Discriminated and Violent? The Social Representations of Minorities in the Rise of Radical Right Populist Parties in Portugal and Italy

Abstract

The rise of radical right-wing parties in Europe brings new dynamics and challenges to western liberal democratic models, particularly in how these parties construct narratives around minorities, often framing them as threats to national identity and security. Given the historical background of populist governments in Italy and Portugal being, until recently, an exception in the context of populism in Europe, the comparison between these two countries offers an opportunity to analyse the dynamics and impacts of radical right-wing populism in both countries. The present research aims to address the scarcity of studies on social representations of minorities in Portugal and Italy. To achieve this goal, we conducted a survey (N = 1796) in Portugal and Italy. Using the free word association technique, based on Abric’s Structural Approach to Social Representations Theory, we analyse responses regarding social representations of minorities. Our findings reveal that, while respondents in both nations acknowledge discrimination, the Italian sample includes a wider range of negative terms, such as “violent”—whereas the Portuguese sample largely portrays minorities in positive terms, favouring their inclusion. Respondents in both countries recognise the existence of discrimination against minorities in society, yet the evocation of terms such as “violent”, “profiteers”, and “repugnant” reflects considerable influence from exclusionary and marginalising narratives.

Full text

Academic Editor: Nigel Parton
Received: 13 January 2025
Revised: 25 February 2025
Accepted: 6 March 2025
Published: 13 March 2025
Citation: Rebelo, Sofia, Manuel João
Cruz, Cristiano Gianolla, Luciana
Sotero, and Lisete Mónico. 2025.
Discriminated and Violent? The Social
Representations of Minorities in the
Rise of Radical Right Populist Parties
in Portugal and Italy. Social Sciences 14:
172. https://doi.org/10.3390/
socsci14030172
Copyright: © 2025 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license
(https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
Article
Discriminated and Violent? The Social Representations of
Minorities in the Rise of Radical Right Populist Parties in
Portugal and Italy
Sofia Rebelo 1, Manuel João Cruz 2, Cristiano Gianolla 2, * , Luciana Sotero 1,2 and Lisete Mónico 1,3
1Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, University of Coimbra, 3000-115 Coimbra, Portugal;
gramaxosofia11@gmail.com (S.R.); lucianasotero@ces.uc.pt (L.S.); lisete.monico@fpce.uc.pt (L.M.)
2Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, 3000-995 Coimbra, Portugal; manuelcruz@ces.uc.pt
3Center for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive Behavioral Intervention, University of Coimbra,
3000-115 Coimbra, Portugal
*Correspondence: cgianolla@ces.uc.pt
Abstract: The rise of radical right-wing parties in Europe brings new dynamics and
challenges to western liberal democratic models, particularly in how these parties construct
narratives around minorities, often framing them as threats to national identity and security.
Given the historical background of populist governments in Italy and Portugal being, until
recently, an exception in the context of populism in Europe, the comparison between these
two countries offers an opportunity to analyse the dynamics and impacts of radical right-
wing populism in both countries. The present research aims to address the scarcity of
studies on social representations of minorities in Portugal and Italy. To achieve this goal,
we conducted a survey (N= 1796) in Portugal and Italy. Using the free word association
technique, based on Abric’s Structural Approach to Social Representations Theory, we
analyse responses regarding social representations of minorities. Our findings reveal that,
while respondents in both nations acknowledge discrimination, the Italian sample includes
a wider range of negative terms, such as “violent”—whereas the Portuguese sample largely
portrays minorities in positive terms, favouring their inclusion. Respondents in both
countries recognise the existence of discrimination against minorities in society, yet the
evocation of terms such as “violent”, “profiteers”, and “repugnant” reflects considerable
influence from exclusionary and marginalising narratives.
Keywords: political culture; far right; outgroup hostility; public narrative
1. Introduction
There has been a rise in radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, a
phenomenon that has affected the liberal democracies of the 21st century (The Economist
Intelligence Unit 2023). The rapid growth of radical right political parties across Europe is
an example of the populist phenomenon, both in terms of ideology and political narratives
(Galhardas 2023). As an example, the 2024 European Elections were marked by a signifi-
cant increase in radical right parties in several European countries. In Portugal, CHEGA,
considered a radical right-wing party, entered the European Parliament while in Italy
Fratelli d’Italia won a relative majority of seats. This growth of radical right-wing parties
has put several sensitive issues at the centre of public debate, such as anti-immigration
discourse, anti-minorities and patriotism (Krzy ˙
zanowski and Ledin 2017). Despite being a
phenomenon that cuts across most European countries, this research will focus on compar-
ing the rise of radical right populist parties in Portugal (until recently seen as an exception
Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14030172

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 2 of 21
in European populism (Salgado and Zúquete 2017)) and Italy, a country whose past is
marked by the influence of several populist parties (Blokker and Anselmi 2019).
This paper looks at the concept of populism from the perspective of Mudde (2004)
and Laclau (2005). These perspectives converge on anti-elitism, which refers to the division
between the people and the elite, indicating a centrality in the distinction between “those
below” and “those above” (Ostiguy 2020). Although populism is often associated with
nationalism, studies show that the people that populists claim to represent is not necessarily
identical to the nationalist notion, but rather of an oppressed people (Wojczewski 2020).
Populist leaders instrumentalise society’s feelings of revolt to challenge the legitimacy
of the political entity (Abts and Rummens 2007). The discourse employed by populist
leaders tends to create scapegoats who are blamed for society’s current woes (Wodak 2015),
adopting nativist notions. In other words, it establishes an explicit preference for members
of the native group and rejects those perceived as foreign (Mudde 2021). This type of
populism is characterised by the exclusion of all those who are not considered pure in
the process of characterising and constructing the people (Mudde 2004) and promotes
manichean us vs. them narratives, placing minorities as the others, who play a threatening
role to social cohesion and national security (Wodak 2015). It is in this sense that it is
worth focusing on social representations as a set of ideas and beliefs created in everyday
life and in communicative processes, serving to interpret and make sense of the world
(Parreira et al. 2018)
, by considering the concept of nativism, since they influence the way
social groups perceive and react to ideas of identity and belonging.
Guiding this paper is the question: What are the social representations of minorities in
countries like Italy and Portugal, which have experienced a right-wing shift, and to what
extent do factors such as age, gender, political orientation, and education influence these
representations? In addition, we aim to investigate whether social representations vary
according to gender and age class. To this end, we conducted a survey in Portugal (
N= 906
)
and Italy (N= 890) and adopted a qualitative method, using the free word association
technique, through Structural Approach to Social Representations Theory according to
Abric (1976).
In the next two sections this article will examine the most relevant theories of populism
in relation to minorities, followed by an analysis of the populist upsurges in Italy and
Portugal. It will then contextualise Social Representations Theory before introducing the
materials and methods, as well as the data and analysis. The main findings indicate that,
in both samples, social representations primarily reflect the perception that minorities are
discriminated against. However, they also reveal that minorities are subject to prejudice,
particularly the notion that they are violent.
1.1. Populism
It is difficult to give a concrete definition of populism, as it has been applied to
various historical phenomena over time (Caiani 2022). Furthermore, within the scientific
community there is no concrete and consensual definition of this phenomenon. Thus, this
paper will focus on the advantages presented by Cas Mudde’s (2004) ideational approach
in conjunction with Laclau’s (2005) formal-discursive contribution.
An emerging consensus in the literature regarding the various conceptualisations
of populism is the identification of two opposing groups: the corrupt elite and the pure
people (Mudde 2004). Populism can be seen as a fragile political ideology that seeks to
divide society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people and the
corrupt elite. The central concept in populism is therefore the people (Canovan 1999),
portrayed as a source of virtue and power, in contrast to the elite, unconcerned with the
interests of the people. Mudde’s vision of populism entails a superficial nature, with a

