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Diversifying European Supply Chains:
Can Africa Play a Role?
By Rainer Thiele*, Tomke Necker** and Cara Spitzer***
Summary
Multiple geopolitical disruptions have highlighted the need for firms to diversify their
supply chains. For Germany and the EU, this might imply an increased reliance on Africa,
the neighboring continent, for example when it comes to sourcing critical raw materials
for the energy transition towards renewables. In this paper, we critically assess whether
Africa can indeed play a significant role in Europe’s strategy of diversifying supply chains
and reducing its dependence on China in particular.
Zusammenfassung
Eine Vielzahl geopolitischer Verwerfungen haben für Unternehmen die Notwendigkeit
deutlich gemacht, Lieferketten stärker zu diversifizieren. Für Deutschland und die EU
könnte dies zu einer stärkeren Hinwendung zum Nachbarkontinent Afrika führen, etwa
wenn es darum geht, die Versorgung mit kritischen Rohstoffen für die Energiewende si-
cherzustellen. In diesem Artikel wird kritisch diskutiert, ob Afrika eine nennenswerte
Rolle dabei spielen kann, Europas Lieferketten zu diversifizieren und insbesondere die
Abhängigkeit von China zu reduzieren.
JEL classification: F15; L67; L72
Keywords: supply chains, critical raw materials, textiles and clothing, China, Africa
1. Introduction
Numerous supply chains that cut across multiple geographies and generate
significant economic benefits for the countries they connect are central to eco-
* Rainer Thiele, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, email: rainer.thiele@ifw-kiel.de
** Tomke Necker, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, email: tomle.necker@ifw-kiel.de
*** Cara Spitzer, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, email: cara.spitzer@ifw-kiel.de
Financial Support from the German Federal Ministry of Finance and the German Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action as part of the “Economic Re-
search Cluster on Africa” is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank an external reviewer
for helpful suggestions.
Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung: Published Online First
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nomic globalization. These complex networks of supply chains have contributed
to increased stability and prosperity worldwide. As the world’s largest manufac-
turing hub, China has played an instrumental role in shaping global supply
chains. However, trade tensions, the emergence of political disputes, the eco-
nomic upheaval caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the raw material needs
for the European energy transition towards renewables have revealed consider-
able risks associated with excessive reliance on a single supplier (Chepeliev etal.
2022; Müller 2023). In response to the geopolitical frictions centered around
China, suggestions to relocate production closer to the home country or to
more geographically favorable regions have gained significant traction. These
developments might prompt a reassessment of global production networks, with
European nations and companies seeking to mitigate vulnerabilities and diversi-
fy their sourcing strategies.
In this context, Europe’s neighboring continent– Africa– might emerge as a
nearshoring destination for key industries. Africa does not only have the advan-
tage of geographical closeness to Europe, closeness being a factor that has re-
peatedly been shown to matter for trade relations in gravity-type trade models
(e. g. Head and Mayer 2014). It could also benefit from existing language and
cultural ties that partly originate from the colonial past (e. g. Felbermayr and
Toubal 2010).
One example that we consider in more detail below is critical raw materials,
where China currently has a dominant position. Africa’s abundant reserves of
natural resources, including cobalt and lithium – essential for energy transi-
tions– coupled with its cost-competitive labor force, could render the continent
a viable alternative to established production regions (Karkare and Medinilla
2023). The promotion of value addition and downstream processing of minerals
might even facilitate a transition for African economies from a position of sup-
plying raw materials to a more integrated role within the global market, foster-
ing domestic economic growth and greater participation in higher-value seg-
ments (Mavhunga 2023).
A second example we specifically look at in this paper is the clothing sector, a
labor-intensive industry which contributed to East Asia’s spectacular industrial-
ization. In this case, economic forces rather than geopolitical shifts are mainly
behind the ongoing diversification of supply chains. China is still the world’s
leading exporter, but clothing sector investments have recently been shifted to
Asian low-wage economies, such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Bangla-
desh, taking advantage of rapidly rising wages in China (Altenburg etal. 2020).
The question we deal with is whether some African countries can also become
major clothing exporters, filling the space vacated by China.
The remainder of the paper discusses the potential of nearshoring in Africa
for these two industries. Similar considerations may also apply to other indus-
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Diversifying European Supply Chains
Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung
tries, examples including the establishment of vaccine production facilities in
Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, or
the location of automobile assembly lines in Morocco and Rwanda. The two cas-
es highlighted in this paper should therefore be regarded as exemplary rather
than providing an exhaustive account of ongoing or planned shifts in European
supply chains.
