Partisans of Color: Asian American and Latino Party ID in an Era of Racialization and Polarization

Abstract

What influences partisan allegiance among Asian Americans and Latinos? These fast-growing demographics are heavily populated by immigrants who were raised outside the United States, which limits parental socialization as the primary mechanism behind their partisan identities. We argue that contemporary Asian and Latino partisanship is better understood in a context characterized by racialization and polarization. Asian and Latino adults regularly navigate the straits between their racial and American identities—two categories, sorted along partisan lines, that shape their sense of belonging in the US. We hypothesize that Asian and Latino adults generally prioritize their racial or national identity, which affects the intensity of their allegiance to Democrats or Republicans. Leveraging major Asian and Latino surveys since 2006 (N = 20,327), we uncover wide heterogeneity in identity prioritization, with 27% of Asian and Latino adults privileging their American identity over their racial one. Greater prioritization of one’s racial (versus national) identity is significantly associated with Democratic (versus Republican) allegiance (meta-analyzed d ~ 0.30). These patterns also emerge at an automatic level via Implicit Association Tests (IATs). Across two experiments (N = 2,920) we then isolate one possible mechanism: Asian and Latino adults who feel their prioritized identity is overlooked signal their preferred attachment through their partisan allegiance.

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Partisans of Color: Asian American and Latino Party ID in an Era of
Racialization and Polarization
EFRÉN PÉREZ University of California, United States
JESSICA HYUNJEONG LEE College of the Holy Cross, United States
GUSTAVO MÁRTIR LUNA University of California, Los Angeles, United States
What influences partisan allegiance among Asian Americans and Latinos? These fast-growing
demographics are heavily populated by immigrants who were raised outside the United States,
which limits parental socialization as the primary mechanism behind their partisan identities.
We argue that contemporary Asian and Latino partisanship is better understood in a context characterized
by racialization and polarization. Asian and Latino adults regularly navigate the straits between their
racial and American identities—two categories, sorted along partisan lines, that shape their sense of
belonging in the US. We hypothesize that Asian and Latino adults generally prioritize their racial or
national identity, which affects the intensity of their allegiance to Democrats or Republicans. Leveraging
major Asian and Latino surveys since 2006 (N = 20,327), we uncover wide heterogeneity in identity
prioritization, with 27% of Asian and Latino adults privileging their American identity over their racial
one. Greater prioritization of one’sracial (versus national) identity is significantly associated with
Democratic (versus Republican) allegiance (meta-analyzed d~ 0.30). These patterns also emerge at an
automatic level via Implicit Association Tests (IATs). Across two experiments (N = 2,920) we then isolate
one possible mechanism: Asian and Latino adults who feel their prioritized identity is overlooked signal
their preferred attachment through their partisan allegiance.
What explains partisanship among Asian
Americans and Latinos? It is now difficult
for Democrats and Republicans to compete
electorally without adding voters from these diverse
groups to their electoral coalitions. Asian and Latino
adults trend toward Democrats (Abrajano and Alva-
rez 2010;Wongetal.2024), with roughly 66–75% of
them backing Democratic candidates in recent
national elections. Yet this figure masks enormous
heterogeneity. About 25 to 30% of Asian and Latino
adults regularly support Republican candidates
(Fraga, Velez, and West 2024; Wong and Shah
2021), and about 40% identify as Independents
(Doherty, Kiley and O’Hea 2018). We develop here
a new theory on the origins of Asian and Latino
partisanship against a backdrop of heightened polar-
ization and racial diversity, revealing how both groups
shape the vitality of partisan coalitions.
The conventional model of parental socialization
holds that US-born parents transmit their partisanship
to their children, which establishes life-long allegiance
to Democrats or Republicans (Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler 2002; Niemi and Jennings 1991). However,
many Asians and Latinos are immigrants (García 2012;
Wong et al. 2011), which dilutes this theory’s power.
According to 2015–2018 American Community Survey
data, about 28% of immigrants are from Asia, 25% are
from Mexico, and 25% are from other Latin American
countries. In 1960, only 4% of immigrants were Asian,
6% were Mexican, and 3% were from other Latin
American nations. Immigrants also have cultural and
historical experiences in their nations of origin that
shape their partisanship via non-parental channels
(Lien 2001; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Ramak-
rishnan 2005; Schmidt et al. 2010).
Newer theories fill some gaps in the parental socializa-
tion framework, but with mixed results. Hajnal and Lee
(2012) find that inconsistent and culturally insensitive
outreach to Asian and Latino adults by both parties leads
many of them to shun politics, leaving these populations
with large shares of unaffiliated voters. This yields less
crystallized partisanship in the aggregate (Dyck and
Johnson 2022) and reinforces the political marginalization
of many Asian and Latino voters (Ramírez 2015).
Other work suggests the high degree of partisan
unaffiliation among Asians and Latinos is partly an
artifact. Some of these analyses use survey items that
take noncompliant answers at face value (e.g., not
sure), which underestimates the share of firm partisans.
Corresponding author: Efrén Pérez , Full Professor, Departments
of Political Science and Psychology, University of California, Los
Angeles, United States, perezeo@ucla.edu
Jessica HyunJeong Lee, Assistant Professor, Department of Political
Science, College of the Holy Cross, United States, jhlee@holycross.
edu
Gustavo Mártir Luna , Doctoral Student, Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of California, Los Angeles, United States, gmartir@g.
ucla.edu
Received: June 12, 2023; revised: February 08, 2024; accepted:
September 20, 2024.
1

