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LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
ISSN 2524-101X
eISSN 2617-541X
DOI 10.62821/lp11101
Cybersecurity in Maritime Transport:
An International Perspective on Regulatory
Frameworks and Countermeasures
Oleksiy Melnyk*, Oleksandr Drozdov**, Serhii Kuznichenko***
*Professor, Master Mariner, Navigation and Maritime Safety Department, Odesa National Maritime University (34, Mechnikova St., Odesa, Ukraine)
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9228-8459
**Professor, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University (77, Hryhoriia Skovorody St., Kharkiv, Ukraine), University of Barcelona (08034,
684 Av. Diagonal, Barcelona, Spain) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1364-1272
***Professor, National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine (80, Chernyshevskaya St., Kharkiv, Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9278-2756
ABSTRACT
This article combines legal, technical, and organizational aspects to propose a comprehensive
approach to addressing cybersecurity of maritime transport. The article highlights key gaps in
the international legal framework and suggests a unied legal framework to regulate these cyber
threats from a maritime transportation perspective. The article focuses on technical solutions
but is supported by professional training in a virtual environment. The main innovation of this
article is the interdisciplinary approach, combining technological advances with social research
and legal analysis. Among other proposals, developing an international maritime cybersecurity
convention, a standard global incident registry and a transnational data sharing system are
proposed. Such a systematic framework would have serious potential to address critical safety
issues and improve the safety of the global shipping industry.
CITATION
Melnyk, O., Drozdov, O., &
Kuznichenko, S. (2025). Cyber-
security in Maritime Transport:
An International Perspective
on Regulatory Frameworks
and Countermeasures.
Lex Portus, 11(1), 7–19.
https://doi.org/10.62821/lp11101
KEYWORDS
maritime cybersecurity, maritime
law, incident response, global
maritime security standards,
international legal frameworks
The journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License
Introduction
Cyberthreats represents a vital concern for anything to do with global logistics and
transportation security regarding the maritime industry. As shipping becomes largely
dependent on digital technologies like automated vessel trac management, IT systems, and
electronic data exchange, it becomes more and more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Enacting
legislation against these acts may represent a big step in the creation of an international
maritime security conguration. However, several factors pose challenges to establishing law:
the international character of maritime transport, the complicated identication, and the lack
of uniform security standards.
Studies in recent times reveal that the maritime industry is becoming a victim of cyber-
attack every year. Currently, vessel control systems, navigation systems, and logistics platforms
are most frequently targeted by cyber perpetrators threatening the global maritime safety.
The gravity of cybersecurity issues in the maritime sector is well attested by academic
studies like that of Emre et al. (2024), which details major cyber incidents within this realm,
highlighting the inadequacy of ship control systems to guard against advanced attacks.
A famous instance is the NotPetya virus, which altered the activities of Maersk and thus
represents a far-reaching impact of cyberattacks on global supply chains.
8LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
According to Clavijo et al. (2024), maritime supply chains are especially vulnerable due
to their multi-layer structure made of suppliers, transportation rms, and ports. Kanwal
etal. (2022) pinpointed that current ship navigation systems (AIS, GPS) are poorly defended
against cyber threats and, therefore, pose a signicant threat to the security of the maritime
domain. Further, Park et al. (2023) initiated an organized conclusion Failure Mode and
Eects Analysis (FMEA) for risk evaluation; underlined the organization requirement under
vulnerability evaluations within navigation systems. Progoulakis et al. (2022) presented
cybersecurity issues in relation to port and oshore asset security threats, including essential
security measures and collaborative defenses.
The analysis of port infrastructure was made dicult by the complexity within their
cybersecurity by Syta (2024), who accentuated that many ports do not perform system
modernization satisfactorily due to technological and nancial constraints. Ports in developing
countries remain extremely vulnerable, as emphasized and evidenced by Patrick et al. (2024),
who discussed global port infrastructure protection practices with the C2M2 model as a case
study. According to Sime (2023), many African ports remain vulnerable to threats because of
the non-implementation of international standards into national legislation. Consequently,
logistics losses would be signicant and threaten disruption in global transportation.
