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Abstract
This volume provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date compendium of theory and research in the field of human intelligence. Each of the 42 chapters is written by world-renowned experts in their respective fields, and collectively, they cover the full range of topics of contemporary interest in the study of intelligence. The handbook is divided into nine parts: Part I covers intelligence and its measurement; Part II deals with the development of intelligence; Part III discusses intelligence and group differences; Part IV concerns the biology of intelligence; Part V is about intelligence and information processing; Part VI discusses different kinds of intelligence; Part VII covers intelligence and society; Part VIII concerns intelligence in relation to allied constructs; and Part IX is the concluding chapter, which reflects on where the field is currently and where it still needs to go.
... This manifold is one the most replicated findings in psychology (Kovacs & Conway, 2016) and the implication is this: The vehicles (or superficial characteristics) of the situations science uses for assessing intelligence and cognitive ability are relatively irrelevant. The key lies in their cognitive requirements (Hunt, 2011, Jensen, 1998. From this perspective, it becomes possible to use video games for obtaining measures of the construct of interest. ...
Video games can be useful tools for assessing intelligence and cognitive differences. First, available video games are grouped into thirteen genres defining their basic features. Second, empirical studies relating intelligence and video games are reviewed. Results show very strong correlations between intelligence and video game performance at the latent level, which suggests that the latter taps core facets of the intelligence concept. Third, regarding cognitive processes, studies have focused on “action video games.” Results have shown that video game experience (hours per week) correlates mainly with visuospatial cognition, perception, and attention. Fourth, key neural correlates of video game performance are also discussed. The final section enumerates required features for a video game to properly measure intelligence differences using a video game elaborated for research purposes (Forgotten Depths).
... As noted by Hunt (2011) "the biggest challenge will be to expand research on intelligence from observations within the conventional testing paradigm to observations of behavior in everyday life" (p. 882). ...
Zekâ araştırmaları geniş bir literatür düzlemine yerleşmiştir. Bu düzlem zekânın insan doğasına özgü genetik bağlamına dayanmakla birlikte yine insan doğasına özgü toplumsal bir bağlamı da zorunlu kılmış ve bu bağlam mevcut literatürü oldukça genişletmiştir. Dolayısıyla zekâ yalnızca genetik boyutuyla değil aynı zamanda başta psikoloji olmak üzere eğitim bilimleri, işletme, yönetim organizasyon, örgütlenme araştırmaları, sosyoloji ya da kültürel çalışmalar gibi pek çok farklı araştırma alanının gündemine girmiştir. Zekânın ne olduğu hakkındaki görüşlerin çeşitliliği beraberinde zekâ çeşitlerini gündeme getirmiş ve pek çok zekâ türünden farklı bağlamlar ve açıklamalar üzerinden söz edilmiştir. Mevcut zekâ araştırmaları literatürünün geniş ve uzak tarihsel bağları olsa da kültür ve zekâ arasında kurulmaya çalışılan ilişkinin henüz son yıllarda belirginleştiği ve ‘kültürel zekâ’ tanımlaması ile ele alındığı görülmektedir. Kültürel zekâ bu bağlamda kültürel farkların bireysel yönetimi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma da öncelikli olarak kültür ve zekâ kavramları arasındaki ilişkiye dair tartışmaların gündemini ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. Bu doğrultuda çalışma, kültür ve zekâ arasında kurulan arayüzün ve ampirik olarak geçerliliğin test edildiği metodolojik hattın temel çerçevesini çizecek ve bir kavramsallaştırma olarak kültürel zekânın bu çerçeve içindeki sınırlarını ve imkanlarını tartışmaya açacaktır.