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 3 of 21
limited core and a restricted set of associated political concepts. In this sense, populism
tends to focus on simple issues, related to the opposition between the people and the elite,
without addressing political and social issues in a comprehensive manner. Populism is
thus described as a thin-centred ideology, i.e., its ideological base is narrow, implying that
it can be easily adapted to different contexts and political agendas.
A critical view of populism focuses on its formal and discursive characteristics.
Laclau (2005
) considers that populism involves the performative and discursive construc-
tion of diverse political identities with specific social demands that coalesce (forming a
chain of equivalences between them) around an empty signifier, thus constituting the
people that opposes an elite constructed in an antagonistic relationship. In this sense,
populism is a political logic that characterises the very core and essence of democratic
action and refers to an inherent rationality (form) behind its discursive construction. The
dialogue between the Muddean and Laclauian schools reveals a point of contact in anti-
elitism that refers to the construction and binary division between people and elite. This
dual nature of populism, although with different perspectives on what consists of the
people and the elite, points to a centrality in the distinction between “those below” and
“those above”)
(Ostiguy 2020, p. 33)
, reflecting a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion that
is fundamental to populist mobilisation. While Mudde highlights a more structured ap-
proach to the categorisation of the people and the elite, Laclau emphasises the fluidity
and contingency of the signifiers that discursively constitute these categories. Building on
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) discourse here is understood not merely as a linguistic construct
but as something material and an encompassing realm that includes societal institutions,
structures, and norms. Far from being secondary or derivative, discourse is constitutive, in
that individuals, groups, classes, and identities are formed through discourse. Accordingly,
discourse is not just a reflection of reality; it is actively and performatively shaping reality.
Within this framework, a Laclaudian approach to populism takes a post-foundational
stance (Thomassen 2024), suggesting that populist discourse actively creates the very entity
it purports to represent—the people (Thomassen 2024). When populist actors speak in the
name of the people, they are also performatively constituting that people. In line with
Laclau’s formal perspective on populism, there is no specific content that defines populist
discourse per se. This holds true for Mudde’s (2004) idea of a moral people and their volonté
générale, as well as the authoritarian and nativist dimensions typically associated with
radical right-wing populism (Mudde 2007). Rather, it is a particular discursive form—a
logic—that demarcates a discourse as populist (Laclau 2005;Thomassen 2024), regardless
of its substantive content.
As can be seen, there is a significant amount of discord between Laclau and Mudde
over whether “the people” possess any fixed, ontological status. Mudde’s ideational
approach attributes a moral essence not only to the people (virtue) but also to the elites
(corruption). Laclau, however, views both the people and the elites as hegemonic constructs
lacking any ontological primacy, highlighting the contingency of populist articulations.
Despite this divergence, both perspectives acknowledge that populism delineates an antag-
onistic frontier between an underdog populace and an established elite.
1.2. Minorities and Populism
Society is necessarily composed of stratified and hierarchical groups
(Schermerhorn 1970
).
There is a paradigm of power that determines which groups in a society are dominant or
inferior. If a group has power and is numerous, it is a majority; if a group has power but is
not numerous, it is the elite; if a group has neither power nor is numerous, it is a minority.
In this sense, minorities represent the differences that exist in society, and it is an important
aspect in the construction of their identity.

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 4 of 21
Minority is a social categorisation used to complexify the degree of social differences
that various groups experience in relation to a dominant group. Minorities can be defined
as population groups that are perceived as separate from the rest of society due to socio-
demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, sexuality and religion (Indelicato 2022). The
characteristics that define ethnic minorities can vary from group to group and context to
context and may not coincide with individual perceptions. Barth (1969) developed the view
that ethnicity is used as a sign of cultural difference, which defines social barriers. In this
sense, an ethnic group represents itself not only as distinct from other groups, but with
specific characteristics that allow it to identify with those groups. Ethnicity is a relational
identity, but it is an ambivalent relationship, in that constructs of difference and shared
identity coexist (Harrison 2003). From Yinger’s (1986) perspective the socio-cultural barriers
that define ethnic groups must be visible and tangible.
Minorities are often targeted by populist parties of the radical right. In this way,
populism, associated with radical right-wing political ideology, generates exclusionary
views, by constructing impure outgroups, in contrast with the pure people (Mudde 2004).
Populism, in this case, can be seen as a construct fundamentally at odds with liberal democ-
racy due to its anti-pluralist character, as it defends the belief in cultural homogeneity.
While democracy depends on an acceptance of diversity and the protection of the rights
of all citizens, radical right-wing populism promotes a simplified and polarising vision
of society, which can lead to exclusion, the erosion of democratic institutions and the rise
of authoritarianism. Considering that radical right populist actors see multiculturalism
as a threat to national identity and social cohesion, it’s not surprising that their response
to the complexities of an increasingly pluralistic society is a rejection of multiculturalism
(Indelicato and Magalhães Lopes 2024). Radical right-wing populism assumes that multi-
culturalism contributes to the weakening and denial of the shared values and traditions
that unite the nation (
Mudde 2021
) which gives rise to nativism. Contemporary nativism
involves an explicit preference for members of the native group and the rejection of those
who are perceived as foreign or non-native (Mudde 2021). Thus, the us vs. them narra-
tive is often promoted, characterising minority groups as threats to social cohesion and
national security (Wodak 2015). This view tends to construct scapegoats or enemies—the
Others—who are blamed for society’s current problems, often drawing on traditional collec-
tive prejudices and stereotypes. Thus, the others are foreigners, defined by race, ethnicity,
religion, sexuality or language (Wodak 2015). The construction of a pure nation involves
the use of politics based on fear and hatred, often directed against minorities. By exploiting
these two elements, radical right populist leaders seek to strengthen their support among
elements of the population that feel insecure or marginalised, stimulating polarisation and
weakening social cohesion (Galhardas 2023). This emphasis on exclusive identities and
authoritarian tendencies directly influences how radical right populist movements perceive
and treat minority groups. By promoting a vision of democracy rooted in exclusion rather
than inclusion, these political cultures reinforce the divide between those who belong and
those who are deemed as outsiders. Their emotional narratives encourage conceptions of
democracy based on exclusivity, which favours centralisation, authoritarianism, and state
securitisation over innovation and public participation (Gianolla et al.,2024).
1.3. Populist Movements in Portugal and Italy
In Italy, a crisis of political parties emerged, which reached its peak with a corruption
scandal called “Tangentopoli” (1993–1994) (Rhodes 2015). As a result, there was a rise in pop-
ulist movements, coinciding with the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall
(Lanzone 2014)
.
This contemporary Italian populism has its roots in the creation of regional leagues in the
late 1980s like Bossi’s Lega Nord (LN) in 1991. The LN party emerged as a consequence of the

