Beyond a single pole: exploring the nuanced coexistence of scientific elitism and populism in China

Abstract

The rise of scientific populism has become a global issue, but research on the coexistence of scientific elitism and scientific populism, especially in East Asian societies, is still limited. Based on a large-scale online survey conducted in the Chinese mainland in 2023 (N = 2922), this study explores the tendencies towards scientific elitism, scientific populism, and scientific pluralism among different groups in Chinese society. The results show that Chinese women tend to have a more conservative view of scientists, with no clear inclination towards elitism or populism. People with middle income and education levels show a dual tendency, supporting both elitist views and populism, and even leaning towards pluralistic attitudes. The “initial construction generation,” has a more negative view of scientific elitism and tends towards extreme populism, while the “new century generation” shows less deference for elitism and a stronger populist tendency. The study also finds that the interaction between post-materialist values and interest in science significantly shapes attitudes towards scientists. Social media, especially short-video platforms, plays an important role in promoting scientific populism and its more extreme forms. This study emphasizes the need to account for the diversity and complexity of attitudes across different social groups when developing science communication strategies.

Full text

ARTICLE
Beyond a single pole: exploring the nuanced
coexistence of scientific elitism and populism
in China
Shuo Wang 1,2✉, Tuo Wang 3, Hiromi M. Yokoyama 2✉, Shotaro Kinoshita 4,5 & Zhengfeng Li 1✉
The rise of scientific populism has become a global issue, but research on the coexistence of
scientific elitism and scientific populism, especially in East Asian societies, is still limited.
Based on a large-scale online survey conducted in the Chinese mainland in 2023 (N =2922),
this study explores the tendencies towards scientific elitism, scientific populism, and scientific
pluralism among different groups in Chinese society. The results show that Chinese women
tend to have a more conservative view of scientists, with no clear inclination towards elitism
or populism. People with middle income and education levels show a dual tendency, sup-
porting both elitist views and populism, and even leaning towards pluralistic attitudes. The
“initial construction generation,”has a more negative view of scientific elitism and tends
towards extreme populism, while the “new century generation”shows less deference for
elitism and a stronger populist tendency. The study also finds that the interaction between
post-materialist values and interest in science significantly shapes attitudes towards scien-
tists. Social media, especially short-video platforms, plays an important role in promoting
scientific populism and its more extreme forms. This study emphasizes the need to account
for the diversity and complexity of attitudes across different social groups when developing
science communication strategies.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04685-3 OPEN
1School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. 2Center for Data-Driven Discovery(CD3), Kavli Institute for the Physics and Mathematics of
the Universe (Kavli IPMU), University of Tokyo, Chiba, Japan. 3School of Public management and Policy, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. 4Hills Joint
Research Laboratory for Future Preventive Medicine and Wellness, Keio University School of Medicine, Tokyo, Japan. 5Graduate School of Interdisciplinary
Information Studies, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. ✉email: s-wang21@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn;hiromi.yokoyama@ipmu.jp;lizhf@tsinghua.edu.cn
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Introduction
In recent years, particularly following the outbreak of COVID-
19, subtle shifts have occurred in public attitudes towards
scientists, including distrust (Mede, 2022), skepticism (Staerklé
et al., 2022), and the acceptance of misinformation (Scheufele
et al., 2021). These shifts are not confined to Western contexts
(Butler, 2020; Kennedy et al., 2022; Wissenschaft im Dialog, 2024;
UZH News, 2022; Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014) but are also evident
in non-Western countries (Lasco, 2020; Mietzner, 2020). Scholars
have employed various concepts to describe the evolving public
attitudes towards scientists, including scientific populism (Mede
& Schäfer, 2020), anti-intellectualism (Motta, 2018), conspiracy
theories (Mahl et al., 2023), and the post-truth era (Sismondo,
2017). These studies have shed light on key characteristics of
public perceptions of the role and function of scientists in society.
However, the existing body of research might have overlooked
two critical aspects. First, while evidence of growing skepticism is
clear, recent large-scale cross-national surveys suggest that overall
societal confidence in scientists remains robust (Cologna et al.,
2024; Edelman, 2024). This finding highlights two seemingly
contradictory attitudes: scientific elitism, reflecting deference to
scientists and their authority; and scientific populism, character-
ized by questioning and challenging scientific authority (we will
elaborate on this in the conceptual framework section). Scientific
elitism and scientific populism coexist globally, although in
varying forms and degrees. For example, Guenther et al. (2018)
observed in their study of the South African public that attitudes
toward science and technology simultaneously reflected “pro-
mise”and “reservation,”a duality that can coexist even within
specific subgroups.
More importantly, much of the current research relies on data
from Western societies, with limited evidence from East Asia.
Actually, scientific populism has also emerged in East Asian
societies in recent years (Lü & Gao, 2024; Chen & Zhu, 2023;
Fominaya, 2022; Rauchfleisch et al., 2023; Yokoyama & Ikkatai,
2022; Kim et al., 2017). However, in East Asia, Confucian cultural
traditions that emphasize social order and deference to authority
(Ma, Yang, 2014; Tan & Chee, 2005) have cultivated a high-
power-distance society (Hofstede, 1984), where members often
accept and expect authority (Zhai, 2022; Zhai, 2017). These tra-
ditions may provide some resilience against scientific populism;
even in the face of skepticism, significant public deference to
scientists often endures. From the perspective of cultural value
theory, embeddedness reinforces the public’s identification of
scientists as “guardians of collective interests,”while hierarchical
structures strengthen trust in scientific authority. However, the
rise of autonomous values among younger generations and the
expansion of the internet and digital culture have created new
spaces for the expression of scientific populism (Schwartz, 1992).
This cultural tension has fostered the coexistence of scientific
elitism and scientific populism in East Asia.
