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What do aid recipients want? Public attitudes toward foreign aid in developing countries
Abstract
Individuals in developing countries are the ultimate end users of foreign aid. While the international donor community has emphasized the importance of aligning aid with recipient countries’ preferences, the literature on public opinion and foreign aid has remained largely focused on donors. Using an original conjoint experiment conducted in seven developing countries, we examine the determinants of public attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We find that the characteristics of donor countries and foreign aid projects significantly influence recipient attitudes, often more than the size of the aid packages themselves. Individuals in recipient countries consistently prefer aid from democracies and donors with transparent aid agencies, as well as aid delivered by international organizations rather than directly from donor countries’ aid agencies. These findings underscore the importance of multilateral aid agencies in aligning the preferences of donors and recipients.
This paper examines the role of Islamic charity and its potential impact on development initiatives, focusing on the case study of Karama Solidarity and The Islamic Cultural Center of Belgium. The study uncovers a nuanced approach where religious principles intersect with secular humanitarianism, reflecting the evolving landscape between faith-based organizations and NGOs. The study reveals substantial community involvement, driven by trust, transparency, and a commitment to addressing humanitarian needs. Active participation, particularly among youth and women, emphasizes Faith-Based Organizations’ (FBOs) important role in fostering social cohesion and volunteerism. Moreover, the accessibility of low-cost flights facilitates direct engagement with charitable causes, shaping donation practices. The findings highlight the reciprocal relationship between public response and charitable distribution, offering insights into the complex interplay between societal dynamics and philanthropic endeavors within Muslim communities in Brussels. The study also identifies key policy recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of FBOs in development initiatives. These include promoting transparency and accountability to strengthen donor trust, creating a supportive regulatory environment, and fostering collaboration between FBOs and public institutions in both donor and recipient countries.
Does hosting UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) increase multilateral foreign aid inflows into civil war-affected countries? Under what conditions do UN PKOs make multilateral foreign aid effective, enhancing governance quality? Multilateral foreign aid agencies increasingly focus on good governance as an allocation criterion. However, multilateral aid assistance faces dilemmas when allocating aid since it undermines the credibility of government commitments to good governance. This study argues that UN PKOs mitigate such uncertainty by initiating democratization, capacity-building, and political participation while mitigating political violence, thereby increasing the multilateral aid inflows. In missions involving these initiations, multilateral aid effectively enhances governance quality. These arguments are tested using a sample of countries that have experienced civil wars between 1991 and 2009. The findings suggest that UN PKOs increase the multilateral aid inflows. Moreover, increasing multilateral aid is more effective in improving the governance quality when missions have capacity-building or electoral tasks.
Although many countries engage in public diplomacy, we know relatively little about the conditions under which their efforts create foreign support for their desired policy outcomes. Drawing on the psychological theory of “insincerity aversion,” we argue that the positive effects of public diplomacy on foreign public opinion are attenuated and potentially even eliminated when foreign citizens become suspicious about possible hidden motives. To test this theory, we fielded a survey experiment involving divergent media frames of a real Russian medical donation to the U.S. early in the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that an adapted news article excerpt describing Russia’s donation as genuine can decrease American citizens’ support for sanctions on Russia. However, exposing respondents to information suggesting that Russia had political motivations for their donation is enough to cancel out the positive effect. Our findings suggest theoretical implications for the literature on foreign public opinion in international relations, particularly about the circumstances under which countries can manipulate the attitudes of other countries’ citizens.
Contrary to scholarly predictions, foreign aid does not appear to undermine individuals’ beliefs in the legitimacy of their governments. This paper aims to understand why this prediction has failed to materialize in mounting evidence. I develop explanations inductively based on original descriptive evidence from a survey and in-depth interviews in western Kenya. I propose, first, that the prediction itself incorrectly assumes individuals expect their governments to be self-sufficient, and second, tax-based measurements of legitimacy are sometimes ill-suited to developing country contexts. I offer specific suggestions for how future studies can overcome these limitations in their theories and research designs. The contribution of this project is to facilitate future research by furnishing detailed and descriptive evidence on how individuals from a relevant sample think about politics and aid.
