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Occasion Setting in Humans: Norm or Exception?

Authors:
45
Occasion Setting in Humans: Norm or Exception?
In this commentary, we propose that occasion setting in humans may be even more widespread than
Leising and colleagues assume. In contrast to animal work, our research using the feature negative
procedure (A+ AX−) reveals substantial individual dierences in what people learn about the feature
(X). We discuss ndings showing that the majority of participants in our experiments learn something
akin to occasion setting, and we present reasons for why this may be the case. We conclude that
occasion setting may be the norm in humans because it allows existing learning to be preserved and
allows for the possibility that the eect of a cue is unique to its accompanying target.
Keywords: occasion setting, feature negative, modulation, conditioned inhibition, prevention learning
Leising, Nerz, Solorzano-Restrepo, and Bond (2025)
present a comprehensive review on the theoretical and
methodological issues surrounding occasion setting in
a number of species. We agree that occasion setting, or
modulation, is a potentially widespread phenomenon in
human learning and that greater consideration should be
paid to the possibility that humans learn hierarchical or
higher-order associations in addition to direct or rst-or-
der associations. In fact, our ndings in causal learning
procedures lead us to believe that in humans, modulation
may be the norm rather than the exception.
Causal learning often requires individuals to make
inferences about cues and their outcomes based on in-
complete or ambiguous information. For example, in a
feature negative discrimination1 commonly used in the
occasion-setting literature (A+ AX−), it is unclear whether
X directly prevents the outcome (i.e., conditioned inhibi-
tion or prevention) or whether X prevents A from causing
the outcome (i.e., negative occasion setting, or what we
have termed modulation). Situations of high ambiguity
1. We focus on negative occasion setting in this commentary, as
we have investigated negative occasion setting in our research.
are ripe for the observation of individual dierences in
what people learn. Indeed, we observed this exact result in
multiple experiments using self-report (Chow et al., 2022,
2024; Lee & Lovibond, 2021; Lovibond & Lee, 2021;
Lovibond et al., 2022). To our surprise, we found that very
few participants spontaneously described their learning by
using words such as “inhibition” or “prevention” despite
prevailing assumptions that learning a direct negative
association is dominant under these conditions. Instead,
we found that a large proportion of participants reported a
modulatory causal structure (i.e., X stopped A from causing
an allergic reaction) over a preventative structure (i.e., X
prevented allergic reactions) or a congural structure (i.e.,
A and X together produced no allergic reaction). These
ndings were surprising because conditioned inhibition
(i.e., prevention learning) has been seen as the default
mode of learning in feature negative discriminations, with
serial presentation of the AX compound assumed to be
necessary in order to observe occasion setting (Holland,
1984, 1989, 1991; Holland & Lamarre, 1984; Lamarre &
Holland, 1985; see Bonardi et al., 2017, and Fraser & Hol-
land, 2019, for reviews). In contrast, a direct comparison
ISSN: 1911-4745
DOI:10.3819/CCBR.2025.200003 Volume 20, 2025
Jessica C. Lee
University of Sydney
University of New South Wales
Julie Y.-L. Chow
University of New South Wales
Peter F. Lovibond
University of New South Wales
COMMENTARY
46
COMPARATIVE COGNITION & BEHAVIOR REVIEWS
Author Note: Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Jessica Lee at jessica.c.lee@sydney.edu.au
Jessica Lee, School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Camp-
erdown, 2006, New South Wales, Australia.
Lee, Chow, and Lovibond
of simultaneous and serial presentation of stimuli revealed
no signicant dierence in the kinds of causal structure
endorsed by participants, with the majority of participants
endorsing a modulatory structure in both conditions
(Lovibond & Lee, 2021).
In retrospect, the dominance of modulation learning
makes sense. In the presence of ambiguity due to limited
information, participants may lean toward modulation,
as it is the more conservative inference to make if par-
ticipants are unable to observe the eects of the feature
X with other cues. Modulation also helps to preserve
existing learning about the target A, which may be less
resource intensive when A is being learned alongside
AX. Consistent with this idea, Fraser and Holland (2019)
pointed out that one of the hypotheses guiding early ani-
mal research was that occasion setting is more likely when
the target is learned about faster than the feature. Under
this hypothesis, our failure to obtain a dierence between
serial and simultaneous presentation in feature negative
learning in humans (Lovibond & Lee, 2021) may be ex-
plained by assuming that learning of the target was rapid
in both conditions. Rapid learning may occur because both
serial and simultaneous procedures include trials in which
the target is presented without any other cues, making its
direct relationship with the outcome unambiguous and
easy to identify. We generally nd rapid learning under
these conditions, making it more likely that participants
will try to preserve this learning through modulation (a
form of theory protection, discussed next).
