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Towards a somnolent information-processing theory: Understanding the human sleep-onset control
system from an integrative design-oriented perspective
Luc P. Beaudoin
Sheryl Guloy
Reference:
Beaudoin, L.P. & Guloy, S. (in press). Towards a somnolent information-processing theory:
Understanding the human sleep-onset control system from an integrative design-oriented
perspective. In D. Kay (Ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Sleep Theories and Models. Cambridge
University Press.
NAME: Luc P. Beaudoin
INSTITUTION: Simon Fraser University
ADDRESS LINE 1 8888 University Drive
ADDRESS LINE 2 Burnaby BC V5A 1S6 Canada
EMAIL: LPB@sfu.ca
WEB URL: https://www.sfu.ca/education/faculty-profiles/lbeaudoin.html
COI disclosure: Dr. Luc P. Beaudoin is a director of CogSci Apps Corp., owner
of CogZest and shareholder of Somnolence+ Inc. These Canadian businesses
develop products based on his research, including Hookmark app,
mySleepButton¨ app, books, and training services.
NAME: Sheryl Guloy
INSTITUTION: Somnolence+ Canada Foundation
ADDRESS LINE 1: 88 chemin des Colibris J0R 1B0
ADDRESS LINE 2: STE ANNE DES LACS, Quebec, Canada
EMAIL: sheryl@sherylguloy.com
COI disclosure: Sheryl Guloy is a director of Somnolence+ Inc. and of Sleep
Well Network Inc.
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Abstract
Falling asleep is a crucial transition in mental and brain states. The brain's regulation of sleep onset is
complex, significant and not fully understood. This paper proposes a theory of the human sleep onset
control system (SOCS) from an integrative design-oriented perspective, considering the interactions of
consciousness, emotion, mood, and repetitive thought. The paper presents six theoretical postulates
towards a somnolent information processing (SIP) theory. Additionally, it presents a cognitive technique
based on SIP, namely cognitive shuffling, aimed at facilitating sleep onset under conditions of light
insomnolence. This integrative approach may lead to a better understanding of SOCS, advances in
related research domains, and new cognitive strategies to improve sleep onset.
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1 Introduction
Although falling asleep takes place within minutes, occupying a small fraction of the 24-hour
cycle, it is perhaps the most significant and informative regular global transition in mental and brain
states. During the sleep-onset period, brain waves slow down significantly. Experientially, of course, the
sleep onset period marks a significant shift in consciousness. Asleep, the agent is highly vulnerable to
predators; but without sleeping when sleep is needed, cognitive abilities deteriorate which also presents
significant risks.
Given the ubiquity of sleep, it may be tempting to suppose that the brain’s regulation of sleep
onset is very simple. Many genes that control sleep are ancient and humans share many sleep
regulatory mechanisms (such as the reticular formation, suprachiasmatic nucleus and ventrolateral
preoptic nucleus) and the general sleep architecture with other mammals (Brown et al., 2012).
However, the human brain’s abilities and dispositions to regulate sleep onset are an important
evolutionary accomplishment the complexity and significance of which ought not to be underestimated.
A theory of the human sleep onset control system (SOCS) is required (Lemyre et al., 2020).
Given that the sleep onset period marks a radical shift in global states of consciousness, one
cannot understand the SOCS without some understanding of consciousness. Furthermore, prima facie,
one would not expect someone to easily be able to fall asleep if they are feeling terrified, furious or
overwhelmed by jealousy or infatuation. Thus, to understand the SOCS, one also needs to understand
emotion and how emotion interacts with the SOCS. If one assumes that worrying and ruminating can
delay the onset of sleep, then a theory of repetitive thought is required. Many, perhaps most, theories
of insomnia appeal to bedtime hyperarousal as a cause or at least a correlate of insomnia. Prima facie, it
seems unlikely that a person should easily be able to fall asleep if they are hyperaroused, tense or
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energized. Arousal, tension, and energy are core dimensions of moods. A theory of the SOCS should
therefore presumably also either reference a theory of moods or explain why arousal and moods are
irrelevant to the sleep onset period. A complete theory of SOCS should also specify whether and how
the SOCS can be modified through innate processes, learning and deliberate control. Given all these
interactions, characterizing the SOCS may be quite difficult.
Current theorizing about sleep onset and insomnolence is still at an early stage. Most theories
do not explicitly reference theories of consciousness, emotion, mood and repetitive thought. This
presents a difficult challenge for sleep theorists, namely to construct a theory of the SOCS that
integrates diverse research domains. This might lead to a better understanding of the SOCS, advances in
the constituent domains (consciousness, affect, etc.), and new cognitive strategies to facilitate sleep
onset.
