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Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy hps://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v29i3.3968
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OURS IS A SPECIESIST WORLD, REALLY
François Jaquet
among animal ethicists that ours is a speciesist world.
e fact is that most people relentlessly treat nonhuman animals in various
dreadful manners in which they would never dare treat members of their
own species. is dominant view is critical insofar as it combines neatly with
another common view in animal ethicsnamely, that speciesism is immoral,
in the same way and for the same reason that racism is immoral. In conjunc-
tion, these two claims entail that there is something deeply wrong about the
way most people treat animals. Considering the gigantic mass of speciesism’s
victims and the magnitude of their suering, our treatment of nonhumans
might well constitute the worst injustice that has ever existed.
All interesting claims have their detractors. e above two are no excep-
tions, but not in anything like equal proportions. e speciesism debate has
essentially focused on whether speciesism is unjustied, with a number of phi-
losophers arguing that there is actually nothing wrong with it. Once in a while,
however, someone denies that most people are speciesistscall their view spe-
ciesism antirealism. In this contribution, I discuss three aempts to establish this
view. One is due to Travis Timmerman, another to Shelly K agan, and the third
seems to follow from a view defended by Stijn Bruers, though Bruers would
not endorse it. It will be my contention that all three aempts to establish
e rst philosopher who defended this view was Peter Singer in his book Animal Liber-
ation. Social psychologists who have started to investigate the issue empirically tend to
agree with philosophers on that score. See, e.g., Amiot and Bastian, “Toward a Psychology
of Human-Animal Relations”; Caviola, Evere, and Faber, “e Moral Standing of Ani-
mals”; Caviola et al., “Humans First”; Dhont et al., “e Psychology of Speciesism”; and
Wilks et al., “Children Prioritize Humans over Animals Less an Adults Do.”
Singer, Animal Liberation; Rachels, Created om Animals; McMahan, “Our Fellow Crea-
tures”; and Jaquet, “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?” and “Indirect Defenses of Specie-
sism Make No Sense.”
Rachels, “ Vegetarianism”; Huemer, Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism; and Jaquet, Le pire
des maux.
See, e.g., Wreen, “In Defense of Speciesism”; Cohen, “e Case for the Use of Animals
in Biomedical Research”; Diamond, “e Importance of Being Human”; Chappell, “In
Defence of Speciesism”; and Williams, “e Human Prejudice.”
I
speciesism antirealism are misguided. Each of the three sections of the present
paper deals with one of these aempts. But before geing to the heart of the
maer, let me share a few thoughts on the social relevance of the question.
It has become a truism that words maer. As cognitive scientist Lera
Boroditsky puts it,
ings that are named are the ones most likely to be thought about and
to be visible in our consciousness. ough in principle we can think
about lots of things, our actual aentional span is very limited. As a
result, the kinds of things we tend to think about are the ones that are
named.
No doubt this applies to the word ‘speciesism’ in particular. Having at our dis-
posal a label to denote the form of discrimination that infuses our relationships
with other animals is amazingly useful. is has created and structured a whole
conceptual framework in which it is much easier for philosophers to address
the ethics of our duties to nonhumans. While some authors maintain that there
is nothing wrong with speciesism, many believe that the way we treat animals
is morally unjustied because it is speciesist.
e point goes further. From its very rst steps, animal ethics has been a
source of inspiration for animal rights activists. e notion of speciesism is one
of the very few instances of a philosophical concept that has leaked from the
classroom to make its way into the world. In many countries, those who defend
animals on the ground resort to it in their communication, claiming that many
practices involving nonhumans are speciesist. e press has followed suit, and
the notion is now present in the public space. A telling illustration of this trend
is the holding every year on the last Saturday of August of the World Day for the
End of Speciesism. In , for the ninth edition of this event, actions were
organized by a hundred groups in no less than twenty-eight countries. Besides
such major animal rights organizations as the Humane League and People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the notion is also mobilized by eective
altruists in their outreach activities. In the branch of the Eective Altruism
Maron, “Why Words Maer.”
See the World Day for the End of Speciesism (o) homepage, hps://end-of-specie-
sism.org/en/ (accessed November , ).
See the websites of the Humane League (hps://thehumaneleague.org) and People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (hps://www.peta.org). See also a November ,
, forum post from Eective Altruism (hps://forum.eectivealtruism.org/posts/
XyZCnYMyxf EbtEKRq/the-case-against-speciesism-).
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
movement that is dedicated to animal advocacy, many hold that a focus on
speciesism is the most eective communication strategy available at this point.
If the concept of speciesism has the potential to shape central debates in
animal ethics and to raise public awareness about the ethical shortcomings of
common aitudes toward nonhuman animals, then the stakes regarding the
existence of speciesism are high. is topic is worth discussing.
.
e rst argument for speciesism antirealism that we will discuss is Travis Tim-
merman’s. Timmerman holds that even self-described speciesists are not spe-
ciesists on the grounds that they are inclined to reject some clear implications
of speciesism construed as a philosophical view. Here is my reconstruction
of his argument:
.
A speciesist is someone who believes that all humans have a moral
status higher than that of all nonhumans.
.
Purported speciesists would reject the proposition that all humans
have a moral status higher than that of all nonhumans upon nding
out that one of its implications is inconsistent with some other prop-
osition they believe.
. Someone who would reject a proposition upon nding out that one
of its implications is inconsistent with some other proposition they
believe does not believe that proposition.