Recent studies on global performance indicators (GPIs) reveal the distinct power that nonstate actors can accrue and exercise in world politics. How and when does this happen? Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine the impact of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), an annual rating and rankings index produced by the small UK-based NGO Publish What You Fund. The ATI seeks to shape development aid donors' behavior with respect to their transparency—the quality and kind of information they publicly disclose. To investigate the ATI's effect, we construct an original panel data set of donor transparency performance before and after ATI inclusion (2006–2013) to test whether (and which) donors alter their behavior in response to inclusion in the ATI. To further probe the causal mechanisms that explain variations in donor behavior we use qualitative research, including over 150 key informant interviews conducted between 2010 and 2017. Our analysis uncovers the conditions under which the ATI influences powerful aid donors. Our mixed-methods evidence reveals how this happens. Consistent with Kelley and Simmons's central argument that GPIs exercise influence via social pressure, we find that the ATI shapes donor behavior primarily via direct effects on elites: the diffusion of professional norms, organizational learning, and peer pressure.
Pundits, development practitioners, and scholars worry that rising populism and international disengagement in developed countries have negative consequences on foreign aid. However, how populism and foreign aid go together is not well-understood. This paper provides the first systematic examination of this relationship. We adopt the popular ideational definition of populism, unpack populism into its core “thin” elements, and examine them within a delegation model of aid policy, a prominent framework in the aid literature. In so doing, we identify specific domestic political processes through which the core components of populism may affect aid spending. We argue that increases in one component of populism—anti-elitism—and in nativist sentiments, an associated concept, in a donor country lead to a reduction in aid spend- ing through a public opinion channel. We supply both micro- and macro-evidence for our arguments by fielding surveys in the United States and United Kingdom as well as by analyzing aid spending by a large number of OECD donors. Our findings show that nativism and anti-elitism, rather than populism per se, influence not only individual attitudes toward aid but also actual aid policy and generates important insights into how to address populist challenges to foreign aid. Beyond these, our study contributes to the broader International Relations literature by demonstrating one useful analytical approach to studying populism, nativism, and foreign policy.
Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters’ preferences about foreign aid. However, little is known about how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects does this interplay have on preferences over policy actions? This article assesses these questions using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that violate human rights, rig elections, crack down on media, etc.). The results indicate that the public does have a strong aversion to providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but that it also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps acquire. Contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, the study finds that moral aversion can largely be reversed if the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings call into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, and produce several implications for the aid literature.
How does information about the presence of foreign financing in a development project change people’s perceptions of that project? Using an informational experiment in Bangladesh, we find that information about US financing of a specific development intervention sends a positive signal about project quality; this effect is concentrated among individuals who are the least likely to have been exposed to the information ex ante. The information does not change the already high demand for foreign aid but does help citizens target their demands toward the existing donor. That foreign funding can be a signal of project quality helps explain an existing finding in the literature that individuals prefer foreign aid projects to government projects.
Foreign aid is a policy tool implemented with the purpose of fostering both hard and soft power abroad. Yet, previous research has not probed the effects of US foreign aid on public attitudes toward the US in the recipient countries. In this article, I argue that US foreign aid may actually feed anti-Americanism: aid indirectly creates winners and losers in the recipient countries, such that politically discontented people may blame the US for the survival of the prevailing regime. Drawing on Pew Research for Global Attitudes and on USAID Greenbook datasets, I focus on determining both the conditions under which foreign aid exacerbates anti-Americanism and the type of aid most likely to do this. The findings reveal that political losers of the recipient countries are more likely to express negative attitudes toward the USA as the amount of US aid increases, whereas political winners enjoy the results of US aid and view the USA positively accordingly. Moreover, the effect of US aid on attitudes toward the USA is also conditional on the regime type. While US aid increases the likelihood of anti-American attitudes among the losers in non-democratic countries, it decreases the likelihood of anti-Americanism among the losers in democratic ones. This article has important implications for policy in terms of determining how and to whom to provide aid in the context of the possible ramifications of providing aid at the individual level.
Does foreign aid enable or constrain elite capture of public revenues? Reflecting on prominent debates in the foreign aid literature, we examine whether recipient preferences are consistent with a view that foreign donors wield substantial control over the flow of aid dollars, making elite capture more difficult and mass benefits more likely. We compare elite and mass support for foreign aid versus government spending on development projects through a survey experiment with behavioral outcomes. A key innovation is a parallel experiment on members of the Ugandan national parliament and a representative sample of Ugandan citizens. For two actual aid projects, we randomly assigned different funders to the projects. Significant treatment effects reveal that members of parliament support government programs over foreign aid, whereas citizens prefer aid over government. Donor control also implies that citizens should favor foreign aid more and elites less as their perceptions of government clientelism and corruption increase. We explore this and report on other alternative mechanisms. Effects for citizens and elites are most apparent for those perceiving significant government corruption, suggesting that both sets of subjects perceive significant donor control over aid.