Stable Asian and Latino partisanship emerges when
conventional scales and scoring are used (Hopkins et al.
2020; see also Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016). This
work finds steadfast partisanship levels among Asians
and Latinos, even during Donald Trump’s nativist
attacks on these groups (Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez
2022; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020).
We synthesize this work to solve existing theoretical
impasses. One major hurdle is scholars’mixed attention
to the psychology of partisan identification among
people of color (PoC) (Pérez and Vicuña 2023). We
clarify some of this psychology by focusing on the
racialization of Asians and Latinos as foreigners and
outsiders (Zou and Cheryan 2017). Prior research finds
that Asian partisanship responds to whether their pan-
ethnic group is perceived to be included (excluded) in
Democratic (Republican) coalitions and discourse
(Chan, Kim, and Leung 2022; Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo
2017). This aligns with partisanship as rooted in the
mental associations people have between each party
and the social categories they value (e.g., race) (Green,
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). While racial exclusion
drives most Asians and Latinos toward Democrats
(Saavedra Cisneros 2018), many identify as Republi-
cans despite this party’s anti-PoC hostility (Abrajano
and Hajnal 2016). This suggests a need to explain how
Asians’and Latinos’racialization drives their partisan-
ship (Kim 2003).
Accumulating work indicates that parties are
increasingly sorted in ideological terms, with Demo-
crats becoming more homogenously liberal and Repub-
licans becoming more homogenously conservative
(Levendusky 2009; Mason 2018). This sorting has trans-
formed the racial imagery, symbols, and groups that are
mentally linked to each party. Democrats have become
more strongly associated with PoC and racially pro-
gressive politics, while Republicans have become more
strongly associated with whites and a preference for a
racially conservative status quo (Westwood and Peter-
son 2020; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022).
These long-run trends have implications for Asian
and Latino adults, who have varied priorities over their
racial and national identities (Silber Mohamed 2017).
1
We treat identity as the degree to which a person views
a category as central to who they are (Leach et al.
2008). For example, Latinos who prioritize their Amer-
ican (versus racial) identity are more supportive of
racially conservative candidates (Hickel et al. 2020).
Racially conservative Latinos also deny racism’s prev-
alence in society (Alamillo 2019). These trends align
with Republicans’hostility to racial diversity
(Abrajano and Hajnal 2016). This implies that Asians
and Latinos have digested some of the information
trickling from national polarization trends, but no avail-
able theory can explain it.
Our theory creates synergy between literatures on
the racialization of Asians and Latinos and the height-
ened polarization of America’s major parties. We claim
that the convergence of these forces incentivizes Asian
and Latino adults to identify as Democrats or Repub-
licans more strongly. Prior work shows that Asians and
Latinos are systemically racialized as foreigners and
outsiders to US society (Kim 2003; Zou and Cheryan
2017), yielding wide heterogeneity in terms of how
important their racial identity is compared to their
American identity (Du Bois 1903; Hickel et al. 2020;
Silber Mohamed 2017).
2
This prioritization of racial
versus national identity is consequential in two ways.
The greater importance of racial (over national )
identity indicates a distinct outlook about the role of
race in one’s life (Du Bois 1903; Hickel et al. 2020;
Silber Mohamed 2017). Prioritizing one’sracial identity
implies recognition of one’s subordinated status and
the importance of improving one’s lowlier position
through available means, including politics (Tajfel
1981). In contrast, prioritizing one’snational identity
implies an outlook that minimizes the role of race in
one’s life and focuses attention on bolstering a racially
conservative status quo for “real”Americans (Jost
2019; Sidanius and Pratto 2001). These categories
(race,nation) are now more tightly associated in mem-
ory with the two major parties due to polarization.
Democrats are construed as a diverse party that advo-
cates for PoC, while Republicans are viewed as a more
demographically homogenous coalition that cham-
pions racially conservative politics (Westwood and
Peterson 2020; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022). This
suggests that prioritization of one’sracial or national
identity might shape one’s allegiance to Democrats or
Republicans.
We test our claims across four studies. Study 1 draws
on major surveys of Asian and Latino adults since 2006
(N = 20,327), using meta-analytic methods to show that
prioritization of one’sracial (national) identity is sig-
nificantly correlated with Democratic (Republican)
allegiance (d~ 0.30). This suggests that identity prior-
itization is a real force among Asian and Latino adults.
Study 2 uses two Implicit Association Tests (IATs) to
show that Asians and Latinos automatically associate
members of their pan-ethnic group (e.g., Mexicans,
Chinese, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos) with Democrats—
and Americans with Republicans. This implies that
identity prioritization is deeply ingrained among Asians
and Latinos and not driven by social desirability bias.
Studies 3 and 4 probe one mechanism with two
1
Although it is plausible that polarization and racialization vary
significantly across and within eras, we note that polarization has
evolved incrementally across decades (Rosenfeld 2018), while racia-
lization is the result of a lasting hierarchy with small and gradual
perturbations over time (Zou and Cheryan 2017). Together, these
descriptive facts provide two relatively stable forces as a backdrop to
our theorizing.
2
W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) coined the term double consciousness,
which is the mental tug-of-war that Black people feel between their
racial and American identities. This double consciousness is a useful
lens to appreciate the duality that some Asians and Latinos sense.
Indeed, our theory draws on this tradeoff between racial and Amer-
ican identities or identity prioritization—and not the solo influence of
racial and American identities. For validation of this concept and
measure, see Hickel et al. (2020) and Hickel, Oskooii, and Colling-
wood (2024).
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
2

experiments that manipulate public depictions of one’s
pan-ethnic group as mainly concerned about racial
inequality versus national belonging. These treatments
deny the importance that some Asians and Latinos
place on their racial (or national identity). Asians and
Latinos who prioritize their racial identity react to
messages of racial inequality with greater Democratic
allegiance. However, those who prioritize their Amer-
ican identity react to the same message with greater
allegiance to Republicans. We conclude by discussing
the implications of our results.
CONCEPTUALIZATION, THEORY, AND
HYPOTHESES
Why do Asian and Latino adults prioritize their racial
or national identity more? We first clarify key terms in
our theory: race,pan-ethnicity,national origin, and
nationality. We define race as the socially constructed
designation of the US population based on perceived
physical characteristics, ancestry, and/or language
(APA Dictionary of Psychology 2024), which we oper-
ationalize via the US Census categories, Asian Ameri-
can and Latino (US Census Bureau 2022a).
3
The
Census deems Latino an ethnicity (US Census Bureau
2022b), which entails membership in a cultural group
(APA Dictionary of Psychology 2024). But social sci-
entists often treat Latino as a race, a convention we
follow here. This equivalence of Asian Americans and
Latinos is facilitated by the fact that both are pan-ethnic
categories that encapsulate varied national origin
groups (e.g., Asian Americans: Chinese, Filipinos,
Indians, etc.; Latinos: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans,
Cubans, etc.) (Espiritu 1992; Mora 2014). In turn,
nationality is an attachment to one’s country of resi-
dence—here, the US.
4
Our theory focuses on the racialization and stratifi-
cation of Asian and Latino individuals. Racialization is
a structural process that stigmatizes these groups and
subordinates them to whites (Omi and Winant 1986).
Stratification is the “sticky”social ordering of these
racialized groups relative to whites (Kim 2003;
Masuoka and Junn 2013). Although stratification pro-
duces stable social positions between whites and Asians
and Latinos, racialization allows this field of relations to
evolve—for example, when elites valorize Asians as
“model minorities”relative to Black people (Kim 2003;
2023) or praise Latinos as “hardworking”in implied
comparison to Black individuals (Fox 2004). These
discursive moves reposition, even if temporarily,
Asians and Latinos away from Black people and closer
to whites, which bolsters white supremacy.
Kim (2003) observes that minoritized groups
(i.e., Asians) are often triangulated between whites and
other PoC, which produces structural advantages
(“Asians as model minorities”) and disadvantages
(“Asians as perpetual foreigners”). Recent work inno-
vates this view by illuminating richer variation in the
social stations of minoritized groups (Chen and Hosam
2022; Kim 2023; Masuoka and Junn 2013). As Zou and
Cheryan (2017) explain, PoC in the US are marginal-
ized along two broad axes: how inferior–superior and
how foreign–American are they considered?
5
As Figure 1 shows, whites are the most superior and
American group. In turn, PoC are divided by their
varied stations in this order. While Black people are
sometimes considered a more American minority than
Latinos and Asians (Carter 2019), Black and Latino
people are often stereotyped as inferior compared to
Asians and whites. Further, although Asians are some-
times deemed superior to Blacks and Latinos, as indi-
cated by the model minority myth (Kim 2003), Asians
and Latinos are both stereotyped as perpetual for-
eigners (Lacayo 2017). This implies that Asians and
Latinos are subordinated to Black people. However,
this order also has an anti-Black pole on top of its pro-
white pillar (Davies 2022; Kim 2023). Consequently,
Asians and Latinos sometimes benefit from being for-
eign, but not Black (Chen and Hosam 2022; Kim 2023;
Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña 2023).
The marginalization of Asians and Latinos as for-
eigners makes their pan-ethnic identities highly acces-
sible because it regularly drives their exclusion (Pérez
and Vicuña 2023). Since the 1990s, this marginalization
has occurred in tandem with systemic surges in nativism
(Abrajano and Hajnal 2016), sexism (Frasure-Yokley
2018), homophobia/transphobia (Michelson and Har-
rison 2020), and Islamophobia (Lajevardi 2020).
Against these trends, pan-ethnic identities provide
Asians and Latinos with a sense of security and belong-
3
Per the US Census, individuals can report any race, but still report
Latino ethnicity. In this paper, the category Asian is inclusive of
Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders.
4
This does not require one to be a (naturalized) citizen of the US. It
only demands that an Asian or Latino person identify to some degree
as American. Note that identity is distinct from categorization, which
reflects classification into a group (Tajfel 1981).
5
Kim (2003) names these axes as superiority/inferiority versus
insider/foreigner.
FIGURE 1. Two Axes of Subordination
Asians Whites
Latinos Blacks
Inferior
Æ
Superior
Foreign
Æ
American
Note: Adapted from Zou and Cheryan’s(2017) Racial Position
Model (RPM).
Partisans of Color
3

