An Ecofeminist Approach to Climate Risks

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An Ecofeminist Approach to Climate Risks
Angela Hefti*
ABSTRACT
Climate change poses significant risks to the human right to life.
However, international adjudicators have either neglected to examine
right to life claims in the context of climate risks or dismissed them as
prospective. Human rights bodies have long applied the standard of
imminence to determine whether a threat to the right to life exists and
the extent to which it constitutes a violation. In climate cases, this
standard has hardened, requiring a tight temporal connection between
climate risks and a violation of the right to life. This article argues that
failing to recognize the impact of climate risks on the right to life
undermines the protection of historically disadvantaged and minority
communities, including women and girls.
This article offers a first account of an ecofeminist approach to
climate risks. First, the article establishes how climate change
exacerbates domestic violence, and exposes the disproportionate effects
of climate change on the lives of women and girls. Second, the article
argues that human rights responses to domestic violence can serve as a
model for addressing climate risks. Human rights bodies, including the
European Court of Human Rights, have long identified violations of the
right to life in domestic violence cases involving disproportionate harm,
even where the harm was seen as uncertain or prospective. Adopting a
similar approach to address climate risks, courts could begin to
recognize the unequal impacts of climate change and the recurring
nature of climate risks. An ecofeminist approach to climate risks has the
* Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA
(LL.M., Yale Law School). I owe thanks to the participants of the VSRE Spring 2024
Colloquium at Harvard Law School and the 2024 Law and Society Conference in Denver, CO.
I am deeply grateful to those who have read this article and provided very helpful comments:
Camila Bustos, Viktoryia Gurash, Angel Cabrera Silva, Ariq Hatibie, Corina Heri, Hannah
van Kolfschooten and Aminta Ossom. I am also indebted to Abadir M. Ibrahim, Asaf Lubin,
Gerald L. Neuman, Rosa Hayes, and Susannah Tobin Barton for insightful discussions and
feedback, and to Matthew Baker, Kai Mueller and Gabrijela Papec for their editorial
assistance. I am thankful to the editors of MJIL for their very helpful comments. All views and
any remaining errors are my own. Disclosure: the author contributed to the
KlimaSeniorinnen’s application of 26 November 2020 to the European Court of Human
Rights.

2forthcoming Michigan Journal of International Law
potential to highlight avenues for reform, such as by mandating strict
proactive due diligence obligations on states.
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................3
I. CLIMATE RISKS TO THE RIGHT TO LIFE............................................6
A. Past Climate Risks...................................................................12
B. Future Risks to Life.................................................................13
II. AN ECOFEMINIST APPROACH..........................................................17
A. Gender-based Violence and Ecological Destruction...............21
B. Climate and Domestic Violence Risks....................................23
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RISKS............................................................25
A. Risk Dynamics.........................................................................27
B. Cyclical Risks.......................................................................... 30
C. Differential Impact...................................................................32
IV. ADDRESSING CLIMATE RISKS..........................................................35
A. Recurring Risks.......................................................................35
B. Disparate Impact......................................................................37
C. Implementation........................................................................39
CONCLUSION 42

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INTRODUCTION
Climate change poses significant risks to the human right to life.
However, international courts and adjudicators have either neglected to
examine right to life claims in the context of climate risks or have
dismissed them as prospective and speculative. International human
rights bodies have long applied the standard of imminence to determine
whether a threat to the right to life exists and the extent to which it
constitutes a violation. In climate cases, this standard has hardened,
requiring a tight temporal connection between climate risks and a
violation of the right to life.1 For example, Pacific Islanders’ claims for
violations of their right to life due to rising sea levels have so far been
dismissed as putative for at least another decade.2 This article argues that
failing to recognize the impact of climate risks on the right to life
undermines the protection of those most at risk, including women and
girls.
Scholars have critiqued the incoherent interpretation of the
imminence standard in climate-related contexts—namely, the
requirement for a close temporal connection between climate harm and
threats to life in determining violations of the right to life.3 Some
scholars have proposed retaining only the foreseeability aspect, based on
knowledge of climate risks.4 Consistent with this proposition, Véronique
1. Hum. Rts. Comm., Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, ¶ 9.12 UN Doc.
CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (Jan. 7, 2020). and Billy. v. Australia, ¶ 8.7 UN Doc.
CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019 (Sept. 22, 2022). Verein KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v.
Switzerland, App. No. 53600/20 ¶¶ 512-513 Eur. Ct. H.R. (April 9, 2024) [hereinafter “Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen”]. Angela Hefti, Hannah van Kolfschooten & Aminta Ossom, A Health-
Centric Intersectional Approach to Climate Litigation at the European Court of Human Rights
351, 355 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (2024).
2. Billy, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 8.7, Teitiota, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 9.12.
3. Justine Bell-James & Briana Collins, Human Rights and Climate Change Litigation:
Should Temporal Imminence Form Part of Positive Rights Obligations?, 13 J. HUM. RTS. &
ENV'T 212, 212 (2022). Véronique Boillet & Clémence Demay, L’exigence d’imminence:
examen de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme à l’aune de deux
affaires climatiques suisses, N° 135 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 675,
689–91 (2023). Jane McAdam, An Analysis of Imminence in International Protection Claims:
Teitiota v. New Zealand and Beyond, 69 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 975 (2020).
4. Bell-James and Collins, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 218-219
(referring to Keenan v. UK, App. No. 27229/95 Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Apr. 3, 2001).
Foster and McAdam proposed to replace the test in the context of refugee law. McAdam and
Foster, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 982.

4forthcoming Michigan Journal of International Law
Boillet and Clémence Demay claim that established environmental law
principles of precaution and prevention should guide the understanding
of foreseeability.5 Scholars have also noted that human rights bodies
apply the concept of imminence inconsistently and often equate it with
foreseeability.6 This article advocates for a modified imminence
standard, since human rights bodies are more inclined to adopt a narrow
approach over the broader foreseeability standard.7 It is also recognized
that deadly climate risks are ultimately foreseeable, based on advanced
scientific knowledge8 and states’ commitments under the Paris
Agreement, which sets safe limits for global warming at well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels, with an aim at keeping it below 1.5°C.9
This article offers a first account of an ecofeminist approach to
climate risks. Ecofeminism is a branch of feminist philosophy that
considers the links between the exploitation of nature and the oppression
of women, asserting that both forms of domination are interconnected.10
5. Boillet & Demay, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 689–91.
6. See Vladislava Stoyanova, Fault, Knowledge and Risk Within the Framework of
Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 33 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 601, 612 (2020) [hereinafter Stoyanova, Fault, Knowledge and Risk]; Franz Christian Ebert
& Romina I. Sijniensky, Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the
Inter-American Human Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to a Coherent Doctrine on Risk
Prevention?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 343, 358 (2015) (tracing the preventive duties
development and the so-called “Osman test” in the European and Inter-American human
rights systems). Boillet & Demay, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 687–688;
Monica Visalam Iyer, Environmental Migration in Regional Human Rights Courts: a Lifeboat
from the “Sinking Vessel”, 92, 352 TENN. L. REV. 307. Bell-James and Collins, supra note
Error: Reference source not found at 218-219. As Kelleher points out, the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “the Court”) in environmental contexts uses various terms, such
as “serious health and environmental risks”, or real and immediate risks. Orla Kelleher,
Incorporating Climate Justice into Legal Reasoning: Shifting towards a Risk-Based Approach
to Causation in Climate Litigation, 13 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 290, 302 (2022).
7. Hefti, van Kolfschooten & Ossom, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 372.
8. See IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Working
Group II Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Technical Summary, 9-14, at 2425 [hereinafter IPCC, Climate Change
2022].
9. Once these thresholds are crossed, more severe climate effects, like extreme heat, sea
level rise and rainfall threaten human life. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-
1104, 55 I.L.M. 740 (2016). UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris
Agreement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement (last
visited Aug. 16, 2024).
10. Chaone Mallory, What’s in a Name? In Defense of Ecofeminism (Not Ecological
Feminisms, Feminist Ecology, or Gender and the Environment): Or “Why Ecofeminism Need
Not Be Ecofeminine—But so What If It Is?,” 23 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 11, 13 (2018).
Karen J. Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, An Ecofeminist Philosophical Perspective,
3, in ECOFEMINISM, WOMEN, CULTURE AND NATURE (Karen J. Warren ed., 1997) (describing
the relationship between the environment and women as “women-nature connections”).

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This article makes two key contributions to the existing literature. First,
it establishes how climate change exacerbates domestic violence and
exposes the disproportionate effects of climate change on the lives of
women and girls. Second, the article argues that human rights responses
to domestic violence can serve as a model for addressing climate risks.
Human rights bodies, particularly the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR” or “the Court”), have long identified violations of the right to
life in domestic violence cases involving disproportionate future harm,
even where the harm was seen as uncertain or prospective. By adopting a
similar approach to address climate risks, courts can begin to recognize
the inequality of the impacts of climate change and the recurring nature
of climate risks. An ecofeminist approach to climate risks has the
potential for generating new insights into the interconnectedness of
environmental degradation and gender inequality. It could also highlight
avenues for reform, such as by mandating strict proactive due diligence
obligations on states, ultimately saving lives.
The comparison between climate and domestic violence risks
may appear unconventional. Yet, this approach is justified by the need to
adapt the human rights framework to address climate risks to life,11 the
pragmatic appeal of this proposal, and its potential for implementation.
International courts like the ECtHR recognize that acts of domestic
violence recur and even increase over time.12 This recognition matches
the continuous dynamics of climate risks. Human rights approaches to
domestic violence therefore offer a suitable framework for addressing
climate risks to life.
While recognizing that various social identities—including race,
gender, class, disability, and others—create climate-related
vulnerabilities, this article primarily focuses on gender. By integrating
ecofeminism into human rights responses to climate change, this article
pioneers new approaches for addressing climate change risks to life,
providing an impetus for novel legal strategies in future climate cases.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part I
introduces the imminence standard as a means to examine whether
states’ inaction violates the right to life. It exposes the deficiency of this
11. Karen Morrow, Towards an Ecofeminist Critique of International Law? in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTHROPOCENTRISM, 183, 194
(Vincent Chapaux, Frédéric Mégret, Usha Natarajan, ed. 2023) (calling for an ecofeminist
approach to international law). Emily Jones, Posthuman Feminism and Global
Constitutionalism: Environmental Reflections 13 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2022)
(drawing attention to the fact that international environmental law perpetuates the unequal
structures that allow for ecological degradation).
12. Talpis v. Italy, App. No. 41237/14, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122 (March 21, 2017).

6forthcoming Michigan Journal of International Law
standard in climate contexts and critiques the prevailing approach to
climate risks. This section underscores the tendency of human rights
bodies to deem threats to the right to life as too remote to constitute a
right to life violation. Part II introduces the ecofeminist approach as a
theoretical framework for drawing analogies between the human rights
responses to domestic violence risks to life and those of climate change.
Part III outlines human rights responses to risks to life from domestic
violence, focusing on the ECtHR’s approach, given its extensive
expertise in this area. Part IV makes a normative proposal by applying
these insights to climate risks to life and outlines how human rights
bodies could implement this approach. The article concludes with
recommendations for future litigation strategies.
I. CLIMATE RISKS TO THE RIGHT TO LIFE
Before proposing an ecofeminist solution to climate-related risks
to the right to life, it is essential to first elucidate the impact of climate
change on this right and explain the standard of imminence human rights
bodies apply in climate cases.
Climate change poses one of the most significant risks to life. In
2023, Europe experienced at least 70,000 heat-related deaths, with the
continent warming two to three times faster than the global average.13
Rising sea levels cause flooding, water shortages, land loss, and food
insecurity on Pacific islands, placing vulnerable populations in life-
threatening conditions.14 Wildfires kill people and burn crops necessary
13. The 2023 numbers are not yet confirmed, but they are likely at least as high as
previous figures, given the reported increase in extreme heat. Copernicus Climate Change
Service, European State of the Climate 2023: Summary (2023) 20-23,
https://climate.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/custom-uploads/ESOTC%202023/
Summary_ESOTC2023.pdf (last visited, July 202, 2024). 2022 was the hottest summer ever
recorded in Europe. Joan Ballester et al., Heat-Related Mortality in Europe during the
Summer of 2022, 29 NAT MED 1857-1858, 1857 (2023). Heatwaves are also one of the main
weather-related causes of deaths in the United States. A study suggests that extreme heat
could lead to approximately 110,000 premature deaths in the U.S. by the end of the century:
Drew Shindell et al., The Effects of Heat Exposure on Human Mortality Throughout the
United States GEOHEALTH 1, 7 (2020). Kristina Dahl et al., Increased frequency of and
population exposure to extreme heat index days in the United States during the 21st century
ENVIRON. RES. COMMUN 1, (2019). NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, Severe Weather-
Awareness – Heatwaves,
https://www.weather.gov/mkx/heatwaves#:~:text=Extreme%20heat%20is%20the%20number,
hundreds%20of%20fatalities%20each%20year (last visited, July 1, 2024).
14. Billy, supra note Error: Reference source not found , ¶¶ 8.12 and 8.14. See IPCC,