. erefore, purported speciesists are not speciesists.
In short: purported speciesists accept the claim that humans have a moral
status higher than that of nonhumans only because they fail to appreciate some
of its implications; hence, they do not believe this claim; hence, they do not
qualify as speciesists. Let us see how Timmerman motivates his three premises.
Premisea speciesist is someone who believes that all humans have
a moral status higher than that of all nonhumansows directly from his
account of speciesism. Timmerman distinguishes between two forms of spe-
ciesism, which he labels genuine speciesism and coextensive speciesism. Human s
count more than nonhumans: in virtue of their belonging to the human species,
according to the former; in virtue of their instantiating some property that is
coextensive with the human species, according to the laer. Both views are
See, e.g., Vinding, “Animal Advocates Should Focus on Anti-Speciesism, Not Veganism.”
Timmerman, “You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist.”
Timmerman, “You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist,” .
variants of speciesism understood as the proposition that humans have a moral
status higher than that of nonhumans. Speciesists are simply those who believe
in this proposition.
Premisepurported speciesists would reject the proposition that all
humans have a moral status higher than that of all nonhumans upon nding
out that one of its implications is inconsistent with some other proposition
they believeis supported by the following two thought experiments:
Anomaly and the Anomalous Case of Speciation: Two human parents give
birth to a baby named Anomaly, where a large random genetic mutation
causes (genotypic) speciation to occur. Consequently, the makeup
of Anomaly is dierent to the extent that it is impossible for Anomaly
to ever reproduce with a human. However, Anomaly is still fertile. So,
on any genotypic conception of species, Anomaly is not a human. Now
here is the catch. Surprisingly, Anomaly’s mutated has exactly the
same phenotypic eects as normal human with the notable excep-
tion that she will not develop a cognitive capacity higher than that of
an average dog. As such, Anomaly looks identical to any other human
baby and her mental life will mirror that of a set of cognitively disabled
humans. e only way to tell that speciation has occurred is by sequenc-
ing Anomaly’s .
Dr. Moreau and Innocent Irene: Dr. Moreau has developed a chemical
cocktail that allows him to control the phenotypic eects of any crea-
ture’s . A particularly loathsome individual, he conducts his experi-
ments on Innocent Irene, a cognitively disabled human whose cognitive
capacity is comparable to that of a normal dog. Now, Dr. Moreau gives
Irene a cocktail that keeps her human intact but changes some of
the ’s phenotypic eects so that she comes to look just like a dog.
Although Irene’s cognitive capacity and are not altered, she is men-
tally and, to the naked eye, physically indistinguishable from a dog.
Building on these scenarios, Timmerman reasons as follows. Accounts of the
notion of species are divided into two broad types: genotypic and phenotypic
Earlier, Timmerman writes, “Speciesists are those who give disproportionate weight to
the interests of one species over another and tend to do so on the basis of a creature’s
species membership” (“You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist,” ). I set this other
characterization aside because it plays no role in his argument for speciesism antirealism.
To reach this conclusion, Timmerman needs to dene speciesism as he does laterthat
is, as a belief.
Timmerman, “You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist,” .
Timmerman, “You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist,” .
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
accounts. Whichever kind of account one adopts, either Anomaly or Irene will
not be a human. On the one hand, because Anomaly does not have a human
genotype, she is not human on any genotypic conception. On the other hand,
because Irene does not have a human phenotype, she is not human on any
phenotypic conception. Hence, speciesism entails that either Anomaly’s or
Irene’s moral status is lower than that of humans, which is absurd. No maer
how we analyze the notion of species, speciesism has ridiculous implications.
And chances are that self-described speciesists will reject it upon considering
these implications.
Timmerman presents the following case in support of premisesomeone
who would reject a proposition upon nding out that one of its implications
is inconsistent with some other proposition they believe does not believe that
proposition:
Vegan Keegan and Apathetic Oysters: Keegan is a vegan and believes that
it is morally permissible to eat living things so long as they are not, and
could not be, sentient (e.g., plants) but thinks it is wrong to eat any
creature that is, or once was, sentient. Now, Keegan might assent to the
proposition “It is morally wrong to eat any animal,” not recognizing that
this proposition entails that it is wrong to eat oysters. Oysters are not
sentient. In an important sense, then, Keegan doesn’t really believe that
it’s wrong to eat any animal. Were Keegan to recognize the inconsistency
in his beliefs, he would reject the claim “It is morally wrong to eat any
animal.”
Keegan would reject the proposition that it is morally wrong to eat any animal
upon appreciating that this proposition entails that, contrary to his belief, some
nonsentient living things are morally wrong to eat. Hence, he does not really
believe that proposition.
I suspect there is something wrong with each premise of Timmerman’s
argument. e concern with premise is that it rests on a questionable deni-
tion of speciesism. It is a mistake to dene speciesism as the claim that humans
have a higher moral status than nonhumans and to think of speciesists as those
people who believe that claim. Here is why. A good denition of speciesism
Timmerman does not claim that all purported speciesists would reject the proposition that
humans have a moral status higher than that of nonhumans upon considering some of its
implications. His argument is meant to cover only those people who initially accept this
proposition for prima facie plausible reasons. Premise and conclusion should therefore
be read as being about “most, i f not all” purported speciesists (“You’re Probably Not Really
a Speciesist,” ). is point does not aect my objection.
