Western goods and companies in Chinese exports to Russia

Abstract

This report examines the development of Western contents in Chinese exports to Russia, based on available trade and customs data. We focus on China and Hong Kong's changing role as a route for Western indirect trade and circumvention of sanctions

Full text

1
WESTERN GOODS AND COMPANIES
IN CHINESE EXPORTS TO RUSSIA
WESTERN CONTENTS IN RUSSIA’S IMPORTS FROM CHINA AND
HONG KONG DURING SANCTIONS
APRIL, 2025

2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
WESTERN GOODS AND COMPANIES IN CHINESE EXPORTS TO RUSSIA ................................ 1
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 3
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 6
WHAT THE DATA SAY : INCREASING CHINESE SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA .................................. 7
MORE WESTERN GOODS VIA CHINA AND HONG KONG ..................................................... 8
WESTERN COMPANIES CONTRIBUTE TO CHINESE SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA ........................ 13
TECHNICAL TABLES .......................................................................................................... 16
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
B4Ukraine is a global civil society coalition with a singular mission:
to sever nancial and material support for Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Norwegian Helsinki Committee is a human rights organisation
founded in 1977. NHC works to ensure that human rights are
respected in practice, through monitoring, reporting, teaching and
democracy support in Central-Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Corisk is a Norwegian data-driven consultancy focusing on trade,
evasions and compliance with sanctions. Their analysis has
supported investigations and governments across Europe.
B4Ukraine and partners use this research to do data-driven
advocacy, urging companies to comply with sanctions regulations
and operate responsibly, in alignment with their obligations under
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights. To date, B4Ukraine has engaged with over 200 companies,
emphasising these obligations and highlighting the extreme risks
associated with business operations in, or trade with, Russia.
Front page photo: Evan Amos (Public Domain).

3
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This report examines the development of Western contents in Chinese exports to Russia, based
on available trade and customs data. We focus on China and Hong Kong's changing role as a
route for Western indirect trade and circumvention of sanctions, with emphasis on industries at
particular risk of exporting war-critical goods to Russia. Ending such direct and indirect supplies
is crucial to stop Russia’s illegal war and defend international law.
We nd that companies in the sanction coalition produce goods that are increasingly exported
to Russia via China and Hong Kong, unintendedly or as a strategy to circumvent export controls.
However, the general pattern contains several important nuances. Several European and
Japanese companies increasingly export indirectly to Russia via China and Hong Kong, while US
companies have in total reduced the shadow export over this East-Asian corridor (Tables 5-6).
Among European countries, German companies saw the largest increase in the ow of goods
through China. Irish, Dutch, Belgian, Swiss, Polish, Czech, and Slovenian companies also
upheld or increased their indirect exports to Russia via through China and Hong Kong. On the
other hand, there were substantial declines in indirect exports from French, Italian, Austrian,
Romanian, British, and Nordic companies.
There are both pull and push factors behind China’s emergence as a route for shadow export to
Russia. Other circumvention routes have been closed (Belarus) or come under intensied
scrutiny (Turkey, UAE, ex-Soviet states) as high-risk facilitators of sanction evasion. China’s
economy is a behemoth compared to other states on Russia’s periphery. Therefore, excessive
exports to China may appear less conspicuous than to countries like Georgia or Kazakhstan.
Several Western companies with production sites and daughter companies in Asia, export
goods to Russia via China or Hong Kong. Several had no exports to Russia this route before 2022,
but introduced or expanded this trade considerably during the sanction period. Further research
will illuminate whether Western companies increase their role in Chinese-Russian trade as a
consequence of improved enforcement of circumvention via Belarus and other western routes.
Total Russian imports from China and Hong Kong more than doubled from $ 54 billion in 2019, to
$ 125.2 billion in 2023. While direct Russian imports from China and Hong Kong stabilized from
2023, Chinese exports to Kazakhstan increased excessively, indicating Chinese circumvention
and parallel exports to Russia via this Central Asian country. This raises the question of whether
the risk of secondary sanctions has forced parts of Chinese exports to take indirect routes.
The value of Western-origin goods in re-export via China and Hong Kong increased during the
rst two years of sanctions, from an average monthly value of $ 255 million before sanctions, to
more than $ 300 million after the 2022 attack. Totals under the whole period equal $ 9.22 bn. We
see an increase in the re-export of Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean, German and Italian goods
during sanctions, and a decline in goods originating in the United States and United Kingdom.
The average monthly value of US-origin goods in the Chinese-Russian trade ow decreased from
$ 94 million before sanctions, to $ 61 million in the latest sanction period (August 2023 to July
2024). The monthly value of goods from Europe was $ 108 million before sanctions, jumping to $
123 million in the period from August 2023. Goods from Japan and Taiwan also increased their
shares of the trade markedly, while Korean-origin goods increased only modestly.

