How indicative are the indicative financial tables – Case Study of the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment (2007-2020)

Abstract

Celem artykułu jest ocena poziomu różnicy między planowaną alokacją środków krajowych i unijnych a rzeczywistym poziomem ich wydatkowania w ramach Programu Operacyjnego "Infrastruktura i środowisko". Ma to na celu ocenę skuteczności procesu planowania, który został podjęty przez Instytucję Zarządzającą. Podczas gdy raporty ewaluacyjne opracowywane na poziomie krajowym lub na poziomie Komisji Europejskiej analizują skuteczność programu przez pryzmat jego wyników, zarządzanie finansami jest badane przy użyciu innych technik. W ten sposób obszar całego procesu planowania jest do pewnego stopnia ignorowany w oficjalnym procesie ewaluacyjnym. Polska jest zwykle wskazywana jako jeden z liderów pod względem absorpcji funduszy UE i ma jeden z najniższych odsetków nadużyć finansowych (znacznie poniżej wyników uzyskanych przez wiele zachodnioeuropejskich państw członkowskich UE). Wykazują one jednak raczej techniczną zdolność do identyfikowania najlepiej dopasowanych projektów i zdolność do właściwego zarządzania całym procesem finansowym. Rozbieżności zidentyfikowane na poziomie Priorytetów Inwestycyjnych były w większości przypadków znacznie poniżej 1.0 pp.

Full text

Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024, 73–94
DOI: 10.33119/KSzPP/2024.4.4
eISSN: 2719-7131
szpp.sgh.waw.pl
Aleksandra Firek1
Szymon Kajma2
Tomas z Tyc3
How indicative are the nancial tables?
ACase Study of the Operational Programme
Infrastructure and Environment (2007–2020)
Abstract
e article aims toassess the dierences the planned allocation of national and EU funds
and their actual disbursement within the Operational Programme “Infrastructure and
Environment”. e study evaluates the eciency of the planning process conducted by
the Managing Authority inPoland. While evaluation reports at the national or European
Commission levels typically analyze programme eciency through its outcomes, nancial
governance is examined using alternative techniques. Consequntly, acritical aspect of plan-
ning process is somewhat overlooked inthe ocial review. Poland is generally regarded as
aleader inEU funds absorption and exhibits one of the lowest fraud rates– signicantly
lower than those of many Western European Member States. However, these evaluations
reect only atechnical ability toidentify optimal projects and eectively manage the
1 Warsaw University of Technology (PW), Warsaw, Poland, e-mail: aleksandra.firek@pw.edu.pl,
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0444-5715
2
Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy (Republic of Poland), Warsaw, Poland, e-mail:
szymon.kajma@mfipr.gov.pl, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6324-2811
3 Warsaw University of Technology (PW), Warsaw, Poland, e-mail: tomasz.tyc@pw.edu.pl, https://
orcid.org/0000-0002-1625-078X

74 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
nancial process. e research identied discrepancies inthe level of investment priori-
ties, with dierences oen amonting toless than 1.0 percetage point.
Keywords: EU funds, Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment; Governance,
years 2007–2013, years 2014–2020
JEL Classication Codes: E61, E65, H61
Planowana alokacja arzeczywiste wydatki– Studium przypadku
Programu Operacyjnego Infrastruktura iŚrodowisko wlatach 2007–2020
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest ocena poziomu różnicy między planowaną alokacją środków krajowych
iunijnych arzeczywistym poziomem ich wydatkowania wramach Programu Operacyjnego
„Infrastruktura iśrodowisko”. Ma tonacelu ocenę skuteczności procesu planowania, który
został podjęty przez Instytucję Zarządzającą. Podczas gdy raporty ewaluacyjne opracowy-
wane napoziomie krajowym lub napoziomie Komisji Europejskiej analizują skuteczność
programu przez pryzmat jego wyników, zarządzanie nansami jest badane przy użyciu
innych technik. Wten sposób obszar całego procesu planowania jest do pewnego stopnia
ignorowany wocjalnym procesie ewaluacyjnym. Polska jest zwykle wskazywana jako
jeden zliderów pod względem absorpcji funduszy UE ima jeden znajniższych odsetków
nadużyć nansowych (znacznie poniżej wyników uzyskanych przez wiele zachodnioeuro-
pejskich państw członkowskich UE). Wykazują one jednak raczej techniczną zdolność do
identykowania najlepiej dopasowanych projektów izdolność do właściwego zarządzania
całym procesem nansowym. Rozbieżności zidentykowane napoziomie Priorytetów
Inwestycyjnych były wwiększości przypadków znacznie poniżej 1.0pp.
Słowa kluczowe: fundusze UE, Program Operacyjny Infrastruktura i Środowisko, zarzą-
dzanie, lata 2007–2013, lata 2014–2020
Kody klasykacji JEL:E61, E65, H61
Introduction
e eciency of EU co-nanced programmes is assessed through amultistage
evaluation process embracing aholistic approach towards the governance of pub-
lic interventions. Aset of minimal requirements detailed inEU treaties was subse-
quently developed insector-specic regulation adapted toachanging regulatory
regime over time.