In China, deeply influenced by Confucian culture and its
socialist system, there has been a long-standing deference and
trust in various authorities, including scientific ones. Scientific
elitism remains a dominant feature of public attitudes toward
scientists. Surveys show that Chinese public evaluations of sci-
entists have become increasingly positive from 2017 to 2021 (Ye
et al., 2023), and trust in scientists is significantly higher than the
global average (Cologna et al., 2024). However, scientific popu-
lism, similar to trends observed in Western societies, has also
begun to surface in China. This populism manifests in skepticism
and opposition to scientists, with greater trust placed in local
knowledge or personal experiences (Lü & Gao, 2024; Chen &
Zhu, 2023; Cheng & Shi, 2020; Fan, 2015). Several areas have seen
direct or indirect conflicts between the public and scientists,
particularly in the wake of frequent academic misconduct
scandals (Greely, 2019), public protests against chemical projects
like the “PX”incidents (Zhu, 2017; Lee & Ho, 2014), discussions
surrounding PM2.5 (Li et al., 2021; Huang, 2015), debates over
genetically modified foods (Qiu et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2020), and
controversies over COVID-19 measures (Yuan et al., 2023; Yuan
et al., 2022; Luo & Jia, 2022). Since 2022, topics resonating with
scientific populism, such as the slogan “Advice for experts: Never
advise!”have frequently appeared on social media hotlists (Chen
& Zhu, 2023; Lü & Gao, 2024).
Given this backdrop, our study seeks to move beyond a sin-
gular polarized perspective to explore the coexistence of scientific
elitism and scientific populism in Chinese society. We analyze
how demographic and attitudinal variables distinguish these
attitudes and identify groups that may simultaneously support
both—a phenomenon we refer to as “scientific pluralism.”This
investigation aims to deepen the understanding of deference in
scientists and its resilience, shedding light on how these see-
mingly contradictory attitudes coexist in different cultural
contexts.
The paradox of high deference and gradual populism in China
In modern Chinese society, scientists are often shown in official
discussions as examples of national progress and patriotism,
enjoying a high social status. Celebrated figures such as Jiaxian
Deng, the “Father of China’s nuclear weapons,”Xuesen Qian, a
pivotal figure in China’s space program, Longping Yuan, the
“Father of hybrid rice,”and Youyou Tu, who won the Nobel Prize
in Physiology or Medicine for her discovery of artemisinin to
treat malaria, epitomizes this esteem (Ye et al., 2023). The public
image of scientists has remained relatively stable, often char-
acterized by perceptions of strong capabilities and significant
contributions to societal progress (He & Wang, 2009; Ye et al.,
2023). This deference is echoed in social trust surveys, where trust
in scientists ranks among the highest, second only to close
interpersonal relationships such as family and friends (Xiang
et al., 2015). During the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic,
public trust in scientists soared, reaching historic highs by 2021
(Chen et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2021; Ye et al., 2023).
Political imperatives during different historical periods have
shaped official discourses on scientific elitism, influencing how
the public perceives the roles and functions of scientists. For
instance, in the 1950s, scientists were portrayed as models of
unity and learning from the Soviet Union. Following the Sino-
Soviet split in the 1960s, the discourse shifted to emphasize
independence and self-reliance, casting scientists as symbols of
national resilience (Zhang, 2016). However, during the “Cul-
tural Revolution”of the 1960s and 1970s, scientists and
intellectuals were persecuted and subjected to ideological
scrutiny, transforming them from revered figures into targets
of criticism and re-education (Li & Guo, 2015). Since the
reform and opening-up period, scientists have been reima-
gined as key drivers of economic development and technolo-
gical innovation. Overall, official narratives have consistently
reinforced a stance of scientific elitism, presenting scientists as
patriotic, competent, and diligent figures (Wang & Xu, 2021).
The Communist Party of China (2019) issued the “Opinions
on Further Promoting the Spirit of Scientists and Strength-
ening Academic and Conduct Standards,”emphasizing the
need to guide the public toward showing deference to scien-
tists. During the COVID-19 pandemic, prominent medical
scientists such as Nanshan Zhong and Lanjuan Li were por-
trayed as trusted and exemplary figures, symbolizing the
alignment of scientific excellence with national unity (Zhong,
2020). The strong influence of this elitist discourse has been a
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key factor in sustaining the public’s long-standing deference to
scientists in China.
Under the deep influence of the official scientific elitist dis-
course, the Chinese public has generally maintained high defer-
ence toward scientists (Cologna et al., 2024). However, in recent
years, public evaluations of scientists have become increasingly
negative (Ye et al., 2023), accompanied by a growing prominence
of scientific populism and a gradual decline in unquestioning
reverence toward scientific authority.
This shift is partly driven by scandals involving scientists. In
recent years, high-profile cases of academic misconduct and
ethical violations have undermined trust in the scientific com-
munity. For example, the 2018 “He Jiankui gene-edited babies
incident”drew worldwide criticism for its ethical violations
(Greely, 2019). Additionally, scandals involving sexual harass-
ment and academic fraud have further eroded public trust in
scientists (Chen et al., 2023). Such incidents have not only wea-
kened scientists’authority in knowledge production but also
damaged their moral credibility in the eyes of the public.
Conflicts between scientists and the public have also emerged
in areas such as environmental health, food safety, and public
policy. The “PX”incidents, a series of public protests against
paraxylene chemical projects, represent one of the few cases of
active public participation in scientific issues (Zhu, 2017; Chin-
Fu, 2013). Paraxylene, used in producing plastics and fibers, has
raised public concerns due to its potential environmental and
health risks, prompting widespread protests (Wang et al., 2022).
Similarly, debates over genetically modified foods reflect public
fears that scientists may prioritize economic or political interests
over safety and necessity (Hu et al., 2020; Lü & Chen, 2016).
During the pandemic, statements by Chinese scientists on issues
such as the origin of the virus, vaccine safety, treatment protocols,
and lockdown measures often faced skepticism. Many of these
statements were criticized as unsubstantiated or detached from
public concerns. On social media, many people mock experts as
“brick experts”(磚家), which is the exact homophone of “expert”
(專家) in Chinese, humorously implying that these individuals
lack genuine expertise. Similarly, they refer to professors as
“callous beasts”(叫獸), which is also the exact homophone of
“professor”(教授) in Chinese, ironically suggesting that pro-
fessors may not be as knowledgeable or compassionate as their
title implies. Since 2022, slogans such as “Advice for experts:
Never advise!”have frequently trended on platforms like Zhihu
and Weibo (see Fig. 1), reflecting public dissatisfaction with
expert opinions (Chen & Zhu, 2023; Lü & Gao, 2024). In the later
stages of the pandemic, even scientifically substantiated claims
faced significant public skepticism. In response, the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (2023) issued a “Code of Conduct for
Academicians (Trial)”, mandating that academicians refrain from
publicly expressing opinions unrelated to their fields of expertise,
aiming to preserve the authoritative discourse of scientists.