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for survival.15 Extreme weather events endangering human lives are
likely to increase, even if emissions are stopped in time.16 For example,
deaths related to heatwaves have increased by 94% in Europe in the last
two decades.17 These threats to life disproportionately affect historically
disadvantaged groups, including women and girls.18 The urgency of
these risks necessitates state intervention to prevent loss of life.
The right to life, which is protected by all international and
regional human rights treaties,19 is one of the most important human
rights in climate contexts.20 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of
Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2425.
15. Marina Romanello et al., Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change in
Europe, 6 THE LANCET PUBLIC HEALTH e858, 859 (2021). See Copernicus Climate Change
Service, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 9.
16. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 17, 42-
51.
17. Copernicus Climate Change Service, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at
20. See also Mohammad Reza Alizadeh et al., Increasing Heat-Stress Inequality in a Warming
Climate, 10 EARTH’S FUTURE 1, 3 (2022).
18. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 17, 42-
51 (outlining the severity and increase of climate risks over time and its effects around the
world, as well as the disproportionate health impacts on women, Indigenous People and
children among other marginalized groups). SUMUDU ATAPATTU, HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 200 (2016) (exposure
of women and girls during longer searches of water due to climate-related droughts).
19. Article 3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
UN Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976)
999 UNTS 171, ratified by the United States June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Article 2
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Art. 14,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR or European Convention]; Article 4 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into
force 18 July 1978) and Article 4 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 245 (entered into force 21 October 1986).
20. The ECtHR calls the right to life “one of the basic values of the democratic societies
making up the Council of Europe.” McCann and others v the UK [GC], App. No. 18984/91,
Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 147 (Sept. 27, 1995). The Human Rights Committee [hereinafter
HRC] speaks of the “supreme right of the human being.” HRC, Suarez de Guerrero v.
Colombia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979, ¶ 13.1 (Mar. 31 1982). The right to life is
conceived differently across jurisdictions. For example, the HRC’s conception of the right to
life with dignity stands in contrast to the ECHR’s more limited view, which addresses socio-
economic conditions under the right to private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). Pretty v. the
United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, ¶ 39, ECHR 2002-III. See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 127 (2015). As Sarah
Joseph points out, the “right to life with dignity” under the ICCPR covers “those
circumstances that plausibly threaten one’s life and simultaneously undermine dignity.” Sarah
Joseph, Extending the Right to Life Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: General Comment 36, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 347, 358 (2019). HRC,
General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the ICCPR, on the Right to Life, UN Doc.

8forthcoming Michigan Journal of International Law
Human Rights provides that “everyone has the right to life,” while the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) clarify that this right
must be protected by law.21 The right to life not only covers unlawful
deprivations of life, but also life-threatening situations, such as those that
stem from climate effects.22 It is one of the most basic rights on which
other human rights affected by climate change such as the right to health
depend. Moreover, the right to life is non-derogable, meaning that states
cannot suspend this right, even in times of a public emergency.23 The
ways in which human rights bodies address climate risks to the right to
life are essential to protect marginalized and disadvantaged individuals.
The right to life exists to protect against harm that cannot be
clearly attributed to individual state actors. This is the case with climate
change, which is caused by numerous diffuse actors across the world and
cannot be tied to a specific actor for purposes of liability.24 As a product
of Western political theory, international human rights law has
traditionally protected individuals from interference by the state.25 This
CCPR/C/GC/36, ¶ 26 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment No. 36]. The conception
of the right to life under Article 6 ICCPR is particularly apt for encompassing climate risks to
life, yet the HRC has not yet applied it. General Comment No. 36 explains that the right to life
with dignity under Article 6 ICCPR includes “[the] degradation of the environment,
deprivation of indigenous Peoples’ land, territories and resources […],”and requires states to
protect the environment “[from] climate change caused by public and private actors.” Id. at
62, see also at 26.
21. Article 2 ECHR: “Everyone’s life shall be protected by law.” and Article 6 ICCPR:
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” To preempt any potential confusion, it should be
noted that under international and European human rights law, the issue of when life begins is
not definitively addressed. The ECtHR held that “the issue of when the right to life begins
comes within the [discretion] which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in
this sphere.” Vo v. France [GC], App. No. 53924/00, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 82, ECHR
2004-VIII. See also MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, HANDBOOK ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 223 (2023) (explaining that the Court has been careful to discuss
“temporal limits of life”). The HRC similarly leaves the regulation of voluntary termination of
pregnancy up to states, except in cases where the woman’s life is at risk or the pregnancy is
the result of incest or rape. HRC, General Comment No. 36, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, ¶ 8.
22. Soare and Others v. Romania, App. No. 24329/02, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶
108-109 (Feb. 22, 2011). Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], App No. 50385/99, Judgment Eur. Ct.
H.R., ¶ 55 (Dec. 20, 2004). Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶¶ 108-110.
23. HRC, General Comment No. 36, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 2.
The taking of life in times of war is permitted, because international humanitarian law prevails
as lex specialis. Villiger, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 212. PAUL M.
TAYLOR, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 167 (2020).
24. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29 (2023).
25. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights

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means that states are fundamentally obligated to respect the right to life,
for example, by refraining from unlawfully depriving individuals of life.
Historically, deprivations of life within the private sphere, like violence
in a woman’s home, or actions not clearly linked to the state, such as
climate-related harm, were seen as outside the scope of international
law.26 However, today international law recognizes that states must also
prevent human rights violations in the so-called “private” sphere.27 One
of the most notable recognitions of “private” risks to life concerns
domestic violence perpetrated by (ex-)partners.28 Another example is
enforced disappearances, where unidentified actors, often with state
support, abduct and deprive a person of life, often unlawfully detaining
them for a period of time.29 States’ duty to protect the right to life
includes the responsibility to take preventive measures against such
Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1995). Human rights law aims at states, which is reflected
in how the exceptions to the right to life are conceived. For example, under Article 2(2) ECHR
the exceptions include: “(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to
effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action
lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” A restriction of the right to
life is permitted if it “is no more than absolutely necessary.” Villiger, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 213-214. These exceptions are implicit under the ICCPR.
HRC, General Comment No. 36, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 10.
26. Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 90, 101 (1993).
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 625 (1991) (arguing that women’s concerns,
including domestic violence, have been overlooked in international law). CAROL PATEMAN,
THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) 118 (explaining that women were traditionally relegated to
the private sphere, where they are alienated from public matters).
27. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found. Ronagh J.A. McQuigg,
Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue: Rumor v. Italy, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1009, 1009 (2015).
28. BONITA MEYERSFELD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21
(2010). E.g., Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found. See also De Schutter,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, 452.
29. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4, (July 29, 1988) (enforced disappearance of a student in the context of systematic
disappearances in Honduras). Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 23, 2010, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 defines enforced
disappearance as: “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.” See also Jimena Reyes et al., Harmonizing Legal
Approaches to Enforced Disappearances: Evidentiary Challenges, Emerging Developments,
and the Role of Non-State Actors 37 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 172, 184-186 (2024) (explaining in
the context of enforced disappearances that international law recognizes human rights
violations by private actors).

10 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
Law
lethal risks.30
However, not every instance of state inaction in the face of
climate risks constitutes a violation of the right to life, as this would
place an unreasonable burden on states by requiring them to excessively
police their territories.31 Instead, international courts have used the
standard of imminence to establish the extent to which risks to life
violate this right.32 For example, the ECtHR has applied and adapted this
standard across various contexts, including environmental issues33 and
30 HRC, General Comment No. 36, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 6.
31. VILLIGER, supra note Error: Reference source not found at 203. Osman v. the United
Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 116; Kurt v. Austria, App. No. 62903/15, Judgment Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 185 (June 15, 2021). (A restriction of state responsibility for non-state actor
violence is necessary given “the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability
of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and
resources.”)
32. Arguably the imminence standard emerged in the ECtHR’s Osman v. the United
Kingdom case. In Osman, a teacher harassed a student over several months, ultimately injuring
him and killing his father. Specifically, the Court held that the right to life is violated if: 1. The
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the events of; 2. A real and immediate
risk to the life of an individual from the criminal acts of a third party, and, 3. They failed to
take preventive measures “within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably might
have been expected to avoid that risk.” Osman, supra note Error: Reference source not found
¶ 116. The ECtHR has its own approach to state responsibility which differs from that of
international law. James Crawford & Amelia Keene,The Structure of State Responsibility
under the European Convention on Human Rights,inTHE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW(Anne van Aaken & Iulia Motoc eds.,
2018); Helen Keller & Reto Walther, Evasion of the International Law of State
Responsibility? The ECtHR’s Jurisprudence on Positive and Preventive Obligations under
Article 3, 24 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 957, 959–958 (2020) (arguing that this makes sense because
human rights courts are primarily dealing with the protection of individuals from acts of
governments rather than inter-state disputes). Other human rights bodies similarly rely on the
principles of foreseeability and imminence to establish right to life violations. E.g., Equality
Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) v. Federal Republic of Ethiopia
(2015), Afr. Comm. H.R., Comm. No. 341/2007 ¶¶ 129-131 (Ethiopia’s failure to prevent a
practice of forced marriage by abduction despite its awareness of the practice). Veliz Franco et
al. v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 277, ¶ 146 (2014). See similar language in
the CEDAW Committee’s domestic violence cases: E.g., CEDAW Committee, Angela
Gonzalez Carreño v. Spain, UN Doc.C/58/D/47/2012, ¶ 9.2 (July 16, 2014). Even though UN
treaty bodies often use the language of foreseeability, suggesting mere knowledge of climate
risks, they rely on a standard of temporal proximity between climate harm and the right to life.
Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 2 2.9, 8.5, 9.7 (“reasonably
foreseeable risk of a threat to his right to life” as a result of climate effects”). Billy, supra note
Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 5.7. (“real and foreseeable threat”). (“children are
protected from foreseeable premature or unnatural death and threats to their lives”). CRC,
General Comment No. 26 on Children’s Rights and the Environment, with a special focus on
Climate Change and Children, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/26 ¶ 20 (Aug. 22, 2023) [hereinafter
“General Comment No. 26”]. See also Iyer, supra note Error: Reference source not

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domestic violence.34 In an environmental case, the Court considered a
landfill methane explosion, which killed inhabitants of an adjacent slum,
as imminent because domestic reports had highlighted the risk two years
prior, but the landfill had continued to operate, resulting in a violation of
the right to life.35 In domestic violence cases, the ECtHR held that “the
recurrence of successive episodes of violence within the family unit”36
and its disproportionate impact are important aspects of imminence in
the context of the right to life.37 This article argues that the same
imminence standard can be applied to human rights responses to deadly
climate risks, addressing both recurring climate impacts and disparate
effects.
Currently, the imminence standard in climate contexts operates
on a timeline.38 It recognizes past risks as imminent, whereas future risks
are seen as speculative and therefore too remote to threaten the right to
life today. The following sections critique the reliance of human rights
bodies on temporal proximity between climate harm and a violation of
the right to life when assessing lethal climate risks. The main focus is on
the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), the Committee on the Rights of
the Child (“CRC”) and the ECtHR, which have developed jurisprudence
on lethal climate risks39 and are the only human rights bodies that have
heard climate cases brought by individuals against governments.40
found, at 326-29.
33. Tătar v Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 88 (Jan. 27, 2009)
(contaminated water). Öneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov.
30, 2004) (operation of a waste collection site). See also Iyer, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, at 326-29.
34. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 122.
35. Öneryildiz, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 18, 77, 101-102.
36. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 122.
37. Id. ¶ 99.
38 Bell-James and Collins, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 233. Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found ( where the Court adopts
temporal proximity as a criteria for imminence).
39. Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference source not found; Billy, supra note Error:
Reference source not found; Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not
found. CRC Committee, Sacchi et al. v. Argentina, UN Doc. CRC/C/88/D/107/2019 (Sept. 22,
2021) (Sacchi discussed the right to life at the admissibility stage).
40. ECtHR Factsheet, Climate Change, available at:
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/fs_climate_change_eng (last accessed, July 9,
2024). Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found. Duarte
Agostinho v. Portugal and 32 Other States, App. No. 39371/20, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
(Apr. 9, 2024). Carême v. France, App. No. 7189/21, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Apr. 9, 2024).
There are also Advisory Opinion proceedings pending before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), Request for Advisory Opinion Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change,