Research conrms that cybersecurity threats in the maritime industry are growing, covering
a wide range of issues. A review of the rst decade of maritime cybersecurity research outlines
key challenges and gaps in the eld (Harish et al., 2025). The analysis of CO₂ emissions in
maritime transport using AIS data demonstrates the importance of digital technologies
for environmental monitoring, which is also a potential target for cyberattacks (Cheng et al.,
2024). A bibliometric study of cybersecurity in the maritime sector over the past 20 years helps
to identify the main research areas and prospects (Mawer et al., 2024). In matters of overall
maritime security, it is important to consider both traditional and digital threats (Melnyk et al.,
2022). The use of simulation modeling allows forecasting changes in maritime security under
the inuence of cyber threats and complex scenarios (Melnyk et al., 2023). In particular, the
oshore oil and gas industry remains particularly vulnerable to attacks on remotely operated
platforms and supply vessels, which poses additional challenges to the security of maritime
operations (Progoulakis et al., 2021).
Countering cybercrime in maritime transportation calls for proper training of personnel. As
such, Chupkemi & Mersinas (2024) submitted the need for compulsory cybersecurity training
for shipping companies’ employees. However, given the fast-changing threats, traditional
training methods have become increasingly inadequate. According to Jepsen et al. (2024),
a novel approach has been developed based on game-based learning, which better equips
seafarers to become aware of the kinds of cyber-attacks they possibly face. Nikolov (2024)
conceptualized a virtual training environment simulating real cyber threats while signicantly
improving operators’ training aboard ships. Technology innovation is crucial in safeguarding
maritime infrastructures. According to Ibokette et al. (2024), AI systems automatically detect
network attacks, thus minimizing human error with regard to identifying such attacks.
A proposal to integrate sensor data into a single system to protect port infrastructure,
allowing real-time monitoring of threats, Potamos et al. (2024) presented a proposal to
integrate sensor data into a single system to protect port infrastructure, allowing real-time
threat monitoring. Yousaf and Zhou (2024) also explored the possibility of using MITRE ATT&CK
and D3FEND to protect ships, which they argue involves predicting upcoming attacks and
responding automatically.
As noted by Martínez et al. (2024), such situation creates a disaggregated system of regulatory
laws for cybersecurity in the maritime industry. This paper emphasizes the urgent need for
9LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
a binding international agreement governing the cybersecurity of any maritime infrastructure.
Dimakopoulou and Rantos (2024) showed that linking maritime operations to international
standards such as NIST CSF v2.0 proves that their adaptation can enhance ship security.
The cybersecurity is a key component of the modern maritime industry, as the digitalization
of ports and vessels creates new threats (Neumann, 2024). A bibliometric analysis of current
studies conrms that interest in this problem is emerging at a rapid pace (Peng et al., 2025;
Mawer et al., 2024), and the main challenges remain unresolved.
A systematic review shows that cybersecurity threats include hacking of ship systems,
attacks on automated ports, and risks to navigation (Bolbot et al., 2022). Text mining
techniques are identifying new threats, especially in the transportation of dangerous
goods(Huang et al., 2025). The risk life cycle of cargo ships is analyzed based on probabilistic
models (Jiang et al., 2025). The development of risk assessment and mitigation methods
is a priority for international organizations. For example, the CRAMMTS method allows
assessing the cyber risks of maritime companies based on surveys (Tatar et al., 2024).
Dynamic modeling of ship cyber resilience demonstrates the importance of a systematic
approach (Putra et al., 2024). The level of employee awareness is a key factor in preventing
cyber threats. An analysis of the level of knowledge of maritime students (Karaca & Soner,
2023) and industry workers (Aşan, 2024) revealed signicant gaps. In Malaysia, the level of
cybersecurity implementation depends on economic and regulatory factors (Ahmad et al.,
2024). Big language models can be used to improve risk analysis and security of maritime
operations(Miller et al., 2025). Automated approaches to risk and attack analysis can improve
situational awareness (Xia et al., 2024). Research in Indonesia shows the eectiveness of
a multi-level cyber defense strategy(Putri & Burhanuddin, 2023).
Autonomous vessels are particularly vulnerable to attacks on authentication
systems(Crawford & Sylvanus, 2023). Legal aspects of gray areas in international maritime law
aect cybersecurity law enforcement (Kormych et al., 2023). Military conicts are changing the
approach to maritime security, as the example of the Black Sea shows (Kormych et al., 2024).
Risks in nancial technologies and their connection with the maritime sector are studied in the
context of digital transactions (Popova et al., 2024). An analysis of energy systems in maritime
transport emphasizes the vulnerability to cyberattacks (Prasetyo et al., 2022).
The protection of ships in military convoys requires optimization of speed and schedule,
which also aects overall security (Qiao et al., 2024). The use of eye-tracking technology allows
to assess the level of attention of operators in critical situations (Petrović & Vujičić, 2025).