4
While Russia’s imports of Western-origin goods via China and Hong Kong have expanded, this
represent only a part of Russia’s attempt to circumvent sanctions. Apart from the Western-
origin goods, the Chinese-Russian trade ow also contains produced by Western companies
abroad, in subsidiaries operated in other countries outside the sanction coalition. This includes
goods produced by Western subsidiaries or controlled production sites in China and elsewhere.
Goods produced by Western companies abroad now make up 66 percent of all Western content
in Chinese-Russian exports, larger than the value of goods produced inside Western countries.
The total value of Russian imports from China and Hong Kong that were produced by Western-
registered companies anywhere in the world, totalled $ 23.69 billion during the sanction years
from April 2022, of which $ 17.91 billion produced by European, North American, and Australian
companies. Western companies’ products in the export declined from $ 996 million per month
before sanctions, to monthly $ 624 million in the most recent sanction period (August 2023 to
July 2024, see Figure 6 and Table 6). While European companies upheld the value of their goods
owing to Russia, goods produced US and Taiwanese rms declined by almost two thirds.
There is an increase in circumvention via China and Hong Kong for many Western electronic
components manufacturers, machinery and tools producers, and car and truck manufacturers.
There is also a trend towards increased indirect sales of medical equipment. On the other hand,
the aviation and shipbuilding industries are still reluctant to circumvent sanctions this way.

5
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
The EU and European governments should address the ow of sanctioned goods to Russia via
China and Hong, by increasing resources and eorts of enforcement. The implementation of
common provisions concerning circumvention and daughter companies in the EU, should be
supported by joint investigating groups focusing on companies participating in this trade.
The EU should transparently monitor enforcement so that the European public can see how
member states investigate and prosecute entities and individuals involved in sanction evasion.
The Ukrainian government and the EU should demand that companies participating in
reconstruction or tenders under the Ukraine facility, have not violated sanctions.
Investors, owners, pensions funds, and nancial institutions should address companies at risk
to strengthen corporate compliance cultures and resources, through ownership dialogue and at
shareholder meetings. This report has studied how a large number of companies increased
indirect sales via China and Hong Kong, many of whom have a high-risk product mix.
The governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Canada, and Japan need to
address particularly worrying increases in circumvention trade via China and Hong Kong.
The government of Ireland has for years attracted domicile registration of multinational
companies with low corporate taxes. These multinationals command daughter companies and
production sites all over the world, which take part in Chinese-Russian trade. Irish authorities
must substantially expand enforcement and export controls to address these companies.
Photo: Dili (CC-BY-SA 3.0)

6
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY
Western companies are involved in Chinese supplies that crucially support Russia’s economy
and war eort, including via circumvention exports, and as owners of Chinese and third-party
production for export to Russia. Ending such supplies is crucial to end the illegal war and defend
international law. This report examines the development in Chinese exports to Russia, and the
role of Western goods and Western companies in these supplies. It is based on detailed trade
data and customs data, gathered and analysed by Corisk from November 2024 to January 2025.
The period consistently covered runs from January 2019 to July 2024. Corisk methodologies and
datasets developed over the last two years, includes a laborious calibration of granular customs
data against oicial macro trade data from Chinese customs and UN ComTrade. Per-company
product values are based on customs data for 1,700 Western companies, including all that were
producing more than $ 1 million of goods in the Chinese-Russian export ow in the period.
Chinese circumvention exports to Russia via Kazakhstan is estimated along an Excessive Trade
Methodology. Trade sourced from Chinese and Kazakh customs data is regarded as excessive
(indicating circumvention or parallel trade) when it exceeds a 2019-2021 baseline level by 20 %,
with this threshold increasing from 2023 onwards by an additional 1 % every second month. The
excessiveness threshold represents Kazakhstani economic growth plus estimated ination in
imports. Excessiveness is veried against total Kazakhstani imports which increase excessively,
and considerably more than the estimated excessive Chinese exports (Table 1).
Russian customs data included 322 million import shipments from China and 25 million from
Hong Kong from January 2019. Import data from Russian customs rely on third-party aggregation
of such data and present missing data through the period - with particular levels of missing data
during the fall of 2021, the fall of 2023, and from May 2024 onwards. The magnitude of missing
data can be inferred from Figure 1, below. With the variable completeness of customs data
through the sanction period, data have been continuously adjusted by an inator corresponding
to the dierence between Russian and Chinese / UN total trade values.
Chinese and Hong Kong export data are more comprehensive than Russian customs import
data, especially during the more recent periods, and this report therefore performs an upward
adjustment of Russian data in order to match Chinese export data FOB (free-on-board). That
upward adjustment for China is on average 55.2 % over the period, but less than 17.3 % if we
exclude the most recent months of May-July 2024, which have substantial Russian under-
reporting. The report similarly adjusts Russian data on imports of goods of Western origin from
China and Hong Kong, where each Western country’s production of goods present in Chinese
and Hong Kong exports is adjusted equally as the adjustment of total Russian imports. This
implies an assumption that Russian customs under-report Chinese and Hong Kong exports of
Western-origin goods just as much as they under-report goods of other origins in those exports.
Company-level trade has been retrieved from Russian Customs data during the period, with no
distinction made between sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods. The report does not identify
any company or individual as being liable for breach or violation of sanctions. Company trade is
referred solely in aggregate numbers, regardless of whether goods were sanctioned or not.

