Subnational variations and the rule of law in Argentina

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Introduction
Macro-political and social processes like democratization, elite turnover, eco-
nomic development, and enforcement of the rule of law can vary enormously
within countries to the extent that this variation may be as sharp as the varia-
tion across countries. Recent research has shown important variations in politi-
cal competition and subnational elites, the enforcement of the rule of law, and
economic development. Each of these domains of subnational politics is usu-
ally studied relatively autonomously from each other. Yet subnational politi-
cal systems are best understood as entangled processes in which formal and
informal structures and practices combine to produce distinct outcomes. In this
context, who governs subnational entities and how lawfully they govern can
mark important dierences. This chapter is about how formal institutions and
informal practices come together to enable or inhibit the creation and perpetua-
tion of subnational political elites. It argues that there are two dierent strategies
through which subnational political elites seek to remain in control of provin-
cial politics. One is the creation of subnational political dynasties, where power
passes democratically from one relative to another, thus remaining in the family.
This allows members of the family to retain control of executive oce through
democratic means. The other involves governors’ attempts to seek reelection
beyond the term limits imposed by the provincial constitution through dubious
interpretations of provincial constitutional rules. When attempting this strategy,
incumbents are usually assisted by local high court rulings. However, these rul-
ings have generally been overturned by the Supreme Court. The chapter there-
fore explores the links between political elites and the judicialization of politics.
Some of the questions it seeks to address are: what strategies do provincial gov-
ernors use to remain in oce or maintain control of their subnational bastions?
When are conicts over who governs judicialized? What role do local courts
play and how does the Supreme Court exercise oversight?
Subnational political elites make decisions about policymaking in their dis-
tricts, and these decisions can have important developmental and governance
eects. Therefore, who governs is as important at the subnational level as it is at
the national level. However, the eects that political dynasties or governors who
6
Subnational variations and the rule of
law in Argentina
Political dynasties, elite turnover, and Supreme
Court oversight
Jacqueline Behrend
DOI: 10.4324/9781003519195-6
10.4324/9781003519195-6

88 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
Subnational variations
seek to remain in oce beyond their constitutional mandates have on regional
development are not linear. Continuity in oce may aid developmental projects
in some cases, but it may give rise to capture in others. Developmental elites
may be elected in districts that are pluralistic and have political alternation, but
elites in districts with less alternation and pluralism may also pursue develop-
mental policies. Such an assessment is beyond the aims of this chapter, but at
the end of the next section, I draw some insights into the diverse eects that elite
continuity can have on subnational development.
This chapter makes three main contributions to the study of subnational
democratization, political elites, and the rule of law. First, building on my previ-
ous work on political dynasties, it provides an overview of the political dynas-
ties that have governed Argentine provinces since re-democratization. Second,
it provides an empirical analysis of how governors have sought to perpetuate
their power by bypassing bans on their reelection with the help of local courts,
and how the Supreme Court has exercised oversight in each case. Finally, it
provides some insights into the links between political dynasties and subnational
economic development.
Political dynasties are informal structures that arise in democracy and become
entangled with formal democratic institutions. This is a complex and under-stud-
ied topic that is essential to understanding who governs at the subnational level
and how this aects subnational governance. The judicialization of politics and
the role of the Supreme Court allow us to see how conicts over who governs
and how many terms they can govern are resolved. Although provinces have a
substantial degree of autonomy to design their institutions and electoral norms,
the Supreme Court has intervened to settle disputes over conicting interpreta-
tions of local constitutions regarding incumbent governors’ reelection. The role
of courts at dierent levels of government varies greatly. While provincial high
courts have usually ruled in favour of incumbent governors, even when the con-
stitution clearly banned their reelection, the Supreme Court has usually exercised
oversight in cases where the constitutionality of a governor’s reelection was in
doubt. In these cases, its rulings were authoritative and usually uncontested.
Argentina has created a steady electoral democracy and reasonably function-
ing democratic institutions. However, at the subnational level, there is enormous
variation in political competition, economic development, and in the enforce-
ment of the rule of law. Subnational governments have the power to imple-
ment regional economic development strategies, and their capacity to do so is
increasingly shaped by subnational actors and conicts (Eaton, 2017). Informal
practices can strongly aect major policy areas of critical importance to the elec-
torate, and they are key to understanding why some provinces are able to deliver
a higher quality of democracy and to undertake development projects that
improve the lives of their citizens, while others are not. The subnational level
has received considerable attention in recent years through studies that show
how large-scale processes such as democratization, economic development,