75How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
e analysis of public policies co-nanced with EU funds can be conducted before
the operationalisation of the process (ex-ante), during the disbursement of funds
(mid-term) or aer the closure of the programme (ex-post). Literature underlines
that the evaluation process focuses on the outputs of programmes: their goal achieve-
ment (Philipp & Tobias, 2010; Szarfenberg, 2015; OECD, 2021; Wolniewicz-Slom-
ka, 2022; Corti & de la Ossa, 2023) or through the lenses of the usage of available
funds (Uusikylä & Virtanen, 2000; Stolbova, Monasterolo & Battiston, 2018; Euro-
pean Court of Auditors, 2021). Both approaches are integrated, as seen inseveral of
the European Commission’s reports (2021, 2022).
Programmes co-nanced by the EU are also analysed through dierent govern-
ance perspective: budgeting (Downes, Moretti & Nicole, 2017); fraud prevention
policies (Quirke, 2009; Pujas, 2011; Roman, Achim & McGee, 2023); administrative
capabilities and cooperation (Rodríguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2019; Incaltarau, Pascar-
iu & Surubaru, 2020).
ese approaches have provided further valuable insights into successful inter-
vention parametrisation that can be replicated inother EU Member States. However,
while informative, the evaluation itself provides little data on the quality of the plan-
ning process enacted and the administrative capacity of public bodies. Furthermore,
agrowing number of articles and research studies analyse the outcomes of interven-
tions using the meta-analysis approach (Marzinotto, 2012; Heapp & Allacron, 2024).
us, anadditional layer inthe evaluation process– or adierent type of
ex-postanalysis covering the entire programming period for aspecic programme–
could involve comparing the planned allocation tocertain investment categories or
policy objectives with the actual disbursements. is approach can be criticised on
several points: (1) inorder toensure that the entire allocation is used within the set
time frame, the managing authority may make necessary amendments by relocat-
ing available and unused funds tothose intervention that are more popular among
potential beneciaries, (2) most evaluation work relies heavily on analysing thepro-
gramme’s ability todeliver certain product KPIs, which inmost cases take the form
on easily attainable outcomes; (3) last but notleast, managing authorities are scruti-
nized by dierent EU institutions that require specic outcomes and formalities as
dened inregulations for the various programming periods. While these criticism
may be justied towards the proposed approach, they seem tobe entrenched inaspe-
cialised– or, tosome extent, narrow– perspective on evaluation.
We make the case for the added value of the proposed approach, as the analysis of
the life cycle of an EU co-funded programme cannot be based solely on its capacity
to deliver physical KPIs, such as the length of build railways, the number of schooled
children, or other widely used measures. Furthermore, even as socioeconomic variables

76 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
and the general environment change over time, EU co-funded programmes cannot be
based solely on their capacity todeliver outcomes as programmed within the frame-
work of along- or medium-term strategic document. Due tothe nature of these stra-
tegic documents, their goals remain, toalarge degree, stable over extended periods.
An approach based on analysing the dierence between the draed assumptions of
support by intervention category (or policy objective) and the actual disbursement
of funds could provide valuable insight into the programming quality during the
preparatory stages of policy implementation.
is article is divided into three distinct parts. First, we provide general infor-
mation concerning the evaluation process, as well as outline of the proposed ana-
lytical approach, this sectionalso includes the theoretical assumptions made by the
authors. e second partcontains an analysis of the scale and scope of dierences
between the planned allocation and the actual disbursements made todierent cat-
egories of beneciaries. is analysis covers two programming periods: 2007–2014
and 2014–2020. e third partof the article oers further insights into the results,
discusses issues encountered by the analytical team, and outlines potential direc-
tions for further research.
The general outline of the proposed approach towards
analysing the difference between the planned allocation
and the actual disbursements
An overall approach towards the evaluation process
and its legal framework
Evaluating policies co-nanced or nanced with EU funds is enacted using three
basic approaches. e rst one (Ex-ante evaluation) is linked with the planning phase
of managing EU funds on the national, regional or EU level (Pellegrin & Colnot,
2020). Authorities analyse the needed interventions (Szarfenberg, 2015) tofoster the
development potential (Samset & Christensen, 2017) of aregion or economic sector
(OECD, 2022) but also the impact of the proposed measures (Kupiec, 2014). e
second path (Mid-term evaluation) is prepared aer the third or fourth year of the
implementation of the programmes. is phase is prepared by independent evalua-
tors, mandated todetermine whether the strategy adopted at launch remains relevant
due topossible changes inthe overall socio-economic environment. e nal stage is
the Ex-postevaluation, conducted by the EC. Its objective is toexamine the utilisation
of resources and their eectiveness, and potential medium- and long-term impact.