Scholars studying foreign assistance differ over whether multilateral aid is preferable to bilateral aid for promoting development, but nearly all build their cases primarily on highly aggregated cross-national time-series data. We investigate this topic experimentally from the perspective of those whom the foreign aid directly affects: recipient citizens and elites. We thus report results of a survey experiment with behavioral outcomes on more than 3000 Ugandan citizens and over 300 members of Uganda’s Parliament. In spite of a large literature suggesting differences, the findings generally reveal few substantive differences in citizens’ and elites’ preferences and behavior toward the two types of aid. While no strong pattern of differences emerges, limited evidence suggests that the public evinces greater trust in multilateral institutions, and both masses and elites feel that multilateral aid is more transparent. Overall, these null results inform an ever-expanding literature, which is increasingly articulating distinctions between multilateral and bilateral aid. At least in the minds of the recipients, however, multilateral and bilateral aid may not in fact be all that different. This accords with the literature noting the strong overlap in aid organizations and bemoaning the fact that they do not specialize more. Our results raise the question about why have both multilateral and bilateral aid donors if they in effect do the same thing.
Does being named and shamed for human rights abuse influence the amount of foreign aid received by the shamed state? Recent research suggests that the impact of public censure may depend on the political relationship between donor and recipient. We argue that donors deriving a direct political benefit from the aid relationship (such as a military advantage or the satisfaction of a domestic political audience) will ignore or work against condemnation, but donors with little political interest in the recipient (who give aid for symbolic or humanitarian reasons) will punish condemned states. We also argue that the size of prior aid packages can be used as a holistic measure of the donor?s political interest in the aid relationship because mutually beneficial aid packages are subject to a bargaining process that favors recipients with more to offer. We find that condemnation for human rights abuse by the United Nations is associated with lower bilateral aid levels among states that previously received small aid package, and with equal or higher bilateral aid to states already receiving a great deal of aid. The source of shaming also matters: We find that public shaming by human rights NGOs is not associated with decreased aggregate bilateral aid.
Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizens’ attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizens’ needs.
Economic crises generally lead to reductions in foreign aid. However, the widely held view that budgetary constraints caused by economic crises reduce aid is inaccurate because donor government outlays actually tend to increase. We develop an argument that aid cuts occur because voters place a lower priority on aid during economic downturns and politicians respond by cutting aid. Using data from Eurobarometer, we demonstrate that economic downturns lead to reduced public support for helping the poor abroad. These findings are robust across a large number of alternative specifications. Our findings have implications for how advocates may prevent aid reductions during economic recessions.
As Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) has surged in popularity throughout political science, scholars have increasingly challenged the external validity of inferences made drawing upon MTurk samples. At workshops and conferences experimental and survey-based researchers hear questions about the demographic characteristics, political preferences, occupation, and geographic location of MTurk respondents. In this paper we answer these questions and present a number of novel results. By introducing a new benchmark comparison for MTurk surveys, the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, we compare the joint distributions of age, gender, and race among MTurk respondents within the United States. In addition, we compare political, occupational, and geographical information about respondents from MTurk and CCES. Throughout the paper we show several ways that political scientists can use the strengths of MTurk to attract respondents with specific characteristics of interest to best answer their substantive research questions.
INTRODUCTION: Why do countries sometimes use multilateral strategies and institutions for pursuing their foreign policies? Since World War Two the advanced industrial countries – basically, the OECD countries – have chosen to distribute part of their foreign aid through multilateral organizations, such as the European Union (EU), World Bank, IMF, UN, and regional development banks (RDBs). In particular I want to understand why these countries have chosen to delegate varying amounts of aid to these international organizations over the past 40 years. The delegation of aid-giving to multilateral organizations is surprising; it reduces a country's control over its own foreign policy and has the potential to increase principal-agent problems associated with all spending programs. The other choice that these countries had was to use their own bilateral aid agencies to select projects and oversee aid expenditures, which was the traditional practice prior to the 1960s. So the question addressed is why delegate the provision of foreign aid to a multilateral organization instead of using traditional bilateral channels. The total amount of such multilateral aid is not inconsequential. For instance, the World Bank gives aid in two main forms. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) uses its donor subscription base as collateral to borrow money on world capital markets, which it then lends at below market interest rates to developing countries. In 2001 the IBRD committed roughly $10.5 billion in low interest loans (World Bank 2001a).
