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Energy, Sustainability
and Society
No easy way out: towardsaframework
concept oflong-term governance
Dirk Scheer1*, Sandra Venghaus2, Stefania Sardo1, Sascha Stark2, Sophie Kuppler1, Michael W. Schmidt1 and
Carsten Hoyer‑Klick3
Abstract
Background Problems such as climate change, environmental pollution, nuclear disposal and unsustainable produc‑
tion and consumption share a common feature: they pose long‑term challenges because of their complex nature,
potentially severe consequences, and the demanding problem‑solving paths. These challenges may have long‑lasting
impacts on both present and future generations and, therefore, require to be addressed through a long‑term govern‑
ance perspective, i.e., coherent and consistent policy‑making across sectors, institutions, and temporal scales. Deal‑
ing with these challenges is a core task of policy‑making in modern societies, which requires problem‑solving skills
and capabilities. In this context, we identify long‑term governance traces in the literature, illustrate the case of energy
transition towards renewable energy systems as a long‑term governance case, and elaborate on the scope and defini‑
tion of long‑term governance and its research.
Main text We elaborate an analytical framework for long‑term governance (LTG), based on five building blocks:
the ‘environment’, which details the policy‑making arena; the ‘policy issues’, which elaborates on the problems to be
dealt with by LTG; the ‘key challenges and driving force’, revealing LTG mechanisms; the ‘key strategies’, in which prom‑
ising approaches for LTG are identified; and the ‘policy cycle’, where governance impacts on different policy phases are
discussed. In essence, we understand long‑term governance at its core as a reflexive policy‑making process to address
significant enduring and persistent problems within a strategy‑based decision‑making arena to best prepare for, navi‑
gate through, and experiment with a changing environment.
Conclusions The framework does not describe specific processes or individual cases in detail. Instead, it should be
understood as an illustration of long‑term governance characteristics at a more general level. Such a framework may
help to structure the field of long‑term policy‑making, guide future research on conceptual, comparative, and empiri‑
cal in‑depth studies, and may provide orientation and action knowledge for making our governance system sustain‑
able. Stimulating and broadening research on long‑term issues seems indispensable, given the existence of several
‘grand challenges’ that require successful long‑term governance.
Keywords Long‑term governance, Conceptual framework, Grand challenges, Systemic and societal change,
Renewable energy systems
*Correspondence:
Dirk Scheer
dirk.scheer@kit.edu
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
Background
Problems such as climate change, environmental pol-
lution, nuclear disposal and unsustainable production
and consumption share a common feature: they pose
long-term challenges because of their complex nature,
potentially severe consequences, and the demanding
problem-solving paths—often linked to high hopes
attached to technological developments and implemen-
tation, which mark them as “socio-technical problems”.
Addressing these challenges will require fundamen-
tal changes to the status quo, as their root causes are
deeply embedded in the structures and practices of
modern societies, bringing about changes that will have
long-lasting impacts on both present and future gen-
erations [1–6].
Dealing with these long-term challenges is a funda-
mental aspect of policy-making in modern societies,
necessitating the implementation of problem-solving
decision-making strategies. In essence, it requires the
implementation of a long-term governance architec-
ture that coherently copes with the problem through an
adequate policy-making process. On the problem side,
issues must first be recognized at the societal level.
rough complex political processes, which also rely on
the insights of various experts, issues are identified as
“priorities” by policy makers, leading to their inclusion
in specific policy agendas. is process will inevitably
take time, because, for instance, the consequences and
side effects of a problem may only become fully appar-
ent over time [7, 8]. A major challenge on the policy-
making side is to develop and agree on policy options
that are feasible within existing constraints and find
legitimacy among stakeholders, voters, and society at
large. In addition, myopia resulting in short-term poli-
cies and compartmentalized structures resulting in silo
policies are a major difficulty in policy-making. Long-
term problem causes and policy solutions are indeed
intertwined and interdependent, potentially creating
self-reinforcing and amplifying effects. us, tempo-
rality is a key feature of long-term governance. While
there is no consensus in the literature on the meaning
or definition of the time scale inherent to “long-term”
policy problems [9, 10], it is important to acknowledge
that the time-horizon is specific to different policy
issues [11] and also differs depending on the individual
and organizational department or practice [12]. For
instance, the conservation of biodiversity and the regu-
lation of biogeochemical flows must be maintained over
an extended period to be effective [13]. Geological stor-
age of carbon dioxide or nuclear waste calls for contin-
uous management under stable institutional safeguards
and communication systems for centuries and more.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to
elaborate an analytical framework for long-term govern-
ance. is framework aims to better understand the long-
term governance environment and the pending issues,
challenges and key strategies and their implications in the
policy-making cycle. As a framework, it does not detail
specific processes or single cases, but is an illustration of
long-term governance characteristics at a more generic
level. Such a long-term governance framework can help
structure the long-term policy-making field, guide future
research on conceptual, comparative, and empirical
studies, and provide orientation and action knowledge
to enable governance systems to be fit for sustainability
challenges.
e paper is organized as follows: within this back-
ground section, we first identify long-term governance
traces in the literature. Next, we briefly illustrate the case
of energy transitiontowards a renewable energy system
as a long-term governance case study, and finally, we out-
line the scope and a definition of long-term governance
and its research. e main section lays out the long-term
governance framework according to several building
blocks, i.e., the long-term governance environment, long-
term governance issues, major challenges and driving
forces, substantial key strategies, and considerations of
long-term governance within the policy cycle. Finally, we
discuss the main results and draw conclusions.
Long‑term governance traces intheliterature
Our understanding of long-term governance provides
many links to several strands of literature—although lit-
erature that explicitly addresses the notion of long-term
governance is rare. We draw on the following four areas
of research: governance literature provides us with ideas
about the structures and processes of policy systems and
policy-making; earth system governance explores the
global scale of environmental risks and their institutional
handling; risk research provides knowledge about threats
and their systemic and sometimes hidden cause-and-
effect relationships; and transition studies explore how
change processes can be conceptualized and governed.
e field of governance research is essential for the
concept of long-term governance. e term govern-
ance ultimately derives from the Greek verb kubernaein
[kubernáo] (meaning to steer). In its current under-
standing, the term has gained popularity in the 1980s
and 1990s, indicating changes about the way political
decisions and implementations are made. Governance
is generally defined as the interplay of actors and insti-
tutions, as well as structures and processes [14], but this
concept also encompasses the process by which societies
adapt their rules to new challenges [15]. is can hap-
pen by integrating various perspectives, often including
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
a substantive dimension (“What are the rules?”), a pro-
cedural dimension (“How are the rules developed?”), and
a structural dimension (“Which rules are established,
how are they implemented and enforced, and how are
conflicts over them resolved?”) [16]. However, there is
no common understanding of what governance entails.
ree different meanings of governance have been sum-
marized by Fukuyama [17]: governance as the regula-
tion of social behaviour through networks and other
non-hierarchical mechanisms (governing without gov-
ernment), governance as public administration (good
governance), and governance as international coopera-
tion through non-sovereign bodies outside the state sys-
tem (international governance).
Governing long-term challenges will often entail
aspects of all three meanings. As framed by Nye and
Donahue [18: p.12], governance, therefore, means “the
processes and institutions, both formal and informal,
that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”.
ese activities are usually aimed at providing public
goods [19, 20]. However, scholars have observed a signifi-
cant shift since the 1970s, which can be summarized as a
shift from government to governance. As Renate Mayntz
puts it [21: 18]: “For a long time, the word ‘governance’
simply meant ‘governing’, government seen as a process.
Today, however, the term ‘governance’ is mostly used to
indicate a new mode of governing, different from the old
hierarchical model in which state authorities exert sov-
ereign control over the people and groups making up
civil society […]. ‘Governance’ refers to a basically non-
hierarchical mode of governing, where non-state, private
corporate actors (formal organisations) participate in the
formulation and implementation of public policy”.
While governance research describes the processes and
structures of cooperation and coordination among differ-
ent actors irrespective of time, earth system governance
explicitly addresses long-term challenges [22]. is field
is concerned with the interrelated institutions, organi-
zations, formal and informal rules, and mechanisms
through which humans govern their relationship with
the natural environment. It focuses on how such govern-
ance can be more effectively and equitably aligned with
the goal of sustainable earth system transformation [23,
24]. Indeed, human activities have profoundly affected
planetary biogeophysical systems to the extent that they
may be driving the Earth system into “alternative modes
of operation that may prove irreversible and inhospitable
to humans and other life” [24: p. 278]. us, a global gov-
ernance architecture might be needed to “steer societies
towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global
and local environmental change and, in particular, Earth
system transformation” [24: p. 279]. is architecture is
composed of public and private institutions, principles,
procedures, and norms that insist on a particular (prob-
lem) area. However, this governance can be quite frag-
mented, for example, in relation to the perceived scale of
the problem [23]. When dealing with earth system gov-
ernance problems, attention must be paid to dimensions,
such as the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions
and the consequences of their interactions (the problem
of architecture), the capacity of agents (i.e., actors having
the legitimacy and authority to exercise power) to pur-
posefully steer earth system transformations (the prob-
lem of agency), the ability of groups of agents to adapt to
the challenges caused by these transformations, including
issues of injustice (the problem of adaptiveness), issues of
accountability and legitimacy, and questions of allocation
and access [24].