Whereas cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for insomnia (CBT-I) is somewhat effective, Morin &
Benca (2012) reported that 80% of patients saw some improvement, only approximately 40% achieved
clinical remission. In systematically reviewing cognitive techniques aiming to facilitate sleep onset,
Lemyre et al. (2020) found previously researched bedtime cognitive strategies for insomnolence to be
mostly of limited effectiveness (see Table 1), nor were they based on integrative theories of the SOCS.
Integrative theories would consider how the SOCS integrates chronobiological, sensory, affective,
motivational, and executive information in controlling the transition to sleep. Lemyre et al. (2020)
concluded by suggesting the need for integrative theories of normal sleep onset that account for the
evolutionary function of the SOCS.
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Table 1.
Effectiveness of bedtime cognitive strategies according to Lemyre et al. (2020)
Cognitive strategies
(23 studies)
Results
1. Paradoxical intention
- 11 studies
Some benefits
2. Articulatory suppression
- 1 study
3. Guided mental imagery
- 3 studies
Mixed results
4. Unguided mental imagery (e.g. cognitive
refocusing)
- 4 studies
5. Hypnosis
- 3 studies (small samples)
6. Suppression and distraction
- 2 studies
No benefit
This chapter presents the integrative design-oriented theoretical approach to psychology. From
an integrative design-oriented perspective, this chapter briefly reviews literature on sleep onset and
insomnolence, consciousness, emotions, motivation, and moods. It presents six theoretical postulates
towards a somnolent information processing (SIP) theory. It also describes a recent class of cognitive
techniques based on SIP that aim to facilitate sleep onset under conditions of light insomnolence:
cognitive shuffling.
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2. The Integrative Design-Oriented Approach
While the use of an integrative design-oriented approach to human psychology considers
empirical data and spawns empirical studies, it is driven by the designer stance of theoretical Artificial
Intelligence, attempting to reverse-engineer the competencies one is trying to understand (Dennett,
1994). Humans are viewed as autonomous agents capable of generating, evaluating, and resourcefully
pursuing their own sources of motivation in real-time, with some reflective control of their own
information processing, despite their limited knowledge, abilities and resources (Beaudoin et al., 2020;
Beaudoin, 1994; Franklin & Graesser, 1996). The overarching research challenge is to understand how
such autonomy is possible. Using the integrative design-oriented approach, one attempts to explain the
interaction and blending of affective, motivational, perceptual, motor, executive, and ancillary functions
involved in the target competence (here, falling asleep). With this approach, one also attempts to
integrate different theories and utilize methods and concepts from multiple disciplines.
3. Theoretical Summary
In this chapter, steps towards a SIP theory are taken from an integrative design-oriented
perspective. The SIP framework proposes that the function of the SOCS is to cause a gradual transition
into sleep to the extent it is currently safe and appropriate to do so. To reverse-engineer the SOCS, one
needs to understand the clues that evolution may implicitly have ‘discovered’ indicating this safety and
appropriateness. With a theory of those clues, one can develop designs that utilize them. SIP framework
includes six postulates and ancillary assumptions. An assumption that played a role in developing SIP is
the sleep onset emulation hypothesis: that one of the heuristics the SOCS uses to determine that it is
appropriate to fall asleep is that the agent has already begun falling asleep —a positive feedback loop.
SIP defines new terms. ‘Insomnolent’ information-processes are said to delay sleep onset or
cause an exit from the sleep onset period. Insomnolence is the difficulty of falling asleep experienced
when one wants to fall asleep and has what one considers to be sufficient opportunity to do so. One can
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experience insomnolence even without having clinical insomnia. Information-processing that interferes
with insomnolent processes is called ‘counter-insomnolent’. ‘Pro-somnolent’ information processing is
information processing that facilitates sleep onset. Information processing that is both pro-somnolent
and counter-insomnolent is called ‘super-somnolent’. Discovering super-somnolent cognitive strategies
(if they exist) is a theoretically important objective of the SIP research.
SIP theory primarily aims to explain sleep onset and insomnolence, rather than insomnia which
is a more elaborate clinical condition.
4. Sleep Research
4.1 Sleep onset and the sleep onset period
There are different ways to define sleep onset and the sleep onset period. The standard staging
criteria for sleep imply that sleep onset is a discrete transition from wake to non-wake, typically Stage 1
(Berry et al, 2007). According to Merica & Fortune (2004) and Gorgoni et al (2019), however, the most
common definition of sleep onset is the beginning of stage 2, marked by the first occurrence of sleep
spindles or K-complexes. Sleep onset can also be viewed as a process taking place during a sleep onset
period.