Why do states choose multilateralism? We develop three theories to explain this choice: a principal-agent model in which states trade some control over the policy for greater burden sharing; a normative logic of appropriateness; and hegemonic self-binding in which powerful states seek to reassure other countries. Each theory leads to distinct observable hypotheses regarding both the reasons for and the patterns of the public’s support and opposition to multilateralism. To focus our study, we choose to analyze support for bilateral and multilateral foreign aid giving by the United States. By analyzing survey data, we provide evidence about the correlates of public support for multilateral engagement, showing that two competing rationales - burden sharing and control - dictate some of the politics around the choice between multilateral and bilateral aid channels. We conclude with a discussion of how a rincipal-agent model can help us understand the choice for multilateralism.
The literature on aid has come a long way in recent years, and as a result we now know much more about aid effectiveness than possibly ever before. But significant gaps in knowledge remain. One such gap is the effectiveness of aid in the so-called ?fragile states?, countries with critically low policy and institutional performance ratings. The current paper addresses this void by examining possible links between aid and economic growth in fragile states. It finds that: (i) growth would have been 1.4 percentage points lower in highly fragile states in the absence of aid to them, compared to 2.5 percentage points in other countries; (ii) highly fragile states from a per capita income growth perspective can only efficiently absorb approximately one-third of the amounts of aid that other countries can, and; (iii) while from the same perspective most fragile states are under-aided, to the extent that they could efficiently absorb greater amounts of aid than they currently receive, many of the highly fragile states are substantially over-aided in this sense. The overall conclusion is that donors need to look very closely at their aid to the sub-set of fragile states deemed in this paper as highly fragile.
As Official Development Assistance (ODA) tops 180 billion USD per year, there is a need to understand the mechanisms underlying aid effectiveness. Over the past decade we have seen some low- and middle-income countries become developed nations with record economic growth. Others remain in development purgatory, unable to provide their citizens with access to essential services. In an effort to improve aid effectiveness, the prescriptive nature of aid, where (typically) Western countries allocate funds based on perceived need or the strategic priorities of donors is being reconsidered in favour of locally-led development, whereby recipient governments and sometimes citizens are involved in the allocation and delivery of development aid. Meeting the preferences of donors (both governments and citizens) has been a longstanding priority for international development organisations and democratically governed societies. Understanding how these donor preferences relate to recipient preferences is a more recent consideration. This systematic review analysed 58 stated preference studies to summarise the evidence around donor and recipient preferences for aid and, to the extent possible, draw conclusions on where donor and recipient preferences diverge. While the different approaches, methods, and attributes specified by included studies led to difficulties drawing comparisons, we found that donors had a stronger preference than recipients for aid to the health sector, and that aid effectiveness could be more important to donors than recipients when deciding how to allocate aid. Importantly, our review identifies a paucity of literature assessing recipient perspectives for aid using stated preference methods. The dearth of studies conducted from the recipient perspective is perplexing after more than 30 years of 'alignment with recipient preferences', 'local ownership of aid', 'locally-led development' and 'decolonisation of aid'. Our work points to a need for further research describing preferences for aid across a consistent set of attributes in both donor and recipient populations.
How does funding from foreign aid shape public opinion toward development programs? Existing research suggests that citizens of recipient countries prefer aid-funded programs, particularly if they view the domestic government as corrupt and ineffective. However, these studies have been implemented in contexts where major donors are relatively popular. We extend this literature by analyzing attitudes toward foreign aid in the Arab world, where Western donors are often polarizing and disliked. A survey experiment conducted in Egypt provides some evidence that respondents approve less of public health programs when they are funded by the US or French development agencies instead of the Egyptian government. We find that this effect is driven by distrust of Western donors’ motives. Descriptive survey data from the Arab Barometer reinforce the experimental findings by illustrating the importance of anti-Americanism and perceptions of donor motives in heightening opposition to aid. This research note contributes to a growing literature on public opinion toward foreign aid in recipient countries.