12 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
Law
Notably, the ECtHR has already decided three climate cases, all
involving right to life claims,41 and has more such cases on its docket.42
Because the ECtHR’s judgments are binding on 46 Council of Europe
member states,43 they are regarded as “standard-setting” in international
human rights jurisprudence44 and are likely to significantly impact
European domestic law and policy. Moreover, the human rights
standards applied by international adjudicators in climate change cases
are likely to influence the practices of human rights bodies that have not
transmitted to the Court pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/276 of 29 March 2023
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Request for an Advisory Opinion
on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights submitted to the IACtHR by the Republic of
Colombia and the Republic of Chile (Jan. 9, 2023). While the IACtHR has yet to decide a
climate case, at least in environmental cases it also applies the standard of imminence. State
Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of
the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1)
in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am.Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 62-63, ¶ 120 (Nov. 15, 2017). Inhabitants
of La Oroya v. Peru, Preliminary Measures, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 511, ¶¶ 135-136 (Nov. 27, 2023) (the La Oroya case refers to the duty to
prevent violations of the right to life without specifying if imminence is required). The
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has already issued an advisory opinion
on climate change: ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of
Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (May 21, 2024). Advisory
opinions are not binding, but they have persuasive value: ICJ, ADVISORY JURISDICTION,
https://www.icj-cij.org/advisory-jurisdiction.
41. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found. Duarte
Agostinho, supra note Error: Reference source not found. Carême, supra note Error:
Reference source not found.
42. ECtHR Factsheet, supra note Error: Reference source not found. The ECtHR also
issues more than 1000 judgments per year, making it likely to decide future climate cases.
European Court of Human Rights, Statistical Reports 2023, available at
https://www.echr.coe.int/statistical-report (last accessed July 21, 2024).
43. Article 46 ECHR: 1. “The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court
shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.” The
Committee of Ministers is constituted by the foreign ministers of all 46 Council of Europe
member states. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, https://www.coe.int/en/web/cm/about-
cm#:~:text=The%20Committee%20of%20Ministers%20is%20the%20Council%20of%20Eur
ope%27s%20decision,collective%20responses%20to%20these%20challenges. (last accessed,
July 9, 2024). In contrast to the ECtHR, the HRC’s views are persuasive. See Gerald L.
Neuman, Giving Meaning and Effect to Human Rights: The Contributions of Human Rights
Committee Members, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AT 50: THEIR PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE, 34 (Daniel Moeckli, Helen Keller, & Corina Heri eds., 2018) (arguing that views
“exert a softer normative force for compliance” and can inform political processes and social
movements).
44. Hefti, van Kolfschooten & Ossom, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at
355. See Gerald L. Neuman, The External Reception of Inter-American Human Rights Law,

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yet addressed this issue due to ongoing judicial dialogue.45 Therefore,
while this discussion focuses on human rights bodies that have already
adjudicated climate change cases, other international courts may also
adopt an ecofeminist approach in the future.
A. Past Climate Risks
Human rights bodies have considered harm that materialized in
the past to be imminent.46 For example, in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia,
Indigenous inhabitants of the low-lying Torres Strait islands complained
that Australia had failed to mitigate harm and help the community adapt
to sea-level rises that flooded their islands.47 The HRC accepted that
climate risks, such as saltwater inundation and cyclones, posed
significant risks to the community’s way of life and culture,48 and
therefore violated their right to private, family, and home life, as well as
culture.49 Similarly, the ECtHR accepted past climate risks as a violation
of the right to private and family life in its first ever climate case, Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen and Others v. Switzerland. In Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen, elderly women aged 75 years and older, acting both
as four individuals and through an association of over 2,000 members,
argued that they experienced health problems and lethal risks due to
climate-related extreme heat.50 While they pointed to excessive
heatwaves which have occurred over the past few years as past harm,
QUEBEC J. OF INT’L L. 99, 104 (2011) (explaining that the IACtHR in particular references the
ECtHR’s judgments based on its large body of case law). E. Voeten, Why Cite External Legal
Sources?: Theory and Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, in BEYOND
FRAGMENTATION: CROSS-FERTILIZATION, COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 172 (Chiara Giorgetti & Mark Pollack eds., 2022).
45. Wayne Sandholtz, Human Rights Courts and Global Constitutionalism: Coordination
through Judicial Dialogue 455 10(3) GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2021) (noting that the
African and Inter-American Court cite the jurisprudence of other regional courts more than the
ECtHR).
46. One challenge in linking climate change with human rights is that “human rights
violations are normally established after the harm has occurred.” UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶ 70, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan.
15, 2009).
47. They also complained that past events like a cyclone had already resulted in the
destruction of buildings and flooding of graves, and that every year, they lost one meter of
land to the rising sea. Billy, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶¶ 2.1-2.4, 2.7, 2.8.
48. Billy, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 8.9 and 8.10.
49. These human rights are protected under Articles 17 and 27 ICCPR Id. ¶¶ 8.12 -8.14.
50. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 50, 54.

14 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
Law
they also argued that climate harm involves future yet imminent risks.51
They called for a reinterpretation of the imminence standard to cover
“abrupt and irreversible climate impacts.”52 Even though the ECtHR in
Verein KlimaSeniorinnen rendered a pioneering judgment which linked
climate change and human rights, it did not examine climate risks from
the perspective of the right to life for procedural reasons.53 While these
decisions confirm that state inaction in the face of climate change can
violate human rights, recognizing climate risks as part of the right to life
could ensure that states take urgent and proactive measures to protect
those under their jurisdiction.
B. Future Risks to Life
To date, no international court has found a violation of the right
to life in climate cases. Instead, they consider these threats to be
speculative for at least another decade. Human rights bodies have
required a tight temporal link between climate impacts and a violation of
the right to life. For example, although the ECtHR in Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen did not examine the right to life itself,54 it considered
“temporal proximity” to be a relevant factor in interpreting imminence in
the context of climate risks.r55 The HRC similarly adheres to the
standard of temporal proximity in individual complaints brought against
states.56 In Teitiota v. New Zealand, the petitioner and his family left
51. KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland and Request under Rule 41 (priority), Application
to the ECtHR, submitted on 26 Nov. 2020 ¶ 50, available at: https://climatecasechart.com/wp-
content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2020/20201126_Application-
no.-5360020_application-1.pdf
52. Id.
53. This can partially be explained by the fact that the ECtHR held that the individual
women’s claims were inadmissible for lack of standing. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note
Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 521. However, it granted standing to the association and
found a violation of Article 8 ECHR (the right to private and family life), recognizing a duty
to work towards “the substantial and progressive reduction of their respective GHG emission
levels, with a view to reaching net neutrality within, in principle, the next three decades.” Id.
¶¶ 542, 550. The association cannot rely on the right to life in and of itself. Id. ¶ 10 and 12-20,
473.
54. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 50-54.
55. Id. ¶¶ 512-513.
56. The HRC hears individual complaints by individuals against states that have ratified
its Optional Protocol establishing this individual complaint procedure. Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999
UNTS 302. Article 1 provides that: “A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the
present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a
violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication

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their native Kiribati due to rising sea levels that made life on the island
untenable. After their asylum applications were denied in New
Zealand,57 the claimant petitioned the HRC, arguing that returning to
Kiribati would endanger his and his family’s life due to saltwater
inundation, dying crops, frequent flooding, and increased violence.58 The
HRC rejected his right to life claim.59 The HRC acknowledged “that the
risk of an entire country becoming submerged under water is such an
extreme risk, the conditions of life in such a country may become
incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the risk is
realized.”60 The HRC estimated that this would occur in about ten to
fifteen years, suggesting adaptive measures in the interim period.61 The
CRC mirrored this approach in Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al., a climate
case spearheaded by children,62 acknowledging that due to life-
threatening conditions “[the Marshall Islands and Palau may become]
uninhabitable within decades.”63 These decisions excessively focus on
temporal proximity between climate harm and threats to life to establish
a right to life violation.
Current approaches to imminence overlook both the inequitable
shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a
Party to the present Protocol.” Neuman, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 33.
57. Id. ¶ 2.8 (New Zealand’s immigration and protection tribunal considered that the
claimant was not at risk of irreparable harm if returned to Kiribati. He could relocate and he
did not personally face a risk of violence or insufficient access to fresh water).
58. His wife and experts explained that saltwater contamination resulted in the death of
coconut trees, endangered children’s health and lives, resulted in overcrowding and spread of
diseases as well as increasing violence. Id. ¶¶ 2.1-2.2, 9.7-9.10.
59. Id. ¶ 9.13. Since Mr. Teitiota did not experience a personalized risk of imminent harm
to his life, the HRC considered that he had failed to substantiate that “he would face life-
threatening environmental conditions.” Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference source not found,
¶¶ 9.3- 9.7.
60. Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 9.11.
61. Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 9.12. See also Monica Feria-
Tinta, The Future of Environmental Cases in the European Court of Human Rights:
Extraterritoriality, Victim Status, Treaty Interpretation, Attribution, Imminence and “Due
Diligence” 13 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV'T 172, 188 (2022) (noting that Teitiota is not a
paradigmatic climate case, but instead concerns issues of deportation as well as the assessment
of the risk upon his return). Event though Teitiota concerned a refugee case, the HRC
reiterated this position in another climate case, Billy, rejecting a violation of the right to life.
Billy, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 8.7.
62. CRC Committee, Sacchi, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 2.
63. Id. ¶ 10.14. The CRC Committee dismissed the case because the petitioners had
failed to first bring their case before the domestic courts, i.e., to exhaust domestic remedies.
Id. ¶¶ 10.15-10.21. The CRC Committee confirmed this standard in its new General
Comment. CRC, General Comment No. 26, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, ¶¶ 11, 20, 69.

16 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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impacts of climate change and the recurring nature of this harm.
Moreover, the current interpretation of imminence does not adequately
address the escalating impacts of climate change. Although the HRC
recognizes that the right to life “extends to reasonably foreseeable threats
and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life [such as
climate change impacts],”64 it has not applied this standard in climate
cases.65 For example, the HRC’s decisions fail to address slow-onset sea-
level rises and sudden cyclones on Pacific islands.66 The emphasis on a
temporal timeline neglects the fact that climate risks do not materialize
at a clearly defined point on a timeline, but rather recur over time.67
Claimants, by their nature, have been alive in all international climate
cases, while claiming a life-threatening situation due to sea-level rises or
extreme heat. However, the HRC appears to imply that risks to life must
fully materialize to violate the right to life. This essentially requires an
actual death. Human rights bodies have therefore considered climate
risks to life as inherently materializing in the future. Had the Committee
recognized that the standard of imminence covers threats unfolding over
time—such as saltwater contamination of freshwater sources due to sea-
level rises—it might have found that risks to life begin with slow-onset
climate events. The dynamics of climate change are cyclical and
ongoing. For example, heatwaves recur every year, while sea-level rises
are a continual process. These patterns should inform the imminence
standard.68
Moreover, the imminence standard should be interpreted to
64. Billy, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 8.3; Teitiota, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, ¶ 9.4.
65. As Psymhe Wadud points out, “these observations [that the right to life includes
climate risks] have largely been rhetorical.” Psymhe Wadud, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen
Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland: The Intersection of Climate Change and the Human Right
to Life, CAMBRIDGE INT. L. J. BLOG (May 20, 2024).
66. In this sense, the dissenting Committee Member, Vasilika Sancin, considered that the
claimant and his family were exposed to polluted water. The claimants’ children, Sancin
argued, were born in New Zealand and the water available on the island was particularly
unhealthy for them (arguing that even though the family had access to “potable water,” this
was not the same as safe drinking water.). Individual opinion of Committee member Vasilka
Sancin (dissenting), Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference source not found Annex 1, ¶¶ 1-3.
67. Helen Keller & Corina Heri, The Future is Now: Climate Cases before the European
Court of Human Rights, 40 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 153–74 (2022) (explaining that the fact that
the brunt of climate harm lies in the future raises challenges for climate litigation).
68. This recognition also aligns with the recognition of domestic violence risks as
ongoing. Meyersfeld, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 118-119 (explaining
the continuum of harm in domestic violence). ANGELA HEFTI, CONCEPTUALIZING FEMICIDE
AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION: STATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 255–
256 (2022) [hereinafter Hefti, Conceptualizing Femicide].

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reflect the fact that climate risks ultimately result in the loss of life for
those most at risk.69 Instead, human rights bodies have ignored the
disproportionate impact of climate risks on marginalized or
disadvantaged communities, including women and girls. For example,
the ECtHR considered it “questionable,” whether states’ inaction on
climate change had “life-threatening consequences as could trigger [the
right to life]” of the elderly women claimants,70 and overlooked the idea
that elderly women already face heightened morbidity risks from
climate-related effects.71 The current approach to imminence is
particularly problematic for Indigenous inhabitants of sinking islands for
whom climate change poses an existential threat.72 Recognizing the
nature and inequitable impact of climate risks is a crucial step toward an
urgent response to the existential threat climate change poses for human
life. Human rights bodies use the imminence standard to delineate which
climate risks can result in a violation of the right to life, which
consequently limits the number of such climate claims. While
distinguishing who can bring a case is pertinent to avoid overburdening
states, any such test must effectively address the complex nature and
dynamics of climate risks.73
Having provided an overview of the challenges associated with
the current focus of imminence on temporal proximity, the next part
introduces the ecofeminist approach to climate risks to the right to life.
Through this approach, human rights adjudicators can address the
69. For example, women and children in Inuit populations are particularly at risk of
climate effects due to poverty and related food insecurity with women and children being at
particular risk. James D. Ford, Indigenous Health and Climate Change, AM J PUBLIC
HEALTH, 1260, 1262 (2012).
70. Id. ¶ 536.
71. See Angela Hefti, Intersectional Victims as Agents of Change in International Human
Rights-Based Climate Litigation, TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 1, 9 (2024) [hereinafter Hefti,
Intersectional Victims]. Yvette van Steen et al., Sex Differences in Mortality after Heat
Waves: Are Elderly Women at Higher Risk?, 92 INT ARCH OCCUP ENVIRON HEALTH 37, 37–
38 (2019) (highlighting that elderly women may risk more from heat related morbidity). Hefti,
van Kolfschooten & Ossom, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 363-364
(pointing out the increased health risks, such as heart disease, women face from climate
change).
72. See Melissa Stewart, Cascading Consequences of Sinking States, 59 STAN. J. INT'L L.
131 (2023).
73. Domestic courts dealing with climate change support such an effective interpretation.
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Climate Policy) v. Stichting Urgenda, No. 19/00135, ¶ 5.2.2 Judgment of Dec. 20,
2019 (“the term ‘immediate’ does not refer to imminence in the sense that the risk must
materialize within a short period of time, but rather that the risk in question is directly
threatening the persons involved”).