An analysis of the various works under review clearly reveals some gaps that require further
investigation. Lack of a unied international legal framework, poor port security in developing
countries, limited use of innovative technologies and low level of personnel training are the
major gaps in combating cybercrime in maritime transportation. This article proposes to
review applicable international and national legal frameworks, analyze the main technological
measures to counter cyber threats and explore opportunities for international cooperation in
this eld.
1. Overview of cyber threats in shipping industry
The United Nations (UN), as well as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have
supported recommendations on maritime cyber security, as reected in the adoption of
resolution MSC.428(98). This resolution requires shipowners to include cyber risks in ship security
management plans. However, at this point arose a jurisdiction problem since attacks can come
from anywhere worldwide. Increased cooperation between states, intelligence sharing, and the
creation of specialized cyber police units may be some ways to address the problem.
10 LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
Cybersecurity in maritime transportation is a broad spectrum of threats targeting virtually
all aspects of shipping and port infrastructure. For example, hacking into navigation systems,
AIS or GPS, allows attackers to alter ship routes, create false coordinate positions, and cause
collisions or cargo theft. Interference with vessel control systems, which takes control of
onboard systems, leads to accidents, ship stoppages, or even hijackings. Stealing course data
and cargo information - stealing important information about cargo in transit facilitates pirate
attacks and economic blackmail. Sabotage against port systems is designed to paralyze port
operations, from delayed unloading to mismanagement of containers, resulting in nancial
losses (Table 1).
Table 1. Classication of cyberattacks’ targets in maritime transportation
Type of Target Description Possible Consequences
Navigation System Breach
(AIS, GPS)
Interference with
vessel navigation and
communication systems
Route deviation, collision
provocation
Ship Management System
Interference
Hijacking vessel control,
sabotaging onboard systems
Vessel hijacking, accidents,
shipwrecks
Theft of Cargo and
Route Data
Stealing commercial data on
cargo and shipping routes
Financial losses, piracy
Sabotage of Port Operations Breaching port management
systems, delaying cargo
handling
Logistics delays, nancial
losses
The history of shipping already knows many signicant cyber incidents. One of the
most famous cases was the NotPetya virus that paralyzed Maersk’s global operations in
2017, causing an estimated $300 million in damages. The virus damaged corporate cargo
management systems and caused disruptions at dozens of ports. Attacks on container
terminals also pose a serious threat: in 2021, attackers disabled control systems at several
major ports, causing huge delays. Lastly, cases of illegal intrusion into port systems include
hackers who divert cargo, create false declarations or steal sensitive data, destabilizing global
supply chains.
Various types of cyber threats aect maritime transport, including phishing attacks,
malware infections, data breaches, ransomware, and DDoS attacks. The distribution of these
threats is illustrated in Figure 1, based on cybersecurity reports analyzing maritime sector
vulnerabilities.
Cyber threats can pose a real risk to shipping security, so their comprehensive classication
is very important for countermeasures. Network attacks, such as distributed denial of service
(DDoS) and man-in-the-middle (MITM), target communication systems, disrupt data ows, and
jeopardize condential exchanges. Malware such as viruses, Trojans, and spyware can damage
critical systems and steal sensitive data.
Attacks on the security of navigation systems involve GPS spoong and signal jamming.
These actions manipulate ship location data, which disrupts navigation and jeopardizes
operations. Cargo manipulation involves tampering with cargo or accompanying documents
or altering shipment data, which can facilitate smuggling and illicit trade. Finally, social
engineering is gaining access to critical maritime databases (Table 2) by exploiting weaknesses
in the human factor through phishing or false login attempts.
11LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
Figure 1. Distribution of cyber-attacks on maritime transport
(Source: Research analysis based on cybersecurity reports)
Table 2. Classication of cyber threats in the maritime industry
Category of Threats Examples Description
Network Attacks DDoS, MITM, Phishing Disruption of communication
and data transfer
Malware Attacks Viruses, Trojans, Spyware System damage and data theft
Navigation System Attacks GPS Spoong, Signal
Jamming
Ship disorientation and
navigation failures
Cargo Manipulation Cargo Data Forgery Illegal operations and
smuggling
Social Engineering Phishing, Account
Compromise
Hacking of personnel accounts
through deception
Thus, the diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the complex mechanism of a cyber-attack on
maritime transportation. It is structured to reect both linear and branched attack paths,
making it versatile for analyzing cyber threats in the maritime sector.