Empirical evidence from cross-country studies on the effectiveness of aid to the water, sanitation and hygiene sector (WASH aid) points to significant heterogeneity across countries and highlights the need for further research at the sub-national level to assess and quantify the effectiveness of WASH aid within countries. This paper combines geocoded sub-national data on the location of WASH aid projects in Uganda with nationally representative household-level panel survey data to examine whether proximity to aid-funded WASH projects improves household access to water. Access to water is evaluated along three dimensions: access to an improved water source, travel time to an improved water source and waiting time at an improved water source. The results of a difference-in-difference regression analysis suggest that while aid-funded WASH projects increase household access to improved sources of water, households may also see the time burden of water collection increase, as they may need to travel longer distances and also experience longer wait times due to congestion at water service points. This is an indication that the supply of improved water sources financed by WASH aid in Uganda remains insufficient relative to demand as measured by the population density.
How can we elicit honest responses in surveys? Conjoint analysis has become a popular tool to address social desirability bias (SDB), or systematic survey misreporting on sensitive topics. However, there has been no direct evidence showing its suitability for this purpose. We propose a novel experimental design to identify conjoint analysis’s ability to mitigate SDB. Specifically, we compare a standard, fully randomized conjoint design against a partially randomized design where only the sensitive attribute is varied between the two profiles in each task. We also include a control condition to remove confounding due to the increased attention to the varying attribute under the partially randomized design. We implement this empirical strategy in two studies on attitudes about environmental conservation and preferences about congressional candidates. In both studies, our estimates indicate that the fully randomized conjoint design could reduce SDB for the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the sensitive attribute by about two-thirds of the AMCE itself. Although encouraging, we caution that our results are exploratory and exhibit some sensitivity to alternative model specifications, suggesting the need for additional confirmatory evidence based on the proposed design.
Is foreign aid an effective instrument of soft power? Does it generate affinity for donor countries and the values they espouse? This article answers these questions in the context of Chinese aid to Africa and the competing aid regime of the United States. The study combines data on thirty-eight African countries from Afrobarometer, AidData, and the Aid Information Management Systems of African finance and planning ministries. The authors use spatial difference-in-differences to isolate the causal effects of Chinese and US aid. The study finds that Chinese aid to Africa does not increase (and may in fact reduce) beneficiaries’ support for China. By contrast, US aid appears to increase support for the United States and to strengthen recipients’ commitment to liberal democratic values, such as the belief in the importance of elections. Chinese aid does not appear to weaken this commitment, and may strengthen it. The study also finds that Chinese aid increases support for the UK, France and other former colonial powers. These findings advance our understanding of the conditions under which competing aid regimes generate soft power and facilitate the transmission of political principles and ideals.
Experimental political science has changed. In two short decades, it evolved from an emergent method to an accepted method to a primary method. The challenge now is to ensure that experimentalists design sound studies and implement them in ways that illuminate cause and effect. Ethical boundaries must also be respected, results interpreted in a transparent manner, and data and research materials must be shared to ensure others can build on what has been learned. This book explores the application of new designs; the introduction of novel data sources, measurement approaches, and statistical methods; the use of experiments in more substantive domains; and discipline-wide discussions about the robustness, generalizability, and ethics of experiments in political science. By exploring these novel opportunities while also highlighting the concomitant challenges, this volume enables scholars and practitioners to conduct high-quality experiments that will make key contributions to knowledge.
What are the effects of foreign aid on the perceived legitimacy of recipient states? Different donors adhere to different rules, principles, and operating procedures. The authors theorize that variation in these aid regimes may generate variation in the effects of aid on state legitimacy. To test their theory, they compare aid from the United States to aid from China, its most prominent geopolitical rival. Their research design combines within-country analysis of original surveys, survey experiments, and behavioral games in Liberia with cross-country analysis of existing administrative and Afrobarometer data from six African countries. They exploit multiple proxies for state legitimacy, but focus in particular on tax compliance and morale. Contrary to expectations, the authors find little evidence to suggest that exposure to aid diminishes the legitimacy of African states. If anything, the opposite appears to be true. Their results are consistent across multiple settings, multiple levels of analysis, and multiple measurement and identification strategies, and are unlikely to be artifacts of sample selection, statistical power, or the strength or weakness of particular experimental treatments. The authors conclude that the effects of aid on state legitimacy at the microlevel are largely benign.
Foreign aid is one of the few areas where Americans say the government should spend less. We leverage a unique conjoint experiment to assess how characteristics of an aid package, as well as characteristics of the targeted country, affect public support. We find that people are far more inclined to support economic aid than military aid and are disinclined to provide aid to undemocratic countries. We also find that people are more averse to providing aid—particularly economic aid—to countries in the “greater Middle East” than those countries’ other characteristics would suggest. These effects are comparable to those associated with substantial increases in the cost of the aid package, suggesting that public wariness of foreign aid is not rooted in a fundamental aversion to spending in this domain. Our findings offer new insights into the contours of public opinion regarding foreign aid.