Some studies of sleep onset characterize the sleep onset period as starting 5 minutes before and
ending 5 minutes after the first sleep spindle or K-complex (e.g., Cervena et al, 2014). Some others
define the sleep onset period as the "transition from relaxed, drowsy wakefulness to unresponsive
sleep" (Yang et al 2010, p. 1084). Yang et al (2010) point out that while defining sleep onset in
physiological (EEG) terms has methodological advantages, subjective measures of being asleep are also
important. Discrepancy between the experience of being asleep and physiological measures should not
be relegated to "sleep state misperception". Indeed, Hori et al (1994) documented nine stages of the
sleep onset period starting a bit before N1 and terminating within the beginnings of N2. They tracked
sleep-wake judgments during this sleep onset period and found that participants responded less than
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50% of the time that they were asleep. Prerau et al (2014) found that some subjects asleep by standard
criteria were still capable of responding behaviorally to stimuli. They developed a statistical framework
and empirical model of the sleep onset period, which combines physiological measurements with
behavioral data requiring no arousing external sensory stimuli. This chapter is consistent with either
specification of the sleep onset period in this paragraph.
Behaviorally, experientially and neurologically the sleep onset period is distinct from most
waking states (Goupil & Bekinschtein, 2012). There are slow rolling eye movements, a slowing of
breathing and a reduction in responsiveness (Ogilvie & Wilkinson, 1984; Ogilvie et al., 1989). There is a
dissociation between anterior and posterior EEG patterns wherein anterior regions have a more sleep-
like EEG pattern and the posterior regions more wake-like (Gorgoni et al, 2019). Often, spontaneous
mental imagery, even dreaming, is experienced during sleep onset (Nielsen, 2017; Stenstrom et al.,
2012; Morikawa et al., 2002; Hori et al., 1994; Windt, 2019).
Sleep onset latency may be defined as the period between entering bed with eyes closed and
sleep onset. Kraüchi et al (2000), for instance, define the end of sleep latency as the beginning of N2.
Sleep latency may include exits from the sleep onset period back to wake (Merica & Fortune, 2004).
Compared to others, in the sleep latency period, people with insomnia engage in more problem-solving
and planning and have more unpleasant thoughts (Lemyre et al., 2020). They also report less
deactivation of executive processes and less spontaneous imagery (Lemyre et al., 2020).
4.2 Two-Process Theory of Sleep
Borbely’s influential chronobiological theory has significant implications for the ability and
propensity to fall asleep. It postulates that sleep is regulated by two major processes: a homeostatic
process (“S”), whereby sleep propensity increases as a function of time awake; and a circadian process
(“C”) which co-regulates sleep propensity in relation to time of day (Borbély et al., 2016). Borbely
considers slow-wave density as the index to the S component of sleep propensity. The circadian process
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is mediated by the suprachiasmatic nucleus in the hypothalamus and a network of peripheral oscillators
(Borbély, 2022; Koronowski & Sassone-Corsi, 2021.)
4.3 Psychological Processes Affecting Sleep Onset
Several psychobiological processes can also facilitate or prevent sleep. Johns (2019) argued that
the fact one can deliberately remain standing in order to postpone sleeping means there are non-
chronobiological factors involved in sleepiness. Johns therefore postulates a ‘secondary’ wake drive to C,
which integrates various sensory inputs, which he calls the “A-process”, where “A” stands for the
afferent nervous system. George (2018) argued that additional psychological factors can increase wake
drive such as meditation, cognitive activity, and emotional processing. He therefore proposed a psycho-
sensory wake drive, which he named ‘PS’, subsuming the A-process. He argues that PS activates or
“recharges” the ascending arousal system.
Some other influences on sleep can be subsumed under the PS concept. Raymann et al. (2005)
demonstrated that warming the skin promotes sleep onset. This, they note, makes sense on
evolutionary grounds as without appropriate bedding one might become dangerously cold. Romeijn et
al. (2011) collated various factors that one would expect, on evolutionary and evidentiary grounds, to
promote wakefulness, such as acute cold, heat, danger, and pain. Steenland (2014) argued that rodent
and primate brains are designed to enable top-down control over wake. He argued for direct volitional
maintenance of vigilance and indirect motivational processes such as the detection of significant threats
and opportunities. Steenland assumed that top-down control over sleep could be explained by
mechanisms affecting a threshold parameter of the two-process model called ‘H’ postulated by Daan et
al. (1984).
It is common knowledge that young children driven in a car seat tend to fall asleep if the timing
is right. Rocking, as well as various stimulations of rocking sensations such as vestibular stimulation,
seem to facilitate sleep onset in adults Perrault et al. (2019).
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5. Autonomous agency
SIP is partly based on the H-CogAff affective information processing framework (Sloman et al.,
2005; Beaudoin et al., 2020; Sloman, 2003). H-CogAff specifies a three-layer information processing
architecture containing reactive (stimulus-driven) processes and two types of executive processes:
deliberative processes and reflective processes. It specifies a collection of psychological concepts some
of which are reprised below.