Intelligence is a crucial psychologic construct for understanding human behavioral differences. This construct is based on one of the most replicated findings in psychology (the positive manifold): individuals can be reliably ordered according to their cognitive performance. Those showing high levels in ability X are more likely to show high levels in the remaining abilities, while those showing low levels in ability X are more likely to show low levels in the remaining abilities. Intelligence is characterized as a general cognitive ability integrating more than 80 distinguishable but related abilities. The mainstream definition states that intelligence is a general mental ability for reasoning, planning, solving problems, think abstractly, comprehending complex ideas, and learning. Intellectual abilities are measured by standardized tests showing highly reliable and valid indices. Intelligence is a highly stable psychologic trait, but different abilities change following disparate trends across the life span. These average trends, however, (a) hide the wide range of individual differences in the rates of change and (b) are consistent with the fact that abilities show orchestrated changes, which is consistent with the positive manifold. This chapter presents examples of the conventional testing paradigm along with recent developments based on cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.
Previous research on route learning has shown that men learn routes faster and with fewer errors than women. The same patterns have also been found for girls and boys. In this study, 19 children of ages 5 to 6 years, 26 children of ages 7 to 9 years, and 22 children of ages 10 to 12 years were presented a route-learning task. The children were randomly assigned to either the Landmark group in which they were required to learn a route on a map that included landmarks or the No-landmark group in which they learned a route on a map without landmarks. Significant main effects were found for age and sex. Older children learned the route faster and with fewer errors than younger children. Boys made significantly fewer errors and took less time and fewer trials to reach criterion in learning the route regardless of whether landmarks were present or not. The role of landmarks in route learning needs to be further clarified.
The Bischof–Kohler hypothesis holds that nonhuman animals cannot anticipate a future event and take appropriate action when that event involves satisfaction of a need not currently experienced. Tests of the Bischof–Kohler hypothesis were performed with squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and rats (Rattus norvegicus). In experimental trials with both species, a nonthirsty animal had its water bottle removed and then chose between a smaller and larger quantity of food. Consumption of the food induced thirst. Choice of the smaller quantity led to the return of the water bottle sooner than choice of the larger quantity. Monkeys reversed their baseline preference for the larger quantity of food when the experimental contingencies were introduced, but rats continued to prefer the larger amount. Although the rat findings support the Bischof–Kohler hypothesis, the monkey findings challenge it.
Established culture-invariant measures are needed for cross-cultural assessment of verbal and visuospatial speed of processing and working memory across the life span. In this study, 32 younger and 32 older adults from China and from the United States were administered numerically based and spatially based measures of speed of processing and working memory. Chinese superiority on the numerically based tasks was found for younger adults. Age and increasing task demands diminished this cultural effect, as predicted by the framework proposed by D. C. Park, R. Nisbett, and T. Hedden (1999). However, the visuospatial measures of both working memory and speed of processing did not differ cross-culturally for either age group. The authors concluded that these visuospatial measures provide culture-invariant estimates of cognitive processes in East Asian and Western cultures, but that numerically based tasks show evidence of cultural and linguistic biases in performance levels.
Latent growth curve techniques and longitudinal data are used to examine predictions from the theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence (Gf-Gc theory; J. L. Horn & R. B. Cattell, 1966, 1967). The data examined are from a sample (N ∼ 1,200) measured on the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery—Revised (WJ–R). The longitudinal structural equation models used are based on latent growth models of age using two-occasion “accelerated” data (e.g., J. J. McArdle & R. Q. Bell, 2000; J. J. McArdle & R. W. Woodcock, 1997). Nonlinear mixed-effects growth models based on a dual exponential rate yield a reasonable fit to all life span cognitive data. These results suggest that most broad cognitive functions fit a generalized curve that rises and falls. Novel multilevel models directly comparing growth curves show that broad fluid reasoning (Gf) and acculturated crystallized knowledge (Gc) have different growth patterns. In all comparisons, any model of cognitive age changes with only a single g factor yields an overly simplistic view of growth and change over age.