The majority of participants not only report learning
a modulatory causal structure but also seem to behave in
ways that are consistent with occasion setting. The rst
piece of evidence comes from studies examining the de-
gree of transfer observed by modulation and prevention
subgroups in a summation test (Leising et al., 2025, Test
2; see Rescorla, 1969). A summation test involves training
another cue as a predictor of the outcome (e.g., B+), and
then combining the feature X with that predictor (BX),
to test its ability to modulate responding to the predictor.
Summation is observed if the addition of the negative
feature to the separately trained predictor (BX) reduces
responding relative to the predictor alone (B). We con-
sistently nd strong summation for participants reporting
a modulatory causal structure, albeit weaker summation
than for those reporting a prevention structure (Chow et
al., 2022; Lee & Lovibond, 2021; Lovibond & Lee, 2021).
Notably, transfer was determined by the degree of similar-
ity between the training and test targets. Further, we have
repeatedly failed to show complete transfer of inhibition
in summation tests, even among individuals who report
learning a preventive causal structure. We have argued
that these results are consistent with “preventors” having
also learned a modulatory causal structure but being
more willing to generalize the modulatory properties of
the feature to new stimuli (Chow et al., 2022). Thus, the
summation test may be viewed as more like a general-
ization test, meaning it is unclear whether the dierence
between modulation and prevention is actually qualitative
or whether there is simply a dierence in degree (Chow et
al., 2022). The implication of these ndings is that Test 2
proposed by Leising et al. may not be very diagnostic in
humans. Researchers who wish to use this test should con-
sider the possibility that individual dierences may exist
in what people learn even among those who have received
identical experimental treatment and that the dierence
between modulators and preventors might be subtle.
The second piece of evidence comes from experi-
ments showing that extinction of a feature is most eective
using procedures that nullify the modulatory properties
of the feature. After feature negative training (A+ AX−),
we found reversal of the inhibitory properties of X after
“no-modulation” training (A+ AX+). Reversal also oc-
curred when the no-modulation contingencies included
a novel cue (M+ MX+). In contrast to the predictions of
the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972),
extinction of the feature (X−) did not have the same eect.
These results suggest that what is learned in feature nega-
tive discriminations is a modulatory causal structure, akin
to occasion setting.
A third piece of evidence is that a preventative cue
(i.e., a conditioned inhibitor) fails to show greater retarda-
tion of subsequent excitatory conditioning compared with
a latently inhibited cue (Lovibond et al., 2023). In a series
of experiments, we compared the properties of a negative
feature X trained in a feature negative discrimination (A+
AX−) with an equivalent cue E presented in compound
with a cue (D), which was separately presented with no
feedback about the outcome (D DE−; see Lee et al., 2022,
for experiments validating this no-feedback procedure).
According to the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972), X should become a conditioned inhibitor,
whereas E should undergo latent inhibition. Because latent
inhibition is assumed to be dierent to “true” inhibition, X
should show stronger inhibition than E in both a summation
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OCCASION SETTING IN HUMANS
and retardation test (Rescorla, 1969). In a retardation test,
the degree to which a cue shows impairment in learning
when it is subsequently paired with the outcome is used
as an index of inhibitory learning. We found that X did
indeed show more transfer than E in a summation test, but
there was no dierence between the speed of acquisition
(X+ vs. E+) in a retardation test (Lovibond et al., 2023).
The similar levels of retardation observed for the negative
feature X and the latently inhibited cue E contradict the
intuition that the inhibitor should be slower given that
it starts at negative associative strength, but can be ex-
plained by assuming that X has become an occasion setter.
Occasion setters should show strong transfer, because as
mentioned the summation test involves generalization
(Chow et al., 2022), and any retardation observed can be
attributed to latent inhibition, since the level of retardation
observed was equivalent to that of the trained latent in-
hibitor. We emphasize that this is not the only explanation
of our results (see Lovibond et al., 2023); nevertheless,
it is worthwhile considering that other processes may be
occurring alongside occasion setting.