In the field of risk research, the study of how societies
deal with risks, represents a major source of insight for
long-term governance. Modern societies have evolved
into a risk society, according to Ulrich Beck, where the
pursuit of wealth and economic development “is system-
atically accompanied by the social production of risks”
[7: p. 19]. Let us highlight one important topic in risk
research among many others relevant for long-term gov-
ernance: systemic risks. ese risks can “endanger the
functionality of systems of critical importance for society
and their scope in time and space” [25: p. 2]. ey pos-
sess several attributes: they are highly interconnected
and intertwined, leading to complex causal structures,
and exhibit nonlinear cause–effect relationships [25, 26].
In addition, they are stochastic in their cause–impact
chains, leading to increased uncertainty that is challeng-
ing or impossible to characterize through statistical con-
fidence intervals. Finally, the consequences of systemic
risks are transboundary or cross-sectoral in scope. In
light of the aforementioned complexities and uncertain-
ties surrounding systemic risk, the question arises: what
constitutes “good” risk handling within modern societies?
Renn [27] proposes a risk governance framework con-
sisting of five elements: pre-assessment, risk appraisal,
risk characterisation/evaluation, risk management, and
risk communication. Pre-assessment deals with fram-
ing the risk (early warning and preparation for handling
a risk) and identifying and involving relevant actors and
stakeholders to capture different perspectives on a risk,
its associated opportunities and potential strategies for
addressing it. Risk appraisal comprises risk assessment
and concern assessment, i.e., assessing the technical and
perceived causes and consequences of the risk. Risk char-
acterisation and evaluation includes comparing the out-
come of the risk appraisal with specific criteria elaborated
by decision-makers, determining the significance and
acceptability of a risk, and preparing for decisions. Risk
management deals with decisions and implementation of
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
risk management options. Finally, risk communication is
central as a cross-cutting issue that challenges all other
risk governance phases. Overall, then, risk governance
“includes matters of institutional design, technical meth-
odology, administrative consultation, legislative proce-
dure and political accountability on the part of public
bodies, and social or corporate responsibility on the part
of private enterprises” [27: p. 364].
In the field of transition studies, scholars have explored
processes of medium- and long-term transformation
from a socio-technical systems perspective, combining
narrative analyses with more practical guidelines [28,
29]. is research field focuses on understanding, analys-
ing and encouraging socio-technical change. Against this
background, several strands of research have emerged,
such as strategic niche management [30, 31], transition
management [32–34], and the multi-level perspective
(MLP) approach [29, 35, 36]. e latter conceptualizes
transitions as an interplay of dynamics between the land-
scape (macro-level), regime (meso-level), and niches
(micro-level). MLP is a sort of heuristic device, or mid-
dle-range theory, meant to direct “the analyst’s attention
to relevant questions and problems” concerning transi-
tions [37: p. 33]. In contrast, transition management aims
to support decision-makers and other actors in making
a transition, which is a long term, cross-domain, cross-
scale, multi-actor, and multi-domain process. e long-
term nature of the process highlights several key aspects.
It is crucial to develop strategies to integrate long-term
governance and concerns into the realm of “regular” poli-
cymaking, as the latter “is generally focused on the short-
and mid-term because of political cycles, individual
interests, and public pressure” [38: p. 169]. Policymaking
itself is complex and uncertain, and clear solutions are
sometimes difficult to design [28]. Finally, attention must
be paid to “learning, interaction, integration, and experi-
mentation on the level of society (…), as every action or
solution will lead to changes in the societal structures, in
turn transforming the problem itself” [38: p. 164].
In summary, the literature review concerning long-
term governance provides the following key insights: gov-
ernance research highlights the multitude of actors and
institutions that make up modern policy making, yielding
in best case to collectively binding decisions. Earth sys-
tem governance indicates the severity of scales with the
global dimension of many environmental problems, and
the long-term time horizon, necessitating correspond-
ing institutional regimes and settings. Risk research indi-
cates to the importance of threats confronting societies
and offers insights into how to deal with them in modern
societies. Finally, transition studies research the process
of change and propose tools for understanding and man-
aging complex socio-technical system transformations.
Energy transition asalong‑term governance case
e case of the energy transition is a good example of
long-term governance, which we will briefly illustrate.
e transformation towards a renewable energy system
aims to de-fossilize the energy use by 2050 as a climate
change mitigation solution pathway. e Paris agreement
[39] calls for carbon neutrality by the mid-century. e
preferred solution is to change the energy provision from
fossil fuels to renewable energies, with policies that apply
economic instruments (so-called “carrots”) to encourage
investments by private businesses. Replacing the entire
power park and adding new systems to better balance
energy demand and supply requires long-term invest-
ments in new energy technologies, which have monetary
payback periods of often 10–20 years. Investors, there-
fore, call for stable boundary conditions for new tech-
nologies. As these technologies are often at the beginning
of their development, they need support instruments that
make investments competitive. A long-term perspective
is also needed for continuous investments that help to
run down the learning curve of technologies and bring
their prices down.
A first example of long-term decision-making refers
to one of the most popular instruments implemented,
i.e., the feed-in tariff for solar installations, which pro-
vided the investors with a guaranteed long-term (usually
20years) price for the energy provided. e return on
investment should be similar to that of a bank investment
over the same period to make it attractive. However,
policy outcomes vary between countries. A comparison
between Spain and Italy, for instance, shows that rev-
enues were much higher than system costs [40]. is
resulted in rapid growth of photovoltaic (PV) instal-
lations. In Spain, the installed capacity reached 4GW
in 2008, ten times more than the national targets. As a
result, by 2009, drastic cuts have been undertaken in
the renumeration, bringing investments down to almost
zero. In Italy, 3.1 GW were installed in 2010, 4 GW were
awaiting connection. If all this capacity had been con-
nected, the 2020 targets would have been almost reached
by 2011 [40]. e German tariff was different. It had an
annual reduction that lowered the tariff every year. In
2009, costs started to fall faster, which led to a larger dif-
ference between costs and renumeration. is caused a
large public debate about unfair windfall profits for PV
installers, who profited from the money of all electricity
customers. is led to a number of extra unscheduled
tariff reductions in 2010 and 2011, and later to a sched-
uled reduction of the tariff every quarter of the year. is
learning approach to the feed-in tariff kept the net pre-
sent value quite close to the actual system costs.
A second example is the development of the wind
energy industry. A secondary target of a support regime
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
is to create new local jobs and industries to compensate
for job losses in the fossil industry. An analysis of the
evolution of the global wind power industry [41] shows
how the development of national markets influences the
development of the industry. Markets with stable mar-
ket conditions are much more likely to develop national
industries than markets with unstable conditions, which
experienced a much earlier shake-out of companies.
A final example is the ability of different nations to
adapt to changing conditions for energy. An analysis by
Meckling etal. of the 1973 oil crisis and the impacts of
the recent conflicts in the Ukraine identified three groups
of nations: “insolation—policy makers are shielded from
political opposition; compensation—policy makers ease
the burden of adjustment for business and customers;
and markets—policy makers step back and markets drive
the change” [42]. e first two can create more stable
policy regimes, whereas market-based transitions can be
much more volatile and subject to price fluctuations.
e case of energy transition shows the long-term
approach of solution pathways with its “in-between”
social, economic and environmental consequences and
the corresponding need to continuously adapt and adjust.
is leads us to elaborate the scope and definition of
long-term governance.
The scope oflong‑term governance andits research
Long-term governance requires careful attention to
issues of temporality, to the management of uncertainty,
and to the interplay between the short and the long term
[43]. Urgent and integrated policy responses and long-
term governance efforts are needed that take into account
two major problems: first, as a consequence of the system
complexity and the long time-lags between policy action
and effort, these processes of social–ecological change
are characterized by a profound level of uncertainty [44–
46]. Second, while it is clear that knowledge is required
to formulate such responses, it is less clear how to pro-
duce and mobilize this knowledge effectively and legiti-
mately [47]. is latter aspect not only includes issues at
the science–policy interface, but also reflects the ques-
tion of how to integrate the interests of future genera-
tions into policy-making processes [48]. Since long-term
problems can last for generations, the time horizons for
addressing them must exceed the regular governmental
cycles of elections, decision making, planning, and budg-
eting [49]. Political actors are influenced by time con-
straints due to the temporary nature of democratic rules,
and these short time horizons may provide incentives to
focus on immediate electoral gains, often at the expense
of responsible long-term governance [50]. Governments
in particular can find it difficult to develop and execute
long-term strategies due to their highly politicized and
rule-bound nature [51, 52]. Moreover, the political incen-
tive structure may be affected by discounting and time
inconsistency, and long time-lags between policy effort
and effect can lead to extreme temporal asymmetry in
participation and political power, as the concerns and
preferences of important future stakeholders have no
bearing on current political decisions [44].