77How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
e legal framework for the evaluation process of EU policies is enshrined inthe
European Union treaties. As stated inarticle 70: “ (…) the Council may (…) adopt
measures laying down the arrangements whereby Member States, incollaboration
with the Commission, conduct an objective and impartial evaluation of the imple-
mentation of the Union policies referred tointhis Title by Member States’ authori-
ties (…)” (TFEU, 2016). During each programming periods, aset of regulations has
been prepared (usually following apath indicated by aWhite Paper or aset thereof)
that provides ground rules notonly for the individual Funds (e.g., European Social
Fund) but also for Programmes. During the programming period 2014–2020, Regu-
lation (EU) No 1303/2013 set the legal framework for all Managing Authorities and
partners involved inprogramming, disbursement, or evaluation.
Why is there aneed toanalyse the difference between the
planned allocation and actual disbursements inEU co-nanced
programmes?
Evaluation reports of EU co-nanced programmes and policies focus on the out-
put being provided. It can be seen inboth historical as well as more recent research
papers (Uusikylä & Virtanen, 2000; Marzinotto, 2012; Majone, 2015; Penszko, 2017,
2019; Boumans & Ferry, 2019; Ośrodek Ewaluacji, 2022; Mergoni & de Vitte, 2023).
e reader should be aware that this approach is also enshrined inthe political pro-
cess of EU policies as dened through the REFIT programme (2020/C163/03), Better
Regulations Guidelines (2021), and Toolbox (2023). Performance-based management
of programmes has become the norm also inthe case of the approach taken by EU
institutions (Corti & de la Ossa, 2023; European Court of Auditors, 2021; Cipriani,
2021; European Commission, 2021). Budgetary performance is also being evaluat-
ed by both European and national institutions through governance procedures. is
process is being scrutinised on dierent levels and themes– the procedural approach
of the Court of Auditors (Giammarioli etal., 2007), the eciency of implementing
the budget (Downes & Nicole, 2016; Wantoch-Rekowski & Tati, 2023).
However, neither the performance-based northe budgetary-based approach
provides an analyses of the dierences between planned allocation and actual dis-
bursements. We should note that this sort of analytical approach is well known and
widely used as atool for evaluating the eciency of policy-design t, especially if this
can be used topromote greater progress towards goal attainment (Early etal., 1990;
Harkin etal., 2016; Przygocka, 2017; Bachtler etal., 2016; van Geet etal., 2021). Fur-
thermore, this approach was notused inany of the major evaluations of EU-fund-
ed programmes during the 2007–2013 and 2014–2020 programming perspectives