7
WHAT THE DATA SAY : INCREASING
CHINESE SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA
Russian total imports from China and Hong Kong more than doubled from $ 54 billion in 2019 to
$ 125.5 billion in 2023 (Figure 1, Table 1). While direct Russian imports from China and Hong
Kong stabilized during 2024, (excessive) exports to Kazakhstan continued to increase, indicating
an expansion of Chinese circumvention exports and/or Russian parallel imports via this Central
Asian country. We also see that Russian customs data normally under-reports trade compared
to Chinese data, except from the reporting year 2022. In 2024 the under-reporting in available
Russian data marginally exceeds 50 %, possibly attesting to an increasing tendency of Russian
sources to conceal trade in reporting to third-parties.
Figure 1 presents Russian total imports from China and Hong Kong, including excessive Chinese
exports to Kazakhstan that presumedly end up in Russia (see detailed annual data in Table 1).
Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 is marked by a thicker vertical, black line. Direct
exports from China represent the bulk of trade, growing to about $ 10 billion per month from late
2022. Direct exports from Hong Kong remain rather constant through the period but with a
downward trend in 2024. Excessive Chinese exports to Kazakhstan occur from June 2022 and
thereafter climb to represent about 10 % of China’s total commodity export to Russia:
FIGURE 1: Total Russian imports of goods from China and Hong Kong
Parts of these Chinese exports also consist of commodities produced in Western countries that
have been rst imported to China or Hong Kong and then re-exported to Russia. We will analyse
such Western circumvention exports in the following chapter, and then analyse the export of
goods produced by Western company subsidiaries outside of the Western countries
themselves, including such Western-controlled production in China.

8
MORE WESTERN GOODS VIA CHINA AND
HONG KONG
The total value of Western-origin goods in Chinese and Hong Kong exports to Russia was $ 3.8
billion in 2022, and $ 6.1 billion in 2023. If we exclude the pre-war hoarding in early 2022, Russia
imported Western-origin goods worth $ 9.22 billion under eective sanctions between April
2022 and July 2024. Again, throughout this and the following chapters, we include all Chinese
exports of Western goods to Russia, without distinction to whether or not the commodities
traded were sanctioned, or not.
We see from Figure 2 that Western goods (red) are relatively modest with around 5-10 % of
Chinese exports to Russia. But we must consider that while Chinese-origin exports (yellow)
include substantial volumes of food, clothing, and other staple commodities, Western-origin
goods are predominantly high-tech items.
FIGURE 2: Russian imports of Western-origin goods (red) from China and Hong Kong
Western-origin goods that were produced in the Western countries, represent a circumvention
export to Russia via China and Hong Kong – intentional or unintentional from the side of Western
producers. This Western-origin share of the exports was high in 2019, peaking at $ 800 million
(17% of totals) in August, but virtually disappeared when Covid-19 struck later in the fall.
Western commodities soon re-emerged to reach $ 630 million in September 2022, only half a
year after Russia’s full-scale invasion, and $ 690 million in April 2023.
However, the composition of Western-origin goods by country changed considerably over time.
Adjusted country data are presented below in Figure 3 (detailed data in Tables 2-4).