There are serious gaps in knowledge with respect to the use of standardized assessment instruments such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Third Edition (WAIS-III; D. Wechsler, 1997) or the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2 (MMPI-2; J. N. Butcher, W. G. Dahlstrom, J. R. Graham, A. Tellegen, & B. Kaemmer, 1989) with Asian Americans. Issues surrounding the availability, reliability, and validity of assessment instruments must be addressed before extended discussions about the implication of test revisions for this population can take place. The authors review the current status of the WAIS-III and MMPI-2 with Asian Americans with respect to their availability, reliability, and validity, including reasons why Asian Americans have been severely underrepresented in validation studies. The authors argue for the need to collect data on the use of standardized assessment instruments with Asian Americans and conclude with recommendations for the inclusion of this population in future test revision projects.
When an attitude changes from A1 to A2, what happens to A1? Most theories assume, at least implicitly, that the new attitude replaces the former one. The authors argue that a new attitude can override, but not replace, the old one, resulting in dual attitudes. Dual attitudes are defined as different evaluations of the same attitude object an automatic, implicit attitude and an explicit attitude. The attitude that people endorse depends on whether they have the cognitive capacity to retrieve the explicit attitude and whether this overrides their implicit attitude. A number of literatures consistent with these hypotheses are reviewed, and the implications of the dual-attitude model for attitude theory and measurement are discussed. For example, by including only explicit measures, previous studies may have exaggerated the ease with which people change their attitudes. Even if an explicit attitude changes, an implicit attitude can remain the same.
Though often reliable, human memory is also fallible. This article examines how and why memory can get us into trouble. It is suggested that memory’s misdeeds can be classified into 7 basic “sins”: transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. The first three sins involve different types of forgetting, the next three refer to different types of distortions, and the final sin concerns intrusive recollections that are difficult to forget. Evidence is reviewed concerning each of the 7 sins from relevant sectors of psychology (cognitive, social, and clinical) and from cognitive neuroscience studies that include patients with focal brain damage or make use of recently developed neuroimaging techniques. Although the 7 sins may appear to reflect flaws in system design, it is argued instead that they are by-products of otherwise adaptive features of memory.
A new version of the Rational–Experiential Inventory (REI), which measures rational and experiential thinking styles and includes subscales of self-reported ability and engagement, was examined in two studies. In Study 1, the two main scales were independent, and they and their subscales exhibited discriminant validity and contributed to the prediction of a variety of measures beyond the contribution of the Big Five scales. A rational thinking style was most strongly and directly related to Ego Strength, Openness, Conscientiousness, and favorable basic beliefs about the self and the world, and it was most strongly inversely related to Neuroticism and Conservatism. An experiential thinking style was most strongly directly related to Extraversion, Agreeableness, Favorable Relationships Beliefs, and Emotional Expressivity, and it was most strongly inversely related to Categorical Thinking, Distrust of Others, and Intolerance. In Study 2, a rational thinking style was inversely related and an experiential thinking style was unrelated to nonoptimal responses in a game of chance. It was concluded that the new REI is a significant improvement over the previous version and measures unique aspects of personality.
A new theory of cognitive biases, called error management theory (EMT), proposes that psychological mechanisms are designed to be predictably biased when the costs of false-positive and false-negative errors were asymmetrical over evolutionary history. This theory explains known phenomena such as men's overperception of women's sexual intent, and it predicts new biases in social inference such as women's underestimation of men's commitment. In Study 1 (N = 217), the authors documented the commitment underperception effect predicted by EMT. In Study 2 (N = 289), the authors replicated the commitment bias and documented a condition in which men's sexual overperception bias is corrected. Discussion contrasts EMT with the heuristics and biases approach and suggests additional testable hypotheses based on EMT.
The ability of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to recognize the correspondence between a scale model and its real-world referent was examined. In Experiments 1 and 2, an adult female and a young adult male watched as an experimenter hid a miniature model food in 1 of 4 sites in a scale model. Then, the chimpanzees were given the opportunity to find the real food item that had been hidden in the analogous location in the real room. The female performed significantly above chance, whereas the male performed at chance level. Experiments 3 and 4 tested 5 adult and 2 adolescent chimpanzees in a similar paradigm, using a scale model of the chimpanzees' outdoor area. Results indicate that some adult chimpanzees were able to reliably demonstrate an understanding of the relationship between a scale model and the larger space it represented, whereas other subjects were constrained by inefficient and unsuccessful search patterns.