78 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
(MFiPR, 2024). We urge the reader tonote that it was also nottaken into consider-
ation during the recurring analysis of the potential of public bodies engaged inthe
managing the structural funds inPoland (MR, 2016; MFiPR, 2023). us, ageneral
lack inthe use of this approach can be identied inrecent documents and analyses
prepared by Polish authorities or on their behalf. However, we identify arising trend
inthe use of certain elements of this approach with regard tothe EU Recovery and
Resilience Facility (Darvas, Welslau & Zettelmeyer, 2023; Cecchi, 2023).
Discrepancies between the rst dra of the programme and the actual disburse-
ment of funds toits beneciaries can be used toassess notonly the quality of admin-
istrative capabilities of the managing authority but also the relative ease of access
todierent types of public support co-nanced through EU-funds. It should be noted
that the latter element requires additional information concerning the level of rejec-
tion of dierent types of projects submitted by potential beneciaries.
The theoretical rationale for the analysis presented by the authors
While an analysis of planned nancial allocation and its actual disbursements
might be seen as amere computational or budgeting exercise, it can also provide
additional insight into the quality of the planning process of the public body. is is
primarily evident inthe ability of apublic entity totranspose the political goals of
medium and long-term development strategies into aset of KPIs, or more broadly–
into the triangle of goals (general statements outlining the programme’s intentions),
objectives (specic results tobe delivered within apreset timeframe), and outcomes
(measurable statements of the result).
It imperative toconsider two programming periods (2007–2013 and 2014–2020).
Technically speaking, it would be possible toinclude the rst programming period
(2004–2006), during which Poland and nine other countries were considered ful-
ly-edged Member States of the European Union. However, the scale of the pro-
grammes and the methods employed toorganise and plan them were notadequate
for the analytical purpose. Furthermore, by choosing the 2007–2013 and 2014–2020
periods, it is possible toidentify any changes that might have arisen from increased
experience inthe preparation process of EU-funded programmes.
To prepare the analysis, the research team had todecide which operation
-
al programmes would be examined. Akey element inthe decision process was
the relative similarity of political goals and objectives outlined inthe EU strategic
documents– both under the Lisbon Process and its direct successor Europe 2020
(COME/2010/2020)– as these two strategies set the stage for the 2007–2013 and
2014–2020 programming periods. Substantial similarities between the two strate-

79How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
gies can be observed inintervention areas related topublic infrastructure (Trans-
port, Energy, and Telecommunication), as well as inthose focusing on public services
delivery. While certain parallels can also be found inthe areas related toinnovation
and entrepreneurship, these tend tobe less parametrisable. us, arational choice
was tofocus on the Operational Programme “Infrastructure and Environment” for
both 2007–2013 and 2014–2020 periods, as both versions focus on the abovemen-
tioned goals and types of public intervention. It should be noted that similar actions
are also being undertaken within the scope of 16 Regional Operational Programmes.
However, due totheir decentralised nature and the highly dierentiated categories of
beneciaries, we rejected these kind of programmes. Furthermore, reports prepared
by the Polish government (MR, 2016; MFiPR 2023) clearly show alarge discrepan-
cy between the administrative capacities of individual units, potentially inducting
additional nonparametrical elements into the research– elements that should be
avoided if possible toachieve arelatively clear and unbiased result.
For more information on the documents used further within the research and
identied as (1) rst dra/version and (2) nal version, please refer tothe Table 2.
Table 2. Organisational information concerning the programmes versions
Programming period First draft Latest version
ID Date ID Date
2007–2013 1.0 07.05.2007 5.0 18.03.2016
2014–2020 1.0 16.12.2014 25.0 15.02.2023
Source: own elaboration.
Table 1. Aggregation of Investment Axis used inthe analysis
Programming
period
Water,
sewage and
environmental
infrastructure
Mobility
infrastructure
& transport
services
Energy
infrastructure
& efficiency
Other types
of public
infrastructure
Technical
Assistance
2007–2013 Axis 1–5 Axis 6–8 Axis 9–10 Axis 11–13 Axis 14–15
2014–2020 Axis 1 (infull)–
2(partof)
Axis 3–6 Axis 2 (partof),
7, 11
Axis 8–9 Axis 10, 12.
Source: own elaboration.
e next stage of the analysis will be toaggregate the Investment Axis (as dened
within both Operational Programmes) and Types of Intervention (as dened by
COM/215/2014, COM/2021/1060) both interms of the original allocation, the lat-
est version of the strategic document, and lastly– the level of disbursements actually
being made. is is crucial toassess the projects being rolled-out through dierent