ing as outsiders (Hogg, Hohman, and Rivera 2008),
plus an outlook that enshrines the role of race and
racism in their lives (Espiritu 1992; Mora 2014). For
many Asians and Latinos, their pan-ethnic identity is
a high priority because it is central to their lives
(Ethier and Deaux 1994). Although many Asians and
Latinos prefer to define themselves by national origin
(e.g., Chinese, Mexican), rather than pan-ethnicity
(i.e., Asian, Latino) (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010;
Schmidt et al. 2010; Wong et al. 2011), we reason that
in national politics, Asian and Latino are the relevant
categories, with national origin groups cognitively sub-
sumed under pan-ethnic categories (e.g., Asian = {Chi-
nese, Indian…}; Latino = {Mexican, Cuban…}) (Pérez
2021). Since pan-ethnic and national origin identities
are believed to converge and align with the Democratic
party (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016), it is plausible
that identity prioritization also extends to national ori-
gin attachment (relative to American identity), which
we explore in Study 1.
Still, not all Asians and Latinos prioritize their pan-
ethnic identities (Hickel et al. 2020). This can be partly
explained by demographics within these groups, where
rootedness in the US (e.g., nativity, immigrant genera-
tion, age) predisposes some individuals to value their
American identity more (e.g., Abrajano and Alvarez
2010; Wong et al. 2011). But there are also major
systemic forces that encourage some Asians and Lati-
nos to prioritize their American identity. As Sidanius
and Pratto (2001) observe, racial hierarchies are sus-
tained by a consensus between the oppressors and
some of the oppressed. This arises for two reasons.
First, despite the benefits of identifying with a minor-
itized ingroup, it also poses risks, such as a chronic lack
of social respect, which negatively affects some people’s
well-being (e.g., low self-esteem) (Huo and Binning
2008). Thus, some minoritized individuals look for
paths out of this marginalization, such as identifying
with a higher-status group like Americans.
6
For instance, Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña (2023)
establish that some Latinos are motivated to prove
their worth as new Americans, leading them to express
racism toward Black people despite their shared station
as inferior groups (Figure 1). Indeed, inclusion in a
higher-status group (American), no matter how tenu-
ous, often drives individuals to sharpen the boundaries
between “us”and “them”(Pickett and Brewer 2005).
This implies that some Asians and Latinos will priori-
tize their American identity to counter their racial
subordination, but at the expense of bolstering the
larger system of oppression against non-Americans
(Jost 2019), which includes their pan-ethnic groups
(Hickel et al. 2020). Although American identity pro-
vides these individuals with greater prestige and a sense
of belonging, it also desensitizes them to the welfare of
non-Americans, including their own pan-ethnic groups
(Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2015). We therefore
hypothesize that the racial stratification of Asians and
Latinos produces significant variation in their prior-
itization of their racial or American identity (H1).
Given the heterogeneity between Asians and Lati-
nos in terms of their arrival to the US, their geo-
graphic spread, cultural nuances (e.g., common
Latino language; no common Asian language), and
their distinct treatment by US institutions (Schmidt
et al. 2010), we expect some variation in the size of
this relationship.
But how does this identity preference relate to
Asians’and Latinos’partisan allegiance? Democrats
and Republicans have become more racially and ideo-
logically homogenous than before (Levendusky 2009;
Mason 2018). This process yields two implications we
exploit. First, polarization has yielded clearer stereo-
types about who comprises each party and what it
stands for (Ahler and Sood 2018; Westwood and Peter-
son 2020). People have racialized images about Dem-
ocrats and Republicans (Zhirkov and Valentino 2022),
with the former perceived as intertwined with PoC and
the latter with whites, the “real”Americans (Danbold
and Huo 2015). Alas, both whites and PoC associate the
category, American, with whites (Devos and Banaji
2005).
These mental schemas indicate clear mental links
between parties and racial and national symbols. Dem-
ocrats privilege the identities of racially minoritized
supporters, while Republicans enshrine American
identity among their rank and file. Each party also
has different visions about race in US society. Demo-
crats widely recognize the continued influence of prej-
udice in US politics and broadly advocate for a racially
inclusive society, while Republicans downplay racism’s
prevalence and advocate for a polity that excludes
sundry outgroups, including racial ones (Abrajano
and Hajnal 2016). This suggests two party alternatives
for Asians and Latinos: Democrats who privilege racial
liberalism or Republicans who espouse racial conser-
vativism. Thus, we predict that Asians’and Latinos’
partisan allegiance is influenced by how much weight
they place on their racial or national identity (H2).
Asians and Latinos who privilege their racial
(national) identity will report stronger allegiance to
Democrats (Republicans).
Finally, we explain when identity prioritization is
activated. Many Asians and Latinos trend toward
Democrats because their racial identity is central to
them (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Wong et al. 2011).
Yet it is also true that many Asians and Latinos deem
their American identity just as important, if not more
(Silber Mohamed 2017). This means each party’s image
as the home of PoC (Democrats) or Americans
(Republicans) risks being misaligned with Asians’and
Latinos’own identity priorities. This misalignment is
called categorization threat (Branscombe et al. 1999),
and it reflects the cognitive discomfort one feels when
classified into a group against one’s preferences. For
example, Latinos who prioritize their American iden-
tity will experience categorization threat if they feel
6
Many forms of national attachment exist, including patriotism,
nationalism, and nativism (Carter and Pérez 2016; Huddy and Khatib
2007). We focus on American identity because it is the least ideolog-
ically and racially skewed form of national attachment, broadly
endorsed by Democrats and Republicans, and by whites and PoC
(Huddy and Khatib 2007).
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
4