How do the perceived motives of donor states shape recipient attitudes toward foreign aid in a conflict zone? This research note evaluates the impact of two frames that characterize the motives of foreign powers involved in a civil conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These frames portray foreign actors as providing aid either to alleviate suffering during conflict (humanitarian frame) or to increase their power and influence in the recipient country (political influence frame). We demonstrate how framing impacts attitudes toward foreign assistance from the European Union and the Russian government among potential aid recipients in the Donbas. The results show that frames impact support for foreign aid from the European Union but have no effect on views of Russian aid. Counter to conventional expectations, aid provided for geopolitical, strategic reasons may be viewed as a positive, stabilizing force—even more than foreign aid provided for humanitarian reasons.
Despite starting as one of the poorest countries in the mid-1980s, Vietnam has achieved rapid developmental progress, reaching lower middle-income status in 2010. In line with rapid economic growth, Vietnam has achieved impressive progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) during this time. This paper sheds light on some elements of Vietnam’s success story, highlighting crucial policies in education and electricity sectors. It undertakes a forward-looking costing exercise that focusses on five sectors – education, health, roads, water, and electricity infrastructure. Achieving the remaining SDGs in Vietnam will be a challenge, with total annual additional spending needs in the 5 subsectors estimated at 7 percent of GDP by 2030.
Conjoint analysis is a common tool for studying political preferences. The method disentangles patterns in respondents’ favorability toward complex, multidimensional objects, such as candidates or policies. Most conjoints rely upon a fully randomized design to generate average marginal component effects (AMCEs). They measure the degree to which a given value of a conjoint profile feature increases, or decreases, respondents’ support for the overall profile relative to a baseline, averaging across all respondents and other features. While the AMCE has a clear causal interpretation (about the effect of features), most published conjoint analyses also use AMCEs to describe levels of favorability. This often means comparing AMCEs among respondent subgroups. We show that using conditional AMCEs to describe the degree of subgroup agreement can be misleading as regression interactions are sensitive to the reference category used in the analysis. This leads to inferences about subgroup differences in preferences that have arbitrary sign, size, and significance. We demonstrate the problem using examples drawn from published articles and provide suggestions for improved reporting and interpretation using marginal means and an omnibus F-test. Given the accelerating use of these designs in political science, we offer advice for best practice in analysis and presentation of results.
Foreign aid allocations represent one of several important economic policy tools used by governments to realize their foreign policy objectives. Using a conjoint survey of respondents in the United States, this paper shows that recipient country religion is a significant determinant of individual-level foreign aid preferences. In particular, respondents express a preference for giving to Christian-majority countries in contrast to Muslim- or Buddhist-majority countries. This effect is comparable with that of other important determinants of support for foreign aid, such as a country's status as a U.S. ally or trade partner. Importantly, the preference for Christian recipient countries is especially pronounced among Christian, and most notably Evangelical Christian, respondents. This paper explores two potential mechanisms for the effect of religion: country religion as a heuristic and an individual-level preference for giving to co-religionists.
How do the human rights practices abroad affect decisions about the allocation of foreign aid? This article provides a new approach to this long-standing question. We bring donor government, donor citizens, and recipients’ attributes together in a single analytical framework. We argue that donor citizens are more self-serving than previously assumed; they do not wholeheartedly support their government punishing human rights abusers when those states provide important policy benefits. When donor governments believe that their citizens will hold them accountable for their policy choices, they make foreign aid decisions that mirror citizens’ self-serving policy preferences. Thus, they avoid punishing repressive regimes that are the sources of valuable benefits. Our experimental and observational results provide support for our claims. Overall, our findings suggest that aid donors selectively punish human rights violators with aid cuts, but their variegated treatment of human rights violators largely stems from the self-serving policy preferences of their voters.