80 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
schemes and approaches. e following table shows the aggregation during both
programming periods.
Furthermore, one must always consider an imperative motive of the managing
authority itself toreach the highest available level of disbursements of the commit-
ments being made during the entire run of the programme. And thus, consider-
ing the inevitable transfer of allocation between dierent types of intervention. We
should further note that this is quite normal inall EU Member States, whenever
there are beneciaries of Cohesion or Structural funds. One should also consider
the fact that during later programming periods aperformance reserve mechanism
was introduced into EFSI funds, increasing the need of the Managing Authority
todeliver pre-arranged results tohave access tothose blocked funds. An analysis of
Polish programmes shows that the level of transfers varies greatly by both type of
Managing Authority (with central government or development agencies managed
programmes showing slightly higher level of reallocation of resource than inthe
case of self / regional governments), as well as type of funding (with higher levels
among Cohesion policy programmes than inthe case of Common Agricultural Pol-
icy). However, at the end the level of reprogramming could go as high as 5% of the
originally allocated resources.
us, when aggregating the Types of Intervention and the Investment Axis into
the grouping predened by the authors, the level of reprogramming should notexceed
ageneral rule of thumb of 1–2 percentage points. Any overlap above this threshold
should be identied by ahigh degree of subgroup reallocation of funds, implying an
issue inthe programming process.
Subsequently, the analysis of allocation and disbursement will be conducted
using dierent versions of the programmes, taking into consideration the Investment
Axis, which encompasses dierent types of intervention for the ERDF, the ESF, and
the Cohesion Fund. Considering the EU budget planning regarding disbursements
and budgetary capping (commitment appropriations and payments), the discrep-
ancies should notexceed an overall level of 2–3pp., with asmaller allowed level of
1–2pp.for infrastructure payments (due tospecic capping).
e last stage of the analysis will involve converting the prices used inthe indic-
ative tables (both the original and nal versions), as well as inthe beneciary trans-
fer data, into constant prices. Additionally, these gures must be converted into
EUR, as the data provided by the Ministry contain transfers inthe Polish national
currency. To do so, we will use GUS deator for individual years and NBP’s ocial
exchange rate tables.

81How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
Analysing the allocation and disbursements
inthe different programming periods
Programming period 2007–2013
e Operational Programme “Infrastructure and Environment” 2007–2013 (fur-
ther abbreviated toOPIE 2007–2013) was approved by the European Commission
on December 7th, 2007. e document and its crucial components underwent 25
changes advocated by the Polish Government or through the input of the Monitor-
ing Committee of the above-mentioned Operational Programme. e implemented
modications were relevant for the allocation of national contribution on the level
of Investment priorities (programming level below Investment Axis). eir impact
should be seen as negligible on the entire document.
Figure 1. Allocation of EU Funds contributions among main themes inthe Operational
Programme “Infrastructure and Environment” 2007–2013, inpp., and
constant prices (2007)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Water, sewage
and environmental
infrastructure
Mobility
infrastructure
& related
transportservices
Energy
infrastructure
& efficiency
actions
Other types
of public
infrastructure
Technical
assistance
First draft Latest version
Source: own elaboration based on (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024A) data.
e abovementioned changes were typical for other documents used togovern
EU funds inPoland during the programming period 2007–2013. Furthermore, even
the large number of changes made tothe individual Priority Axis (15 intotal, two of

82 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
which were used tonance Technical Assistance) did notmake an essential change
tothe general allocation of EU funds (Figure 1). e dierence between the versions
did notexceed 0.5pp,except for Water, sewage, and environmental infrastructure,
where it increased by just over 1pp., and for Technical Assistance, where it felt by
almost 1pp.We emphasize that ageneral decrease of budgets allocated tothose func-
tions was common tocentral government programmes.
e allocation of national budget contributions (either from the central govern-
ment, local government budgets, or other public sector Polish-based entities) did
change signicantly (Figure 2): mobility infrastructure and related transportation
services were defunded inorder toincrease support for either water, sewage and
environmental-related infrastructure (covered under Priority Axis 1–5) or energy-re-
lated infrastructure (covered by Priority Axis 9–10). Furthermore, while the anal-
ysis will concentrate on the dierence between the original allocation of funds and
their actual disbursements, as this can be used toshowcase the managing authority’s
strategic planning skills, the work will also present abreakdown of the allocation of
EU and national funding. is can be used toassess if any major changes occured
on the level of strategic documents and goals during the programming period. As
usual, EU funds tend tobe more sticky than national contributions.
Figure 2. Allocation of National Budget contributions among main themes inthe
Operational Programme “Infrastructure and Environment” 2007–2013,
inpp., constant prices (2007)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Water, sewage
and environmental
infrastructure
Mobility
infrastructure
& related
transportservices
Energy
infrastructure
& efficiency
actions
Other types
of public
infrastructure
Technical
assistance
First draft Latest version
Source: own elaboration based on (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024A) data.