It is particularly worth noting that China’s media environment
plays a critical role in both the rise of scientific populism and the
persistence of scientific elitism. Traditional official media and
digital media contribute differently to these phenomena, reflecting
the tension between mainstream ideology and grassroots scientific
discussions. Traditional official media, such as People’sDaily,
Xinhua News Agency,Guangming Daily,andChina Central Tele-
vision, function as transmitters of mainstream ideology by
emphasizing the central role of science and technology in national
modernization and by highlighting the contributions of scientists to
the nation and society (Hassid, 2020). Additionally, these outlets
employ innovative communication strategies, such as subcultural
narratives, to engage younger audiences (Li et al., 2024).
In contrast, digital media provide a decentralized platform for
public engagement with science, allowing individuals to
participate in discussions and even challenge scientific authority.
Platforms such as Zhihu and Bilibili, as well as social media like
Weibo and Douyin, have facilitated the emergence of citizen
science communicators—members of the public without formal
scientific backgrounds who actively take on the role of science
communicators (Yang, 2021). This “dissolution of boundaries”
not only challenges the traditional notion of scientists as the sole
legitimate creators of scientific knowledge but also fosters the
deconstruction and diversification of scientific authority in the
eyes of the public (Yang, 2022). Moreover, Chinese scientists
generally do not regard science communication as part of their
professional responsibilities (Jia et al., 2018), and their commu-
nication on social media often reflects a preference for one-way
dissemination of knowledge rather than interactive engagement.
This lack of interaction further strengthens public skepticism of
authority on digital platforms (Jia et al., 2017).
In summary, we observe the widespread prevalence of scientific
elitism in both official and public discourse in China, alongside
the emergence of various topics and actions characterized by
scientific populism. The complexity of public attitudes towards
scientists motivates us to explore which groups within society are
more likely to support scientific populism, which are more
inclined toward scientific elitism, and, more intriguingly, which
groups might simultaneously hold both attitudes. To address
these questions, we propose the following research questions:
RQ1: Which groups in Chinese society are more likely to
support scientific elitism or scientific populism?
RQ2: Which groups in Chinese society are inclined to support
both scientific elitism and scientific populism (scientific
pluralism)?
Conceptual framework and existing research
Scientific elitism, populism, and pluralism. We have frequently
referred to two core concepts in this study, namely scientific
elitism and scientific populism, which now require precise defi-
nitions to establish a conceptual foundation for subsequent
analysis. These two concepts not only depict the complex
dynamics between the public and scientists—characterized by
deference and skepticism, authority and equality, participation
and representation—but also reflect the public’s attitudes and
perceptions toward scientists and the knowledge they produce.
Scientific elitism typically manifests as deference to and trust in
the professional knowledge of scientists, whereas scientific
populism reveals public skepticism and challenges to scientific
authority. These attitudes are not isolated; rather, they are
interwoven and mutually influential within societal contexts.
Scientific populism has been a widely discussed concept,
indicating public skepticism towards scientists and their knowl-
edge. Mede and Schäfer (2020) were among the first scholars to
conceptualize and measure this phenomenon, emphasizing the
significant opposition between “ordinary people”and “academic
elites.”Advocates of scientific populism argue that knowledge
created by scientific elites is often criticized as unhelpful,
ideologically biased, and lacking practical value (Ylä-Anttila,
2018; Eberl et al., 2021), and is thus considered inferior to the
“common sense”of the public on a value level. The daily
experiences and intuition of the public are sometimes considered
more credible than the theories and data analysis of scientists
(Mede et al., 2021). Based on this view, some people advocate that
the production of knowledge should rely more on the public,
whose moral positions are more neutral, rather than on scientists
(Mede et al., 2022). To a certain extent, scientific populism is seen
as a “thin ideology”(Rekker, 2021) that does not advocate a
complete system of knowledge but challenges the existing
scientific authority.
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Elitism is theoretically the mirror image of populism (Mudde,
2004), yet in practice, the relationship between populism and
elitism is often blurred. Scientific elitism reflects the public’s
respect and trust in the professional knowledge and authoritative
status of scientists. In this concept, scientists, with their profound
professional knowledge and skills, are granted authority in the
field of science that surpasses that of the general public. They are
considered able to provide more accurate interpretations and
predictions of scientific phenomena, and their opinions and
judgments are generally regarded as having higher value and
significance (Spruyt et al., 2023; Bertsou & Caramani, 2022).
Scientists are seen as legitimate creators and disseminators of
Fig. 1 Anti-expert topic on Chinese social media. illustrates the discussion trends of the “Anti-Expert”topic on Chinese social media platforms,
highlighting the public’s skepticism and crisis of trust towards experts.
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scientific knowledge in scientific elitism. It should be emphasized
that this point of scientific elitism differs from scientism.
Scientism advocates that science and scientific methods are the
main, if not the only, ways to understand the world and reality
(Stenmark, 1997), but does not emphasize the unique role and
authority of scientists in scientific inquiry and knowledge
construction.
Although scientific populism and scientific elitism are often
viewed as opposing concepts, they are not entirely mutually
exclusive in practice and may coexist in certain situations
(Akkerman et al., 2014). In some cases, the public may
simultaneously respect the professional knowledge of scientists
and be skeptical of scientific research results. In addition, the
public may recognize the authority of scientists in technical issues
but believe that the opinions of ordinary people are equally
important when applying scientific knowledge to social policies or
moral decisions. In this paper, we regard this attitude as scientific
pluralism.
Differentiating factors of public attitudes towards scientists.
Our focus is on which groups are inclined to support scientific
elitism or scientific populism, and even hold both seemingly
contradictory attitudes toward scientists. While existing research
has largely concentrated on Western contexts, it has revealed how
factors such as social backgrounds and personal interests influ-
ence public attitudes toward scientists. However, the applicability
of these theories in the Chinese context remains underexplored.
In light of this, our study adopts an exploratory perspective,
situating the analysis within China’s unique socio-cultural con-
text, and focuses on how socio-demographic characteristics,
personal values, and media use serve as critical factors that dif-
ferentiate groups in their attitudes toward scientists.