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 5 of 21
coalition of regional movements in affluent northern Italy. These movements were united
by a sense of localism and a perception of dissatisfaction with the state bureaucracy, which
they alleged to have been usurped by the southern ‘parasites’
(Bulli and Tronconi 2012
).
Under Bossi’s leadership, the party developed a clear populist distinction between the pure
people (of the North) and the corrupt elites (in the Capital). The party underwent a shift
in its ideological orientation towards nationalism in 2013, under the leadership of Matteo
Salvini. This transformation marked a departure from its previous regionalist stance and
a shift towards a more nationalistic perspective (Passarelli and Tuorto 2022). The initial
success of LN coincided with and contributed to the fall of the “First Republic”, charac-
terised by the old mass parties. LN formed an alliance for the 1994 elections with Forza
Italia (FI) and, together with Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) (which soon after the elections
became Alleanza Nazionale (AN)), entered Berlusconi’s first centre-right government. In
1993, with the end of the “First Republic”, almost all the old parties disappeared or renewed
themselves, and the power vacuum was filled by a new party: “Forza Italia” (FI), founded
and led by Silvio Berlusconi (Lanzone 2014), with a people centrist and anti-establishment
political discourse (Maccaferri 2022). The consolidation of Berlusconi-Bossi’s populism
paved the way for a new anti-system movement years later, like Grillo’s Movimento Cinque
Stelle (M5S). What unites these movements is the articulation of populist demands, such
as anti-elitism and national sovereignty, although their associated ideologies differentiate
them. It is in this context that Fratelli d’Italia (FdI, led by Giorgia Meloni) emerged, a party
founded in 2012 by dissidents from Il Popolo della Libertà(PdL) who had previously been
active in the M5S and AN.
The last decade has seen the influence of populist parties on the Italian political
landscape. In the 2013 parliamentary elections, half of Italian voters voted for parties
labelled populist, such as Berlusconi’s PdL, Salvini’s LN and Grillo’s M5S. Italy, unique
in Europe, had four coalition governments of populist parties between 1994 and 2011
(
Verbeek and Zaslove 2016
). Meanwhile, the FdI, a radical right-wing party with neo-
fascist roots, increased its representation in parliament, culminating, in September 2022, in
a legislative electoral victory, forming a coalition government with the LN and FI. This is the
most right-wing Italian government since World War II (Expresso 2023;
SIC Notícias 2022
).
According to Verbeek and Zaslove (2016), there are three reasons for the reaction to
populism in Italy. Firstly, Italian populism has been partly functional for democracy, having
helped to bring down the “First Republic”. Secondly, populism ends up being a reaction
to populism itself, as the FI reacted to the success of the LN and the M5S challenged the
populism of these two parties. Finally, the anti-populists seek to oppose populist policies
and ideas, but they face various populist parties with different facets. Thus, despite their
ideological differences, these parties share opposition to the established political elite,
which can make it challenging for anti-elitists to formulate an effective strategy to confront
them. However, all these parties constitute new elites which, in part, incorporate the
previous ones. This is how Laclauian theory is necessary to understand populism as an
articulation of political and social demands that represent dissatisfaction with emerging or
reformulated leaderships.
In contrast, the so-called “Portuguese exception” in Europe has often been explained
by the collective memory of Salazar’s dictatorship under the Estado Novo regime until
1974, which contributes to the stigmatisation and repudiation of radical right-wing ideas
(Salgado and Zúquete 2017). This cultural resistance created a less favourable environment
for such movements to flourish. According to Quintas Da Silva (2018) three main factors
hindered the success of radical right ideologies in Portugal: (1) widespread identification
with European Union ideals, (2) comparatively lower immigration rates than other EU
states, and (3) the historically poor communication skills of radical right candidates during

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 6 of 21
electoral campaigns. Additionally, left-wing parties—such as the Communist Party (PCP)
and Left Bloc (BE)—have long acted as aggregators of popular discontent, absorbing some
of the protest potential that might otherwise be channeled into more extreme right-wing
populist ventures (Salgado and Zúquete 2017). Over time, this interplay of collective
memory, established left-wing organisations, and low-profile radical right communication
strategies has contributed to an enduring perception that Portugal was uniquely resistant
to populist movements.
Despite this, Portuguese politics and media, especially, have not been entirely devoid
of populist elements. As Salgado and Zúquete (2017) note, populism often carries a
negative connotation in Portuguese public discourse, with politicians and journalists alike
employing the term “populist” to delegitimise rivals or policies they deem oversimplified
or opportunistic. Historically, mainstream media have offered minimal coverage of extreme
right-wing voices, generally portraying them as remnants of the authoritarian regime
(Salgado and Zúquete 2017).
This perceived “Portuguese exceptionality” was, however, challenged by the emer-
gence of CHEGA in 2019, a party led by André Ventura. That year, CHEGA won a single
seat in the Assembly of the Republic—its first entry into the Portuguese Parliament. Five
years later, in 2024, the party expanded its representation to fifty seats, indicating a consid-
erable electorate receptive to radical right-wing populist messages (Santana-Pereira and
Cancela 2020). Several factors account for CHEGA’s rise, including broad dissatisfaction
with traditional elites, growing concern over immigration and security, frustration with
political and economic corruption, and adept use of social media to amplify nationalist and
populist sentiments (Biscaia and Salgado 2022;Jaramillo 2021). In his public addresses,
Ventura frequently divides society into “good Portuguese” versus outsiders, castigates
corruption, and singles out minorities. In particular, he blames Roma communities for
contributing to the “mass invasion” of immigrants from southern Mediterranean coun-
tries (Jaramillo 2021;Prior and Andrade 2025). By emphasising national identity and
“traditional” Portuguese values, CHEGA frames multiculturalism as a threat to Portugal’s
cultural heritage (Prior and Andrade 2025).
Insofar as CHEGA’s discourse resonates with a portion of the electorate, it signals
that Portugal may no longer be as immune to radical right populism as once perceived.
The party’s success underscores that core elements of the populist style can find fertile
ground even in contexts where historical memory and left-wing protest channels once
seemed to foreclose such possibilities. Populist anti-elitism, the juxtaposition of an idealised
“people” against a corrupt establishment, and emotional appeals to national sentiment
have proven particularly effective in Portugal. Thus, while the country’s unique legacy and
political culture have shaped a more resistant public sphere, CHEGA’s ascendance calls into
question whether Portugal’s populist “exception” can endure the evolving demographic
and political conditions.
1.4. Social Representations Theory
The Theory of Social Representations, created by Moscovici in 1961, is an explanatory
theory of common sense. Moscovici (1986) considers that social representations arise be-
cause of interactions and that different interactions give rise to different representations.
However, representations cannot be considered a reflection of reality, but rather a mean-
ingful organisation that depends simultaneously on the situational context and the social
and ideological context. Thus, representations act as systems of interpretation of reality,
which define the relationship of individuals with the physical and social context and their
behaviour in that context (Parreira et al. 2018). In general, definitions of social represen-
tation reflect an aspect that results from attempts to produce meaning, which we use to