5.1 Arousal and Affect
Concepts of arousal figure prominently in models of insomnia (Dressle et al, 2023; Perlis et al.,
2005). For instance, in Harvey et al. (2005); Harvey (2005); and Harvey (2002), it is assumed that worry
leads to physiological arousal and distress which together are said to be incompatible with sleep onset
(insomnolent). Perlis et al. (2011) assume cortical arousal enables cognitive processes that are
incompatible with sleep onset (insomnolent).
Arousal is also a central concept in many theories of affect (specifically, of mood and emotion).
For instance, in his seminal cognitive theory of emotion, Simon (1967) states that “sudden intense
stimuli often produce large effects on the autonomic nervous system, commonly of an “arousal” and
“energy marshaling” nature. It is to these effects that the label “emotion” is generally attached.” (p. 35).
Also, dimensional theories of affect, such as Core Affect theory (Russell, 2009; Russell, 2003), either
postulate or imply that arousal is one of the major dimensions of affect. Other frequently cited
dimensions of affect are valence (Russell, 2009; Russell, 2003) and impact (Osgood et al., 1957). Core
Affect theory specifically assumes that core affect is a global feeling. According to Thayer’s Tension-
Energy theory of moods, tension and energy are the two main dimensions of moods (Thayer, 2003).
These two dimensions are seen as psychometric rotations of the Core Affect model’s valence and
arousal dimensions (Fontaine et al., 2013 pp. 34-35. Thus, in this respect the models are equivalent.
Core Affect theory can be considered a theory of moods.
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In this chapter, a different conception of affect is adapted from H-CogAff whereby affect is
defined as distributed, more or less local dispositional control states of various durations that tend to
produce affective evaluations, which tend to produce motives, which subject to attentional processes
tend to consume executive resources, tending to lead to decisions and action (adapted from Sloman,
1992).
5.2 Motivation as Motivator Processing
Concurring with Baumeister’s (2015) claim that a general theory of motivation is required for a
general theory of psychology, autonomous agents can be viewed as motivation processing systems.
Affective states are motivators (Sloman, 1992; Beaudoin et al., 2020). Following Ortony et al. (1988) and
Beaudoin (1994), motives, attitudes and internalized norms are motivators. Motivators, when activated,
can produce affective evaluations (of desirability, praiseworthiness, or appeal Ortony et al. (1988).
Multiple affective evaluations can co-exist.
The human mind hosts multitudinous asynchronously processed motivators as well as
mechanisms for generating and activating motivators. Motivators that have been elaborated by
executive processes at least roughly specifying a state to preserve, achieve or maintain are known as
motives. Motives are complex control states, having (a) a specification of the state to achieve, avoid or
preserve; (b) intensity, i.e., the strength of the tendency to pursue the motive; (c) importance, which
reflects its costs and benefits; (d) urgency, temporal information about the costs and benefits of the
goal; and (e) decisions. These attributes are not necessarily numeric, meaning they may be discrete,
qualitative and relational.
While human executive resources are powerful and despite the brain hosting multiple parallel
cognitive and affective streams, executive functions and the most global levels of consciousness have
limited coarse-grained parallelism, for design reasons explained in Baars (1988) and in Beaudoin (1994).
Therefore, motivators have (f) insistence, defined as the heuristically determined propensity to consume
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executive resources, in interaction with variable-threshold attention mechanisms. This is to minimize
the likelihood of dangerous interruptions, thrashing and other problems by insufficiently relevant
(insistent) motivators (Beaudoin, 1994).
The foregoing specification provides a basis for describing mental perturbance, which is
discussed below. According to SIP, mental perturbance is a significant source of insomnolence.
5.3 From Emotion to Integrative Design-oriented Modeling of Autonomous Agency
As noted in the introduction, one would not normally expect someone easily to be able to fall
asleep if they are experiencing an intense emotion such as feeling terrified or furious. Interpreting this
claim calls for a theory of emotion. Yet theories of emotion do not loom large in insomnia literature.
Perhaps the reason insomnia theories don’t attribute insomnolence to intense emotion is that emotion
researchers do not agree on how to define emotion, though they may be converging on the notion that
emotions have multiple components: neural, phenomenological and cognitive (Izard, 2010). There are
even skeptics regarding emotion. For instance, Moors (2017) notes that Russell’s psychological
construction theory and Scherer’s Componential Process Model eschew explaining emotion per se in
favor of emotion episodes. While agreeing with Russell and Sherer’s skepticism about emotion and
proposing a two-level architecture (with stimulus-driven and goal-driven layers), Moors criticizes
psychological construction theory and Componential Process Model for assuming that emotional
episodes involve a shift to stimulus-driven mode. Moors assumes the default mode, even with respect
to what psychological construction theory and Componential Process Model describe as emotional
episodes, is goal-directed motivation, which can also be automatic. In a review of emotion literature,
Moors (2022) suggests the search for an emotion theory is pointless. Instead, she suggests empirically
exploring possible mechanisms that may explain behavior and experience. New concepts and terms
related to ‘emotion’ may be required by sleep research and other psychology areas. If emotion concepts
survive such skepticism, which ones should be used to explain insomnolence?