Against this background, we define long-term govern-
ance as the political handling and policy-making to ade-
quately cope with enduring problems that spans over a
long period of time—i.e., as a rule of thumb, at least one
generation (approximately 25years). Governance is used
here in a broad sense according to Meuleman & Veld [53]
and encompasses the totality of interactions between the
government, other public bodies, the private sector and
civil society, aimed at solving societal problems or creat-
ing societal opportunities to address the complexity of
the problem. In our view, research on long-term govern-
ance addresses analytical, normative and transformative
issues:
• Analytically, it yields to better understand the mech-
anisms, challenges, and critical success factors of
long-term problem-solving processes.
• Normatively, it aims at long-term governance deci-
sion-making that addresses the policy problem in the
best and most beneficial way for society.
• And transformatively, it considers change as a key
constituent to deal with in long-term governance
approaches.
e governance process endures over time for two
main reasons: the first characteristic of any governance
process addressing long-term problems (“pathway”) is
complexity and uncertainty, which determines its persis-
tence: not only is there no single right solution, but any
pathway trying to solve it needs to address many differ-
ent known and emerging, partially intertwined techni-
cal, economic and social issues over time, in particular
in the phase of policy formation within the policy cycle.
e second characteristic is that at best there is only con-
sensus on general goals, such as the decarbonization of
the energy system by the mid-century in Europe. What
a decarbonized energy system will look like and which
specific solution-pathway to this target has to be selected
must be negotiated contextually and may need to be
readjusted according to societal preferences, evolving
knowledge and other external influences.
Ideally, we understand long-term governance as the
most forward-looking and adequate political handling
of large-scale, target-oriented change processes. Long-
term governance addresses a policy problem through
reflexive, anticipatory and adaptive action, considering
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
its uncertain, complex and ambiguous nature due to the
unusually long temporal relationship between problem
identification, coping interventions, and intended and
unanticipated effects. Addressing uncertainty and the
need for constant negotiation and adaptation requires
long-term, integrated, comprehensive, and iterative
learning efforts that combine the technical with the
organizational, social and economic dimensions.
Main text
Elaborating along‑term governance framework
Long-term governance is a fuzzy and complex topic.
us, based on further literature insights, we developed
an analytical framework for long-term governance to gain
a better understanding and facilitate further research. A
general framework helps to identify the crucial elements
of an object and their relation, and organizes diagnostic,
descriptive and prescriptive inquiry [54]. e framework
comprises the following building blocks:
• e “environment” details the policy-making arena of
long-term governance
• e “policy issues” elaborate on problems to be dealt
with by long-term governance
• e “key challenges and driving force” reveal mecha-
nisms of long-term governance
• e “key strategies” identify promising approaches to
good long-term governance
• e “policy cycle” asks about long-term governance
impacts on policy phases
The long‑term governance environment
e governance environment refers to the political arena
in which government, other public bodies, the private
sector, and civil society interact to solve societal prob-
lems or create societal opportunities [53]. us, the gov-
ernance environment comprises a relation between: (1) a
governing system and (2) systems to be governed (includ-
ing the institutional setup of the governing system) [55,
56].
The systems tobe governed andlong‑term governance
e systems to be governed relate to several sub-sys-
tems (polity, economy, society, science) with their func-
tional specifications and mutual interactions, which
make up social systems in modern societies [57, 58].
Each sub-system has its own rationale for achieving
effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, and social cohesion.
Long-term governance issues, such as climate change,
emerging technologies, or biodiversity, etc., touch upon
several systems of organized complexity. ese systems
are dynamic, evolving and self-organizing, and respond
with unknown feedback loops and cascading effects
[56]. us, it is extremely difficult to foresee and forecast
social system behavior and assess policy intervention
effects and outcomes—in particular with a long-term
future perspective. ere will be no clear ex-ante pic-
ture of how social systems will evolve and simple policy
planning and intervention activities certainly will not
yield the intended outcome [59, 60]. In addition, these
sub-systems largely operate in a self-organizing mode, in
a highly complex intra- and inter-system interaction, so
that interventions may have very different outcomes than
expected.
What scholars empirically observed [61] is that deci-
sion-making in modern societies has become increas-
ingly complex due to structural and procedural changes
within and across existing sub-systems and society as a
whole: globalization, increased international cooperation
and multilateralism (such as the European Union), soci-
etal changes, including the increased citizen engagement
and the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
the changing roles of the private sector and an increas-
ing complexity of policy issues. All this makes it difficult
to make decisions with confidence and legitimacy. e
interfaces between the sub-systems and policy-making
are, therefore, crucial.
The governing system andlong‑term governance
Against this background, the governing system has been
characterized as shifting from a traditionally hierarchical
to a more co-operative form of governing, i.e., from gov-
ernment to governance [21]. For a long-term governance
approach, two aspects are crucial—the impact of a gov-
ernance style and the range of policy interventions and
instruments.
A robust long-term governance approach builds
on existing polity, politics, and policy configurations.
Countries and nation-states have uniquely devel-
oped their specific policy regimes based on historical
developments and their political cultural alignments.
Renn [62], for example, differentiates four govern-
ance approaches—adversarial, fiduciary, consensual,
and corporatist—as defining patterns of interaction
between science and politics, and policy-making.
In the literature, it is often argued that democracies
are not well equipped to implement long-term poli-
cies that impose costs on the present for the benefit of
future generations. In this sense, long-term governance
brings the “when” into policy-making as it can intro-
duce a strong temporal delay between cost and benefit
[63, 64]. Research focusing on the effect of different
forms of democratic institutions on a democracy’s
ability to consider long-term aspects in political deci-
sion-making suggests that democratic myopia is more
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
prevalent in some forms of democracy than in others.
Caluwaerts and Vermassen [65: p. 191) show in a com-
parative study that “democracies with coalition gov-
ernments, proportional electoral systems, multiparty
systems and high levels of public participation among
diverse societal groups, are more future-regarding than
those built on majoritarian foundations.” Furthermore,
if policy-makers can take decisions that have long-term
benefits, but short-term costs, without being made per-
sonally responsible and having to fear not being ree-
lected (“insulation”), future-regarding decision-making
is more likely to take place. e same is true if a coun-
try can offer compensation for costs imposed on indi-
viduals and industries, e.g., due to the energy transition
[42].
Irrespective of these general democratic configura-
tions that encourage or discourage future-oriented
decision-making, some countries choose to create
institutions whose explicit task is to bring future-ori-
ented thinking into the decision-making process, such
as parliamentary committees or offices for future gen-
erations. ere are several success factors for the work-
ing of such institutions: a certain degree of institutional
independence rooted in the political system, the need
to foster deliberation and diversity, and the need to be
empowered to set agendas and influence political deci-
sion-making [66].
e toolbox of policy instruments and political steer-
ing are another important component of long-term gov-
ernance. e debate on political steering started off when
the failure of the planning euphoria of the late 1960s
became apparent. e shift from planning euphoria to
control skepticism largely paved the way for the govern-
ance debate. e scope of the exercise of political power
was thus expanded from command and control towards
more non-hierarchical forms of political steering. Direct
political steering with command and control via sticks,
indirect steering as incentive-based via carrots, perva-
sive and information-based steering via sermons, and—
in addition—so-called contextual control (e.g., nudging),
structural control and societal self-regulation mark the
spectrum of governance intervention strategies. e con-
trol spectrum of governance thus covers the extremes
from hard to soft steering approaches. In the context of
long-term governance, the aforementioned spectrum can
be employed if the chosen approach enjoys a high degree
of legitimacy. Otherwise, its long-term implementation
may be jeopardized [65].
While traditional policy instruments of carrots, sticks,
and sermons are familiar [67], soft and indirect control
approaches are less known. Göhler [68] detailed three
types of soft control that relate to indirect and contex-
tual steering approaches: control through discursive
practices; control through questions and arguments; and
control through symbols.
Control through discursive practices refers to the
socially accepted content of meaning and can be deduced
from Michel Foucault’s work [69, 70]. ese discursive
practices structure, determine and generate social dis-
cursive debates and, consequently, guide subsequent
actions. Control through discursive practices can set in
motion a variety of mechanisms to act on a specific con-
text without the aid of hierarchies. An example of this
type of steering is the way specific events are categorized
(e.g., the corona pandemic in Germany with strict lock-
down policies and Sweden with loose ones), leading to
different policy actions. Control through questions and
arguments focuses on the direct influence on the inter-
locutors and not on the framework conditions. Questions
and arguments induce mechanisms of substantive justi-
fication. Justification pressure, although neither coercion
nor command, leads to an influence on the addressees
and thus enables soft control. In the German parliamen-
tary policy-making process, there are several questioning
instruments (e.g., major and minor interpellation, writ-
ten question, etc.) which initiate mechanisms of ques-
tioning, argumentation, justification and subsequently a
corridor of courses of action, since policy action needs
to be in line with reasoning [71]. Finally, soft control via
symbols refers to condensing meaning and content to a
signifier which leaves considerable room for interpreta-
tion. Symbols can be used as intentional soft control in
case they allude to common values and, therefore, gener-
ate social resonance which structures action orientation.
Many actors in social–political debates, such as NGOs,
political parties, business groups, etc., use symbol control
mechanisms to find legitimacy and support within soci-
ety [68]. An illustrative example is the picture of a polar
bear clinging on melting ice as a symbol of rapid climate
change.
