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Ideology critique in times of crisis
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This essay outlines an empirically grounded account of normative political legitimacy. The main idea is to give a normative edge to empirical measures of sociological legitimacy through a nonmoralized form of ideology critique. A power structure’s responsiveness to the values of those subjected to its authority can be measured empirically and may be explanatory or predictive insofar as it tracks belief in legitimacy, but by itself it lacks normative purchase. It merely describes a preference alignment, and so tells us nothing about whether the ruled have reason to support the rulers. I argue that we can close this gap by filtering the preferences of the ruled through a form of nonmoralized epistemic ideology critique, itself grounded in an empirical account of how belief in legitimacy is formed.
This paper examines how radical realism, a form of ideology critique grounded in epistemic rather than moral normativity, can illuminate the relationship between ideology and political power. The paper argues that radical realism can have both an evaluative and a diagnostic function. Drawing on reliabilist epistemology, the evaluative function shows how beliefs shaped by power differentials are often epistemically unwarranted, e.g. due to the influence of motivated reasoning and the suppression of critical scrutiny. The paper clarifies those mechanisms in order to address some recent critiques of radical realism. The paper then builds on those clarifications to explore the how tracing the genealogy of legitimation stories can diagnose the distribution of power in society, even if ideology does not play a direct stabilising role. This diagnostic function creates a third position in the debate on ideology between culturalists and classical Marxists, and it can help reconciling aspects of structural and relational theories of power.
What is the point of ideology critique? Prominent Anglo-American philosophers recently proposed novel arguments for the view that ideology critique is moral critique, and ideologies are flawed insofar as they contribute to injustice or oppression. We criticize that view and make the case for an alternative and more empirically oriented approach, grounded in epistemic rather than moral commitments. We make two related claims: (a) ideology critique can debunk beliefs and practices by uncovering how, empirically, they are produced by self-justifying power and (b) the self-justification of power should be understood as an epistemic rather than moral flaw. Drawing on the recent realist revival in political theory, we argue that this genealogical approach has more radical potential, despite being more parsimonious than morality-based approaches. We demonstrate the relative advantages of our view by discussing the results of empirical studies on the contemporary phenomenon of neopatriarchy in the Middle East and North Africa.
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in unprecedented government interventions in many people's lives. Opposition to these measures was not only based on policy disagreements but for some founded in an outright denial of basic facts surrounding the pandemic, challenging social cohesion. Conspiracy beliefs have been prolific within various protest groups and require attention, as such attitudes have been shown to be associated with lower rule compliance. Several studies have shown that the characteristics linked to holding COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs are complex and manifold; however, those insights usually rest on cross-sectional studies only. We have less knowledge on whether these cross-sectional correlates also reveal which parts of the population have been newly convinced by conspiracy theories or have dropped their support for them as the pandemic evolved. Using a unique panel data set from Germany, this paper explores a wide range of characteristics and compares the insights gained from cross-sectional associations on the one hand and links to the ways in which people change their views on the other hand. The findings show that cross-sectional analyses miss out on nuanced differences between different groups of temporary and more consistent conspiracy supporters. Specifically, this paper identifies major differences in the profiles of people who have been denying COVID-19 consistently compared to those who changed their minds on the question and those who assessed the reality correctly throughout. In doing so, socio-political and perception-based dimensions are differentiated and distinctions between respondents from East and West Germany explored.
This article sets out to examine the politicising and depoliticising effects of the various stories that were deployed by the UK government in its response to the coronavirus crisis during its daily press briefings over a 2-month period between 16 March and 16 May 2020. In doing so, we identify four key narratives: (1) unprecedented government activism; (2) working to plan; (3) national security, wartime unity and sacrifice; and (4) scientific guidance. Through a quantitative and qualitative study of the deployment of these narratives, we attempt to further recent theoretical insights on depoliticisation by noting that the COVID-19 crisis produced a particular type of crisis moment in which the government was forced to respond in ‘real time’ to a set of circumstances which were rapidly changing. As such, this made it much more difficult to control the various stories they wanted to tell and therefore find a coherent ‘anchor’ for their politicising and depoliticising strategies. This led to some deft discursive footwork as the government sought to pass the ball of responsibility between various groups of actors in order to rapidly and continually shift the balance between avoiding blame and taking credit.
