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Politics and Governance
2025 •Volume 13 •Arcle 9282
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.9282
ARTICLE Open Access Journal
Addressing Migrant Inequality in Youth Polical Engagement:
The Role of Parental Inuences
Simona Guglielmi 1and Nicola Maggini 2
1Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Milan, Italy
2Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna, Italy
Correspondence: Simona Guglielmi (simona.guglielmi@unimi.it)
Submitted: 13 September 2024 Accepted: 31 December 2024 Published: 27 February 2025
Issue: This article is part of the issue “Unequal Participation Among Youth and Immigrants: Analyzing Political
Attitudes and Behavior in Societal Subgroups” edited by Arndt Leininger (Chemnitz University of Technology)
and Sabrina Mayer (University of Bamberg), fully open access at https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.i426
Abstract
While citizenship acquisition varies across the EU, children of immigrants are expected to comprise a
growing share of the voting‐age population in the coming years. Consequently, understanding the factors
influencing their political integration has garnered increasing attention from researchers and policymakers.
Existing studies highlight the complex and context‐dependent interplay of structural, cultural, and
policy‐related factors that shape immigrant political engagement. Additionally, some scholars have noted
that the standard model of youth political socialisation—where political learning is transmitted from parent
to child—may be “disrupted” in immigrant families. Against this backdrop, this article investigates the critical
role of family political discussions and parent–child political alignment in (re)producing ethnic inequalities
in political engagement among late adolescents, using Lombardy (Italy) as a case study. The project
MAYBE—Moving into Adulthood in uncertain times: Youth Beliefs, future Expectations, and life choices
(University of Milan) collected survey data from 2,756 final‐year high school students (aged 18–19) between
February 2023 and March 2024, including 620 students with migrant backgrounds. The study applied a
multilevel regression model—spanning 81 schools, 165 classes—to investigate individual and contextual
factors, such as the classroom political climate and municipal electoral competitiveness. Migrant parents
navigate the host country’s political environment with varying levels of familiarity, shaped by their
connections to the political culture of their country of origin. Findings suggest that these dynamics create
unique pathways for the political socialisation of their children, in which the influence of socioeconomic
status and intergenerational social learning on political engagement differs significantly from the patterns
observed among native‐born youth.
Keywords
family political discussions; Italy; parent–child political alignment; political socialisation; second‐generation
migrants; youth political engagement
© 2025 by the author(s), licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1
1. Introduction
While the regulations on the acquisition of citizenship by children of immigrants vary across the EU
(Goodman, 2023; Weil, 2010), it is reasonable to anticipate that this group will constitute an increasingly
significant proportion of the voting‐age population in the forthcoming years. According to Eurostat, between
January 2014 and January 2023, the population of non‐national children grew by 52.6%, almost offsetting
the 4.4% decline in national children. Fostering the active participation of all young individuals, regardless of
ethnic origin, is an ongoing challenge of the EU Youth Strategy 2019–2027 (Council of the European Union,
2018) that is closely linked to an additional, related concern: the declining participation of young people in
institutional politics, such as voter turnout and party membership (Tsatsanis et al., 2021), or signing petitions,
participating in legal demonstrations, and joining unofficial strikes (Deželan, 2023; Kitanova, 2020).
Levels and modes of youth political involvement are significantly shaped by social stratification (Giugni &
Grasso, 2021; Hooghe & Boonen, 2015; Lello & Bazzoli, 2023). Young people of migrant origin face the dual
challenge of being young and having a foreign background. These disadvantages, which intersect with other
factors such as gender and socioeconomic status (SES), can negatively impact their active participation in
democratic life (Collins, 2021; Gatti et al., 2024; Harris & Roose, 2014). In addition, the lower levels of
political engagement among immigrant parents (Ortensi & Riniolo, 2020; Terriquez & Kwon, 2015) and their
adherence to the political culture of the country of origin (Borkowska & Luthra, 2024; Dinesen & Andersen,
2022) can have a detrimental effect on the political involvement of their children. Accordingly, researchers
and policymakers have shown increasing interest in understanding the factors influencing the social and
political integration in the EU of immigrants and their descendants (e.g., De Rooij, 2012; Gabrielli &
Impicciatore, 2022; Monforte & Morales, 2018; Vintila & Martiniello, 2021). Although methodological
challenges remain, data collection is increasing to enable quantitative analyses of life outcomes for children
of immigrants, in terms of health, education, social exclusion, labour market participation, and family
transitions (Lessard‐Phillips et al., 2017).
Despite this growing interest, relatively few studies have specifically explored the political engagement of
children of immigrants and the extent to which it differs from that of their native‐born peers in European
democracies. Existing research on the political engagement of children of immigrants often draws on the
extensive American literature on assimilation and youth political socialisation and employs both comparative
(e.g., Hochman & García‐Albacete, 2019) and country‐specific approaches (e.g., Jungkunz & Marx, 2024;
Riniolo & Ortensi, 2021). Research findings reveal a complex and mixed pattern that is highly
context‐dependent and shaped by a complex interplay of structural, cultural, and policy‐related factors.
Furthermore, some studies seem to downplay the social relevance of the topic, suggesting that differences
in political engagement and participation between children of immigrants and native‐born peers could
disappear as a result of intergenerational assimilation (Alba & Nee, 2003; Finseraas et al., 2022; Hochman &
García‐Albacete, 2019; Li & Jones, 2020; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). While immigrant parents often face
structural challenges such as limited legal rights, language barriers, and lower familiarity with the host
country’s political system, their children typically have greater access to these resources. Born or raised in
the host country, the second generation often holds citizenship and benefits from education systems that
facilitate political socialisation and exposure to the political norms of the “receiving” country (Heath
& Brinbaum, 2014; Quintelier, 2009, 2015). Although the gap in political involvement between
second‐generation immigrants and natives is generally narrower compared to the gap between natives and
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 2
first‐generation migrants, several studies highlight that the political integration of children of immigrants is
shaped by distinct challenges (Elodie, 2022). These include negotiating dual identities (Fischer‐Neumann,
2014; Hochman & García‐Albacete, 2019; Rapp, 2020) and experiencing discrimination (Quintelier, 2009),
often compounded by the disadvantages inherited from their families’ immigrant backgrounds (Alba & Foner,
2015; Bevelander & Hutcheson, 2022).