A meta-analysis was conducted on 91 studies to derive a correlation matrix for adult age, speed of processing, primary–working memory, episodic memory, reasoning, and spatial ability. Structural equation modeling with a single latent common cognitive factor showed that all cognitive measures shared substantial portions of age-related variance. A mediational model revealed that speed of processing and primary–working memory appear to be important mediators of age-related differences in the other measures. However, not all of the age-related influences were mediated. An examination of quadratic age effects and correlational patterns for subsamples under and over 50 years of age revealed that (a) negative age–cognition relations were significant for the 18- to 50-year-old sample and (b) the age-related decline accelerated significantly over the adult life span for variables assessing speed, reasoning, and episodic memory.
Extending the Jacksonian principle of the hierarchical development and dissolution of function to the development and dissolution of memory, researchers have concluded that implicit (procedural) memory is a primitive system, functional shortly after birth, that processes information automatically, whereas explicit (declarative) memory matures late in the 1st year and mediates the conscious recollection of a prior event. Support for a developmental hierarchy has only been inferred from the memory performance of adults with amnesia on priming and recognition–recall tests in response to manipulations of different independent variables. This article reviews evidence that very young infants exhibit memory dissociations like those exhibited by adults with normal memory on analogous memory tests in response to manipulations of the same independent variables. These data demonstrate that implicit and explicit memory follow the same developmental timetable and challenge the utility of conscious recollection as the defining characteristic of explicit memory.
An individual-differences approach was used to examine the component processes that predict episodic long-term memory performance. A total of 301 participants ages 20–90 received a 7-hr cognitive battery across 3 days. Key constructs hypothesized to affect long-term memory function were assessed, including multiple measures of working memory and perceptual speed. Latent-construct, structural equation modeling was used to examine the relationship of these measures and age to different types of long-term memory tasks. Speed was a key construct for all 3 types of memory tasks, mediating substantial age-related variance; working memory was a fundamental construct for free and cued recall but not spatial memory. The data suggest that both speed and working memory are fundamental to explaining age-related changes in cognitive aging but that the relative contributions of these constructs vary as a function of the type of memory task.
The purpose of this article is to introduce the inspection-time measure to the wider psychological community. Inspection time is, to date, the only single information- processing index that accounts for approximately 20% of intelligence-test variance. We argue that inspection time, because of its much-replicated correlation with IQ and its potential for theoretical tractability, has more potential for our understanding of individual differences in cognitive ability than other indexes of human information processing. The nature of inspection time and its measurement are described, studies correlating inspection time and IQ-type test scores are summarized, and the difficulties of explaining this correlation are highlighted.
A theory is proposed to account for some of the age-related differences reported in measures of Type A or fluid cognition. The central hypothesis in the theory is that increased age in adulthood is associated with a decrease in the speed with which many processing operations can be executed and that this reduction in speed leads to impairments in cognitive functioning because of what are termed the limited time mechanism and the simultaneity mechanism. That is, cognitive performance is degraded when processing is slow because relevant operations cannot be successfully executed (limited time) and because the products of early processing may no longer be available when later processing is complete (simultaneity). Several types of evidence, such as the discovery of considerable shared age-related variance across various measures of speed and large attenuation of the age-related influences on cognitive measures after statistical control of measures of speed, are consistent with this theory.
Manipulative strategies of social conduct (Machiavellianism) have been studied by both psychologists and evolutionary biologists. The authors use the psychological literature as a database to test evolutionary hypotheses about the adaptive advantages of manipulative social behavior. Machiavellianism does not correlate with general intelligence and does not consistently lead to real-world success. It is best regarded as 1 of several social strategies, broadly similar to the “defect” strategy of evolutionary game theory, which is successful in some situations but not others. In general, human evolutionary psychology and evolutionary game theory provide useful frameworks for thinking about behavioral strategies, such as Machiavellianism, and identify a large number of specific hypotheses that have not yet been tested by personality and social psychologists.
