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Rebel victory and constitutional change

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Sally Sharif
Sally Sharif
Sally Sharif
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Ilia Murtazashvili at University of Pittsburgh
Ilia Murtazashvili
Jennifer Murtazashvili at University of Pittsburgh
Jennifer Murtazashvili
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Abstract

How do rebel regimes consolidate power while staying true to their revolutionary goals? Though some studies have found that revolutions can be efficiency-enhancing, our analysis of victorious rebellions from 1946 to 2021 and case studies from Ethiopia and Afghanistan finds that successful rebels establish constitutions that involve selective enforcement of property rights. Rebel-led constitutions tend to include provisions for private property rights that simultaneously empower the government to suspend these rights and expropriate property under broad justifications. Governance strategies post-victory include property insecurity as a tactic for maintaining political authority.
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Public Choice
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-025-01261-w
Rebel victory andconstitutional change
SallySharif1 · IliaMurtazashvili2· JenniferBrickMurtazashvili2
Received: 29 May 2024 / Accepted: 15 January 2025
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2025
Abstract
How do rebel regimes consolidate power while staying true to their revolutionary goals?
Though some studies have found that revolutions can be efficiency-enhancing, our analysis
of victorious rebellions from 1946 to 2021 and case studies from Ethiopia and Afghani-
stan finds that successful rebels establish constitutions that involve selective enforcement
of property rights. Rebel-led constitutions tend to include provisions for private property
rights that simultaneously empower the government to suspend these rights and expropri-
ate property under broad justifications. Governance strategies post-victory include property
insecurity as a tactic for maintaining political authority.
Keywords Rebel victory· Revolution· Property rights· Constitutional change· Ethiopia·
Afghanistan
JEL Classification B52· H1· K11· N40· P26
1 Introduction
While some revolutions, such as Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution, unfold peacefully,
others involve the violent overthrow of elites following protracted violent campaigns.
These events are categorized as “rebel victories” within the civil war literature. Such vic-
tories result in the fusion of military and political elites, often with former guerrilla com-
manders assuming key leadership roles (Levitsky & Way, 2022). This paper examines the
institutional outcomes of these regimes, specifically the relationship between rebel vic-
tories and the establishment of property rights frameworks. We argue that rebel regimes,
* Sally Sharif
sally.sharif@ubc.ca
Ilia Murtazashvili
ilia.murtazashvili@pitt.edu
Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
jbrick@pitt.edu
1 University ofBritish Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
2 University ofPittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
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