social pressure to align with Democrats, like most of
their co-ethnics, prompting them to express Republican
allegiance. Thus, categorization threat should activate
one’s prioritized identity (racial, national), leading
Asian and Latino adults to adjust their partisanship in
line with it (H3).
Table 1 displays our hypotheses. Study 1 evaluates
(H1-H2) with analyses of surveys on Asian and Latino
adults since 2006, including a meta-analysis. Study
2 uses a pair of IATs to further assess (H2) by reveal-
ing the automaticity of identity prioritization. Studies
3–4 use two experiments testing for identity prioritiza-
tion’s moderating influence on Asian and Latino par-
tisanship (H3).
Studies 1 and 2: Identity Prioritization and Its
Association with Asian and Latino Partisan
Allegiance
To test H1 and H2, Study 1 assembled major publicly
available population surveys of Asian American and
Latino politics since 2006. Our efforts yielded N =
20,237. The inclusion criteria for this analysis were
two-fold. First, surveys had to include large numbers
of Asian and Latino adults to analyze (N ≥500 per
group). Second, surveys had to contain items to oper-
ationalize our main variables, identity prioritization and
partisan self-identification. This yielded (1) the 2006
Latino National Survey (LNS) (N = 8,634); (2) the
2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) (N =
5,159); (3) the 2012 American National Election Study
(ANES) (N = 1,005 Latinos); (4) the 2016 Collabora-
tive Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) (N =
3,055 Asians and N = 3,002 Latinos); and (5) the 2020
Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (N =
3,956 Asians and N = 4,585 Latinos).
Our preregistered analyses of these surveys involved
linearly predicting expressed allegiance to the Demo-
cratic (Republican) party based on one’sidentity prior-
itization, holding constant differences in perceived
discrimination, ideology, church attendance, educa-
tion, nativity, gender, and age (Supplementary SI.1).
We also undertake a preregistered meta-analysis of
these surveys to estimate a common trend among them
(Supplementary SI.1). We measured partisanship with
a 7-point scale arranging individuals in terms of
strength of identification as Democrats (Republicans),
with those indicating “independence”arrayed as par-
tisan leaners upon further prompting (Supplementary
SI.2). Substantial shares of respondents indicated no
partisan affiliation in the 2006 LNS. They are excluded
from our analyses because their replies were not fur-
ther probed for partisan leanings, leaving us with N =
5,802. Throughout, we rescale partisanship to a 0–1
range, where higher values indicate greater Democratic
self-identification.
Our key predictor is identity prioritization. Except
for the 2008 NAAS, we measured it by differencing
pairs of pan-ethnic and American identity items
(Supplementary SI.2).
7
For example, in the 2012
ANES, Latinos were asked, separately, “How impor-
tant is being [an American/Hispanic]toyou
personally?”, with replies arrayed from 1 (extremely
important) to 5 (not at all important). We recoded
each variable so that higher values indicate more
importance. We then subtracted one’s importance
score for American identity from one’s importance
score for racial identity. Thus, Identity prioritization
=Racial identity –American identity. Positive scores
reflect prioritization of one’sracial identity as Asian
or Latino, while negative values indicate prioritization
of one’sAmerican identity. We rescale this variable to
a0–1 range. (Supplementary SI.3) describes the cod-
ing of our covariates, also on a 0–1 range. Our coeffi-
cients reflect percentage-point shifts. In all our
studies, the reported p-values are two-tailed. We
advise readers to interpret these analyses as correla-
tional and suggestive of our proposed mechanism,
rather than causal and strictly unidirectional.
STUDY 1 RESULTS
Table 2 displays mean identity prioritization scores in
each survey (in raw form), along with their standard
deviations. Across all samples, reliable variation exists
in the degree of identity prioritization among Asians
and Latinos. Here, a value of zero indicates no prior-
itization of either pan-ethnic or national identity. We
generally observe a modest preference for one identity
over the other, with variation around each mean.
Indeed, the average prioritization of pan-ethnic iden-
tity over American identity varies by year, survey, and
sampled population. This aligns with the situational
salience of identities (Turner et al. 1987), while
highlighting possible historical, cultural, and demo-
graphic nuances between Asians and Latinos
(Schmidt et al. 2010).
TABLE 1. Hypotheses About Identity
Prioritization and Asian and Latino
Partisanship
(H1) Significant variation in Asian and Latino
individuals’prioritization of their racial versus
American identity.
(H2) Asian and Latino partisanship is significantly
affected by the weight they assign their racial
versus national identity.
(H3) Categorization threat activates identity
preferences, leading Asian and Latino adults to
express their partisanship in line with them.
7
The 2008 NAAS does not contain identity importance items. Thus,
we gauge identity prioritization with an item on Asian American
linked fate (to gauge pan-ethnic ID) and perceived commonality with
whites (i.e., to gauge American ID). The latter operationalization is
justified based on Devos and Banaji (2005), who find that the
category American is strongly associated in memory with the cate-
gory White. We distinguish these items, similar to our measurement
strategy described in the text.
Partisans of Color
5

These patterns align with prior analyses of identity
prioritization among Latinos (Hickel et al. 2020), but
here, we broaden this evidence to multiple survey
samples, time periods, and populations (i.e., Asian
Americans). The last column in Table 2 formally sup-
ports H1. The t-tests indicate we can confidently reject
the null that no systematic differences in identity prior-
itization exist among Asian and Latino adults. Consis-
tent with our theoretical discussion, older, US-born
Asians and Latinos are less likely to prioritize their
pan-ethnic identity over their American identity (see
results in Supplementary SI.4).
Our next hypothesis (H2) is that these individual
differences in identity prioritization are meaningfully
associated with Asian and Latino adults’expressed
allegiance to Democrats (Republicans). Table 3 supports
this claim, with complete results in Supplementary SI.5.
Across samples, we find a consistently positive, substan-
tively meaningful, and generally reliable association
between identity prioritization and partisan allegiance
among Asian American and Latino adults.
Supplementary SI.6 reports provisional results showing
similar patterns when identity prioritization is measured
with items on national origin identity (e.g., Mexican)
rather than pan-ethnic identity (i.e., Latino).
Table 3 also reveals some hints that the associations
between identity prioritization and partisan allegiance
have increased over the period under analysis and that
the observed associations are generally stronger for
Latinos than Asian Americans. The latter might stem
from population differences (e.g., more foreign-born
Asian Americans than Latinos) and/or contextual var-
iation (e.g., more consistent partisan outreach during
recent presidential elections among Latinos, than
Asians) (Schmidt et al. 2010).
Our analyses reveal associations ranging from a low
of about 7 percentage points to a high of 25 percentage
points. These patterns are independent of our covari-
ates, which means that having knowledge of Asian and
Latino adults’identity prioritization helps to reliably
predict the strength of partisan allegiance among
them.
8
Table 3’s last two rows report diagnostics from sen-
sitivity analyses for observational analyses like these
(Cinelli and Hazlett 2020). Each regression’s robust-
ness value (RV) indicates the percentage of residual
variance of identity prioritization and partisanship that
would bring our estimated effect to zero. In turn, the
robustness value for the t-value of each point estimate
(RV
α= 0.05
) indicates the minimum strength of associ-
ation (in terms of partial R
2
) that would bring our point
estimates into a range where they are no longer statis-
tically distinguishable from zero. Looking at the left-
most entry for Asians in Table 3 (under RV), we see
that an unobserved confounder would need to explain
at least 4.99% of the residual variance of our identity
prioritization predictor and our partisanship outcome
to reduce that estimated effect to zero. The entry below
that (under RV
α= 0.05
) indicates that unobserved con-
founders would need to explain at least 1.77% of the
residual variance in identity prioritization and partisan-
ship for us to be unable to reject the null (at p< 0.05)
that the effect of identity prioritization is equal to zero.
These diagnostics suggest the estimated effects of iden-
tity prioritization are reasonably robust to confounding.
Nevertheless, they do not provide evidence of a causal
and/or a unidirectional relationship in these cross-
sectional data.
Given the variability around identity prioritization’s
effects, we undertake a preregistered meta-analysis,
which estimates the average association, net of
differences in survey samples under analysis (Goh,
Hall, and Rosenthal 2016)(https://osf.io/6tfh5/;
Supplementary SI.1). This approach utilizes a
precision-weighted estimate of the association
between identity prioritization and expressed partisan-
ship across survey samples. Figure 2 displays these
associations, with a meta-analyzed estimate of 0.149,
SE =0.008, p< 0.001. We convert this into a d-value,
whichisinstandarddeviationunits.Ourmeta-
analyzed d-value of 0.29 suggests that a unit increase
in the prioritization of one’sracial identity (versus
TABLE 2. Significant Heterogeneity in Asian and Latino Identity Prioritization
Survey (Population) Mean (Std. Dev.) Range (raw) One-sample t-test (null: no ID prioritization)
2008 NAAS (Asians) −0.450 (1.469) −3to3 t
3,972
=−19.321, p< 0.001
2016 CMPS (Asians) −0.170 (.772) −3to3 T
3,024
=−12.126, p< 0.001
2020 CMPS (Asians) 0.784 (1.536) −4to4 t
3,659
= 30.868, p< 0.001
2006 LNS (Latinos) 0.570 (1.275) −3to3 t
8,188
= 40.493, p< 0.001
2012 ANES (Latinos) −0.438 (1.447) −4to4 t
917
=−9.169, p< 0.001
2016 CMPS (Latinos) −0.151 (.906) −3to3 t
3,002
=−9.123, p< 0.001
2020 CMPS (Latinos) 0.888 (1.561) −4to4 t
3,374
= 33.060, p< 0.001
Note: Positive values in identity prioritization indicate greater weight on one’s racial versus American identity. All significance tests are
two-tailed.
8
Although identity prioritization, as a concept, requires that we
difference our measures of Latino (Asian) and American identities
to capture an individual’s tradeoff between both categories,
Supplementary SI.5.1 shows that in our available datasets, these two
identities are differentially associated with pro-Democratic partisan-
ship, as one might expect. Besides more faithfully measuring identity
prioritization, our measure of this concept has the added benefit of
reducing random and systematic (i.e., method artifact) measurement
error via the differencing procedure we use (Kinder and Kam 2009).
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
6