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, social and traditional media have disseminated predictions from experts and nonexperts about its expected magnitude. How accurate were the predictions of ‘experts’—individuals holding occupations or roles in subject-relevant fields, such as epidemiologists and statisticians—compared with those of the public? We conducted a survey in April 2020 of 140 UK experts and 2,086 UK laypersons; all were asked to make four quantitative predictions about the impact of COVID-19 by 31 Dec 2020. In addition to soliciting point estimates, we asked participants for lower and higher bounds of a range that they felt had a 75% chance of containing the true answer. Experts exhibited greater accuracy and calibration than laypersons, even when restricting the comparison to a subset of laypersons who scored in the top quartile on a numeracy test. Even so, experts substantially underestimated the ultimate extent of the pandemic, and the mean number of predictions for which the expert intervals contained the actual outcome was only 1.8 (out of 4), suggesting that experts should consider broadening the range of scenarios they consider plausible. Predictions of the public were even more inaccurate and poorly calibrated, suggesting that an important role remains for expert predictions as long as experts acknowledge their uncertainty.
Background:
Vaccine hesitancy presents an obstacle to the campaign to control COVID-19. It has previously been found to be associated with youth, female gender, low income, low education, low medical trust, minority ethnic group membership, low perceived risk from COVID-19, use of certain social media platforms and conspiracy beliefs. However, it is unclear which of these predictors might explain variance associated with others.
Methods:
An online survey was conducted with a representative sample of 4343 UK residents, aged 18-75, between 21 November and 21 December 2020. Predictors of vaccine hesitancy were assessed using linear rank-order models.
Results:
Coronavirus vaccine hesitancy is associated with youth, female gender, low income, low education, high informational reliance on social media, low informational reliance on print and broadcast media, membership of other than white ethnic groups, low perceived risk from COVID-19 and low trust in scientists and medics, as well as (to a much lesser extent) low trust in government. Coronavirus conspiracy suspicions and general vaccine attitudes appear uniquely predictive, jointly explaining 35% of variance. Following controls for these variables, effects associated with trust, ethnicity and social media reliance largely or completely disappear, whereas the effect associated with education is reversed.
Conclusions:
Strengthening positive attitudes to vaccination and reducing conspiracy suspicions with regards to the coronavirus may have a positive effect on vaccine uptake, especially among ethnic groups with heightened vaccine hesitancy. However, vaccine hesitancy associated with age and gender does not appear to be explained by other predictor variables tested here.
The availability of vaccines does not mean that people will be willing to get vaccinated. For example, different conspiracy beliefs on the adverse effects of vaccines may lead people to avoid collective health measures. This paper explores the role played by antecedents of COVID-related conspiracy beliefs, such as the role of political ideology and the endorsement of moral purity values, and the consequences of COVID-related conspiracy beliefs in terms of the acceptance of a COVID vaccine (when available) via structural equation modelling (SEM). A sample of 590 Italian participants filled in a questionnaire implemented using the Qualtrics.com platform, during the first Italian lockdown in April–May 2020. Results showed that endorsing purity values predicted stronger negative attitude towards COVID-vaccines. Moreover, conspiracy beliefs negatively predicted general attitudes toward vaccines. Faith in science negatively predicted general and COVID-related conspiracy beliefs, with those believing more in science also less endorsing general and COVID-related conspiracy beliefs. The attitudes towards the vaccines mediated the relationship between COVID-related conspiracy beliefs and attitudes towards COVID vaccine.
Trust between representatives and citizens is regarded as central to effective governance in times of peace and uncertainty. This article tests that assumption by engaging elite and mass perspectives to provide a 360-degree appraisal of vertical and horizontal policy coordination in a crisis scenario. Specifically, a multi-dimensional conception of political trust, anchored in psychological studies of interpersonal relations, is operationalised in the context of the United Kingdom’s response to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Detailed analysis of data collected from 1045 members of the public and more than 250 elected politicians suggests that particular facets of political trust and distrust may have contributed to levels of mass behavioural compliance and elite policy support in the UK at the height of the COVID-19 crisis. These findings help to evaluate policy success during a unique and challenging moment while contributing theoretically and methodologically to broader studies of political trust and governance.
This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.
Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in Western Africa:
It is clear that the outbreak of local virus epidemics must
be fought with the best biomedical and scientific tools and
knowledge available. But we also have to deal with secondary,
virtual epidemics that are taking place globally in
news and social online media, where various correct and
incorrect information, misconceptions, and rumors can be
distributed without editorial control.