Gender. Gender plays a role in differentiating individuals’atti-
tudes towards scientific elitism and scientific populism, although
existing research findings are not consistent. Some studies suggest
that men are more inclined towards attitudes of scientific popu-
lism (Ralph-Morrow, 2022; Spruyt et al., 2016; Kaltwasser & van
Hauwaert, 2020), while women are more supportive of scientific
elitism (Yokoyama & Ikkatai, 2022). However, there are also
studies indicating that women are more likely to criticize science
or scientists (Morgan et al., 2018; Evans & Hargittai, 2020), and
higher-income men may be more inclined towards scientific
elitism (Evans & Hargittai, 2020; Gauchat, 2012). In addition,
some studies suggest that gender may not have a significant
impact on attitudes towards science (Gauchat, 2011; Johnson
et al., 2015).
Generation. Studies point out that older people tend to show
more attitudes of scientific populism (Mede et al., 2022; Spruyt
et al., 2016; Kaltwasser & van Hauwaert, 2020), while younger
people are relatively more supportive of scientists (Funk et al.,
2020). However, there is also evidence that older people may be
more supportive of scientists (Evans & Hargittai, 2020), which
may be related to their generally positive attitude towards social
trust (Lunz Trujillo, 2022; Li & Fung, 2013; Poulin & Haase, 2015;
Price & Peterson, 2023), while younger people usually have lower
levels of social trust (Connaughton, 2020; Gramlich, 2019).
In fact, an individual’s attitude towards scientists may be
profoundly influenced by the historical period in which they live.
Therefore, generational analysis provides a more in-depth perspec-
tive than simply considering absolute age, revealing the shaping of a
generation’s values by shared historical and cultural experiences. In
China, rapid socio-political changes and economic development
have led to significant differences in values between different
generations (Gao et al., 2022). For example, the generation that
experienced the Cultural Revolution may have developed a critical
attitude towards scientists due to the devaluation of scientists’status
and the prevalence of populism during that era (Zhang, 2016;Li&
Guo, 2015). At the same time, Generation Z, who grew up in an
environment of highly developed internet and information
technology, may influence their views on science and scientists
with their open-mindedness and critical thinking (Brosius et al.,
2022;Lazányi,2019;Turner,2015).
Education. The level of education is also an important factor
distinguishing an individual’s attitude towards scientists. Studies
have shown that people with lower levels of education and less
exposure to science are more inclined towards attitudes of sci-
entific populism (Mede et al., 2022; Spruyt et al., 2016; Kaltwasser
& van Hauwaert, 2020; Lunz Trujillo, 2022). According to the
theory of reflexive modernization, people with more education
are more aware of the failures of scientific institutions, especially
scientific projects (Allum et al., 2008), and thus may hold critical
attitudes towards scientific institutions and scientists. Some
research in China partly supports this view, with a significant
negative correlation between the level of education and trust in
scientists (Ye et al., 2023; Jin & Chu, 2015). The theory of anomie
suggests that lower levels of education are associated with skep-
ticism towards scientific institutions, and people with less edu-
cation are more likely to feel threatened by modernity and
institutionalized systems (Achterberg et al., 2017), thus being
more inclined towards scientific populism. Conversely, people
with higher levels of education show more interest and trust in
science and research (Wissenschaft im Dialog, 2024; Funk et al.,
2020; Price & Peterson, 2023) and are more likely to lean towards
scientific elitism. However, some studies also suggest that the
impact of education may not be significant (Evans & Hargittai,
2020). In addition, the relationship between education and atti-
tudes towards scientists may be influenced by the level of risk and
uncertainty in the institutional environment (Wu, 2021), showing
a nonlinear relationship, that is, individuals with a moderate level
of education show the most pronounced scientific populism
(Eberl et al., 2023; Mede et al., 2022).
Income. Similar to the role of educational level as a distinguishing
factor, the influence of income level on an individual’s attitude
towards scientists is also complex. Although some studies point
out that individual or household income is not a strong predictor
of attitudes towards scientists (Evans & Feng, 2013; Gauchat,
2015), other studies suggest that higher-income groups are more
likely to support scientific elitism (Gauchat, 2012), and support
for scientific populism may decrease with higher income levels
(Spruyt et al., 2016). This may be because economically dis-
advantaged groups are more likely to feel out of control and
relatively impoverished, thus being more inclined to support
populism. In contrast, economically affluent individuals, with
more resources and a sense of security, are more inclined to
support scientific elitism.
Media. The influence of media on individual support and trust in
scientists is a complex issue (Hmielowski et al., 2014; Neureiter
et al., 2021). Different media usage may lead to different levels of
trust in science. People who frequently use traditional media,
such as newspapers, television, and radio, may be more inclined
towards scientific elitism (Anderson et al., 2012; Jin & Chu, 2015).
However, in some regions, the use of traditional media is also
positively predictive of scientific populism (Mede, 2022). Social
media platforms add greater uncertainty to this influence (Van
Dijck & Alinejad, 2020; Mihelj et al., 2022). Social media facilitate
direct interaction among the public, allowing individuals to easily
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share and amplify their views. This direct participation is parti-
cularly conducive to the spread of personal ideologies and pro-
vides conditions for the dissemination of scientific populism
(Postill,2018; Gerbaudo, 2018; Engesser et al., 2017). While the
broader media environment in China has been discussed above,
its specific impact on attitudes toward scientists requires further
investigation.
Scientific interest. Some studies indicate that people with less
interest in science may be more inclined towards scientific
populism because they are less interested in and willing to
understand science, thus tending to reject it (Choung et al., 2020;
Spruyt et al., 2016). However, scientific populism may also be
consistent with a higher interest in science (Motta, 2018), and
skepticism towards scientists and other elites does not necessarily
mean a lack of interest in scientific knowledge and research
results (Mede et al., 2022). In fact, people who are skeptical of
science often participate in scientific discussions (Wintterlin et al.,
2022). Existing research in China suggests that people interested
in science are more likely to lean towards scientific elitism
compared to those without interest (Ye et al., 2023).