Against this backdrop, this article sets out to study the political incorporation of children of immigrants in
European democracies. Specifically, it examines whether the influence of family factors—such as SES and
political socialisation—on political engagement varies between children of immigrants and their native‐born
peers. We adopt the concept of migrant political incorporation (Bueker, 2005; Laubenthal, 2023; Martiniello
& Rath, 2014) to describe the process through which immigrants and their descendants engage with and
integrate into the political systems of their host countries. This process includes both formal aspects, such as
obtaining citizenship and voting rights, and informal dimensions like political participation, representation,
and influence. A crucial aspect of this process consists of comprehending and navigating the foundational
coordinates of the political space in Western democracies. These include party identification, the
meaningfulness of ideological self‐placement, and political interest. In this article, we focus on differences
between children of immigrants in alignment with these traditional, party‐related anchors of political
systems. We will refer to this as “political engagement” to stress the cognitive and motivational dimensions
necessary to foster meaningful participation in structured political contexts (Carreras, 2016; Pontes et al.,
2018). Political engagement and political participation are often treated as synonymous, but they should be
analytically distinguished. Carreras (2016) differentiates between active and cognitive engagement, while
others (Barrett, 2012; Barrett & Brunton‐Smith, 2014) view engagement as a psychological condition and a
prerequisite for participation, encompassing interest, attention, knowledge, and emotions vis‐à‐vis politics
without necessarily involving action. Emler (2011) describes political engagement as a developmental
process driven by motivation, with political interest being key to attentiveness and knowledge, which in turn
shape opinions and political identities or ideologies necessary for active participation. Pontes et al. (2018)
echo this distinction, emphasising that for young people, “engagement” means having an interest in, being
attentive to, or having awareness, opinions, or emotions regarding political matters or objects, while
“participation” involves actions or behaviours related to political and civic involvement.
The central thesis of this article is that while family political socialisation plays a crucial role in shaping youth
political engagement, the processes within migrant families are often distinct and segmented. These
dynamics create unique pathways for the children’s political socialisation, in which the influence of SES and
intergenerational social learning on political engagement differs significantly from the patterns observed
among native‐born youth. This argument aligns with recent studies pointing out that the parent‐to‐child
influences described in the standard model of youth political socialisation (Jennings et al., 2009) are thus
likely to be “disrupted” in most immigrant families (Borkowska & Luthra, 2024) and impacted by the political
culture of the country of origin (Chaudhary, 2018; Dinesen & Andersen, 2022).
Empirically, the study employs data from a survey carried out between February 2023 and March 2024 on
2,756 students in the final year of high school in the region of Lombardy (Italy), using a probabilistic multistage
sampling design (165 classes from 81 schools located in 55 municipalities). Lombardy serves as a significant,
strategic case study within Europe, as it is the second most populous region in the EU and ranks high in
nominal GDP. There are two key reasons it is particularly relevant to our research. First, it has a significant
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 3
foreign population, with 1,176,169 foreign residents (11.8% of the region’s total) and 231,819 foreign pupils
(17.1% of the student population) in the 2022/2023 school year. Lombardy hosts 24% of all students with
migrant backgrounds in Italy. Second, the right‐leaning political tradition in the region has greatly politicised
the immigration and citizenship issue, ever since the establishment of the Northern League in the 1990s.
More in general, Italy provides a compelling case study, having undergone a transformation in the 1980s and
1990s from a country characterised by emigration to a major destination for immigration. Based on Italian
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) data (Buonomo et al., 2023), in the 2001 census there were fewer than
365,000 residents under the age of 20 who were either foreign nationals or Italians by acquisition. Of this
number, approximately 140,000 were born in Italy. As of the beginning of 2020, the number of those born
in Italy had risen to nearly 1.1 million individuals (73% of the total). Until recent years, this demographic
shift caused a gap in comprehensive data on second‐generation immigrants, limiting the scope of research
on their political integration (Gabrielli & Impicciatore, 2022; Gabrielli et al., 2013; Riniolo & Ortensi, 2021).
Nevertheless, it is crucial to address this gap as Italy, alongside Germany, France, and Spain, host nearly 75%
of the EU’s non‐national minors, with Italy alone accounting for 13.9% of this population (Eurostat, 2023).
To the best of our knowledge, while numerous studies have examined educational inequalities among young
migrants in Italy, this is the first to investigate the role of parental influences among children of immigrants
and their native‐born peers, using a large probabilistic sample of late adolescents. Previous noteworthy
research has primarily examined individuals aged 14–35 who were still living with their family of origin,
comparing the political activism of Italian natives with that of first‐ and second‐generation migrant peers.
These analyses relied on two national household surveys conducted by ISTAT in 2011–2012 (Riniolo &
Ortensi, 2021). In contrast, ISTAT surveys conducted in school contexts—such as Identity and Pathways of
Integration of Second Generations in Italy (ISTAT, 2016), or the survey targeting boys and girls aged 11 to 19
living in Italy in 2021 and 2023—did not include questions related to political engagement (ISTAT, 2024).
The article begins by outlining the theoretical framework that underpins its central arguments and
hypotheses. The methods section provides a detailed account of the dataset, the operationalisation of key
variables, and the analytical strategy employed in the study. The results section then presents findings
derived from multilevel models, offering insights into the research questions. Finally, the article concludes by
discussing the main findings, highlighting the study’s contributions, reflecting on its limitations, and
suggesting avenues for future research.
2. The Political Engagement of Children of Immigrants: How Family Matters
Since the influential studies of Jennings and Niemi (1968), the literature has consistently shown that the
roots of political inequalities go back a long way: People tend to form predispositions towards politics during
adolescence and early adulthood. These formative years, often called the “impressionable years” (Dinas,
2010), are characterised by increased cognitive openness and receptiveness to social influences, making it a
crucial period for developing long‐lasting political attitudes and inequalities. Social class, gender, and
migratory background still impact youth political socialisation, despite it becoming more individualised and
influenced by a broader range of agents beyond family and schools, including peers, media, and digital
platforms (Dalton, 2021). Parental SES and family political socialisation remain key factors in explaining
inequalities in youth political engagement (Jennings et al., 2009), although the process of intergenerational
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 4
political transmission is complex and dynamic (Boonen, 2017; Durmuşoğlu et al., 2023; Mayer et al., 2024;
van Ditmars, 2023).
Parents influence children’s political engagement in both direct and indirect ways (Jennings et al., 2009).