83How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
e dierences inthe programmed allocation of EU funds between the rst ver-
sion of the document (approved by the European Commission in2007) and its latest
version (from 2014) appear minimal for the majority (12 out of 15) of the invest-
ment priorities (Figure 3). e most signicant change between the two versions of
the programme was observed inthe investment priorities concerning water, sewage
and waste management (Priority Axis 1 and 2).
Considering disbursements of EU funds and their deviation from the original
state of the Operational Programme (Figure 4), signicant dierences can be iden-
tied intwo Priority Axis: the rst being waste management and the protection of
the earth (adierence of nearly 1.0pp), and the second being theTEN-T road and
air transport network (adierence slightly higher than 1.2pp).
Figure 3. Differences inthe allocation of EU funds between the original (first) draft
and the final version of the Operational Programme “Infrastructure and
Environment” (2007-2013), inpp., constant prices (2007)
1.1
0.7
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.6
0.4
Water and sewage management
Waste management and the protection of the earth
Resource management and counteracting environmental risks
Initiatives aimed at adjusting enterprises to the requirements
of environmental protection
Environment protection and the promotion of ecological habits
TEN-T road and air transport network
Environment-friendly transport
Transport safety and national transport networks
Environment-friendly energy infrastructure and energy efficiency
Energy security, including the diversification of energy sources
Culture and cultural heritage
Health, safety and improvement of health protection system
Higher education infrastructure
Technical assistance – ERDF
Technical assistance – cohesion fund
Source: own elaboration based on (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024A) data.

84 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
Figure 4. Differences inthe allocation of EU funds between the original (first) draft and
the final disbursements of the Operational Programme “Infrastructure and
Environment” (2007-2013), inpp., constant prices (2007)
0.1
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.0
1.2
0.1
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.5
Water and sewage management
Waste management and the protection of the earth
Resource management and counteracting environmental risks
Initiatives aimed at adjusting enterprises to the
requirements of environmental protection
Environment protection and the promotion of ecological habits
TEN-T road and air transport network
Environment-friendly transport
Transport safety and national transport networks
Environment-friendly energy infrastructure and energy efficiency
Energy security, including the diversification of energy sources
Culture and cultural heritage
Health, safety and improvement of health protection system
Higher education infrastructure
Technical assistance – ERDF
Technical assistance – cohesion fund
Source: own elaboration based on (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024A) data.
Programming period 2014–2020
e Operational Programme “Infrastructure and Environment” 2014–2020
(hereaer abbreviated as OPIE 2014–2020) was approved by the European Com-
mission on May 24th, 2014. e document and its crucial components underwent
nearly 50 changes, which is within the norm for similar national-level Operational
Programmes during the 2014–2020 programming period. For example, the OP “Intel-
ligent Growth” underwent more than 45 times modications up to2023, inaccord-
ance with the n+3 rule governing the disbursement of EU funds. e modications
implemented aected the allocation of national contributions at the investment pri-
orities level (aprogramming level below the Investment Axis).
Despite the numerous changes made tothe individual Priority Axis, the over-
all allocation of EU funds was notsignicantly altered (Figure 5). Compared tothe
previous programming period, the magnitude of discrepancies between the original
allocation and the most recent version was quite similar.

85How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
Figure 5. Allocation of EU Funds among main themes inOperational Programme
“Infrastructure and Environment” (2014–2020), inpp., constant prices (2014)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Water, sewage
and environmental
infrastructure
Mobility
infrastructure
& related
transportservices
Energy
infrastructure
& efficiency
actions
Other types
of public
infrastructure
Technical
assistance
First draft Latest version
Source: own elaboration based on (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024A) data.
Figure 6. Allocation of National Budget contributions among main themes
inOperational Programme “Infrastructure and Environment” (2014–2020),
inpp., constant prices, (2014)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Water, sewage
and environmental
infrastructure
Mobility
infrastructure
& related
transportservices
Energy
infrastructure
& efficiency
actions
Other types
of public
infrastructure
Technical
assistance
First draft Latest version
Source: own elaboration based on (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024A) data.

86 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
e allocation of National contribution (either from the central government,
local government budgets, or other public sector Polish-based public sector entities)
underwent amuch smaller change (Figure 6)– notexceeding the 0.5ppthreshold.
is is instark contrast tothe previous programming period, where the discrepancies
between the original and nal allocations were well above the 10pp.mark. Awork-
ing hypothesis for such overperformance is, toacertain degree, the nancial condi-
tion of the Polish GG sector (which facilitated the co-nancing of projects by local
and self-government), as well as an overall increase inthe administrative capacities
of programme’s managing body. e latter hypothesis is supported by the reports of
the Ministry (MR, 2016; MFiPR, 2022).
e most signicant dierence inthe allocated EU funds between the rst dra of
the documents and the latest version (Figure 7) can be seen infour areas: REACT- EU,
which– due toits COVID-related source– was notconsidered in 2014; TEN-T net-
works, whose allocation was reduced by more than 1.5pp;road infrastructure incit-
ies (+0.8pp); and health infrastructure (+0.6pp.).
Figure 7. Differences inallocations between the original (first) draft and the final
version of the Operational Programme “Infrastructure and Environment”
(2014–2020), inpp., constant prices (2014)
0.2
0.3
1.1
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.0
2.6
0.1
Low-emmission economy
Environmental protection, including adaptation
to climate change
Development of the TEN-T road network
and multimodal transport
Road infrastructure for cities
Development of the railway transport in Poland
Development of the low emission public
transport in the cities
Improving energy security
Protection of cultural heritage and development
of cultural resources
Strengthening the strategic health infrastructure
Technical assistance
REACT-EU
Technical assistance REACT-EU
Source: own elaboration based (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024B) data.