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 7 of 21
communicate and guide our behaviour to live in society. The two fundamental processes
that underpin social representations are objectification and anchoring. Objectification refers
to the way in which the elements of representations are organised and the way in which
these elements become expressions of a reality that is thought of as natural and analyses the
way in which a concept is thought of objectively (Vala 2000). Anchoring refers to the way
in which new objects are associated and framed in pre-existing representations, being the
social instrumentalisation of the represented object (Vala 2000). The process of objectifica-
tion correlates with that of anchoring to form an object classification system that influences
the behaviour of individuals (Moscovici 1986). It can be said that social representation is
organised around a core which, in a way, acts as the underlying basis for all the images,
beliefs or judgements created by a group or society over time (Moscovici 1986).
Abric (1976) with his Structural Approach to Social Representations, considers social
representations to be a set of beliefs, opinions and behaviours that form a cognitive system
made up of two subsystems that interact with each other, a central core and a peripheral
core (Abric 2001). The central core refers to collective thought, being stable and resistant
to change (Machado and Aniceto 2010) and constitutes the common and shared basis of
social representation (Mónico et al. 2019). The peripheral core is more individual, flexible,
open to change and exposes personal modulations in relation to the common central core
(Abric 1993).
According to Moscovici (2011) the theory of social representations is useful for un-
derstanding the relationship between minorities and the majority. A group is formed
by external characteristics and from beliefs and theories that anticipate its initial state of
development. This can explain why society categorises its members, defining differences
between majorities and minorities, based on popular beliefs, religious or political rituals.
These are representations that follow norms with an ethical meaning. The most distinctive
feature of a minority lies in the central core of its representation (Moscovici 2011). The
central core of a minority, which is associated with the social representation of that minority,
is represented in what is said or thought about that group. One of the main ideas in
relation to minorities is the concept of pure/impure, which characterises minorities as a
group divergent from the rest of society (Mudde 2004). Another idea is stigma, which
differentiates minorities and praises the majority. Stigma is not just a mark of the minority,
but a way of thinking that replaces symbolic thinking, where stigmatised people belong to
a persecuted minority (Moscovici 2011). These ideas partly shape social representations
and precede the development of relations between minorities and majorities in contexts of
ethnic and religious persecution and other forms of oppression (Moscovici 2011).
2. Materials and Methods
The qualitative method used in this research is based on the Structural Approach of
the Theory of Social Representations, formulated by Abric (1976). The free word association
technique was used, based on Jung’s Word Association Test (Petchkovsky et al. 2013).
The free word association technique is an open method in which a stimulus (words
or expressions that are part of the subject’s linguistic universe) induces the production of
words or terms that emerge by free association. It is part of the associative methods that use
verbal expressions collected more spontaneously, which makes it more authentic, without
prior contamination by the researcher’s discourse.
This technique is used in studies on social representations (structural approach) and
makes it possible to understand the organisation of content by identifying its structure
of representation (central core, contrasting core and peripheral elements). It focuses on
the internal structure of social representations and seeks to understand how the elements
of these representations are organised and hierarchised. Abric’s proposal (Abric 1993,

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 8 of 21
1994a,1994b,1997) is considered appropriate because it allows for the spontaneous (and
therefore less controlled) nature of the evocation, with the aim of capturing a projective
dimension of the elements of this evocation that make up the semantic universe of the term
or object studied.
Using this technique allows access to implicit elements that would otherwise be lost
in the subjects’ discursive productions (Abric 2001). By analysing the content of free
recall, we can identify the content, structure and organisation of the social representations
of minorities. To understand whether the political orientation, gender and age of the
respondents have an influence on social representations, we will use the same technique,
analysing the central nuclei. Through this technique, with a simple and direct indication,
the participant can express what they think and believe about the object (Abric 2001)
avoiding biases that can arise when the researcher provides a prior selection of words.
2.1. Sample
The sample of this research includes individuals living in Portugal (n= 906) and Italy
(n= 890), or nationals of these countries in 2022, all of whom were over 18 years of age
(Table 1).
Table 1. Sociodemographic characterisation of the Portuguese and Italian samples.
Portugal
(N= 906)
Italy
(N= 890)
n%n%
Gender
Male 320 35.3 415 46.6
Female 580 64.0 472 53.0
Other 6 0.7 3 0.3
Age (years)
18–24 471 52.0 44 4.9
25–34 138 15.2 127 14.3
35–44 94 10.4 186 20.9
45–54 124 13.7 179 20.1
55–64 63 7.0 161 18.1
>65 16 1.8 193 21.7
Education
Primary (up to 9 years of education) 68 7.5 147 16.5
High school (up to 12 years of education) 262 28.9 406 45.6
Higher education (University) 576 63.6 337 37.9
Area of residence
Suburban 247 27.3 249 28.0
Rural 265 29.2 160 18.0
Urban 394 43.5 481 54.0
Professional status
Unemployed 26 2.9 157 17.6
Student 441 48.7 44 4.9
Public Employee 87 9.6 102 11.5
Retired 15 1.7 196 22.0
Employed 321 35.4 287 32.2
Self-employed 54 6.0 104 11.7
2.2. Ethical and Formal Procedures
To collect data, participants were instructed to answer a questionnaire prepared by the
research team from UNpacking POPulism: Comparing the formation of emotion narratives
and their effects on political behaviour hosted by the Centre for Social Studies, University
of Coimbra (CES-UC).

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 9 of 21
Participants in Portugal were recruited by distributing a questionnaire via a link
and by instructing students of the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of the
University of Coimbra to distribute the link. These students received specific instructions
for distributing the questionnaire and collecting data, following a protocol established
within the Research Methodology course. In Italy, the questionnaire was distributed by the
company NETQUEST, Barcelona, Spain.
Throughout this study, all ethical principles were respected, and informed consent
was obtained by the team in charge of data collection, guaranteeing participant anonymity
and data confidentiality. In addition, participants were informed that there was no risk
associated with their participation, and that they could stop answering the questionnaire at
any time and their previous data would be deleted.
The questionnaire collected information on the social representations of Portuguese
and Italian people, elites and minorities, as well as the emotions associated with these
groups, using the Geneve Emotion Wheel (GEW) (Scherer et al. 2013). For this research,
participants were instructed to answer the question: “Write down the first five words or
short expressions that immediately come to mind when you think of ethnic minorities
(e.g., romani, blacks, Muslims, etc.), in the order in which they come to mind.” Participants
answered according to their country. Information was also collected on the participants’
political orientation, the party they were most sympathetic to, how they voted in the last
elections or who they would have voted for, how they voted in elections prior to the last
one, and their assessment of each of the parties running for Parliament on a scale of 0 to
10, including the option of not answering. In addition, sociodemographic information
was recorded, such as age, level of education, current professional situation, and area
of residence.
We analysed the data obtained from the question “Write down the first five words
or short expressions that immediately come to mind when you think of ethnic minorities
(e.g., Roma, black, Muslim, etc.), in the order in which they come to mind” to find out
about the social representations of minorities in Portugal and Italy. In addition, we used
sociodemographic information—namely gender, age group, and political orientation—to
analyse how these variables impact representations.
2.3. Data Analysis
We first entered the words/short expressions into the Excel program and then into the
EVOC (Ensemble de Programmes Permettant L’Analyse des Evocations) software (version
2005). Next, we reviewed the entire lexicographic corpus, with the aim of eliminating
special characters from the words, inserting hyphens in expressions that contained more
than one word (e.g., social-beneficiaries), due to limitations inherent in the software which
does not process special characters and does not distinguish short expressions from single
words. In addition, the review helped to maintain the spelling of synonymous words to
unite them into a single term (Mónico et al. 2019). Finally, we created a categorisation of
words that we considered to be synonymous, such as the terms “abused”, “removed”, and
“apart” replaced by “discriminated”.
In this sense, it is important to take a closer look at how the categorisation was carried
out. For example, the category “identity construction” refers to the characteristics of
minorities that the participants evoked, such as “attitude”, “fair”, “vocal”, and the category
“mistrust” indicates that minorities are a factor of mistrust, with words such as “alert”,
“careful”, and “caution” being evoked.
Finally, the data were processed using EVOC, which reproduces the number of times
a word or expression was used to characterise the object of study. The software calculates a
frequency index for each word or expression mentioned, counting how many times each is