18 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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specificities of climate change risks and advance their understanding of
these risks as a continuum of harm that disproportionately impacts
women and girls.
II. AN ECOFEMINIST APPROACH
This article applies an ecofeminist approach to climate risks.
Ecofeminism, a strand of feminist philosophy, considers that the
“environment and social oppression are entangled and must be addressed
concomitantly.”74 This article does just that. Through an ecofeminist
lens,75 it examines how risks to the right to life should be interpreted to
better address the exclusion of women and girls from existing human
rights responses to climate change.76 Applying an ecofeminist lens can
yield solutions for how human rights law addresses climate-related risks
to life in two important ways.77 First, the ecofeminist approach illustrates
the interplay between gender-based violence and the destruction of the
environment with the example of domestic violence,78 and explains the
disproportionate effect of climate change on women and girls.79 Second,
74. Mallory, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 13. Capitalism,
colonialism, racism all drive social oppression. Leigh Brownhill & Terisa E. Turner,
Ecofeminist Ways, Ecosocialist Means: Life in the Post-Capitalist Future, 31 CAP. NAT. SOC.
1 (2020). Feminism refers to the struggle to eliminate unequal social structures that exclude
women and girls and violate their human rights, including the right to life. Feminism,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/feminism (last visited July
29, 2024).
75. Much like the various forms of feminism, ecofeminism can be categorized into
subfields. (According to Warren, these include liberal, Marxist, radical, social so-called “black
and Third World” feminism). Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 4. Taylor critiques this distinction, considering that it “is not
very helpful in trying to understand the lives, experiences, and activism of women of color,”
as it, for example fails to recognize womanism. Dorceta E. Taylor, Women of Color,
Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism in ECOFEMINISM, WOMEN, CULTURE AND NATURE
61 (Karen J. Warren ed., 1997).
76. See Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 613, 625 (1991).
77. See Jared M. Adams, Missing Voices of Ecofeminism in Environmental Governance:
Consequences and Future Directions, 28 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 55, 56 (2023).
78. Id. at 59. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Environmental Law and Feminism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FEMINISM AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 573, 573 (Deborah Brake, Martha
Chamallas, & Verna L. Williams eds., 1 ed. 2021).
79. One of the examples often cited in the ecofeminist literature is the 1974 Chipko
movement in India. Indian women protested against government’s policies by hugging trees to
prevent their felling. The felling of trees would have disproportionately affected them as
women were collecting firewood, they also are responsible for forest production. Warren,
Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 5-6.

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it underscores the key proposal of this article: reinterpreting the
imminence risk standard to better address climate change-related risks to
life, similar to how human rights frameworks address domestic violence.
Through an ecofeminist approach, we can better understand how climate
change deepens existing social oppressions, creating life-threatening
situations for certain populations.
Ecofeminist scholars have long explored the intersections
between feminism and ecology within the realms of philosophy and
environmentalism.80 However, these debates have only recently started
to permeate the legal field.81 This article extends ecofeminism to
international law, specifically the human right to life,82 as well as
domestic violence, a form of gender-based violence.83 Intuitively,
climate risks could be compared with gender-based violence and
discrimination, as recognized in international treaties like the
Convention on the Elimination on Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”) and regional human rights treaties on women’s rights.84
However, human rights bodies currently lack a framework for addressing
these risks beyond the standard of temporal proximity.
Chipko Movement, Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology, https://fore.yale.edu/World-
Religions/Hinduism/Engaged-Projects/Chipko-Movement (last visited July 6, 2024).
80. E.g., Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source
not found; Mallory, supra note Error: Reference source not found. GRETA GAARD, CRITICAL
ECOFEMINISM (2017) [hereinafter GAARD, CRITICAL ECOFEMINISM].
81. Carlarne, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 578 (arguing that “despite
its relevance, ecofeminism failed to cross the divide into law and failed to infiltrate feminist
legal theory or the emerging field of environmental law”). Aga Natalis, Ani Purwanti and
Teddy Asmara, Anthropocentrims vs. Ecofemism: How should modern environmental law be
reformed? ONATI J. OF EMERGENT SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 38, 40 (2023) (studying the
relationship between environmental law and feminism). Elaine L. Hughes, Fishwives and
Other Tails: Ecofeminism and Environmental Law, CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 502 (1995)
(suggesting that ecofeminism could inform environmental law in Canada).
82. Karen Morrow, Towards an Ecofeminist Critique of International Law? in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTHROPOCENTRISM, 183, 194
(Vincent Chapaux, Frédéric Mégret, Usha Natarajan, ed. 2023) (calling for an ecofeminist
approach to international law).
83. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence
Against Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 1 ¶ 21 CEDAW/C/GC/35 (July 26,
2017) (defining gender-based violence as violence that is “directed against a woman because
she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately”).
84. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Additional Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Maputo Protocol) (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21
October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Belém do Pará Convention)
(adopted 9 June 1994, entered into force 3 May 1995).

20 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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The ecofeminist approach must avoid essentialism, which
assumes that all women and girls face identical climate-related risks to
life.85 In response to criticism that ecofeminism primarily centers on
white experiences,86 this article adopts an intersectional ecofeminist
approach. As advanced by Kimberlé Crenshaw, intersectionality exposes
how multiple axes of oppression intersect to create a specific
disadvantage.87 Ecofeminism aims to address all unequal power
structures; it is also concerned with racism, classism, heterosexism,
ageism, and other forms of oppression.88 Therefore, the ecofeminist
approach to climate risks must simultaneously consider how climate
change impacts women based on race, age, and gender,89 while
considering the oppression of other groups.90 This anti-essentialist
perspective understands that women are not a monolithic category,91 but
face unique experiences and varied risks from climate change.92
Crucially, this perspective highlights the intersecting inequality of
climate effects on the right to life.93
Before delving into the relationship between threats against
women and those against the environment, some caveats are in order. An
ecofeminist approach to the human right to life is anthropocentric in
nature,94 focusing on human beings, rather than adopting a posthuman
85. Mallory, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 13. ELIZABETH V.
86. Dorceta E. Taylor, Women of Color, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism in
ECOFEMINISM, WOMEN, CULTURE AND NATURE 38-39, 61-62 (Karen J. Warren ed., 1997)
(critiquing ecofeminism for overlooking the experience of women of color).
87. Kimberlé Crenshaw has highlighted how traditional “single-axes” frameworks of
discrimination fail to address the discrimination faced by Black women based on their race
and gender. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1
U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139, 140 (1989). Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1242, 1299 (1991).
88. Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 4. Taking an intersectional approach is particularly important considering the
critique of ecofeminism. See also Taylor, Women of Color, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, at 61-62.
89. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 140. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 1241-1242, 1299.
90. Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 4.
91. Adams, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 56.
92. Hefti, Intersectional Victims, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 9.
93. See Carlarne, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 121-122.
94. EMILY JONES, FEMINIST THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW POSTHUMAN

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perspective.95 While this human-centric approach aligns with the human
rights framework, it does not sufficiently address the climate risks faced
by non-human animals and the environment.96
The ecofeminist approach does not suggest that women
generally have an inherent biological or spiritual connection to nature or
“Mother Earth” that men lack;97 they also do not possess “a privileged
affective and epistemic point of view toward the protection and
restoration of the more-than-human world.”98 The ecofeminist approach
centers on social connections between the environment and violence
against women, rather than biological disadvantages.99 Ecofeminism,
while using a gender lens, also addresses power structures such as
racism, sexism, classism, and colonialism, and is therefore concerned
with the fate of marginalized groups, including Indigenous Peoples.100 It
is important to note, however, that despite the heightened risk they face
from climate change, neither women (nor other disadvantaged groups)
nor nature should be seen solely as victims of subordination and
PERSPECTIVES 128 (2023) (arguing that international law is “stubbornly anthropocentric”)
[hereinafter Jones, Feminist Theory and International Law].
95. Id. at 574.
96. Jones, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1 (arguing that posthuman
approaches challenge the idea that humans rule over the non-human world, including the
environment and non-human animals).
97. Id. at 133 (noting that while some Indigenous Peoples do have a special connection to
Pachamama, mother earth, transposing this concept to international law risks essentializing
this indigenous concept).
98. Mallory, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 13.
99. Of course, biophysical factors can also play a role. For example, heatwaves may
impact elderly women more than elderly men because of biological risks of heat strokes.
KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland and Request under Rule 41 (priority), Application to the
ECtHR, submitted on 26 Nov. 2020, para. 3, available at: https://climatecasechart.com/wp-
content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2020/20201126_Application-
no.-5360020_application-1.pdf (arguing that elderly women are more at risk due to
biophysical vulnerabilities). See also van Steen et al., supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 37–38 (suggesting that extreme heat may affect women more than men). However,
these disadvantages are often linked with social experiences, i.e., of bias in access to medical
care. Even though some connections are biological, they are present in both men and women
in different forms. For example, pollution can harm breastfeeding women and by extension
their children, but it might impact male fertility rates too. Mallory, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 25. Women are more at risk of exposure to toxins because of
gendered roles, for example in the household. Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 10. Naina Kumar & Amit Kant Singh, Impact
of Environmental Factors on Human Semen Quality and Male Fertility: A Narrative Review,
34 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES EUROPE 6 (2022).
100. KAREN J. WARREN, ECOFEMINIST PHILOSOPHY: A WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON
WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS 2 (2000). GAARD, CRITICAL ECOFEMINISM, supra note
Error: Reference source not found.

22 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
Law
violence.101 Instead, their resilience and potential for adaptation must be
acknowledged. 102
Ecofeminism explores the intricate dynamics between human
societies and nature. What exactly makes the comparison between
gender-based violence and environmental risks compelling? How do
prevailing social systems concurrently mistreat women and nature?
These insights are crucial for understanding the systemic nature of both
forms of violence,103 making it feasible to draw compelling parallels
between the human rights response to domestic violence and the risks
posed by climate change.
A. Gender-based Violence and Ecological Destruction
An ecofeminist approach can explain the relationship between
the subjugation of women and ecological destruction.104 In our
hierarchical social systems, composed of idiosyncratic and interlocked
systems of oppression, violence reinforces hierarchies and places many
women at the bottom of these systems.105 Kate Manne contends that
gender-based violence upholds and enforces the patriarchal social
order.106 Similarly, Susan Brownmiller argues that rape is perpetrated to
control and subjugate women.107 For example, pervasive domestic
violence restricts women to caretaker roles and punishes them when they
exceed their station, such as when they earn more income than their
partners.108 This reflects societal contempt for women, objectifying them
and subjecting them to violence or death if they overstep their assigned
societal roles.109 Of course, other hierarchies, such as those based on
racism, colonialism, and other systems of oppression, also influence
women’s positionality and can, as a result, deprive women and girls of
101. I use the term “victim” instead of “survivor” to avoid confusion in discussions about
the right to life, especially when referring to those who have lost their lives.
102. Greta Gaard, Ecofeminism and Climate Change, 49 WOMEN’S STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL FORUM 20, 21 (2015) [hereinafter Gaard, Ecofeminism and Climate Change].
103. See CLARE SCHNEIDER DALTON, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 33 (2001) (on
domestic violence risks).
104. See Id. at 19; Adams, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 55.
105. See Adams, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 59.
106. KATE MANNE, DOWN GIRL: THE LOGIC OF MISOGYNY, 23 (2017).
107. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL, MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE, 285–288,
1975 (relying on anthropological studies, Brownmill argues that rape serves to punish women
and girls, for example after schoolgirls escape a missionary school or women initiate sexual
intercourse).
108. Manne, supra note ERROR: REFERENCE SOURCE NOT FOUND, at 51–52.
109. Id. 85–86.