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Relatedly, Beaudoin (et al., 2020) and Beaudoin (1994) suggested instead of debating what
‘emotion’ should be taken to mean, affective scientists should seek to understand the information
processing mechanisms and architectures underlying autonomous agency more generally, while
attributing a central role to the processing of motivators. Beaudoin, 1994 introduced the term
‘perturbance’, defined below, for what Sloman had called ‘emotions’ (Sloman, 1987) and would later call
‘tertiary emotions’ (Sloman, 2003). SIP theory utilizes the term ‘perturbance’ rather than ‘tertiary
emotion’.
5.4 From Repetitive Thought to Mental Perturbance
Everyone is subject to occasional repetitive thought regarding their motivators, history, etc.
Repetitive thought is discussed in many areas of psychology under different labels (Watkins, 2008; De
Raedt et al. 2015). Negative repetitive thought is transdiagnostic (De Raedt et al., 2015) and associated
with shorter sleep duration (Nota & Coles, 2015). Worry and rumination are two significant forms of
negative repetitive thought. The term repetitive thought is neutral, in that some forms of repetitive
thought are constructive and others are unhelpful. It is also atheoretical.
The concept of mental perturbance may contribute to an integrative design-oriented
(theoretical) way of understanding repetitive thought. There are two types of mental perturbance:
motivator-based and alarm-based. Unless otherwise specified here, “mental perturbance” refers to
motivator-based perturbance. A mental perturbance is a state in which an insistent motivator tends to
influence executive processing even if the agent were to attempt to postpone consideration of the
motivator (Beaudoin et al., 2020; Wright et al., 1996). Thus, mental perturbance is a partial loss of
control of executive processing. In mental perturbance, theoretically, motivators can influence executive
functions in many ways, such as interrupting executive functions, making them go slower or faster, and
affecting the breadth and depth of their processing. Motivators may also parameterize executive
functions and ongoing behavior in other ways, such as causing the agent to engage in social signaling or
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to be more careful. Thus, the concept of mental perturbance includes but is more general than the
concept of interruption that is central to many classical cognitive theories of emotion (Mandler, 1964;
Simon, 1967; Oatley, 1992; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). The concept of mental perturbance assumes
an interaction of mechanisms including motivator generators, variable threshold motivator filters,
executive functions (deliberative and reflective), each set of mechanisms being functional. Mental
perturbance itself is not part of the design but it is assumed to emerge from the interactions of these
functional mechanisms.
5.5 Consciousness
Because sleep onset involves a significant shift in consciousness, a theory of consciousness
would be helpful in understanding sleep onset. With the integrative design-oriented approach, one
sidesteps the supposed “hard” problem of consciousness. One instead aims to mine the contributions
that theories of consciousness have made to an integrative design-oriented (functional) understanding
of autonomous agency. SIP draws on two theories of consciousness: Merlin Donald's Multi-component
Convergent theory (Donald, 2004; Donald, 2001) and Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (Baars,
2017; Baars, 1988, Baars & Franklin, 2009).
The Multiple Component Convergence theory theory claims that consciousness integrates
information from multiple sources (presenting multiple retrieval options) over multiple time scales
(from sensory binding to long-term awareness) leveraging mechanisms from multiple evolutionary
trajectories, providing or hosting memetic, mythic and theoretic capabilities. Global Workspace theory
claims that consciousness involves communication by a distributed coalition of mental processes
requiring relatively exclusive access to the brain’s connective core (“connectome”; Shanahan, 2012;
Shanahan, 2010; Beaudoin, 2011). Both the Multiple Component Convergence theory of consciousness
and the Global Workspace theory emphasize the human tendency to maintain coherence of mental
states as central to consciousness (Donald, 2001 p. 213 and Baars, 1988 ch. 8). Similarly, Allport (1989 p.
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652) proposes that a central function of attention is to maintain coherence of behavior. A continuous
process of coherent sense-making is assumed in many theories of emotion, such as Frijda (2005), of
decision making (Simon et al., 2015), and of mirth (Hurley et al., 2011).
Drawing on these theories, SIP assumes that sleep onset involves a relaxation of monitoring for
coherence, and that insomnolence can, in some cases, be countered by cognitive techniques that
engage the connectome with processes that are not insomnolent.