9
FIGURE 3: Monthly Russian imports from China and Hong Kong, by Western country of origin
Western goods in Russian imports 2019-2021 were mostly produced in Europe or the USA (pink,
red), with random spikes indicative of occasional sales of airplanes or industrial equipment. A
new pattern emerged from June 2022, as sanctions took hold and Western-origin goods became
more constantly present. More goods emerged from Taiwan (orange), especially in electronics.
Japan and South Korea (light blue, blue) emerged as more continuous sources of goods,
typically car parts and electronics. After substantial increase in 2022 and 2023, Western-origin
goods declined to around $ 200 million per month in early 2024. But here, we must bear in mind
the higher level of missing customs data in 2024: If there are more missing data for war-relevant
goods, it may lead us to underestimate the share of Western-origin goods in the trade in 2024.
During sanctions from April 2022, apart from China and Hong Kong themselves, the top-10 origin
countries of these goods in Russian imports were Taiwan (bn$ 1.76), USA (bn$ 1.35), Malaysia
(m$ 956.74), Japan (m$ 943,59), South Korea (m$ 764.03), Vietnam (m$ 748,95), Indonesia (m$
594.50), Germany (m$ 567.93), Thailand (m$ 456,19), and Italy (m$ 299,95). Among Western
countries followed 13. France (m$ 161.15), 15. United Kingdom (m$ 154.68), 16. Czechia (m$
117.71), 17. Spain (m$ 112,16), 19. The Netherlands (m$ 82,15), 21. Sweden (m$ 71.44), 24.
Switzerland (m$ 67.88), 26. Canada (m$ 48.11), 28. Finland (m$ 40.44), 29. Hungary (m$ 37.79),
31. Austria (m$ 32,20), 33. Poland (m$ 29.80), 34. Romania (m$ 29.16), 35. Norway (m$ 27.84),
36. Belgium (m$ 27.18), 37. Denmark (m$ 26.61), 39. Ireland (m$ 20.56), 41. Australia (m$
16.61), 42. Croatia (m$ 16.00), 44. Latvia (m$ 11.51), 49. Malta (m$ 7.28), 50. Slovakia (m$ 6.74).
Manzhouli at the Chinese-Russian border. Photo: Myan Ming (CC-BY-SA 3.0)

10
In Figure 4 we present the same Western-origin products in Russia’s imports from China and
Hong Kong, as monthly averages over three distinct periods. In the pre-sanction period until
March 2022, Western-origin countries amounted to $ 255 million per month, dominated by
goods from Europe and the USA. In the rst sanction period from April 2022, Western-origin
goods expanded, induced by inows of Taiwanese-origin products. In the mature sanctions
period from August 2023, European, Korean and Japanese goods gained market share in this
indirect export channel to Russia, at the expense of goods originating in the USA and Taiwan.
FIGURE 4: Russian imports from China and Hong Kong before and during sanctions, by Western
country of origin
Figure 5 presents the countries of origin (country of production) of goods in the Chinese-Russian
exports ow during the calendar years of 2022, 2023, and 2024 (January-July).
FIGURE 5: Western countries of origin of goods in Russia’s imports from China and Hong Kong
during the years 2022 - 2024

11
Goods worth $ 2.24 billion produced in Taiwan were shipped to Russia via China or Hong Kong
over the almost three years, including $ 780 million in 2022 and $ 990 million in 2023. Next
follows goods produced in the United States, but with a substantial decline of such goods in
2024. Keeping in mind that the 2024 gures only include seven months of trade, circumvention
exports by Japan, Korea, Germany, Italy and Canada seem to be increasing and expanding into
2024, while there is a clear decline in such indirect exports to Russia of goods produced in the
UK, France, Netherlands, and Finland. Other countries display less origin export (Tables 3-4).
Drone attack in Lviv, Ukraine, January 2024. Photo: National Police of Ukraine (CC-BY-SA 4.0)
China is an entrepot for a great variety of Western goods, including digital equipment, heavy
machinery, and ships. Hong Kong is more narrowly an entrepot for indirect exports of digital
equipment and luxury goods, with much less facilitation of trade in heavy machinery or vehicles.
In Russian imports from China, during the sanction period from April 2022, the major
commodity groups (with HS system Heading numbers) originating from the United States were
aircraft 8802 (m$ 292.27), integrated circuits 8542 (m$ 76.08), computers 8471 (m$ 56,02),
turbojets and gas turbines 8411 (m$ 39.22), and analytical instruments 9027 (m$ 24,02). The
major commodity groups originating from Taiwan were integrated circuits 8542 (m$ 234.40),
computers 8471 (m$ 82.96), computer parts 8473 (m$ 71.64), telephones 8517 (m$ 66.32), and
machining centres 8457 (m$ 58.21). The machining centres group includes machinery critical to