Post-materialism. Since the reform and opening-up in 1978,
China’s economy, social structure, and cultural concepts have
undergone significant changes, and social values have become
increasingly diverse (Gao et al., 2022). Post-materialism has
become an important perspective in studying the transformation
of Chinese public values (Chi et al., 2023; Guo, 2010; Li, 2017; Li,
2020). Post-materialist theory suggests that when society develops
to a certain stage and basic material needs are fully met, active
political participation and the independent expression of one’s
own interests become an important part of public life (Inglehart,
1971,1977). This shift in values also promotes the development
of social and political participation, with an increasing number of
groups challenging the elite, and mass politics becoming more
frequent (Cho & Park, 2020; Flanagan & Lee, 2003).
In the field of science, the transformation of social values may
affect individuals’trust in scientists. In post-materialist societies
where the direct benefits of science are becoming less significant,
along with a growing awareness of the possible negative effects of
technological development, people may rely less on and trust
scientists less (Price & Peterson, 2016). Those who are still in the
materialist stage may have just begun to experience the benefits
brought by science, such as vaccination and the advancement of
information technology, and therefore may have higher expecta-
tions for improving their quality of life through science (Price &
Peterson, 2023). Research has found that in some highly
developed countries, public interest and positive attitudes towards
science have declined (Bauer et al., 1994). With China’s rapid
economic growth and social structural changes, some people may
gradually adopt post-materialist values, which may lead them to
adopt a populist attitude towards science (Li, 2017; Liu, 2021).
However, it is also possible that some people may continue to
maintain materialist values, thereby supporting scientific elitism.
It is currently unclear whether post-materialist values directly
shape attitudes towards scientists, and this hypothesis needs to be
verified by further research. Interest in science may be a key
factor in the impact of post-materialist values on attitudes
towards scientists, but this point still needs to be further explored.
Post-materialism & scientific interests. Furthermore, the influence
of post-materialist values on attitudes toward scientists may not
be direct but could depend on certain contextual factors. Among
these, interest in science may act as an important moderator.
Post-materialists often exhibit a higher need for self-expression
and a propensity for critical thinking, but whether these traits
translate into specific attitudes toward scientists likely depends on
their level of engagement with science. Cultural values and sci-
entific interest may jointly shape the formation of attitudes
toward scientists (Kahan et al., 2012). This hypothesis requires
further investigation.
Data and methods
Data. In December 2023, we conducted a large-scale online
survey in mainland China using a quota-based non-probability
sampling method. The sampling scheme was designed based on
the demographic and geographic distribution data from the
Chinese seventh national population census, ensuring repre-
sentativeness in terms of geographical and age distribution (see
Supplementary Material 1). The sampling error rate was 1.80%.
Invitations were sent to 21,074 target respondents, and 9906
completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of
47.01%.
To ensure data quality, rigorous screening was applied to the
sample. During the automated filtering stage, 5,364 responses
were excluded for reasons such as completion time being under
10 minutes, respondents being under 18 years old, exceeding
geographic or age quotas, inconsistent answers to lie detection or
duplicate screening questions, or detection of duplicate submis-
sions based on IP address or device information. Subsequently,
during the manual review stage, 1208 additional responses were
excluded. These exclusions were based on anomalies such as
selecting the same options for all scale items (variance =0) and
other inconsistencies in demographic variables (e.g., respondents
aged 18-25 indicating a marital status of “widowed,”individuals
with primary education indicating occupations as civil servants or
teachers, respondents under 30 indicating “retired,”corporate
executives reporting unusually low income, or PhD holders
reporting manual labor jobs). After this rigorous screening
process, 3000 valid responses were retained. Following the
exclusion of records with missing data, a total of 2922 valid
responses were included in the final analysis.
Measurement. Existing studies have developed scales such as
SciPop (Mede et al., 2021) and NPSS (Morgan et al., 2018)to
measure scientific populism or negative perceptions of science,
providing significant insights into public attitudes toward scien-
tists. However, rather than adopting predefined scales directly,
this study employed an exploratory approach to extract key
dimensions from the complexity of public attitudes toward sci-
entists. This exploratory strategy revealed that scientific elitism
and scientific populism are independent, asymmetrical dimen-
sions rather than traditional binary opposites. We developed five
items (see Supplementary Material 2): (1) Scientists know more
about a scientific phenomenon than ordinary people. (2) Scien-
tists’views are more important than ordinary people’s opinions.
(3) If all scientists agree on a theory, I will also believe in that
theory. (4) Scientists rely too much on data and theory and ignore
real-life experience. (5) Scientists’research results are often
wrong. We conducted a pilot survey using these five items in
November 2023 (N =100), and the measurement outcomes met
our expectations. These items cover different aspects of public
deference to and skepticism toward the professional authority of
scientists. Respondents rated the items using a 7-point Likert
scale, where 1 indicated “strongly disagree”and 7 indicated
“strongly agree.”A pilot study conducted in November 2023
(N =100) confirmed that these items met expectations in terms
of design.
Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to extract two
distinct components from the first three and the last two items,
named “scientific elitism”and “scientific populism,”respectively
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(see Supplementary Material 3). The results highlighted the
multidimensional nature of attitudes toward scientists and
validated the independence of scientific elitism and scientific
populism. Internal consistency checks provided additional
evidence. The Cronbach’s alpha for the scientific elitism items
((1), (2), and (3)) was 0.714, with an average interitem covariance
of 0.905, indicating high consistency for this dimension. For the
scientific populism items ((4) and (5)), the Cronbach’s alpha was
0.498, with an average interitem covariance of 0.891. While the
lower internal consistency for scientific populism can be
attributed to the smaller number of items, the scale remains
theoretically robust. Notably, the lack of significant correlation
between (1), (2), (3) and (4), (5) further underscores the
independence of these two dimensions.
Based on the extracted components, we defined extreme
variables: respondents scoring 6 or 7 on items (1), (2), and (3)
were classified as “extreme scientific elitism”; respondents scoring
6 or 7 on items (4) and (5) were classified as “extreme scientific
populism”; and respondents scoring 6 or 7 on all five items were
classified as “scientific pluralism.”
For gender, education, and income variables, we adopted
common practices. As for the generational division of Chinese
people, there are different views in academia. However, most
existing research believes that generational divisions should be
based on key political events in Chinese history, such as the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Cultural
Revolution, and the period of reform and opening up (Egri &
Ralston, 2004; Sun & Wang, 2010). Therefore, we refer to existing
research (Chi et al., 2023) and divide the samples into four
different generations: (1) Initial construction generation, includ-
ing those born before 1978; (2) Reform and opening up
generation, born between 1979 and 1992; (3) Market-oriented
generation, born between 1993 and 1999; (4) New century
generation, born after 2000.