Long‑term governance policy issues
Not all societal problems require a long-term governance
handling, but some issues do. What are the dividing lines
that differentiate long-term governance issues from oth-
ers? Governance requires something to be acted upon—
that is, something that is perceived as a public problem
(or opportunity) and subsequently enters successfully the
political agenda and then the decision-making process
[72]. Indeed, a policy problem is defined “as a condition
or situation that produces needs or dissatisfaction among
people for which relief or redress by governmental action
is sought” [73: p. 81]. While early research directed the
problem definition process solely to objective facts, cur-
rent scholars emphasize that both individual percep-
tions and objective facts are equally important in making
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
a condition “a problem” [74]. e goal of policy prob-
lem handling is to prevent serious harm to humans and
the environment, or to create social opportunities, for
instance by improving people’s living conditions com-
pared to the status-quo. Once a problem is “identified”,
a process of discussion and eventual placement on the
political agenda follows. is is in line with Kingdom’s
multiple streams framework, which posits that issues
emerge through a confluence of problems, policies, and
politics [72]. However, this process is deeply embedded
in power dynamics and social negotiations that shape
how problems are politically framed and recognized [75].
The long‑term aspersistency ofproblems and/orsolutions
Temporal persistence takes “time periods” as a defin-
ing attribute for long-term governance issues. us, the
policy issue (problem/opportunity) and/or the corre-
sponding policy solutions are enduring over longer time
periods. e long-term here is commonly defined against
short-term horizons (e.g., election cycles) as a generation
(about 25years), several decades up to a hundred or even
more years, depending on the specific issue. e long
time periods can be caused by various circumstances,
either related to the source and/or the solution of the
issue, and its target orientation as either benefit-seeking
or damage-avoidance.
e policy issues’ target orientation area can be differ-
entiated between a focus towards damage-avoidance or
benefit-seeking. Damage-avoidance takes a risk perspec-
tive, identifying severe threats that need to be addressed
by policy-making. e main feature is the potential of
consequences that harm what people value. e long-
term persistence of an issue can be caused by large uncer-
tainties about the risk consequences; by different values
associated with the risk, resulting in different assess-
ments of target setting and need for action; and by policy
solutions that, for instance, take a long time to be effec-
tive. e creation of opportunities from a benefit-seeking
perspective often targets social, health or employment
policy areas. e long-term persistence for both types
of target orientation relates to a continuous discrepancy
between target-setting and its non-achievement.
e policy issues’ source and solution area address the
nature of the problem source and the solutions being
considered. Both can form the basis of long-term per-
sistence. On the source side, for instance, we may be
confronted with risks that cause triggers that cannot be
eliminated by risk management policies. Consequently,
these risks continue to pose a threat and require a more
“permanent” policy action. e complexity and uncer-
tainty of the risk source, with its cause–impact rela-
tionships, intervening variables, delayed effects and
unknown side-effects, may indeed constitute a long-term
governance issue. However, the implementation of policy
solutions can also result in long-term persistence. On one
hand, differences in social values regarding the risks and
benefits of potential pathways may complicate the design
and selection of adequate policy solutions [76–78]. us,
decision-making is a time-consuming process that also
necessitates windows of opportunities for certain policies
to come into force [79]. On the other hand, solution poli-
cies can be comprehensive, complex and based on each
other and require a long-term perspective [80–82].
e two aspects of long-term governance policy
issues—target orientation, and source-solution—are
combined in Fig. 1 as a matrix to illustrate long-term
governance issues.
In the following, we provide some examples of
long-term governance issues from the case of energy
transition.
A source–damage example relates to specific socio-
technical systems that have persistent negative conse-
quences that may require long-term governance. ese
issues may stem from legacies of prior, but still lasting,
natural developments or human activities. Most promi-
nent in this field are long-lasting technologies and large-
scale infrastructures that have been built in the past, but
still need political action to guarantee their safety [7,
83]. Czada [60] pointed out four aspects of technologies
becoming long-term issues: implementation may cause
irreversible changes to society and the environment. e
termination of control of the technical project would
result in disadvantages and damage to society and the
environment. e possibility of conclusively regulating
the technology at present is limited, in that it is uncertain
how the overall socio-technical system will change in the
long run as a result of the implementation and operation
of the technical facility with its infrastructure elements.
e goal of institutionalized control by a governance net-
work is the preservation of the common good precisely
over longer periods of time. Examples of source-damage
Fig. 1 Matrix of long‑term governance issues along target
orientation and problem coping. Source: own elaboration
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
issues are the so-called eternal costs related to under-
ground mining. In the Ruhr area of Germany, the so
called “Ewigkeitskosten” are the eternal costs related to
the drainage of land submerged by coal mining, which
involves the continuous and eternal pumping of water
out of the area to keep the land artificially dry and pre-
vent it from sinking further. Other examples of long-
term issues requiring long-term safety maintenance are
nuclear waste disposal, energy and transport infrastruc-
ture, dams and levees. In these cases, policy action is
needed to ensure the management and maintenance of
long-term safety to prevent serious damage.
A solution-damage case refers to complex solution
packages that cope with the problem, but need consid-
erable time to be designed, implemented, or to demon-
strate their efficacy. Many policy solutions tackling severe
environmental risks fall into this area. Climate change,
overexploitation of natural resources, environmen-
tal pollution, etc., refer to economic activities and their
impacts on the planet that jeopardize the overall balance
of the Earth system by crossing the planetary bounda-
ries. Coping with these threats requires policy solutions
that fundamentally tackle the sources of the threats—but
take considerable amounts of time to materialize due to
policy implementation constraints [84, 85]. An exam-
ple of a time-consuming implementation is the decar-
bonization of the energy system through the expansion
of renewable energy solutions. A key policy response to
climate change is to decouple energy (production and
consumption) from CO2 emissions by substituting fossil
fuels with renewable energy (e.g., solar and wind power).
However, the mere size and scale of the transformation
requires considerable amount of time, as several tech-
nologies along the energy production, infrastructure and
consumption chain need to be replaced. Complex policy
packages and mixes are, therefore, needed, for instance to
help install onshore and offshore wind and photovoltaic
power, to encourage the expansion of energy grids and to
stimulate adequate energy use devices (heat pump, elec-
tric car). e timeline for Germany’s energy transition
policy targets, for instance, is a 60% share of renewables
in energy consumption by 2045 [86]. It should also be
acknowledged that the implementation of such energy
transition policies is often met with controversy and
resistance from various stakeholders, which can lengthen
their enactment [87, 88]. is is due, for example, to dif-
fering social values, economic concerns, and other politi-
cal dynamics.
A source–benefit case relates to the improvement of liv-
ing conditions, typically in the field of social, health or
employment policy. Empirical socio-economic data and
the forecasting of future trends can be used as a basis
for early warning and raising awareness of a problem.
Specific examples include the ageing populations, skills
shortages, and public debt, which are among the most
significant social problems shared by advanced industri-
alized countries [64]. e countries of the global South
are also characterized by long-term issues of improving
living conditions, such as fighting poverty, providing suf-
ficient food and drinking water, safeguarding jobs and
workers’ rights, etc. Another illustrative example in the
field of energy is regional structural change policies as
a transition away from coal phase out in Germany. e
legal basis for this phase out is the Act to Reduce and End
Coal-Fired Power Generation (KVBG), adopted in July
2020. is legislation foresees coal-fired power genera-
tion to be gradually reduced and phased out by the end
of 2038 at the latest. As an indirect, but intended con-
sequence, lignite coal mining will also be phased out. A
major policy effort is currently underway with the objec-
tive of implementing benefit-seeking measures designed
to facilitate the transition process in the affected regions.
ese measures are intended to address both the job
losses and to support the structural changes that are nec-
essary in the coal mining regions to establish future-ori-
ented business and industry.
A solution–benefit case refers to specific far reaching
target visions of “better futures” that might trigger con-
crete policies. Visions of change usually comprise rather
normative concepts and guiding principles that might
aim at fundamentally changing the way we live. One
example are debates on sustainability and transitions with
its political embedding and operationalization within the
sustainable development goals (SDGs), i.e., grand chal-
lenges whose solutions require more radical and disrup-
tive changes and thus unfold over a long period of time
[88–90]. Value orientation towards inter- and intragen-
erational justice in sustainability is fundamentally based
on time. Further examples of far reaching solution–ben-
efit target visions are, for instance, those based on the
concepts of bioeconomy and circular economy [91, 92],
green transformation [93], smart cities [94], or growth-
critical concepts, such as degrowth or post-growth [95].
Key challenges anddriving force oflong‑term governance
is section identifies, based on the existing literature,
the key challenges that undermine long-term govern-
ance. In particular, the following are considered: (1) the
openness of the future; (2) the intertemporal divide; (3)
the presentist bias, a—and, as a key driving force (4)
future expectations and narratives that guide societal
actions, thereby making long-term governance happen.