American identity) heightens one’s expressed alle-
giance to the Democratic party by about one-third of
a standard deviation, which we interpret as substan-
tial, since partisan identities are characterized as being
difficult (though not impossible) to shift, given their
stability (Egan 2020; Hopkins et al. 2020). These
layers of evidence support (H2): identity prioritization
is meaningfully associated with Asian and Latino
partisanship.
Still, our analyses here rest on self-reported data,
which means the correspondence between identity pri-
oritization and partisan allegiance might be affected by
social desirability pressures to express one’s allegiance
with a certain party (e.g., “since most Latinos are
Democrats, then I, as a Latino, should also say I’ma
Democrat”). Study 2 throws light on this possibility by
digging deeper into the automaticity of identity priori-
tization among Asians and Latinos.
STUDY 2: IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TESTS
(IATs)—PAN-ETHNICS|DEMOCRATS
VERSUS AMERICANS|REPUBLICANS
We further evaluate (H2) with a pair of IATs that use
reaction times (in milliseconds) to gauge how automat-
ically people associate pairs of categories in memory
(Theodoridis 2017) (preregistration in Supplementary
SI.7). A virtue of IATs is that they are less prone to
social desirability bias than self-reports since one’s
ability to control responses is short-circuited through
this rapid, timed sorting task (Pérez 2013).
We conducted our IATs among Asian and Latino
undergraduates in a laboratory at a major public
university on the West Coast during May 2023. Par-
ticipants were recruited from political science classes
and provided with two extra credit points in their
course in exchange for their participation. After con-
senting to participate via an information sheet
emailed to them, participants chose a convenient time
tovisitourlabtocompleteanIAT.TheseIATs
estimate the degree to which Asians (N = 39) auto-
matically associate (1) members of their pan-ethnic
group (e.g., Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, etc.) with
Democrats or Republicans;and(2)Americans with
Democrats and Republicans (Supplementary SI.7
contains stimuli). The same logic was adapted to
Latinos (N = 32) (e.g., Mexicans, Puerto Ricans,
etc.). While sample sizes for these IATs are small,
IAT effects are often large (d> 0.80), so they require
fewer observations to detect (Pérez 2013). Even with
our sample sizes, our power to detect a large and
reliable effect (d> 0.80) is 0.83.
9
Since the order of the IATs’classification pairs used
by participants are randomly assigned, each IAT is a
within-subjects experiment, with the estimated quan-
tity being a D-value ranging from −2to2.Positive
TABLE 3. Prioritization of Pan-Ethnic ID (over American ID) Predicts Democratic Partisanship Among Asians and Latinos
Dependent Variable: Democratic Partisanship
2008 NAAS
(Asians)
2016 CMPS
(Asians)
2020 CMPS
(Asians)
2006 LNS
(Latinos)
2012 ANES
(Latinos)
2016 CMPS
(Latinos)
2020 CMPS
(Latinos)
Pan-Ethnic ID
(American ID)
0.059** 0.075 0.121** 0.145** 0.251** 0.214** 0.191**
(0.020) (0.049) (0.023) (0.023) (0.062) (0.045) (0.027)
Constant 0.409** 0.195** 0.119** 0.446** 0.102 0.107** 0.139**
(0.024) (0.036) (0.023) (0.028) (0.056) (0.035) (0.025)
Adj. R
2
0.090 0.319 0.386 0.058 0.236 0.260 0.284
F-statistic 24.67 96.13 259.48 30.26 23.71 78.46 142.88
(14, 3319) (10, 2013) (8, 3280) (11, 5227) (10, 725) (10, 2190) (8, 2856)
N 3,334 2,024 3,289 5,239 736 2,201 2,865
Controls √√√√√ √ √
RV 4.99%3.47%8.77%8.35%13.95%9.66%12.39%
RV
α= 0.05
1.7%0.0%5.6%5.8%7.45%5.79%9.12%
Note: **p< 0.010 or better, two-tailed. All variables run along a 0–1 interval. Full results in Supplementary SI.5.
9
Our preregistration anticipated collecting N = 50 participants from
each group, but only 32 Latinos and 39 Asians voluntarily signed up
and completed their IAT in our lab, for a total N = 71.
Partisans of Color
7

values indicate a stronger association between the
hypothesized classification pair (i.e., Latinos|Demo-
crats versus Americans|Republicans) in comparison
toitsoppositepair(i.e.,Americans|Democrats ver-
sus Latinos|Republicans). In our IATs, participants
sat behind laptop computers and sorted stimuli
reflecting each category in these classification pairs
(e.g., Mexican flag, Democrat logo, Republican logo,
Chinese flag, American flag). Using one classifica-
tion pair, each participant made 40 classifications of
thesestimuli.Theyrepeatedthesamesorting
exercise another 40 times with the opposite classifi-
cation pair. For Asians, a positive D-value reflects
the degree to which Asians and Democrats,and
Americans and Republicans, are associated in their
memory. For Latinos, a positive D-value indicates
the extent to which Latinos and Democrats,and
Americans and Republicans, are associated in their
memory.
Figure 3 depicts our D-values, which are positive and
range from moderately strong (Asians D: 0.164, SD =
0.459) to very strong (Latinos D: 0.472, SD = 0.317). If
we divide each D-score by its standard deviation, we
yield a Cohen’sd, or standardized mean difference.
Cohen’sdvalues around 0.20, 0.50, or 0.80 or greater
are considered small, medium, and large, respectively
(Asian Americans d= 0.357; Latinos d= 1.489). The
stronger IAT effect for Latinos is reliably different at
the 1% level (M
Latinos
-M
Asians
=−0.307, SE = 0.096; t=
−3.210, df = 69, p< 0.002). These results suggest the
associations between Democrats and Asians and Lati-
nos—and between Republicans and Americans—are
automatic for these individuals, thus extending Study
1’s observational analyses.
While the evidence across Studies 1–2 supports our
first two hypotheses, what remains unclear are the
mechanisms behind this pattern—that is, under what
conditions does identity prioritization matter for Asian
and Latino partisanship? Answering this question is
partly complicated by some evidence suggesting that
partisan identities can influence racial identities
(Agadjanian and Lacy 2021; Hopkins, Kaiser, and
Pérez 2022). Thus, to validate this aspect of our think-
ing, we undertook a pair of experiments, which allowed
us to control the causal order between identity prioriti-
zation, partisan allegiance, and our proposed mecha-
nism connecting both.
STUDY 3: CATEGORIZATION THREAT AND
IDENTITY PRIORITIZATION AMONG LATINOS
Per our categorization threat hypothesis (H3), the
internal diversity of Asian Americans and Latinos
lends itself to depicting them as principally con-
cerned about their status as pan-ethnics or as Amer-
icans (Branscombe et al. 1999). That is, members of
these pan-ethnic groups possess, to varying degrees,
attributes reflecting their nominal membership in
two major categories with high partisan relevance:
Asian/Latino and American. This implies that char-
acterizations of each pan-ethnic population’s central
tendency and variance are somewhat malleable
(Turner et al. 1987). Thus, Asians and Latinos should
FIGURE 2. Percentage Point Increase in Democratic Allegiance by Greater Prioritization Racial ID
Over American ID (95%Confidence Bands)
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
8