Figure 2. Compact Maritime Cyberattack Mechanism Diagram
12 LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
The main nodes of the presented scheme include attack phases such as cyberattack
initiation, hacking navigation systems, data collection, malware injection, and sabotage of
port infrastructure. The cyberattack begins with vulnerable entry points, including phishing
campaigns, malware injection, and supply chain compromise. Once inltrated, attackers get
to the system’s vulnerabilities by navigating the network with elevated privileges.
Further steps include hacking into shipboard AIS/GPS systems, intercepting data,
installing ransomware, and compromising IoT devices in port. All of this can lead to logistical
disruptions, nancial losses and resulting loss of reputation, as well as covert activities of
attackers by masking their tracks and bypassing security systems.
2. Legal aspects of countering cyberthreats at sea
One of the key international instruments in the eld of the law of the sea is the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes the
foundations of the legal regime of the world’s oceans. Although there are no explicit rules
governing cybercrime in the text of the Convention, UNCLOS provides a framework for
states to cooperate in ensuring the safety of maritime navigation and preventing unlawful
acts. States are obliged to prevent the use of their ships for illegal activities, which can
beinterpreted as the need to counter cyber-attacks on ships ying their ag. It should be
kept in mind that the legal framework of UNCLOS is limited to maritime cybersecurity
applications, as the document initially focused on traditional threats such as piracy and illicit
trade. However, the growing dependence of the maritime industry on digital technologies
requires updating international treaties.
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001), known as the Budapest
Convention, is the primary international agreement for combating cybercrime. While it
initially focused on crimes committed on land, its principles can be adapted to the maritime
domain. The Convention facilitates international cooperation, including extradition,
joint investigations, and information exchange, which is vital given the global nature of
cybercrime at sea.
According to IMO Resolution MSC.428(98), initiated by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), this regulation is the rst to tackle maritime cybersecurity directly.
It requires shipping companies to incorporate cyber risk management tools into their
security management systems (ISM Code). This obligation aims to reduce the eects of
cyber-attacks on vessels and diminish the risks to global maritime shipping.
National legal acts. These measures enacted by the leading maritime states are
essentially the essential elements that make up the response to cybercrime in the maritime
realm. The U.S. has passed an array of legal measures, such as the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) for the security of maritime transportation infrastructure and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) addressing computer crime. These acts create
a basis for protecting critical maritime infrastructure and legally punishing those who are
perpetrating cyber-attacks.
In the European Union, the NIS (Network and Information Systems) Regulation was
adopted and introduced mandatory cybersecurity standards for the operators of critical
infrastructures, such as seaports and shipping companies. ENISA (European Cybersecurity
Agency) is creating specic recommendations for the shipping industry to raise the level of
protection of maritime systems. These measures, therefore, strengthen European legislation
as adapted to address threats beyond maritime cyberattacks.
Jurisdiction and enforcement. Maritime cybercrime creates tremendous legal problems
concerning jurisdiction and enforcement. The transnational nature of cyber-attacks
13LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
complicates the establishment of jurisdiction since some attacks may originate from servers
in one state, aect vessels ying the ag of another, and impact the infrastructure of third
countries. Jurisdiction for cyber-attacks against ships is determined by the ag under which
they sail in accordance with UNCLOS, but such an approach is inadequate in the context of
cyber threats.
Another diculty regarding liability determination arises from issues in establishing
the source of attacks. Legal scholars generally refer to the situation as “hybrid jurisdiction,”
according to which states conduct joint investigations into such incidents.
The collection and presentation of evidence are made even more dicult since the
digital traces of cybercrime can be easily and quickly destroyed. Furthermore, international
evidential procedures are stressed by each state’s very dierent laws. In other words, the use
of joint investigation teams and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) becomes crucial in
the whole process.
One of the prime issues in maritime cybersecurity concerns the ability to balance
anonymity and identication in cyber-attacks. With the growing reliance on technologies
such as IP masking and encrypted networks, identifying the perpetrator can be a case too
thick to cut. Thus, new international frameworks on legal recognition of cyber-intelligence
methods would go a long way in promoting data sharing among countries and between
public and private sectors as possible solutions to the problem.
Legislation on maritime cybercrime should thus be related to international standards,
national requirements, and stringent enforcement. International cooperation and the
harmonization of legal standards across various countries would thus make a single
international framework for the cybersecurity of maritime shipping possible.