As regards indirect influence, families shape political engagement by creating an environment that fosters or
hinders civic awareness. This is mediated through SES (Verba & Nie, 1972). Young people from higher
socioeconomic backgrounds typically benefit from greater access to socialisation agents, such as
high‐quality educational institutions, extracurricular activities, and digital resources, all of which significantly
impact civic and political development (Giugni & Grasso, 2021; Janmaat & Hoskins, 2022; Jungkunz & Marx,
2024). As far as direct influences are concerned, consistently with social learning theory, parents act as
primary role models, transmitting political values, beliefs, and behaviours through mechanisms such as family
discussions, participation in political activities, and explicit encouragement. Extensive evidence highlights
the relevance of two key microprocesses: family political discussions and parent–child political ideology
similarity. Studies have shown that adolescents who engage in political discussions with their parents are
more likely to be involved in politics (e.g., Andolina et al., 2003; Cornejo et al., 2021; Jennings et al., 2009;
McIntosh et al., 2007). Additionally, research indicates that children raised by politically engaged parents are
more likely to adopt their family’s political views or party preferences (Macfarlane, 2022; Ojeda & Hatemi,
2015), at least in the short term (for opposite effects, in the long run, see Dinas, 2014). This direct influence
helps explain disparities in key dimensions of political engagement, including gender differences in social and
civic participation (Cicognani et al., 2012), political ideology (van Ditmars, 2023), political interest (Pensiero
& Janmaat, 2024), and political ambition (Fox & Lawless, 2014). Direct and indirect parental influences
reinforce each other. While much of the research has focused on the US, similar patterns emerge in the few
studies examining these forms of intergenerational reproduction in European countries (e.g., Janmaat &
Hoskins, 2022; Kroh & Selb, 2009; Lahtinen et al., 2019; Neundorf & Niemi, 2014).
2.1. Hypotheses
Given these insights, how does family matter in shaping the differences in political engagement between
children of immigrants and their native‐born peers?
Research on the political socialisation of adolescent children of immigrants, particularly in Europe, remains
scarce. Nevertheless, existing studies suggest that traditional models of parental influence may be less
applicable to this group, particularly concerning the effects of SES and intergenerational learning
(Borkowska & Luthra, 2024; Humphries et al., 2013). As outlined in the introduction, we argue that the
political socialisation process within migrant families differs due to parents’ limited familiarity with the host
country’s political system and their “bicultural” experiences (Berry, 1997). These differences in parental
political socialisation may hinder children’s ability to comprehend and engage with the political environment
in the receiving country. Moreover, migrants are more likely to face labour and social discrimination, which
can exacerbate the challenges in translating available resources into political opportunities.
Accordingly, we expect that even in a country like Italy, where migrants face systemic social and economic
disadvantages (Panichella et al., 2021), the negative effect of a migrant background on youth political
engagement is only partially attributable to parental socioeconomic resources while it is highly mediated by
political socialisation. Therefore, our first general hypothesis is:
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 5
H1: Political socialisation variables have a greater influence on youth political engagement than
structural variables, including migratory background.
However, within this broader framework, we anticipate that certain family resources will exert a distinct
influence on the political engagement of children of immigrants compared to their native‐born counterparts.
Specifically, we propose a hypothesis regarding the role of parental education in the political engagement of
youth from a migrant background. We contend that, unlike in native families, education in migrant families
may not be a reliable indicator of SES, particularly in contexts where social mobility opportunities are
frequently limited for migrants. Humphries et al. (2013), for example, using longitudinal data from the US,
found that while higher levels of parental education strongly correlated with voter registration and party
identification among third‐generation and white individuals, this relationship did not hold for Latino and
Asian children of immigrants. They argued that, unlike native‐born adults, parental education levels among
immigrant families may not be a reliable reflection of SES. While for native‐born adults, higher education
levels often signified familiarity with and acceptance of the US political and civic culture, in their argument,
immigrant parents with comparable educational attainment—often acquired abroad—may not demonstrate
similar patterns of political engagement, such as voter registration or party identification. A similar argument
was proposed more recently by Borkowska and Luthra (2024) who examined the political socialisation
process in immigrant families based on the UK Household Longitudinal Study. Their findings suggested that
parental education did not affect the political engagement of second‐generation individuals in the same way
it did for those with UK‐born parents. However, the direct transmission of political engagement remained
consistent across both groups.
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: The effect of parents’ education on political engagement is weaker for students with a foreign
background compared to their native counterparts.
Given the unique characteristics of migrant families, we anticipate that another common predictor of youth
political engagement—gender—may have a diminished influence among children of immigrants. Scholars have
increasingly highlighted the need to move beyond examining women’s disadvantages in politics and instead
focus on the advantages that men enjoy, particularly how norms of masculinity shape gendered patterns of
political participation (Bjarnegård & Murray, 2018). Both families and schools play pivotal roles in reinforcing
these gendered socialisation processes (Cicognani et al., 2012; Fox & Lawless, 2014; Hoskins et al., 2017;
Pensiero & Janmaat, 2024). In addition, in the Italian context, many children of migrants, male and female, face
additional barriers to formal political participation due to their lack of citizenship. This exclusion often fosters
feelings of underrepresentation (Farini, 2019; Riniolo, 2023). Given these circumstances, we hypothesise that:
H3: The “male advantage” in political engagement is likely to be significantly reduced among children
of immigrants.
Shifting the focus to the two primary microprocesses involved in family political socialisation—political
discussions at home and the similarity of political views between parents and children—we expect that
only the former will have a consistent effect on young people’s political engagement, irrespective of their
family background.
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 6
The literature on political socialisation suggests that political discussions at home are one of the most
significant socialising agents (Jennings et al., 2009) influencing young people’s political engagement.
Although family background may influence the content of discussions, it is plausible that the mere presence
of political discussions at home, regardless of migratory context, acts as a factor stimulating political
engagement, as supported by studies suggesting that the quality and frequency of political discussions is
positively correlated with youth political engagement (McIntosh et al., 2007; Riniolo & Ortensi, 2021).
Therefore, we propose that open dialogue and discussions on political issues within the family can have a
uniform impact, regardless of migratory background:
H4a: “Homogeneous effect”—Political discussion at home has an impact on political engagement
regardless of migratory background, with similar effects for both children of immigrants and
native‐born individuals.
In contrast, the effect of political similarity between parents and children may be more pronounced for
natives compared to children of immigrants. This could be due to differences in the political socialisation
processes between the two groups. Among children of native families, political opinion alignment between
parents and children may be stronger. Specifically, the perception of political child–parent similarity in native
families may be more fluid and direct, based on a shared understanding of the national political system and
its dynamics (Dinas, 2014; McIntosh et al., 2007). For children of immigrants, political views may be more
influenced by intercultural experiences, reducing the direct effect of political similarity between parents and
children. Accordingly, we hypothesise:
H4b: “Heterogeneous effect”—Parent–child political similarity is particularly relevant for native‐born
youth, with a weaker or absent effect for children of immigrants.
Additionally, we anticipate an interaction effect between these two parental socialisation variables and
migratory background: When the frequency of political discussions is high, disagreeing with parents should
have the same positive effect as having similar opinions, particularly for Italian youth. For native Italian
youth, who are more integrated into the national political system, both agreement and disagreement with
parents could stimulate critical thinking and the adoption of an independent political stance and,
consequently, higher political engagement (Dinas, 2014; Graham et al., 2020). For children of immigrants,
however, the effect may be less evident, as experiences of political disagreement might be mediated by the
difficulty of negotiating between different political and cultural norms. This hypothesis resonates with
studies indicating that young people are less likely to engage in political discussions with parents or friends
whom they feel hold distant political views from themselves (e.g., Levinsen & Yndigegn, 2015) and those
stressing the key role of social learning mechanisms in explaining differences in parent–child similarity
(e.g., Meeusen & Boonen, 2022). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4c: “Interaction effect”—When the frequency of political discussion is high, disagreeing with parents
should have the same positive effect on political engagement as sharing similar political views, but only
among native‐born individuals.