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 10 of 21
evoked. The minimal frequency considered for analysis was 20. It also assigns a position
index to each term, indicating in which order it was mentioned (position 1 for the first term
mentioned, up to position 5 for the last term evoked). Combining these two indices gives a
matrix of Four Houses or Four Quadrants, as proposed by Abric (1993). This matrix makes
it possible to identify the possible elements of the central core, the contrast zone and the
first and second peripheries.
EVOC is made up of sixteen tools which, although they perform different functions,
contribute to statistical calculations and the construction of co-occurrence matrices, which
serve as the basis for drawing up the four-house matrix (Machado and Aniceto 2010). For
the purposes of this study, only four are relevant: Lexique, Trievoc, Rangmot and Rangfrq.
Lexique creates a vocabulary of evocations; Trievoc separates the evocations and organises
them in alphabetical order; Rangmot presents a list of all the words and expressions in al-
phabetical order, showing the frequency of each one, as well as the weighted average of the
evocation order of each word and the total frequency and overall average of the evocation
orders; finally, Rangfrq brings together, in a table with four quadrants, the elements that
constitute the central core and the peripheries of the representations (Mónico et al. 2019).
The upper left quadrant of the four-house social representation matrix shows the
central core, constituted with words characterised by having a higher frequency of evoca-
tions in a lower order, being more frequently evoked in the first positions (essentially 1st
and 2nd place in the order of evocations). This core is constituted with the most relevant,
stable and consensual terms of a social representation (
Machado and Aniceto 2010
). In
the lower left quadrant are the terms that represent the contrasting core or mute zone,
characterised by words that are evoked in first or second place, but with a low frequency,
i.e., they are terms that are relevant to certain subgroups of the sample, but do not
have the same centrality or universal consensus as the elements of the central core. On
the right-hand side is the peripheral system of social representation, which is a strong
indicator of possible future changes in social representation. In the upper right-hand
quadrant is the first periphery, where frequently evoked terms are shown, but with more
secondary evocation orders (terms evoked in third, fourth or fifth place), supporting the
central system of social representations. Finally, in the lower right quadrant is the second
periphery, where we find terms characterised by low frequency and more secondary
evocation order (words evoked in the third, fourth or fifth positions), being the terms
most susceptible to change and which play a role in the adaptation and flexibility of social
representation (Abric 1993).
3. Results
As can be seen in Table 2, the Portuguese sample evoked 3458 words, 314 of which
were unique, with an average order of evocation (A.E.O.) of 2.50 (from 1 to 5). The frequency
(f) ranged from 1 to 628 evocations of the same word, and the word most evoked by the Por-
tuguese population was “discriminated”. Table 1shows the four-house matrix constructed
using the EVOC software. In the first quadrant, which corresponds to the central core, the
following 8 words appeared, including: “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, “poor”,
and “empathy”. In the contrasting nucleus, 13 terms were evoked, including: “cultural”,
“injustice”, “hardworking”, and “not very hardworking”. Regarding the first periphery,
there were 6 terms evoked, including: “violent”, “included”, “diversified”, and “fighters”.
Finally, the second periphery is made up of 12 terms, including: “self-excluded”, “distrust”,
“united”, and “religious”.
As can be seen in Table 3, the Italian sample evoked 3190 words, 328 of which were
single words, with an average evocation order of 2.50. The frequency varied between 1 and
378 evocations of the same word, and the word most evoked by the Italian population was

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 11 of 21
“discriminated”. Table 2shows the matrix of the four houses in the Italian sample. The
central nucleus consisted of 11 words, including: “discriminated”, “violent”, “included”,
and “racialised minorities”. In the contrasting nucleus, 12 terms were evoked, including:
“hardworking”, “victims of racism”, “numerous”, and “indifferent”. In relation to the
first periphery, 4 terms were evoked, including: “solidarity”, “rude”, “diversified”, and
“distrust”. Finally, the second periphery is made up of 7 terms, including: “sympathetic”,
“admirable”, “equality”, and “intolerable”.
Table 2. Matrix of the four houses of the Portuguese sample (N= 906).
Intermediate
f
Central Core
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
<2.5
First Periphery
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
>2.5
≥70 Discriminated 628 2.22 Violent 148 2.57
Racialised minorities 145 2.29 Included 119 2.60
Poor 141 2.28 Diversified 108 2.57
Empathy 106 2.33 Fighters 92 2.72
Victims of racism 96 2.10 Solidarity 88 2.63
Equality 93 2.31 Sympathetic 71 2.70
Respect 75 2.04
Social beneficiaries 74 2.24
Contrasting Core
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
<2.5
Second Periphery
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
>2.5
<69 Cultural 59 2.48 Self-excluded 60 2.57
Profiteers 55 2.49 Distrust 59 2.53
Hardworking 53 2.38 Distressing 55 2.89
Injustice 52 2.27 Vulnerable 41 2.51
Victims of xenophobia 39 2.36 United 37 2.95
Doubtful 32 2.19 Rude 35 2.57
Maladjusted 30 2.30 Illiterate 32 2.66
Worthy of rights 28 2.39 Admirable 32 2.72
Not very hardworking 25 2.20 Religious 31 2.90
Sufferers 25 2.20 Cultural enrichment 27 2.67
Repugnant 24 2.33 Cheerful 26 3.12
Politicised 23 2.00 Traditional 23 2.83
Misunderstood 22 2.32
Table 3. Matrix of the four houses of the Italian sample (n= 890).
Intermediate
f
Central Core
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
<2.5
First Periphery
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
>2.5
≥70 Discriminated 378 2.16 Solidarity
101
2.57
Violent 292 2.35 Rude 85 2.51
Included 140 2.34 Diversified 83 2.51
Racialised minorities 137 2.34 Distrust 73 2.64
Poor 113 2.32
Cultural enrichment 82 2.32
Profiteers 80 2.43
Self-excluded 75 2.24
Repugnant 73 2.43
Empathy 71 2.21
Contrasting Core
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
<2.5
Second Periphery
Evoked Term fA.E.O.
>2.5
<69 Hardworking 66 2.46 Sympathetic 63 2.60
Victims of racism 51 2.24 Admirable 52 2.58
Distressing 47 2.30 Equality 46 2.59
Numerous 37 2.35 Intolerable 44 2.55
Indifferent 35 2.40 Not very hardworking 38 2.50
Vulnerable 33 2.30 Religious 31 2.94
Incompetent 32 2.22 Fighters 25 2.68
Doubtful 28 2.21 United 20 2.85
Illegal 26 2.19
Sufferers 26 2.31
Unpleasant 24 2.29
Debtors 20 2.35