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their right to life.110
Just like women, the environment is perceived as an object and
relegated to a lower tier within the hierarchical structures of our
anthropocentric world.111 Around the world, corporations and states emit
greenhouse gases (“GHG”) to make profits with little regard for the
harmful effects on the planet.112 The view that nature is subjugated to
humankind has encouraged states to exploit the natural environment by
logging forests, abusing rivers through toxic chemical waste, and killing
trees through climate-induced wildfires.113 As Simone De Beauvoir
noted, just as women are oppressed in our societies, nature is also
“othered.”114 The Global North in particular is responsible for historical
GHG emissions, while the Global South, including the African continent
—also known as the “the motherland,” 115 evoking ecofeminist concerns
about nature as an essentialized nurturing figure116—suffers and is
exploited. This exploitation directly links to colonialist, racist, and other
forms of oppression.117 As such, integrating intersectional ecofeminism
into interpretations of imminence, particularly under the ECHR, makes
sense in light of Europe’s role in colonializing and exploiting the
planet.118
These systems of subordination do not exist independently of
each other: they also intersect and converge. Women and girls in the
Global South, who are most at risk from climate effects,119 are
110. Rosa-Linda Fregoso & Cynthia Bejarano, Introduction: A Cartography of Femicide
in the Americas, in TERRORIZING WOMEN: FEMICIDE IN THE AMERICAS 1, 12 (Rosa-Linda
Fregoso & Cynthia Bejarano eds., 2010).
111. Jones, Feminist Theory and International Law, supra note Error: Reference source
not found, at 1. Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 632.
112. See Adams, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 59; Emily Jones,
Posthuman International Law and the Rights of Nature, J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 82, 85 (2021).
113 See Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source
not found, at 3.
114. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR,THE SECOND SEX112 (1952).
115. Diane Boudreau et al., Africa: Human Geography,
https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/africa-human-geography/ (last visited Mar
8, 2024).
116 Gaard, Ecofeminism and Climate Change, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 21.
117. Jones, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 67.
118. See Andy Smith, Ecofeminism through an Anti-Colonial Framework in
ECOFEMINISM, WOMEN, CULTURE AND NATURE (Karen J. Warren ed., 1997). Warren, Taking
Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 4.
119. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1372,
1715. For example, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea regions reach extremely high levels of

24 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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particularly vulnerable to having their right to life violated due to their
gendered roles, which contribute to higher mortality risks.120 For
example, in Bangladesh, women represented 90% of all deaths when a
cyclone struck because they stayed behind to take care of children and
elderly, and did not know how to swim.121 A tsunami in Aceh province,
Indonesia, also disproportionately killed women122 since men who
worked in the fields or were fishing far away from the coastal areas
survived, whereas women who remained at home did not.123 The deaths
of women also endanger their children’s lives, particularly those of their
daughters, since they are left without protection.124 In the aftermath of
disasters, rates of sexual violence increase, and young girls are sold into
marriage to compensate for lost harvests or to reduce the number of
mouths to feed.125 Climate change therefore has an unequal impact on
women and girls across the world, resulting in increased risks of
mortality in many ways.
The next section will focus on the relationship between climate
and domestic violence risks to explain why international law can use
domestic violence responses to address climate change. This justification
is necessary because international law has particularly well-developed
standards for addressing domestic violence.
B. Climate and Domestic Violence Risks
Climate and domestic violence risks intersect and correlate. In
times of climate disasters, domestic and other types of violence against
women tend to increase, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”), the U.N. body assessing climate science and risks, has
heat. Carter M. Powis et al., Observational and Model Evidence Together Support Wide-
Spread Exposure to Noncompensable Heat under Continued Global Warming, 9 SCI ADV
eadg9297, 2 (2023). Natalia Urzola Gutiérrez, Gender in Climate Litigation in Latin America:
Epistemic Justice Through a Feminist Lens 16 OXFORD J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 220 (2024)
(emphasizing the need to include gender and colonialism in a climate litigation analysis)
120. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 37 (2018) on the Gender-related
Dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction in the context of Climate Change, ¶ 19, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/GC/37 (Mar. 13, 2018).
121. Gaard, Ecofeminism and Climate Change, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 23.
122. Oxfam International, BRIEFING NOTE, The Tsunami’s Impact on Women, 3, 4
(2005).
123. Id.
124. Gaard, Critical Ecofeminism, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 124.
125. Rowena Maguire, A Feminist Critique on Gender Based Violence in a Changing
Climate: Seeing, Listening and Responding in FEMINIST FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE JUSTICE 68,
72 (2023).

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affirmed.126 Climate events cause death in families, economic instability,
anxiety, and insecurity about the future that exacerbate preexisting
inequalities.127 Climate-related stressors, like droughts and tsunamis, can
exacerbate domestic abuse of women and girls and worsen an already
tense situation in women’s homes.128 For example, in Pakistan, floods
have caused spikes in domestic violence rates because men who were
seen as breadwinners suddenly lost their businesses. Since they could no
longer adhere to their socially assigned roles, some men “lost sense of
control” and responded with domestic violence.129 Conversely, where
women deviate from their gendered roles, such as when they cannot
provide for water in times of drought,130 they may also face the backlash
of domestic violence.131 The same applies for women who begin working
126. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1088.
127. Id. at 20. Mofya Phiri et al., The Impact of Climate Change on Women’s Health and
Safety, 6 LANCET PLANET HEALTH e303 (2022).
128. See Atapattu, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 200. These stressors
are not limited to the context of climate change. For example, during the COVID-19
pandemic, domestic violence rates also increased. Alex R. Piquero et al., Domestic Violence
During the COVID-19 Pandemic - Evidence from a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 74
J. CRIM. JUST. 101806 (2021).
129. Achinthi C. Vithanage, Addressing Correlations Between Gender-Based Violence
and Climate Change: An Expanded Role for International Climate Change Law and
Education for Sustainable Development, 38 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 328, 334 (2021) (arguing
that the increase in domestic violence during climate disasters also affects the Global North).
Aadil Bashir & Misbah Rafiq,Dynamics of Domestic Violence in Kashmir: An Interplay of
Multiple Factors, 17ASIAN SOC WRK & POL REV216, 2-3 (2023) (also drawing
attention to other risk factors, including alcohol consumption, financial disparities, etc.).
Amiera Sawas et al., Reflections on Gender, Climate, and Security Linkages
in Urban Pakistan, in GENDER, CLIMATE AND SECURITY, SUSTAINING INCLUSIVE PEACE
ON THE FRONTLINES OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 36 (2020),
https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/
Publications/2020/Gender-climate-and-security-en.pdf (last accessed, Aug. 2, 2024).
Another example concerns droughts in Kenya, which exacerbate existing domestic
violence, ultimately forcing women to flee their homes. Nichole Sobecki, From Drought to
Floods, Climate Crisis After Crisis Keeps Women on Edge in East Africa, THE FULLER
PROJECT (Feb. 14, 2023).
130. In times of droughts, they must walk longer distances to fetch water, where they are
already exposed to sexual violence and health risks from polluted water. Atapattu, supra note
Error: Reference source not found, at 200.
131. Vithanage, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 333. See also
International Federation of Red Cross & and Red Crescent Societies, Unseen, Unheard:
Gender-Based Violence in Disasters (2015). See Reem Alsalem, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls, Its Causes and Consequences, Violence
Against Women and Girls in the Context of the Climate Crisis, Including Environmental
Degradation and Related Disaster Risk Mitigation and Response, UN Doc. A/77/136, ¶ 35
(July 11, 2022). Shreya Atrey, The Inequality of Climate Change and the Difference It Makes,
in FEMINIST FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE JUSTICE 21 (Cathi Albertyn et al. eds., 2023). Warren,

26 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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outside their homes to help secure income, thereby challenging men’s
roles as providers, and causing them to “feel[…] emasculation.”132 For
example, women in drought-affected areas of Australia have taken
charge of household finances, which has correlated with higher domestic
violence rates.133 Climate change thus likely increases the risk of women
being killed in contexts of domestic violence.134
International human rights law, through elaboration by U.N.
treaty bodies such as the CEDAW Committee, has explicitly recognized
that disasters increase the risk of violence against women. For example,
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 37 considers that women and
girls are at risk of domestic violence in times of disasters stemming from
prevalent impunity and risk exposure due to their gendered roles in
securing food.135 As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women and Girls noted, women are particularly at risk from domestic
violence shortly after climate disasters due to community ties, with girls
being particularly at risk of “sexual abuse, incest and early
pregnancy.”136 From this vantage point, an ecofeminist approach
underpins the proposal of applying the same human rights approach to
domestic violence and climate risks.
The correlation between the risks of violence against women and
nature justifies consideration of domestic violence jurisprudence in the
work of human rights adjudicators in climate cases. Domestic violence is
a systemic issue that goes beyond the family unit in which it occurs.137
Yet international human rights law, which is traditionally concerned
with risks created by state actors, has only recently started to consider
private actor risks such as domestic violence.138 As with systemic
domestic violence risks, which are rooted in unequal power relations,
Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 7.
132 Reem Alsalem, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and
Girls, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 36.
133. Id.
134. Phiri et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at e303 (climate change
deepens existing domestic violence, which results in higher mortality risks).
135. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 37, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, ¶ 5.
136. Reem Alsalem, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and
Girls, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 35. Shreya Atrey, The Inequality of
Climate Change and the Difference It Makes, in FEMINIST FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE JUSTICE 21
(Cathi Albertyn et al. eds., 2023). Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, at 7.
137. Meyersfeld, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 102.
138. Hefti, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 8.

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climate change concerns structural risks139 that have only just started to
enter the realm of human rights law.140 Climate risks cannot be attributed
to one state actor, as GHG emissions from any state can have effects
across the world over a period of many years.141 GHG emissions also
emanate from the activities of corporations and private individuals.142
Climate risks created by various state and non-state actors—in tandem or
independently—concern states’ duties to protect people from threats to
their right to life.143 A reinterpretation of the right to life to address these
risks can thus counteract climate risks to life for disadvantaged
individuals and could save lives.
Having outlined the theoretical framework to make the right to
life more responsive to women and girls’ climate-related plight, the next
part lays the groundwork for applying the ecofeminist approach to
climate risks in practice by examining how international adjudicators
interpret imminence in the context of domestic violence risks.
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RISKS
This part introduces the human rights responses to domestic
violence risks and highlights their recurring nature, which
disproportionately impacts women and girls. This article focuses
primarily on the ECtHR’s response to domestic violence, but also draws
on the CEDAW Committee’s work due to its expertise on gender-based
discrimination. The ECtHR has extensive expertise with domestic
violence cases compared to other human rights bodies.144 It has
139. Corina Heri, Climate Change before the European Court of Human Rights:
Capturing Risk, Ill-Treatment and Vulnerability, 33 EUR. J. INT’L L. 925, 928 (2022).
140. For example through the ECtHR and the HRC’s first cases on climate change. Billy,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 8.7, Teitiota, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, and Verein KlimaSeniorinnen supra note Error: Reference source not found.
141. See also Lazarus, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 73-80 (explaining
the time between cause and effect in the context of environmental law).
142. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 9-14.
Lazarus, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 29 (showing that many contributing
activities make it challenging to disentangle the contributors and origins of climate harm).
143. See De Schutter, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 427.
144. The Inter-American system has considered domestic violence cases, but mainly
focused on procedural violations, such as effective investigations in these cases. Maria da
Penha v. Brazil, Inter-American Commission Case 12.051, Report No 54/01 ¶¶ 41 and 177
(16 April 2001) and Barbosa de Souza et al. v. Brazil, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 435, (Sept. 7, 2021). An exception is Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. the United
States, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Case 12.626, Report No 80/11 ¶ 170
(July 21, 2011) (ruling that the United States had violated the right to life of children who had

28 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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developed a nuanced approach to the imminence standard in domestic
violence cases, recognizing that these incidents often unfold and recur
over extended periods, which justifies transposing the imminence test as
applied in domestic violence contexts to climate risks. Notably, the
ECtHR in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen already affirmed that climate risks
increase and recur, similar to its approach in Kurt v. Austria, its
landmark domestic violence case.145 This makes the consideration of
domestic violence risk standards particularly relevant and
implementable.
Some may wonder why the focus is not on broader gender-based
violence that disproportionately affects women and girls. International
law does recognize gender-based violence as a human rights issue, as
acknowledged by the CEDAW Committee and regional women’s rights
treaties.146 However, it currently lacks a framework for addressing
widespread gender-based harm, instead emphasizing individualized
harm. For example, while the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(“IACtHR”) has pioneered human rights responses to femicide—where
unidentified perpetrators abduct, rape, and typically kill a woman or girl
with impunity147—it has overlooked the structural risks to their lives in
examining states preventive obligations. While it has asked states to
swiftly search for a missing woman,148 it has not considered the wider
context of gender-based violence in requiring states to protect women’s
lives.149 As Ebert and Sinjienski contend, the imminence standard does
not respond to structural risks of violence, such as those created by
been shot by their father in a domestic violence context). Lenahan is a landmark case and one
of the first cases on domestic violence that likely inspired future case law, including the
European approach to domestic violence.
145. The Court in both KlimaSeniorinnen and Kurt referred to the increase in frequence
and intensity over time of these risks. Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶
175. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 513.
146. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 35, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, ¶¶ 10, 15 UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35 (July 26, 2017) (explaining that gender-based
violence perpetuates discrimination against women and girls and acknowledging the link
between the right to life and women’s right to be free from gender-based violence).
147. Hefti, Conceptualizing Femicide, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 21.
148. Veliz Franco, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 146. See also the
IACtHR’s landmark case: Cotton Field Case, supra note Error: Reference source not found,
¶¶ 282-283 (concerning the femicides of women and girls in Mexico).
149. Thus, the IACtHR has consistently ruled that a known context of femicide does not
create an imminent risk to the lives of women and girls. González et al. v. Mexico (Cotton
Field Case), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 282-283 (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).