be sensitive to whether they are depicted as a pri-
marily pan-ethnic or American group. This raises the
possibility that their identity priorities will be mis-
aligned with their ingroup’s characterization. If this
reasoning is valid, then depicting Asians and Latinos
as generally pan-ethnic (American) communities
should activate their identity prioritization (H3), with
identity prioritization moderating the impact that
being categorized as Asian/Latino or American has
on partisanship.
Our initial test of (H3) uses a preregistered exper-
iment with Latino adults (N = 1,572) (Supplementary
SI.8). Study 3 occurred online on Dynata’ssurvey
platform, which compensates participants via an
internal reward system akin to frequent flier miles.
Latino adults from Dynata’s respondent panel were
invited via email to participate in our study. After
providing informed consent, Study 3 collected demo-
graphic data and measured our moderator, identity
prioritization. In the middle of this pretreatment
module, participants completed identity centrality
items gauging the importance of four identities for
Latinos. In randomized order, these were one’s iden-
tity as American,asLatino,asafamily member,andas
aprofessional (Leach et al. 2008). Here, American
and Latino identities were gauged with two items
each,answeredona7-pointscale,withaneutral
option: (1) “Being [American/Latino] is personally
important to me;”and (2) My [American/Latino]
identity is central to who I am.”We use these pairs
of items to gauge each of these identities to increase
our measure’s reliability (α
American
=0.833,α
Latino
=
0.840). We build our identity prioritization measure by
taking participants’average Latino identity centrality
and subtracting from it participants’average Ameri-
can identity centrality. This produces an identity
prioritization measure ranging from +6 (prioritize
Latino identity) to −6(prioritizeAmerican identity),
where higher values indicate that Latinos prioritize
their pan-ethnic identity more than their American
identity. We leave this variable in its raw metric
(M = 0.328, SD = 1.696).
Following an attention check, participants were
randomly assigned to a control group or one of
two treatments. All three conditions exposed partic-
ipants to a mock news article from the Associated
Press, which presented an alternative perspective to
another point of view on a matter. In the control,
participants read a news brief about how, contra the
views of some people, the number of giant tortoises
around the globe is declining. In turn, our American
categorization treatment discussed how, despite
being characterized as a largely pan-ethnic popula-
tion, many Latinos place greater weight on their
American identity. In contrast, our Latino identity
treatment explained that, despite their similarity to
Americans in terms of some traits (e.g., optimism,
hardworking), many Latinos prioritize their pan-
ethnic identity.
10
Post-treatment, participants answered a conven-
tional 7-point scale of partisan identification. This
measure probes for partisan leaners, who are ulti-
mately included along this spectrum; and it aligns with
the same outcome analyzed in our observational ana-
lyses. We leave this partisanship measure, Democratic
allegiance, in its raw metric and code it so that higher
values indicate greater reported attachment to the
Democratic party (i.e., 1 to 7 range). Below, we report
fully interactive models where the impact of identity
prioritization on partisan allegiance is moderated by
FIGURE 3. D-values from Implicit Association Tests with Asian and Latino Participants
Note: For Asians, a positive D-value reflects the degree to which Asians and Democrats, and Americans and Republicans, are associated
in memory. For Latinos, a positive D-value indicates the extent to which Latinos and Democrats, and Americans and Republicans, are
associated in memory.
10
Each condition asked a factual manipulation check about its
assigned article. About 10.4% of Latino participants responded
incorrectly to this check, while about 8.6% of Asian participants
did so in Study 4. We analyze all respondents to avoid post-treatment
bias by dropping them (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018).
Partisans of Color
9

exposure to our Latino and American categorization
treatments.
11
STUDY 3 RESULTS
The statistical key to (H3) is a set of reliable interactions
indicating that the impact of identity prioritization on
Latinos’Democratic allegiance is moderated by our
Latino categorization and American categorization treat-
ments. Given Equation 1 below, we expect [β
4
]and[β
5
]
to be reliably different from zero, which would suggest
that the relationship between partisanship and identity
prioritization is dependent on each of our treatments.
YDemocrat ¼β1,Latino categorization þβ2,American categorization
þβ3,ID prioritization þβ4,Latino x prioritization
þβ5,American x prioritization þε
(1)
Table 4 provides raw evidence supporting (H3).
First, notice that in our control group, participants
who prioritize their Latino identity are more likely to
express Democratic allegiance by about one-third of a
point on our 7-point scale of partisanship (0.302, SE =
0.045, p< 0.001), which is a substantively meaningful
effect. Second, both interaction terms are highly reli-
able, suggesting the influence of identity prioritization
on expressions of Democratic allegiance depends on
how Latinos are categorized.
To better interpret the interactive effects from our
model, we depict the change in pro-Democrat
allegiance in light of a ± 1 SD in Latinos’identity
prioritization when exposed to Latino categorization
or American categorization. Given identity prioritiza-
tion’s coding, a positive SD indicates a shift toward
prioritizing one’sLatino identity, whereas a negative
SD decrease reflects a shift toward prioritizing one’s
American identity. The depicted quantities are raw
estimates drawn from these two subsets of data.
Panel A in Figure 4 reveals that when Latinos are
characterized as a largely ethnic population, those who
prioritize their Latino identity report stronger allegiance
to Democrats (0.674, SE = 0.158, p< 0.001), while those
who prioritize their American identity express reliably
weaker allegiance to Democrats (−0.351, SE = 0.125, p<
0.005). The difference between both marginal effects is
highly significant (F
(1, 1566)
= 44.26, Prob > F = 0.000).
Substantively, this pattern implies that when Latinos
are characterized as a largely pan-ethnic population,
those who prioritize their Latino identity express greater
allegiance to Democrats by two-thirds of a point (0.674)
on our partisanship 7-point scale. However, the same
treatment propels Latinos who prioritize their American
identity to express lower allegiance to Democrats by
about one-third (−0.351) of a point on the same partisan-
ship scale. This trend suggests that Latinos’reaction to
their group’s depiction as pan-ethnics affirms allegiance
to Democrats among those who prioritize their Latino
identity but undermines allegiance to the same party
among those who privilege their American identity. This
finding suggests that public characterizations of their
population as pan-ethnics stand to bring some Latinos
closer to the Democratic party, but at the expense of
losing some adherents—all because of how (mis)matched
their prioritized identity is to public characterizations of
their pan-ethnic population.
Panel B further shows that when Latinos are catego-
rized as Americans, those who prioritize their ethnic
identity express significantly weaker allegiance to
Democrats, a decrease of nearly half a point on our
partisanship scale (−0.459, SE = 0.149, p< 0.002).
However, among those who prioritize their American
identity, the categorization of Latinos as new Ameri-
cans propels them to express greater allegiance to
Democrats, an effect of about two-thirds of a point on
our partisanship scale (0.625, SE = 0.192, p< 0.001).
This shift in partisan allegiance is statistically reliable
(F
(1, 1566)
= 20.61, Prob > F = 0.000), indicating that
categorizing Latinos as Americans increases Demo-
cratic allegiance among those who prioritize their
American identity, but decreases it among those who
prioritize their pan-ethnic identity. Our next study eval-
uates whether these patterns also characterize identity
prioritization’s influence on Asians’partisanship.
STUDY 4: CATEGORIZATION THREAT AND
IDENTITY PRIORITIZATION AMONG ASIAN
ADULTS
Study 4 is a preregistered experiment with Asian adults
aiming to conceptually replicate Study 3’s findings
(S.9). Study 4 followed the same structure as Study
TABLE 4. Categorization as Latino or American
Activates Identity Prioritization Among Latinos
Democratic
allegiance (1–7)
Latino categorization 0.162
(0.120)
American categorization 0.083
(0.123)
Identity prioritization 0.302***
(0.045)
Identity prioritization x Latino
categorization
−0.250***
(0.067)
Identity prioritization x American
categorization
−0.320***
(0.070)
Constant 4.412***
(0.087)
N 1,572
Note: Entries are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) coefficients with
robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.050.
11
In Studies 3–4, we also measured expressive partisanship among
respondents. These items are part of a companion paper. These
expressive items always followed the conventional partisanship mea-
sure we analyze here, making our outcome here invulnerable to
possible mediation effects (Hayes 2022).
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
10