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 12 of 21
Figure 1compares the central nuclei between Portugal and Italy, visually illustrating
the similarities and differences presented in Tables 2and 3. Both samples place a strong
emphasis on minorities who face discrimination, racialisation, deteriorating economic
conditions, and a need for empathy. However, the Italian sample shows more ambivalent
representations. In particular, Italian respondents associate minorities with violence, while
simultaneously recognising their inclusion in Italian society and the cultural benefits they
provide. At the same time, these groups are also portrayed as “profiteers” and “repugnant”.
By contrast, Portuguese representations are generally more positive, highlighting minorities
as victims of racism who require better conditions and greater respect.
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 24
Self-excluded 75 2.24
Repugnant 73 2.43
Empathy 71 2.21
Contrasting Core
Evoked Term f A.E.O.
<2.5
Second Periphery
Evoked Term f A.E.O.
>2.5
<69 Hardworking 66 2.46 Sympathetic 63 2.60
Victims of racism 51 2.24 Admirable 52 2.58
Distressing 47 2.30 Equality 46 2.59
Numerous 37 2.35 Intolerable 44 2.55
Indifferent 35 2.40 Not very hardworking 38 2.50
Vulnerable 33 2.30 Religious 31 2.94
Incompetent 32 2.22 Fighters 25 2.68
Doubtful 28 2.21 United 20 2.85
Illegal 26 2.19
Sufferers 26 2.31
Unpleasant 24 2.29
Debtors 20 2.35
Figure 1 compares the central nuclei between Portugal and Italy, visually illustrating
the similarities and differences presented in Tables 2 and 3. Both samples place a strong
emphasis on minorities who face discrimination, racialisation, deteriorating economic
conditions, and a need for empathy. However, the Italian sample shows more ambivalent
representations. In particular, Italian respondents associate minorities with violence,
while simultaneously recognising their inclusion in Italian society and the cultural
benefits they provide. At the same time, these groups are also portrayed as “profiteers”
and “repugnant”. By contrast, Portuguese representations are generally more positive,
highlighting minorities as victims of racism who require beer conditions and greater
respect.
Figure 1. Social representations regarding minorities in Portugal and Italy.
Table 4 and Figure 2 show the central nuclei of the Portuguese and Italian samples
by gender. The most evoked word was “discriminated”, except for Italian men, who most
frequently evoked “violent”. The Portuguese males’ central nucleus consists of the terms
“discriminated”, “violent”, “racialised minorities”, and “poor”. The Italian male’s central
nucleus included terms like “violent”, “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and
Figure 1. Social representations regarding minorities in Portugal and Italy.
Table 4and Figure 2show the central nuclei of the Portuguese and Italian samples by
gender. The most evoked word was “discriminated”, except for Italian men, who most
frequently evoked “violent”. The Portuguese males’ central nucleus consists of the terms
“discriminated”, “violent”, “racialised minorities”, and “poor”. The Italian male’s central
nucleus included terms like “violent”, “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and “in-
cluded”. The Portuguese female’s central nucleus included terms such as “discriminated”,
“poor”, and “racialised minorities”. The Italian female’s core group includes terms such as
“discriminated”, “violent”, and “included”.
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 24
“included”. The Portuguese female’s central nucleus included terms such as
“discriminated”, “poor”, and “racialised minorities”. The Italian female’s core group
includes terms such as “discriminated”, “violent”, and “included”.
Table 4. Central core according to gender in the Portuguese and Italian samples.
Portugal
(N = 906) Italy
(N = 890)
Intermediate
f ≥ 50 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5
Gender
Male Discriminated 193 2.12 Discriminated 157 2.15
Violent 65 2.42 Violent 166 2.31
Racialised minorities 58 2.16 Racialised minorities 69 2.30
Poor 54 2.46 Poor 54 2.39
Included 59 2.41
Female Discriminated 427 2.26 Discriminated 200 2.16
Poor 87 2.17 Poor 58 2.26
Racialised minorities 83 2.40 Racialised minorities 68 2.38
Empathy 77 2.30 Included 81 2.28
Victims of racism 69 2.16 Violent 126 2.40
Equality 55 2.22 Diversified 51 2.43
Respect 51 2.10
Figure 2. Representations by gender.
Table 5 and Figure 3 show the central nuclei of the Portuguese and Italian samples
by age group. The most evoked word was “discriminated” in all age groups in both
samples. The Portuguese sample aged between 18 and 24 presented a central nucleus with
terms such as “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and “poor”. The Italian sample
presented a central nucleus with the words “discriminated”, “diversified”, and
“included”. The Portuguese sample aged between 25 and 34 presented a central core with
terms such as “discriminated”, “poor”, and “diversified”. The Italian sample presented a
core group with terms such as “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and “violent”. The
Portuguese sample aged 45–54 presented a central nucleus that includes the terms
“discriminated” and “included”. The Italian sample presented a central nucleus with
terms such as “discriminated”, “violent”, and “included”.
Figure 2. Representations by gender.

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 13 of 21
Table 4. Central core according to gender in the Portuguese and Italian samples.
Portugal
(N= 906)
Italy
(N= 890)
Intermediate
f≥50 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5
Gender
Male Discriminated 193 2.12 Discriminated 157 2.15
Violent 65 2.42 Violent 166 2.31
Racialised minorities 58 2.16 Racialised minorities 69 2.30
Poor 54 2.46 Poor 54 2.39
Included 59 2.41
Female Discriminated 427 2.26 Discriminated 200 2.16
Poor 87 2.17 Poor 58 2.26
Racialised minorities 83 2.40 Racialised minorities 68 2.38
Empathy 77 2.30 Included 81 2.28
Victims of racism 69 2.16 Violent 126 2.40
Equality 55 2.22 Diversified 51 2.43
Respect 51 2.10
Table 5and Figure 3show the central nuclei of the Portuguese and Italian samples
by age group. The most evoked word was “discriminated” in all age groups in both
samples. The Portuguese sample aged between 18 and 24 presented a central nucleus
with terms such as “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and “poor”. The Italian
sample presented a central nucleus with the words “discriminated”, “diversified”, and
“included”. The Portuguese sample aged between 25 and 34 presented a central core with
terms such as “discriminated”, “poor”, and “diversified”. The Italian sample presented
a core group with terms such as “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and “violent”.
The Portuguese sample aged 45–54 presented a central nucleus that includes the terms
“discriminated” and “included”. The Italian sample presented a central nucleus with terms
such as “discriminated”, “violent”, and “included”.
Table 5. Central core according to age group in the Portuguese and Italian samples.
Portugal
(N= 906)
Italy
(N= 890)
Intermediate
f≥10 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5
Age (years)
18–24 Discriminated 389 2.19 Discriminated 16 2.44
Racialised minorities 97 2.25 Diversified 12 2.42
Poor 81 2.41 Included 12 2.42
Empathy 64 2.41
Victims of racism 62 2.02
25–34 Discriminated 85 2.24 Discriminated 58 1.86
Poor 23 2.39 Racialised minorities 27 2.15
Violent 21 2.33 Violent 26 2.23
Diversified 21 2.33 Included 24 2.42
Equality 21 2.29
45–54 Discriminated 71 2.20 Discriminated 77 2.26
Included 23 2.44 Included 24 2.13
Violent 62 2.36
Poor 23 2.17
Self-excluded 22 2.14
Racialised minorities 22 2.18

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 14 of 21
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 24
Table 5. Central core according to age group in the Portuguese and Italian samples.
Portugal
(N = 906) Italy
(N = 890)
Intermediate
f ≥ 10 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5
Age (years)
18–24 Discriminated 389 2.19 Discriminated 16 2.44
Racialised minorities 97 2.25 Diversified 12 2.42
Poor 81 2.41 Included 12 2.42
Empathy 64 2.41
Victims of racism 62 2.02
25–34 Discriminated 85 2.24 Discriminated 58 1.86
Poor 23 2.39 Racialised minorities 27 2.15
Violent 21 2.33 Violent 26 2.23
Diversified 21 2.33 Included 24 2.42
Equality 21 2.29
45–54 Discriminated 71 2.20 Discriminated 77 2.26
Included 23 2.44 Included 24 2.13
Violent 62 2.36
Poor 23 2.17
Self-excluded 22 2.14
Racialised minorities 22 2.18
Figure 3. Representations by age group.
Table 6 and Figure 4 show the central nuclei of the Portuguese and Italian samples
according to the political orientation of the respondents. The most evoked term was
“discriminated”, except among Italian centre-right and right-wing respondents, who most
frequently evoked “violent”. The Portuguese sample with a central political orientation
presented a central nucleus that includes the terms “discriminated”, “violent”, and
Figure 3. Representations by age group.
Table 6and Figure 4show the central nuclei of the Portuguese and Italian samples
according to the political orientation of the respondents. The most evoked term was “dis-
criminated”, except among Italian centre-right and right-wing respondents, who most
frequently evoked “violent”. The Portuguese sample with a central political orientation
presented a central nucleus that includes the terms “discriminated”, “violent”, and “poor”.
The Italian sample presented a central nucleus that includes the terms “discriminated”,
“rude”, and “mistrust”. The Portuguese sample with a centre-right political orientation
presented a central nucleus that includes terms such as “discriminated”, “racialised mi-
norities”, and “violent”. The Italian sample presented a central nucleus with terms such
as “violent”, “discriminated”, and “included”. The Portuguese sample with a centre-left
political orientation presented a central nucleus that includes terms such as “discrimi-
nated”, “poor”, and “victims of racism”. The Italian sample presented a central nucleus
that includes terms such as “discriminated”, “violent”, and “racialised minorities”. The
Portuguese sample with a right-wing political orientation presented a central nucleus with
terms such as “discriminated”, “solidarity”, and “poor”. The Italian sample presented a
central nucleus with terms such as “violent”, “discriminated”, and “racialised minorities”.
The Portuguese sample with a left-wing political orientation presented a central nucleus
that includes terms such as “discriminated”, “racialised minorities”, and “poor”. The
Italian sample presented a central nucleus that includes terms such as “discriminated”,
“included”, and “poor”.