2. Sourcing Critical Raw Materials from Africa
The European intention to respond to China’s dominance in global value
chains is nowhere more apparent than in the raw materials sector. The EU’s
Critical Raw Materials Act specifically seeks to diversify away from this depend-
ence (Fernandez-Stark and Bember 2023). It foresees, among other things, that
only 65percent of the EU’s demand for a critical mineral may be sourced from
a single country. Currently, the EU itself extracts or processes very few critical
raw materials. Since 2000, the processing of these materials– including com-
modities such as aluminum, copper, iron, and rarer elements like gallium and
neodymium– has progressively shifted to China. For instance, China is current-
ly accounting for 100percent of the refined supply of natural graphite, 70per-
cent of cobalt, and almost 60percent of lithium and manganese (IRENA 2023),
and its share within all the manufacturing stages of solar panels exceeds 80per-
cent (IEA 2022). China may well use its strategic position in mineral supply
chains as a weapon for its geopolitical interests. It responded already to the US’
export controls on semiconductors with export restrictions of graphite (Carry
etal. 2023).
Africa is well endowed with many of the raw materials the EU considers as
critical. As shown in Table1 for selected raw materials that are among others
used in electrical vehicle batteries, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of
Congo are the leading producers worldwide of Manganese and Cobalt, respec-
tively, while African countries are also important suppliers of copper and graph-
ite. With respect to Lithium and Nickel, where production on the continent is
still fairly limited, countries like Gabon and Tanzania (Nickel) as well as Cote
d’Ivoire and Morocco (Lithium) are heavily investing in exploration activities
(IRENA 2023), and Zimbabwe has the fifth largest– still largely unexploited–
Lithium reserves worldwide. Hence, there is considerable scope for the EU to
include Africa in its strategy to diversify the sourcing of critical raw materials.
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Rainer Thiele, Tomke Necker and Cara Spitzer
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Tab le 1
Production Shares of Selected Raw Materials, 2022
Copper Manganese Nickel Cobalt Lithium Graphite
Chile 23.6 % South Africa 35.8 % Indonesia 48.8 %
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
70.0 % Australia 46.9 % China 64.6 %
Peru 10.0 % Gabon 22.9 % Philippines 10.1 % Indonesia 5.4 % Chile 30.0 % Mozambique 12.9 %
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
10.0 % Australia 16.4 % Russian
Federation 6.7 % Russian
Federation 4.8 % China 14.6 % Madagascar 8.4 %
China 8.6 % China 4.9 % France 5.8 % Australia 3.2 % Argentina 4.7 % Brazil 6.6 %
United States 5.9 % Ghana 4.7 % Australia 4.9 % Canada 2.1 % Brazil 1.6 % Others 7.5 %
Russian
Federation 4.5 % India 2.4 % Canada 4.0 % Cuba 2.0 % Others 2.2 %
Indonesia 4.1 % Brazil 2.0 % China 3.3 % Philippines 2.0 %
Australia 3.7 % Ukraine 2.0 % Brazil 2.5 % Others 10.5 %
Zambia 3.5 % Côte d’Ivoire 1.8 % Others 13.9 %
Mexico 3.3 % Malaysia 1.8 %
Kazakhstan 2.6 % Others 5.3 %
Canada 2.4 %
Poland 1.7 %
Others 16.1 %
Note: Adapted from IRENA (2023)
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Diversifying European Supply Chains
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Would Africa benefit?
While African leaders would most likely welcome additional demand for their
raw materials, the expected welfare effects of such a shift in supply chains to-
wards Africa are far from ensured. Africa is arguably the continent that suffers
most from the natural resource curse, i. e. the paradox that countries richly en-
dowed with raw materials tend to have lower GDP per capita and worse devel-
opment outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources (Henri 2019). Af-
rica’s main oil-producing countries– Angola and Nigeria– are prominent cases
in point. The main driver behind the resource curse is a lack of institutions such
as government accountability that are strong enough to enable a growth-en-
hancing investment of the resource rents rather than their capture (Hodler etal.