3 and also occurred online via Dynata’s survey plat-
form. Asian adults from Dynata’s respondent panel
were invited via email to participate in our study. After
providing their informed consent, we collected demo-
graphic data and our measure of identity prioritization,
which captures the degree to which Asian participants
place greater importance on their pan-ethnic versus
American identity. The primary difference between
Studies 3 and 4 arises from the specific content of our
manipulations, given that Asian Americans are consid-
ered a foreign, but superior minoritized outgroup and
Latinos are considered a foreign and inferior outgroup
(Figure 1).
After collecting demographic data, our measures of
identity prioritization (α
American
= 0.843, α
Asian
= 0.879),
and an attention check, participants were randomly
assigned to a control group or one of two treatments.
All three conditions, again, exposed participants to a
mock news article (attributed to the Associated Press)
that presented an alternative perspective to another
point of view on a matter. In the control, participants
read a news brief about how, contra the views of some
people, the number of giant tortoises around the globe
is declining. In turn, our American categorization treat-
ment discussed how, despite being characterized as a
largely pan-ethnic population, many Asian individuals
place greater weight on their American identity, as
evidenced by wealth-induced increases in consumer
purchases (which aligns with the construal of Asian
individuals as model minorities, relative to Latino and
Black people) (Kim 2003). In contrast, our Asian iden-
tity treatment explained that, despite their similarity to
Americans in terms of some traits (e.g., optimism,
hardworking), most Asians prioritize their racial
FIGURE 4. Latinos’Categorization as Pan-Ethnics Activates Their Identity Prioritization
Note: The marginal effects depicted here are from the model reported in Table 4.
Partisans of Color
11

identity, as evidenced by increasing hate crimes against
this population.
Post-treatment, participants answered a conven-
tional 7-point scale of partisan identification. We
again leave this partisanship measure, Democratic
allegiance, in its raw metric and code it so that higher
values indicate greater reported attachment to the
Democratic party (1–7 range). Below, we report fully
interactive models where the impact of identity prior-
itization on partisan allegiance is moderated by expo-
sure to our racial and American categorization
treatments.
RESULTS: STUDY 4
Similar to Study 3, we are looking for evidence that
identity prioritization is activated in light of Asians’
categorization as a primarily pan-ethnic or American
population. This entails reliable and substantively
meaningful interactions between identity prioritiza-
tion and assignment to each of our manipulations.
Table 5 provides our raw results, with some evidence
reaffirming (H3). In our control group, participants
who prioritize their Asian identity over their American
identity are more likely to express Democratic alle-
giance by about one-fourth of a point on our 7-point
scale of partisanship (0.267, SE = 0.051, p<0.001),
which is a substantively meaningful effect that is com-
parable to the one observed among Latinos in Study
3. Given that our constant (4.582) indicates a pro-
Democrat outlook, our average effect here suggests
an intensification of this allegiance based on one’s
identity prioritization.
What happens when we examine the activation of
identity prioritization in light of Asian adults’categori-
zation as a racial community? Very little, actually. In
both substantive and statistical terms, the interaction
between identity prioritization and Asian categorization
is essentially zero (−0.021, SE = 0.072, p< 0.769). Panel
AinFigure 5 confirms this null pattern, where the
difference between both depicted marginal effects is,
statistically, zero (β
1, racial categorization
+β
4, racial x prioritize
Asian ID
=−0.118, SE = 0.118, p< 0.321 versus β
1, racial
categorization
+β
5, racial x prioritize American ID =
−0.061, SE =
0.176, p< 0.728).
Interestingly, however, when Asian individuals are
categorized as new Americans,theiridentity prioriti-
zation levels behave similarly to what we observed
among Latinos under the same type of categorization
in Study 3 (Figure 4, panel B). The interaction
between identity prioritization and our American cat-
egorization treatment is highly reliable and meaning-
ful (−0.215, SE = 0.080, p< 0.001). Panel B in Figure 5
depicts this significant pattern. When Asian adults
who prioritize their Asian identity are categorized as
a primarily American population, they express
weaker allegiance to Democrats (−0.179, SE =
0.121, p< 0.139). In turn, when Asian adults who
prioritize their American identity are categorized as
Americans, they report reliably stronger allegiance to
the Democratic party (0.391, SE = 0.188, p< 0.038),
with this difference in marginal effects being signifi-
cantly different from zero (β
1, racial categorization
+
β
4, racial x prioritize Asian ID
=−0.179, SE = 0.121, p<
0.139 versus β
1, racial categorization
+β
5, racial x prioritize
American ID
= 0.391, SE = 0.188, p< 0.038; F
(1, 1662)
=
7.30, Prob > F, 0.007). Similar to Latinos, then, Asians
who value their American identity are more inclined
toward the Democratic party when their ingroup is
characterized as being composed of new Americans—
an effect that comes at the expense of weaker Dem-
ocratic allegiance among those Asian individuals who
prioritize the pan-ethnic identity.
MINI META-ANALYSIS OF STUDIES 3–4
Here, we formally probe for any summary trends
across our experiments by undertaking another pre-
registered mini meta-analysis, using Goh, Hall, and
Rosenthal’s(2016) template (Supplementary SI.9).
Table 6 reports a model based on a dataset that pools
Studies 3–4. This model estimates the same interactive
relationship in Tables 4 and 5, but tests whether
meaningful trends emerge across our pooled sample.
Readers will recall that Latinos’identity prioritiza-
tion was activated in the wake of their ingroup’s
racial categorization,butthesamepatternwas
absent among Asians under this same circumstance
(see Figure 4A versus Figure 5A). Consistent with
that mixed pattern, our meta-analysis here shows that
the impact of identity prioritization on Democratic
allegiance among Latino and Asian adults (0.290,
SE = 0.017, p< 0.001) is statistically similar across
our control group and racial categorization condition
(−0.161, SE = 0.109, ns). We cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the effect of identity prioritization on
Democratic allegiance in the control group versus
the racial categorization is zero (Χ
2(1)
=2.19,Prob>
Χ
2
= 0.139). This means identity prioritization’s
TABLE 5. Categorization as Asian or American
Activates Identity Prioritization Among Asians
Democratic
allegiance (1–7)
Asian categorization −0.089
(0.116)
American categorization 0.106
(0.118)
Identity prioritization 0.267***
(0.051)
Identity prioritization x Asian
categorization
−0.021
(0.072)
Identity prioritization x American
categorization
−0.215***
(0.080)
Constant 4.582***
(0.083)
N 1,668
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p< .001, **p< .050.
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
12

effects in light of racial categorization are specific
to Latinos and do not apply to Asians in our exper-
iments.
In contrast, the reader will recall that in light of
American categorization, we observed parallel pat-
terns in identity prioritization among Latinos and
Asians (see Figures 3B and 4B).Inthewakeof
American categorization, Latinos and Asians who
prioritize their pan-ethnic identity expressed weaker
allegiance to Democrats, while those who prioritize
their American identity reported significantly stron-
ger allegiance to Democrats. That pattern is borne out
by our meta-analysis: the effect of identity prioritiza-
tion on Latinos’and Asians’Democratic allegiance is
reliable in the control group (0.290, SE = 0.017, p<
0.001) and the American categorization condition
(−0.277, SE = 0.050, p< 0.001), with this difference
in effects being significantly different from zero
(Χ
2(1)
=30.52,Prob>Χ
2
= 0.001). This summary
pattern is depicted in Figure 6, indicating that expo-
sure to American categorization steers Latino and
Asian adults who prioritize their pan-ethnic identity
away from Democrats, but propels those who privi-
lege their American identity toward Democrats.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
We theorized and found that Asian and Latino adults
vary significantly in their identity prioritization (H1).
We also hypothesized and discovered that variation in
identity prioritization substantively predicts the
FIGURE 5. Asians’Categorization as Asians Activates Their Identity Prioritization
Note: The marginal effects depicted here are from the model reported in Table 5.
Partisans of Color
13