87How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
While analysing the dierence between the original dra allocation and the
disbursement of EU funds (Figure 8), we nd the highest discrepancies inthe Pri-
ority Axis 11 (REACT-EU). As noted above, this is clearly because the mechanism
was implemented in2020, while the rst funding period began in2021 (Regulation
(EU) 2020/2221).
Figure 8. Differences inallocations between the original (first) draft and final
disbursements of the Operational Programme “Infrastructure and
Environment” (2014-2020), inpp., constant prices (2014)
0.2
0.3
1.1
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.0
2.6
0.1
Low-emmission economy
Environmental protection, including
adaptation to climate change
Development of the TEN-T road network
and multimodal transport
Road infrastructure for cities
Development of the railway transport in Poland
Development of the low emission public
transport in the cities
Improving energy security
Protection of cultural heritage and development
of cultural resources
Strengthening the strategic health infrastructure
Technical assistance
REACT-EU
Technical assistance REACT-EU
Source: own elaboration based (Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Policy, Republic of Poland,
2024B) data.
Discussing the obtained results and further steps
e results obtained during the computational exercise provide insight into the
accuracy of the programming mechanism used by Polish national and, toacertain
degree, regional authorities tomanage the inow of EU funds related toinfrastruc-
tural projects. One should always take into consideration that tthe nancial indica-
tive tables represent atheoretical outlook on actual disbursements.
We can clearly state that during the 2007–2013 programming period, the level of
dierence between the dra allocation, the programme’s latest version, and the actual
disbursement was, inmost cases, well below 1.0pp.However, this almost negligible
dierence should be solely associated with the EU contribution, as for the national

88 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
budget contribution, the dierence reached amuch higher value (entering the dou-
ble-digit range). is striking dierence can be partly explained by the nancial situ-
ation of local and self-governments, whose budgets were notprepared toprovide the
necessary beneciary contribution for the projects. To some extent, this explanation
can be supported by the fact that an increase occurred inthe allocation provided for
water and sewage activities, and while utilities inPoland tend tobe characterised by
arelatively low level of protability, they generate, inmost cases positive cash ows
form their main activities (GUS, 2024). Furthermore, another category, that experi-
enced arelatively high level of change inthe national budgetallocation during the
entire programming period was mobility infrastructure. is dierence can be pri-
marily explaned by changes made tothe budgetary mechanisms used tofund these
types of works (especially inthe wider context of the post-subprime crisis recovery
mechanisms implemented inPoland) (Białek, Firek & Tyc, 2022; Białek & Tyc, 2022).
Looking into the dierence between the allocated levels of funding at the Invest-
ment Axis level, it seldom exceeded 0.5pp.e relatively minor discrepancies between
the disbursements and the dra (original) allocation, as well as the latest allocation
of the programme, can be oset by arather stringent approach tomobility-related
infrastructure (roads, railways, airports, and marine ports) inall Polish development
strategies. Furthermore, infrastructure investments received higher markups com-
pared toother investment themes, with discrepancies close to1pp.or even higher.
e national desired outcome is broadly inline with the evolving EU mobility strat-
egy, which nowplaces greater emphasis on enhancing transport corridors other than
East-West, inorder toprovide more regional development opportunities.
e analysis of the 2014–2020 programming period analysis reveals aslightly
higher discrepancy between the dra allocation of EU and national contributions,
and the actual nal disbursements, compared tothe previous period. is discrep-
ancy (almost twice as large as inthe rst programming period analysed) can largerly
be linked toCOVID-19 pandemic and its impact on economic policy. e pandemic
forced asignicant change tothe previously observed laissez-faire approach tothe
common market and overall state aid. Public intervention, which had been viewed
through the lens of anti-competition policy, was once again seen as valid instru-
ment inBrussels and national capitals. Even taking this black swan-like event and
its policy backdrop into consideration, the level of discrepancy should still be con-
sidered relatively low. We should further emphasise that discrepancies rarely reach
a2.0ppthreshold, even at the thematic objective level (excluding programming con-
ducted specically under the REACT-EU policy objective).
Looking at the dierence between the originally planned allocation and the actual
disbursements during the 2014–2020 programming period, we nd that the highest