5.6 Alarms and Alarm-Based Mental Perturbance
Hans Selye described the first stage of the stress response as involving an “alarm reaction”
(Selye, 1973; Selye, 1936). Sloman & Croucher (1981); Sloman (2003); Sloman et al. (2005) introduced
the concept of alarms in AI research on autonomous agents and emotion, an idea that was incorporated
into the Global Workspace theory of consciousness (Baars & Franklin, 2009). In the H-CogAff
computational architecture (Sloman, 2003; Sloman et al., 2005), alarms can be trigged by perception
and by deliberative processes; and they can directly and globally affect two H-CogAff levels: the reactive
and deliberative levels. The reactive effects of alarms in H-CogAff can include arousal and behaviors or
readiness for behavior (freezing, fleeing, etc.). Like motives, the effects of alarms on executive processes
are assumed to be subject to attention filtering. This leads to the possibility of alarm-based perturbance,
where reflective processes would have difficulty controlling deliberative processes due to the alarm.
The term “alarm” does not figure prominently in psychology, even in stress literature. In
addition to in H-CogAff papers, it appears informally in some research on pain (Moreno et al., 2015;
Plaghki et al., 2010; Cervero, 2012; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004) and on emotion (Oatley, 1992). The
concept of alarm is admittedly highly speculative and vague. Still, attempting to understand emotion,
stress and ad hoc arousal in terms of computational alarms seems a promising avenue for both empirical
and integrative design-oriented research in psychology.
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6. Somnolent Information-Processing Postulates
As noted, according to SIP the function of the SOCS is to cause a controlled transition into sleep
to the extent it is currently safe and appropriate to do so. The gradual nature of sleep onset enables the
SOCS to return to wake if new information implies it is better to remain vigilant. SIP is a high-level
qualitative functional specification based on the foundations summarized above.
Figure 1. Overview of Somnolent Information Processing
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
Postulate 1 Chronobiological processes, C and S, are the major sources of somnolence
SIP assumes that processes C and S are the main processes regulating sleep onset. For instance,
if sleep pressure (C) is sufficiently low, and the circadian wake drive propensity sufficiently high, then
none of the pro-somnolent processes below (postulates 4 and 5) would be able to trigger sleep onset.
Postulate 2: Mental perturbance is insomnolent
SIP assumes that mental perturbance is insomnolent. The presence of a highly insistent
motivator is a signal to the SOCS that it should (other things being equal) back off from transitioning the
agent toward sleep. Mental perturbance may involve positively and/or negatively valenced motivators.
Some insomnolent motivators are negative, triggering executive processes such as worry or rumination;
some trigger more positive processes such as anticipating desired outcomes. For instance, in grief an
insistent desire to reunite with the lost one is insomnolent; in anger, an insistent desire for revenge is
insomnolent. The extent of the insomnolence is assumed to be partly a function of the insistence of the
perturbant motivators, though insistence is not purely a quantitative notion. SIP also heuristically
leverages Scherer’s Componential Process Model of emotions (Scherer, 2009). As such, the degree of
insomnolence of a motivator is also supposed to be a function of appraisal of the situation associated
with the motivator such as the person’s potential for coping with the situation. This should hold as long
as the appraisals feed back into the insistence of the motivator, meaning (again) its propensity to
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capture and maintain executive functions. Thus, there is a wide variety of potentially insomnolent
motivational perturbance.
By postulating that the SOCS is sensitive to the insistence of motivators, one need not assume
that executive processing of motivators or cortical arousal is inherently insomnolent. The SOCS, with its
old evolutionary history, must have been designed parsimoniously, without relying on details of
executive processes for its decisions. Insistence is assumed to be based on simple (heuristic)
computations of importance and urgency that determine whether a motivator will influence executive
functions, as opposed to requiring executive functions. It would have been evolutionarily economical for
SOCS to have made use of the same mechanism as used by low-level attentional mechanisms, i.e.,
insistence-based motivational filtering. While executive functions are not required for computing
insistence, it is assumed in SIP that attending to a motivator may sustain or increase its insistence,
potentially contributing to a perturbance involving it. Prior executive assessments of importance and
urgency of a motivator can feed back into the motivator’s insistence.
In SIP, bodily arousal and tension (aspects of moods, per the discussion above) may indirectly be
insomnolent to the extent that they trigger insistent motivators concerning the arousal or tension. This
could include low-level evaluations or higher-order motivators.
Postulate 3: Computational alarms are insomnolent
SIP assumes that, other things being equal, when a computational alarm is being broadcast
inside the mind-brain it is not a good time to fall asleep. After all, the purpose of an alarm is to signal the
occurrence of something important that urgently requires executive attention. Thus, SIP proposes that
computational alarms are insomnolent. SIP assumes that the stress response mediated by alarms can
sustain arousal for several hours. The Cano-Saper neurobiological rat model of insomnia shows how a
stressor can trigger activation of the arousal system for several hours after a stressful event (Cano et al.,
2008).
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Again, SIP does not assume that executive processing which may be triggered by alarms is
inherently insomnolent—it depends on the side-effects of the processing in relation to the postulates.