Virtual viruses are a relatively recent phenomenon that differs
from traditional and non-virtual rumors. So far no consensus
has been reached on how to counter them most effectively.
However, we want to emphasize the importance
of contextual knowledge, traditional professional and critical
journalism, and the benefits of alliances between different
agents that are actively involved in a breakout, so that
local resources and competences are both acknowledged
and supported.
This article takes a closer look at the problem of uncertainty in war—its causes, manifestations, and characteristics—and suggests some ways to deal with it. The authors base their arguments principally on observations made during the last year in a Marine Corps-sponsored study of regimental command and control. The main arguments are that uncertainty is a more fundamental, pervasive, and dominant problem than commonly recognized, and that the prospect of using information technology to significantly reduce the problem is not good. In fact, it is believed that the view that technology will blow away the fog of war is a dangerous delusion. The Marine Corps can benefit more from people solutions than from technology solutions. First and foremost, leaders can be taught to do a better job of handling uncertainty. The first step is to emphasize the point in doctrine and education that uncertainty is an inevitable and dominant feature of all military action and that commanders must be willing to act in the face of uncertainty. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
Is it possible to do ideology critique without morality? In recent years a small group of theorists has attempted to develop such an account and, in doing so, makes claim to a certain sort of “radical realism” distinguished by the ambition to ground political judgments and prescriptions in nonmoral values, principles, or concepts. This essay presents a twofold critique of this realist ideology critique (RIC) by first offering an internal critique of the approach and then arguing that the very attempt to do political theory generally—and ideology critique more specifically—in a way that abjures morality is misguided. In doing so, I contribute both to current debates around “new” ideology critiques and to contested questions about what it means to do political theory realistically.
Objective
This research investigates the impact of collaboration and trust on disaster resilience, conducting a comparative analysis among groups of the public, experts, and public officials.
Methods
This research employs the 2017 National Survey on Emergency Management, conducted by the Korean Institute of Public Administration. Using a random quota-sampling method, data were collected from a total of 1800 citizens, 200 public officials, and 56 experts through an online system. The study compares the impact of public trust in government on organizational resilience perceived by experts, citizens, and public officials, employing hierarchical regression analysis.
Results
The analysis results are as follows: First, in the case of citizens, it was suggested that government trust and collaboration have a positive effect on disaster resilience. Second, in the case of experts, it was suggested that government trust and collaboration have a positive effect on disaster resilience. Third, in the case of public officials, it was suggested that government trust and collaboration have a positive effect on disaster resilience.
Alison McQueen’s study of the historical role of apocalyptic ideas in realist political theory cautiously proposes the ‘redirection’ of apocalyptic thought as a plausible alternative to its rejection. Apocalyptic redirection, so understood, uses apocalyptic language to describe potential future catastrophes in order to inspire drastic action to prevent them. Although McQueen acknowledges that apocalyptic redirection may have certain risks, she suggests it may be an appropriate response to the crisis of climate change. In this article, I aim to show that this use of the discourse of apocalyptic redirection is ideologically problematic. I argue that it involves conflating the interests of those who are at least moderately materially comfortable with the interests of humanity as a whole. I will also draw on the 2019 ‘Stop Adani Convoy’ in Australia as a case study to show how the ideological character of this discourse renders it ill-suited to generating popular support for action on climate change, and liable to reproduce existing power relations.
Emergency frames are mobilized in contemporary sustainability debates, both in response to specific events and strategically. The strategic deployment of emergency frames by proponents of sustainability action aims to stimulate collective action on issues for which it is lacking. But this is contentious due to a range of possible effects. We critically review interdisciplinary social science literature to examine the political effects of emergency frames in sustainability and develop a typology of five key dimensions of variation. This pinpoints practical areas for evaluating the utility of emergency frames and builds a shared vocabulary for analysis and decision-making. Emergency frames in sustainability debates can stimulate collective action on issues for which it is lacking but can have consequences. This Review examines the political effects of emergency frames in sustainability and develops a typology of different effects to build a shared vocabulary for analysis and decision-making.