3. Technological measures to counter maritime cyberthreats
Implementation of cyber security systems on ships and in ports. The development
and implementation of technological solutions is a key element in countering maritime
cyberthreats. These measures include security systems, cyber threat monitoring and
standardization of management technologies. Eective cybersecurity systems protect ships
and ports from cyberattacks. Modern systems include network infrastructure protection,
data encryption, access control, and crew training. For example, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) recommends integrating cybersecurity into ship management systems
to minimize the risks of attacks on navigation systems, automation and cargo platforms.
Eective maritime defense requires comprehensive technical solutions, such as the use of
automatic intrusion detection systems (IDS), cryptographic data transmission protocols, and
rewalls with adaptive algorithms.
As shown in Figure 3, a hierarchical representation of the port cybersecurity system is
used, using a branching structure to demonstrate the important components and their
interrelationships. This emphasizes a layered approach to security measures, ranging from
broad categories to detailed operational elements.
Articial intelligence (AI) and machine learning systems can analyze large data sets in real-
time and identify anomalies and suspicious activities. The application of AI makes it possible
to predict potential threats, respond to incidents, and optimize ship management processes.
An important direction in ensuring maritime transportation safety is the creation
of secure digital logistics platforms, such as global distribution systems (GDS) and
passenger data management (PNR) platforms. These systems ensure the secure exchange
of information between participants in the logistics chain, preventing data leaks and
unauthorized access.
14 LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
Figure 3. Hierarchical representation of the Port Cybersecurity System
Infrastructure projects. The introduction of autonomous ships has been an important step
in the digitalization of the maritime industry. Remotely, captains operate autonomous ships
using secure communication channels. These systems minimize the impact of human error and
improve navigational safety. Examples of such projects include Rolls-Royce developments and
the SEA-KIT autonomous ship project.
The diagram shown in Figure 4 depicts the interaction of key components of an
autonomous control center used to coordinate the various elements in complex systems such
as autonomous vessels.
Figure 4. Advanced autonomous ship protection system architecture
The Autonomous Control Center is the core center, a control node that carries the relay of
communication amongst the coalescing sensors, the navigation systems, safety modules,
etc., other functional components. The interconnections between the elements illustrate very
important data ows, for example, navigational information dissemination, threat detection,
GPS synchronization, and redundancy of data. It takes care of the integrity and security of the
system with the exibility to go along with an intricate, real-time condition.
15LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
Indeed, ship management technology is set to be standardized, with all systems
incorporating these standardized communications, navigation, and monitoring
technologies. The International Maritime Organization strongly supports these standards,
facilitating the integration of innovative technologies throughout the shipping industry. One
notable initiative is the International SMART Ship project, which has emerged as a successful
example of developing smart ships that enhance navigation capabilities and improve
resilience against cyber threats.
Therefore, technological measures to eliminate cybercrime at seas involve protecting
networks and data and establishing innovative solutions to secure the maritime
infrastructure. The integration of standards, the use of AI, and the future advancement of
autonomous vessels create a multi-tiered protective layer as our environment becomes more
digital.
4. Organizational measures and international cooperation
to counter syberthreats at sea
Combating cybercrime at sea requires coordinated action at the international level.
Organizational measures include establishing international bodies, strengthening interstate
cooperation, and developing training and certication for maritime professionals.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) actively promotes maritime cyber security
by establishing a special task force to develop policies, standards and recommendations.
IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) requires shipowners to incorporate cyber risk management into
ship security management systems, making this measure mandatory from 2021 onwards.
A number of international organizations and regional blocs, such as the European Union
(EU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), have entered into agreements
aimed at coordinating eorts to secure digital infrastructure at sea. Examples include the
EU’s Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and INTERPOL’s global cooperation
program to combat cybercrime.
To eectively address cyber threats, a dependable system whereby countries can
exchange information regarding attacks, vulnerabilities, and best practices must be
established. Organizations like Europol’s EC3 and Interpol’s International Cyber Defense
Center help to facilitate rapid responses using worldwide early warning systems and joint
research programs. An example of a successful international collaboration is the European
Maritime Security Network (EMSA), uniting European states in countering and investigating
cyberattacks.
The formation of joint incident investigation teams at the international level accelerates
the detection of cyber-attacks on ships and maritime infrastructure. Examples of successful
initiatives include INTERPOL’s Operation OPERATION 404, which addresses cyber threats in
international waters.