To measure post-materialist values, we adopted a scale fully
aligned with the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1981; Brym,
2016). To assess scientific interest, we used an indirect question:
“How often do you discuss the latest developments or hot topics
in science and technology with family, friends, and colleagues?”
Although indirect measurement may result in some loss of
validity, frequent interpersonal discussions about science-related
topics can serve as an observable indicator of scientific interest
(Romine et al., 2014). To measure social media usage, we asked:
“How often do you visit information and comments related to
science and technology on short video platforms such as TikTok,
Kuaishou, or WeChat?”
Table 1presents descriptive statistics for the core variables. All
variables were standardized using Z-scores before analysis to
mitigate the influence of different variable scales, improving the
stability and comparability of the analysis. In the sample, males
and females each accounted for 50.00%. Regarding income levels,
12.80% were in the low-income group (<6000 RMB), 21.20% in
the low-middle income group (6000–9000 RMB), 27.00% in the
middle-income group (9000–12000 RMB), 19.10% in the middle-
upper income group (12000–15000 RMB), and 19.80% in the
high-income group (>15000 RMB). In terms of education levels,
4.10% had elementary education, 12.80% had secondary educa-
tion, 78.30% had tertiary or university education, and 4.80% had
graduate education. Regarding generational segmentation, the
initial construction generation (born before 1978) comprised
24.60%, the reform and opening-up generation (1979–1992)
13.30%, the market-oriented generation (1993–1999) 32.10%, and
the new century generation (2000 and later) 30.00%.
Results
RQ1: Who is More Likely to Support Scientific Elitism or
Scientific Populism? Chi-square tests and ANOVA are useful for
comparing group differences and providing descriptive statistics
(see Supplementary Material 4). However, this study aims to
uncover the key factors driving scientific elitism and scientific
populism, making regression analysis a more suitable approach.
Regression analysis not only accommodates both continuous
variables (e.g., post-materialism, scientific interests, social media
usage) and categorical variables (e.g., generation, education level,
income level) but also allows for the control of confounding
variables, enabling precise assessment of each variable’s inde-
pendent effect on the outcomes. Additionally, regression analysis
can model interaction effects, such as the interplay between post-
materialism and scientific interests in shaping attitudes toward
scientists, which helps to reveal complex relationships among
variables. Therefore, regression analysis is crucial for this study.
We also conducted a series of robustness checks to ensure the
reliability of the regression results (see Supplementary Material
5).
The regression results (see Table 2) reveal key findings:
Women exhibit more conservative attitudes toward both scientific
elitism and scientific populism. Compared to the low-income
group, middle-income and middle-to-high-income groups dis-
play a significantly higher tendency toward scientific elitism. The
high-income group shows the strongest inclination toward
scientific elitism and a significantly lower tendency toward
scientific populism. Furthermore, higher education levels corre-
spond with a markedly lower tendency toward scientific populism
compared to elementary education.
On the other hand, post-materialism is significantly associated
with both scientific elitism and scientific populism, with a
stronger correlation observed for scientific populism. Greater
scientific interest fosters a tendency toward scientific elitism,
while social media usage is strongly positively correlated with
scientific populism. Generational differences are also evident:
Compared to the market-oriented generation, the new century
Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Scientific elitism 0.000 1.000 −3.631 1.713
Scientific populism 0.000 1.000 −2.355 2.148
Extreme scientific elitism 0.181 0.385 0 1
Extreme scientific populism 0.181 0.290 0 1
Scientific pluralism 0.032 0.176 0 1
Female 0.500 0.500 0 1
Average monthly income
Low income group 0.128 0.334 0 1
Low and middle income group 0.212 0.409 0 1
Middle income group 0.270 0.444 0 1
Middle and upper income group 0.191 0.393 0 1
High income group 0.198 0.399 0 1
Level of education
Elementary education 0.041 0.198 0 1
Secondary education 0.128 0.334 0 1
Tertiary and university education 0.783 0.412 0 1
Graduate education 0.048 0.214 0 1
Generation
Initial construction generation 0.246 0.431 0 1
Reform and opening up generation 0.133 0.340 0 1
Market-oriented generation 0.321 0.467 0 1
New century generation 0.300 0.459 0 1
Post-materialism 3.721 2.055 0 9
Scientific interests 5.070 1.223 1 7
Social media usage 5.532 1.376 1 7
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generation demonstrates a notably lower tendency toward
scientific elitism, while scientific populism is on the rise among
the younger generation.
When the dependent variables are changed to extreme
scientific elitism and extreme scientific populism, slightly
different patterns emerge. Women still exhibit more conservative
positions, with significantly lower tendencies toward both forms
of attitudes. Higher-income groups continue to show a stronger
inclination toward scientific elitism. However, a critical difference
arises: Middle-income and middle-to-high-income groups exhibit
significant tendencies toward extreme scientific populism.
Education levels also yield distinctive patterns. Compared to
elementary education, secondary, tertiary, and graduate education
levels show significantly higher tendencies toward extreme
scientific elitism. Interestingly, secondary education is signifi-
cantly more associated with extreme scientific populism.
Generational differences reveal further nuances. Compared to
the market-oriented generation, the new century generation
exhibits a markedly lower tendency toward extreme scientific
elitism but a higher tendency toward extreme scientific populism.
Additionally, the initial construction generation shows a
pronounced inclination toward extreme scientific populism. This
suggests that the historical imprint of the Cultural Revolution or
earlier periods may have shaped their populist attitudes.
Post-materialism is significantly associated with extreme
scientific populism, while scientific interest is positively linked
to both extreme scientific elitism and extreme scientific populism.
Social media usage is significantly associated with extreme
scientific populism but has no notable distinguishing effect on
extreme scientific elitism.
RQ2: Who is more likely to simultaneously support scientific
elitism and scientific populism? We further explored whether
extreme scientific elitism and extreme scientific populism could
coexist within the same individual, referred to as scientific plur-
alism. The results indicate that women tended to adopt more
conservative positions, while men were more likely to exhibit
pluralistic tendencies. In terms of economic income, the middle-
income group was more inclined towards pluralism compared to
the low-income group. Regarding education, individuals with
Table 2 Regression Results for Different Scientific Attitudes.