For realists, political theories exhibit an anti‐moralist character when their normativity stems from an appraisal of the value and the specificities of real political practices. While realists agree on such a characterisation of the realist project, they split when it comes to explaining to what extent realist political normativity can provide us with a critical perspective on the status quo. The most recent contributions on this topic are polarised. Some contributors interpret political realism as an approach to politics that leads to an affirmation of the status quo. Others suggest that political realism might lead to radical transformations of the status quo. In this paper, I argue that it is possible to identify a consistent middle ground between these alternative interpretations: the interpretation of political realism as a form of reformist conservatism. Moreover, I defend the reformist‐conservative interpretation of political realism as superior to the extant ones. Contrary to the rival interpretations, I show that the reformist‐conservative interpretation consistently reconciles all the fundamental tenets of political realism. Furthermore, I explain that while the conservatist interpretation risks undermining the normative commitment of realism and the radical interpretation leans towards an irresponsible form of political theorising, the reformist‐conservative reading avoids these pitfalls.
This collection of texts on the Sublime provides the historical context for the foundation and discussion of one of the most important aesthetic debates of the Enlightenment. The significance of the Sublime in the eighteenth century ranged across a number of fields - literary criticism, empirical psychology, political economy, connoisseurship, landscape design and aesthetics, painting and the fine arts, and moral philosophy - and has continued to animate aesthetic and theoretical debates to this day. However, the unavailability of many of the crucial texts of the founding tradition has resulted in a conception of the Sublime often limited to the definitions of its most famous theorist Edmund Burke. Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla's anthology, which includes an introduction and notes to each entry, offers students and scholars ready access to a much deeper and more complex tradition of writings on the Sublime, many of them never before printed in modern editions.
Politicians may present themselves as merely implementing scientific advice, but Alex Stevens argues that, when science meets politics, it can be a case of survival of the ideas that fit.
Prominent in the EU’s recent transformations has been the tendency to advance extraordinary measures in the name of crisis response. From emergency lending to macro-economics, border management to Brexit, policies are pursued unconventionally and as measures of last resort. This book investigates the nature, rise, and implications of this politics of emergency as it appears in the transnational setting. As the author argues, recourse to this method of rule is an expression of the deeper weakness of executive power in today’s Europe. It is how policy-makers contend with rising socio-economic power and diminishing representative ties, seeking fall-back authority in the management of crises. In the structure of the EU they find incentives and few impediments. Whereas political exceptionalism tends to be associated with sovereign power, here it is power’s diffusion and functional disaggregation that spurs politics in the emergency mode. The effect of these governing patterns is not just to challenge and reshape ideas of EU legitimacy rooted in constitutionalism and technocracy. The politics of emergency fosters a counter-politics in its mirror image, as populists and others play with themes of necessity and claim the right to disobedience in extremis . The book examines the prospects for democracy once the politics of emergency takes hold, and what it might mean to put transnational politics on a different footing.
Political realists seek to provide an alternative to accounts of political legitimacy that are based on moral standards. In this endeavor, they face the challenge of how to interpret the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating. In this paper, we argue that work by Bernard Williams sheds light on the possible answers to this challenge. While Williams aligns himself with the realist tradition, his account of legitimacy contains an implicit critique of political realism. This is evident, we show, in his rejections of the views of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. Williams is not satisfied with Hobbes because he conflates legitimacy and political order, eliminating space for criticizing power. Weber's view, however, offers a non‐moralist standard of legitimacy that has critical purchase. This critical purchase emerges from the demands made on rulers to uphold the values that underlie their legitimation, combined with the ethic of responsibility. The resulting grounds for criticism are thus consistent with the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating—the very maxim that Williams puts at the heart of his realism. By showing that Williams's partial rejection of Hobbes and Weber cannot be sustained only on realist grounds, our analysis clarifies the limits of political realism.
Background:
The current outbreak of Ebola in eastern DR Congo, beginning in 2018, emerged in a complex and violent political and security environment. Community-level prevention and outbreak control measures appear to be dependent on public trust in relevant authorities and information, but little scholarship has explored these issues. We aimed to investigate the role of trust and misinformation on individual preventive behaviours during an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD).
Methods:
We surveyed 961 adults between Sept 1 and Sept 16, 2018. We used a multistage sampling design in Beni and Butembo in North Kivu, DR Congo. Of 412 avenues and cells (the lowest administrative structures; 99 in Beni and 313 in Butembo), we randomly selected 30 in each city. In each avenue or cell, 16 households were selected using the WHO Expanded Programme on Immunization's random walk approach. In each household, one adult (aged ≥18 years) was randomly selected for interview. Standardised questionnaires were administered by experienced interviewers. We used multivariate models to examine the intermediate variables of interest, including institutional trust and belief in selected misinformation, with outcomes of interest related to EVD prevention behaviours.