12
arms production such as computer-numerical controlled machines (CNC machines). Major
commodity groups originating in Japan were rubber tyres 4011 (m$ 138.40), lathes and turning
centres 8458 (m$ 88.98), car parts 8708 (m$ 86.85), rubber articles 4016 (m$ 49,94), and ships
8901 (m$ 35.78). For goods originating in South Korea, the largest groupings were ships 8901
(m$ 171.90), integrated circuits 8542 (m$ 39.58), polymers 3901 (m$ 21.35), various machines
8479 (m$ 18.38), and car parts 8708 (m$ 17.74). From Germany, major groups of origination
were other instruments 9031 (m$ 23.52), electrical parts 8538 (m$ 19.73), valves 8481 (m$
19.52), agricultural machines 8436 (m$ 19.14), and electrical control boards 8537 (m$ 18.94).
Goods originating in Italy included heating or cooking machines 8419 (m$ 52.12), escalators or
lifts 8428 (m$ 34.95), spraying appliances 8424 (m$ 13.20), steam heating boilers 8402 (m$
11.69), and valves 8481 (m$ 18.94). Goods originating in France included aircraft 8802 (m$
14.75), turbojets and gas turbines 8411 (m$ 12.86), electrical switches 8536 (m$ 8.51), liquid
pumps 8413 (m$ 6.17), and refrigerators 8418 (m$ 4.93).
In Russian imports from Hong Kong, in the sanction period from April 2022, major commodity
groups (with HS system Heading numbers) originating in the United States were integrated
circuits 8542 (m$ 104.85), computers 8471 (m$ 69.69), electrical switches 8536 (m$ 29.87),
telephones 8517 (m$ 17.04), and electrical converters etc 8504 (m$ 12,66). The major
commodity groups from Taiwan were computers 8471 (m$ 232.95), integrated circuits 8542 (m$
212.99), computer parts 8473 (m$ 168.24), telephones 8517 (m$ 134.924), and digital storage
media 8523 (m$ 56.22). Major commodities originating in Japan were broadcasting apparatus
8525 (m$ 12.19), gaming consoles 9504 (m$ 9.58), semiconductors 8541 (m$ 8.62), electrical
capacitors 8532 (m$ 8.45), and electrical switches 8536 (m$ 3.98). Goods from South Korea
were dominated by computers 8471 (m$ 72.94), computer parts 8473 (m$ 68.91), digital storage
media 8523 (m$ 55.40), integrated circuits 8542 (m$ 37.63), and skin care products 3304 (m$
2.29). Major goods originating in Germany were electrical switches 8536 (m$ 11.18), analytical
instruments 9030 (m$ 4.31), computers 8471 (m$ 4.27), radar or radio apparatus 8526 (m$
4.21), and transmission shafts 8483 (m$ 4.04). Goods from Italy rst of all included jewellery
7113 (m$ 14.30), computers 8471 (m$ 7.94), telephones 8517 (m$ 3.26), transmission shafts
8483 (m$ 1.82), and terrain working machinery 8430 (m$ 1,67). Goods from France included
integrated circuits 8542 (m$ 12.38), electrical switches 8536 (m$ 9.41), wine 2204 (m$ 3.17),
semiconductors 8541 (m$ 2.16), and turbojets and gas turbines 8411 (m$ 1.56).
Altogether, goods produced in Western countries were relatively modestly represented with less
than 10 % of Chinese exports to Russia. But these gures ignore the content of goods produced
by Western rms and their overseas subsidiaries and daughter companies abroad.

13
WESTERN COMPANIES CONTRIBUTE TO
CHINESE SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA
Western companies do not produce only in their homelands, they are also present outside of
their own countries of registry, with subsidiaries, joint ventures, and various production sites in
China and elsewhere. These Western owned production sites also export indirectly to Russia.
To detect the total share of Chinese commodity exports to Russia that was produced by
Western-registered companies, we analysed customs data at company level. In the survey, we
included sought up all Western-registered rms supplying more than $ 1 million in Russian
imports of goods from China and Hong Kong (Figures 3-4). We recorded 1,700 such Western
rms, and aggregated values for those rms’ products in the same three periods as already
presented: pre-sanction years from January 2019 to March 2022, the early sanctions period from
April 2022 to July 2023, and the mature sanction period from August 2023 to July 2024.
In this chapter, we present the combined indirect exports to Russia of Western companies,
without revealing any company names. The relevant trade relates to both sanctioned and non-
sanctioned goods, and the data do not entail estimates or indications of illegal trade. Western
totals amounted to $ 23.69 billion in the whole sanctions period, of which almost $ 5.78 billion
from companies of East Asia, and $ 17.91 billion from Europe, North America, and Australia.
However, the data on country-wise indirect trade by domestically registered companies will be
of high relevance to law enforcement and export control authorities in the related countries.
Figure 4 presented only goods produced in Western countries. We now study how much the
1,700 Western rms produced globally, and which China or Hong Kong exported to Russia.
Figure 6 shows the share of Western-registered rms’ goods in these total exports to Russia via
China or Hong Kong. Western companies enjoyed a substantial share of products in the pre-
2022 exports from China and Hong Kong to Russia, reaching 19.3 % in that rst period. That
share was halved in the 2022-2023 early sanctions period, dropping to 12.5 % of the totals. From
August 2023 when more comprehensive sanctions were enacted, the Western rms’ share
further dropped to 6.8 % of export from China and Hong Kong to Russia.
FIGURE 6: Western companies’ share of Russian imports of goods from China and Hong Kong