Timmerman, “You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist,” .
will match a good denition of racism. As its name suggests, speciesism is
meant to be analogous to racism. Richard Ryder, who coined the term, is very
explicit about that when he introduces it in his book Victims of Science: “I use
the word ‘speciesism’ . . . to draw a parallel with racism.” Likewise, in Animal
Liberation, Peter Singer talks about “the aitude that we may call ‘speciesism’,
by analogy with racism.” Why should speciesism be analogous to racism?
is requirement stems from the primary function of the concept, which is to
denote a phenomenon resembling racism in certain respects and thereby to
allow us to draw philosophical lessons from the ethics of racism to the ethics
of that phenomenon. Any account of speciesism that matches a bad account
of racism and thus makes speciesism and racism disanalogous will prevent the
concept of speciesism from fullling this important function and w ill therefore
be unsatisfactory.
e worry is that the conception of racism that matches Timmerman’s
accountracism as the claim that white people have a moral status higher
than that of nonwhite peopleis awed. It is awed because it is too narrow.
Consider the following case:
Racist Buck: Buck, a white man, gives white people preferential treat-
ment because he disrespects black people. Not the sharpest tool in the
box, Buck has never given much thought to people’s moral status. His
respective aitudes toward white and black people are not the output
of ethical deliberation. ey certainly have causes, but the causal chain
that leads to them does not involve any consideration of people’s moral
worth.
ere is no question that Buck is a racist. Yet the account of racism that parallels
Timmerman’s denition of speciesism entails that he is not. Hence, this account
is too narrow; it does not cover all cases of racism. Not only that. I presume that
many racists are like Buck. ey do not believe that white people have a higher
moral status, either because the question never occurred to themaer all, few
Dunayer, Speciesism; Horta, “W hat Is Speciesism?” ; Horta and Albersmeier, “Dening
Speciesism,” –; and Jaquet, “How to Dene Speciesism.”
Ryder, Victims of Science, .
Singer, Animal Liberation, .
Singer’s case against speciesism in Animal Liberation provides a nice illustration of the kind
of lesson I am thinking about. In Singer’s view, racism is wrong because it breaches the
principle of equal consideration of interests, but speciesism also breaches the principle of
equal consideration of interests, so speciesism is wrong too. Another illustration is provided
by James Rachels in Created om Animals, where he argues that speciesism is unjustied
because, just like racism, it involves treating dierently cases that are relevantly alike.
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
people are even familiar with the notion of moral statusor because it did, and
they rejected this propositionthose who understand the proposition should
also understand that it is implausible. e dierence between racists and the
rest of us does not lie in a stance on moral status. As a rule, racism is much
more insidious than that. If I am right, then, it is not only the case of Buck; the
present account of racism fails to accommodate many cases of racism. But
then Timmerman’s account of speciesism is also too narrow. It may well be that
most people are speciesists even on the assumption that they do not believe
that humans have a higher moral status.
Let us turn to premise. I would be surprised if those self-described specie-
sists who accept the proposition that humans have a higher moral status were
to reject it aer considering Timmerman’s two scenarios. To be sure, few will
contest his intuitive judgmentsAnomaly and Irene certainly maer no less
than anyone else. However, most will deny that their views on moral status
imply otherwise. For they will resist the claim that either Anomaly or Irene
is a nonhuman. In response, Timmerman will no doubt want to insist that
both genotypic and phenotypic accounts support that claim. Purported specie-
sists will concede that much, but the odds are they will not draw the intended
conclusion. ey are much more likely to deny that one or the other account
of species captures the concept of human they have in mind. Anomaly and
Irene, they will say, are obvious instances of humans; too bad for genotypic and
phenotypic conceptions of species if they cannot accommodate this datum!
ough these conceptions may be useful tools for scientic inquiry, they do
not capture the ordinary notion of species. Since both Anomaly and Irene are
humans, speciesism ascribes them full moral status. At the end of the day, spe-
ciesists will remain speciesists, against the prediction expressed by premise.
One might object that this move is not available to purported speciesists.
Timmerman himself writes, “Any defense of speciesism must be able [to] identif y
the concept of species that is supposed to be morally relevant.” What should
we make of our purported speciesists’ refusal to dene species? We need to dis-
tinguish two claims. One is normative: faced with the cases of Anomaly and
Irene, most purported speciesists should accept that either Anomaly or Irene is
not human and conclude that being human does not maer aer all. e other is
predictive: faced with these cases, most purported speciesists would accept that
either Anomaly or Irene is not human and conclude that being human does not
maer aer all. In the above quote, Timmerman appears to endorse the former
Some philosophers of race generalize this kind of criticism to all doxastic accounts of
racism (e.g., Garcia, “e Heart of Racism”; and Todorov, “Race and Racism”), but the
charge is especially powerful against doxastic accounts in terms of moral status.
Timmerman, “You’re Probably Not Really a Speciesist,” .
claim. Importantly, however, only the laer is relevant in the present context,
for premise is about what purported speciesists would do upon nding out
that speciesist claims are inconsistent with some proposition they believe. And
it is this claim that I contest. Whatever they should do, I guess most purported
speciesists would insist that both Irene and Anomaly are human.
Moving on to premise, is it so clear that someone who would reject a
proposition upon nding out that one of its implications is inconsistent with
some other proposition they believe does not really believe that proposition?