To account for the large demands on working memory during text comprehension and expert performance, the traditional models of working memory involving temporary storage must be extended to include working memory based on storage in long-term memory. In the proposed theoretical framework cognitive processes are viewed as a sequence of stable states representing end products of processing. In skilled activities, acquired memory skills allow these end products to be stored in long-term memory and kept directly accessible by means of retrieval cues in short-term memory, as proposed by skilled memory theory. These theoretical claims are supported by a review of evidence on memory in text comprehension and expert performance in such domains as mental calculation, medical diagnosis, and chess.
Men and women clearly differ in some psychological domains. A. H. Eagly (1995) shows that these differences are not artifactual or unstable. Ideally, the next scientific step is to develop a cogent explanatory framework for understanding why the sexes differ in some psychological domains and not in others and for generating accurate predictions about sex differences as yet undiscovered. This article offers a brief outline of an explanatory framework for psychological sex differences—one that is anchored in the new theoretical paradigm of evolutionary psychology. Men and women differ, in this view, in domains in which they have faced different adaptive problems over human evolutionary history. In all other domains, the sexes are predicted to be psychologically similar. Evolutionary psychology jettisons the false dichotomy between biology and environment and provides a powerful metatheory of why sex differences exist, where they exist, and in what contexts they are expressed (D. M. Buss, 1995).
Four experiments examined individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity and how those differences affect performance on retrieval from both primary and secondary memory. The results showed that WM differences appear only in retrieval from primary memory and then only under conditions that lead to interference or response competition within the task. This suggests that WM capacity is important to retrieval that is based on controlled effortful search but not search that is based on automatic activation. A view is presented suggesting that individual differences in attentional resources lead to differences in the ability to inhibit or suppress irrelevant information. The paradigm also allowed more general comparisons between the processes involved in retrieval from primary and secondary memory. As expected, it was found that retrieval from primary memory was a function of set size. However, for sets larger than 2 items, retrieval from secondary memory was independent of set size.
Cognitive–experiential self-theory integrates the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious by assuming the existence of two parallel, interacting modes of information processing: a rational system and an emotionally driven experiential system. Support for the theory is provided by the convergence of a wide variety of theoretical positions on two similar processing modes; by real-life phenomena—such as conflicts between the heart and the head; the appeal of concrete, imagistic, and narrative representations; superstitious thinking; and the ubiquity of religion throughout recorded history—and by laboratory research, including the prediction of new phenomena in heuristic reasoning.
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion—that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation—extends both the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures—which are imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. The finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges’ attention on their judgment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducing such unintended discrimination.
When offered an opportunity to win 1. These results were predicted from the concretive and experiential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in real life.
Although Piagetian theory proposes that the ability to make transitive inferences is confined to humans above age 7, recent evidence has suggested that this logical ability may be more broad based. In nonverbal tests, transitive inference has been demonstrated in preschool children and 2 species of nonhuman primates. In these experiments, I demonstrate evidence of transitive inference in rats (Rattus norvegicus). I used an ordered series of 5 olfactory stimuli (A < B < C < D < E) from which correct inferences were made about the novel B versus D pair. Control procedures indicated that performance did not depend on the recency with which the correct answer was rewarded during training and may be disrupted by the addition of logically inconsistent premises (F > E and A > F). The possibility that logical transitivity may reflect a form of spatial paralogic rather than formal deductions from a syllogistic–verbal system is discussed.