The openness ofthefuture challenge
A long-term perspective encompasses a governance
approach that looks far into the future. At its core,
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
however, future developments are open, uncertain,
and difficult to predict. e future openness is due to
the existence of deep uncertainty, described as a situ-
ation “where it is difficult to agree on the relationships
between the key driving forces of change in the long-
term or on the probability distributions used to repre-
sent uncertainty about those factors” [96: p. 1]. Adaptive
governance approaches are, therefore, considered to be
suitable to consider deep uncertainty [97]. It is inevita-
ble that both positive and negative surprises will occur
in the short and long-term. is is due to a number of
factors. e openness of the future is contingent upon
the stochastic nature of cause-and-effect relationships.
e envisioned development of social systems relies on
stochastic relationships comprising many variables that
interact mutually and influence each other. For exam-
ple, interactions relate to the individual and/or collective
contingency of decisions. In addition, depending on how
decisions were made, they influence future decisions.
Another example is natural events, which are impossible
to point predict. e risk of an earthquake or a volcanic
eruption can be estimated as high, but it is not possible
to point predict these events far in advance. Knowledge
deficits are another major reason for uncertain futures.
Uncertainty ultimately arises, because there is a “lim-
itedness or even absence of scientific knowledge (data,
information) that makes it difficult to exactly assess the
probability and possible outcomes of undesired effects”
[61]: p. 234]. When facing complex problems and sys-
tems, human knowledge is always incomplete and selec-
tive about assumptions, assertions, and predictions [27,
98, 99], and it is, therefore, difficult to assign probabili-
ties, e.g., when defining risks, even though some forms
of judgments are still possible [100]. Uncertainty thus
manifests itself on the time scale of long-term govern-
ance, with difficulties in forecasting its concrete outcome
within the variety of possible futures [101]. As such, the
issue of uncertainty remains a fundamental hurdle for
rational decision making, since “future states of the world
are not predictable because of the complexity of situa-
tions in which decisions are made; unforeseeable effects
of interactions; genuine novelty brought about by unpre-
dictable innovations; and the contingency of other actors’
choices” [102]: p. 8].
The intertemporal divide challenge
A key characteristic of long-term governance is its inter-
temporal divide between the present, the short-term,
and the long-term, in short: the temporalities. ere are
tight linkages between the present and the futures. One
aspect of the intertemporal divide challenge is the tem-
poral fragmentation both of problems and solutions.
Issues such as climate change lead to both acute crises
and enduring creeping risks, with different policy action
needed. Enacting change to tackle these issues is, there-
fore, also a complex and uncertain process [103, 104].
e occurrence of weather extremes, such as forest fires,
intensive flooding, and extreme droughts, call for urgent
action, which, however, might not tackle the causing
effects. us, policy action addressing creeping risks
with possible future negative outcomes is simultaneously
needed. Solutionwise there is also a high degree of frag-
mentation. On one hand, there is often a temporal divide
between costs and benefits. On the other hand, large-
scale problems require radical solutions, often involv-
ing complex and time-dependent policy packages with
intermediate targets. e energy transition, for example,
is being tackled via complex policy packages developing
over time: feed-in tariffs, off-shore wind parks, interim
renewable expansion targets, subsidy programs for elec-
tric cars, energy storage technologies, system flexibility
through sector-coupling, etc., are just very few compo-
nents of an energy transition policy package. If one con-
siders that policy-making itself is a somehow chaotic and
unpredictable process [71, 105, 106], it becomes clear
that the intertemporal divide challenge for long-term
governance is considerable. It requires both being open
and adaptive, as well as closing down contingency and
trying to fix long-term goals, at least for guidance [104].
Another issue is the difficulty of engaging the public in
long-term governance, especially when the benefits of
policies are not immediately apparent [107]. Sustaining
public engagement on these types of issues requires con-
tinuous efforts.
The presentist bias challenge
One of the challenges of long-term governance is the
already mentioned myopia in policy-making, especially
with regard to the so-called presentist bias both within
the systems to be governed and the governing system
[64, 108]. ere are several indications strengthening
the presentist bias. Jacobs [64] identified several presen-
tist bias factors. e first is the paucity of information
about longer-term outcomes. Indeed, there is a notable
asymmetry in the information available, with much more
data on past and present events than on future ones.
As a result, voters tend to prioritize current issues over
future concerns when communicating with policy-mak-
ers [109]. e second is the fragility of long-term politi-
cal commitments. is refers to the fact that policies with
long-term benefits often come with short-term costs.
Present constituents often challenge such political com-
mitments, because these costs are borne unequally across
generations and social groups (intergenerational and
distributional issues) [110]. e third challenge relates
to the power difference among affected stakeholders, in
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
that organized groups are both highly attentive to policy
consequences that affect them and are able to mobilize
against policies that go against their interests [64].
e institutional setup of democracies favors short-
termism (e.g., parliamentary terms, short election cycles,
budgetary and fiscal policy). e institutional arrange-
ments developed according to past and present problem-
solving produces siloed policies. Silos originate from
the way institutions have historically developed and are
structured with departments for health, the environment,
the economy, etc. [56]. What is needed for coping with
future issues, instead, is policy coherence and cross-sec-
toral public bodies.
e presentist bias challenge is also backed by ambigu-
ity. Ambiguity refers to the variability of interpretations
based on identical observations or data assessments, and
relates to both the target and possible outcomes [100,
104]. Indeed, social groups usually hold different values
and meanings towards certain problems and their solu-
tions [100, 111], and this influences the way they judge
events, set priorities, calculate risks, and propose solu-
tions. Key differences in interpretations may arise, for
example, when trying to understand what a problem
means for humanity and the environment. Ambiguity
leans towards the present due to the impact of mental
models and heuristics. Social–psychological research
revealed that human attitudes and choices depend on
simplified heuristics (i.e., availability heuristic) [112–
114]. ese intuitive heuristics are presence-oriented and
correspond with satisfying rather than optimizing strat-
egies [27]. is has a major impact on the definition of
risks, for example, as Stirling [100: p. 310] states, “where
there is ambiguity, reduction to a single ‘sound scien-
tific’ picture of risk is also neither rigorous nor rational”.
Indeed, goals such as “fighting climate change” should be
understood as a process along which participants collec-
tively define “what” should be fought and “how”.
Future expectations andnarratives aslong‑term governance
driving force
Having identified the challenges that hamper long-term
governance, a crucial question remains: what is the driv-
ing force that, despite the aforementioned challenges,
encourages a long-term governance perspective? In our
view, theories of expectations provide compelling argu-
ments for how visions of the future influence the present,
that is, how they contribute to long-term processes of
policy-making, societal debate and technological devel-
opments [75, 115].
We draw here on a book by Jens Beckert [102] on
imagined futures, which provides a solid interdiscipli-
nary basis for understanding why the future matters.
Beckert argues that images of the future state of the
world or possible courses of action—so-called imagined
futures—are a fundamental source and motivation for
economic decision-making today [102]. Future expecta-
tions have the “as if” power: “Expectations under con-
ditions of uncertainty and ascribed symbolic meanings
may be seen as a kind of pretending, which creates con-
fidence and provokes actors to act as if the imaginary
were the ‘future present’” [102: p. 10]. However, the
opening of the “as if” space is not arbitrary and does
not open up countless opportunities for action. On the
contrary, “Expectations, and stories about the future in
general, reduce essential contingency in a non-deter-
ministic sense, by providing blueprints that can be used
in action” [116: p. 217; 117]. A key example of future
expectations in economics is money and credit, which
are the backbone of capitalism. ese are based on
fictional expectations, because they entail the prom-
ise of future value and “belief in their value depends
on imaginaries of uncertain future states of the world”
[102: p. 128]. In essence, investments represent future
visions of anticipated profits. Business investment in
plant production facilities for the purpose of provid-
ing goods and services is predicated on the expectation
that future sales will yield higher returns than the initial
investment.
Another object of strong expectations within the
capitalist economy is technological innovation. ese
expectations play a fundamental role in shaping the
development and design of new and innovative tech-
nologies. Such expectations can be either positive,
entailing desired benefits, or negative, expressing con-
cerns about social and cultural decay. ese conflict-
ing technological visions often coexist [79], once again
demonstrating that the adoption and development of
technologies is a political matter [75, 117–120]. e
role of expectations in science and technology has
been analyzed in detail. Future-oriented abstractions
and expectations can be seen to be fundamentally ‘gen-
erative’. According to Borup etal. [121: p. 286], “they
guide activities, provide structure and legitimation,
attract interest and foster investment. ey assign
roles, clarify duties, offer some shared shape of what
to expect and how to prepare for opportunities and
risks. Visions drive technical and scientific activity,
warranting the production of measurements, calcula-
tions, material tests, pilot projects and models”. ese
manifold impacts of expectations are evident in policy-
making, where respective fields of policies (e.g., inno-
vation policy, education policy, competition policy, and
environmental policy) are concerned with shaping the
socio-technical environment of science and technology.
us, they constitute a fundamental driving force for
long-term governance.
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
Key strategies forgood long‑term governance
In light of existing literature, we deduced four strategies
for an effective long-term governance: (1) reflexivity, to
identify problems and solution-oriented goals; (2) antici-
pation, futuring, and iteration, to best prepare for change;
(3) adaptation, flexibility and robustness, to navigate
through change; and (4) deliberation, probing, and learn-
ing, to experiment with change.