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) Probit (4) Probit (5) Probit
Varibales Scientific elitism Scientific populism Extreme scientific
elitism
Extreme scientific
populism
Scientific pluralism
Female −0.147*** −0.170*** −0.188** −0.264*** −0.204*
(0.032) (0.033) (0.078) (0.082) (0.110)
Scientific interests 0.156*** −0.005 0.219*** 0.170*** 0.538***
(0.027) (0.015) (0.033) (0.040) (0.062)
Post-materialism 0.049* 0.157*** 0.024 0.292*** 0.366***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.035) (0.056)
Social media usage 0.037 0.051** 0.034 0.054* −0.004
(0.023) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031) (0.059)
Generation (Compared to market-oriented generation)
Initial construction generation 0.074 0.120 0.151 0.416*** 0.545**
(0.072) (0.089) (0.101) (0.152) (0.252)
Reform and opening up
generation
0.078 0.002 0.056 0.255* 0.222
(0.088) (0.074) (0.123) (0.148) (0.236)
New century generation −0.230*** 0.146* −0.379** 0.322* 0.203
(0.066) (0.085) (0.166) (0.179) (0.282)
Average monthly income (Compared to low-income group)
Low and middle income group 0.150* 0.123* 0.184 0.299* 0.235
(0.077) (0.071) (0.141) (0.160) (0.242)
Mid-income group 0.362*** 0.023 0.385*** 0.428*** 0.429*
(0.071) (0.076) (0.140) (0.158) (0.257)
Middle- and upper-income
group
0.305*** −0.130 0.383*** 0.360** 0.232
(0.109) (0.089) (0.136) (0.158) (0.253)
High-income group 0.403*** −0.193** 0.378*** 0.290 0.378
(0.096) (0.089) (0.136) (0.194) (0.265)
Level of education (Compared to elementary education)
Secondary education 0.032 −0.132 0.355** 0.410* 1.082**
(0.110) (0.119) (0.157) (0.231) (0.452)
Tertiary and university
education
0.018 −0.356*** 0.328** 0.091 0.766*
(0.124) (0.094) (0.146) (0.239) (0.427)
Graduate education −0.102 −0.720*** 0.330* −0.123 0.057
(0.133) (0.180) (0.181) (0.346) (0.633)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.201 0.322*** −2.313*** −3.719*** −5.573***
(0.147) (0.115) (0.329) (0.319) (0.625)
Observations 2922 2922 2922 2922 2922
R-squared 0.103 0.117 \ \ \
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1,**p< 0.05,***p< 0.01
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secondary and university education were more likely to demon-
strate pluralistic tendencies than those with only elementary
education. Generational differences were also significant: the
initial construction generation was notably more inclined towards
pluralism compared to the market-oriented generation. Both
post-materialism values and scientific interest showed significant
positive correlations with pluralism, whereas social media usage
did not exhibit any significant association with this phenomenon.
The combined effect of post-materialism and scientific interest.
As discussed in the literature review, post-materialism, as a
broader social value system, may not directly shape attitudes
toward scientists but interacts with scientific interest to exert
influence. To test this theoretical hypothesis, we included an
interaction term between post-materialism and scientific interest
in the regression model to explore their combined effects on
scientific elitism and scientific populism (see Table 3). The results
show that the interaction term is significantly associated with
both scientific elitism and scientific populism, while the standa-
lone effect of post-materialist values becomes insignificant. This
suggests that individuals with a strong interest in science are more
likely to develop distinct attitudes toward scientists, whether in
support of or in skepticism toward scientific authority. Con-
versely, those with little interest in science are less likely to exhibit
strong attitudinal tendencies.
Discussion
The coexistence of “high deference”and “gradual populism”in
Chinese attitudes toward scientists has sparked curiosity about
the intricate dynamics within the Chinese context. We explored
the subtle coexistence of scientific elitism and populism, along
with their respective supporters, revealing a more multifaceted
landscape than the single-dimensional perspectives commonly
found in existing literature, particularly in studies focused on
Western societies.
The conservative scientific tendencies of women. Contrary to
the expectations of some existing literature, our study found that
Chinese women did not show a more pronounced tendency
towards scientific elitism (Yokoyama & Ikkatai, 2022) nor were
they more inclined towards scientific populism (Morgan et al.,
2018; Evans & Hargittai, 2020). In fact, Chinese women generally
exhibited a conservative attitude towards scientists. This non-
extreme attitude may stem from the caution of Chinese women
and may also reflect broader social structural factors.
The middle-class pluralism. Our findings extend traditional
assumptions about the relationship between social class and
attitudes toward scientists, uncovering a more nuanced pattern.
Contrary to research in Western societies that associates middle
education levels with a greater propensity for scientific populism
(Eberl et al., 2023; Mede et al., 2022), we find that in China,
individuals with middle income and education levels display
significant duality in their attitudes toward scientists. These
individuals are not only likely to simultaneously hold scientific
elitist and populist perspectives but may also lean toward plur-
alism. This coexistence of attitudes likely stems from the sense of
“relative deprivation”experienced by the middle class—they are
caught between lacking the economic advantages of the high-
income group and the social supports and benefits available to the
low-income group. This socio-economic “in-between”position
creates favorable conditions for the emergence of complex atti-
tudes toward scientists (Chen et al., 2023; Si et al., 2022).
Generational shifts in attitudes towards scientists. Unlike
existing research discussing the impact of age on attitudes
towards scientists, we are interested in the generational differ-
ences in attitudes towards scientists in Chinese society (Mede
et al., 2022; Funk et al., 2020; Evans & Hargittai, 2020). The Initial
construction generation experienced social upheavals such as the
Cultural Revolution, and the social experiences of that era may
have fostered skepticism towards any form of authority, leading
to aversion to scientific elitism, and the populist attitudes towards
scientists may also be rooted in the historical impact of that
period (Zhang, 2016; Li & Guo, 2015). Meanwhile, the New
century generation has grown up in an environment of infor-
mation technology and the internet, where they are exposed to
more information than any previous generation. This may lead
them to be more cautious when facing scientific authority and
knowledge. The scientific literacy education and critical thinking
training of this generation may also reduce their unconditional
worship of scientific elites, showing a lower tendency towards
elitism and a higher tendency towards populism (Lazányi, 2019).