To further investigate this issue, we argue that the larger the gap between a family’s cultural/political
background and Italian political culture—defined by democratic values and a Catholic tradition—the more
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 7
likely it is that family political discussions, parent–child political alignment, and political engagement will be
disconnected. Therefore, our final hypothesis is:
H5: The effect of a “foreign background” on political engagement is likely to weaken once we control
for the religious affiliation and political regime of the parents’ country of origin.
3. Data
The empirical investigation is based on survey data from the project MAYBE—Moving into Adulthood in
uncertain times: Youth Beliefs, future Expectations, and life choices (University of Milan). This study
interviewed 2,756 students in the final year of high school in Lombardy (Italy), between February 2023 and
March 2024, employing a probabilistic multistage sampling design (81 schools, 165 classes). The study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Milan.
3.1. Sample
The sample was selected using a multistage probability sampling approach. First, 81 schools were drawn
from the population of all public secondary schools in Lombardy (𝑛 = 710) using systematic sampling with
stratification by school type (lyceum, vocational, technical) and province. The original list of schools was
obtained from the Ministry of Education and Merit’s School Data Portal. School principals were contacted
via email and telephone to invite them to participate. If a school declined, a replacement school was
randomly selected from the same stratum of school type and/or province. Next, in each school, one to three
final‐year classes were chosen based on school size (and the school’s effective ability to participate in the
requested number of classes). The survey was administered during school hours. Computer‐assisted web
interviewing (CAWI) was conducted in computer labs whenever possible. Where computer labs were
unavailable, paper‐and‐pencil interviews (PAPI) were used (352 students). All students within a selected
class completed the survey simultaneously. The average number of respondents per class was 20.3. Given
the notable difficulties in obtaining availability from schools, the data collection took place between March
2023 and March 2024: During the 2022/2023 academic year, 39 schools were interviewed, and 42 schools
were interviewed in the following academic year.
In terms of ethnic origin, 2,135 students had both parents with an Italian background (77.4%), 401 were
children of immigrants (14.5%), and 208 were of mixed origin (7.5%). Among the latter, a small group
included students with at least one parent from a Western country, the largest subgroup being those with a
Swiss mother (23) or father (22). Among the students with mixed backgrounds, 92.3% were born in Italy, and
90.4% held Italian citizenship. In contrast, among those with both parents of foreign origin, 67.6% were born
in Italy, and 70.3% were Italian citizens. The data were consistent with official statistics (Buonomo et al.,
2023). The sample included 1,510 male and 1,226 female students (30 respondents who identified as
“other” were excluded from the analysis). The respondents’ average age was 18.6: 44% were 18, 45%
were 19, and the remaining respondents, primarily from vocational schools, were over 19 due to irregular
educational trajectories (see Table A9 in the Supplementary File for more details).
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 8
3.2. Concepts and Measures
The operationalisation process was carried out as described below.
Regarding the dependent variable, students’ political engagement (as discussed in the introduction), we
created an additive index based on key items that are commonly used in the literature. The index included
three components: interest in politics (1–4 scale), awareness of key political ideologies (0 =not self‐placed
on the left–right scale; 1 =self‐placed on the scale), and party closeness (0 =not close to any party;
1=close to a party). These items are widely employed in political science to capture general political
interest and attachment to the partisan and ideological aspects of the political system, specifically
concerning traditional, party‐related politics. They address the cognitive, ideational, and emotional
dimensions of engagement (Barrett, 2012; Barrett & Brunton‐Smith, 2014; Emler, 2011; Pontes et al., 2018).
Furthermore, to ensure that this measure was reliable and that the three items measured a single latent
dimension, we conducted a hybrid item response theory (IRT) analysis combining a two‐parameter logistic
model for binary variables (left–right awareness and party closeness) and a graded response model for an
ordinal variable (political interest). The results confirmed that these variables were related to the latent (see
Section 1 in the Supplementary File). For robustness checks, we also ran a factor analysis with both a
principal factor method and a principal component factor method with an orthogonal oblimin rotation after
rescaling the political interest item through min‐max normalisation. Again, the results confirmed that the
items belonged to a single factor (see Section 2 in the Supplementary File).
To test the hypotheses, a multilevel regression model was employed. The model included parental SES,
family political socialisation variables, and a range of control variables, drawing on literature on youth
political engagement that highlights the broad spectrum of socialisation agents and contextual facilitators
(school and municipality level). Peer/classroom climate can influence political attitudes through shared
discussions, habits, and practices (Hoskins & Janmaat, 2019). Schools provide civic education (Campbell,
2008, 2013), offering a “compensation effect” (Deimel et al., 2021; Hoskins & Janmaat, 2019; Neundorf
et al., 2016) for missing or poor parental political socialisation. Additionally, research from political
geography has pointed out the importance of considering the role of places where social/political action and
interactions occur in influencing how youth approach politics (Adolfsson & Coe, 2024), in line with the
“political context matters” argument (Kitanova, 2020; Vráblíková, 2014).
Accordingly, Table 1 provides the list and operationalisation of the independent and conditioning/control
variables, along with their measurement. The original wording of the items in the questionnaire is presented
in Table A8 in the Supplementary File.
Beyond what is presented in Table 1, some additional clarification is needed regarding the political regime
and right–left margin variables. To define the political regime of the parent’s country of birth, we relied on
the classification by Lührmann et al. (2018) and the V‐Dem’s expert estimates for 2023 (Coppedge et al.,
2024). Our final variable also considered the geopolitical area of the parent’s country of birth. By “West” we
meant Western Europe, North America (US and Canada), and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). To be
classified in a category, both parents (or just one if the response for the other was missing) had to come from
a specific regime/area. The only exceptions were the “Western + other democracies” category (the regime
had to be democratic for both parents, but one could come from a non‐Western area) and the “Mixed
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 9
Table 1. Independent and conditioning/control variables.