Subnational variations 89
or political competition vary within countries as much as between countries
(Behrend, 2011; Behrend & Whitehead, 2016a, 2016b; Giraudy, Moncada &
Snyder, 2019). Scaling down to the subnational level (Snyder, 2001) is relevant
because it shows that aggregate measures do not accurately reect how important
processes unfold within countries and how heterogeneity within countries can
have various political and economic eects at the national level. In many coun-
tries across the world, the combined processes of democratization and decen-
tralization allowed local political elites to capture the provincial state (Kenawas,
2015). But even if they capture political oce, some political dynasties can also
promote subnational development. The link between the two – capturing politi-
cal oce and state capture – is neither unilinear nor straightforward and requires
careful assessment in each case.
Argentine provinces can be seen as a laboratory of how diverse political
institutions and economic structures can produce varying outcomes within a
single democratic country. Argentina has 24 autonomous subnational units –
23 provinces and the autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Although the national
Constitution has preeminence and all provincial constitutions must abide by the
republican form of government, there is signicant institutional variation and a
notable degree of subnational autonomy in policymaking. In this context, the
Supreme Court intervenes regularly and substantively to guarantee the rule of
law.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the rst section, I observe the variation
in the types of political elites that arose in dierent provinces after democratiza-
tion. I focus particularly on family links and the existence of political dynasties
in subnational executives. I put forth some ideas about the importance of sub-
national political elites for the promotion of subnational economic development
but highlight that there is no evidence of a causal link between political dynas-
ties and the type of development policies pursued. In the following section, I
focus on how the Supreme Court has exercised oversight in subnational electoral
conicts. The nal section concludes.
Subnational political dynasties and democracy in contemporary
Argentina
Democratization in Argentina did not put an end to political dynasties. As in
many other countries within Latin America and other world regions, the evi-
dence presented in this chapter shows that democracy sometimes aids the estab-
lishment of new subnational political dynasties. The geographic extension of
dynasties to so many countries and regions across the world casts doubt on
the assumption that political families and dynasties develop in weakly institu-
tionalized or economically underdeveloped settings alone (Kurtz 1989, 2001).
Moreover, families are not merely present in recent or developing democracies
but also in established and long-standing ones.1 Political families can slant the

90 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
electoral playing eld and make it more dicult for political actors who are not
part of a family network to compete in elections. They can also capture the state.
But they may also pursue policies that improve citizens’ well-being.
Political dynasties matter in a democracy for several reasons. In the rst place,
the question of “who governs” (Dahl, 1961) and who gets elected is central
because it indicates how plural and permeable to dierent interests a political
system is. The existence of political dynasties in a democracy could be attributed
to the fact that politicians’ ospring, like the ospring of doctors, lawyers, or
other professions, wish to follow their parents’ paths (Smith, 2018). But demo-
cratic dynasties could also be a symptom that the democratic process is being
captured by a closed political elite that pursues narrow interests, and this could
have eects on the policies that are enacted and on possibilities for economic
and social development (Behrend, 2011; Smith, 2018). In the second place, sub-
national political families and dynasties are important for democracy because,
in some cases, they are linked to the interests of economic groups that operate in
the district, or they may use their positions in oce to promote their personal or
family business interests. Political dynasties are evidence of the heterogeneity
and political variation that can exist within a single democratic country, and this
heterogeneity poses diverse developmental challenges.
Political dynasties point to the problem of succession. Why do politicians
seek to pass on power to a family member instead of another party member? The
main arguments found in the literature indicate that politicians develop political
dynasties to perpetuate their power, to achieve power for its own sake, and to
reap economic benets (Dal Bó et al., 2009). In some cases, politicians designate
family members as candidates when they cannot run for reelection. A family
member can be an insurance against investigation or prosecution by political
opponents. In other cases, political dynasties are formed because individuals
who grew up in a political family have a genuine interest in politics and pursue
the same career as their family members. Another possibility is that a family
member is chosen as a successor when political parties are weak, and surnames
replace party labels as a form of identication.
As outlined in my previous work (Behrend, 2021a, 2021b), the term politi-
cal dynasty refers to family succession in a single elected position. A political
dynasty exists when an elected public ocial is succeeded in the same position,
either immediately or in a subsequent period, by a family relation. These rela-
tions can be based on marital links, lineage, or extended family. Political dynas-
ties must be distinguished from political families, where relatives hold elective
oce simultaneously, previously, or subsequently, but they do not hold the same
elective oce. Political dynasties also need to be distinguished from the concept
of nepotism. Nepotism involves designating family members in unelected posi-
tions. Political dynasties often incur nepotism, and nepotism may be central to
capturing the local state. But, unlike nepotism, the concept of political dynasty
refers to electoral politics, which is the focus of this study.

Subnational variations 91
Most governors in Argentina are related to other elected politicians by blood
or by marriage. They belong to political families that are elected to the national
Congress, subnational legislatures, mayors’ oces, etc. Governors with blood
or marital links to other elected politicians governed in 21 out of 24 provinces
(87.5% of provinces), since the transition to democracy in 1983, as Figure 6.1
shows. In provinces like Catamarca, Córdoba, Corrientes, or Santa Cruz, most
governors were related to other elected authorities, that is, they belonged to a
political family or dynasty. Only in three provinces, Chubut, La Pampa, and
Santa Fe, none of the governors belonged to a political family or dynasty.
Political dynasties are, however, a dierent phenomenon. The existence of
political dynasties in executive oce means that power is transferred from one
relative to another. Dynasties imply continuity in oce even if the transfer of
power to a relative is not immediate. At a minimum, they are a symptom of
limited political competition. At a maximum, they could be a symptom that
the political process is captured by a reduced oligarchy (Behrend, 2011; Smith,
2018).
In Argentina, 12 out of 24 provinces were governed by political dynasties
since the transition to democracy in 1983 (50% of provinces), as Figure 6.2
shows. Three provinces were governed by two dierent dynasties after re-
democratization. Eight provinces were governed by dynasties for more than a
decade, and three provinces were governed by dynasties for close to or over
30 years, as Figure 6.3 shows. The provinces of Catamarca, Corrientes, San
Luis, and Santiago del Estero are among the most salient cases. But Santa Cruz,
Figure 6.1 Percentage of governors with relatives in Argentina, 1983–2024.
Source: Database of Argentine political families and dynasties (Behrend, 2024).