14
In Figure 7, below, Western rms’ total goods in Russian imports from China and Hong Kong are
measured by monthly average for the three periods, presented at country level. We notice how
Western-registered companies have reduced their total global production that ows to Russia
via China and Hong Kong. But geographical dierences are now striking: European (pink) and
Japanese companies (light blue) increased their production of goods exported to Russia, while
US companies (red) have sharply reduced their total values and share of such goods. The same
did companies registered in Korea (blue) and Taiwan (orange).
FIGURE 7: Russian imports from China and Hong Kong before and during sanctions, by Western
country of the manufacturing company’s domicile
Figure 8 below presents goods produced by European rms that were imported by Russia from
China or Hong Kong. German rms (pink) make up more than half of the European-controlled
production in this trade ow, with increasing indirect export values during the sanction period.
FIGURE 8: Russian imports from China and Hong Kong before and during sanctions, by
European country of the manufacturing company’s domicile

15
Companies registered in Ireland also increased their manufacture of these traded goods, while
there was a clear decline for companies registered in France, United Kingdom, and Sweden.
Italian companies also reduced their role in this indirect trade, but rebound in the latest period.
Figure 9 presents the countries of registry of companies that had the largest value of products in
the Chinese-Russian exports ow during sanctions, between April 2022 and July 2024. US
companies produced goods worth $ 7 billion during the rst sanctions period from April 2022 to
July 2023 (blue), and $ 1.8 billion in the later period from August 2023 to July 2024 (dark blue).
This clear decline in US companies’ involvement in the indirect trade, is similarly matched by a
decline in the later period of products manufactured by Taiwanese, and British rms.
FIGURE 9: Western countries whose companies produced most goods in Russia’s imports from
China and Hong Kong during sanctions (April 2022 – July 2024)
We observe how German companies were behind less products in the later sanction period, but
that period is shorter (12 vs 16 months), and represented an increase from $ 156 million to $ 167
million per month. A similar increase in involvement in the later sanctions period is seen among
rms from Italy, and partly by rms registered in Japan, Korea, and Slovenia.
Hotel in Kharkiv after Russian bombing, January 2024. Photo: National Police of Ukraine (CC-BY-SA 4.0)

16
TECHNICAL TABLES
Table 1 below presents the magnitude of total Chinese and Hong Kong exports to Russia 2019-
2024 according to local / Corisk estimated export data versus Russian import data, and the
implied annual Adjustment factor that is needed to adjust upwards the Russian customs data:
TABLE 1: Total Russian direct and indirect imports from China and Hong Kong, 2019-2024
Import ows to Russia, source
Billion USD
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
(I - VII)
Total exports to Russia (below)
54.25
55.53
73.29
84.48
125.53
69.24
China to Russia, Chinese customs
49.48
50.61
67.60
76.27
111.33
61.71
China to Russia, Russian customs
42.60
41.38
47.03
79.35
108.64*
31.28
→
Adjustment factor
1.16
1.22
1.44
0.96
1.02
1.97
Hong Kong to Russia, Corisk estimation
4.77
4.92
5.69
5.73
4.97
0.96
Hong Kong to Russia, Russian customs
5.00
4.31
5.08
4.61
4.33
0.67
→
Adjustment factor
1.06
1.14
1.12
1.24
1.15
1.43
China via Kazakhstan, Corisk estimate
2.48
9.23
6.57
* Russian customs data for August-September 2023 missing, set at adjacent period average.
Table 2 below presents adjusted shares of Western-origin goods in Russia’s imports from China
and Hong Kong, and the non-Chinese-origin share of Chinese excessive exports to Kazakhstan.
The data do not distinguish between sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods, they simply present
the shares of Western produced goods irrespective of the legal status of the commodities.
TABLE 2: Total Russian imports from China and Hong Kong by country of origin, adjusted
annually to match total trade values, 2019-2024
Russian imports, adjusted
Billion USD
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023*
2024
(I - VII)
Direct from China + Hong Kong
54.256
55.070
72.065
80.368
115.367
65.684
Western origin
6.428
3.401
2.953
3.240
5.830
3.429
Europe
1.983
1.254
0.601
0.668
1.370
0.877
Germany
0.097
0.052
0.085
0.111
0.444
0.233
France
0.776
0.210
0.162
0.110
0.111
0.043
Italy
0.929
0.833
0.014
0.047
0.177
0.251
Spain
0.010
0.002
0.200
0.115
0.014
0.012
Czechia
0.010
0.003
0.004
0.057
0.070
0.054
Sweden
0.003
0.005
0.002
0.008
0.065
0.024
United Kingdom
0.079
0.097
0.076
0.111
0.116
0.038
United States of America
2.075
0.274
0.727
0.569
1.144
0.294
Japan
0.067
0.070
0.094
0.276
0.564
0.449
Korea
0.190
0.362
0.703
0.255
0.354
0.441
Taiwan
0.121
0.181
0.214
0.784
0.991
0.464
Kazakhstan from World
39.709
22.158
27.752
30.952
61.161
..
Kazakhstan from China
12.807
11.707
12.910
16.390
24.840
16.026
Of which excessive
2.475
9.233
6.569
China origin, total
1.670
..
4.189
Non-China origin
0.805
..
2.380
* Russian customs data for August-September 2023 missing, set at adjacent period average.