Label Concept Measure
Independent variables
Migratory
Background
Respondent’s family
migratory background
Italian =0 (both parents are Italian)
Mixed =1 (one of the two parents was born in Italy)
Foreign =2 (both parents of foreign birth)
Family Political
Discussion
Frequency with which
political topics are discussed
within the family setting
Measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 =There are never
arguments/discussions about political issues; 10 =We very
often have arguments/discussions about political issues)
Perceived
Parent–Child
Political Similarity
Degree of alignment or
difference between the
individual’s political opinions
and those of their parents
Different =0 (political opinions different from those of
the parents)
Partially/totally similar =1 (political opinions similar to
those of both or at least one parent)
DK =2 (don’t know)
Individual‐level condioning/control variables
Gender Binary gender Male =0
Female =1
Parents’ Education Parents’ level of education Low =0 (both parents have a low level of education, or
one has a low level and the other completed upper
secondary education)
Medium =1 (both parents completed upper secondary
education)
High =2 (both parents completed tertiary education, or
one completed tertiary education and the other upper
secondary education)
Note: A low level of education corresponds to lower
secondary school at most. For the original six
educational attainment levels, see Table A8 in the
Supplementary File
Family’s Economic
Well‐being
Subjective evaluation of the
economic situation of the
family
Difficult situation =0 (it is very difficult or difficult for
the family to make ends meet at the end of the month)
Not difficult =1 (it is easy for the family…)
Wealthy =2 (it is very easy for the family…)
DK =3 (don’t know)
Religion Respondent’s religious
denomination
Atheist =0
Christian =1
Muslim =2
Other =3
Regime in Parents’
Countries
Political regime of the
parents’ reported countries
Western democracies =0
Eastern European democracies =1
Non‐Western/European democracies =2
Western +other democracies =3
Mixed regimes =4
Electoral/closed autocracies =5
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 10
Table 1. (Cont.) Independent and conditioning/control variables.
Label Concept Measure
Contextual control variables
Classroom Political
Involvement
Political climate and
involvement in the
classroom
Mean of non‐electoral political participation in
protests/demonstrations (see Table A8 in the
Supplementary File) and political engagement index
(excluding the respondent) in the respondent’s class
School Type of school Lyceum =0
Technical =1
Vocational =2
Turnout Turnout in the 2022 general
election
Turnout in percentages (municipality)
Right–Left Margin Degree of centre‐right
political predominance at
the school municipal level
Difference in percentage points between votes for the
centre‐right and centre‐left coalitions in the 2022
general election
regimes” category (one parent’s country was a democracy and the other’s an autocracy). The right–left
margin could also be considered as a proxy for the degree of electoral competitiveness of each municipality,
given the traditional and long‐lasting predominance of centre‐right parties in Lombardy. Franklin (2004)
empirically demonstrated that the closeness of an electoral race, measured by the margin of victory, along
with turnout in previous elections, were strong predictors of electoral participation. Given that these
variables could also impact political engagement, we included them in our model to control for the effects of
the political context.
Before running the multivariate multilevel regression analysis, all municipal‐level variables were centred to
obtain a zero sample mean. Then, all the non‐categorical variables were normalised by adjusting those
values measured on different scales to a common scale between 0 and 1 according to the formula:
𝑋′= (𝑋 − 𝑋min)/(𝑋max − 𝑋min ). All categorical non‐binary variables were transformed into sets of dummies.
In this way, all variables could be analysed on a comparable basis.
4. Findings
Before examining whether political socialisation processes differed for children of immigrants, we first
analysed the variations in political engagement, parental political socialisation, and main conditioning/
control variables by family migration background (Table A9, Supplementary File). Children of immigrants
showed lower political engagement (mean =0.37) compared to native‐born Italians (mean =0.46) and
mixed‐background youth (mean =0.44). They also faced significant socioeconomic and educational
disadvantages. Their political involvement in the classroom was also lower (mean =0.41 vs. 0.50 for
native‐born Italians), and they reported fewer family political discussions (mean =0.18 vs. 0.26). Only 31.0%
of children of immigrants aligned with their parents’ political views, compared to 51.8% of native‐born
Italians and 50.0% of mixed‐background youth. Additionally, 49.9% of children of immigrants were unsure
about their political alignment with their parents, a significantly higher proportion than native‐born
Italians (30.3%).
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 11
Beyond this overview, to test our hypotheses, we conducted a multilevel mixed‐effects regression analysis
with robust standard errors at the highest level. There were three levels: students, schools, and
municipalities. Random intercepts were specified at both the municipal and school levels, ensuring that our
analysis accurately reflected the hierarchical structure of the data. We followed a multistage analytical
strategy to test the first hypothesis on the greater relevance of variables measuring political socialisation
compared to structural ones, including migration background. Specifically, we first ran the model with only
socio‐demographic variables and variables related to individual resources (Model A). Then, we introduced
interactions between migration background and, respectively, parental education level (to test H2) and
gender (to test H3). We also interacted migration background with family economic well‐being to control for
an additional resource that could be transmitted by parents, although in this instance we did not hypothesise
a differentiated effect based on migratory background. Subsequently, we introduced variables related to
family political socialisation (Model C). Finally, we included variables measuring the influence of the political
context, both electoral turnout/competitiveness at the municipal level and peer groups in classes (Model D).
The results of these four models are reported in Table 2.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to note that the likelihood ratio test of the null model with
only random intercepts for level 2 (school) and level 3 (municipality) indicated that the multilevel structure was
appropriate (see Section 3 in the Supplementary File), whereas the residual intraclass correlation (ICC) analysis
for both the null model (Table A4 in the Supplementary File) and the initial resources model (Table A5 in the
Supplementary File) showed that the majority of the residual variance appeared to be at the individual level, as
the ICCs for the higher levels (municipalities and schools) were relativelysmall, with schools contributing more
to the variance than municipalities. Furthermore, it is worth reporting that we re‐ran the analyses including
the missing party closeness values (𝑁 = 214), which were recoded as 0 in the political engagement index, to
assess the robustness of the results. The results remained largely consistent. Ultimately, we chose to retain
the models excluding the missing values, as they provided a more conservative and reliable estimate.
The predictive models of political engagement in Table 2 indicate that our H1 was not falsified: As the
variables were progressively included in the models, family‐transmitted individual resources—including
migrant background—became less relevant compared to the political socialisation variables. Concerning the
goodness‐of‐fit statistics, the AIC and BIC values improved significantly from the resources model
(AIC =344.76, BIC =424.41) to the full model (AIC = −295.92, BIC = −182.16), indicating a better model
fit. The log pseudolikelihood also improved notably, confirming that adding socialisation and contextual
variables enhanced the explanatory power.
In the resources model (A), higher parental education was a significant predictor (𝑝 < 0.01) with a positive
coefficient (0.037). However, as more variables were added, this effect weakened, becoming not significant in
the full model. Being in a “wealthy” family was significant across all models but showed decreasing coefficients
(from 0.080 in the resources model to 0.058 in the full model D). As expected, foreign background showed
a significant negative impact on political engagement across all models, but the coefficient weakened (from
−0.077 in the resources model to −0.029 in the full model) and the statistical significance also decreased
from 𝑝 < 0.001 to 𝑝 < 0.05. This indicates that the inclusion of variables related to political socialisation
and contextual factors partially mediated the influence of family‐transmitted individual resources on political
engagement. Nevertheless, these variables do not fully explain the disparities in political engagement between
children of immigrants and their native‐born peers. Conversely, the negative effect of being female remained
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 12
Table 2. Different predictive models of political engagement.