The cyber security competency of maritime industry professionals plays a key role in
protecting ships. International training programs include courses on cyber risk management,
cyber attack simulation and certication of maritime operators. Standards for cybersecurity
training should be harmonized. International associations of maritime universities are
developing training programs that are consistent with IMO and International Association of
Maritime Institutes (IAMU) recommendations. Examples include international cybersecurity
training at the IAMU in Sweden.
Thus, institutional measures, including the establishment of specialized bodies, interstate
cooperation and the development of certication systems, play a crucial role in shaping
a global strategy for preventing cybercrime at sea.
16 LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
5. Discussion
Eectively countering cybercrime in the maritime industry requires a systematic approach
that includes the development of international legislation, strengthening enforcement
mechanisms and using advanced technologies. Let us consider the key areas of perspectives
and recommendations.
Given the global nature of cybercrime, developing a specialized international convention
regulating maritime cybersecurity is an urgent task. Such a convention could combine the
norms of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the Council of Europe Framework Convention
on Cybercrime, ensuring more comprehensive regulation. Establishing an international
maritime cyber threat data sharing system, including a global incident registry and a rapid
response center, will enable rapid coordination of eorts.
Global sanctions mechanisms similar to those used for terrorism and piracy could be an
eective deterrent. Such measures include asset freezes, a ban on maritime trade, and a ban on
ships suspected of cyber-attacks entering ports of IMO member states.
A centralized database of cyber-attacks on ships and maritime facilities would improve
threat monitoring by providing early warning of possible attacks. International organizations,
such as IMO or INTERPOL, in cooperation with national authorities, could maintain this registry.
International rapid response teams for cyber-attacks could operate similarly to maritime
rescue services. Such teams would conduct operational investigations, provide digital
forensics, and protect key maritime assets from threats in real-time.
Blockchain technology can protect critical data such as navigation routes, ship logs and
contracts. Blockchain-based systems can prevent information manipulation and ensure
transparency and reliability of data in logistics chains.
Integrating autonomous cyber defense systems on ships will enable automatic detection
and blocking of cyber-attacks. Articial intelligence and machine learning will ensure
constant monitoring of the ship’s digital environment and the application of protective
measures without human intervention. As mentioned, Rolls-Royce and Kongsberg are already
developing examples of such systems.
Conclusions
The analysis of legal, technological and organizational aspects revealed such key challenges
as the lack of a unied international regulatory framework, problems related to jurisdiction and
attribution of cyberattacks, and the rapidly changing pace of development of technologies
used by attackers. Key recommendations include developing a new international convention
on maritime cybersecurity, implementing international mechanisms, creating global threat
databases, and forming interstate task forces. Technological measures should be based on
introducing autonomous defense systems, using blockchain for data protection and articial
intelligence for threat monitoring.
Legislation, technology, and training should be considered as part of a layered approach
to nding solutions. Improved international cooperation, including information sharing and
joint incident response, remains key to the security of the maritime industry. This argument
points to an essential fact that the international community must realize global maritime
cybersecurity standards must be developed to provide a robust, resilient framework to counter
modern cyber threats. All proposed measures involve cooperation between states, maritime
companies, and international organizations. In this way, global maritime cybersecurity
standards will provide higher protection for shipping routes and ports, minimizing economic
and social risks.
17LEX PORTUS VOL 11 ISS 1 2025
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Мельник О., Дроздов О., Кузніченко С. Кібербезпека на морському транспорті: перспективи міжнародно-
правового регулювання та заходи протидії. – Стаття.
У статті вивчено систему правових, технічних та організаційних заходів для формування комплексного підходу до
вирішення проблеми кібербезпеки морського транспорту. Авторами висвітлено ключові прогалини у міжнародно-пра-
вовому регулюванні та пропонується створення єдиної правової бази у сфері кіберзагроз у морській транспортній сфері.
Статтю сфокусовано на технічних рішеннях та підкріплено досвідом професійної підготовки у віртуальному середовищі.
Інноваційним став застосований міждисциплінарний підхід, що поєднав технологічні досягнення з соціальними дослі-
дженнями та правовим аналізом. Запропоновано розробку міжнародної конвенції з морської кібербезпеки, стандартизо-
ваного глобального реєстру інцидентів і транснаціональної системи обміну даними. Така системна база отримає вагомий
потенціал для вирішення критичних безпекових проблем та підвищення безпеки світового судноплавства.
Ключові слова: морська кібербезпека, морське право, реагування на інциденти, глобальні стандарти морської
безпеки, міжнародні правові засади.