92 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
Neuquén, Salta, and Córdoba were also governed by governors from a political
dynasty for over a decade.2 Figure 6.3 shows the number of years governed by
political dynasties. In provinces like San Luis, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero,
and Corrientes, political dynasties have governed for an extraordinary number
of years.
Figure 6.2 Political dynasties by province in Argentina, 1983–2024.
Source: Database of Argentine political families and dynasties (Behrend, 2024).
Figure 6.3 Number of years governed by dynasties per province in Argentina, 1983–2024.
Source: Database of Argentine political families and dynasties (Behrend, 2024).

Subnational variations 93
Political dynasties exist across political parties: they are present in the
Peronist Party, in the Radical Party,3 in the Pro Party, and in provincial parties.
In some cases, the political party in oce changed, but the dynasty persisted.4
This highlights the contrast between political dynasties as informal arrange-
ments and political parties as formal structures. In other cases, a dynasty was
replaced by another dynasty from a dierent political party.5 Dynasties exist in
provinces with a less developed economic structure, like Santiago del Estero,
in provinces that are less developed but have experienced party turnover, like
Corrientes and Catamarca; in provinces that are economically more developed,
like Córdoba; or with enclave economies, like Neuquén; and, more recently,
in the autonomous City of Buenos Aires, which is by far the most developed
and pluralistic district in Argentina. The province of Buenos Aires, which is the
largest and most diverse district and has a highly developed economic structure,
as well as political pluralism, has never been governed by a political dynasty,
although there are many dynasties at the municipal level. The two provinces
that have an explicit ban on political dynasties in their constitutions – Río Negro
and Mendoza – have never had a political dynasty. The existence of political
dynasties across parties, diverse economic structures, and provinces that have
experienced party alternation as well as provinces that haven’t makes it hard to
nd single, unilinear causes that explain their rise and persistence. The eects of
political dynasties on subnational development are also not linear.
Of the 12 districts where subnational political dynasties developed after the
transition to democracy, two of the most developed and diversied districts in
Argentina are included: Córdoba and the City of Buenos Aires. These two dis-
tricts, however, have been governed for a shorter period by political dynasties.
The provinces of Catamarca, Corrientes, Neuquén, San Luis, and Santiago del
Estero have been governed by political dynasties for over 16 years. The province
of San Luis was governed by the Rodríguez Saá brothers for 33 years and experi-
enced a dramatic transformation of its economic structure through a developmen-
talist industrialization programme based on national tax exemptions (Behrend,
2011; Karamane in this volume). Unlike other provinces that beneted from
the same industrialization policy, the San Luis government built highways and
infrastructure to attract businesses to the province. In San Luis, dynastic politics
resulted in unprecedented growth and development in the province. In the prov-
ince of Neuquén, which is one of the most important producers of oil and gas
in Argentina, the dynasties that governed the province strongly defended and
promoted this industry, which provides employment directly and indirectly to an
important part of the population. But in other provinces, political dynasties have
not promoted economic development with such zeal. Corrientes and Santiago
del Estero, for example, have remained peripheral, and their local economies
are unspecialized and not diversied (Behrend & Bianchi, 2017). In these two
provinces, there have been limited attempts to implement policies to promote
regional development. Catamarca, which is another dynastic province, has an

94 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
enclave economy devoted to gold and copper mining, but mining only accounts
for 5.5% of registered private employment in the province, that is, a total of
1,844 workers are employed in mining (Secretaría de Minería, 2022). Other than
mining, its economy is unspecialized and not diversied, and there have been
few policies to promote regional development, even though until the early 1990s
it beneted from a federal industrial promotion law (Karamane, 2022).
These examples illustrate that political dynasties can promote developmen-
talist policies in some cases but can fail to do so in others. There is no xed out-
come in this regard, and the developmental consequences of political dynasties
need to be investigated in each case.
Enforcing the rule of law: Reelection and Supreme Court oversight
of subnational politics
Provincial governors may wish to remain in executive oce beyond the number
of periods allowed by the provincial constitution for a variety of reasons. They
may have a genuine vocation to continue in executive oce, they may wish to
continue developmental projects, they may feel that there are no suitable can-
didates, they may wish to remain in oce for a lust of power itself, they may
fear prosecution once they leave oce, or, in some cases, incumbent governors
may have an economic interest in remaining in oce. In developing countries,
the economic benets and rents from political oce are powerful incentives
that encourage the expansion of political families into dierent types of elected
oce (Chandra, 2016). Politicians’ salaries may be more attractive than those
of other professions (Smith, 2018), and public oce can allow politicians to
develop business interests linked to, or protected by, the state (Behrend, 2011;
Sidel, 2014).
Any of these reasons might lead incumbent governors to try to interpret ree-
lection norms in ways that benet them, or to nominate a relative as a candidate
to succeed them in oce. In previous work, I used the concept of a “closed
game” (Behrend, 2011) to refer to subnational political elites that controlled
key aspects of provincial political systems, including access to business oppor-
tunities. Provincial governors, like most politicians, have diverse origins. Some
come from a career in liberal professions, others may have developed a career
solely in the public sector, and yet others come from the private sector and own
businesses.
In 1983, when Argentina’s democracy was re-established, the reelection of
governors was banned in all provinces. But in the mid-1980s and 1990s, many
provinces reformed their constitutions and enabled reelection. After this wave
of constitutional reforms, only two provinces – Mendoza and Santa Fe – con-
tinued to ban the reelection of governors. Some provinces allow the reelection
of governors for one consecutive period, others for two, and others allow the
indenite reelection of governors.6 Although provincial constitutions are clear