Consider again the case of Keegan, and suppose he came to deny that it is
morally wrong to eat any animal aer discovering that some animals are not
sentient. Timmerman’s reading of this case is that from the outset, Keegan did
not believe that it is wrong to eat any animal. He only assented to this propo-
sition. is interpretation strikes me as far-fetched. It very much seems to me
that Keegan changed his mind when he learned that oysters are not sentient. If
this is a beer description of what happened, however, we must conclude that
Keegan did initially believe that it is wrong to eat any animal. To change one’s
mind involves substituting a belief for anotherin this case, the belief that
eating nonsentient animals is morally okay for the belief that all animals are
wrong to eat. Keegan would not have changed his mind if he did not initially
have the laer belief.
Maybe I am misreading this scenario, and Keegan actually knew from the
outset that oysters are nonsentient animalsperhaps he just failed to connect
the dots. is alternative interpretation is supported by Timmerman’s assertion
that Keegan’s beliefs are inconsistent, which (strictly speaking) would be the
case only if Keegan initially believed that only sentient creatures are wrong to
eat, that all animals are wrong to eat, and that oysters are nonsentient animals.
But wait, now, this assertion is incompatible with the view that Keegan merely
assented to the proposition that all animals are wrong to eat; it entails that he
believed this proposition. It can therefore not be used to establish that Keegan
did not believe that all animals are wrong to eat.
Perhaps the idea is rather that, because Keegan was aware of the existence
of nonsentient animals all along, he merely thought that all animals are wrong
to eatwhere the thought that P does not commit its author to the truth of P
I am not sure that the normative claim is true either. Suppose Jim believes that free will
is morally relevant. Pam, who disagrees, lists all extant analyses of free will and, for each,
presents a counterexample to the claim that the analysans is morally relevant. Jim agrees
that all these analysans are morally irrelevant, but he sticks to the view that free will mat-
ters morally. It is just that none of the extant accounts manages to capture the concept, he
says. Jim need not provide an analysis of free will of his own to be justied in doing that.
Purported speciesists appear to be in a similar situation.
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
as the belief that P does. It is this thought that was inconsistent with Keegan’s
genuine beliefs. Fair enough. ere is still a concern, though. On this new read-
ing of the case, the analogy with speciesist beliefs breaks, for most speciesists
are not aware of the possibility of Anomaly and Irene in the way Keegan is now
assumed to be aware of the existence of nonsentient animals. So they do not
believe that either Anomaly or Irene is a nonhuman who has full moral status
in the way Keegan is now said to believe that oysters are animals that are not
wrong to eat. Unlike Keegan, most people do not have inconsistent aitudes.
Assuming that they ascribe humans a higher moral status, their situation is
rather analogous to that of Keegan on the former interpretation, where he
believed that all animals are wrong to eat until he changed his mind.
Since all its premises are dubious, I conclude that Timmerman’s argument
fails to establish that purported speciesists are actually not speciesists.
.
Another philosopher who rejects the common view that most people are spe-
ciesists is Shelly Kagan. His argument for speciesism antirealism goes some-
thing like this:
.
A speciesist is someone who believes that, other things being equal,
the interests of humans count more than the like interests of all
nonhumans.
.
Purported speciesists do not believe that, other things being equal,
the interests of humans count more than the like interests of intelli-
gent aliens.
. erefore, purported speciesists are not speciesists.
Like Timmerman’s, Kagan’s rst premise rests on his own account of speciesism,
in this case as the view that human interests maer more than correspond-
ing nonhuman interests, other things being equal. Speciesists are just those
people who accept that view. As for premise, here is what Kagan has to say
in its support:
Imagine that Lex Luthor is trying to kill Superman with some Kryp-
tonite. Superman is in great pain, and may soon die. Now remember:
Superman isn’t human. He isn’t a member of our biological species.
But is there anyone (other than Lex Luthor!) who thinks this makes a
dierence? Is there anyone who thinks: Superman isn’t human, so his
Kagan, “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?”
Kagan, “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?” –.
interests should count less than they would if he were? I doubt it. At any
rate, there surely aren’t many. (Show of hands?) Examples like this could
easily be multiplied. When , the extraterrestrial, is dying (in the movie
of the same name) does anyone think, “Well, he isn’t a Homo sapiens,
so all of this maers less”? I doubt it.
If we take and Superman to count just as much as the average human, then
we do not believe that the interests of all nonhumans maer less than those of
human beings. We are not speciesists.
Assuming that this argument can establish that we are not speciesists, it
does not yet tell us what we are. Why is it that we discount the interests of
animals but not those of intelligent aliens? Kagan thinks he knows. We grant
the interests of and Superman full consideration, in his opinion, because
and Superman are modal personsa modal person being a subject who either
is or could have been rational and self-aware. Animals, by contrast, neither
possess nor could have possessed these mental abilities. ey are not modal
persons, and this is why we treat them as inferiors and give their interests lesser
consideration. Hence Kagan’s diagnosis for our conduct and aitudes: we are
modal personists rather than speciesists.
Kagan’s argument appears no more compelling than Timmerman’s. I believe
it is unsound because both its premises are false. My concern with premise is
that it rests on a problematic account of speciesism. It is a mistake to dene spe-
ciesism as the claim that, all else being equal, human interests maer more than
the like interests of all nonhumans and to think of speciesists as those people
who accept this claim. As we saw while dealing with Timmerman’s argument, a
good denition of speciesism will t a good denition of racism. Any account
that would match a bad account of racism would prevent the concept of spe-
ciesism from fullling its core function of allowing us to draw philosophical
lessons from the ethics of racism to the ethics of speciesism. Unfortunately, the
conception of racism that matches Kagan’s accountracism as the claim that,
everything else being equal, the interests of white people maer more than the
like interests of all nonwhite peopleis awed. It is awed because it is too
narrow. To see why, consider the following case:
Kagan, “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?” .