Foreign aid donors make themselves visible as the funders of development projects to improve citizen attitudes abroad. Do target populations receive these political communications in the intended fashion, and does the information succeed in changing attitudes? Despite the widespread use of various mechanisms to communicate information about foreign funding, little evidence exists about their effectiveness. We embed an informational experiment about a US-funded health project in a nationwide survey in Bangladesh. Although we find only limited recognition of the USAID brand, explicit information about US funding slightly improves general perceptions of the United States; it does not, however, change respondent’s opinions on substantive foreign policy issues. We also find that information increases confidence in local authorities. While our results suggest that information about foreign donors can effect attitudinal change, they also suggest that current mechanisms for information transmission might not be sufficient to do so.
To examine the extent to which foreign aid reaches people at different levels of wealth in Africa, I use household surveys to measure the subnational distribution of a country's population by wealth quintiles and match this information to data on the location of aid projects from two multilateral donors. Within countries, aid disproportionately flows to regions with more of the richest people. Aid does not favor regions with more of the poorest people. These findings violate the stated preferences of the multilateral donors under study, suggesting that the donors either cannot or are not willing to exercise control over the location of aid projects within countries. The results also suggest that aid is not being allocated effectively to alleviate extreme poverty.
In response to corruption and inefficient state institutions in recipient countries, some foreign aid donors outsource the delivery of aid to nonstate development actors. Other donor governments continue to support state management of aid, seeking to strengthen recipient states. These cross-donor differences can be attributed in large measure to different national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service delivery. Countries that place a high premium on market efficiency (for example, the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden) will outsource aid delivery in poorly governed recipient countries to improve the likelihood that aid reaches the intended beneficiaries of services. In contrast, states whose political economies emphasize a strong state in service provision (for example, France, Germany, Japan) continue to support state provision. This argument is borne out by a variety of tests, including statistical analysis of dyadic time-series cross-section aid allocation data and individual-level survey data on a cross-national sample of senior foreign aid officials. To understand different aid policies, one needs to understand the political economies of donors.
Recent articles conclude that foreign aid, like other nontax resources, inhibits political change in authoritarian regimes. This article challenges both the negative political effects of aid and the similarity of aid to other resources. It develops a model incorporating changing donor preferences and the heterogeneity of foreign aid. Consistent with the model's predictions, an empirical test for the period 1973–2010 shows that, on average, the negative relationship between aid and the likelihood of democratic change is confined to the Cold War period. However, in the post–Cold War period, nondemocratic recipients of particular strategic importance can still use aid to thwart change. The relationship between oil revenue and democratic change does not follow the same pattern over time or across recipients. This supports the conclusion that aid has different properties than other, fungible, resources.
We examine the trade-offs associated with using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) interface for subject recruitment. We first describe MTurk and its promise as a vehicle for performing low-cost and easy-to-field experiments. We then assess the internal and external validity of experiments performed using MTurk, employing a framework that can be used to evaluate other subject pools. We first investigate the characteristics of samples drawn from the MTurk population. We show that respondents recruited in this manner are often more representative of the U.S. population than in-person convenience samples-the modal sample in published experimental political science-but less representative than subjects in Internet-based panels or national probability samples. Finally, we replicate important published experimental work using MTurk samples. © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology. All rights reserved.
This paper uses data from the AidData project to analyze the association between foreign aid and the likelihood of democratization in aid recipients. Previous studies have argued that aid can entrench dictatorships, making a transition less likely. I find evidence that the relationship between aid and democratization depends on characteristics of the aid donor. During the period from 1992 to 2007, aid from democratic donors is often found to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of a democratic transition. This is consistent with a scenario in which aid promotes democratization and/or a situation in which democratic donors reward countries that take steps in a democratic direction. In either case, it suggests that democratic donors use scarce aid resources to encourage democracy. During the same period, aid from authoritarian donors exhibits a negative relationship with democratization. This suggests that the source of funding matters, with donor preferences regarding democracy helping to determine the link between aid and democratization.
Branding of foreign aid may undermine government legitimacy in developing countries when citizens see social services being provided by external actors. We run a survey experiment on a sample of Indian respondents. All subjects learn about an HIV/AIDS program; treated subjects learn that it was foreign-funded. We find null results that, along with existing results in the literature obtained from observational data, call into question the view that foreign-funded service delivery interferes with the development of a fiscal contract between the state and its citizens.
Does foreign aid extended by one country improve that country’s image among populations of recipient countries? Using a multinational survey, we show that a United States aid program targeted to address HIV and AIDS substantially improves perceptions of the U.S. Our identification strategy for causal inference is to use instrumental variables measuring the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS problem in aid recipient countries. Our finding implies that in addition to its potential humanitarian benefits, foreign aid that is targeted, sustained, effective, and visible can serve an important strategic goal for those countries that give it: fostering positive perceptions among foreign publics. By doing good, a country can do well.