Subnational variations 95
about how many terms an incumbent governor can aspire to govern, over the
years, conicts have arisen over the wording and interpretation of the articles of
provincial constitutions that regulate reelection. In most cases where conicts
have arisen, local courts – usually the provincial electoral court and the high
court (Superior Tribunal de Justicia) – have tended to rule in favour of incum-
bent governors’ reelection bids. In such conicts, the national Supreme Court
has the nal say and exercises oversight over the interpretation of subnational
norms. Local oppositions therefore usually appeal to the Supreme Court after the
provincial high court has issued a ruling.
In this section, I focus on cases in which governors sought to transgress the
limits to their reelection, on the demands subsequently led by subnational
oppositions before the Supreme Court, and on cases where the opposition pre-
ventively asked the Supreme Court to rule on whether an incumbent governor
was eligible to run. In most cases, provincial high courts ruled in favour of the
governor’s reelection. Attempting reelection in dubious cases can be a dangerous
move for outgoing governors. Even if they can manage a favourable ruling by
the provincial electoral court or high court, the local opposition will very likely
take the case to the Supreme Court, which has usually ruled against incumbent
governors. An adverse ruling by the Supreme Court entails an additional risk
for governors – they may have to come up with an alternative candidate only a
few weeks or even days before the election. In some cases, after a court ruling
that banned an incumbent governor from running, a relative was nominated to
run instead. But relatives need to win elections, and this is not guaranteed, espe-
cially in a short period of time. The same may also be true for other unrelated
candidates nominated at the last moment. Although in many cases these new
candidates won the elections, in a few cases the governor’s wager turned against
them and their political parties lost the election. Stretching the limits of the law
is therefore a dangerous venture for governors.
In federal countries, subnational units have guaranteed realms of authority,
but notably in Argentina, the Supreme Court plays a major role in enforcing
the rule of law and making sure that provinces do not use their autonomy to
install forms of government that are contradictory to democracy. Formally, the
Supreme Court exercises oversight and is the nal arbiter and regulator in sub-
national conicts. In my previous work with Whitehead (Whitehead & Behrend,
2016; Behrend & Whitehead, 2016b) we discussed the mechanism of control/
conditionality as a pathway toward subnational democratization. Here, I focus
on one of these mechanisms of control: rulings by the Supreme Court with
regard to electoral conicts and disputes over who is eligible to run for gov-
ernor. Supreme Court rulings are part of ordinary forms of control in a federal
democracy, but the Supreme Court does not automatically admit challenges.
Those ling the challenge must either have exhausted all previous instances or
they must demonstrate that the Court has original jurisdiction in this matter. The
Court, therefore, exercises its oversight in subnational elections only in specic

96 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
Table 6.1 Supreme Court rulings on the reelection of governors, 1983–2023
Date Ruling no. Province Court ruling Article
6 October 1994 317:1195 Santa Fe Conrmed that the
governor could not
be reelected.
Article 64,
provincial
constitution.
12 September
2003
326:3448 Jujuy Declared that the
Supreme Court
did not have
competence to rule.
Article 127,
provincial
constitution.
5 November
2013
336:2148/
336:1756
Santiago del
Estero
Banned the governor’s
reelection.
Article 152,
provincial
constitution.
8 April 2015 338:231 Salta Declared that the
Supreme Court
did not have
competence to rule.
Article 140,
provincial
constitution.
22 March 2019 342:343/
342:171
La Rioja Banned the governor’s
reelection.
Amendment
of Articles
120 and 171,
provincial
constitution.
12 March 2019 342:235/
342:287
Río Negro Banned the governor’s
reelection.
Article 175,
provincial
constitution.
9 May 2023 CSJ 561/2023 San Juan Banned the governor’s
reelection.
Article 175,
provincial
constitution.
16 May 2023 CSJ 687/2023 Tucumán Banned the governor’s
reelection.
Article 90,
provincial
constitution.
11 July 2023 CSJ
1300/2023
City of
Buenos
Aires
Declared that the
Supreme Court
did not have
competence to rule.
Article 97 of
the city’s
constitution.
Source: Own elaboration on data from the Supreme Court.
cases that cannot be resolved by local authorities. Taking cases to the Supreme
Court is a fundamental aspect of democratic normality, but in recent years there
has been a process of judicialization of politics and political parties have sig-
nicantly increased the use of legal mechanisms to resolve political disputes
(Berruecos García Travesí & Whitehead, 2021). The judicial arena became a
locus of politics, and it drew courts into political conicts to a greater extent than
before. Citizens, civil society groups, and members of the opposition increas-
ingly turned to courts to vindicate rights and contest policy (Kapiszewski, 2012).
Table 6.1 summarizes the cases led before the Supreme Court in con-
icts over gubernatorial candidates’ eligibility to run and the rulings issued by