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sexism.150 It is therefore necessary to consider individual instances of
gender-based harm, such as domestic violence cases, to draw an effective
analogy.
This article therefore proposes to reinterpret the imminence
requirement to respond to the dynamics of structural climate risks to life
by drawing on human rights responses to domestic violence. In domestic
violence jurisprudence, the imminence standard accounts for the
recurring and seemingly unpredictable nature of threats posed by non-
state actors, such as (ex-)partners.151 A similarly detailed and nuanced
risk assessment can be applied to examining whether climate risks to life
are imminent. The next section explores the dynamics of domestic
violence, which will be crucial as I apply the ecofeminist approach in
Part V.
A. Risk Dynamics
Domestic violence takes various forms around the world. It is
not caused by the same factors everywhere, ranging from physical to
economic and psychological abuse. Today, it is recognized as an
international human rights violation.152 The Council of Europe
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (“Istanbul Convention”) is the only international
treaty that maintains domestic violence as a central focus.153
The Istanbul Convention is binding on the European Union
(“EU”) in addition to seven other states,154 and has therefore provided a
150. Ebert & Sijniensky, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 363.
151 See e.g., Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found.
152. McQuigg, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1009. LAURA FINLEY,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ABUSE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK , 4 (2020). Meyersfeld, supra
note Error: Reference source not found, at 2-3. See for an early proposal of recognizing
domestic violence as a human rights issue: Thomas & Beasley, supra note Error: Reference
source not found. Domestic violence as torture: Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious
in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994).
See also UNGA, Relevance of the Prohibition of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the Context of Domestic Violence (12 July 2019) UN
Doc A/74/148. UN GAOR, Relevance of the Prohibition of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the Context of Domestic Violence, UN Doc.
A/74/148 (July 12, 2019). Domestic violence as a violation of the right to life: Talpis, supra
note Error: Reference source not found.
153. Art. 3b Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence
against Women and Domestic Violence (hereinafter Istanbul Convention) (adopted 7 April
2011, entered into force 1 August 2014). The two other regional human rights treaties relevant
to women’s rights protect more broadly against violence, with the Maputo Protocol including
a provision on domestic violence (Article 2b).
154. In total, 39 Council of Europe states have ratified the Istanbul Convention. Seven

30 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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strong basis for the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and recognition of the risk
dynamics of domestic violence.155 The Istanbul Convention defines
domestic violence as “all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or
economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit or
between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the
perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim.”156
While the Convention itself mandates that states carry out a risk
assessment, it remains silent on the risk dynamics of domestic violence.
The Explanatory Report to the Convention describes imminence in
domestic violence contexts as “any situations of domestic violence in
which harm is imminent or has already materialized and is likely to
happen again.”157 It further explains that “any risk assessment and risk
management [must] consider the probability of repeated violence,
notably deadly violence, and adequately assess the seriousness of the
situation.”158 The risk assessment adopted by the ECtHR fits squarely
with the common description of the “cycle of violence,” inherent in
domestic violence cases.159
The risk dynamics of domestic violence are complex since they
do not specify when and how the risk will materialize.160 Leonore
states who are not members of the European Union have ratified this treaty: Ukraine, North
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Georgia. Turkey
withdrew from the Convention on 1 July 2021. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Key facts about the
Istanbul Convention (last visited July 9, 2024). COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Chart of signatures and
ratifications of Treaty 210, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?
module=signatures-by-treaty&treatynum=210 (last visited July 9, 2024).
155. The Court noted in Talpis that “the specific nature of domestic violence as
recognised in the Preamble of the Istanbul Convention’ must be taken into account.” Talpis,
supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 13, 129. See also Kurt, supra note Error:
Reference source not found, ¶¶ 180, 179, 175 referring to Art. 52 of the Council of Europe,
Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence (Explanatory Report),
https://rm.coe.int/1680a48903 (last visited July 22, 2024) [hereinafter Istanbul Convention,
Explanatory Report].
156. Art. 3b Istanbul Convention. Article 2a Belém do Pará Convention defines domestic
violence similarly: “… occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other
interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same
residence with the woman, including, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse”; See also
Article 6 Maputo Protocol, supra note Error: Reference source not found, which does not
explicitly prohibit domestic violence, but understand violence against women as an
infringement of the right to life.
157. Article 52 Istanbul Convention, Explanatory Report, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, ¶ 265.
158. Id. ¶ 260.
159. LEONORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, 90-100 (3d ed. 2017).
160. It should be noted that risks may also play out differently. Women also fight back.

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Walker first described the “cycle of domestic violence” as a phenomenon
that explains how domestic violence risks play out over time.161
Typically, cycles of domestic violence start with an initial period of
tension often caused by external stressors, such as the loss of
employment and livelihood, followed by instances of violence, including
physical and mental abuse.162 The violent act is often followed by a
period of reconciliation, where the perpetrator apologizes, and calmer
periods, where the perpetrator justifies their behavior.163 Domestic
violence includes multiple episodes of violence over years which affect
women over time.164 For example, a slap or verbal abuse could
foreshadow a woman being killed in contexts of domestic violence, even
though it is unclear when and how this will materialize.165 Women often
struggle to leave abusive relationships,166 and even when they do leave,
the risk of domestic violence can persist or increase.167 Human rights
bodies have recognized this pattern of abuse implicitly in designing the
corresponding human rights responses.168
To address the risk dynamics of domestic violence, the ECtHR
has developed specific case law and acknowledged the structural context
in which domestic violence occurs.169 Accordingly, it has interpreted the
imminence standard “taking due account of the particular context of
domestic violence.”170 The ECtHR has also endorsed standardized risk
assessments to predict domestic violence risks,171 such as the Spousal
161. Walker, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 90-100. See also Dalton,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 46.
162. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE
155 (2d ed. 2023).
163. Walker, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 90-100.
164. See id. Stark, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 155 (identifying the
length of these abusive cycles to about seven years on average in a study).
165. Meyersfeld, supra note Error: Reference source not found,
166. Stark, supra note Error: Reference source not found, 148, 151, 194 (pointing to the
phenomenon of “learned helplessness” whereby women are unable to leave abusive
relationships because they feel helpless to change the situation; women usually develop
learned helplessness after they experience about two cycles of abuse).
167. Stark, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 147.
168. E.g., Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 122. See Meyersfeld,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 121-122.
169. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 177-202. (9 Mar.
2009).
170. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 122. See also Volodina v.
Russia, App. No. 41261/17, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 86 (9 July 2019); Luca v. Moldova, App.
No. 55351/17 Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 64 (17 Oct. 2023).
171. Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 191. See Dissenting Opinion

32 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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Assault Risk Assessment (“SARA”)172 and the Dynamic Risk Analysis
System (“DyriAs”).173 These tools evaluate risks based on specific
factors like the presence of children, gun possession, or sexual jealousy,
which indicate the potential for future domestic violence risks.174 Human
rights bodies have recognized that while domestic violence is primarily
aimed at the woman, her parents and children are often secondary
victims.175 Recognizing the cyclic nature of domestic violence risks
when establishing imminence could provide a potential framework for
climate litigation centered on the right to life.
B. Cyclical Risks
International human rights bodies, particularly the ECtHR and
the CEDAW Committee, have adjudicated the cyclical risks in domestic
violence. For example, the CEDAW Committee in V.C. v. Slovakia
recognized the ongoing nature of domestic violence. In V.C., a woman
with a disability, V.C., had reported domestic violence to the police
many times, but law enforcement authorities remained inactive. As she
tried to divorce the perpetrator, he attacked V.C. and left her paralyzed,
later to die from her injuries.176 The CEDAW Committee considered that
“the police should have recognized the risk of continued violence against
V.C.,” and found a violation of her right to equal protection before the
of Judges Turkovic, Lemmens, Harutyunyan, Elósegui, Felici, Pavli, and Yüksel, ¶ 10
(critiquing this approach).
172. SARA, Spousal Risk Assessment Guide, https://downloads.mhs.com/saRA/SARA
_TechBrochure.pdf. (last visited July 12, 2024).
173. Dyrias, https:// www.dyrias.com/en/module/intimate-partners.htm; SARA, Spousal
Risk Assessment Guide, https://downloads.mhs.com/saRA/SARA _TechBrochure.pdf (last
visited July 12, 2024).
174. N. Zoe Hilton et al., An Indepth Actuarial Assessment for Wife Assault Recidivism:
The Domestic Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, 32 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 150, 150
(2008).
175. Children: Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 163; parents: Opuz,
supra note Error: Reference source not found. See also CEDAW Committee, Angela Gonzalez
Carreño v. Spain, Comm. No 47/2012, UN Doc. CEDAW/ C/58/D/47/2012 ¶¶ 2.4-2.7 (July
16, 2014) (the petitioner had left her abusive husband who had threatened to kill her. Her ex-
husband killed their young daughter and committed suicide. The CEDAW Committee held
Spain responsible for its failure to prevent gender-based violence against the petitioner’s
daughter). Lenahan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 164-165, 170. (The
Inter-American Commission in Lenahan concerning the murder of the claimant’s daughters in
a context of domestic violence also considered that the authorities had not only failed to
protect the claimant but also her three daughters from her ex-husband).
176. CEDAW Committee, V. C. v. Republic of Moldova, Comm. No. 105/2016, UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/76/D/105/2016 ¶¶ 2.2-2.7 (August 26, 2020).

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law,177 indicating that the cyclical dynamics of domestic violence play a
role in the assessment of imminence.178
The ECtHR developed clear standards for what counts as an
imminent threat in cases of domestic violence. In the case of Talpis v.
Italy, the claimant reported her husband, who had beaten her for years, to
the police multiple times.179 Although the police intervened each time,
they never issued protection orders and only took her testimony seven
months after she first reported the violence.180 On the night of the most
severe attack, the police stopped her drunk husband, but let him go.181
Later that night, he attacked her with a kitchen knife, killing their son
who tried to protect her. The claimant was badly injured, but survived.182
The ECtHR considered that even though she survived, her right to life
was violated since the authorities failed to assess the risk and act quickly
to prevent the danger.183 By failing to act, the authorities had “create[d] a
situation of impunity conducive to the recurrence of [the perpetrator]’s
acts of violence against his wife and family.”184 Given the recurring risks
of domestic violence and the authorities’ knowledge of the risk,185 they
could have anticipated her attempted murder.186 The Court held that even
177. Id. 7.11.
178. The ECtHR’s most recent case law on domestic violence also supports this in A.E. v.
Bulgaria, App. No. 53891/20, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 86, 100 (23 May 2023). In A.E. v.
Bulgaria, Bulgaria’s legislation mandated police intervention only after repeated acts of
domestic violence. The Court rejected Bulgaria’s excessively narrow definition of domestic
violence, which required 2 years of cohabitation, repeated harm and a high threshold, as
incompatible with the dynamics of domestic violence. See Luca, supra note Error: Reference
source not found ¶ 69 (holding that the fact that the applicant was not attacked again after the
first time she reported an incident of domestic violence, did not justify the authorities’ inaction
and therefore violated her human rights). See also Volodina, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, at ¶ 81.
179. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 6-48 (violence against her
allegedly begun right after their marriage in the 1990s). The claimant and her daughter had
required medical attention because of the injuries they sustained, as evidenced by a police
report. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
180. Id. ¶¶ 113.
181. Id. ¶ 41.
182. Id. ¶¶ 36-42.
183. Id. ¶ 110. The claimant who had temporarily fled to a domestic violence shelter “was
living in fear” due to constant threats from the perpetrator.
184. Id.
185. Id. ¶¶ 119-122 (the authorities ‘should have known’ about the risks to the applicants’
lives, and the ‘imminent materialisation [of the risk to life] could not [have been] excluded.’).
186. Id. Similarly, in Volodina v. Russia, which involved harassment and stalking over
two years by her ex-partner, the Court held that the authorities’ response was ‘‘manifestly
inadequate’ as they had allowed the perpetrator to act ‘without hindrance and with impunity.’
The Court emphasized that the risk was real and immediate because the domestic violence risk

34 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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though she remained alive, she found herself in a life-threatening
situation, which violated her right to life.187 Recognizing that threats to
life violate this right is relevant in climate contexts, such as slow-onset
effects that are known to cause health impacts today, and threaten
people’s lives later.188
The ECtHR’s leading case, Kurt v. Austria, further developed
the standards on cyclical risks.189 In that case, the claimant endured years
of violence. In response to her complaints, the authorities conducted a
thorough risk assessment,190 initiated criminal proceedings and issued
protection orders for her home and her parents’ home. However, the
protection orders did not cover their children’s school.191 Her husband
went to the school, where he asked to speak with his son. He shot and
killed his son in the school’s basement before committing suicide.192 The
Court rejected her claim that the authorities should have ordered pre-trial
detention. In this case, the authorities had properly assessed the domestic
violence risk and understood its dynamics.193 The Court reiterated that
domestic violence risks involve “consecutive cycles,” and
“recurrence,”194 informing the concept of imminence.195 It further
explained that the imminence of domestic violence risks must be
understood as “increase[ing] in frequency, intensity and danger over
time.”196 This interpretation of imminence could similarly support the
recognition of recurring climate risks as discussed below.
was not limited to a one-time incident, the police knew or ought to have known about the
harm through her repeated reports (six times in total) for physical abuse and death threats as
well as the medical evidence. Volodina, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at ¶¶ 87 and 90.
187. Id. ¶ 108.
188. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found.
189. Hefti, Conceptualizing Femicide, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 269, 284.
190. Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 27.
191. Id. ¶¶ 27-30.
192. Id. ¶¶ 35-39.
193. Id. ¶ 206.
194. Id. ¶164.
195. Id. ¶ 175.
196. Id. ¶ 175 referring to Istanbul Convention, Explanatory Report, supra note Error:
Reference source not found (explaining that immediacy ‘refers to any situations of domestic
violence in which harm is imminent or has already materialised and is likely to happen
again’).