Kagan distinguishes two readings of his denition of speciesism (“What’s Wrong with
Speciesism?” ). On the “relat ivized” interpretation, speciesism is the view that we should
give the interests of humans more weight because humans belong to our species. On the
“absolute” interpretation, by contrast, it is the view that anyone should give the interests
of humans more weight because humans have a higher moral status. e argument from
smart aliens is meant to show that we are speciesists in neither sense of the term (“What’s
Wrong with Speciesism?” ).
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
Racist Barb: Barb, a white woman, treats white people beer than black
people. When prompted for a justication, she replies that the interests
of white people maer more than those of black people. Because of this,
Barb gets sometimes called a racist. at happened the other day at the
grocery store, when she was rude to the black cashier. Barb does not take
these accusations too seriously, though. She has a ready answer: “I’ve
got nothing against Asians and Latinos,” she replies. “In my view, their
interests maer just as much as white people’s.” Since she takes some
nonwhites to count just as much as whites, she does not believe that all
nonwhites count less than white people. Hence, she is not a racist.
ere is no question that Barb is a racist, however. Her aempt to show the con-
trary rests on a awed conception of racism, one that is obviously too narrow.
Importantly for our purposes, this conception matches Kagan’s account of spe-
ciesism. e laer fails to t a good account of racism, so it is unsatisfactory.
Speciesists need not believe that the interests of humans maer more than
those of all nonhumans. Just as Barb is a racist even if she does not discriminate
against Asians and Latinos, maybe we are speciesists even assuming that we
would not discriminate against intelligent aliens.
Is this assumption warranted, any way? is question brings us to premise.
In the above quote, Kagan is fairly condent: most people believe that, all else
being equal, we should give the interests of intelligent aliens every bit as much
consideration as the corresponding interests of humans. As his claim is empir-
ical, it would be nice if it were supported by empirical data. Unfortunately, the
extant experimental evidence rather speaks against it. In a recent study, Lucius
Caviola and his colleagues asked their participants to imagine the “Atlans,” a
species of aliens with human-like mental abilities. e subjects were then
invited to think about the following dilemma: two individuals, a human and
an Atlan, will die if you do not come to their rescue, but you can help only one.
Kagan’s hypothesis predicts that participants would be indierent to species in
this case, that they would basically toss a coin. But this is not what transpired
in the results. Only one-third of the participants said they would toss a coin;
over half would save the human. In a variation on this scenario, the participants
could save a human or a member of a newly discovered species of apes with
similar mental abilities. One might have expected comparable results. One
would have been wrong: percent of the participants said they would favor
the human. Overall, this experiment invalidates premise of Kagan’s argument.
It also goes against Kagan’s diagnosis according to which we are modal per-
sonists rather than speciesists. And things get worse, as this hypothesis makes
Caviola et al., “Humans First,” –.
some prey wild predictions of its own. Some of these concern human beings.
Consider this case:
Actually Identical Grace and Jane: Grace and Jane are mentally handi-
capped to such an extent that they are neither rational nor self-aware.
However, their conditions trace to dierent origins: Grace’s disability
is the consequence of a malfunction that intervened at the embryonic
stage, whereas Jane’s has a genetic cause. is dierence bears no eect
on their actual faculties, but it does aect their modal abilities: unlike
Jane, Grace could have been rational and self-aware; she would have
been if her fetal development had proceeded according to plan.
Kagan’s diagnosisthat we are modal personists rather than speciesistsplau-
sibly predicts that we would take Grace to maer roughly as much as a para-
digmatic human. While Grace is not rational and self-aware, she could have
possessed these abilities, which makes her a modal person. Jane, by contrast,
not only is not rational and self-aware but could not have possessed these abil-
ities. She is therefore not a modal person. Kagan’s diagnosis predicts that we
would believe that her interests count no more than those of pigs and cows
that is, much less than Grace’s interests. is prediction seems absurd. Oddly
enough, Kagan reports having the intuition that Jane’s interests maer much
less than Grace’s, even though he “can certainly see that others may not agree.”
Well, he is right about that. None of the people I have asked about this case
share his intuitive reaction.
Other predictions of Kagan’s diagnosis concern animals. Here is a case
inspired by David DeGrazia and Je McMahan:
Modal Persons All over the Seas: It is the year . Advances in cognitive
therapy now allow us to radically enhance the mental lives of our nonhu-
man cousins. Intended for humans who, like Jane, could previously not
have possessed the mental capacities characteristic of their conspecics,
the procedure was rst tested on animals, including shes. Now that it
Or maybe Jane is a modal person. is might become possible if gene therapy can turn
nonpersons into persons. In that case, however, Jane would be less of a modal person
than Grace. is form of gene therapy does not exist yet in the actual world; it already
exists in another possible world, but this other world is more distant than that in which
everything went well in the pregnancy that led to Grace’s existence. K agan recognizes that
modal personhood might actually be a maer of degree, in which case his view would be
that the more you are a modal person, the higher your moral status (“What’s Wrong with
Speciesism?” ). is view entails that Grace has a moral status much higher than that of
Jane.
Kagan, “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?” .