Findings:
Among 961 respondents, 349 (31·9%, 95% CI 27·4-36·9) trusted that local authorities represent their interest. Belief in misinformation was widespread, with 230 (25·5%, 21·7-29·6) respondents believing that the Ebola outbreak was not real. Low institutional trust and belief in misinformation were associated with a decreased likelihood of adopting preventive behaviours, including acceptance of Ebola vaccines (odds ratio 0·22, 95% CI 0·21-0·22, and 1·40, 1·39-1·42) and seeking formal health care (0·06, 0·05-0·06, and 1·16, 1·15-1·17).
Interpretation:
The findings underscore the practical implications of mistrust and misinformation for outbreak control. These factors are associated with low compliance with messages of social and behavioural change and refusal to seek formal medical care or accept vaccines, which in turn increases the risk of spread of EVD.
Funding:
The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative Innovation Fund.
In this paper I defend Max Weber's concept of political legitimacy as a standard for the moral evaluation of states. On this view, a state is legitimate when its subjects regard it as having a valid claim to exercise power and authority. Weber’s analysis of legitimacy is often assumed to be merely descriptive, but I argue that Weberian legitimacy has moral significance because it indicates that political stability has been secured on the basis of civic alignment. Stability on this basis enables all the goods of peaceful cooperation with minimal state violence and intimidation, thereby guarding against alienation and tyranny. Furthermore, I argue, since Weberian legitimacy is empirically measurable in terms that avoid controversial value judgments, its adoption would bridge a longstanding divide between philosophers and social scientists
Emergency as a descriptor, technique and legal-political device has become a taken-for-granted way of apprehending and governing events and situations. In this paper, I explore the temporality of emergency, through reflections on the use of declarations of emergency in relation to US-based Black Lives Matter protests. I do so in the context of claims and counter-claims about contemporary transformations in what Rheinhart Kosselleck (2004: 241) terms the ‘expected otherness of the future’. Arguing for changes in the form of the ‘expected otherness of the future’ rather than its simple loss, disappearance or absence, I describe how emergency operates around a temporality of exceptionality, urgency and interval. Formal and informal declarations of emergency are, in addition, imbued with hope: the hope that time remains and action can make a difference to events. What the use of declarations of emergency by Black Lives Matter activists does is disrupt the geo-historically specific divide between the everyday and emergency by naming conditions that mix the endemic and the evental as emergencies. In the spark of hope that is the act of declaring that ongoing conditions should be treated as emergencies, the ‘otherness of the future’ folds into and becomes part of the present.
Draws on new sources to examine one of the most dramatic and dangerous episodes in world histor from a global perspective. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a six-day clash in October 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union over the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Both John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev were determined to avoid nuclear war, but events could easily have spiralled out of control with cataclysmic results. This book provides a lucid and up-to-date introduction to the Crisis, including American responsibility for causing it, and Cuba's role as an important actor rather than a superpower pawn. Drawing on an extensive body of research, including material released only on the 50th anniversary of the crisis, this book places the event in a broader international and chronological context than ever before. It features a number of primary source documents, some of which have rarely - if ever - been reproduced, and includes a discussion of the legacies of the Crisis.
Trust in government has long been viewed as an important determinant of citizens' compliance with public health policies, especially in times of crisis. Yet evidence on this relationship remains scarce, particularly in the developing world. We use results from a representative survey conducted during the 2014–15 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic in Monrovia, Liberia to assess the relationship between trust in government and compliance with EVD control interventions. We find that respondents who expressed low trust in government were much less likely to take precautions against EVD in their homes, or to abide by government-mandated social distancing mechanisms designed to contain the spread of the virus. They were also much less likely to support potentially contentious control policies, such as “safe burial” of EVD-infected bodies. Contrary to stereotypes, we find no evidence that respondents who distrusted government were any more or less likely to understand EVD's symptoms and transmission pathways. While only correlational, these results suggest that respondents who refused to comply may have done so not because they failed to understand how EVD is transmitted, but rather because they did not trust the capacity or integrity of government institutions to recommend precautions and implement policies to slow EVD's spread. We also find that respondents who experienced hardships during the epidemic expressed less trust in government than those who did not, suggesting the possibility of a vicious cycle between distrust, non-compliance, hardships and further distrust. Finally, we find that respondents who trusted international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were no more or less likely to support or comply with EVD control policies, suggesting that while INGOs can contribute in indispensable ways to crisis response, they cannot substitute for government institutions in the eyes of citizens. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for future public health crises.