Subnational variations 97
the Court. It includes a total of nine rulings issued by the Court in this period
(1983–2023). Before 2013, only two cases were led before the Supreme Court
to resolve a conict over the election of a governor. After 2013, cases where
the Court had to determine a candidate’s eligibility to run became more fre-
quent, and the Court ruled in seven further cases to establish the legitimacy of
provincial governors’ bids for reelection. Except for one, the cases led before
the Supreme Court usually involved interpretations of provincial constitutional
restrictions for incumbent governors, particularly after constitutional reforms
enabling reelection, or in situations that gave rise to conicting interpretations
about which period counted as the rst term in oce.
The rst case was led in 1994 by the Peronist Party of Santa Fe, which
claimed that the article banning the immediate reelection of the governor was
unconstitutional and restricted the rights of individuals to be elected.7 The
Supreme Court ruled that the republican form of government did not necessarily
mean that governors had the right to be reelected if the provincial constitution
banned reelection.8 The Court’s ruling was authoritative, and no governors have
since attempted reelection in Santa Fe.
In 2003, the Libertad y Democracia Party in Jujuy led a claim before the
Supreme Court asking it to determine whether Governor Eduardo Fellner could
stand for reelection. Fellner had been designated interim governor by the provin-
cial legislature after the death of Governor Guillermo Snopek and the resigna-
tion of his deputy governor in November 1998 until December 1999 to complete
Snopek’s mandate. In 1999, Fellner was elected governor for a full period and in
2003, he ran for reelection. The constitution of Jujuy allows only one consecu-
tive reelection, and the claim led by the opposition party aimed at determining
whether his period as interim governor counted as his rst period in oce. The
Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction and returned the case to the provincial
high court, which ruled that his year as interim governor did not count and what
counted as his rst term in oce was his rst elected period in 1999. Fellner was
therefore allowed to run for reelection in 2003.
In 2013, the Radical Party (UCR) of Santiago del Estero led a case before
the Supreme Court, asking it to determine whether Governor Gerardo Zamora
could run for a third consecutive term. The province of Santiago del Estero had
reformed its constitution to enable the reelection of the governor for one con-
secutive period. In 2013, a local court ruled that since the provincial constitution
had been reformed during his rst term as governor (2005–2009), his second
term (2009–2013) should be considered his rst under the new constitution, and
he could therefore run for a third term in 2013. This ruling contradicted the
provincial constitution, which explicitly stated that the mandate of the governor
in oce when the new constitution was sanctioned should be considered his
rst term in oce.9 Five days ahead of the election, the Supreme Court ruled
that Zamora was not eligible to run and suspended the elections. A few days
later, Zamora announced that his wife, Claudia Ledesma Abdala, who up to then

98 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
had not held elective oce, would run for governor instead. Ledesma Abdala
was elected in December 2013 with 64.7% of votes, thus initiating a political
dynasty. Her election marked the beginning of a successful political career.
After her term ended, her husband was once again elected governor, and she
continued her career as a national deputy (2017–2019) and then as a national
senator (2019–2025). As senator, she was named provisional president of the
Senate (2019–2023) and became second in the presidential line of succession,
after the vice president.
In April 2015, the opposition Frente Grande in Salta led a case before the
Supreme Court requesting that it put an end to the uncertainty regarding the
interpretation of Article 140 of the provincial constitution and declare that
Governor Juan Manuel Urtubey was not eligible to run for a fourth consecu-
tive term in oce. The provincial constitution allows three consecutive terms in
oce, and there were rumours that Urtubey might seek a fourth. However, the
Court dismissed the case, arguing that it had no jurisdiction to rule because the
governor had not ocialized his candidacy and the case was hypothetical. In the
end, Urtubey did not run for reelection.
In March 2019, two conicts regarding the reelection of governors in the
provinces of Río Negro and La Rioja were led before the Supreme Court
within days of each other. In Río Negro, Governor Alberto Weretilneck had
been elected deputy governor in 2011 but had become governor when his run-
ning mate, Carlos Soria, was killed three weeks after being sworn in.10 In 2015,
he ran for reelection, and in 2019, the provincial high court ruled that he was
eligible to run for a third term in oce, overriding a ruling against Weretilneck’s
candidacy by the provincial electoral court. The high court argued that in his rst
term he had merely replaced his running mate, Carlos Soria, and therefore that
term should not count as his rst term as governor. The opposition Frente para
la Victoria (Peronists) took the case to the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled
that he was not eligible to run because Article 175 of the provincial constitution
states that governors and deputy governors can be reelected or reciprocally suc-
ceed each other for only one term.11 If they wish to be reelected again, they must
let one term pass. This meant that even if his rst term as governor did not count,
because he had been elected deputy governor and was part of the executive, he
could not run again at the time. The Court issued its ruling two weeks before
the elections but did not suspend them. Weretilneck’s running mate, Arabela
Carreras, ran for governor instead and won the elections.
In La Rioja, Peronist Governor Sergio Casas ran a plebiscite in January 2019
to ask voters whether the article in the provincial constitution that banned the
governor from running for reelection if he had previously been elected deputy
governor should be reformed. Although there was a high level of abstention and
blank ballots (voter turnout was only 44%), the result was in favour of modify-
ing Article 120 of the provincial constitution. The opposition Radical Party took
the case to the Supreme Court, and one month before the elections, the Court