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
has proven eective and risk-free, it is used only on humans. As a result,
all shes are in the same situation as Grace in Actually Identical Grace
and Jane. While they are not rational and self-aware, they could have
possessed these abilities; they would be rational and self-aware if this
new form of gene therapy had been implemented on them.
What would we say in such a situation? Kagan’s hypothesisaccording to
which we are modal personists rather than speciesistspredicts that we would
give the interests of shes full consideration, or at least the same weight we
currently give to Grace’s interests. Indeed, just like her, shes would be modal
persons even though they would not be rational and self-aware. is prediction
is unreasonable. Seeing as their mental capacities would remain unchanged,
it seems obvious that we would go on giving the interests of shes the same
weight that we currently do.
Not only does Kagan’s case for speciesism antirealism appear to fail. His
positive take on our aitudes to animals is unlikely to be adequate.
.
One might nally be tempted to deny the ex istence of speciesism by appealing
to the notion of heuristics. Heuristics are conceptual tools that we use when
we have trouble detecting an aribute that is relevant to our deliberation. ey
rely on a process of substitution: the target aribute that we struggle to detect is
substituted by a heuristic aribute, both easier to perceive and statistically cor-
related with it. Such a mechanism is employed, for instance, by airline compa-
nies when they impose a strict age limit on their pilots for fear that their visual
abilities might be impaired. In and of itself, the age of the pilots is unimport-
ant, but it is both correlated with and easier to assess than their visual abilities.
Building on this characterization, one might put forward the following
argument:
. Purported speciesists use species only as a proxy for personhood.
. Someone who uses species only as a proxy for personhood is not a
speciesist.
. erefore, purported speciesists are not speciesists.
DeGrazia, “Modal Personhood and Moral Status,” –; and McMahan, “On ‘Modal
Personism’,” .
At some point, Kagan seems to rely on such a strategy to ground his denial that people are
speciesists (“What’s Wrong with Speciesism?” –).
Schauer, Proles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, –.
According to premise, when we treat fellow humans beer than other ani-
mals, we are not interested in their species per se; what maers to us, really, is
their rationality and self-awarenesstheir personhood, for short. It just so
happens that whether a subject belongs to the human species is both correlated
with whether that subject is a person and much easier to nd out. One need
not interact with an individual to check her mental capacities; a simple glance
suces to realize that she bears the phenotypic properties typical of humans.
Membership in the human species then plays the role of a heuristic aribute,
which we substitute for the target aribute of personhood in our deliberative
episodes. is is why we end up treating humans so much beer than nonhu-
man animals. Call this the heuristic hypothesis.
is hypothesis has been most thoroughly defended by Stijn Bruers, via an
inference to the best explanation. It is a trite observation that purported spe-
ciesists do not justify their conduct by appeal to species. When pushed to point
at a morally signicant dierence between humans and other animals, one that
could justify granting the former preferential treatment, they consistently cite
the higher mental abilities of humans. On Bruers’s view, this observation is best
explained by the heuristic hypothesis: purported speciesists are not interested
in species per se; they use species only as a proxy for higher mental abilities.
Why, then, accept premise and think that someone w ho uses species only as
a proxy for personhood is not a speciesist? Well, think about an analogous case:
Medical Proxy: Two treatments are normally used to treat congestive
heart disease: beta blockers and angiotensin-converting-enzyme ()
inhibitors. As shown in many studies and meta-analyses, while black
and white people with this condition respond equally well to the former
drug, the laer is most oen ineective with black patients. e correla-
tion between race and responsiveness to inhibitors is not perfect,
but it is signicant. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of beta blockers,
and Dr. Smith is le with only inhibitors, which are also in short
supply. In order to maximize medical success, she decides to use race as
a proxy for responsiveness to inhibitors and, accordingly, gives the
available drugs to her white patients.
Bruers, “Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic.” Notice that Bruers does not take the heuristic
hypothesis to commit him to denying the existence of speciesism. On the contrary, he
believes that this hypothesis tells us something about the psychology of speciesism. is
is clear enough in the various ways he phrases it, such as when he writes that “speciesist
thinking is based on a heuristic” () or “speciesism is a heuristic” ().
For a thought-provoking discussion of such uses of race, see Root, “e Use of Race in
Medicine as a Proxy for Genetic Dierences.”
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
Intuitively, Dr. Smith is not a racist; she is just a physician who values eec-
tiveness. A good account of racism will accommodate the fact that someone
who, like Dr. Smith, uses race only as a proxy for some other property is not a
racist. But then parity requires that an account of speciesism should entail that
someone who uses species only as a proxy for personhood is not a speciesist.
Just as Dr. Smith is best described as an eectiveness-oriented physician, such
a person will be best described as a personist. In sum, the heuristic hypothesis
entails speciesism antirealism, in line with premise.
What should we make of this argument? My inclination is to reject its rst
premise. You will remember that Bruers supports the heuristic hypothesis w ith
an abductive argument: the hypothesis is the best available explanation of the
observation that purported speciesists invoke mental abilities to justify the
preferential treatment they give to human beings. is is admiedly a possible
explanation, but I doubt it is the best. Here is another. W hen pushed to justify
the preferential treatment they give to members of their species, most people
make up a justication that looks plausible on the face of it. Since species mem-
bership does not seem like the kind of feature that could ground a dierence
in moral status, they turn to other characteristics that are peculiar to humans.