In an emergency, statesmen concentrate power and suspend citizens' rights. These emergency powers are ubiquitous in the crisis government of liberal democracies, but their nature and justification is poorly understood. Based on a pluralist conception of political ethics and political power, this book shows how we can avoid the dangers and confusions inherent in the norm/exception approach that dominates both historical and contemporary debate. The book shows how liberal values need never - indeed must never - be suspended, even in times of urgency. Only then can accountability remain a live possibility. But at the same time, emergency powers can sometimes be justified with reference to extra-liberal norms that also operate in times of normalcy. By emphasizing the continuity between times of normalcy and emergency, the book illuminates the norms of crisis government, broadening our understanding of liberal democratic government and of political ethics in the process.
Contemporary theorists use the term "social construction" with the aim of exposing how what's purportedly "natural" is often at least partly social and, more specifically, how this masking of the social is politically significant. The chapters in this book draw on insights from feminist and critical race theory to develop the idea that gender and race are positions within a structure of social relations. On this interpretation, the point of saying that gender and race are socially constructed is not to make a causal claim about the origins of our concepts of gender and race, or to take a stand in the nature/nurture debate, but to locate these categories within a realist social ontology. This is politically important, for by theorizing how gender and race fit within different structures of social relations we are better able to identify and combat forms of systematic injustice. The central chapters of the book offer critical social realist accounts of gender and race. These accounts function as case studies for a broader approach that draws upon notions of ideology, practice, and social structure developed through interdisciplinary engagement with research in social science. Ideology, on the proposed view, is a relatively stable set of shared dispositions to respond to the world, often in ways that also shape the world to evoke those very dispositions. This looping of our dispositions through the material world enables the social to appear natural. Additional chapters in the book situate a critical realist approach in relation to philosophical methodology, and to debates in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language.
In this book Tom Sorell argues that emergencies can justify types of action that would normally be regarded as wrong. Beginning with the ethics of emergencies facing individuals, he explores the range of effective and legitimate private emergency response and its relation to public institutions, such as national governments. He develops a theory of the response of governments to public emergencies which indicates the possibility of a democratic politics that is liberal but that takes seriously threats to life and limb from public disorder, crime or terrorism. Informed by Hobbes, Schmitt and Walzer, but substantially different from them, the book widens the justification for recourse to normally forbidden measures, without resorting to illiberal politics. This book will interest students of politics, philosophy, international relations and law.
Consumers and scholars show increasing interest in authenticity in products, services, performances, and places. As typically used, authenticity is an attribution that is socially constructed and appears in many domains of social life. The interest in authenticity presumes that its attribution conveys value and emerging evidence agrees. Authenticity, however, carries some very different meanings, including those about classification, morality, craftsmanship, and idiosyncrasy. Parsing these various interpretations requires attention to cultural and historical context.
In the years since the September 11 attacks, scholars and commentators have criticized the emergence of both legal developments and policy rhetoric that blur the lines between war and terrorism. Unrecognized, but equally as damaging to democratic ideals — and potentially more devastating in practical effect — is the expansion of this trend beyond the context of terrorism to a much wider field of non-war emergency situations. Indeed, in recent years, war and national security rhetoric has come to permeate the legal and policy conversations on a wide variety of natural and technological disasters. This melding of disaster and war for purposes of justifying exceptions to ordinary constitutional and democratic norms is particularly apparent in governmental restrictions on the flow of its communications in disasters, as limitations on information flow that might be warranted in cases of thinking enemies in times of war are invoked in disaster scenarios lacking such thinking enemies. The extension of wartime transparency exceptionalism into non-thinking enemy disasters — reflected in both legislation and official rhetoric — risks the illegitimate construction of enemies by government, the unwarranted transformation of public spaces into warzones from which the public can be more easily excluded, and the inappropriate reliance on notions of the “fog of war” to justify communication failures and overbroad access restrictions. Only by consciously disaggregating dissimilar forms of emergencies and removing the rhetoric of war from disaster decisionmaking can the government make appropriate determinations about the provision of information in times of community or national crisis.