Cross-sectional data on age differences in perceptual speed are presented from the Seattle Longitudinal Study for the age range 22–91 years (N = 1, 620, first assessed in 1977; N = 628, first assessed in 1984). In addition, 838 subjects were followed over the 7-year interval. Markers of perceptual speed were the Identical Pictures and Finding A’s tests from the ETS Kit of Factor-Referenced Tests. Significant age differences, age changes, and cohort differences were found at both observed variable and latent construct levels. Cross-lagged correlations examine the role of perceptual speed in predicting later performance on other abilities (Verbal Meaning, Inductive Reasoning, Spatial Orientation, Number, and Word Fluency). When perceptual speed is partialled out of scores for these abilities, aging effects are reduced markedly for all abilities, but least for Spatial Orientation and Inductive Reasoning.
The process of encoding new information involves the imposition of preexisting interpretive categories on newly encountered stimuli, even if the categories do not match perfectly those stimuli. We hypothesized that such encoding of stimuli as supportive of preexisting encoding dispositions may become a source of a perceiver's subjective experiences that support these dispositions. Through this nonconsciously operating mechanism, encoding rules may gradually develop in a self-perpetuating manner, even in the absence of any objectively supportive evidence. Results demonstrated this self-perpetuating process in three studies involving different stimulus materials and experimental tasks (matrix-scanning paradigm and two “intuitive judgment” tasks). The self-perpetuating development of encoding biases is discussed as one of the elementary mechanisms involved in the development of interpretive categories and other individually differentiated cognitive dispositions.
The purpose of this review is to formulate a revised model of information processing that takes into account recent research on memory storage, selective attention, effortful versus automatic processing, and the mutual constraints that these areas place on one another. One distinctive aspect of the proposed model is the inclusion of two phases of sensory storage in each modality. The first phase extends sensation for several hundred milliseconds, whereas the second phase is a vivid recollection of sensation. The mechanism of at least the longer phase is the activation of features in long-term memory, comparable to the mechanism of non-sensory, short-term storage. Another distinctive aspect of the model is that habituation/dishabituation and central executive processes together are assumed to determine the focus of attention, without the need for either an early or a late attentional filter. Research issues that contribute to a comparison of models are discussed.
Normal adult women showed systematic performance fluctuations across the menstrual cycle on several motor and perceptual tests that typically yield sex differences in performance. The midluteal phase, characterized by high levels of estradiol and progesterone, was associated with improved performance on tests of speeded motor coordination and impaired performance on a perceptual-spatial test, relative to performance during menses. Variations in gonadal steroid levels may contribute substantially to the sex differences reported in human cognitive and motor skills.
In 5 studies, undergraduate subjects were given descriptions and outcomes of decisions made by others under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions concerned either medical matters or monetary gambles. Subjects rated the quality of thinking of the decisions, the competence of the decision maker, or their willingness to let the decision maker decide on their behalf. Subjects understood that they had all relevant information available to the decision maker. Subjects rated the thinking as better, rated the decision maker as more competent, or indicated greater willingness to yield the decision when the outcome was favorable than when it was unfavorable. In monetary gambles, subjects rated the thinking as better when the outcome of the option not chosen turned out poorly than when it turned out well. Although subjects who were asked felt that they should not consider outcomes in making these evaluations, they did so. This effect of outcome knowledge on evaluation may be explained partly in terms of its effect on the salience of arguments for each side of the choice. Implications for the theory of rationality and for practical situations are discussed.
In a 22-year study, data were collected on aggressiveness and intellectual functioning in more than 600 subjects, their parents, and their children. Both aggression and intellectual functioning are reasonably stable in a subject's lifetime and perpetuate themselves across generations and within marriage pairs. Aggression in childhood was shown to interfere with the development of intellectual functioning and to be predictive of poorer intellectual achievement as an adult. Early IQ was related to early subject aggression but did not predict changes in aggression after age 8. On the other hand, differences between early IQ and intellectual achievement in middle adulthood were predictable from early aggressive behavior. A dual-process model was offered to explain the relation between intellectual functioning and aggressive behavior. We hypothesized that low intelligence makes the learning of aggressive responses more likely at an early age, and this aggressive behavior makes continued intellectual development more difficult.