Subnational variations 99
ruled that the constitutional reform that enabled the governor’s reelection was
illegal. After the provincial elections were suspended,12 the governor designated
Ricardo Quintela as his candidate. A new date for the elections was set, which
coincided with the presidential elections of October 2019. Quintela won the
election, and the Peronist Party retained the province.
In 2023, in the run-up to the presidential elections, most provinces elected
governors, and a new round of cases was led before the Supreme Court to
establish the legitimacy of incumbent governors’ bids for reelection. In May
2023, the Supreme Court issued two rulings within a week of each other that
suspended the elections for governor in the provinces of San Juan and Tucumán.
Unlike previous cases, the Court did not intervene to review a prior ruling by the
provincial high courts, but as a case of original jurisdiction.13
In San Juan, the opposition led a claim before the Supreme Court asking
it to determine whether incumbent Governor Sergio Uñac could run for a third
term in oce, given that he had been deputy governor of the province in the
period before his election as governor (2011–2015). The constitution of San
Juan allows governors to run for two consecutive reelections – a total of three
consecutive periods. But like in many other provincial constitutions, if the gov-
ernor was previously deputy governor, this period counts as his rst. Despite
this constitutional provision, when consulted, the provincial high court ruled in
Uñac’s favour and determined that he could run. The Supreme Court suspended
the election and ruled that his period as deputy governor counted as his rst
period in executive oce and that he was not eligible to run for a third period as
governor. Uñac postponed the elections for governor until the Supreme Court’s
ruling was conrmed and named his brother Rubén Uñac as the candidate for
governor. Unlike the case of Santiago del Estero, where the governor’s wife won
the election, Uñac’s brother did not win, and the Peronist Party lost the province
to the opposition. This was a failed attempt at creating a political dynasty and
shows that even if governors seek to maintain executive oce in the hands of a
family member, getting a relative elected is not a simple or automatic process,
and the consequences can be negative for the ruling party.
In Tucumán, the situation was similar, although in this case, Peronist Governor
Juan Manzur, who had served as deputy governor (2011–2015) and twice as
governor (2015–2019 and 2019–2023), had previously asked the provincial high
court to determine whether he was eligible to run for deputy governor in 2023.
The high court ruled that he could run, and after this ruling, the opposition went
straight to the Supreme Court, without rst ling a case before the provincial
high court. The Supreme Court ruled against Manzur on the same day it ruled
against Uñac’s reelection in San Juan. Manzur did not postpone the elections
and instead stepped down as a candidate. A new candidate for deputy governor,
Miguel Acevedo, was designated on the ticket headed by Osvaldo Jaldo. In the
elections, Jaldo and Acevedo won by a landslide, and the ruling Peronist Party
did not lose the province.

100 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
In 2023, the opposition in the province of Formosa led a claim before the
Supreme Court, alleging that the provincial constitution contradicted the princi-
ple of the republican form of government enshrined in the national Constitution
because it allowed provincial governors to be reelected indenitely. The gover-
nor of Formosa, Gildo Insfrán, had been in oce since 1995 and had previously
been deputy governor from 1987 to 1995. The province of Formosa presented
its case before the Court and argued that in this case, the Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction to intervene because there was no ambiguity in the interpreta-
tion of the provincial constitution, which clearly did not establish any limits to
the reelection of governors. The Supreme Court refrained from issuing a ruling
and neither dismissed nor validated the opposition’s claim. It allowed the pro-
vincial elections to go ahead as scheduled, and Peronist Governor Gildo Insfrán
was reelected for an eighth consecutive term.
In July 2023, the Supreme Court ruled in a case about the eligibility of a
candidate to run for head of government (governor) of the autonomous City of
Buenos Aires.14 For all purposes, the city of Buenos Aires has the same auton-
omy as a province, but it only gained this status after the 1994 constitutional
reform. The City of Buenos Aires is considered one of the most plural districts,
and three dierent parties have governed the district since it became autono-
mous. In 1996, the city elected its rst head of government, Fernando de la Rúa,
from the Radical Party. In 2000, Aníbal Ibarra, from the Frepaso centre-left
alliance, was elected and reelected in 2003. In 2007, Mauricio Macri, from the
centre-right Pro Party, won the elections and was reelected in 2011. From this
point onwards, the Pro Party won all elections for head of government in the
city. In 2023, Jorge Macri, Mauricio Macri’s cousin, was nominated to run by
the Pro Party (part of the Juntos por el Cambio coalition). His nomination was
contested because he did not full the residency requirements established in
Article 97 of the autonomous city’s constitution, which states that candidates
“must be natives of the city or have had regular or permanent residence in it for
no less than ve years prior to the election date”15 (author’s translation). Jorge
Macri fullled neither of these criteria. Until a month before his nomination, he
had been mayor of the district of Vicente López in the province of Buenos Aires.
He was born in the city of Tandil, province of Buenos Aires, and had resided in
that same province during his tenure as mayor of Vicente López between 2011
and 2023. Furthermore, between 2005 and 2011 he had been a provincial deputy
in the Buenos Aires province Legislature.
The left-wing Parido Obrero (Workers Party) led a claim before the city’s
electoral court, claiming that Jorge Macri was not eligible to run for head of
government. The electoral court ruled that the residency requirements had been
fullled when the candidate resided in the city of Buenos Aires between 1987
and 1999,16 although the constitution is explicit when it says that the residency
requirements must be fullled “in the ve years prior to the election.” The elec-
toral court’s decision was controversial because it ignored the precedent of a