Cognitive abilities such as rationality and self-awareness immediately come
to mind; they should do the trick. is process of post hoc rationalization at
no point involves relying on species as a heuristic for personhood. Call this
alternative suggestion the rationalization hypothesis. My contention is that it
explains the data beer than the heuristic hypothesis.
To decide between this pair of explanations, we need to compare the pre-
dictions that stem respectively from the rationalization hypothesis and from
the heuristic hypothesis. And as we will see now, the laer generates some silly
predictions. Consider this add-on to Medical Proxy:
Beer Medical Proxy: Race is correlated with responsiveness to
inhibitors in patients with congestive heart disease. As it turns out,
however, genetic ancestry has more predictive power than race in this
respect. While the correlation is still not perfect, it is signicantly stron-
ger than that between responsiveness and race. Dr.Smith learns about
this nding and stops relying on race to assess people’s likely responsive-
ness to inhibitors; she starts using genetic ancestry instead.
is is exactly what should happen on the assumption that Dr. Smith is not a
racist but a physician who, because she cares about eectiveness, has been using
race as a proxy for responsiveness to inhibitors.
Now, the way most people treat animals does not correspond at all to the
way Dr. Smith treats her black and white patients. Consider this case:
Beer Personist Proxy: An engineer manages to design glasses that allow
those who wear them to tell an entity’s mental abilities. rough the
glasses, persons shine with a bright aura, whereas nonpersons do not.
Unsurprisingly, most humans have such an aura, contrary to most non-
humans, which conrms, if need be, that membership in the human
species is correlated to personhood. Although highly reliable, the glasses
do get it wrong on rare occasions. In exceptional cases, a nonperson
will shine, or a person will not. e correlation is not perfect. Still, it is
signicantly stronger than that between species membership and per-
sonhood. e news of this technology is widely reported in the media.
ink about this. If it were true that most people use membership in the human
species only as a proxy to distinguish persons from nonpersons, then they
would react the way Dr. Smith did in Beer Medical Proxy; they would stop
relying on species to assess people’s mental abilities, buy themselves a pair of
glasses, and start using auras as their new proxy for personhood. Once this
is done, they would begin treating all the subjects that lack an aura through
the glasses as poorly as they currently treat animals. But this prediction seems
incredible. It is much more likely that most people would treat humans without
an aura more or less the same as they do nowthat is, far beer than animals.
Other predictions of the heuristic hypothesis concern nonhumans. Recall
the study mentioned earlier in which Caviola and his colleagues asked partici-
pants to imagine the Atlans, an intelligent alien species, and to decide whether
to save an Atlan or a human in case of an emergency. If the heuristic hypothesis
were accurate and our treatment of nonhuman animals were caused by the
mental abilities we aribute to them on the basis of their species, we would be
willing to treat Atlans no worse than humans. Since membership in the Atlan
species is as reliable an indicator of rationality and self-awareness as member-
ship in the human species, we would use it as a proxy for detecting persons, we
would ascribe Atlans the same mental capacities that we ascribe humans, and
we would treat them as well as humans. Faced with the dilemma presented by
Caviola and his colleagues, we would ip a coin. As we saw earlier, this is not at
all what would happen. Most participants indicated that they would save the
human over the Atlan, regardless of their respective mental abilities.
In contrast, the predictions of the rationalization hypothesis for these cases
appear reasonable. Regarding Beer Personist Proxy, the hypothesis predicts
e heuristic hypothesis also predicts that we would toss a coin in the other scenario, in
which we could save either a human or a member of a species of intelligent apes. is
prediction is also false since, as we saw, roughly six out of every seven participants said
they would save the human.
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
exactly what it should. Assuming that people appeal to mental abilities only
to rationalize the unequal treatment they give to nonhumans, they would go
on treating human nonpersons far beer than nonhumans should an engineer
invent glasses through which persons appear to have auras. Maybe they would
make up a new justication. Or maybe not. Aer all, the appeal to personhood
is already quite ridiculous if you think about itwho needs high-tech glasses to
see that babies are not rational and self-aware agents? Yet few people are embar-
rassed to endorse it. It is unclear that anyone would feel the urge to make up a
dierent pretext because a new device makes the obvious even more obvious.
e rationalization hypothesis also generates correct predictions about the
intelligent aliens discussed by Caviola et al. Assuming that the appeal to higher
mental abilities is only a post hoc rationalization of the disadvantageous con-
sideration and treatment that people are disposed to grant nonhumans, one
would expect them to grant intelligent aliens disadvantageous consideration
and treatment. Only, they would then need to invoke a dierent excuse to jus-
tify their aitudes and conduct in this case. Finding such an excuse may prove
more dicult, but probably not dicult enough to dissuade many f rom doing it.
Whether or not the rationalization hypothesis best explains the common
observation that people appeal to animals’ lower cognitive abilities to justify
their own conduct, the explanation it supplies is beer than that supplied by
the heuristic hypothesis. is should be enough to refute Bruers’s abductive
argument in support of the laer. e heuristic hypothesis is not the best
available explanation, so it is unclear why we should accept it. But more than
that: the bizarre predictions that stem from this hypothesis give us sucient
reason to reject it, together w ith premise in the above argument for speciesism
antirealism.
Here is a possible rejoinder. Not all heuristics are as exible as those I have
used to illustrate the phenomenon. As a child, you wanted to know which ani-
mals were dangerous; dangerousness was your target aribute. But you had
a hard time identifying dangerous animals. Membership in the suborder of
snakes, by contrast, was much easier to detect and, as you soon became aware,
correlated with dangerousness. So you started using it as a heuristic aribute.