17
Table 3 below presents adjusted shares of Western-origin goods in Russia’s imports from China.
The data does not distinguish between sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods, but presents the
shares of Western produced goods irrespective of the legal status of the commodities.
TABLE 3: Total Russian imports from China by country of origin, adjusted annually to match total
trade values, 2019-2024
Russian imports, adjusted
Billion USD
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023*
2024
(I - VII)
Direct imports from China
49.48
50.61
67.60
76.27
111.33
61.71
Western origin
4.191
2.466
1.912
1.871
4.463
2.505
Europe
1.238
0.987
0.452
0.473
1.122
0.686
Germany
0.094
0.041
0.077
0.098
0.386
0.168
Netherlands
0.001
0.004
0.003
0.011
0.072
0.018
Belgium
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.005
0.016
0.012
France
0.117
0.010
0.110
0.040
0.081
0.034
Switzerland
0.002
0.000
0.001
0.010
0.040
0.018
Austria
0.004
0.001
0.000
0.006
0.021
0.009
Italy
0.929
0.825
0.007
0.036
0.146
0.216
Spain
0.010
0.002
0.200
0.114
0.013
0.010
Portugal
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.007
Romania
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.035
0.002
Hungary
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.013
0.004
Czechia
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.045
0.052
0.048
Poland
0.000
0.001
0.004
0.007
0.017
0.008
Lithuania
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.005
Latvia
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.002
0.001
Estonia
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
Sweden
0.003
0.005
0.002
0.007
0.062
0.023
Finland
0.031
0.020
0.002
0.019
0.026
0.009
Norway
0.002
0.004
0.026
0.019
0.004
0.004
Denmark
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.018
0.014
Ireland
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.017
0.009
United Kingdom
0.009
0.066
0.012
0.036
0.078
0.029
Canada
0.001
0.002
0.008
0.012
0.024
0.016
United States of America
1.415
0.032
0.143
0.194
0.922
0.195
Japan
0.056
0.055
0.081
0.242
0.496
0.372
Korea
0.178
0.339
0.672
0.113
0.248
0.381
Taiwan
0.059
0.061
0.100
0.358
0.520
0.165
Australia
0.005
0.003
0.003
0.005
0.008
0.005
* Russian customs data for August-September 2023 missing, set at adjacent period average.

18
Table 4 below presents adjusted shares of Western-origin goods in Russia’s imports from Hong
Kong. The data do not distinguish between sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods but present
the shares of Western produced goods irrespective of the legal status of the commodities.
TABLE 4: Total Russian imports from Hong Kong by country of origin, adjusted annually to match
total trade values, 2019-2024
Russian imports, adjusted
Billion USD
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023*
2024
(I - VII)
Direct from Hong Kong
4.771
4.461
4.469
4.103
4.035
3.970
Western origin
2.237
0.935
1.041
1.369
1.367
0.924
Europe
0.745
0.267
0.149
0.195
0.248
0.190
Germany
0,003
0.011
0.008
0.013
0.058
0.065
Netherlands
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.006
0.002
Belgium
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.002
0.001
0.001
France
0.659
0.200
0.051
0.069
0.030
0.008
Switzerland
0.002
0.002
0.005
0.003
0.013
0.016
Austria
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.004
Italy
0.001
0.008
0.006
0.010
0.031
0.035
Spain
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
Portugal
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.000
Romania
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
Hungary
0.000
0.005
0.009
0.002
0.022
0.001
Czechia
0.007
0.001
0.002
0.008
0.014
0.025
Poland
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.006
0.004
Lithuania
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Latvia
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.005
0.000
Estonia
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
Sweden
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.003
Finland
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.007
0.006
Norway
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
Denmark
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.002
Ireland
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001
United Kingdom
0.070
0.030
0.064
0,074
0,037
0,009
Canada
0,002
0,000
0,001
0,003
0,003
0,006
United States of America
0.659
0.242
0.584
0.375
0.222
0.099
Japan
0.011
0.015
0.013
0.034
0.068
0.077
Korea
0.011
0.023
0.030
0.142
0.106
0.060
Taiwan
0.062
0.121
0.114
0.426
0.471
0.299
Australia
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.002
* Russian customs data for August-September 2023 missing, set at adjacent period average.