Resources Resources + Parental Full model—
model (A) interacons (B) polical polical
socialisaon socialisaon +
model (C) polical context (D)
Fixed eects
Background (reference: Italian)
mixed −0.012 −0.066 0.003 0.005
(0.018) (0.049) (0.017) (0.018)
foreign −0.077 *** −0.062 −0.034 *−0.029 *
(0.015) (0.041) (0.014) (0.013)
Gender (female) −0.104 *** −0.111 *** −0.106 *** −0.093 ***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010)
Parents’ education (reference: low)
medium 0.018 0.025 0.014 0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
high 0.037 ** 0.044 ** 0.022 0.011
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
not difficult 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.002
(0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017)
wealthy 0.080 *** 0.071 *0.064 ** 0.058 **
(0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
DK −0.057 *−0.052 −0.029 −0.028
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021)
Type of school (reference: lyceum)
technical −0.039 −0.038 −0.025 −0.010
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.010)
vocational −0.056 *−0.054 *−0.042 *0.009
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015)
Background * gender
mixed * female 0.013
(0.036)
foreign * female 0.045
(0.033)
Background * parents’ education
mixed * medium 0.017
(0.051)
mixed * high −0.014
(0.059)
foreign * medium −0.056
(0.030)
foreign * high −0.042
(0.035)
Family well‐being (reference: difficult situation)
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 13
Table 2. (Cont.) Different predictive models of political engagement.
Resources Resources + Parental Full model—
model (A) interacons (B) polical polical
socialisaon socialisaon +
model (C) polical context (D)
Fixed eects
Background * family well‐being
mixed * not difficult 0.061
(0.056)
mixed * wealthy 0.114
(0.092)
mixed * DK −0.008
(0.073)
foreign * not difficult −0.013
(0.042)
foreign * wealthy 0.005
(0.061)
foreign * DK −0.034
(0.064)
Political discussion at home 0.212 *** 0.201 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
partially/totally similar 0.057 *** 0.054 ***
(0.015) (0.014)
DK −0.174 *** −0.162 ***
(0.018) (0.017)
Classroom political involvement 0.252 ***
(0.022)
Turnout 2022 0.008
(0.030)
Right–left margin −0.018
(0.022)
Intercept 0.504 *** 0.505 *** 0.474 *** 0.344 ***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.023) (0.033)
Random eects
Municipality: 𝑆𝐷 (intercept) 0.038 0.038 0.019 0.000
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.000)
School: 𝑆𝐷 (intercept) 0.043 0.044 0.026 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.000)
𝑆𝐷 (residual) 0.256 0.256 0.228 0.224
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of observations 2,184 2,184 2,182 2,182
AIC 344.76 360.71 −193.60 −295.92
BIC 424.41 508.63 −96.90 −182.16
Log pseudolikelihood −158.38 −154.36 113.80 167.96
Parent–child similarity (reference: different)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; significant at *** 𝑝 < 0.001, ** 𝑝 < 0.01, * 𝑝 < 0.05.
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 14
significant and relatively stable across models, although the coefficient slightly decreased in magnitude (from
−0.104 in the resources model to −0.093 in the full model D). Among the control variables, the type of school
attended, specifically vocational schools, showed a diminishing negative effect on political engagement, and
in the full model, the coefficient became not significant (and even changed sign).
Political discussion at home and classroom political involvement were the most significant drivers of political
engagement in the full model, with a strong positive coefficient (0.201 and 0.252, respectively, with
𝑝 < 0.001). Additionally, having partially or totally similar political views to parents significantly increased
political engagement (𝑝 < 0.001). Respondents who were unable to identify whether their views aligned
with their parents’ exhibited significantly lower levels of political engagement compared to those who
reported “different” views. The large magnitude (−0.162) compared to the “partially/totally similar”
coefficient suggests a stronger disengagement effect, potentially due to uncertainty, ambiguity, or lack of
family discussion about political issues.
By contrast, contextual factors like turnout rates and right–left political margins in the municipalities were
not significant.
To assess whether the impact of parental SES on political engagement differed for children of immigrants
(H2 and H3), we examined the interaction terms between family background and, respectively, parental
education, family economic well‐being, and gender (Model B). As regards the interactions of background
with parental resources (parents’ education and family well‐being) and gender, we did not detect any
significant interaction terms. Nonetheless, the statistical significance of the coefficient of a multiplicative
interaction term is considered neither necessary nor sufficient to determine whether X has an important or
statistically distinguishable relationship with Y dependent on the values of a third variable Z (Brambor et al.,
2006). Therefore, we plotted the adjusted predictions of student political engagement based on migratory
background and parents’ education level (Figure 1, upper panel). The chart shows that the positive effect of
medium and high parental educational levels was significantly higher among native‐born Italians than among
children of immigrants. This supports H2, suggesting that while parental education positively influences
political engagement for both groups, its effect is attenuated among second‐generation youth. This
divergence may reflect systemic or cultural barriers limiting the translation of parental resources into
political engagement for children of immigrants. Conversely, there are no significant differences in terms of
background regarding the effect of a wealthy family condition (see Figure A4 in the Supplementary File).
To test H3, we plotted the adjusted predictions of political engagement based on gender and migratory
background (Figure 1, lower panel). As anticipated, the gender gap in political engagement was only evident
among natives and disappeared for individuals with a foreign origin. Specifically, males with foreign‐born
parents demonstrated the most pronounced decline in political engagement, with their predicted
engagement levels significantly lower than those of males with Italian origins. This finding suggests that the
gender gap observed in the overall models (Table 2) was primarily driven by differences among natives.
For individuals with a foreign origin, the disadvantage associated with their migratory background offset the
typical advantage associated with being male in traditional political engagement in the Italian context. This
pattern was further confirmed by interactions between gender and parental origin categories in the full
model D (results not shown here, available on request).
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 15
Low
Linear predicon, fixed poron
.55
.5
.45
.4
.35
.3
Linear predicon, fixed poron
.55
.5
.45
.4
.35
.3
Medium
Italian
Mixed
Foreign
male
female
parents’ educaon
Adjusted predicons of background with 95% CIs
Adjusted predicons of gender with 95% CIs
High
Italian Mixed
background
Foreign
Figure 1. Adjusted predictions of student political engagement based on migratory background by parents’
education (upper panel) and gender by migratory background (lower panel).