Suppose that, decades later, you were to nd a beer proxy for dangerousness.
You would probably keep fearing all snakes nonetheless. is is an example of a
“sticky heuristic.” Now, we know that purported speciesists do not rely on a ex-
ible heuristicas we just saw, they would keep favoring humans as compared
to nonhumans should they nd a beer proxy for personhood. For all that,
maybe the unequal treatment that purported speciesists give to humans and
nonhumans results from a sticky heuristic just like your fear of all snakes. is
would vindicate premise of the above argument for speciesism antirealism.
is sticky heuristic hypothesis certainly fares beer than the simple heuristic
hypothesis insofar as it delivers the right prediction for cases such as Beer
Personist Proxy. Having said that, I remain unpersuaded, for two reasons. To
begin with, the sticky heuristic hypothesis makes lile sense of the fact that we
have at our disposal much more reliable heuristics for personhood. To mention
just one example, rationality and self-awareness are presumably more strongly
correlated with possession of language than they are with species membership.
Under these circumstances, it is improbable that virtually everyone opted for
membership in the human species aer spending even a lile time looking for
a proxy for personhood.
What is more, the sticky heuristic hypothesis is unlikely to best explain
the facts. It provides us with a distal explanation. e suggestion is that we
developed a robust tendency to favor humans on the basis of species because
long ago we were interested in personhood and became aware that the two are
correlated. Of course, there is nothing wrong with distal explanations per se.
It is just doubtful that the sticky heuristic hypothesis provides the best distal
explanation available in this specic instance. Another distal explanation, one
that is much more popular among psychologists, is the tribalism hypothesis,
according to which the disadvantageous consideration and treatment we give
to nonhuman animals are largely due to our general tendency to discriminate
against out-group members, combined with our perception of nonhumans as
an out-group. is competing explanation sounds more plausible. Even if we
focus on sticky heuristics, premise rests on shaky empirical grounds.
But that is not all. Let us grant the sticky heuristic hypothesis and premise,
for the sake of argument. e worry is that in the meantime, premise has
turned highly implausible. For if what we have now is a distal explanation of our
robust tendency to discriminate on the basis of species, then our explanandum
is speciesismthe proximal cause of the way we discriminate individuals is
species. Remember Buck, the white man who treats white people beer than
black people without reecting much about it? Whatever turns out to be the
best distal cause of his robust tendency to discriminate against black people,
Buck is a racist insofar as the proximal cause of his behavior is race. e same
will be true, mutatis mutandis, of purported speciesists. Whatever turns out to
be the best distal cause of their robust tendency to discriminate against animals,
they will qualify as speciesists.
Amiot and Bastian, “Toward a Psychology of Human-Animal Relations,” ; Dhont et al.,
“e Psychology of Speciesism,” –; Jaquet, “Speciesism and Tribalism”; Kasperbauer,
Subhuman; and Plous, “Psychological Mechanisms in the Human Use of Animals” and
“e Psychology of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination.”
Ours Is a Speciesist World, Really
.
Do we live in a speciesist world? While most animal ethicists would readily
answer this question in the armative, some do not. e laer philosophers
bear the burden of proof. We have examined three aempts to shi that burden.
I believe these aempts fail for various reasons, which I will not reiterate here.
Instead, let me wrap up with some considerations regarding our social respon-
sibility as philosophers.
In the introduction, I touched upon the signicance of this whole issue.
e concept of speciesism is a fantastic device both to morally assess the most
widespread aitudes towards nonhuman animals and to raise public aware-
ness about the ethical shortcomings of these aitudesthe kind of device
we should handle with the utmost caution. And philosophers have a unique
responsibility in this area. Considering the great potential for social change
that the concept of speciesism oers, we would be wise to avoid denying the
existence of speciesism unless we have a very strong case to make to that eect,
one that can resist objections such as those I have presented in this contribution.
Speciesism antirealism is innocuous, one might think, so long as it is
expressed in an academic seing such as a philosophy journal. But this would
be a mistake. What guarantee do we have that the content of our armchair
discussions will not transcend the boundaries of academia to have unwanted
eects on the outside world? By way of anecdote, I have seen people post a
link to Kagan’s article “W hat’s Wrong with Speciesism?” under opinion pieces
denouncing speciesism in the general press. It is not dicult to imagine the
relieving eect this had on readers who might have found the initial pieces
unseling. In light of the impact that animal ethics has had on the public debate
so far, we should be wary of writing papers that might have harmful conse-
quences for animals and the animal rights movement.
is is not a plea for self-censure. It must of course be possible to question
assumptions that are common in the philosophical community. I mean these
concluding remarks only as a reminder, to myself included, to be extra careful
when the stakes are high because the positions under evaluation play or might
come to play a role in the public arena. Some philosophers are indierent to the
fate of animals and broadly satised with the status quo. ey will not be inter-
ested in my two cents. e authors whose views I have discussed in this paper,
however, are nothing like that. Despite our disagreements, I have not a shadow
of a doubt that they care. It is indeed transparent in their workincluding
the articles that I have been discussingthat they are as concerned as anyone
Ebert et al., “Is Daniel a Monster?” .
by the mistreatments inicted on animals in our societies. I trust they will be
sensitive to these considerations.
Université de Strasbourg
aquet@unistra.
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