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C. Differential Impact
Domestic violence risks particularly affect women and girls,197
but do not manifest uniformly for every woman.198 Intersectional risks—
comprising factors such as race, class, age, gender, and other inequities
—render certain women more vulnerable to domestic violence.199 For
example, a white woman in Europe may be able to report violence to the
police, whereas an immigrant women may face racism and other barriers
in getting help from the authorities. Although the ECtHR has
emphasized the risks women and girls face, it has yet to fully recognize
the intersectional impact of domestic violence.200 Nevertheless, the
ECtHR has acknowledged the differential impact of domestic violence
by: (1) classifying the claimants into a category of “vulnerable
individuals;”201 and/or, (2) recognizing that domestic violence raises
issues of equal protection before the law.202
The ECtHR classifies victims of domestic violence as
“vulnerable individuals,” and mandates strict proactive due diligence
obligations on states.203 In particular, it recognizes that women and
children are especially at risk, tying their vulnerability to a history of
past abuse.204 For example, the Court in A.E. v. Bulgaria recognized the
vulnerabilities of a 15-year-old girl who was living in a situation of
domestic violence as incompatible with the state’s duty to respond to
violence against children.205 To identify the victims of domestic
violence, the Court clarified in Kurt v. Austria that authorities should
197. Volodina, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 71. A.E., supra note
Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 85.
198. Finley, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 4.
199. Id. at 10.
200. The ECtHR has recognized intersectionality implicitly in cases unrelated to
domestic violence, for example in B.S. v. Spain, App. No. 47159/08, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(July 24, 2012) (recognizing gender and race as aspect in the ill-treatment the applicant, a
Nigerian sex worker endured on the hands of the police) and Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais
v. Portugal, App. No. 17484/15, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 25, 2017) (recognizing
stereotypes based on age and gender of a fifty-year old woman). Hefti, Intersectional Victims,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 8.
201 E.g., Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 99.
202 E.g., Opuz, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶¶ 177-202.
203. Luca, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 62; Talpis, supra note Error:
Reference source not found ¶ 99; Opuz, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 72-
86, 159; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 64-65,
(12 Jun. 2008); Hajduová v. Slovakia, App. No. 2660/03, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶ 46 (30
Nov. 2010).
204. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 126.
205. A.E., A.E., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at ¶ 98.

36 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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perform a risk assessment that is “autonomous,” “proactive,” and
“comprehensive.”206 Hence, the Court does recognize the
disproportionate impact of domestic violence and is careful to identify
those at risk. Because those classified as “vulnerable” face serious risks,
the Court mandates that states respond “immediately” and with “special
diligence,”207 to domestic violence.208 Notably, the IACtHR has
recognized a “strict due diligence” obligation for states to investigate
and rescue missing women in the context of femicide. In Veliz Franco v.
Guatemala, involving the femicide of a fifteen-year-old girl, the IACtHR
emphasized that authorities should have promptly searched for her given
her status as a girl and a child.209 This demonstrates that the due
diligence standard can be heightened in cases of intersectional harm.
Thus, states’ duties to actively work to prevent violence against women
and girls could similarly be applied in climate cases concerning groups
most at risk.
The Court has also framed domestic violence as an issue of
equal protection before the law, linking the prohibition of discrimination
(Article 14 ECHR) with that of ill-treatment (Article 3 ECHR)210 or in
connection with the right to life (Article 2 ECHR).211 Article 14 ECHR
protects people from discrimination based on various grounds, such as
sex.212 Importantly, human rights law also prohibits discrimination based
206. Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 190.
207. Luca, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 65; A.E., A.E., supra note
Error: Reference source not found, at ¶ 88. Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, ¶¶ 165-166.
208. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 129. The IACtHR has also
firmly established the requirement for states to act swiftly in femicide cases. The IACtHR has
recognized a “strict due diligence” obligation for states to investigate and rescue missing
women in the context of femicide. Cotton Field Case, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, ¶¶ 283-28. The IACtHR grounds this due diligence obligation in Article 7(b) Belém do
Pará Convention (the obligation to eradicate violence against women). Miguel Castro-Castro
Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160 (Nov. 26, 2006) ¶¶ 344–346 and 378
(establishing the obligation to act with due diligence based on Article 3b Belem do Para
Convention).
209. Veliz Franco, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 133-134.
210. The ECtHR has only since 2023 started to apply this framing more consistently.
Ronagh McQuigg, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on
Domestic Abuse: A.E: v. Bulgaria, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (June 27, 2023). Luca, supra
note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 103; A.E., supra note Error: Reference source not
found, ¶ 116. See also Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 126.
211. An early example is the ECtHR’s landmark case Opuz v. Turkey. Opuz, supra note
Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 177-202.
212. Article 14 is not an independent provision and must be invoked together with
another human right. However, it is not required that the other human right is violated. Carson

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on unequal impacts, such as the disproportionate effects of school
segregation on children of Roma origin.213 Article 14 ECHR covers
situations where a neutral policy disproportionately affects a particular
group, even if it is unintentional.214 Claimants must provide evidence
showing unequal treatment. If they do, the government must then justify
the difference in treatment.215 For example, in Talpis v. Italy, the Court
accepted the disproportionate impact of domestic violence on women
based on statistical data, and considered that “the socio-cultural attitudes
of tolerance of domestic violence persist.”216 It also took into account the
authorities’ inaction over months, which fueled the impunity of the
perpetrator.217 Similarly, in A.E., the Court observed that domestic
violence rates in Bulgaria were among the highest in the European
Union.218 The framing of domestic violence as an issue of equal
protection before the law ideally recognizes the differential impacts of
domestic violence and could be employed in climate cases as well.
Like domestic violence risks, climate risks already result in harm
today, such as the destruction of property or health effects on Pacific
Islands, which could point to future risks. Both risks disproportionately
impact disadvantaged population groups. By acknowledging the nature
of risks in domestic violence, the ECtHR sets a precedent that can be
mapped onto the imminence standard in climate cases. Adapting the
ecofeminist approach to climate risks can ensure the protection of those
most at risk from climate-induced hazards through comprehensive
anticipatory adaptation measures.
IV. ADDRESSING CLIMATE RISKS
As the previous section has shown, human rights bodies
recognize that domestic violence risks are cyclical and differential in
impact. International adjudicators should apply a similar approach when
examining imminence in the context of climate risks to life, considering
that broad analogies can be drawn between the risk dynamics and
and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42184/05, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63 (March 16,
2010).
213. D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], App. No. 57325/00, Judgment, Eur.
Ct. H.R.¶¶ 175-80 (November 13, 2007).
214. Id. ¶¶ 175-80.
215. Id. ¶175. Opuz, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 199-202.
216. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 145.
217. Id. ¶¶ 144-149.
218. A.E., A.E., supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 119.

38 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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disproportionate impacts women face from climate change. Climate
risks, like those of domestic violence, raise potential issues under the
right to life. The precise point at which these risks materialize cannot be
determined in either case. Insights from human rights responses to
domestic violence can help recognize climate-related risks to life and
guide changes in legal interpretation.
Human rights interpretations of imminence are particularly
nuanced in the sphere of domestic violence due to two aspects: (1) the
recurring and potential escalation of these risks; and (2) the need to
recognize discrete at-risk groups. These two aspects could be used as a
model for responding to imminent climate risks.
A. Recurring Risks
Like the cyclical nature of risks associated with domestic
violence, climate risks, such as extreme heat, sea-level rises, and
wildfires, are also recurring and escalating. This is extensively
documented through statistical data and research found in IPCC
reports.219 The ECtHR has already indicated its willingness to understand
climate risks as recurring and increasing in nature, stating in Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen that “[climate risks] are most likely to increase in
frequency and gravity” over time.220 The Court uses similar language to
describe domestic violence risks. In its leading domestic violence case,
Kurt v. Austria, it found that domestic violence risks “increase in
frequency, intensity and danger over time.”221 This indicates that
transposing this aspect of imminence to climate risks is feasible. As risks
continue, an initial event—such as a heatwave in summer 2024 that
impacts elderly women’s health or destroys Indigenous Pacific Islanders’
property—can indicate future risks to life for marginalized or
disadvantaged populations. These incremental risks to life cannot be
predicted precisely on a temporal timeline. Climate risks like sea-level
rises tend to accumulate gradually, leading to health and subsistence
problems for marginalized groups, which could lead to death. Human
rights bodies should recognize that when a climate risk has already
materialized and resulted in a violation of human rights, such as the right
to culture or health, risks to life are likely to recur and should be
considered as imminent. For example, on the Pacific Island of Kiribati,
219. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 69.
See also Copernicus Climate Change Service, supra note Error: Reference source not found.
220. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 513.
221. Kurt, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 175.

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due to limited access to drinking water during droughts and poor
sanitation, children under five are at a higher risk of mortality.222 Human
rights courts should recognize that climate risks to life often encroach
slowly rather than instantly.
Like in domestic violence cases, human rights bodies should
require states to carry out a comprehensive and proactive risk assessment
that considers the likelihood of repeated harm for the individual
claimants.223 The fact that some climate harm has already occurred could
signal future risks of similar or elevated harm, particularly for
marginalized individuals. Like in domestic violence cases, human rights
courts could encourage states to use early warning systems to predict
climate-related disaster risks.224 Adjudicators could recommend that
states use risk assessment tools suited to local risks, such as extreme heat
and forest fires in Europe.225 These tools should be gender-responsive, or
be supplemented by policy frameworks like the “gender quality and
climate policy scorecard,” which tracks how states implement gender-
responsive climate action.226 An ecofeminist approach to climate risks
could prompt these avenues for reform, such as by mandating climate
risk assessment tools. By drawing comparisons to their pronouncements
on prevention tools in domestic violence contexts, human rights bodies
could enhance their approach in climate contexts. They should recognize
that climate risks that occur over time can result in untimely death later
on, particularly for disadvantaged groups, and violate the right to life.
222. UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Status Report 2019, DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI, https://www.undrr.org/media/47513/download?
startDownload=trueP. 6
223. Cf. Art. 51 of the Istanbul Convention, Explanatory Report, supra note Error:
Reference source not found: “It is therefore essential that any risk assessment and risk
management consider the probability of repeated violence, notably deadly violence, and
adequately assess the seriousness of the situation.”
224. E.g., World Bank Group, Climate and Disaster Risk Screening Tools,
https://climatescreeningtools.worldbank.org/ (last accessed, July 29, 2024). For example, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has developed a climate resilience evaluation and
awareness tool (CREAT) to assess climate-related water risks. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Climate Resilience Evaluation and Awareness Tool,
https://www.epa.gov/crwu/climate-resilience-evaluation-and-awareness-tool (last accessed,
July 29, 2024).
225. Copernicus Climate Change Service, supra note Error: Reference source not
found, at 9-10.
226. 46. UN Women is developing a tool to track the integration of gender equality in
climate policies. UN Women, Feminist Climate Justice: A Framework for Action (2023),
https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2023/11/feminist-climate-justice-a-
framework-for-action.

40 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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B. Disparate Impact
Like domestic violence, which disproportionately affects women
and girls, climate-related risks are not distributed equally.227 As outlined
in the context of domestic violence, women and girls are particularly at
risk of climate effects due to their gendered roles.228 However, other
groups also experience disproportionate climate effects. For example,
Indigenous Peoples often depend on the very resources that climate risks
—such as wildfires and saltwater inundation—threaten to destroy.229
Historical patterns of exclusion and marginalization have left some
groups without access to healthcare, financial, and other resources,
which are essential for recovering from climate disasters.230 While the
ecofeminist approach focuses on the unequal impact of climate change
on women, it also addresses inequalities faced by other at-risk groups
more broadly.231
The disproportionate harm disadvantaged groups face from
climate effects should inform the imminence requirement.232 As with
domestic violence cases, human rights bodies should define who is
particularly at risk from climate effects. However, while women are
often categorized as a group in the domestic violence context—although
they are not a homogenous group either—this categorization presents a
challenge in climate cases where many different people and groups are at
risk of climate change. To ascertain disparate impacts, claimants could
invoke statistics on the disproportionate harm they face as marginalized
or disadvantaged individuals. For example, in domestic violence cases,
the ECtHR recognizes reports and statistical data as evidence of
227. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1372,
1715. Atrey, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 17.
228. Atapattu, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 200.
229. Nathalie J. Chalifour, Equity Considerations in Loss and Damage, RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND LOSS & DAMAGE 18, 28–29 (2021).
230 For example, access to healthcare for Black women in the United
States after a climate disaster may be impaired because of historical
marginalization. Hefti, van Kolfschooten & Ossom, supra note Error: Reference source
not found, at 359, referring to Juanita Chinn, Iman Martin & Nicole
Redmond, Health Equity among Black Women in the United States, 30 J.
WOMEN’S HEALTH 212, 213 (2021).
231. See Warren, Taking Empirical Data Seriously, supra note Error: Reference source
not found, at 4.
232. For example, the ECtHR in KlimaSeniorinnen did not recognize that the
disproportionate impact of extreme heat on women and girls violated their human rights. In
contrast, it attributed this to physiological differences Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note
Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 509.