The following hypotheses concern the role played by parental political socialisation and how it unfolds
across groups. We hypothesised a homogenous positive effect across all background categories as regards
the frequency of political discussions at home (H4a), whereas we postulated a differentiated effect
concerning the influence of the political content and cues transmitted by parents, with parent–child political
agreement being relevant only among Italians (H4b). Furthermore, we hypothesised an interaction effect
between the frequency of political discussions at home and parent–child political similarity by background
(H4c). Table A6 in the Supplementary File shows the results of the full model with interactions between
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 16
parental political socialisation and background. Figure 2 shows the adjusted predictions of political
engagement based on migratory background by frequency of political discussions at home (upper panel) and
by parent–child political similarity (lower panel).
Consistently with H4a, political discussion at home had a positive effect on political engagement, regardless
of the migratory background. Conversely, in line with H4b, sharing political views with their parents only
significantly boosted political engagement among students with Italian parents, whereas among children of
immigrants, the effect of having partially/totally similar opinions was significantly lower, being practically the
same as having different opinions. Of course, the lowest effect was recorded among those who did not know
their parents’ political opinions, regardless of their background.
Linear predicon, fixed poron
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
Linear predicon, fixed poron
.2
.6
.5
.4
.3
Italian
Mixed
Foreign
Italian
Mixed
Foreign
Adjusted predicons of background with 95% CIs
Adjusted predicons of background with 95% CIs
different parally/totally similar
parent-child polical similarity
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
polical discussion at home
DK
Figure 2. Adjusted predictions of student political engagement based on migratory background by frequency
of political discussions at home (upper panel) and by parent–child political similarity (lower panel). Note:
DK =“don’t know.”
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 17
To explore how parental socialisation interacts with background, we plotted the adjusted predictions of
parent–child political similarity against both background and the frequency of political discussions at home
(Figure 3). The findings supported our hypothesis (H4c): The frequency of political discussions at home
moderated the effect of parent–child political similarity, but only among children with two Italian‐born
parents. In this group, as the frequency of political discussions increased, the positive impact of sharing
political views with parents no longer significantly exceeded the effect of having differing views. This shift
occurred starting from the midpoint of the political discussion scale, suggesting that in families where
politics is frequently discussed, even divergent political opinions can still promote political engagement.
However, this dynamic did not apply to children of foreign‐born parents. These children engaged in fewer
political discussions at home (as evidenced by the larger confidence intervals for higher levels of political
discussion) and often struggled to fully understand or communicate the political views of their parents.
In these families, the frequency of political discussions only slightly affected those who were unaware of
their parents’ opinions, helping to close the gap with those who were aware of them. Among children of
Italian parents, however, this gap persisted, despite showing a similar trend. For a robustness check, we
re‐ran the analysis using a different operationalisation of parent–child political similarity, categorising
responses into four groups: “different opinions,” “opinions similar to those of one parent,” “opinions similar to
those of both parents,” and “don’t know.” The results were very similar to those from the initial analysis.
Our interpretation, as outlined in the theoretical section, was that children of immigrants face significant
challenges in developing an interest in Italian politics and in forming attachments to its partisan and
ideological frameworks due to the parents’ socialisation in a foreign political context. This issue is
particularly pronounced for those whose parents come from political and cultural backgrounds that differ
significantly from the Italian context. Based on this reasoning, our final hypothesis (H5) suggests that when
polical discussion at home
Linear predicon, fixed poron
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Foreign
different
parally/totally similar
DK
Mixed
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
Italian
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Figure 3. Political engagement: adjusted predictions of difference/similarity to parents’ political opinions by
background and frequency of political discussions at home (95% CIs). Note: DK =“don’t know.”
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 18
controlling for certain proxies of the political‐cultural context of the parents’ country of origin—such as
religion and political regime—alongside other previously identified predictors, the effect of the broader
“foreign background” category should diminish or disappear. The findings (Table A7 in the Supplementary
File) supported this hypothesis: In both models, one including the respondent’s religion and the other
incorporating the political regime of the parents’ country of origin, the variable for migratory background—
although still negatively correlated—lost its statistical significance as a predictor.
Hence, we replicated the interactions shown in Figure 3 by replacing migratory background first with
religion and then with the political regime of the parents’ country. The results confirmed that these variables,
despite their limitations, were valid proxies for the political‐cultural context of the parents. The (non) pattern
previously observed in Figure 3 for children of immigrants was very similar to that observed for students of
Muslim faith (see Figure A5 in the Supplementary File), who are predominantly children of immigrants from
very different political‐cultural contexts from the Italian one. This finding was further confirmed when
religion was replaced with the political regime of the parents’ country (Figure 4). It is worth noting that the
Western democracies category is composed mainly of students with an Italian background (95.4% of the
total in this category). In contrast, those with a mixed background showed a more varied distribution,
falling particularly under the Western + other democracies (30.8%) and mixed regimes (22.1%) categories,
suggesting broader engagement across different political systems. Individuals with a foreign background
were predominantly found in electoral/closed autocracies (50.1%) and Eastern European democracies
(28.2%), reflecting a distinct alignment with non‐Western regimes. Focusing on the most populated
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
mixed regimes
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
electoral/closed autocracies
3
2
1
–1
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Western + other democracies
3
2
1
–1
0
Western democracies Eastern European democracies Non-Western/European democracies
different
par!ally/totally similar
DK
poli!cal discussion at home
Linear predic!on, fixed por!on
Figure 4. Political engagement: adjusted predictions of difference/similarity to parents’ political opinions
by political regime in parents’ country and frequency of political discussions at home (95% CIs). Note:
DK =“don’t know.”
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 19
categories—Western democracies (𝑛 = 2,238), Eastern European democracies (𝑛 = 114), and closed/
electoral autocracies (𝑛 = 203)—it becomes evident that the moderating effect of political discussion on the
parent–child variable was only significant for those with parents from Western democracies (including Italy,
of course). In contrast, it was not significant when the parents’ country was non‐democratic, or an Eastern
European democracy. The political regime variable proved more discriminating than religion, with some
interaction terms also showing significance (see Table A7 in the Supplementary File). We recognise that
regime classification depends on the data source. However, the V‐Dem project classification, favoured by
many scholars (e.g., Boese, 2019), is generally considered reliable and has been used to assess the impact of
country of origin on immigrants’ political participation (Lazarova et al., 2024). To test the robustness of our
results, we re‐ran the analysis using the 2023 Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2024),
and the main findings remained consistent.
5. Conclusion
While much of the rhetoric around youth political disengagement tends to treat young people as a
homogenous group, in actual fact they make up a fragmented population. These divisions, and in particular
the intersection of various inequalities that amplify disadvantages, contribute to shaping youth participation
in democratic life. In this context, this article has sought to explore the critical role of parental influences in
(re)producing ethnic inequalities in political engagement among late adolescents, using Lombardy (Italy) as a
case study.