19
Table 5 below presents estimates of monthly Russian imports from China and Hong Kong of
goods produced by Western companies and their subsidiaries anywhere in the world.
TABLE 5: Total Russian imports of goods from China and Hong Kong, adjusted, produced by
Western companies according to their registered country of domicile, 2019-2024
Russian imports from China + Hong
Kong of goods made by Western
companies, by their registered country
of domicile Million USD
January 2019 –
March 2022
39 months
April 2022 –
July 2023
16 months
August 2023 –
July 2024*
12 months
Via China, adjusted
33 645.4
11 779.0
6 774.5
Monthly average
862.7
736.2
564.5
Via Hong Kong, adjusted
5 152.1
3 578.6
1 104.2
Monthly average
132.1
223.7
92.0
Total via China + Hong Kong
Europe
15 308.2
4 746.2
3 842.1
Germany
5 827.6
2 526.8
2 001.1
Netherlands
172.5
194.1
95.9
Belgium
70.6
44.9
42.5
Luxembourg
0.0
1.4
1.5
France
2 117.0
325.5
191.3
Switzerland
410.6
209.6
132.7
Austria
134.7
37.6
24.1
Slovenia
1.4
173.6
158.8
Croatia
0.0
0.0
0.4
Italy
2 421.2
227.8
414.9
Spain
4.3
1.1
3.1
Portugal
0.2
0.4
1.1
Greece
0.9
0.8
2.2
Romania
468.0
21.8
4.8
Hungary
0.0
0.1
0.2
Slovakia
0.0
0.1
0.0
Czechia
1.3
7.7
19.6
Poland
1.5
2.4
5.2
Lithuania
3.3
1.5
0.9
Latvia
3.6
5.2
2.1
Estonia
1.7
0.0
0.4
Sweden
1 307.3
92.5
138.4
Finland
224.7
40.9
39.9
Norway
1.6
3.7
4.6
Denmark
289.3
95.6
33.4
Ireland
1 090.2
509.8
392.2
United Kingdom
754.5
221.4
120.8
Canada
6.9
16.6
10.0
United States of America
14 641.6
7 007.2
1 813.9
Japan
1 522.7
1 426.8
1 092.9
Korea
3 767.9
810.1
630.0
Taiwan
3 550.1
1 347.9
488.3
Australia
0.1
2.8
1.3
* Russian customs data for August-September 2023 missing, set at adjacent period average.

20
Table 6 below presents the same estimates as in Table 5, but with average monthly values.
TABLE 6: Average monthly Russian imports of goods from China and Hong Kong, adjusted, by
Western companies according to their registered country of domicile, 2019-2024
* Russian customs data for August-September 2023 missing, set at adjacent period average.
Russian imports from China and
Hong Kong from Western producing
companies, by the domicile country
of registry.
Million USD
January
2019 –
March
2022
April
2022 –
July
2023
August
2023 –
July
2024*
Change from the
pre-sanction
period (2019-22)
to the sanction
period (2022-24)
Goods via China, adjusted
862.7
736.2
564.5
- 25 %
Goods via Hong Kong, adjusted
132.1
223.7
92.0
+ 19 %
Total via China + Hong Kong
994.8
959.8
656.6
- 21 %
Europe
392.5
296.6
320.2
- 22 %
Germany
149.4
157.9
167.6
+ 8 %
Netherlands
4.4
12.1
8.0
+ 115 %
Belgium
1.8
2.8
3.5
+ 75 %
Luxembourg
0.0
0.1
0.1
++
France
54.3
20.3
15.9
- 67 %
Switzerland
10.5
13.1
11.1
+ 14 %
Austria
3.5
2.3
2.0
- 39 %
Slovenia
0.0
10.8
13.2
++
Croatia
0.0
0.0
0.0
++
Italy
62.1
14.2
34.6
- 61 %
Spain
0.1
0.1
0.3
+ 100 %
Portugal
0.0
0.0
0.1
++
Greece
0.0
0.1
0.2
++
Romania
12.0
1.4
0.4
- 93 %
Hungary
0.0
0.0
0.0
0
Slovakia
0.0
0.0
0.0
0
Czechia
0.0
0.5
1.6
++
Poland
0.0
0.2
0.4
++
Lithuania
0.1
0.1
0.1
0
Latvia
0.1
0.3
0.2
+ 150 %
Estonia
0.1
0.0
0.0
- 100 %
Sweden
33.5
5.8
11.5
- 74 %
Finland
5.8
2.6
3.3
- 47 %
Norway
0.0
0.2
0.4
+ 200 %
Denmark
7.4
6.0
2.8
- 41 %
Ireland
28.0
31.9
32.7
+ 15 %
United Kingdom
19.3
13.8
10.1
- 38 %
Canada
0.2
1.0
0.8
+ 350 %
United States of America
375.4
438.0
151.2
- 22 %
Japan
39.0
89.2
91.1
+ 133 %
Korea
96.6
50.6
52.5
- 47 %
Taiwan
91.0
84.2
40.7
- 32 %
Australia
0.0
0.2
0.1
++