Subnational variations 101
similar case in 2010, when national Deputy Adrián Pérez (Coalición Cívica
Party) asked the City of Buenos Aires high court to determine whether he could
run for head of government in the 2011 elections. Pérez had been elected dep-
uty for the province of Buenos Aires, and he claimed that his residency was
split between the two districts. On that occasion, the high court ruled that he
did not full the residency requirements and was therefore not eligible to run.
With regard to Jorge Macri’s candidacy, the electoral court stated in its ruling
that this precedent did not constitute a “majoritarian juridical rule” that could
be applied to this case.17 In parallel, the opposition party took the case to the
Supreme Court. The Court ruled that it did not have original jurisdiction – that
is, that it could only intervene through appellate jurisdiction – because there was
no federal matter at stake and that the City of Buenos Aires high court should
determine Jorge Macri’s eligibility to run.18 A few days later, the City of Buenos
Aires high court ruled that any objections to a candidate should have been taken
up with his political party’s electoral board before ling a case with the electoral
court and that it therefore had no jurisdiction to issue a ruling.19 The opposition
then appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court did not issue a ruling before
the elections and allowed them to go ahead.
In the end, Jorge Macri ran for head of government and won the elections. His
election meant the creation of a political dynasty in the City of Buenos Aires.
This case is signicant because it illustrates that the democratic decits exam-
ined in this chapter, which include the development of political dynasties and
the propensity of local courts to rule in favour of incumbents or ruling parties,
are not limited to peripheral provinces but are also present in the nation’s most
developed and pluralistic district. The case raises important questions about
how the rule of law is applied at the subnational level and about the close links
between local courts and subnational ruling elites. In many of the cases ana-
lyzed in this section, provincial high courts ruled in favour of the incumbent
governor and enabled them to run for oce even when the provincial constitu-
tion clearly stated that they were not eligible. These situations occurred in sub-
national districts governed by dierent political parties and in both peripheral
and central districts like the City of Buenos Aires. It evidences a lack of inde-
pendence between the judiciary and the executive in many subnational districts.
Local judicial authorities have too often interpreted the provincial constitution
to favour incumbent governors or parties, although they knew that it was likely
that the Supreme Court would then overrule their decision.
The Supreme Court has played a key role since the transition to democracy,
exercising oversight and acting as a regulator in conicts over who is eligible
to run for executive oce at the subnational level. Several of the cases that
reached the Supreme Court required the interpretation of articles stating that if
an incumbent governor had previously been deputy governor, or if the incum-
bent governor ran for deputy governor, this period was included in the count
of how many consecutive periods an individual could run for executive oce.

102 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
Provincial constitutions make this provision to prevent an incumbent governor
from being elected deputy governor and then assuming another period as gover-
nor if their running mate resigns. The Supreme Court has been consistent in its
interpretation that both the governor and deputy governor are part of the execu-
tive. Other cases referred to the period that counted as the rst period in oce
after a constitutional reform. The case of the City of Buenos Aires was the rst
case in which the Court was asked to determine whether a candidate fullled the
residency requirements established by the local constitution, and it ruled that it
had no jurisdiction.
Conclusions
Political competition varies greatly within Argentina. While some provinces
exhibit frequent turnover for executive oce and respect reelection norms, other
provinces have developed political dynasties, alternate power among dynasties,
and governors have sought to remain in oce longer than the constitution man-
dated, often with the complicity of local courts. However, the Supreme Court
has exercised oversight of subnational politics in electoral conicts such as those
described in this chapter, and its decisions have been authoritative.20
Political leaders’ reluctance to give up oce or lose control of their districts
tests the limits of democracy and the rule of law. This chapter explores two ways
in which this occurs at the subnational level: political dynasties in subnational
executives, and governors’ attempts to seek reelection beyond constitutional
term limits. The rst dimension belongs to the realm of informal structures and
practices, while the second refers to the role of formal institutions and how the
rule of law is enforced in subnational politics. Supreme Court oversight is key
to preventing incumbent governors from being reelected beyond the number of
terms stipulated by provincial constitutions. But the Court has little power to
regulate informal structures and practices such as political dynasties because
political dynasties develop within the rules of the game of democracy. In two
of the cases analyzed in this chapter, a political dynasty arose after a Supreme
Court ruling, while in a third case, the dynastic candidate failed to be elected.
In the case of Santiago del Estero described in the previous section, after the
Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent governor was not eligible to run for a
third consecutive term in oce, his wife was designated as the candidate and
won the elections, thus creating a political dynasty. The Court was able to pre-
vent an unconstitutional interpretation of reelection norms, but the unintended
consequence of this ruling was the creation of a new political dynasty in the
province. In the case of the City of Buenos Aires, the Supreme Court ruled that
it did not have jurisdiction to determine a candidate’s eligibility to run, and the
ruling by the local electoral court and high court enabled the development of the
autonomous city’s rst political dynasty. The case of San Juan illustrates that