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widespread risks of domestic violence.233 In addition to showing an
increased mortality risk, claimants should demonstrate an individualized
climate risk. This aligns with human rights courts’ concerns with
narrowing down the group at risk from climate claims who are able to
bring a case before them.234 There are two ways of defining the at-risk
group. Claimants could show that they experience health risks as a result
of their marginalized experience.235 For example, an elderly woman who
is statistically more at risk from heat-related morbidity, such as with a
heart problem, is also more likely to be at risk of losing her life during
future heatwaves. Alternatively, claimants could show that they
experience compounded risks as a result of their intersectional
experience with climate harm. Intersectionality is particularly effective
in describing the compounded risks people face based on race, gender,
and other factors.236 Black women, Indigenous women, women of color,
women with disabilities, and elderly women face greater lethal risks
from climate change.237 For example, an Indigenous woman with a
disability would be particularly at risk of mortality in a tropical storm.
Human rights bodies should recognize that existing inequities deepen
during climate disasters, placing marginalized groups at heightened
risk.238
233. Opuz, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 193 and 202 (violating the
prohibition of discrimination and the right to life jointly). In environmental cases, the ECtHR
also recognizes statistical data as evidence of structural public health risks Keller and Heri,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 12 referring to Di Sarno v. Italy, App. No.
30765/08, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 108-110 (January 10, 2012).
234. KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶¶ 509-511 (the
ECtHR considered that membership to a group by itself is insufficient to show concrete
climate harm on the claimant).
235. Hefti, van Kolfschooten & Ossom, supra note Error: Reference source not found
(proposing a health-centric intersectional approach to climate litigation).
236. Hefti, Intersectional Victims, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2-3
(proposing intersectionality as a way to meet legal standing requirements in climate cases).
237. Juanita J. Chinn, Iman K. Martin, and Nicole Redmond, Health Equity Among Black
Women in the United States, J. OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, 212, 30:2 (2021) (explaining the
structural conditions that create higher chronic conditions in Black women as a result of their
race and gender). See also Atrey, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 18. Taylor,
supra note 87, at 63-64.
238. James A. Goldston, Climate Litigation through an Equality Lens, LITIGATING THE
CLIMATE EMERGENCY 133 (César Rodríguez Garavito, ed., 2022). See “I Can’t Cool”:
Extreme Heat and Human Rights in the Context of Climate Change, CLIMATE RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL 7, https://cri.org/reports/i-cant-cool/ (last visited Jun 7, 2024). See Joanna
Burke Martignoni, Intersectionalities, Human Rights, and Climate Change: Emerging
Linkages in the Practice of the UN Human Rights Monitoring System in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 398, 401 (Sébastien Duyck,
Sébastien Jodoin & Alyssa Johl eds., 2018) (noting that intersectionality describes inequality

42 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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When human rights courts recognize disproportionate climate
impacts in the interpretation of imminence, they would likely conclude
that states must act with due diligence to prevent this harm. For example,
the CRC viewed children as especially vulnerable to climate impacts,
declaring that “states have heightened obligations to protect children
from foreseeable harm.”239 It noted that climate change “has a
discriminatory effect on certain groups of children, especially Indigenous
children, children belonging to minority groups, children with
disabilities and children living in disaster-prone or climate-vulnerable
environments.”240 Therefore, identifying the at-risk group could enhance
a state’s due obligations to take proactive measures to prevent the loss of
life.
as a dynamic issue).
239. Sacchi, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 10.13. (22 Sep. 2021).
240. CRC, General Comment No. 26, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 14.

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C. International Implementation
International adjudicators could apply an ecofeminist approach
to climate risks from a pragmatic perspective. As discussed above, the
ECtHR’s response to when domestic violence risks violate the right to
life is particularly well articulated.241 Similarly, courts could use this
approach to examine when state inaction in climate contexts violates the
right to life. Of course, the successful implementation of the ecofeminist
approach depends on how effectively claimants can demonstrate the
relevance of transposing domestic violence case law to climate risks.242
For example, Footnote 106 of the September 2020 KlimaSeniorinnen
application to the ECtHR referred to the domestic violence case Talpis v.
Italy in relation to the imminence standard.243 Claimants would need to
draw more explicit comparisons to make clear claims about how climate
risks parallel those in domestic violence contexts. International
adjudicators are able to transpose the imminence standard from domestic
violence contexts to climate risks.244 Human rights courts can address the
present-day realities of human rights violations associated with climate
change.245 For example, the ECtHR has reiterated that the Convention is
a “living instrument” that evolves and adapts to current circumstances,246
interpreting the Convention “in a manner which gives practical and
241. Talpis, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 122. Bizdiga v. The Republic
of Moldova, Appl. No. 15646/18, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (October 17, 2023).
242. Human rights bodies are not prone to using theoretical concepts like vulnerability
and ecofeminism. They rely on the arguments made by the parties and may apply these
concepts without explicitly mentioning them, such as in B.S. v. Spain, supra note Error:
Reference source not found. They may also follow some of the underlining reasoning of these
theories, such as in the case of Martha Fineman’s concept of vulnerability, they usually do so
implicitly. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition Essay, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
243. KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland and Request under Rule 41 (priority) supra note
Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 54 referring to Talpis, supra note Error: Reference
source not found, ¶ 122.
244. Notably, the ECtHR first applied the imminence standard in Osman v. United
Kingdom concerning lethal risk and later transposed it to domestic violence contexts. In line
with the principle iura novit curia, human rights courts like the ECtHR can apply relevant
human rights standards to a specific factual situation. S.M. v. Croatia, App. No. 60561/14,
Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 218 (June 25, 2020).
245. Heri, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 939. The Court has already
pursued an evolutive approach, considering the “urgency of climate change” and its “special
features” in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference
source not found ¶¶ 440, 567.
246. Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC] App. No. 34503/97, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶
140-146 (November 12, 2008).

44 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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effective protection to human rights.”247 As Corina Heri notes, “the
meaning and role of human rights is undermined if their application ends
where they begin to trouble the status quo.”248 The door is therefore wide
open for the Court to adjudicate climate-related risks to life on par with
domestic violence risks.
Several procedural obstacles, which often overlap with
substantive claims, such as the requirement to establish legal standing,
can also bar the examination of imminence in right to life cases.249 For
example, in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, the ECtHR held that the
individual claims of the elderly women were inadmissible for lack of
standing,250 thereby missing the opportunity to decide their claims on
climate-related risks to the right to life.251 The ECtHR has established a
high standard for individuals to demonstrate standing in climate cases.252
Nevertheless, the ecofeminist approach to climate risks could likely
overcome some of these challenges, since it provides a comprehensive,
yet narrow approach to imminence—identifying the recurrence of
climate risks and the disproportionate harm as key factors. Another
aspect of imminence in climate cases should be “physical proximity to
the threat,” as the ECtHR affirmed in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen.253 This
aspect ensures that only climate-related harm that can be geographically
linked to claimants, such as those living in areas at risk of flooding,
would be considered in determining risk. Moreover, particularly in the
European context, a pilot judgment procedure, which addresses
structural issues that would otherwise overwhelm the Court, allows for
swift adjudication of repetitive issues.254
To apply the ecofeminist approach to climate risks, human rights
bodies should view the right to life through an inequality lens, or identify
247. Id. ¶ 146.
248. Heri, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 928.
249. Other hurdles to climate litigation include extraterritoriality of a global claim like
climate change and the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, as evidenced by the
ECtHR’s Duarte Agostinho case. Duarte Agostinho, supra note Error: Reference source not
found.
250. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note Error: Reference source not found ¶ 521.
251. Id. ¶¶ 50-54. This can be explained by the fact that Verein KlimaSeniorinnen was
brought by four elderly women above 75 years and by an association composed of 2000
elderly women. The Court had only granted standing to the association, which cannot rely on
the right to life in and of itself Id. ¶ 473.
252. Claimants must show that they experience a “high intensity of exposure” and require
“special need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection,” particularly high hurdles, which
affects the applicant in “significant” ways. Id. ¶ 487.
253. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, supra note 1, ¶¶ 512-513.
254. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE 198 (2010).

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claimants as “vulnerable individuals.”255 Claimants could show that they
already experience climate effects, for example through impacts on
health and private life, as well as property, to determine the recurring
nature of climate risks. To determine the disparate impact of climate
change, human rights bodies should consider statistics and ICCPR
reports when identifying at-risk groups.256 An individualized risk can be
discerned either through climate-related health problems or
intersectional impact to respond to the compounded risk at hand.257
Human rights bodies have begun to grapple with intersectionality but
have yet to explicitly recognize intersectional implications of human
rights violations.258 Hence, claimants would need to make relevant
claims explicit and provide strong statistical evidence and reports in
support of their intersectional claims. Human rights bodies could
recognize both the recurring risks and disparate climate impacts to
protect the right to life of groups particularly at risk of climate effects.
As with domestic violence cases, human rights bodies could impose
enhanced due diligence obligations on states to adopt anticipatory action.
An ecofeminist approach can provide the necessary framework to ensure
that states take proactive measures to prevent loss of life and provide
redress to those most at risk. Ultimately, the urgency of the climate
threat makes the protection of the right to life, which underpins all other
human rights, essential.
CONCLUSION
As climate change increasingly threatens lives, international law
must move beyond a narrow focus on short-term risks associated with
the imminence standard.259 This article made a novel argument by
255. This classification should not be understood to suggest that claimants are inherently
vulnerable. The ECtHR considers vulnerability in its jurisprudence on domestic violence as
well as in other contexts. A. Timmer et al., The Potential and Pitfalls of the Vulnerability
Concept for Human Rights, 39 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 190, 190-97 (2021) (considering the
ECtHR’s adoption of the term and its potential strengths and weaknesses).
256. IPCC, Climate Change 2022, supra note Error: Reference source not found, ¶ 69.
See also Copernicus Climate Change Service, supra note Error: Reference source not found.
257. Id. at 2-3.
258. Gauthier de Beco, Harnessing the Full Potential of Intersectionality Theory in
International Human Rights Law, Lessons from Disabled Children’s Right to Education, in
INTERSECTIONALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 38 (Shreya Atrey and Peter Dunne, 2020).
259. See Morrow, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 183 (arguing that
while international law is well placed to respond to climate change, it must change in order to
do so).

46 forthcoming Michigan Journal of International
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applying ecofeminism to climate risks to elucidate the connection
between climate-related risks and those of domestic violence. In doing
so, it has drawn attention to the intersectional risks climate change
creates for disadvantaged groups. The ecofeminist approach supports the
pragmatic proposal to adapt existing legal approaches to imminence
from domestic violence case law—principles that recognize recurring
harm and disproportionate impacts—to climate cases. International
adjudicators should recognize that past climate-related human rights
violations for disadvantaged groups are good indicators for determining
imminent risks to the right to life. At-risk groups can be identified
through health impacts or intersectional harm, coupled with physical
proximity to climate effects. The ecofeminist approach can be
operationalized by integrating the right to life with equal protection
before the law, and/or by classifying claimants as vulnerable individuals.
The application of the ecofeminist approach allows courts to extend right
to life protections to those most affected by climate change and to
require states to undertake enhanced anticipatory action to protect
women and girls from climate change impacts. The proposed framework
offers a robust strategy for human rights bodies to address the urgent and
evolving challenges posed by climate change. It is both practicable and
essential for safeguarding the right to life of at-risk populations in the
context of escalating climate threats.
Looking ahead, climate litigation offers an opportunity for courts
around the world to play a pivotal role in addressing climate change.
Since international litigation requires that claimants first bring their case
before the domestic courts claimants would need to raise the same
ecofeminist arguments before national courts. Even in the U.S., which is
not subject to the jurisdiction of a human rights court, the ecofeminist
approach to climate risks could inspire novel litigations strategies in
constitutional climate cases or other areas of law where claims on
climate risks are brought, such as torts or consumer protection litigation.
By adapting human rights responses from domestic violence to
the distinct dynamics of climate risks, both international and domestic
courts can protect the lives of women and girls as well as those of other
disadvantaged groups. In international climate litigation strategies, the
right to life must remain central because it has the potential to compel
states to prevent the individual loss of life and act before deadly climate
disasters strike. Litigation strategies should focus on how climate
disasters exacerbate climate risks for disadvantaged individuals in
localized contexts. They should focus on intersectional risks and/or
health related risks. For example, an elderly woman with a

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cardiovascular disease whose experience with domestic violence
worsens in times of climate disasters will be particularly at risk from
climate-related extreme heat. An ecofeminist approach to climate risks
could ensure her protection, and enable courts to respond to the
existential threat climate change poses.