Reexivity towardslong‑term issues, problems andobjectives
e concept of reflexive governance [122, 123] builds
upon Beck’s work on the risk society [7]. It recognizes
that “governing activities are entangled in wider societal
feedback loops and are partly shaped by the (side-) effects
of its own working. It [therefore] incorporates such feed-
back by opening problem-handling processes for diverse
knowledge, values and resources of influence to learn
about appropriate problem-definitions, targets and strat-
egies of governance for sustainable development” [124:
p. 4]. If reflexive, governance should, therefore, evolve to
adapt to the changing environment and the emergence of
unexpected consequences caused by governance itself.
e principle of reflexivity can be applied to each step
of governance, for example, in relation to the process of
problem-definition, setting targets and devising solution
strategies. Reflexivity in this sense entails the continu-
ous initiation of problem and solution search processes
within both the governing and the governed systems.
Early problem identification and the subsequent goal set-
ting are linked to the science–policy–society interface as
well as to ethical considerations.
Given the inherent complexity, uncertainty and ambi-
guity of long-term governance issues, the science–pol-
icy–society interface is of crucial importance. It indeed
requires a scientific community that is committed to
the scope and able to discuss its concerns effectively
with society and advise policy-makers on possible solu-
tions [27]. erefore, long-term governance should be
equipped with mechanisms to ensure that policies are
not only scientifically sound, but also socially relevant
and accepted [75]. Public engagement has indeed a piv-
otal role in this matter, as it serves to democratize both
science and policy, thereby enhancing their account-
ability [124–126]. To improve the science–policy–soci-
ety interface, several proposals have been put forth,
including the establishment of specialist parliamentary
committees dedicated to exploring long-term or future-
oriented matters [108] and the enhancement of science–
policy ecosystems through the work of interface actors
who facilitate long-lasting collaborations between scien-
tists and policy actors [56].
e role of ethics emphasizes the significance of values
in long-term governance. is leads to considerations of
both intra- and intergenerational justice. Should action
be taken immediately to fulfill the needs of the cur-
rent generation, or should it be postponed to take ade-
quate responsibility for those who will live in the future?
Indeed, long-term governance is essentially about ethical
issues of trust, responsibility, and fairness across genera-
tions. In the terminology of the political philosopher John
Rawls, this could be expressed as follows: development
pathway evaluation must be based on beliefs, values, and
principles that are shared by all reasonable worldviews
and democratic parties in an overlapping consensus [127,
128]. us, integrating ethics and value orientation calls
for the establishment of future councils and the represen-
tation of future generations [129], fostering moral reflec-
tion [56]; and ensuring consistency of policy setting with
well-established principles of intergenerational justice
[108].
Preparing forthechange: anticipation, futuring techniques,
anditeration
As previously stated, the open future uncertainties rep-
resent a major challenge for long-term governance han-
dling. Consequently, it is important to be best prepared
for any future developments that may arise acknowledg-
ing uncertainty constraints. In this context, anticipatory
governance concepts have been developed [130, 131].
Fuerth’s anticipatory governance comprises a system of
systems with four basic components: a foresight system,
a networked system for integrating foresight and the pol-
icy process, a feedback system to gauge performance and
also to manage “institutional” knowledge, and an open-
minded institutional culture [130]. e concept has been
applied to issues, such as climate change, sustainability,
and socio-ecological systems resilience [132].
It becomes obvious that the science–policy–society
interface is again essential here as an anticipatory gov-
ernance arena. On one hand, science and society can
provide possible, probable, and/or socially acceptable
pathways and options for long-term governance issues,
and on the other, policy makers need support for debat-
ing, deciding and implementing long-term governance.
In scientific research, futuring techniques are employed
to investigate future developments and specifications.
Among the most prominent methods used are Delphi
surveys, computer simulation, scenario analysis, trans-
formation change theories, horizon scanning, cross
impact analysis, technology forecasting or backcast-
ing. It is, however, crucial to acknowledge that no sin-
gle method can guarantee optimal outcomes, given
the inherent complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity
of social transformations. e judicious integration of
research methods (e.g., direct or indirect coupling)—or,
in instances where this is not feasible, the integration of
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
results from individual disciplinary (interdisciplinarity)—
is important in addressing these complexities [133, 134].
Finally, transdisciplinary research is an umbrella concept
for integrated research and science which involves soci-
ety. It includes not only scientific actors but also repre-
sentatives of politics, the private sector and civil society,
since these groups can provide special orientation and
action knowledge that helps to promote the transition.
Considering several actors via participation and involve-
ment aims at enhancing agency towards target-oriented
transformations.
In the realm of politics, several requirements back-
ing anticipatory governance have been delineated [130].
ese include the incorporation of anticipation and
futuring techniques into institutions, rules, and deci-
sion-making processes to reduce risks and enhance the
capacity to respond to events at an early stage of their
development. Anticipation should be present at every
governance scale, from the communal to the global.
Iteration of anticipation and futuring exercises is a
fundamental success factor for long-term governance.
Regardless of the methodology employed, the resulting
projections are inevitably imperfect approximations of
how the future will unfold. Within complex social system
development, for example, the considered starting con-
ditions may rapidly change. e global financial crisis of
2008, the global COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, and Rus-
sia’s invasion of Ukraine have all had a significant impact
on the world’s “landscape”. It is imperative that these
changes are considered on an ongoing basis to inform
future anticipation efforts. It is a continuous effort for
science, politics, and society as a whole to repeatedly
undertake futuring exercises, with updated consideration
of changing starting positions, and to integrate these new
anticipatory results into the scope of policy options.
Navigating throughthechange: adaptation, exibility,
androbustness
Long-term governance runs through considerable peri-
ods of time to solve problem issues with high levels of
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. What is cer-
tain is the fact that the decision-making arena is a hazy
environment with ups and downs of change and stabil-
ity within the systems to be governed causing feedback
loops to the governing system. A key success factor for
long-term governance handling is to keep up capacity
for action, options for action, and power for action—
in short: to keep up agency. However, agency must be
understood across the full spectrum from hard to soft
steering approaches.
e term ‘navigation’ [135–137] is employed here to
describe effective long-term governance agency, as it
encompasses the “art of steering”, which originated in
nautical science and involves the determination of the
“most optimal” route to a desired destination, taking into
account the current position and the most efficient path
to the destination. us, navigating through the change
with agency necessitates rightly interpreting the chang-
ing environment and making appropriate decisions
towards long-term problem solution.
Adaptation, flexibility, and robustness have been iden-
tified as key elements of successfully navigating through
the change. Adaptive governance indicates a way of gov-
erning that allows flexibility to find best tailor-made solu-
tions, and—by doing so—contributes to robustness and
resilience of efficient and effective problem handling.
Several adaptive governance requirements have been
outlined [138], namely: provide necessary information,
deal with conflict, induce compliance with rules, provide
physical, technical, and institutional infrastructure, and
encourage adaptation and change. Adaptive governance
has been further researched within the broader social
context that enable ecosystem-based management [139],
towards institutional adaptation [140], and towards dou-
ble crisis (acute and creeping) management [141]. e
latter emphasized adaptation by designing alternative
response strategies and allowing for flexibility to switch
paths. at includes cyclical adaptation which involves
iterative and continuous cycles of trying, monitoring and
adjusting or shifting between policies with the aim of lev-
eraging temporary solutions, feedback cycles, and brico-
lage to work towards robust multi-functional solutions
[141].
Experimenting withthechange: deliberation, probing,
andlearning
is leads to the last fundamental key element—that is
experimenting with the change by deliberation, probing
and learning. Deliberation and involvement are means to
include diverse viewpoints in the governance process to
gain a richer understanding of the affected system, pro-
vide legitimacy as a necessary governance resource, and
enhance the steering toolbox with experimenting along
the full spectrum from direct to indirect and contextual
governance approaches as laid out above on the steering
toolbox of the governing system [142, 143]. By dealing
with the problem in their ways, different actors contrib-
ute to problem definition and solution [125, 144]. e
types of contributions can take on very different forms.
For example, in policy-making, creating and maintain-
ing vigilance, offering knowledge, taking care of local
interests or fulfilling the function of creating a system of
checks-and-balances [145, 146]. Last but not least, long-
term problem solving—as for instance with the energy
transition—cannot be evaluated solely in terms of tech-
nical and economic feasibility. An equally important fact
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Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
is the social approval of the decisions associated with
the structural transformation, which can be expressed
through active participation supporting the change pro-
cess (e.g., through buying efficient appliances, installing
solar energy on their rooftops). e envisaged energy
turnaround will hardly be implemented without the
approval and engagement of the population, as the reas-
surance from the citizenry in a pluralistic–democratic
society is of central importance.
Experimenting is also most relevant for probing pol-
icy action and instruments, and their time adequate
implementation. us, long-term governance arrange-
ments should combine strategically built (top-down) and
emerging (bottom-up) actions as a matter of continuity
and flexibility, and probe new arrangements in protected
areas [147]. ere are several examples for probing envi-
ronments: one refers to setting smart political frame-
work conditions via, for instance, the so-called regulatory
sandboxes and experimentation clause, which allows for
innovation through temporally suspending formal regu-
lation in well-defined areas to innovate in specific fields,
such as mobility or public administration. Another refers
to living labs and real-world laboratories with possibili-
ties to carry out concrete transformation experiments in
local settings. e idea here is that researchers conduct
interventions in the sense of “living lab experiments” to
learn about social dynamics and processes. Co-design,
co-production and co-evaluation are essential features of
a living lab process [148].
ese experiments shall contribute to learning pro-
cesses as an essential part of long-term governance with
their institutional context-conditions need to be under-
stood and considered. Learning in such contexts can take
on different forms, such as, for example, instrumental
learning, political learning or implementation learn-
ing [149]. It is important to keep in mind that learning
processes do not necessarily lead to changes in policies.