2023; Mehlum etal. 2006), and institutions are (too) weak in almost all African
countries with sizeable resource endowments.2 Linked to the resource curse is
the so-called “Dutch Disease”, the economic phenomenon by which booming
extractive industries crowd out tradable sectors such as manufacturing and ex-
port-oriented agriculture. With its dramatic decline in agricultural exports
when oil revenues expanded, Nigeria is again a telling example (Struthers 1990).
To avoid a repetition of the previous negative experience with resource booms
in Africa, there are initiatives underway to go beyond crude raw material ex-
traction, both from the African and the European side. The African Union, for
example, is currently working on a critical minerals strategy to help resource-rich
African countries advance industrial upgrading and integration into battery and
electrical vehicle value chains (Carry et al. 2023). Within the Global Gateway
framework launched in 2021 as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road initi-
ative, the EU supports similar endeavors. It already signed agreements with both
Argentina and Chile in 2023 to secure access to crucial lithium resources. In re-
turn, the EU committed to assisting with the development of competitive and
sustainable processing facilities as well as local value addition in the mining sec-
tor. Along the same lines, the EU is negotiating with several African countries,
including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Zambia (Fernan-
dez-Stark and Bember 2023). It has to be noted that the EU has set itself a goal
of processing at least 40percent of materials internally in the Critical Raw Ma-
terials Act (European Commission 2023), but that still leaves considerable room
for supporting value creation in Africa.
Value can be created through downstream and upstream linkages to the raw
materials sector. The former mostly involves processing and refining of minerals
in smelters and refineries. However, the operation of the smelters and refineries
2 Among the resource-rich countries in Africa, Botswana’s management of diamond
receipts is the only major exception, where the government succeeded in implementing
the right growth-promotion policies and ensuring that strong and inclusive institutions
are in place (Acemoglu etal. 2002).
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Rainer Thiele, Tomke Necker and Cara Spitzer
Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung
is both capital- and energy-intensive and has been shown to generate very low
profit margins (Carry etal. 2023). Significantly higher profit shares are generat-
ed at the next stage of the value chain, in product manufacturing, for example
through the production of batteries or battery components. As concerns back-
ward linkages, local suppliers tend to create more jobs and are often well-posi-
tioned to develop solutions that are tailored to context-specific mining condi-
tions (ibid.).
Most of the plans to increase the domestic value-added share of critical raw
materials in Africa are currently far from being implemented. A number of pre-
requisites have to be in place, including a skilled labor force, the necessary tech-
nology and know-how, an adequate power supply, a reliable infrastructure and
stable institutions that render longer-term engagement of multinational enter-
prises viable. Most African countries fall short of these prerequisites. For in-
stance, according to Transparency International’s corruption perception index
only four small African economies (Botswana, Cape Verde, Rwanda, Seychelles)
are ranked among the 50 least corrupt countries in 2023 (Transparency Interna-
tional 2024). Most African nations also lack the requisite connectivity between
mining sites, processing facilities and export hubs (Karkare and Medinilla 2023).
If properly implemented, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
agreement, which entered into force in 2019 and has been signed by all African
countries except Eritrea (Hinz etal. 2022), could alleviate some of the existing
impediments. It explicitly aims at removing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) such as
long waiting hours at borders and bottlenecks in physical infrastructure includ-
ing power grids.3 The AfCFTA could also render foreign investment more at-
tractive by overcoming the fragmentation of markets in Africa, and it could fa-
cilitate the establishment of regional value chains such as the envisioned
electrical vehicle battery cluster in the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (Foli 2020).
3. Importing Clothes from Africa
Despite its recent shift towards technologically more sophisticated products,
China is still a dominant player in the textile and clothing industry. In 2023, it
accounted for 42 and 32percent of world textile and clothing exports, respec-
tively, being by far the largest supplier worldwide (UN Comtrade). The EU, in
turn, sourced 34 and 28percent of its textile and clothing imports from China,
respectively. As shown in Figure1, when compared to China, all African coun-
3 Simulations using a gravity-type trade model developed at the Kiel Institute for the
World Economy show that a reduction of the NTBs (cost of doing business; transport
cost etc.) by 10percent within the AfCFTA could raise aggregate real production in Af-
rica by almost 30percent, while tariff reductions (tariffs are already low) would hardly
increase welfare on the continent (Hinz etal. 2022).