A 30-item true–false scale was developed for magical ideation, which is defined as belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards are invalid. The scale was based on P. E. Meehl's (1964) description of magical ideation as a symptom of schizotypy or schizophrenia proneness. Of 1,512 college students who completed the scale, 28 were selected who scored at least 1.91 SD above the mean on the Magical Ideation Scale. These 28 magical-ideation Ss and 27 control Ss were interviewed using a modified version of the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia–Lifetime Version. The magical-ideation Ss exceeded the control Ss on evidence of magical thoughts and reported more psychotic or psychoticlike experiences, more schizotypal experiences, more affective symptoms, and more difficulties in concentration. It is concluded that Ss high on the Magical Ideation Scale show symptoms suggestive of predisposition to psychosis, justifying the long-term follow-up of these persons. (27 ref)
This book was the first handbook where the world's foremost 'experts on expertise' reviewed our scientific knowledge on expertise and expert performance and how experts may differ from non-experts in terms of their development, training, reasoning, knowledge, social support, and innate talent. Methods are described for the study of experts' knowledge and their performance of representative tasks from their domain of expertise. The development of expertise is also studied by retrospective interviews and the daily lives of experts are studied with diaries. In 15 major domains of expertise, the leading researchers summarize our knowledge on the structure and acquisition of expert skill and knowledge and discuss future prospects. General issues that cut across most domains are reviewed in chapters on various aspects of expertise such as general and practical intelligence, differences in brain activity, self-regulated learning, deliberate practice, aging, knowledge management, and creativity.
This book is the first international handbook of intelligence ever published. It is intended to prove a truly international perspective on the nature of intelligence. It covers intelligence theory, research, and practice from all over the globe. Areas covered include Great Britain, Australia, French-speaking countries, German-speaking countries, Spanish-speaking countries, India, Japan, Israel, Turkey, and China. Each author is an internationally recognized expert in the field of intelligence. Authors represent not just their own viewpoint, but rather, the full variety of viewpoints indigenous to the area about which they write. Each chapter deals with, for its area, definitions and theories of intelligence, history of research, current research, assessment techniques, and comparison across geographical areas. An integrative final chapter synthesizes the diverse international viewpoints.
In 1990, we started the Router project, a multistrategy-strategy adaptive navigation path planner. It assumes that a mission planner has generated a specific mission plan and identified specific path planning tasks. Given a specific path planning task, it uses a combination of model based and case based methods to solve it. New versions of the Router system view strategic metacontrol as a kind of design task that takes as input a specification of a problem solving task and gives as output the specification of a virtual architecture for addressing it. One version of the system operates in simulated navigation worlds and provides a simple natural language interface. Another version is embodied in Stimpy, an autonomous mobile robot. Stimpy addresses issues in spatial navigation beyond path planning, such as plan execution and monitoring. Our goal is to describe our general framework of multistrategy adaptive path planning, and the specific design of the Router system. To focus this discussion, we report on a series of experiments with Router in simulated navigation worlds.< >
This book is the first international handbook of intelligence ever published. It is intended to prove a truly international perspective on the nature of intelligence. It covers intelligence theory, research, and practice from all over the globe. Areas covered include Great Britain, Australia, French-speaking countries, German-speaking countries, Spanish-speaking countries, India, Japan, Israel, Turkey, and China. Each author is an internationally recognized expert in the field of intelligence. Authors represent not just their own viewpoint, but rather, the full variety of viewpoints indigenous to the area about which they write. Each chapter deals with, for its area, definitions and theories of intelligence, history of research, current research, assessment techniques, and comparison across geographical areas. An integrative final chapter synthesizes the diverse international viewpoints.