The nal piece of evidence comes from experiments
investigating the phenomenon of “protection from extinc-
tion.” Extinction occurs when a cue that was previously
paired with an outcome is no longer paired with that
outcome (A+ / A−), and protection from extinction occurs
when a stimulus is presented with the extinguished cue
and thereby prevents extinction of A from occurring (A+
/ AX−). This procedure is similar to the feature negative
discrimination, except that the trial types are presented
in dierent phases (A+ and then A−). Traditional models
of learning predict that protection of extinction should
occur only if the added cue X is inhibitory, because the
predictions from X (inhibitory) and A (excitatory) will
cancel each other out, resulting in no prediction error and
therefore no associative change to A. In contrast to this
prediction, protection from extinction seems to occur when
the added cue X is neutral (Chow et al., 2024, Experiment
3), excitatory (Lovibond et al., 2000), and even inferred
but not physically present (Chow et al., 2024), suggesting
that there is more than prediction error at play.
In Chow et al. (2024), we found that participants
showed protection from extinction when the cover story
suggested the presence of a hidden cause that could plau-
sibly explain the absent outcome on the extinction trials.
This nding is signicant because it demonstrates that an
additional cue does not need to be present at the onset of
the extinction trials for protection from extinction to occur.
The insight also aligns with well-known ndings demon-
strating the context-specicity of extinction (see Bouton,
1993, 2004). Here, the context can be seen as the hidden
cue that serves to modulate (and therefore protect) the
preexisting belief that the target cue causes the outcome.
If we assume the hypothesis mentioned earlier—occasion
setting is more likely to eventuate when learning of the tar-
get is faster than the feature—then it makes perfect sense
that modulation should occur in extinction, as by denition
the target association must be acquired rst in order to be
extinguished (A+ then AX−, where X is the context).
We concluded from our ndings that people have a
natural tendency to “protect” existing beliefs, leading them
to explain away contradictory information using whatever
stimuli or information is available (Chow et al., 2024). If
this tendency for theory protection is robust (see also Chan
et al., 2024; Spicer et al., 2020, 2022), then occasion set-
ting or modulation will be the dominant form of learning.
Although theory protection may seem suboptimal when an
enduring change has indeed occurred, this tendency helps
to maintain stability of learning in a constantly changing
environment. In other words, rather than starting from
scratch (unlearning or remapping associations), which
would lead to erratic behavior, it may be more ecient for
a learning system to retain existing knowledge and learn
in what specic contexts that knowledge applies. Inter-
estingly, this exact idea is implemented in the Category
Abstraction Learning Model (Schlegelmilch et al., 2022).
To summarize, we agree with Leising et al. (2025)
that modulation, or occasion setting, is more widespread
than assumed. However, we depart in proposing that oc-
casion setting may be the dominant form of learning with
procedures such as the feature negative discrimination. We
have claimed that discriminations that are ambiguous will
produce individual dierences in the content of learning,
and we have advocated for self-report as an additional
test that researchers might want to consider. We reviewed
evidence from our lab demonstrating that the majority
of participants show behavior consistent with occasion
setting, and we presented two explanations for this pref-
erence. First, occasion setting, or modulatory learning,
may be preferable because it is more conservative when
there is limited information regarding the degree to which
the properties of the feature generalize. Second, occasion
setting allows preservation of existing learning, which
may result in more stable and optimal learning over time
in comparison to constantly relearning or remapping as-
sociations. If we are correct, a challenge for the eld will
be to identify the enabling conditions that allow occasion
setting to occur which will allow occasion setting to be in-
tegrated alongside existing mechanisms in formal theories
of learning.
48
COMPARATIVE COGNITION & BEHAVIOR REVIEWS
Lee, Chow, and Lovibond
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We introduce the CAL model (Category Abstraction Learning), a cognitive framework formally describing category learning built on similarity-based generalization, dissimilarity-based abstraction, two attention learning mechanisms, error-driven knowledge structuring, and stimulus memorization. Our hypotheses draw on an array of empirical and theoretical insights connecting reinforcement and category learning. The key novelty of the model is its explanation of how rules are learned from scratch based on three central assumptions. (1) Category rules emerge from two processes of stimulus generalization (similarity) and its direct inverse (category contrast) on independent dimensions. (2) Two attention mechanisms guide learning by focusing on rules, or on the contexts in which they produce errors. (3) Knowing about these contexts inhibits executing the rule, without correcting it, and consequently leads to applying partial rules in different situations. The model is designed to capture both systematic and individual differences in a broad range of learning paradigms. We illustrate the model’s explanatory scope by simulating several benchmarks, including the classic Six Problems, the 5--4 problem, and linear separability. Beyond the common approach of predicting average response probabilities, we also propose explanations for more recently studied phenomena that challenge existing learning accounts, regarding task instructions, individual differences in rule extrapolation in three different tasks, individual attention shifts to stimulus features during learning, and other phenomena. We discuss CAL's relation to different models, and its potential to measure the cognitive processes regarding attention, abstraction, error detection, and memorization from multiple psychological perspectives.