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Diversifying European Supply Chains
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tries taken together are currently only of little importance for the European
market. Two further issues can be discerned from Figure1. First, Africa’s weight
is considerably stronger in clothing than in textiles. This is in accordance with
Africa’s comparative advantage given that producing clothes is significantly
more labor-intensive than producing textiles. Second, its clothing exports to the
EU have slightly risen over time while China’s have fallen; the opposite is true
for textiles. This can be regarded as a very rough first indication that Africa
might have benefited from China slowly abandoning the labor-intensive cloth-
ing sector in response to rising wage costs.
While China retains its position as the world’s leading exporter despite rapid-
ly rising wages, clothing sector investments have recently been shifted to Asian
low-wage economies, such as Vietnam and Bangladesh. By contrast, a massive
relocation of clothing production capacities to Africa is not yet happening. Al-
tenburg etal. (2020) compare wages and labor productivity of six major Sub-Sa-
haran African (SSA) clothing exporters (Ethiopia, Madagascar, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, and Tanzania) to Asian counterparts (China, Bangladesh, and Viet-
nam) and three Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Portugal, and Turkey) that
are supposed to hold most promise as nearshoring locations that serve the Eu-
Figure 1: EU Textile and Clothing Imports from China and Africa, 2017 and 2023
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ropean market EU. It turns out that wage differentials are enormous, with China
having a minimum wage level 10times higher than Ethiopia. Among the SSA
countries covered, only Mauritius– one of the few upper-middle income coun-
tries in Africa– gets close to the wages paid in China. Low wages correspond to
low labor productivity in the poorer SSA countries. Still, Ethiopia and Ghana
are more attractive locations in terms of unit labor costs than China, Bangla-
desh, Vietnam, Morocco, and Portugal, whereas Madagascar and Kenya are less
attractive.
Unit labor costs are of course not the only determinant of a country’s compet-
itiveness. Analogous to the case of raw material processing, African countries
typically exhibit high cost of doing business in other dimensions, for instance
due to weak trade and transport infrastructure and inefficient bureaucracies.
The World Bank’s logistics performance index, for example, puts Turkey, Portu-
gal and Vietnam well ahead of Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar and Tanzania in
terms of trade and transport costs (World Bank 2024). The net effect on com-
petitiveness is hard to gauge, but in most cases low labor productivity and high
costs of doing business are likely to offset any wage advantages.
One African country for which this might not apply is Ethiopia (Ceglowski
et al. 2018). The country has attracted a broad set of global investors, mainly
from Asian countries such as China and India, through building several cloth-
ing-specific industrial parks (Khurana 2018). In these parks, investors are of-
fered various financial incentives, cheap water and electricity as well as a reliable
infrastructure. The government also encourages linkages between clothing, tex-
tile and agriculture by promoting the use of local cotton (Altenburg etal. 2020).
Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s textile industry depends heavily on foreign cotton and
other materials, which raises production costs and erodes potential advantages.
Madagascar constitutes another interesting case of an African country that plays
a significant role in the clothing industry. It has been the leading African cloth-
ing exporter to the EU since 2017 (UN Comtrade) despite very low labor pro-
ductivity and weak institutions. This is because Mauritius, the neighboring
country, has shifted most of its clothing industry to Madagascar in response to
steadily rising wages along its development path (Altenburg etal. 2020). Mauri-
tian firms have kept their more capital- and energy-intensive fabric mills in
Mauritius (and export fabric to their clothing assembly factories in Madagas-
car), among other things to escape unreliable water and electricity supply in
their host country.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed Africa’s potential to benefit from the EU’s
strategy to reduce its dependence from China by diversifying its supply chains,
focusing on critical raw materials and the textile and clothing industry. While
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any nearshoring to Africa cannot yet be observed in the data, it appears plausi-
ble that the EU will increasingly source critical raw materials from Africa where
many of them are in abundant supply.
A sizeable shift of European value chains towards sourcing from African
countries and at the same time establishing manufacturing capacities in Africa
will require that the continent becomes more attractive for foreign direct invest-
ment. This in turn will depend on appropriate framework conditions, including
a reliable infrastructure, a well-trained workforce, and stable institutions. There
are a number of successful examples such as the clothing industry in Ethiopia,
wind and solar parks in Morocco and Egypt, automobile assembly lines in Mo-
rocco, and vaccine production facilities in Rwanda and Senegal, which all were
made possible by a comparably favorable local business environment. Other Af-
rican countries still have a long way to go but can build on these examples.
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