Framing effects (risk preferences reverse for gains vs. losses) and the Allais paradox (risk preferences reverse when an option is certain vs. not) are major violations of rational choice theory. In contrast to typical samples, certified public accountants who are competent in working with probabilities and expected values should be an ideal test case for rational choice, especially high scorers on the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Although dual-process theories emphasize numeracy and cognitive reflection, fuzzy-trace theory emphasizes gist-based intuition to explain these effects among cognitively advanced decision-makers. Thus, we recruited a high-numeracy sample of certified public accountants (N = 259) and students (N = 648). We administered classic dread-disease framing, business framing, and Allais paradox problems and the CRT. Each participant received a gain and loss framing problem from different domains (one disease and one business), with presentation order counterbalanced across participants. Order of Allais problems was counterbalanced within participants. Within-participants (cross-domain) framing, between-participants (within-domain) framing, and the Allais paradox were observed for both samples. Accountants did not show domain-specific attenuation (differentially smaller framing) for business problems. Despite large expected-value differences between Allais problem options, accountants’ choices resembled students’ choices. Contrary to dual-process theories, CRT scores were positively related to framing for students (more framing with higher CRT) and inconsistently related for accountants, but high scorers had robust framing effects; high scorers also showed the Allais paradox. Results are consistent with fuzzy-trace theory’s expectation that experts show framing effects because they rely primarily on gist-based intuition, not because they lack numeracy or cognitive reflection.