Alarms are also meant to cause physiological preparedness for action, including activation of the
sympathetic nervous system. From an integrative design-oriented perspective, one need not assume
that all aspects of sympathetic activation are inherently insomnolent (e.g., heart rate); alarms may be a
simpler signal upon which the SOCS can rely to maintain wakefulness. This is not to deny the possibility
of physiological arousal, through associative conditioning, becoming insomnolent.
Postulate 4: Some cognitions and executive commands have somnolent effects
As noted above in the section on psychological processes affecting sleep onset, sleep onset is
influenced by many cognitive factors such as perception of light and sound, posture, motion, and
temperature. The SOCS is assumed to respond to this information. Some perceptions and deliberation
may also have indirect insomnolent effects on SOCS by triggering or sustaining mental perturbance. It is
also assumed in SIP that top-down intentions to remain vigilant can delay SO per Steenland (2014). In
SIP, intention or effort to sleep is not assumed to be necessarily insomnolent. It depends on the type of
effort; for instance, paradoxical intention to stay awake would not necessarily be insomnolent.
However, effort may indirectly be insomnolent by sustaining the insistence of motivators. Intention to
sleep can also in principle trigger cognitive and behavioral activities that are pro-somnolent.
Postulate 5: The sleep onset period involves diverse somnolent feedback loops
SIP assumes that the sleep onset period involves diverse feedback loops. There are negative
feedback loops, where, for instance, the occurrence of mental perturbance or alarms can inhibit sleep
onset. It also assumes a positive feedback loop, in which signs of sleep onset can further facilitate sleep
onset; i.e., they are pro-somnolent. Thus, inducing a mental state that is in relevant respects similar to
sleep onset should (other things being equal) facilitate sleep onset. The sleep onset emulation
hypothesis, mentioned above, illustrates this. Some of the features of N1 were mentioned above (e.g.,
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spontaneous imagery and slowing of the breath). Cognitive shuffling, discussed below, is meant to
exploit these postulated feedback loops.
Postulate 6: Regulation of sleep onset is subject to manifold forms of learning
Psychological literature on learning in insomnia mostly emphasizes conditioning (e.g., Perlis et
al., 2005), meaning associative models of learning. For instance, Perlis’ neurocognitive model posits that
cortical arousal may be triggered by the environment via classical conditioning. In SIP the SOCS is
assumed to be integrative and susceptible to influence by conditioning and by other forms of learning.
For example, psychoeducation aspects of CBT-I aim to elicit cognitive restructuring — often through
challenging beliefs and spurring reflection (Edinger & Means, 2005; Bootzin & Epstein, 2011).
Viewing humans as autonomous agents, SIP assumes sleep onset is also a helpful target for self-
regulated learning (Clark & Zimmerman, 2014). An important principle of self-regulation is that
perceived self-efficacy facilitates various types of purposive behavior (Bandura, 1997). Viewing the sleep
onset period as involving purposive behavior, SIP aligns with the claim of Bouchard et al. (2003) and
Fretz (2023) that sleep self-efficacy can help with insomnia. Viewing oneself as a competent sleeper,
whether in normal conditions or when facing prior nights of insomnolence, can facilitate sleep onset.
Moreover, like other health behaviors, sleep self-efficacy can be bolstered by improving one’s skills at
the behavior (here, initially falling asleep or back asleep after early awakening). Furthermore, if people
better understand the SOCS, they might better understand how to manipulate it, which may yield
greater confidence in their ability to manipulate it. Perhaps providing people who have a high need for
cognition (Petty et al 1982) with accessible integrative design-oriented models of the SOCS and
explaining how particular cognitive strategies might affect sleep onset may pique their curiosity,
increase their confidence in helpful strategies, and their adherence to them.
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7. Cognitive Shuffle
A way not only to test but also develop theories of the SOCS is to attempt to derive from them
cognitive strategies to promote sleep onset and measure their impacts. For example, the cognitive
shuffle is one such technique based on SIP that could be used for such tests. It involves sequentially
mentally processing a variety of information items. Serial diverse imagining is a subclass of cognitive
shuffling in which one sequentially imagines a variety of concrete items. Items could be people, places,
things, poses, activities — just about anything imaginable. For example, one could sequentially imagine
the planet Jupiter, walking slowly in the woods, a piano, and a calm lake without integrating the imagery
in a coherent model or narrative. The technique is meant to be counter-insomnolent, by tying up
executive resources that might otherwise entertain insomnolent motivators. In serial diverse kinesthetic
imagining one is supposed to imagine motion involving both sides of one’s body such that major
pathways of the connectome (including the corpus callosum) thought, in Global Workspace theory, to
underlie a global workspace (Shanahan, 2010) are occupied—e.g., imagining playing a piano. This would
leave fewer mental and brain resources for processing and activating insomnolent motivators, enabling
their insistence to decrease (Postulate 2). With the right rhythm or imaginative twist, an entrainment
might be possible (similar to actual physical rocking mentioned in Postulate 4). Alarms might also less
likely be generated and maintained (Postulate 3). Some forms of serial diverse imagining that sufficiently
approximate sleep onset imagery might also be pro-somnolent by virtue of the sleep onset emulation
hypothesis which taps into postulates 4 and 5. Sleep onset imagery often has kinesthetic elements
(Nielsen, 2017); hence serial diverse kinesthetic imagining might induce a mental state, in this respect,
that is more similar to natural sleep onset than the other cognitive techniques reviewed in Lemyre et al.