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 15 of 21
Table 6. Central core according to political orientation in the Portuguese and Italian samples (minimal
f = 10).
Portugal
(N= 906)
Italy
(N= 890)
Intermediate
f≧
≧
≧10 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5 Central Core f A.E.O.
<2.5
Political
orientation
Centre Discriminated 59 2.12 Discriminated 29 2.21
Violent 21 2.33 Rude 12 2.08
Poor 16 1.94 Distrust 11 2.27
Social beneficiaries 11 2.46
Centre-Right Discriminated 83 2.30 Discriminated 29 2.14
Violent 24 2.33 Violent 71 2.34
Racialised minorities 34 2.21 Included 20 2.20
Poor 22 2.27 Poor 16 2.00
Diversified 17 2.06 Hardworking 15 2.00
Distrust 15 2.47 Self-excluded 15 2.33
Empathy 10 2.10 Empathy 14 2.07
Equality 12 2.08 Distrust 11 2.46
Respect 10 2.00
Centre-left Discriminated 144 2.11 Discriminated 72 2.22
Poor 32 2.25 Poor 21 2.24
Racialised minorities 18 2.39 Racialised minorities 41 2.29
Included 14 2.43 Included 37 2.35
Self-excluded 17 2.35 Solidarity 23 2.44
Violent 17 2.47 Violent 43 2.21
Victims of racism 24 2.08 Self-excluded 19 1.95
Equality 13 2.31 Distrust 17 2.47
Respect 12 2.25 Sympathetic 15 2.47
Cultural 11 1.90 Empathy 13 2.15
Right Discriminated 29 1.93 Discriminated 39 2.08
Solidarity 14 2.43 Violent 65 2.15
Poor 12 2.17 Poor 10 2.40
Victims of racism 12 1.92 Racialised minorities 19 2.42
Respect 10 1.80 Profiteers 14 2.00
Included 11 2.36
Left Discriminated 139 2.29 Discriminated
104
2.17
Racialised minorities 29 2.24 Racialised minorities 13 2.08
Poor 26 2.46 Poor 21 1.91
Victims of racism 20 1.95 Included 28 2.36
Equality 11 2.09 Cultural enrichment 25 2.44
Empathy 15 2.00
Victims of racism 11 2.00
Distressing 11 2.18
Self-excluded 11 2.46
Sympathetic 10 1.90
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 24
Included 11 2.36
Left Discriminated 139 2.29 Discriminated 104 2.17
Racialised minorities 29 2.24 Racialised minorities 13 2.08
Poor 26 2.46 Poor 21 1.91
Victims of racism 20 1.95 Included 28 2.36
Equality 11 2.09 Cultural enrichment 25 2.44
Empathy 15 2.00
Victims of racism 11 2.00
Distressing 11 2.18
Self-excluded 11 2.46
Sympathetic 10 1.90
Figure 4. Central Nuclei by political Orientation.
Figure 4. Cont.

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 16 of 21
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 24
Included 11 2.36
Left Discriminated 139 2.29 Discriminated 104 2.17
Racialised minorities 29 2.24 Racialised minorities 13 2.08
Poor 26 2.46 Poor 21 1.91
Victims of racism 20 1.95 Included 28 2.36
Equality 11 2.09 Cultural enrichment 25 2.44
Empathy 15 2.00
Victims of racism 11 2.00
Distressing 11 2.18
Self-excluded 11 2.46
Sympathetic 10 1.90
Figure 4. Central Nuclei by political Orientation.
Figure 4. Central Nuclei by political Orientation.
4. Discussion
The overall comparison between the samples of Portugal and Italy demonstrates that
the word most often evoked by participants was “discriminated”. This indicates that
respondents have a significant perception of the injustice and inequality faced by minorities
in both countries. Moreover, it suggests a broad awareness of discrimination and the social
challenges experienced by minorities. The inclusion of terms such as “discriminated”,
“poor”, “respect”, and “empathy” indicates a recognition of the need for equality and social
justice in both countries. However, the presence of terms like “violent” may be a sign of
radical right-wing party rhetoric, which uses political narratives that exclude minorities
and reinforce negative stereotypes. However, the fact that there are terms like “respect”
and “empathy” indicates that people also have a positive perception of minorities. Despite
some positive perceptions, there is a predominance of negative feelings within the Italian
sample towards minorities. This finding could be related to the sample heterogeneity of this
study, but may also be justified by historical, cultural, economic, and political factors. These
factors may include: the fascist legacy and nationalist policies
(Lanzone 2014)
, the greater
impact of migratory movements (Ambrosetti and Paparusso 2018), media narratives that
amplify negative stereotypes (Caeiro 2019), crises and competition for jobs that highlight
economic inequality (Ambrosetti and Paparusso 2018) and, finally, the discourses of radical
right-wing parties that discourage the integration of minorities (Wodak 2015). On the other
hand, results reveal a more positive view within the Portuguese sample. While negative
stereotypes are firmly rooted in the central core of the Italian sample, the Portuguese sample
shows greater diversity and flexibility in perceptions, with less central negative terms
and a greater openness to recognising positive aspects of minorities. In the Portuguese
sample, fewer terms have a negative connotation, which may indicate a more positive

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 17 of 21
view of minorities, suggesting a lower tendency towards stigmatisation. This might be
influenced by the political context, since immigration has only recently become an issue in
the public debate, as well as the presence of more inclusive integration policies
(Cunha 2010
;
Padilla and França 2020).
Regarding the first periphery, the terms evoked by both samples suggest that, even
though initial perceptions may be more critical or stigmatising, the importance of solidarity
and diversity is recognised. Furthermore, the presence of the term “diversity” as a frequent
but not initial term indicates that society is aware of the benefits of diversity. It is in
the second periphery that the Portuguese sample presents terms with a more negative
connotation (“self-excluded”) than those evoked by the Italian sample (“sympathetic” and
“admirable”). This suggests areas of social tension or prejudice, since the second periphery
contains terms which, although not dominant, are significant enough to be mentioned.
Regarding gender, the analysis of the central nuclei based on sociodemographic data
shows that, within the samples, women are more aware of social issues, showing concern
for equality and respect. Females also have a less prejudiced or discriminatory attitude
towards minorities. These results are in line with Neto’s (2007) study, which reported that
women scored higher than men on the ethnic tolerance scale. Recent statistical data also
showed a growing ideological discrepancy between the male gender (virtually stable) and
the female gender (increasingly to the left), especially in the younger and more senior age
groups (Saad 2024).
The age group between 18–24 also shows greater acceptance and neutrality, possibly
due to growing up in more diverse and globalised environments. Such environments
provide exposure to a greater variety of cultures and ethnicities, which can promote more
inclusive views and mitigate stereotypes, as the studies by Janmaat and Keating (2019)
and Maratia et al. (2023) point out. However, the term “violent” appears in the core
group of people aged 25–34 in both countries and of people aged 48–54 in Italy. This could
be because these groups have lived through the economic crises and the stigmatisation
of migration (since 2015) in both countries and have absorbed stereotypes related to mi-
norities
(Ambrosetti and Paparusso 2018;Pellegrini et al. 2021
). Within the 35–44 bracket,
Portuguese responses tend to depict minorities as “discriminated” against yet also possi-
bly dependent on public support (“profiteers” “social beneficiaries”), balanced by more
inclusive notions like “empathy” and “equality”. Meanwhile, Italians in this age group
show a stronger focus on “violence” and “racialisation”, reflecting more fear-oriented
stereotypes. These divergent patterns likely stem from distinct national discourses and
historical legacies surrounding migration, identity, and social integration.
When it comes to political orientation, “discriminated” was the word most often
evoked in both countries in all political orientations, except for Italy’s centre-right and right,
with “violent” being the word most evoked in these cases. Italy’s multi-populist historical
context translates into a past of parties using their propaganda against the perceived danger
that ethnic minorities pose to national identity (Wodak 2015). Therefore, in the Portuguese
sample central nuclei, words with a negative connotation do not correspond to the left-wing
political orientation. This is in line with Bobbio’s (1996) proposal regarding how the right
and left view equality (the right legitimises inequality, while the left challenges it).
In analysing the data through the discursive approach (Laclau), we can identify dif-
ferent sorts of equivalence and antagonism towards minorities, as they emerge within
categories such as “discriminated”, “included”, “poor”, “racialised”, and “violent.” These
categories reflect calls for either greater security and cultural homogeneity, or for enhanced
equality and inclusion. Although these objectives may appear to clash, both discourses
converge on the empty signifier of a better society. Thus, a singular signifier can galvanise
radically different visions of the people and of the frontier created to define it. Each discourse,