International Security 29.1 (2004) 5-48
Mature democracies such as the United States are generally believed to be better at making foreign policy than other regime types. Especially, the strong civic institutions and robust marketplaces of ideas in mature democracies are thought to substantially protect them from severe threat inflation and "myths of empire" that could promote excessively risky foreign policy adventures and wars. The marketplace of ideas helps to weed out unfounded, mendacious, or self-serving foreign policy arguments because their proponents cannot avoid wide-ranging debate in which their reasoning and evidence are subject to public scrutiny.
The marketplace of ideas, however, failed to fulfill this function in the 2002-03 U.S. foreign policy debate over going to war with Iraq. By now there isbroad agreement among U.S. foreign policy experts, as well as much of the American public and the international community, that the threat assessments that President George W. Bush and his administration used to justify the waragainst Iraq were greatly exaggerated, and on some dimensions wholly baseless.
Postwar revelations have made clear that President Bush and top officials of his administration were determined from early 2001 to bring about regime change in Iraq. It was not until the summer of 2002, however, that they began their public campaign to generate support for preventive war to achieve this objective. They made four main arguments to persuade the public of their case against Saddam Hussein: (1) he was an almost uniquely undeterrable aggressor who would seek any opportunity to kill Americans virtually regardless of risk to himself or his country; (2) he was cooperating with al-Qa'ida and had even assisted in the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks against the United States; (3)he was close to acquiring nuclear weapons; and (4) he possessed chemical and biological weapons that could be used to devastating effect against American civilians at home or U.S. troops in the Middle East. Virtually none of the administration's claims held up, and the information needed todebunk nearly all of them was available both inside and outside the U.S. government before the war. Nevertheless, administration officials persistently repeated only the most extreme threat claims and suppressed contrary evidence.
Most important, the marketplace of ideas failed to correct the administration's misrepresentations or hinder its ability to persuade the American public. The administration succeeded, despite the weakness of the evidence for its claims, in convincing a majority of the public that Iraq posed a threat so extreme and immediate that it could be dealt with only by preventive war. Overall, this policy debate resembles what Stephen Van Evera calls "non- evaluation": that is, a debate in which little real evaluation takes place because those in power ignore or suppress assessments from internal sources that might contradict their preferred policy, and use their ability to influence political and media agendas to focus public attention on their own arguments at the expense of attention to external criticisms.
The question now is, why was this threat inflation so successful? The answer has both theoretical and policy implications. Although the Iraq debate is certainly not the first instance of threat inflation in the United States or other democracies, it matters whether this episode should be considered an uncommon exception to the rule that democratic marketplaces of ideas can usually restrain policies based on dubious claims and rationales, or whether there is a risk of repeated equally severe failures, perhaps with much higher costs for U.S. national security.
Understanding the limits of threat inflation has become especially important because of the Bush administration's adoption of a preventive war doctrine, which substantially expands the potential, compared with previous U.S. grand strategies, for involving the United States in multiple military adventures. This in turn greatly increases the possible consequences if democratic processes and the marketplace of ideas fail repeatedly to weed out exaggerated threat claims and policy proposals based on them. Although conquering Iraq could not do much to improve U.S. national security because the supposed Iraqi threat was mostly chimerical, the costs have been remarkably serious considering the weakness and unpopularity of...
It has been common, at least since 1945, to exaggerate and to overreact to foreign threats, something that seems to be continuing with current concerns over international terrorism. This paper sketches threat exaggeration during the Cold War and applies the experience from that era to the current one. Alarmism and overreaction can be harmful, particularly economically. And, in the case of terrorism, it can help create the damaging consequences the terrorists seek but are unable to perpetrate on their own. Moreover, many of the forms alarmism has taken verge on hysteria. The United States is hardly “vulnerable” in the sense that it can be toppled by dramatic acts of terrorist destruction, even extreme ones. The country can, however grimly, readily absorb that kind of damage, and it has outlasted considerably more potent threats in the past.
Truth and truthfulness
- B Williams
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Knowledge, credence, and the strength of belief
- T Williamson
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Full text of Tony Blair’s foreword to the dossier on Iraq. The Guardian
- T Blair
Ongoing crisis communication
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The idea of a critical theory. Habermas and the Frankfurt school
- R Geuss
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Climate emergency politics is dangerous
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