Rather, policy changes also depend, for example, on
power relations, vested interests or available resources
and the way knowledge is discursively created [149].
From the point of view of institutional psychology, a
learning environment that entails both the relevant poli-
cies and the institutions involved requires being open
about mistakes and establishing measures that welcome
the reporting of mistakes. is makes it more likely that
counter-measures can be taken to possible maldevelop-
ments that might threaten the envisioned aim of the
long-term governance process [150].
Long‑term governance andthepolicy‑making cycle
We understand long-term governance at its core
as a reflexive policy-making process to address sig-
nificant enduring and persistent problems within a
decision-making arena based on strategies to best pre-
pare, navigate, and experiment with the changing envi-
ronment. Public policy-making has been described as a
cycle (or process) composed of iterative phases [71, 73,
151–153]. erefore, we build on the existing literature
to start delineating a heuristic long-term policy-making
framework and discuss our conceptual understanding of
long-term governance in the light of the various stages of
the policy-making process. We differentiate the phases
of: (1) policy formation, (2) policy adoption and imple-
mentation, and (3) policy impact, and re-formulation. In
the following, we will discuss each phase from the angle
of long-term governance.
Policy formation: problems, agendas, andoptions
Research has identified several necessary factors for
problems to enter the policy cycle and become a public
problem. at is, problems that produce needs or dis-
satisfaction among people, affect a substantial number
of people with broad impact, and thus are appropriate to
seek governmental remedies [73]. Long-term governance
issues are—as identified above—persistent long-term
issues dealing with either a benefit seeking or damage
avoidance focus attached to the source–solution axis.
is poses different requirements to “good” long-term
governance handling.
First, screening and identifying possible threats and
risks as early as possible is needed. Early warning mech-
anisms established at the science–policy interface are
required to screen and identify possible threats on the
science side and stimulate governance agency to push
forward a consistent political agenda.
Second, good timing for defying agenda setting ration-
ales and cycles is necessary for sound long-term govern-
ance. Since some long-term problems may persist for
generations, addressing these issues needs a governance
architecture that span beyond the regular governmental
cycles of rather short-term elections, decision making,
planning, and budgeting. Adopting a longer-term hori-
zon and addressing the needs of future generations might
be challenging for democratic institutions, especially
when political leaders must be accountable to their cur-
rent constituents [107]. Even with long-term policies in
place, time inconsistency due to the incongruity between
cost/benefit considerations may result in incentives to
abandon or defect from these policies in favor of short-
term gains [44, 154].
ird, consistency and continuous handling of incre-
mental long-term issues are needed across the turbu-
lences and weak predictability of the policy-making
processes. Establishing the necessary institutional envi-
ronments, setting clear targets and evaluation criteria,
and providing sufficient resources to deal successfully
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Page 15 of 22
Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
with, for instance, long-term infrastructure management,
are core parliamentarian and administrational tasks. at
includes to invest resources in updating, improving or
reusing the technological environment, guarantee high-
level education and provision of maintenance staff and
flexible management concepts, and provide strong antici-
pation skills to pre-evaluate changing conditions of infra-
structure embedment.
Policy formulation becomes relevant provided a long-
term policy problem was identified and successfully
entered the agenda setting phase [71], seeking relief
through policy-makers and governmental action. What
comes next, is to identify policy solutions that will cope
with the problem. We introduce the term “pathway” here
as a conceptual approach which in our view becomes
relevant for long-term governance issues [155, 156].
Policy pathways link the problem with the solution and
may entail several principal solution options. e path-
way approach is understood as planning tool for govern-
ance, as pathways frame, channel, and narrow the scope
of policy options and alternatives—and thus work as a
fictional future expectation. When it comes to long-term
governance issues, it is necessary to consider the follow-
ing aspects, which greatly influence the use of pathways
as governance tools.
First, goal and target setting for long-term governance
issues is essential. Before it is possible to design concrete
policy options, there is a need to specify long-term tar-
gets for an envisaged problem solving. Goal and target
setting are search processes involving several actors from
science, policy-makers, stakeholders and the public at
large, where appropriate. Target specification refers to
linking the identified problem with plausible and con-
vincing solution through a target-oriented pathway idea.
is means that the problem-solving final status needs to
be specified somehow. To provide examples, in the con-
text of climate change, target specification entails, for
instance, limiting the global average temperature rise to
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. In the field of
nuclear disposal, instead, the final target can be defined
as ensuring the permanent protection of humankind
and the environment from ionizing radiation and other
harmful effects of such waste for future generations.
Second, knowledge and transparency of pathway mul-
titudes are essential. As a general rule, there exist several
solution-oriented pathways to cope with public prob-
lems. A core activity of policy-making is to identify, spec-
ify, and select pathways for further governance handling.
Pathway identification is, again, a result of close coop-
eration at the science–policy interface and participa-
tory involvement and societal deliberation. To give some
illustrating examples, in the case of climate protection,
one could think of two fundamental problem-solving
pathways, that is a pathway of reducing greenhouse gases
by substituting fossils fuels, and a pathway of geoengi-
neering activities. e former CO2-reduction pathway
includes solutions like fast phasing-out of fossil fuels,
extension of renewable energies, and substitution of fos-
sil energy based towards renewable energy-based energy
consuming devices (i.e., oil heating vs. heat pump). e
latter pathway of geoengineering comprises a set of activ-
ities in the two fields of carbon dioxide removal (CDR)
and solar radiation management (SRM), which means the
introduction of new (experimental) technologies in our
societies. As can be seen, the two pathways follow dis-
tinct roads towards problem-solving and include a high
level of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity.
Policy adoption andimplementation: policy packaging
andincrementalism forchange
Policy-making is in its core a decision-making process of
responsible persons or bodies to select and decide among
alternative policy options to enforce selected target-ori-
ented pathways. Several theories on the process of policy-
making exist, such as the rational–comprehensive theory
(going back to Auguste Comte), the “incrementalism”
introduced by Lindbloom [157] as muddling through
theory, or the so-called mixed-scanning approach [158],
which combines rationale high-order with incremental
low-order decisions. e term “scanning” particularly
refers to the search, collection, processing, and evalua-
tion of information, as well as to the drawing of conclu-
sions, to serve decision-making processes [159]. Among
the relevant individual and collective decision criteria
for policy-making, values, party affiliation, constituency
interests, public opinion, deference, and decision rules
should be mentioned [73]. Decision-making also includes
working out detailed policy options that promise to solve
public problems. In a wider governance sense, long-term
agency should comprise the full spectrum from hard to
soft steering approaches, including contextual and indi-
rect control attempts. Against that background, we see
the following major aspects for long-term governance.
First, incremental planning for change means a step-
wise approach of detailed implementation action. Once
long-term objectives, strategic plans and policy options
are selected, the next step is to translate them into short-
term plans and budgets [160, 161]. is involves devel-
oping an implementation plan, allocating necessary
resources, and assigning responsibilities to relevant gov-
ernment agencies or stakeholders. Clear timelines, moni-
toring mechanisms, and performance indicators should
be established to track progress and ensure account-
ability. However, the implementation of this ideal-type
approach poses several challenges, particularly in rela-
tion to the role of distributed agency. On one hand, it
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Page 16 of 22
Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
is crucial to deliver a strategic direction [88]; and on
the other, it can lead to scattered activities. Long-term
policies and strategies must also align with the existing
routines, budgets and practices within the public sector,
underscoring the need for seamless integration of these
strategies into organizational processes [161].
Second, integrated policy packaging learning needs to
be implemented. Long-term governance issues normally
require complex, multilevel policy action on several
scales (time, space etc.), to achieve a stepwise target-ori-
ented transformation based on interim feedback loops
through policy learning. Coping with climate change, for
instance, calls for a fundamental socio-technical regime
shift that cannot be reached via single policies. What is
needed are comprehensive, decentralized, and integrated
policy packages that challenge the prevailing regime and
thus pave the way for radical transformation. At a prac-
tical level, some strategies can be pursued to mitigate
these issues. For example, ensure that long-term values
and goals are embedded in policies across different sec-
tors; encourage cross-sectoral coordination to address
complex challenges that require integrated solutions;
and embed long-term thinking and evaluation into the
policy-making process. is may entail establishing
dedicated units or bodies responsible for monitoring
and assessing the long-term impacts of policies, ensur-
ing ongoing evaluation and adjustment of strategies if
needed. In addition, learning environments should be
created that encompass the full spectrum of the policy
toolbox steering activities comprising both top-down and
bottom-up approaches that experiment with the change.
Policy impact andre‑formulation: future interest
andsolution pathway monitoring
Long-term governance is a purposeful political interven-
tion triggered by the perception of a problem that could
severely affect our societies over the long run. Given
the fundamental and systemic nature of the change to
be reached, it cannot be expected that the process will
unfold in a linear and rational manner. us, an accom-
panying evaluation and monitoring process is necessary
to stimulate redesign, reformulation and subsequent
decision-making when appropriate. To understand how
to monitor and evaluate long-term governance processes,
we will focus on institutional settings, the object of moni-
toring, and the process of monitoring and reformulation.