This article makes several contributions to the literature. First, it helps to address the knowledge gap on the
experiences of immigrant descendants in Italy, a key EU host country for non‐national children. While research
on the ethnic penalty in areas like education, labour, and health has mainly focused on North and Western
Europe, studies on Southern European countries, including Italy, remain limited. This is due to the relatively
recent influx of immigrant families, with their descendants still young, having arrived mainly in the past three
decades (Gabrielli & Impicciatore, 2022).
Second, it provides original probabilistic survey data on the political incorporation of children of immigrants
in Italy, a topic that remains underresearched, especially using quantitative methods (Riniolo & Ortensi,
2021). Despite the growing activism among the second generation in Italy (Daher & Nicolosi, 2023; Milan,
2022; Riniolo, 2023), there is a significant lack of reliable statistical data, particularly on late adolescence and
early adulthood, critical periods for the emergence of political engagement inequalities (Janmaat & Hoskins,
2022). By using multistage sampling (classes, schools), we were able to consider parental influences
alongside contextual factors such as the political climate in the classroom and municipal electoral
competitiveness. This approach addresses a key challenge in political socialisation research, especially in the
absence of longitudinal or experimental designs, by isolating the family effect from other influences
(Koskimaa & Rapeli, 2015; Quintelier, 2015; Riniolo & Ortensi, 2021).
Third, this article points out how measures of SES, especially parents’ education level, are associated with
political engagement in specific ways for children of immigrants. Several studies on youth political
engagement have highlighted the key role of social stratification (Grasso & Giugni, 2022). Based on these
general patterns, it could be argued that the lower level of political engagement among children of
immigrants is primarily due to the multiple SES disadvantages they face, which indirectly affect the political
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 20
socialisation process. However, the data presented here indicate that the positive relationship between
parental education and political engagement only holds for native‐born Italians. This may be because many
highly qualified immigrants in Italy, particularly from non‐EU countries, are employed in low‐skilled sectors
such as agriculture, family caregiving, or maintenance (Panichella et al., 2021). This phenomenon of
“overqualification” or “underemployment” is driven by factors such as the non‐recognition of foreign
qualifications, labour market discrimination, and language barriers. As a result, education does not serve as a
status booster for immigrants. Moreover, many immigrants obtain their educational qualifications in
countries other than Italy, which means they often lack exposure to the civic education component of the
Italian curriculum. This finding aligns with similar results in the US where parental education seems to be
unrelated to political interest and voting for Latino and Asian children of immigrants (Humphries et al., 2013).
Similarly, parental education has no association with second‐generation voting and political interest in the
UK (Borkowska & Luthra, 2024). Further research, using larger samples of children of immigrants in Italy, is
needed to determine whether the lack of an effect of parental education on children’s political engagement
is consistent across the main immigrant groups in Italy, such as those of Romanian, Albanian, Moroccan, and
Chinese origin.
Finally, our study has confirmed the key role of family political discussions for both native‐born Italians and
children of immigrants, even though parental SES influences political engagement differently across these
groups. This finding aligns with extensive literature highlighting family discussions as a vital socialising factor
that fosters political interest and participation, regardless of the family’s migration background. However,
the study has also shown a difference in the impact of parent–child political alignment. While the political
agreement between parents and children strongly influences the political engagement of native‐born Italian
youth, it has a weaker effect on children of immigrants.
To further explore this issue, we categorised migrant families based on both religion and the political regime
of their country of origin. The analysis revealed that the political regime variable, more than religion, plays
a significant role in shaping the relationship between child–parent political alignment, political discussion at
home, and children’s political engagement. The gap between native‐born children and children of immigrants
was found to be larger when parents come from countries with political systems that differ markedly from
Italy’s. This pattern, however, is not necessarily linked to the non‐democratic nature of the regime but rather
to differences in party systems and ideological frameworks. For instance, the political meanings of terms like
“left” and “right” can differ substantially between Eastern and Western European contexts. These findings
align with existing research suggesting that the transmission of political knowledge from parents to children,
as outlined in the traditional model of youth political socialisation (Jennings et al., 2009), is often “disrupted”
in immigrant families due to international influences (Borkowska & Luthra, 2024) and may be shaped by the
political culture of the parents’ country of origin (Dinesen & Andersen, 2022; Lazarova et al., 2024).
While the results are consistent with our hypotheses, further research is required to explore these dynamics
in greater depth. A key limitation of this study is that the parental information was gathered indirectly
through their children. Consequently, the religion reflected in the analysis corresponds to that of the child,
and we lack important information (Li & Jones, 2020) on when the parents migrated to Italy. A more detailed
classification of political regimes would benefit from considering the regime type in place in the country of
origin before emigration.
Polics and Governance •2025 •Volume 13 •Article 9282 21
In conclusion, this study offers valuable insights into political transmission in Italy, highlighting differences
between native‐born and immigrant children, while acknowledging the limitations of cross‐sectional data.
While we proposed a unidirectional influence from parents to children, in which family discussions promote
political engagement, a converse interpretation is possible. The politically active children of immigrants,
whose schools may compensate for limited family socialisation (Riniolo, 2023; Terriquez & Lin, 2020), might
initiate political discussions at home and influence their parents’ political engagement (McDevitt & Chaffee,
2002; Pedraza & Perry, 2020). These alternative findings emphasise the need for further research,
particularly through longitudinal and experimental studies, to better understand the complex interactions
between family, school, and individual agency in shaping political engagement across different backgrounds.
Acknowledgments
We sincerely thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editors for their constructive and insightful
comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. We are also deeply grateful to all members of the MAYBE
project, particularly Alice Sanarico and Giuliana Parente, for their contributions throughout all project stages.
Special thanks go to Gabriella Scarcella (IPSOS) for her exceptional effort in supervising the school survey
fieldwork and ensuring the successful completion of data collection.
Funding
Data collection was funded by Fondazione Cariplo (Italy)—MAYBE project, ref. 2021‐1157 (Call Human and
Social Sciences in a Changing Society—Granting Schemes 2021. Scientific Research).
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
Data Availability
The dataset used is available at the UNIMI Dataverse for replication purposes: https://doi.org/10.13130/RD_
UNIMI/2UN0UZ
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the authors (unedited).
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About the Authors
Simona Guglielmi is an associate professor of sociology in the Department of Social and
Political Sciences at the University of Milan and a member of the spsTREND Lab. She is
the principal investigator for three research projects on youth and value change in Italy:
MAYBE, START, and YEP! She also serves as the local representative for the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP‐Italy) alongside A. Pedrazzani. Her research focuses on public
opinion, value change, national and European identities, and political culture.
Nicola Maggini is a tenured assistant professor of political science in the Department of
Political and Social Sciences at the University of Bologna. A member of CISE (Italian Centre
for Electoral Studies) and ITANES (Italian National Election Study), his research focuses
on socio‐political attitudes, voting behaviour, and party competition from a comparative
perspective. He has published articles in various international journals and is the author
of the book Young People’s Voting Behavior in Europe: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2016).
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