are not judged by the benefits they provide when benefits provided are unrevealing of underlying psychological variables (despite this variable being relevant to asocial foraging). These results are suggestive of a complex psychology designed for both social and asocial foraging.