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 18 of 21
however, constructs its subjects differently, revealing the flexibility and tension inherent
in populist logic. The data show that both constructions of the people articulate an implicit
critique of the existing social order, outlining populist anti-elitism. Yet, consistent with
Laclau, the articulation of the people appears to hinge more on the discursive construction
of internal equivalences and external antagonisms than on a strictly moral binary (Mudde).
The first most predominant discourse exposes systemic injustices and appeals to egali-
tarian values, whereas the less prominent secondary discourse underscores security and
homogeneity. These two seemingly distinct agendas nonetheless share a suspicion of the
status quo. The demand for a better society as the empty signifier implicitly identifies the
perceived failure of current institutions or elites to meet social demands.
In the present data, the chain of equivalence is observable in the ways participants
either extend empathy towards minorities or reinforce boundaries through negative labels.
In both Portugal and Italy, the frequent use of the term “discriminated” signals a general
recognition of injustice and suggests the existence of an equivalence chain that portrays
minorities as deserving of solidarity. While the Portuguese sample also contains central
terms such as “included” and “cultural enrichment”, the Italian core includes more negative
descriptors like “violent”, “profiteers”, and “repugnant”. This divergence indicates a
stronger antagonism towards minorities, revealing in Italy that the people are more often
defined in opposition to these others. This becomes an important element in the populist
logic, where the unity of the national community can be reinforced by marking minorities
as threats to cultural and economic stability.
Sociodemographic trends further illuminate how antagonism and equivalence are
formed. Women in both samples tend to mention terms related to equality and respect,
indicating that they draw a less exclusionary boundary around the people and express
greater willingness to incorporate minorities into the imagined national community. By
contrast, men show a slightly higher inclination towards negative descriptors, suggesting a
more pronounced exclusionary attitude. Age groups display a similar divergence. Younger
participants (18–24) most often evoke neutral or positive terms, perhaps due to greater fa-
miliarity with diversity. Meanwhile, those aged 25–34 and 48–54—particularly in
Italy—are
more likely to describe minorities as “violent”, reflecting a stronger antagonistic stance
rooted in lived experiences of economic and migratory crises. Political orientation adds
another layer of complexity. In Portugal, left-wing participants exclusively highlight posi-
tive representations, such as “discriminated”, pointing to a more inclusive conception of
“the people” that contests social inequalities. In Italy, however, centre-right and right-wing
respondents more frequently evoke “violent”. This characterisation suggests that their
vision of “the people” relies upon a sharper boundary between the national community
and threatening others/outsiders. These patterns align with Laclau’s notion that populist
discourses hinge on defining chained collective identities as the embodiment of the popular
will, while constructing minorities as an antagonistic frontier.
5. Conclusions
The primary aim of this research was to address the question: What are the social
representations of minorities in countries like Italy and Portugal, which have experienced a right-
wing shift, and to what extent do factors such as age, gender, and political orientation influence
these representations? Article findings reveal both commonalities and contrasts in how
minorities are socially represented in Portugal and Italy. “Discriminated” emerged as the
most frequently evoked term across both samples, suggesting that perceptions of inequality
and injustice remain salient in both contexts. At the same time, the stronger presence of
negative or stigmatising terms in the Italian central core points to deeper populist narratives.
Such narratives have historically resonated in Italy, lending credence to the notion that a

Soc. Sci. 2025,14, 172 19 of 21
legacy of populist discourses can heighten perceptions of minorities as threats or scapegoats.
Meanwhile, Portugal’s slightly more inclusive representations highlight the possibility that
divergent political histories, integration policies, and less entrenched populist rhetoric can
temper overtly negative attitudes.
The findings also exemplify how Laclau’s conception of populism as a political logic
characterises equivalence, emptiness, and antagonism. The data show how two distinct
populist discourses—one advocating for equality and inclusion, the other prioritising se-
curity and homogeneity—rally around “empty signifiers” such as a “better society” or
“better future”. Despite their clashing ideological messages, both Italy’s and Portugal’s
representations reveal a populist dynamic in which the people is defined in opposition to
a perceived failing social order, where minorities are both vulnerable and stigmatised. In
this sense, our data underscore how various grievances and anxieties can be articulated
into populist claims that may paradoxically both highlight discrimination and reproduce
exclusionary stereotypes. The presence of negative stereotypes, particularly in the Ital-
ian sample, underscores the influence of populist narratives. While this finding echoes
scholarship linking democratic decline to populist political discourse, it also complicates
a simple cause-and-effect correlation. Despite the impact of populist influences, many
participants—especially in Portugal—displayed supportive, inclusive attitudes towards mi-
norities. Future research could improve the external validity of these results by broadening
the scope of the samples and comparing a wider range of countries and political cultures in
a diachronic analysis.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, C.G., L.M., L.S., M.J.C. and S.R.; methodology, C.G.,
L.M., M.J.C. and S.R.; vali-dation, C.G. and M.J.C.; formal analysis, C.G., L.M., M.J.C. and S.R.;
investigation, C.G., M.J.C. and S.R.; resources, C.G. and L.M.; data curation, L.M., M.J.C. and S.R.;
writing—original draft preparation, M.J.C. and S.R.; writing—review and editing, C.G., L.M. and L.S.;
visualization, L.M., M.J.C. and S.R.; supervision, C.G., L.M. and L.S.; project administration, C.G. and
L.M.; funding acquisition, C.G. and L.M. All authors have read and agreed to the published version
of the manuscript.
Funding: This work is financed by Portuguese national funds through the FCT—Foundation for
Science and Technology, I.P., under the project UNPOP “UNpacking POPulism: Comparing the for-
mation of emotion narratives and their effects on political behaviour” (PTDC/CPO-CPO/3850/2020)
and by FCT Funding (UIDP/50012/2020 and 2022.01525.CEECIND/CP1754/CT0005).
Institutional Review Board Statement: The study was conducted in accordance with the Dec-
laration of Helsinki, and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Centre for Social Studies
(CE-CES)—omissão
de Ética do Centro de Estudos Sociais—on 31 August 2021, under the chair-
manship of Ana Cordeiro Santos.
Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in
the study
.
Data Availability Statement: The data used and/or analyzed during the current study are available
from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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