intensity of Asians’and Latinos’partisan allegiance,
with some evidence underlining its automatic nature
(H2). Finally, we clarified when identity prioritization
should affect Asian and Latino partisanship. Using two
experiments that induced categorization threat,we
found that Asians and (especially) Latinos react to this
sense of jeopardy by reaffirming their allegiance to
Democrats or Republicans.
We think a major implication of our work is the
underappreciated sensitivity that members of these
pan-ethnic populations have to how their respective
racial ingroups are characterized. It is a truism among
social scientists that Asians and Latinos are internally
diverse populations. And while that assertion is, on the
surface, correct, less understood is what this internal
diversity implies for the political incorporation of these
groups. Our findings underline one way this internal
heterogeneity can matter politically—the partisan alle-
giance that Asian and Latino individuals feel is shaped
by whether a party reflects the importance these indi-
viduals attach to their American or pan-ethnic identity.
If we make the reasonable assumption that most Asian
and Latino individuals trend toward the Democratic
party (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Wong et al. 2011),
our evidence implies that this steady drift toward the
major parties can be slowed or even reversed depend-
ing on whether Asian and Latino individuals believe
their more prioritized identity is overlooked. Of special
relevance here is the centrality of American identity
among significant shares of Asian and Latino individ-
uals. When these people believe their prioritized iden-
tity is overlooked, they become less enthusiastic
supporters of the Democratic party, the “natural”
home of their respective pan-ethnic population.
Against a backdrop of measurable gains by Republi-
cans among segments of these communities (Fraga,
Velez, and West 2024), our evidence points to the role
that identity prioritization might play in these evolving
dynamics.
Our results also suggest the value of sifting through
available models of partisanship formation in order to
make new connections. Various scholars of race and
politics have correctly noted that parental socialization
cannot fully explain partisanship among populations
with deep immigrant roots. Yet we think that in dis-
missing this element of that model, Race, Ethnicity, and
Politics (REP) scholars are also, incorrectly, too quick
TABLE 6. Does Racial (American) Categori-
zation Activate Identity Prioritization Across
Latinos and Asians?
Democratic
allegiance (1–7)
Racial categorization 0.047
(0.123)
American categorization 0.104***
(0.013)
Identity prioritization 0.290***
(0.017)
Identity prioritization x Racial
categorization
−0.161
(0.109)
Identity prioritization x American
categorization
−0.277***
(0.050)
Constant 4.497***
(0.084)
Note: N = 3,240. Entries are GLS coefficients from a random
effects model with robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.050.
FIGURE 6. Mini Meta-Analysis: Identity Prioritization Activated in Light of American Categorization
Among Latino and Asian Adults
Note: The marginal effects depicted here are from the model reported in Table 6.
Efrén Pérez, Jessica HyunJeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártir Luna
14

to dispense with all elements in this framework. In
particular, the role of social groups, parties, and the
mental associations between them offer a potential link
to how some PoC and white individuals learn to be
Democrats or Republicans. As Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler (2002) and others have taught us (Zhirkov
and Valentino 2022; Westwood and Peterson 2020),
individuals are attracted to specific parties based on
various social identities that are “owned”by each party.
The stability of partisanship, in turn, stems from the
strength and consistency of these associations over time.
Our studies indicate that many PoC adhere to this
cognitive process, too, where they associate their pan-
ethnic group with Democrats and Americans with
Republicans. Given the robust sense of partisanship
among PoC and the rich variation in it, our research
also suggests these trends are steady and long enough
for Asians and Latinos to have sorted themselves com-
fortably into respective Democratic and Republican
camps. As our nation continues to racially diversify,
political scientists will need to wrestle further with
whether standing models of political behavior should
be discarded in favor of new frameworks that reflect the
reality of specific communities of color or whether
revised, but more generic models can effectively accom-
modate the broad realities of a multiracial mass public.
One fruitful direction here is to consider the extent to
which identity prioritization is also influenced by party
competition and other dynamics. Consider Margolis
(2018), Egan (2020), and others (Agadjanian and Lacy
2021; Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez 2022), who all dem-
onstrate that under some conditions, partisan identities
can shape the strength and direction of one’s racial or
ethnic identity. This aligns with social psychological
research establishing the role of identity as both a cause
and an effect of intergroup dynamics (Doosje, Spears,
and Ellemers 2002). Consequently, while our evidence
supports the viability of identity prioritization as an
influence on partisan allegiance, more work is needed
on evaluating the path of influence from partisanship to
identity prioritization.
Another promising direction involves the tension
between partisanship’s stability among Asian Ameri-
cans and Latinos over time (Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez
2022; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020) and the shifts in
partisan identity observed here. Some of this disjunc-
ture is simply due to levels of analysis, where differences
between individuals can coexist with aggregate stabil-
ity, akin to models of macro- and micro-level politics
(Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002). Yet some of
this gap is likely theoretically meaningful, which should
encourage scholars to explore when and why
individual-level shifts in partisan identity among Asians
and Latinos translate into more durable, longer-run
shifts in the distribution of partisanship in these publics.
While our observational and experimental research
designs generally supported our hypotheses, this evi-
dence places a stronger emphasis on average correla-
tions or effects. This evidence should not be construed
as implying that there are no meaningful differences
detected between Asian Americans and Latinos,
which are to be expected given the heterogeneous
composition of each population (Schmidt et al. 2010)
and the varying efforts of Democrats and Republicans
in mobilizing these voters during presidential elections
(Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Chan, Kim, and Leung
2022; Fraga 2018; Fraga, Velez, and West 2024; Kuo,
Malhotra, and Mo 2017; Wong et al. 2011). Indeed, in
some instances, we find that some of our results are
relatively stronger for Latinos than Asian Americans,
which raises interesting questions on their own.
Although outside of the scope of this paper, we think
that, theoretically, these nuances reflect, to some
degree, variation in the intensity and consistency of
mobilization efforts aimed at these populations by
partisan and non-partisan operatives, as well as the
relatively unique historical experiences of these two
groups in the US (Fraga 2018; Fraga, Velez, and West
2024; Ramírez 2015; Schmidt et al. 2010; Wong 2005).
We encourage researchers to further leverage this
heterogeneity to yield more insight into partisanship’s
origins among Asians and Latinos.
Finally, we call attention to what our findings imply
about the heterogeneity of partisanship among Asian
Americans and Latinos. A panoramic view of partisan
identity within these two pan-ethnic populations indi-
cates a robust central tendency in favor of Democrats,
with 66%–75% expressing allegiance to this party and
acting on it during elections. But this consistent focus
on averages glosses over the nontrivial share of Asian
and Latino individuals who identify, enthusiastically,
with the Republican party. For those scholars who may
wonder why the share of Asian and Latino Republicans
is not lower, our findings point to identity prioritiza-
tion’s role. It suggests that the strong allegiance that
some Asians and Latinos express toward the Grand
Old Party (GOP) is less likely a function of false
consciousness, lack of knowledge, or misinformation,
and more likely rooted (at least partly) in the fact that
they perceive Republicans as the guardians and stew-
ards of Americans—a social identity that substantial
shares of Asians and Latinos deem central to them
(Silber Mohamed 2017). Without further attention to
this dynamic, scholars risk being surprised, repeatedly,
about the lack of enthusiasm for Democrats in some
elections among these populations or by the commit-
ment of some Asians and Latinos to a Republican party
that is outright hostile to racial diversity. Therefore, we
invite political scientists to continue probing the roots
and nature of partisan identity among members of
these two critical pan-ethnic populations.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please
visit http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424001217.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Research documentation and data that support the
findings of this study are openly available at the Amer-
ican Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.
org/10.7910/DVN/E8SFJP.
Partisans of Color
15

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare no ethical issues or conflicts of
interest in this research.
ETHICAL STANDARDS
The authors declare the human subjects research in this
article was reviewed and approved by the UCLA Insti-
tutional Review Board and certificate numbers are
provided in the supplementary information (SI.10).
The authors affirm that this article adheres to the
principles concerning research with human participants
laid out in APSA’s Principles and Guidance on Human
Subject Research (2020).
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