What is animal intelligence? In what ways is it similar to human intelligence? Many behavioral scientists have realized that animals can be rational, can think in abstract symbols, can understand and react to human speech, and can learn through observation as well as conditioning many of the more complicated skills of life. This book explores the mysteries of the animal mind even further, identifying an advanced level of animal behavior—emergents—that reflects animals' natural and active inclination to make sense of the world. The authors unify all behavior into a framework they call Rational Behaviorism and present it as a new way to understand learning, intelligence, and rational behavior in both animals and humans. Drawing on years of research on issues of complex learning and intelligence in primates (notably rhesus monkeys, chimpanzees, and bonobos), the authors provide examples of animal ingenuity and persistence, showing that animals are capable of very creative solutions to novel challenges. They analyze learning processes and research methods, discuss the meaningful differences across the primate order, and point the way to further advances, enlivening theoretical material about primates with stories about their behavior and achievements.
It is well known that children's activities are full of pretending and imagination, but it is less appreciated that animals can also show similar activities. Originally published in 2002, this book focuses on comparing and contrasting children's and animals' pretenses and imaginative activities. In the text, overviews of research present conflicting interpretations of children's understanding of the psychology of pretense, and describe sociocultural factors which influence children's pretenses. Studies of nonhuman primates provide examples of their pretenses and other simulative activities, explore their representational and imaginative capacities and compare their skills with children. Although the psychological requirements for pretending are controversial, evidence presented in this volume suggests that great apes and even monkeys may share capacities for imagination with children, and that children's early pretenses may be less psychological than they appear.
The goal of this book is to characterize the nature of abilities, competencies, and expertise, and to understand the relations among them. The book therefore seeks to integrate into a coherent discipline what formerly have been, to a large extent, three separate disciplines. Such integration makes both theoretical and practical sense, because abilities represent potentials to achieve competencies, and ultimately, expertise. Authors of each chapter (a) present their views on the nature of abilities, competencies, and expertise; (b) present their views on the interrelationships among these three constructs; (c) state their views on how these three constructs can be assessed and developed; (d) present empirical data supporting their position; (e) compare and contrast their position to alternative positions, showing why they believe their position to be preferred; and (f) speculate on the implications of their viewpoint for science, education, and society.
Research on the evolution of higher intelligence rarely combines data from fields as diverse as paleontology and psychology. In this volume we seek to do just that, synthesizing the approaches of hominoid cognition, psychology, language studies, ecology, evolution, paleoecology and systematics toward an understanding of great ape intelligence. Leading scholars from all these fields have been asked to evaluate the manner in which each of their topics of research inform our understanding of the evolution of intelligence in great apes and humans. The ideas thus assembled represent a comprehensive survey of the various causes and consequences of cognitive evolution in great apes. The Evolution of Thought will therefore be an essential reference for graduate students and researchers in evolutionary psychology, paleoanthropology and primatology.
Working memory is currently a 'hot' topic in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Because of their radically different scopes and emphases, however, comparing different models and theories and understanding how they relate to one another has been a difficult task. This volume offers a much-needed forum for systematically comparing and contrasting existing models of working memory. It does so by asking each contributor to address the same comprehensive set of important theoretical questions on working memory. The answers to these questions provided in the volume elucidate the emerging general consensus on the nature of working memory among different theorists and crystallize incompatible theoretical claims that must be resolved in future research. As such, this volume serves not only as a milestone that documents the state-of-the-art in the field but also as a theoretical guidebook that will likely promote new lines of research and more precise and comprehensive models of working memory.
Research on the evolution of higher intelligence rarely combines data from fields as diverse as paleontology and psychology. In this volume we seek to do just that, synthesizing the approaches of hominoid cognition, psychology, language studies, ecology, evolution, paleoecology and systematics toward an understanding of great ape intelligence. Leading scholars from all these fields have been asked to evaluate the manner in which each of their topics of research inform our understanding of the evolution of intelligence in great apes and humans. The ideas thus assembled represent a comprehensive survey of the various causes and consequences of cognitive evolution in great apes. The Evolution of Thought will therefore be an essential reference for graduate students and researchers in evolutionary psychology, paleoanthropology and primatology.