First, it is essential that impact evaluation and moni-
toring are entrusted to one or a set of institutional moni-
toring bodies, where future interests can be placed. is
organization’s primary tasks include gathering informa-
tion for monitoring, and designing corrective measures
if the long-term governance process branches off in
undesirable directions and if the environment subject to
governance change in a way that might require govern-
ance adjustments. is body should ideally be made up
of a heterogeneous pool of experts, capable of collect-
ing information and analyzing it, whose composition
will most likely change over time, with the emergence of
unplanned consequences.
Second, the monitoring object comprises the selection
of key indicators and the design of the process itself (e.g.,
how frequently it should be performed, data collection
and data analysis methods, etc.). Useful and valid indica-
tors that work for any long-term governance process are
still to be developed and be supplemented with depend-
ing reference context of a given long-term governance
issue. For example, in the case of deep nuclear disposal
geological and safety case minimum requirements are
essential, while for the energy transition case, expansion
targets for renewable energies are crucial [162]. Fur-
thermore, it is important to keep in mind that variables,
classifications, and categories are essentially political
in nature: they determine what is seen and valued, and
what is obfuscated, hidden, or ignored [163–166]. ere-
fore, this selection is in its core ‘political’ and inevitably
raises questions of justice, namely, who has the power to
decide how a problem should be understood, analyzed,
and addressed. From a reflexivity and adaptivity perspec-
tive, it should be noted that monitoring variables may
change over time due to, for instance, scientific knowl-
edge progress, unexpected emergence of artifacts, agents,
and issues, or changes in the composition of the moni-
toring body. In addition, to meet the reflexivity require-
ment, a long-term governance monitoring process must
be attentive to how power accumulates within the net-
work of actors involved and to how coalitions might steer
the overall process to the detriment of potentially more
socially sustainable alternatives.
ird, a key feature of long-term governance moni-
toring is the process of redesign and reformulation with
subsequent policy action to ensure an adaptive and
reflexive long-term governance process. ere are sev-
eral common dilemmas characterizing these steps. One
of such issues is determining the action precedence, i.e.,
how to order the different challenges and when to prior-
itize emerging problems. Another dilemma is the ‘right’
decision-making level to implement the various correc-
tive actions, i.e., the dilemma between centralization and
decentralization. While the former favors coordination
among planned actions, these could be locally rejected as
deemed inapplicable. e latter instead facilitates adapta-
tion to local circumstances (including routines, narratives
about the future, and other cultural elements), but could
result in a patchwork of actions that could lead to over-
all inconsistency. A final dilemma concerns the trade-off
between a governance structure that gives stability to
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Page 17 of 22
Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
the long-term governance process and one that is flex-
ible and responsive to change. At one extreme, excessive
structure and bureaucracy slow down the implementa-
tion of corrective actions and tend to be insensitive to the
demands of change; at the other, governance changing
too frequently is incapable of learning and thus of being
reflexive.
Conclusions
Climate change, environmental pollution, nuclear waste
management, and unsustainable production and con-
sumption all share the common trait of being long-term
challenges that often lead to the implementation of novel
technological solutions. is long-term nature stems
from their complex and uncertain character, their poten-
tial for severe consequences, and the demanding prob-
lem-solving paths. Indeed, effectively addressing these
challenges requires a form of governance that transcends
short-sighted visions and short-term mechanisms.
Within this paper, we conceptually researched the case of
long-term governance based on a comprehensive litera-
ture review with the aim to elaborate a generic long-term
governance framework. We define long-term governance
as the most forward-looking and adequate political han-
dling of large-scale, target oriented change processes. It
requires long-term, integrated, comprehensive, and itera-
tive learning efforts that combine the technical dimen-
sion with the organizational, social and economic ones.
Research on long-term governance relates to three sub-
stantial levels, that is: analytically yielding to better
understand the mechanisms, challenges, and critical suc-
cess factors of long-term problem-solving processes and
outcomes; normatively aiming at long-term governance
decision-making that addresses the policy problem in the
best and most beneficial way for society, and transforma-
tively considering change as a key constituent to deal
with in long-term governance approaches.
Against this background, we specified long-term gov-
ernance as a socio-political response to a policy/future
problem through reflexive, anticipative and adaptive
action, considering its uncertain, complex, and ambigu-
ous nature that results from the unusually long tempo-
ral relationship between problem identification, coping
interventions, and its intended and unintended effects.
Drawing upon diverse sources in governance research,
earth system governance, risk research, and transition
governance studies, we develop a conceptual meta-
framework to establish a robust theoretical foundation
for long-term governance. e overall architecture and
configuration of the long-term governance conceptual
understanding is illustrated in Fig.2.
e environment of long-term governance is char-
acterized by both the systems to be governed and the
governing system. Decision-making in modern socie-
ties has become more and more complex due to struc-
tural and procedural shifts within existing subsystems
and society at large. Anticipating and assessing social
systems behavior and the effects of policy interventions,
especially from a long-term viewpoint, proves exceed-
ingly challenging. Conversely, the governing system is
transitioning towards a more cooperative form, shift-
ing from government-centric to governance-centric
approaches. In a long-term governance framework, two
pivotal aspects are the impact of governance styles and
the spectrum of policy interventions. While the influ-
ence of defining interactions between science, politics,
and policy-making on long-term governance remains an
open research question, the entire range of control and
steering approaches proves indispensable in long-term
governance. Long-term governance policy issues are the
main subject to deal with, and persistency being their key
characteristic. We identified target orientation towards
damage avoidance or benefit seeking, and source–solu-
tion aspects as the main features of long-term govern-
ance issues. Key challenges towards ‘good’ long-term
governance were identified as open future, temporal
divide and presentist bias challenges based on matters
of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity in the area of
knowledge constraints, institutional settings, subjec-
tive perceptions, power relations, and plural interests. A
key driving force, however, is the fact that futures mat-
ter in present attitudes and decision-making alike with
the role of future fictional expectations being crucial.
Against these contextual attributes of long-term govern-
ance, we identified four key strategies to best cope with
these policy issues, that is, strengthen reflexivity towards
long-term issues, problems and objectives; prepar-
ing for the change via anticipation, futuring techniques,
and iteration; navigating through the change via adapta-
tion, flexibility, and robustness; and experimenting with
the change through deliberation, probing, and learning.
However, what remains crucial is to develop suitable
specifications of these strategies and embed these within
the different phases of the policy cycle. us ideally, a
long-term governance approach is anticipatory, flexible,
and adaptive and capable of addressing the challenges of
changing structures and agency over time while main-
taining a focus on the problem-solving target setting and
the chosen solution(s).
e framework does not describe specific processes
or individual cases in detail, but it should be understood
as an illustration of long-term governance characteris-
tics at a more general level. Such a framework may help
to structure the field of long-term policy-making, guide
future research on conceptual, comparative, and empiri-
cal in-depth studies, and may provide orientation and
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Page 18 of 22
Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
action knowledge for making our governance system
sustainable. Stimulating and broadening research on
long-term issues seems indispensable given the existence
of several ‘grand challenges’ that require successful long-
term governance.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the organizations mentioned in the “Funding”
section. The research presented within this paper is a result of teamwork
within the collaborative long‑term governance group of ITAS, FZJ and DLR.
We also would like to thank (former) group members who are not authors of
the paper supporting us with their ideas, critiques, and last but not least their
research. That is: Sophia Dieken, Eike Düvel, Jonas Eschmann, Laura Müller,
Laura García Portela, and Lisa Schmieder. Furthermore, we want to thank the
three anonymous reviewers who commented on the paper with much care
and contributed to improving the quality of the paper.
Author contributions
The design and implementation of the research behind this article was
designed and performed by all authors, i.e., D.S., S.V., St.S., Sa.S., S.K., M.S. and
C.H.K. DS was responsible to set up the paper and wrote the very large parts
of this paper. D.S., S.V., St.S., Sa.S., S.K., M.S. and C.H.K carefully read and com‑
mented on the several versions and helped to finalize it. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Funding
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Open Access
funding was enabled and organized by Project DEAL and implemented by
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). The research carried out for this article
has been carried out in the Program‑Oriented Funding (PoF) of Helmholtz
Association according to the program “Energy System Design (ESD)” within its
subtopic 1.2 (“Societally‑Feasible Transformation Pathways”).
Availability of data and materials
No data sets were generated or analysed during the current study.
Declarations
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Fig. 2 Conceptual framework of long‑term governance. Source: own elaboration
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Page 19 of 22
Scheeretal. Energy, Sustainability and Society (2025) 15:9
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Author details
1 Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS), Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany. 2 Institute of Energy
and Climate Research, Systems Analysis and Technology Evaluation (IEK‑STE),
Forschungszentrum Jülich, Jülich, Germany. 3 Department of Energy Systems
Analysis, Institute of Networked Energy Systems, German Aerospace Center,
Oldenburg, Germany.
Received: 6 December 2023 Accepted: 15 January 2025
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