89How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
levels of discrepancies were identied incertain types of road infrastructure (both
those related tomunicipal mobility schemes and TEN-T networks) and inhealth
infrastructure. e latter is largely attributable once again tothe COVID-19 pan-
demic and needs arising from its aermath.
We identify aneed for aamore in-depth analysis of types of interventions made
under the ERDF, the ESF, and Cohesion Fund (and, toacertain degree, other types
of EU funding). Such an analysis could be used toassess the excent towhich man-
aging bodies and authorities reallocate the funds made available tothem under the
Programme. Further studies could also take into consideration other investments
schemes (for example, regional programmes or other programmes managed at the
central level). Further research using similar methods should be considered, as it
could help assess the capacity todesign and implement interventions and provide
insights into the quality of the programming actions during the preparatory stages
of policy implementation.
Conclusion
e article aimed toassess the discrepancy between the planned allocation
of national and EU funds and their actual disbursement under the Infrastructure
and Environment Operational Programme. is approach is notcommonly used
inresearch within the EU funds evaluation system, but it can serve as an addition-
al element inexamining the quality of strategic nancial planning at the level of the
Managing Authority.
e study covered the Polish operational programme Infrastructure and Envi-
ronment from two nancial perspectives: 2007–2013 and 2014–2020. For the rst
period, slight dierences (less than 1.0pp.) were observed between programme’s ini-
tial nancial plan and the actual disbursements. One possible explanation for this
is the nancial situation of potential beneciaries from self and local government,
which may have hindered their ability tocontribute their share tothe projects. In
contrast, during the second period, the most rational hypothesis is that the discrep-
ancies are signicantly higher. Such discrepancies– almost twice as large as those
observed inthe rst programming period– are related tothe COVID-19 pandemic.
Analysis of the discrepancies level between the dra version of the Operational
Programme and its nal form inboth programming periods (2007–2013 and 2014–
2020) provides strong evidence that the planning process was well managed. Its out-
come shows arelatively low level of overall change, at least at the level of Investments
Axis. Furthermore, acertain stringency was observed inthe management of EU funds

90 Aleksandra Firek, Szymon Kajma, Tomasz Tyc
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
by the national authority through the analysed Operational Programme. However,
we need toemphasize that higher discrepancies can be identied inthe partof the
programme related tothe National Budget contribution. In this case, further stud-
ies should be undertaken toprovide amore robust understanding of their source.
e research suggests that, toacertain degree, these discrepancies can be attributed
tothe economic conditions of local self-governments, which are key beneciaries of
EU-funded interventions inthe analysed Operational Programme.
is analysis, and others like it, could potentially allow for better preparation and
planning of future operational programmes and other instruments through which
EU funds are implemented. Budgetary performance, including expenditure eec-
tiveness, is assessed by the European and national or regional institutions as partof
their management procedures. However, the budgetary approach does notanalyse
the potential discrepancies between the planning period of aprogramme or budget
and the timeframe inwhich it is eectively implemented and managed. is area
has tended tobe neglected inrecent decades, especially as results-based programme
management has become the norm for the approach adopted by the EU.
We nd that further research should be concentrate on three distinctive issues:
the rst, an analysis of other Operational Programmes managed by both national
and regional authorities inPoland; second, an international comparison within the
Visegrad Group (e.g., Czechia and others), as well as with other EU Member states,
especially those being targeted by the Cohesion Fund; and third, an analysis at alevel
lower than the thematic objectives– specically, acloser look at the planning and
disbursement of funds across investment priorities and the types of interventions
made under the ERDF, the ESF, and the Cohesion Fund).
Authors Contributions
e authors conrms being the sole contributors of this work and have approved
it for publication.
Conict of Interest
e authors declare that the research was conducted inthe absence of any com-
mercial or nancial relationships that could be construed as apotential conict
of interest.

91How indicative are the financial tables? A Case Study of the Operational Programme…
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2024
Ethics Statement
e authors certies that the research published inthe text was carried out in
accordance with the research ethics of the aliated university.
Research Data Availability Statement
e original data presented inthe study are found inthe article. Further inquir-
ies may be made tothe authors.
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