(2020). Sleep onset is also a state that differs from most waking consciousness in that the tendency to
maintain overall coherence and sense-making decreases substantially. It is proposed that serial diverse
imagining might trigger a positive feedback loop (per postulates 4 and 5) wherein spontaneous imagery
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is generated. Participants would be encouraged to recognize and sustain fleeting imagery, and to
welcome the imagery as a sign of progress towards sleep. Switching the self’s imagined contextual
location of the behavior (e.g., different rooms, different buildings) would further make the imagining
less realistic and more dream-like. Another similarity between serial diverse imagining and natural sleep
onset, to which Postulate 4 is pertinent, is that both draw on memory; i.e., imagining draws on memory
and natural sleep onset seems to involve episodic remembering. Serial diverse imagining can be done
with or without software that prompts content to imagine. A technology-free self-directed approach to
serial diverse imagining leverages the cue-driven principle of memory. Here, the participant conjures up
an arbitrary seed word or expression, preferably one comprised of between 5-12 letters. The participant
iteratively spells the word, each letter of which becomes a cue. For each cue letter, the participant
sequentially recalls a target that start with the letter or corresponding phoneme. For example, “C” might
cue “car”. The participant then imagines an instance or application of the target concept (e.g., a car), for
5-10 seconds, and then moves onto another target (e.g., “cat”) without relating the targets in a coherent
narrative.
A priori, serial diverse imagining seems more engaging than unguided and guided imagery
techniques reviewed in Lemyre et al. (2020), where participants imagine at length a pleasant scene, or a
specific predetermined object, respectively. Serial diverse imagining shares features of the articulatory
suppression technique, also reviewed in Lemyre et al. (2020), which involves mentally repeating a
phoneme over and over; however, instead of merely occupying the phonological loop, serial diverse
imagining also engages the visual-spatial scratchpad of working memory (Baddeley, 2012). Articulatory
suppression and serial diverse imagining run counter to theories according to which intention, attention
and effort to sleep are necessarily insomnolent. Subject to C and S, which exert a dominant constraint,
serial diverse imagining is predicted to help with light insomnolence, or conditions in which articulatory
suppression or traditional imagery distraction might be helpful; though not likely when motivators or
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alarms are extremely insistent. The cognitive shuffle has not been empirically researched beyond small
scale pilot testing (Beaudoin et al., 2016; Selham et al., 2019). Understanding, in relation to SIP or other
theories, whether — and if so, why and when — this or related techniques can affect sleep onset (even
if to a small extent) is important. Using software to deliver serial diverse imagining opens up many
experimental possibilities to test and refine the postulates. Moreover, such studies could contribute to
the development of innovations in sleep research methodology that leverage software design and its
affordances for modelling what happens during sleep onset.
8. Conclusion
This chapter explained and illustrated a theoretical approach to understanding the SOCS in an
integrative design-oriented way. This means studying a particular set of functions (here, SOCS) in
relation to multiple other psychological functions, with reverse-engineering of each function and
consideration of information processing architecture. The chapter briefly sketched assumptions
regarding human autonomous agency in relation to the H-CogAff architectural schema. Future research
could develop these assumptions in more detail, including with computer simulations and modelling.
Given the complexity of the enterprise, such frameworks should ideally be developed by a team of
researchers; after all, much software that is not nearly as complex as required for human autonomous
agency requires software architects and teams of software developers. SIP itself should be specified in
more detail, in quantitative terms, with computer simulations. The two main original theoretical ideas in
SIP are that (a) mental perturbance is insomnolent; (b) there is a positive feedback loop in N1 such that
emulating features of falling asleep is pro-somnolent.
Much additional research in AI, psychology and neuroscience is relevant to understanding the
SOCS. By better understanding the interactions between SOCS and other aspects of mental and brain
functional architecture, it may be possible to design, refine and test cognitive techniques to facilitate
sleep onset. It should also be researched how bedtime cognitive techniques may be scaffolded with
23 of 33
information technology, including wearables, in theory-based ways. The integrative design-oriented
approach presents sleep researchers with an opportunity to investigate new questions, and previous
questions in new ways, and to advance methodology and innovation in this area.
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Figure 1