Subnational variations 103
dynastic candidates cannot rely solely on name recognition to win elections and
that the decision to name a relative as a candidate can prove to be a bad strategy.
Although the Supreme Court is authoritative, the timing of its rulings has
at times been questioned. Democracy requires an electoral calendar that is
respected, and the timing of elections can have diverse eects. The Supreme
Court has, on occasion, waited until the last minute to issue rulings declaring
that a candidate was not eligible to run or to postpone elections, as some of the
cases described in this chapter show. This can aect the Court’s credibility and
perceptions of impartiality.
In the cases analyzed in this chapter, local high courts usually ruled in favour
of incumbents, even when they knew that their rulings would be scrutinized by
the Supreme Court. This shows an important degree of complicity between local
courts and subnational executives. The cases highlight the diculty of achieving
eective checks and balances at the subnational level and point to the complex
interactions between courts and executives, and between dierent levels of gov-
ernment, regardless of whether the province in question is developed or periph-
eral, more plural or less plural.
Subnational political elites engage in diverse strategies to remain in oce or
to maintain their power. Political dynasties are one way of ensuring dominion
over a subnational entity, but this says nothing about how these dynasties gov-
ern and what policy preferences they pursue. Further work is needed to deter-
mine the causal links between political dynasties and development in specic
cases, but the overview of the cases surveyed in this chapter provides some
initial insights. As noted, some political dynasties of both developed and periph-
eral provinces have promoted developmentalist policies, while others have not.
Governors of both developed and peripheral provinces, and of dierent political
parties, have sought to maintain their hold on power beyond their term limits
in diverse ways. The two dimensions of subnational politics analyzed in this
chapter and the case studies sketched out in the analysis show that subnational
politics is best understood as an entangled process in which formal and informal
institutions, structures, and practices coexist and mutually reinforce each other.
This chapter provides examples of such subnational entanglements.
Notes
1 See Dal Bó et al. (2009); Brian Feinstein (2010); Kurtz (1989); Smith (2018); Asako
et al. (2015); van Coppenolle (2017); Chandra & Umaira (2011); Chhibber (2011);
Chandra (2016); Camp (1982); Vilas (1992); Rossi (2014); Querubin (2011); Cruz et
al. (2017); Mendoza et al. (2012); Amundsen (2013).
2 In the case of Córdoba, the founder of the dynasty was Governor José Manuel de la
Sota’s father-in-law, who was elected in 1958, so only one member of the dynasty
governed after the transition to democracy.

104 Mounting pressures on the rule of law
3 During part of the period, the Radical Party was part of the Cambiemos and then
Juntos por el Cambio label, as was the Pro Party. Here, I consider the governor’s party
aliation.
4 In Corrientes, the Romero/Romero Feris dynasty included governors from the
Peronist Party in the 1970s, from the Autonomista Party in the 1980s, and from the
Partido Nuevo in the 1990s.
5 This was the case in Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, and Catamarca, for example.
6 At present, only two provinces allow the indenite reelection of governors – Formosa
and Catamarca – but in the 1990s, several provinces had no term limits at all for gov-
ernors.
7 As noted, Santa Fe and Mendoza are the only provinces that do not allow the gover-
nor’s reelection.
8 Supreme Court ruling 317:1195, Partido Justicialista vs. Santa Fe Province, 6 October
1994.
9 See Transitory Clause No. 6, Constitution of Santiago del Estero. Available at:
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclendmkaj/https://www .argentina .gob
.ar /sites /default /files /constitucion _de _la _provincia _de _santiago _del _estero .pdf.
Accessed on 9 May 2024.
10 Weretilneck belongs to the provincial party Juntos Somos Río Negro.
11 See Constitution of Río Negro. Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibp-
cajpcglclendmkaj/https://www .congreso .gob .ar /constituciones /RIO -NEGRO .pdf.
Accessed on 9 May 2024.
12 They had originally been scheduled for 27 May 2019.
13 The Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction
means that the Court is the rst and only court to hear a case. Original jurisdiction
is normally limited to a few cases. Appellate jurisdiction means that the Court has
jurisdiction to review the decisions of lower courts (in these cases, the provincial high
courts). Oversight over subnational elections is usually exercised through appellate
jurisdiction, as was the case in the other cases mentioned in this section.
14 The autonomous City of Buenos Aires has the same competences as a province, but
its executive oce is head of government instead of governor. For all purposes, they
have the same responsibilities, autonomy, and competences.
15 See Constitution of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Available at: chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclendmkaj/https://www .argentina .gob .ar /sites /
default /les /constitucion -caba .pdf. Accessed on 28 May 2024.
16 See Electoral Court ruling ELE 74159/2023-0, available at: chrome-extension://
efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://electoralcaba .gob .ar /uploads /resolu-
ciones /SE _RESUELVE _IMPUGNACION _JORGE _MACRI .pdf. Accessed on 28
May 2024.
17 See Electoral Court ruling ELE 74159/2023-0, op. cit.
18 See Supreme Court ruling CSJ 1300/2023, available at: chrom e-ext ensio n://e
faidn bmnnn ibpca jpcgl cle ndmka j/l e:/// Users /Jacq uelin e/Dow nload s/576 61 .pd f.
Accessed on 29 May 2024.
19 See City of Buenos Aires High Court ruling INC 74159/2023-1, available at: https://
drive .google .com /le /d /1Jt 6qiC Kvhj vLeQ xFeH XIf0 Xlj1 Hc3d1e /view. Accessed on
29 29 2024.
20 Another – more extreme – form of control of subnational politics, which I discuss
elsewhere, is federal intervention, which involves the removal of elected authorities
by the national executive. See Behrend (2016).

Subnational variations 105
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