Scientific interest and post-materialism as “tracks of trans-
formation”. Our research reveals the role of post-materialist
values in shaping individual attitudes towards scientific populism,
Table 3 The composite effect of post-materialism and scientific interest.
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) Probit (4) Probit (5) Probit
Varibales Scientific elitism Scientific
populism
Extreme scientific
elitism
Extreme scientific
populism
Scientific
pluralism
Post-materialism −0.122 −0.083 −0.130 0.176 0.087
(0.085) (0.118) (0.142) (0.162) (0.315)
Scientific interests 0.081 −0.109* 0.153** 0.114 0.405**
(0.048) (0.063) (0.066) (0.086) (0.162)
Post-materialism*Scientific interests 0.191* 0.268* 0.165 0.123 0.265
(0.104) (0.144) (0.149) (0.171) (0.304)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provcial Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.204 0.317*** −1.230*** −2.274*** −3.261***
(0.146) (0.111) (0.264) (0.369) (0.595)
Observations 2,922 2,922 2,922 2,922 2,922
R-squared 0.105 0.120 \ \ \
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1,**p< 0.05,***p< 0.01
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but the influence of these values needs to be activated and
directed through an individual’s interest in science. In addition,
individuals with a strong interest in science may exhibit dual
tendencies towards both scientific elitism and scientific populism,
indicating that scientific interest itself is multifaceted and can
promote exploration and thinking from different perspectives
about science, which complements existing literature (Ye et al.,
2023; Choung et al., 2020; Motta, 2018).
Social media as an accelerator of polarization. Social media,
particularly short video platforms, plays a pivotal role in driving
the public toward scientific populism and its radical forms. These
platforms amplify the “voice of the people”(Gerbaudo, 2018) and
enable the rise of citizen science communicators—individuals
without professional backgrounds who challenge traditional sci-
entific authority (Yang, 2021). This dissolution of boundaries
diversifies public perceptions of scientific authority (Yang, 2022)
while intensifying polarization, making social media a critical
force in shaping science communication.
Limitations
This study has certain limitations in terms of conceptual defini-
tion and research methods. Regarding conceptual measurement,
although we developed a scale and conducted preliminary vali-
dation through a pilot survey, its face validity require further
examination and confirmation. For instance, some items mea-
suring scientific elitism and scientific populism did not explicitly
specify whether the scientists’opinions were confined to scientific
domains, which may have led respondents to consider other fields
when answering, potentially affecting measurement validity. In
measuring scientific interest, we used indirect behavioral indica-
tors to capture interest, which may not fully reflect respondents’
intrinsic levels of interest. Future research could consider com-
bining direct and indirect measurement approaches.
Additionally, although we attempted to sample based on the
geographic and age distribution of the national population, the
sample may still be over-represented by individuals with higher
education levels. Moreover, as this study employs a cross-
sectional research design, it is not possible to establish causal
relationships among the observed variables. Future studies should
expand to other East Asian countries, such as Japan and South
Korea, to enable cross-cultural comparisons and focus on
improving measurement tools and methods to enhance both
internal consistency and external validity.
Conclusion
Our study provides a supplementary perspective to the main-
stream literature on the rise of scientific populism in Western
societies, emphasizing that scientific elitism has not merely
declined but can coexist with populism, reflecting a polarization
at both societal and individual levels. This coexistence of attitudes
should not be seen as a simple opposition but as a complex
process involving multiple dimensions, including acceptance of
basic knowledge, value identification, and emotional investment.
This indicates a deep pluralism where individuals may cognitively
accept scientific knowledge while being skeptical of scientists on
emotional or value levels, akin to the coexistence of populism and
elitism in the political field (Bertsou & Caramani, 2022; Akker-
man et al., 2014). Moreover, individuals’attitudes towards sci-
entists may vary depending on specific contexts and topics,
sometimes leaning towards elitism and at other times towards
populism. In China, this pluralism is particularly pronounced,
reflecting the tension between Confucian respect for authority
and the trends of modern social innovation and critical ques-
tioning. Hence, in science communication research, we should
recognize the diversity and complexity of attitudes towards sci-
entists, avoiding the simplification of them as one-dimensional
variables. Instead, we should understand their multifaceted and
interpenetrating nature.
Our study also further distinguishes between conventional and
extreme attitudes towards scientists. Simplifying conventional
scientific elitism and populism as manifestations of polarization
may overlook the inherent diversity and complexity of scientists’
attitudes. Extreme scientific populism may stem from deep social
dissatisfaction or fundamental questioning, while conventional
scientific populism may be more associated with direct responses
to specific scientific issues or policies. In a society that emphasizes
the value of professional knowledge, conventional scientific elit-
ism can be understood as respect for the spirit of science. Simi-
larly, in a society that advocates democratic participation and
diverse voices, conventional scientific populism reflects a rea-
sonable questioning and active participation in the scientific
decision-making process, representing a constructive critical
attitude, regardless of whether in the West or the East.
Data availability
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current
study are available from the corresponding authors upon rea-
sonable request.
Received: 26 May 2024; Accepted: 27 February 2025;
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Acknowledgements
This study was supported by the Major Program of the National Social Science Foun-
dation of China (No. 21ZDA017). This work was also supported by World Premier
International Research Center Initiative (WPI), MEXT, Japan.
Author contributions
Conceptualization: SW and TW; methodology: SW and TW; formal analysis: SW and
TW; resources: ZL; writing—original draft preparation: SW; writing—review and editing:
HMY and SK; supervision: HMY and ZL; funding acquisition: ZL. All authors have read
and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Ethical approval
The questionnaire survey used in this study has been approved by the Tsinghua Uni-
versity Science and Technology Ethics Committee (Humanities, Social Sciences and
Engineering) with approval number THU-12-2023-06. The approval date is December
10, 2023. All surveys were conducted in accordance with the relevant laws and regula-
tions of the People’s Republic of China.
Informed consent
Informed consent was obtained from all participants through the online survey. At the
beginning of the survey, participants were informed that they had the right to choose
whether to participate, could stop at any time, and that their responses would be
anonymized to protect their identities. They were also assured that their personal
information would be strictly confidential in accordance with the Statistics Law of the
People’s Republic of China and that the survey would not involve any sensitive
information.
Additional information
Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary material
available at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04685-3.
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