We hypothesize that selective donors will use types of aid over which they have more control when providing assistance to poorly governed countries. We use an original classification of project purpose codes in the AidData dataset to categorize aid flows from the period 2004 to 2010. Results from fixed effect and compositional data models provide evidence of selectivity in terms of overall aid flows, a tradeoff between technical assistance and programmatic lending, and a tradeoff between social sector and infrastructure projects.
Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives, and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. At the same time, it is open to question whether new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) are more altruistic and provide better targeted aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the AidData initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that, on average, new donors care less for recipient need than old donors. New and old donors behave similarly in several respects, however. They disregard merit by not taking the level of corruption in recipient countries into account. Concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overblown for both groups.
The study of public opinion and foreign policy has a long history (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1955). This history includes a long-standing debate over the utility of studying public opinion when considering international affairs (Holsti, 1992; Mueller, 1971; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Wittkopf, 1986). The dismissal of the importance of public opinion stems from the concern that the mass public knows little about foreign policy. Prominent theories about foreign policy and international relations give no role to publics (Krasner, 1978; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Very few theoretical perspectives in international relations give any weight to public attitudes; neorealism, neoliberalism, and institutionalism provide very little space for the mass public to affect foreign policy.
This paper uses the gravity model of trade to investigate the effect of foreign aid on exports of aid recipients to donor countries. Most of the theoretical work emphasises the possible negative impact of aid on recipient countries’ exports, primarily due to exchange rate appreciation, disregarding possible positive effects of aid in overcoming supply bottlenecks and promoting bilateral trade relations. Using non-stationary panel (cointegration) estimators to control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias, we find that the net effect of aid on recipient countries’ exports is insignificant, both for our sample (of 123 countries) as a whole and for important regional sub-samples. This finding is in line with the small or insignificant macroeconomic impact of aid found in earlier studies and also suggests that exporters in recipient countries are not benefiting from improved trade relations with donors.
Transparency of aid activity is being recognized to be one of the key areas whereby aid effectiveness can be improved. In this paper, we propose an index to measure and rank donors on the transparency of their aid activities. The Transparency Index rates 31 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies on six measures of transparency. We find that being a member of the IATI is a powerful signal of a donor being more transparent across most other dimensions as well. We find no relationship between transparency and donor aid volumes. Overall IDA and Australia are identified as the most transparent donors, while Korea and IDB Special Fund are the least transparent.
Foreign aid involves a chain of accountability relationships stretching from international donors through national governments and implementing agencies to a set of ultimate end users of the goods and services financed by the aid. In this paper, I review five different accountability relationships that exist in foreign aid projects among donors, governments, implementing agencies and end users. Then I summarize existing empirical evidence demonstrating that foreign aid functions better—both at the macro-level of aid flows and at the micro-level of individual aid projects—when there is more government and implementing agency accountability. Specifying several mechanisms that facilitate accountability, I emphasize that participation is a tool often used to produce accountability within aid projects. However, in terms of donor accountability to aid-receiving countries and the end users in them, recent pushes for increased participation have not resulted in more accountability in the design of aid programs. Ultimately, although enthusiasm for participatory models of aid design and delivery is warranted, participation is not a panacea for all the accountability problems in foreign aid programs.
Including abstract, references. The Reduction of transaction costs is a commonly mentioned yet rarely elaborated goal for aid effectiveness in educational development. The casual use of the concept of transaction costs conceals which costs may be reduced, which costs are required and, indeed, what transaction costs actually are. Examining issues related to harmonizing the efforts of multiple donors in education development, this paper analyzes aid conditionality from a transaction-cost perspective. Using transaction-cost analysis, we expand on typical notions of policy conditionality to look at how organizational reforms may affect transaction costs and how aid contract relations may be influenced by conditionality.
The authors theoretically develop and empirically estimate a preference model determining foreign aid donor behavior. Aid access and levels are separately determined by endogenous budgetary allocations, the international economic environment, the distribution of income between countries, basic human needs, the small country effect, and regional bias. The authors find fungibility of aid in recipient budgets is due to donor and recipient preferences. Despite the importance of other economic influences, they find a significant pro-poor country bias in aid allocations, although little aggregate influence of basic human needs or regional bias. The small country effect is significant for two (of six) donors. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.